Patna High Court acquits murder convict, directs DGP, Bihar to initiate departmental proceedings against Mahesh Kumar Rajak, Investigating Officer for keeping material lacuna in prosecution case by his "improper, lackadaisical, and indifferent investigation"

In Meghnath Choupal @ Medhnath Choupal Sharma vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Rana Vikram Singh delivered a 11-page long judgement dated June 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded: "....we are not in a position to concur with the finding of the Trial Court. 15. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. 16. The judgment and order of conviction dated 30th of May, 2018, and the order of sentence dated 31st of May, 2018, passed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Madhepura, are hereby set aside." It is apparent from the public record that Manmohan Sharan Lal was the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Madhepura at that time. 

Justice Chaudhuri authored the judgement. He observed:"2. Before we advert to the prosecution case, we are constrained to record that the instant appeal is a classic example of improper, lackadaisical, and indifferent investigation on the part of the Investigating Officer keeping material lacuna in the prosecution case." 

The case was filed in the High Court on June 21, 2018. It was registered on July 2, 2018. The allegation against the appellant was of having shot dead the son of the informant. The A.P.P., had submitted that there was political rivalry between the parties and the young son of the informant has been shot at point blank range by the appellant. It was submitted that the appellant also was accused in eleven other cases under grave sections of the Indian Penal Code as well as the Arms Act. Further, it was submitted that there is direct identification of the appellant as the main assailant.  The murder took place on July 22, 2014, in the Madhepura district when the victim was intercepted and fatally shot on his way home from a funeral.

Notably, in its order dated April 12, 2022, High Court's Division Bench of Justices Ashwani Kumar Singh and Rajeev Ranjan Prasad had recorded: "In paragraph ‘8’ of the show cause reply filed on behalf of the State, a statement has been made that the appellant is a veteran criminal and he has been chargesheeted in as many as 12 cases. The case numbers are provided in paragraph ‘8’. Let the State file a supplementary affidavit clearly stating the present stage of all the 12 cases. The appellant shall also file an affidavit giving the present stage of the cases. List this matter on 13th May, 2022." The order was authored by Justice Prasad. 

Justice Chaudhary's judgement does not seem to factor in the fact about 12 criminal antecedents of the appellant.   

In his 3-page long order dated July 14, 2022, High Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah  and Purnendu Singh had concluded:"6. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and taking into account the materials and evidence which have come during trial, the Court is not inclined to allow the prayer for suspension of sentence and release of the appellant-applicant on bail during the pendency of the appeal." The order was authored by Justice Amanullah. 

The criminal appeal was filed against an order of conviction and sentence passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court at Madhepura in a Sessions Trial of 2014 which arose out of Shankarpur P.S. Case of 2014 whereby and whereunder the Trial Judge by his judgement dated May 30, 2018 convicted the appellant for the offence under Sections 302/34 of the IPC read with Section 27 Arms Act and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment of life and also to pay fine of Rs. 50,000. For the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act, the appellant was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 1 year. The judgment and order of conviction and sentence are under challenge in the present appeal at the instance of the convict/appellant.

The prosecution case is that on July 22, 2014 at about 4:00 P.M., the informant, namely, Arvind Kumar @ Munnaji was returning to his house by a motorcycle after attending the last rites of his aunt. The son of the
informant was the pillion rider. While he was proceeding towards his house, he noticed near Chapariya Toll that some persons were following them on about four motorcycles. They crossed the motorcycle of the informant and registered them to proceed. The informant also stated that immediately thereafter, one Laltu Yadav and Birendra Choupal caught hold of him and placed a pistol beneath his ear. They instructed the informant not to raise any shout, failing which they would open fire at him. One Meghnand Choupal (the appellant), Bilash Mahto and Umesh Yadav caught hold of the son of the informant, namely, Anupam Ananad and Chandrahaas Choupal instructed them to bring Anupam to him. Chandrahaas was standing about 10 yards away on the western side from the place of occurrence. These named accused persons forcibly took away Anupam to Chandrahaas. When the informant requested Chandrahaas to release his son, the accused persons who caught hold of him assaulted him by fists and blows. At that time Chandrahaas told others that another vehicle is coming towards the place of occurrence. Hearing this, the motorcycle rider started their motorbike to proceed and on the instruction of Chandrahaas Choupal, Meghnad Choupal (the appellant) opened fire at the son of the complainant, touching pistol on his chest. All the accused persons then left the place of occurrence. The informant raised hue and cry and rushed towards his son, who was lying on the ground in pool of blood oozing out from his wound. The cousin brother of the informant, namely, Mantu Kumar and Rupesh Kumar were also present there. Subsequently, other relatives who went to attend the last ritual of the aunt of the informant appeared there and the injured was taken to Madhepura Hospital by a Scorpio Car. The Medical Officer examined him and declared him dead.

On the basis of the complaint, S.H.O. Shankarpur Police Station, namely, Mahesh Kumar Rajak took up the investigation by registering Shankarpur P.S. Case of 2014, dated July 23, 2014. It appeared from the Lower Court Record that the investigation of this case culminated in filing charge-sheet under Section 302/34 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant Meghnad Choupal and one Bilash Mahto. After filing of the charge-sheet, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions and subsequently it was transferred for trial and disposal to the Court of the ddl. Sessions Judge, 2nd at Madhepura. The prosecution examined all 8 witnesses, including the informant (P.W. 8), The Medical Officer, who conducted post-mortem (P.W. 6) and the Investigating Officer (P.W. 7). Amongst other witnesses, P.W. 2, Tarni Sharma, was declared hostile by the prosecution. Only P.W. 1 Subhash Yadav claimed to be the eye-witness of the occurrence and on the basis of his evidence, the Trial Court held the present appellant guilty for committing offence under Sections 302 IPC and 27 of the Arms Act and convicted and sentenced him accordingly. Other witnesses being P.W. 3 Rajendra Sah, who is a signatory to the seizure list. P.W. 4 Rupesh Kumar who is the cousin brother of the informant and he did not see the occurrence. P.W. 5 Rajesh Kumar is also a seizure list witness but so far as the incident is concerned, his evidence is in the nature of hearsay. P.W. 7 is the I.O. and P.W. 8 Arvind Kumar @ Munnaji is the informant of the case. 

On perusal of the LCR, the High Court found that the Trial Judge relied on the evidence of P.W. 1 alone and convicted the appellant on the ground that the Court can even hold an accused guilty on the basis of solitary evidence of one eye-witness only. In support of his contention, he referred to series of decisions, viz, Jarnail Singh & Ors vs. State of Punjab -2009 (9) SCC 719, Ramesh Krishna Madhusudan Nayar vs. State of Maharashtra-AIR 2008 SC 927, Ramji vs. State of Bihar-2007 (57) ACC 385 (SC), Syed Ibrahim vs. State of Andhra Pradesh-AIR 2006 SC 2908, Chaudhari Ramjibhai Narasangbhai vs. State of Gujarat & Ors.-2005 1 SCC 184 and Chhitar Lal vs. State Of Rajasthan-2003 6 SCC.

Justice Chaudhary observed:"At the foremost, we inclined to record that the informant who’s the author of the case did not support his case and did not utter even a single word against the appellant involving him in committing the offence. Surprisingly enough, the informant was not declared hostile by the prosecution. Therefore, his examination in-chief stands firm on the ground and when an incident took place in presence of the informant, the FIR was lodged by the informant as an eye-witness. His contrary evidence on dock suffers most. The Trial Court held that P.W. 1 Subhash Yadav is the eye-witness of the incident. However, Trial Court failed to consider the cross-examination of P.W. 1 when he stated that he saw the deceased in injured condition. He received his injury on his chest. Thus, if the examination-in-chief and the cross-examination of P.W. 1 are taken together for appreciation, a doubt arises as to whether P.W. 1 was present
at the place of occurrence before the deceased received injury or he appeared after the victim suffered gun-shot injury and was lying with blood oozing out from the wound. If we accept the version of P.W. 1 to be true during the cross-examination, then we find that P.W. 1 also reached the place of occurrence after the deceased received the gun-shot injury. 9. In view of such contradiction, we are not in a position to hold that the evidence of P.W. 1 is of sterling character." 

Justice Chaudhary drw on the Supreme Court's decision in Rai Sandeep @Deepu vs. State of NCT Of Delhi reported in 2012 (8) SCC 21, wherein, it described a sterling witness. It reads: "22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.”

The decision was subsequently followed in a judgement passed by the Supreme Court in Nirmal Premkumar & Anr. vs. State Rep. By Inspector of Police reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 260. 

Justice Chaudhary observed: "11. In view of the discrepancies pointed out, we are not in a position to hold that the P.W. 1 is a witness of sterling character and only on the basis of sole evidence of P.W. 1, the appellant could be convicted. There are series of lacunae in the prosecution case. During trial, the seizure list witness was not confronted with their signatures on the seizure list. Though they deposed but their signature on the seizure list was not marked exhibit. In his cross-examination, P.W. 5 stated that he put his signature on a blank paper under the instruction of the Investigating Officer. 12. There is no doubt that the victim of this case received gun-shot injury and succumbed to the said injury on the way to Madhepura Hospital." 

The judgement reads: "From the evidence of Investigating Officer, we find that he seized one motorcycle, one Samsung Mobile phone and an empty cartridge from the place of occurrence. Surprisingly enough, the ownership of the motorcycle was not asserted by the I.O. Had it been asserted at least this Court could have come to a conclusion as to whether any of the FIR named accused persons were present at the spot and left his motorcycle after the occurrence. Ownership of Samsung Mobile Phone was also not asserted. The empty cartridge was not sent to Forensic Laboratory to ascertain as to whether the said empty cartridge was used to commit murder of the son of the informant. These were primary duties of the I.O. for investigation of a case like this. It appears to us that either the I.O. did not know the basic principles of investigation or purposefully withheld the evidences which could have been brought during investigation to save the accused persons. 13. In our view, the process of the investigation by the I.O. of this case is a clear instance of dereliction of his duty. Therefore, we direct Director General of Police, Bihar Patna to initiate departmental proceeding against the Investigating Officer, namely, Mahesh Kumar Rajak, who was
posted as S.H.O. Medhapur Police Station on 22nd of July, 2014. Due to lackadaisical investigation, both the Trial Court and this Court are deprived of having best evidence against the real culprits of the incident."

Revision petition is partly allowed, conviction by Nalanda trial court upheld, sentence awarded reduced to the period already undergone: Justice Arun Kumar Jha

In Bipin Singh @ Bipin Kumar Singh vs.The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 5-page long judgement date June 29, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"If the facts were appreciated in the light of the evidence and two subordinate courts recorded a concurrent finding, there is very little scope for this Court to interfere in the matter in revision. 7. Having regard to the facts and circumstances and considering the fact that the petitioner has already undergone seven months of incarceration in this case and further considering the fact that he has no criminal antecedent and he is facing this lis from the last 19 years, I am of the view that the ends of justice would be met if, while upholding the conviction of the petitioner, the sentence awarded to him is reduced to the period already undergone by him. 8. Consequently, the conviction of the petitioner under the aforesaid section is affirmed and he is sentenced to the period already undergone by him. The fine sentence is affirmed. 9. Accordingly, this revision petition is partly allowed. 10. The petitioner is already on bail. He is discharged from the liability of the bail bonds." 

This criminal revision was preferred by the petitioner against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated January 10, 2025 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-II, Nalanda at Biharsharif in Criminal Appeal of 2016, which arose out of a Complaint Case of 2007 and trial of 2016. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated January 21, 2016 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-II, Nalanda at Biharsharif was affirmed. The petitioner was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC and has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two years with fine of Rs.5,000.

Pushpa Devi, the opposite party no. 2 had filed a complaint case alleging therein that her marriage was solemnized with the petitioner in the year 1987. At the time of marriage, her parents had given cash amounting to Rs.1,00,000/- and some ornaments. After her marriage, the petitioner and his family members demanded a motorcycle and due to non-fulfillment of their demand, they started harassing the opposite party no.2. Thereafter, Rs.40,000 was given by the parents of the opposite party no.2 for purchasing motorcycle. After birth of a female child, the accused persons became more violent and increased torture of the complainant. The accused persons including the petitioner also made an attempt to burn the complainant to death by pouring kerosene oil, but she anyhow escaped and returned to her paternal house. Thereafter, the present complaint case was filed.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned judgments of conviction and orders of sentence was bad in law as well as on facts. The appellate court and the trial court had failed to appreciate that all the complainant witnesses are closely related to each other and, thus, they all are highly interested witnesses. Therefore, their testimonies are not trustworthy. Hence, the petitioner should have been acquitted from the charges levelled against him on this score alone. The counsel also submitted that there is no independent witness of alleged offence. The counsel submitted that the trial court did not examine the evidence of the witnesses minutely and came to an erroneous finding and hence, the judgments of conviction and order of sentence passed by the courts below were not sustainable. Moreover, the petitioner was continuously facing the ordeal and miseries of the prolonged criminal proceeding against him for the last more than 18 years, although he was been paying the amount of maintenance and also paid arrears amount of maintenance to the opposite party no.2 and no useful purpose would be served to put the petitioner behind the bar.  The counsel also submitted that the matter has been compromised between the parties and the petitioner has fulfilled all the conditions put by the opposite party no.2 towards amicable settlement of the matter and the father of the petitioner has executed a sale deed for two bigha of land in favour of opposite party no.2 towards full and final settlement and mutation of the said land is also being done in the name of opposite party no.2. Therefore, it was prayed by the counsel that the judgments and orders of the courts below be set aside and the revision petition may be allowed. If the Court is not inclined, then in that case the sentence awarded to the petitioner may be reduced to the period already undergone by him.

Sections 420, 406 IPC cannot travel together, Police, courts failing to distinguish between a civil wrong in the form of a breach of contract, non-payment of money or violation of contractual terms: Supreme Court

In Rikhab Birani vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench  passed a 15-page long judgement dated April 16, 2025 observed that "The chargesheet in the present case is bereft of particulars and details required and mandated in terms of Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. It merely reproduces the contents of the FIR which makes reference to the payments made as well as the allegation that in the revenue records, the godown in question was recorded in the name of Rakesh Birani, the son of the appellant, Rikhab Birani. It is noted that the appellant, Rikhab Birani, informed the complainant that Rakesh Birani had expired. The complainant had then requested refund of money, etc. However, the FIR does not state the material and evidence available and collected during the course of the investigation to establish the offences under Sections 420, 406, 354, 504 and 506 of the IPC. Clearly, the ingredients of the aforesaid are not established and made out. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we set aside the impugned judgment/order and allow the present appeal quashing the FIR and the resultant proceedings, including the chargesheet."

The judgement reads:"We clarify that the present appeal only deals with the question of criminal offence. We have not commented or made any observations on the civil rights of complainant-respondent No.2. We are also constrained to impose costs of ₹50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) on the State of Uttar Pradesh as, in spite of repeated judgments/orders of this Court, we are being flooded with cases of civil wrongs being made the subject matter of criminal proceedings by filing chargesheets, etc. These costs will be paid by the State of Uttar Pradesh...."

The Court observed:"We are constrained to pass this detailed speaking order, as it is noticed that, notwithstanding the law clearly laid down by this Court on the difference between a breach of contract and the criminal offence of cheating, we are continuously flooded with cases where the police register an FIR, conduct investigation and even file chargesheet(s) in undeserving cases. During the last couple of months, a number of judgments/orders have been pronounced by this Court, especially in cases arising from the State of Uttar Pradesh, deprecating the stance of the police as well as the courts in failing to distinguish between a civil wrong in the form of a breach of contract, non-payment of money or disregard to and violation of contractual terms; and a criminal offence under Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC, the ingredients of which are quite different and requires mens rea at the time when the contract is entered into itself to not abide by the terms thereof."

In V.Y. Jose & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat and Anr.(2009) 3 SCC 78, the Court observed that a contractual dispute or breach of contract per se should not lead to initiation of a criminal proceeding. The ingredient of ‘cheating’, as defined under Section 415 of the IPC, is existence of a fraudulent or dishonest intention of making initial promise or representation thereof, from the very beginning of the formation of contract. 

Similar judgements have been delivered in S.W. Palanitkar vs. State of Bihar, AIR 2001 SC 2960  Hari Prasad Chamaria vs. Bishun Kumar Surekha, AIR 1974 SC 301 and Pepsi Foods Ltd. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate, AIR 1998 SC 128. 

Supreme Court reverses bail denial order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh in SC/ST Act case from Nawada

In Madan Mohan Prasad Verma & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justice Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 3-page long order dated June 19, 2026, wherein, it condoned the delay, issued notice returnable on August 24. The order reads: "By way of an ad interim order, in the event of arrest, the petitioners shall be released on bail in connection with Excl. Spl. SC/St Case No. 37/22 arising out of complaint case no. 37/2022 pending before Exclusive Special Court SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Nawadah, Bihar, subject to their executing a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) each, with one or more sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. However, the Petitioners are directed to cooperate with the investigation and report to the Investigating Officer as and when directed to do so. List again on 24th August, 2026." 

In Madan Mohan Prasad Verma & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh had passed a 2-page long order dated April 2, 2026, wherein, he concluded:" 4. In view of the aforesaid submissions and pronouncement of law rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bachu Das (supra), appellants’ prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail is rejected and this appeal stands dismissed. " 

In this case reliance was placed upon the decision dated February 3, 2014 by the Supreme Court in Bachu Das vs. State of Bihar and others reported in (2014) 3 Supreme Court Cases 471, wherein, the Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice of India P. Sathasivam and Ranjan Gogoi considered the offence under Section 3(1), as well as the bar provided under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act and, it concluded: "Section 18 of the SC/ST Act creates a bar for invoking Section 438 of the Code. However, a duty is cast on the court to verify the averments in the complaint and to find out whether an offence under Section 3(1) of the SC/ST Act has been prima facie made out. In other words, if there is a specific averment in the complaint, namely, insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate by calling with caste name, the accused persons are not entitled to anticipatory bail. The scope of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act read with Section 438 of the Code is such that it creates a specific bar in the grant of anticipatory bail. When an offence is registered against a person under the provisions of the SC/ST Act, no court shall entertain an application for anticipatory bail, unless it prima facie finds that such an offence is not made out. Moreover, while considering the application for bail, scope for appreciation of evidence and other material on record is limited. The court is not expected to indulge in critical analysis of the evidence on record. When a provision has been enacted in the Special Act to protect the persons who belong to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and a bar has been imposed in granting bail under Section 438 of the Code, the provision in the Special Act cannot be easily brushed aside by elaborate discussion on the evidence." 

The Special P.P. appearing on behalf of the State and counsel for Ram Binita Devi, the complainant/Respondent No. 2 submitted before the High Court that the prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail to the appellants is not maintainable, as cognizance had already been taken by the trial court for the offences punishable under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 

The appeal in the Patna High Court was filed for setting aside order dated September 25, 2024 passed by the Special Judge, Exclusive Special Court SC/ST (POA) Act, Nawada in A.B.P. No. 2442 of 2024, which arose out of a complaint case registered for the offence punishable under Sections 323, 341, 504, 506, 354B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(i)(r)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, whereby the prayer for anticipatory bail of the appellants was rejected. Now the order by the trial court and by Justice Singh of the High Court has been reversed by the Supreme Court. 

 

 

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava set aside verdict by Exclusive Special Judge (POCSO Act), Darbhanga in POCSO G.R. Case of 2019

In Sadir Quaraishi @ Md Sadir vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava delivered a 40-page long judgement dated June 19, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"53. In ultimate analysis, we are of the opinion that the learned trial court has erred in appreciation of the evidences available on the record. The conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and order of the learned trial court. The appellant shall be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other case. 54. This appeal is allowed." The judgement was authored by Justice Prasad. 

The appeal was preferred for setting aside the judgment of conviction dated July 1, 2023 and order of sentence dated 05.07.2023 passed by Exclusive Special Judge (POCSO Act), Darbhanga in POCSO G.R. Case of 2019 which arose out of Jalley P.S. Case of 2019. By the impugned judgment, the appellant wasc onvicted for the offences punishable under Section 376 AB of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. By the impugned order, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for twenty years with a fine of Rs. 30,000/- under Section 376 AB of the IPC and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and in default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo simple imprisonment for six months. 

The prosecution case was based on the fardbeyan of the informant (maternal uncle of the victim). In his fardbeyan, the informant had alleged that two years ago, his sister was murdered by her in-laws and his brother-in-law was sent to jail. They had four children whom the informant brought to his house and some
of the children were with his relatives. One amongst the four children ‘X’ (victim) resided with the informant and studied there. The informant took care of the house. The informant had stated that there was a marriage in his sasural so he had gone there. It was alleged that on April 6, 2019, there was a marriage in the neighbourhood of the informant in which his niece was playing with other children. Sadir Qureshi resident of the same village took informant’s niece to his place by luring her and raped her. The niece came home crying and bleeding. Informant’s mother, who was herself a heart patient, became unconscious and could not tell anyone about the incident. When the informant came home, he gathered information about the incident, after which he went to police station to lodge complain. Informant had brought clothes of the victim along with the application. On the basis of the fardbeyan of the informant, FIR was registered. After investigation, police submitted chargesheet dated May 31, 2019 against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376 IPC and Section 4/6 of the POCSO Act. 6. The trial court vide order June 19, 2019 took cognizance of the offences against appellant. Charges were read over and explained to the appellant in Hindi which he denied and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, charges were framed vide order dated November 15, 2019 for the offences. In course of trial, the prosecution examined eight witnesses and got exhibited certain documents.

Justice Prasad referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Pradeep vs. State of Haryana reported in AIR 2023 SC 3245, wherein, the Supreme Court has held that the conviction only on the testimony of a child witness who does not inspire confidence is not safe. The relevant paragraph of the judgment reads: “8. It is a well-settled principle that corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of
caution and prudence. A child witness of tender age is easily susceptible to tutoring. However, that by itself is no ground to reject the evidence of a child witness. The Court must make careful scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness. The Court must apply its mind to the question whether there is a possibility of the child witness being tutored. Therefore, scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness is required to be made by the Court with care and caution.”

The judgement recorded: "No one has appeared on behalf of the informant despite service of notice." 

Supreme Court upholds judgement by Justices A. M. Badar, Sandeep Kumar in a murder case from Bhojpur

In Sunil Roy vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sandeep Mehta and  Vijay Bishnoi passed a 3-page long order dated June 15, 2026, wherein, it upheld the 79-page long final judgment dated February 27, 2023 by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices A. M. Badar and Sandeep  Kumar in Bharath Roy & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2023). 

The High Court had dismissed Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 518 of 2014 Bharath Roy & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar and Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 583 of 2014 Shakuntla Devi vs. The State of Bihar (2023) preferred by the petitioner and the co-accused and had upheld the judgment dated April 16, 2014 rendered by the Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial No. 370 of 2012 convicting the accused persons including the petitioner herein for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34 and Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment for life till their natural death along with fine of Rs.2,00,000/- payable by each accused. For the offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC, the accused were sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life along with fine of Rs.1,00,000/- payment by each of them. The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Badar. The case had arisen out of PS. Case No.-33 of 2012, Chaori Thana, Bhojpur. Sunil Roy was the petitioner no. 3 in the High Court. 

The co-accused Bharath Roy, Uma Shankar Roy alias Uma Roy and Shakuntla Devi, did not prefer any special leave petition for assailing their conviction, only the petitioner-Sunil Roy was before the Supreme Court by way of the instant special leave petition. The case involves brutal murder of five persons, amongst which two were real brothers of accused No. 1 Bharath Roy, two were his nephews and one was his sister-in-law. 

Supreme Court concluded: "7. The case of the prosecution has been well proved by the ocular testimony of PW-1 Akash Kumar @ Vikky Kumar and PW-4 Rubi Kumari, both of whom received injuries in the same incident. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner was not in a position to convince the Court that the reliance placed by the trial Court and the High Court on the testimony of these two witnesses was unjustified or that the witnesses were not present at the spot. As a matter of fact, the presence of the witnesses at the spot is well established and corroborated by the fact that both of them received injuries in the very same incident. 9. Two competent Courts have recorded concurrent findings of the facts in convicting the petitioner as well as the co-accused and affirming their conviction. The judgments rendered by the Courts below do not suffer from any infirmity and are rather based on sound and thorough appreciation of evidence available on record and assign detailed reasons for arriving at a finding of guilt against the accused persons. 10. In this background, we are not inclined to interfere in the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed as being devoid of merit."

Justice Badar's judgement reads:"41. Culpable homicide is a genus and murder is its species. The Indian Penal Code practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. Culpable homicide of the first degree is the gravest form which is defined as 'murder' and is made punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The next may be termed as 'culpable homicide of second degree', which is made punishable under first part of Section 304 of the IPC. The last degree of culpable homicide is 'culpable homicide of third degree' which is made punishable under second part of Section 304 of the IPC. Barring the cases covered by an exception to Section 300 of Indian Penal Code, culpable homicide is murder if an act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death. Otherwise, for making out the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, the prosecution is firstly required to establish that a bodily injury is present on the victim. Secondly, the prosecution is required to establish nature and size of the injury on the victim. Then the prosecution is enjoined to prove that there was intention to inflict the particular injury, by adducing clear and cogent evidence for clarifying that such an injury was not accidental or unintentional. Possibility of injury of other kind intended by the appellant/accused is required to be ruled out. Lastly, the prosecution has to establish that the injury so caused was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. If all these factors are established, then only the offence defined under Section 300 of the IPC and punishable under Section 302 of IPC is made out. Similarly, it is well settled that in the offence under Section 307 of Indian Penal Code all the ingredients of offence of murder are present except the death of the victim. Indian Penal Code are lacking, the accused cannot be convicted under Section 307 of Indian Penal Code. Section 307 of Indian Penal Code does not take into consideration the effect of the act of the accused except as a measure of punishment to be imposed on him. In order to constitute the offence under Section 307 of Indian Penal Code actus reus and the requisite mens rea both must concur and the intention precedes the act attributed to the accused. The offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC is made out when the accused have intended to commit murder and in pursuance of that intention does any overt act towards commission of murder. In order to establish the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC, the prosecution is required to establish the intention or knowledge of committing murder and doing of an act towards it. Thus, Section 307 of the IPC contemplates intention or knowledge and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention." 

The High Court's Division Bench had concluded:"....the accused persons had inflicted blows of sharp cutting weapons on vital parts of bodies of all five deceased persons. As seen from the medical evidence adduced by the prosecution, deaths of Kamlesh Roy, Bikash Roy, Vijay Roy, Satyendra Roy and Shanti Devi were resulted because of cardio respiratory failure caused by haemorrhage and shock due to injuries sustained by them on vital parts of their body such as neck, chest and abdomen. Thus, we have no doubt in our mind that blows of sharp cutting weapons were inflicted by the accused persons on the victims with an intention to cause death of their victims. Seat of injury and the weapons used for causing wounds so also the force by which the blows were given on the victims makes it clear that the accused persons were knowing that they were likely to cause death of the victims by inflicting blows by sharp edged weapons. Therefore, the prosecution has established that in furtherance of their common intention, the appellants had caused murders of five victims, thereby committing the offence punishable u/s 302 R/w 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Similarly, it is proved from evidence on record that in furtherance of their common intention the accused persons had attempted to commit murder of P.W.1 Akash Kumar @ Vikky Kumar by inflicting blow of sharp cutting weapon on his chest leading to his hospitalization for a one and half month at P.M.C.H., Patna. The blow was inflicted on his chest with sufficient force making the intention to eliminate him crystal clear. Thus, the prosecution has also proved commission of the offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 43. As we have carefully gone through the entire case laws relied by the appellants and as we have acted upon the ratio which can be culled out from those rulings, we are not intending to reproduce the ratio by quoting relevant paragraphs from those judgments, for burdening this otherwise lengthy judgment. 44. In the result, both these appeals are devoid of merit and they are accordingly dismissed." 

 

Why is ED hiding Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) which was used to start money-laundering investigation under PMLA against Newsclick

No offence of cheating, criminal breach of trust or criminal conspiracy made out against Prabir Purkayastha and Newsclick: Justice Neena Bansal Krishna 

In M/S PK Newsclick Studio Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors and related matters, Justice Neena Bansal Krishna of Delhi High Court delivered a 41-page long judgment dated May 29, 2026, wherein, she held that the charges made in the FIR registered under Sections 406, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code on allegations that NewsClick, a news entity received foreign direct investment (FDI) from a US-based entity, Worldwide Media Holdings LLC, through an allegedly inflated share valuation structure for which ED had subsequently registered a money laundering case on the basis of the FIR failed to disclose offences of cheating, criminal breach of trust or criminal conspiracy.

Justice Krishna concluded: "130. It has been held that if the FIR under predicate offence is quashed, the ECIR automatically, is liable to be quashed. Consequently, the complete ECIR is also quashed. 131. Once the ECIR itself is quashed, the prayer for supply of the copy of the ECIR has become infructuous. 132. In the light of aforesaid discussion, the aforesaid three Writ Petitions a re allowed. The FIR No. 0116/2020 and the ECIR bearing E CIR/14/HIU/2020 are hereby, quashed and W.P. (Crl.) No. 1129/2021, is hereby disposed of, as infructuous." Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) is an internal document used by the ED to start a money-laundering investigation under the PMLA.

The judgement reads: "124. ....even if all the averments maden in the FIR are admitted, no offence under Sections 420/406 IPC is made out. From the response of ED also, it is evident that they are trying to claim that the offence under Section 120B IPC, is still made out. However, on what basis the criminal conspiracy is being alleged is not explained, except that Prabir Purkayastha and Jason Pfetcher, had entered into an agreement. 125. Merely because the parties entered into an agreement is not sufficient to constitute criminal conspiracy, unless the ED is able to show what is the illegal objective or the means which have been adopted by the Petitioners and the other persons which can be termed as criminal conspiracy. 126. The response of the ED itself reflects that even if the entire allegations against the Petitioners are admitted, no offence is disclosed in the FIR. Pertinently, extensive investigations have been carried out by ED for about a year and a half and Petitioners as well as its employees have been summoned and examined many a times, but nothing incriminating till date has been found or placed on record. Aside from bald assertions of there being a criminal conspiracy, there is not a whisper of any incriminating allegation, which would even remotely suggest the commission of the offence punishable under Section 4 PMLA."

Justice Krishna relied on the judgement of Division Bench of the High Court in Harish Fabiani & Ors. vs. Enforcement Directorate &Ors. 2022:DHC:3892-DB, wherein, it held:"The Hon'ble Supreme Court has been clear and categorical in its reasoning as evident from the para extracted above. The undeniable sequitur of the above reasoning is that firstly, authorities under the PMLA cannot resort to action against any person for money laundering on an assumption that the property recovered by them must be proceeds of crime and that a scheduled offence has been committed; secondly, the scheduled offence must be registered with the jurisdictional police or pending inquiry by way of complaint before the competent forum; thirdly, in the event there is already a registered scheduled offence but the person named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence is finally absolved by a Court of competent jurisdiction owing to an order of discharge, acquittal or quashing of the criminal case of the scheduled offence, there can be no action for money laundering against not only such a person but also any person claiming through him in relation to the property linked to the stated scheduled offence. In other words no action under PMLA can be resorted to unless there is a substratum of a scheduled offence for the same, which substratum should legally exist in the form of a subsisting (not quashed) criminal complaint/inquiry or if it did exist the accused has since been discharged or acquitted by a Court of competent jurisdiction."

Justice Krishna also referred to Supreme Court's decision in para 253 of the judgement in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs. Union of India (2023) 12 SCC 1 which reads: “253. Tersely put, it is only such property which is derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence can be regarded as proceeds of crime. The authorities under the 2002 Act cannot resort to action against any person for money-laundering on an assumption that the property recovered by them must be proceeds of crime and that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless the same is registered with the jurisdictional police or pending inquiry by way of complaint before the competent forum. For, the expression “derived or obtained” is indicative of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence already accomplished. Similarly, in the event the person named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence is finally absolved by a Court of competent jurisdiction owing to an order of discharge, acquittal or because of quashing of the criminal case (scheduled offence) against him/her, there can be no action for money-laundering against such a person or person claiming through him in relation to the property linked to the stated scheduled offence. This interpretation alone can be countenanced on the basis of the provisions of the 2002 Act, in particular Section 2(1)(u) read with Section 3. Taking any other view would be rewriting of these provisions and disregarding the express language of definition clause “proceeds of crime”, as it obtains as of now.”

Justice Krishna also recollected that relying on the above principles, Calcutta High Court in M/s Nik Nish Retail Ltd. & Anr vs. Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, Govt. of India & Ors, held, “The quashing of FIR of regular case automatically created a situation that the offences, stated and alleged in the FIR has no existence; thus the “Scheduled Offence” has also no existence after quashing of the FIR. When there is no “Scheduled Offence”, the proceeding initiated under the provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 cannot stand alone.”

The judgement recorded that two years have passed since the registration of impugned ECIR in 2022. The Petitioner No. 2 and various employees of Petitioner number one joined investigations on numerous occasions in 2021, after which they we're not summoned even once between September 2021 to June 2022. The manner in which the investigation was conducted clearly showed that "the same is a fishing and roving exercise in the financial affairs of the Petitioners without the existence of any offence."

Justice Krishna observed that while ED had alleged that it is investigating into alleged violations under FEMA, "but no summons or notice of inquiry under FEMA, has been received by the Petitioners till date. All the summons issued to the Petitioners are only under the PMLA and it is for the first time that ED has claimed that it is also investigating the Petitioners under FEMA as well. No copy of ECIR has been provided and the Petitioners are not even aware of the provisions and the statutes under which they are being investigated."

The judgement recorded that ED had claimed that mala fide of the Complainant is immaterial in the investigations after the registration of ECIR, but this contention is also misconceived and untenable in law. The Petitioners have a constitutional right to a free and fair investigation and mala fide registration of impugned ECIR and mala fide investigation being conducted by ED hampers the investigations. Moreover, in terms of of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari (1970), where criminal proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fide or are maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive, the same is bound to be quashed. Not only are the present proceedings only mala fide, but also an arbitrary attack and abuse of powers on the free and impartial journalism of the Petitioners.

The judgement records: "122. While the ED has contended that ECIR is an internal document and the copy of the same cannot be provided to the Petitioners, the ED has failed to appreciate that even in the case of Vijay Madan Lal Chaudhary (Supra), Supreme Court has not held that ED can, as a matter of right, reject the request for supply of ECIR. It has merely stated that it is not mandatory that, in each case, ED shall supply the copy of ECIR and non-supply of ECIR will not constitute violation of the Constitutional right of the Accused." 

Significantly, the judgement also records: "123. Further, the ED has filed an Application bearing Criminal M.A. No.9589/2021, dated 22.06.2021 in Criminal W.P. (Crl.) 1129/2021, in which it was submitted that ED has decided to supply the copy of ECIR to the Petitioners herein. Thus, it cannot now turn back and change the legal position. Pertinently, no copy of ECIR has been supplied to the Petitioners till date despite the aforesaid submission of the ED. It is, therefore, submitted that the ECIR and all the proceedings emanating therefrom may be quashed."

The million dollar question is: who is/was afraid of the sunlight. 

Supreme Court upholds 2017 judgement by Justices Rakesh Kumar, Mohit Kumar Shah affirming judgement by Trial Court in a 43 year old case from Jamalpur Kodai, Gaighat, Muzaffarpur

In Mahendra Rai alias Harendra Narain Singh & Ors vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N Kotiswar Singh delivered a 13-page long judgement dated May 26, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"28. We are satisfied that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the ingredients of the offences charged against the appellants. The concurrent findings recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court are based upon proper appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from any perversity warranting interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 29. The brutality of the incident, in which five persons belonging to the same family lost their lives and several others including women and children sustained serious injuries, shocks the judicial conscience. The Courts below have rightly observed that the case leaves no room for misplaced sympathy or leniency. 30. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. 31. Consequently, the appeals stand dismissed. 32. The surviving accused persons, except those who have been granted the benefit of juvenility by this Court or Courts below, are directed to surrender forthwith before the Trial Court concerned and serve the remaining part of their sentence. Their bail bonds, if any, stand cancelled." 

The High Court's 142-page long judgement dated August 3, 2017 was delivered by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rakesh Kumar and Mohit Kumar Shah. It was authored by Justice Kumar. 

The High Court's order dated recorded hat Vidya Nand Rai son of Bhujawan Rai,  Ramadhar Rai, son of Subudh Lal Rai and Rama Nand Rai, son of Mahendra Rai were juvenile on the date of occurrence. Justice Kumar's judgement remitted their cases to the Juvenile Justice Board for imposing appropriate fine to be paid to the family of the victim. The trial court's sentence in respect of these three appellants was set aside. Their current fate is not known. 

Referring to the judgement authored by Justice Kumar, Supreme Court observed: “The High Court has meticulously summarised the role of each accused person and identified those who ignited the straw, those who set the house on fire, those who chased the fleeing victims and those who inflicted fatal blows upon the deceased persons”. All the appellants were residents of village Jamalpur Kodai, Police Station Gaighat, District Muzaffarpur and they were convicted by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur on June 5, 1989 in Sessions Trial No. 21 of 1985 and 127 of 1985. 

Supreme Court asserted: "20. Having carefully considered the submissions advanced and upon perusal of the entire material on record, we find no merit in the appeals. 21. The High Court’s assessment of the evidence is detailed and reasoned.....23. The findings recorded by the High Court clearly establish that the accused persons constituted an unlawful assembly, were armed with deadly weapons and acted in furtherance of their common object of setting the house ablaze and causing death of members of the family of Chandra Shekhar Choudhary. 24. Once the common object of the unlawful assembly stands established, every member thereof becomes vicariously liable for acts committed in prosecution of such common object. The liability contemplated under Section 149 IPC squarely stands attracted in the facts of the present case." 

 With regard to Jagannath Ravidas, "both the Trial Court and the High Court have concurrently found that he had actively facilitated the commission of the offence by disarming the victims at a crucial stage and thereby emboldening the mob. We find no reason to take a different view."

The court dismissed the appeals filed by Mahendra Rai alias Harendra Narain Singh and others, the convicts had challenged the judgment of the High Court, which had upheld their conviction and life imprisonment awarded by the trial court. The incident occurred on the day of Holi in March 1983 in a village in Muzaffarpur district. A mob of at least 58 persons, armed with deadly weapons, surrounded the house of Chandra Shekhar Choudhary, set it on fire and brutally killed five persons while injuring several others, including women and children. The court noted that the evidence clearly established that the accused formed an unlawful assembly, were armed with lethal weapons, and acted in furtherance of their common object to set the house ablaze and cause the deaths. Once the common object is proved, every member becomes vicariously liable for the acts committed. The accused actively participated at different stages — surrounding the house, setting it on fire, chasing the victims, and assaulting them. Several appellants had died during the pendency of the appeals before the High Court, leading to abatement of their cases. It directed the surviving convicts — except those who received the benefit of juvenility — to surrender immediately before the trial court and serve the remaining part of their sentences.

The High Court had affirmed the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court against the appellants in connection with a gruesome incident of mass violence which took place on March 29, 1983 in village Jamalpur Kodai, Gaighat, Muzaffarpur. 

The incident was reported to the police, leading to registration of Gaighat P.S. Case of 1983. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheets were laid and the accused persons were sent up for trial. Charges were framed against the accused persons under Sections 147, 148, 436, 302/149, 324/34, 323 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The accused Jagannath Ravidas, the then Circle Officer, was separately charged under Sections 302/109, 436/109, 379/109, 324/109 and 323/109 IPC on the allegation that he had actively abetted the commission of the offences.

The prosecution case disclosed that the genesis of the occurrence lay in an earlier dispute relating to a pumping set and refusal by the prosecution side to withdraw a criminal case concerning the alleged loot of a khesari crop. On the date of occurrence, which coincided with the festival of Holi, a large mob armed with deadly weapons including lathi, bhala, garasa and farsa surrounded the house of Chandra Shekhar Choudhary. At the relevant time Mahanth Indradeo Jyoti, one of the deceased, was attempting to defend the inmates of the house with his licensed gun and revolver. The prosecution had alleged that Jagannath Ravidas, the then Circle Officer, arrived at the place of occurrence, forcibly seized the licensed firearm and revolver from the deceased, displayed the same before the mob and thereby emboldened the assailants to proceed with the attack. Immediately thereafter, the mob allegedly set the house ablaze. The family members who attempted to flee from the burning house towards the southern field were chased and mercilessly assaulted by the members of the unlawful assembly.  The investigation disclosed that Mahanth Indradeo Jyoti, Braj Bhushan Choudhary, Dr. Indranand Mishra, Lalan @ Ravi Bhushan Choudhary, and Anil Kumar Jha, died as a result of ante-mortem injuries sustained during the occurrence. The injured persons included Chandra Shekhar Choudhary, Mani Kumari, Uma Devi, Maheshwari Devi, Satyendra Jha, Saraswati Devi, Urmila Devi, Murti Devi, Ram Chandra Mahto, Abinash Choudhary, Dauli (child), Arvind Kumar, Usha Mishra, Rita Devi, Punam Kumari, Doyal Mona, Ajay Kumar Choudhary, Munish Kumar and others, many of whom had sustained grievous injuries. In support of its case, the prosecution examined 46 witnesses including numerous injured eyewitnesses. The defence examined 13 witnesses. 

Justice Ansul quashes order of 2020 by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna in a matter of new FIR post settlement of dispute relating to dowry, marriage

In Ashok Kumar Choubey @ Ashok Choubey & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Ansul delivered a 4-page long judgement dated May 27, 2026, wherein, he concluded: "7. In view of the matter that the dispute relating to dowry and marriage was settled between the parties and the new FIR relates to allegation of molestation and continuance of this prosecution is bad in law, malafide and abuse of the process of the Court. The FIR lodged at Delhi is continuing and the same may be taken to its logical conclusion. In view thereof, order dated 14.09.2020 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna (In-charge) in Jakkanpur P.S. Case No. 346 of 2018 is hereby quashed. 8. Accordingly, the application stands allowed." The judgement was reserved on March 18, 2026 upon hearing the parties. Prior to Justivce Ansul the case was heard by Justices Prabhat Kumar Singh, Partha Sarthy, Sandeep Kumar and Soni Shrivastava. 

Notably, Justice Sandeep Kumar had stayed the proceedings of the trial court by his order dated March 27, 2025 during pendency of the application. The case was filed in the High Court on January 24, 2022 and registered on February 4, 2022 in the matter arising out of P.S.case dated July 28, 2018.

The application was filed by the petitioners for quashing the order dated September 14, 2020 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna (In-charge) in Jakkanpur P.S. Case No. 346 of 2018 whereby and whereunder the learned Court has taken cognizance under Sections 406, 420 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The prosecution case was that the informant alleged that marriage of her daughter was fixed between respective parents Ashok Kumar Choubey (petitioner no. 1) and Om Prakash Tiwari. Ring Ceremony was held at Delhi at the residence of Petitioner no. 1. On May 12, 2018, Petitioner no 1 visited Patna and informant’s husband gave Rs. 6 lakhs cash to him. On June 15, 2018 informant and her husband visited at the residence of Petitioner no. 1 where the petitioners demanded Rs. 10 lakh cash and one Honda City Car. Thereafter, marriage was cancelled on July 21, 2018. Later the marriage was attempted to be settled but due to unavoidable issues the marriage negotiations broke down. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the parties had gathered before the SHO, Rajendra Nagar on July 22, 2018 i.e. the petitioner no. 1, the proposed bridegroom and father of the bride. Both the parties gave a letter to the SHO claiming that they have decided not to get the marriage ceremony conducted and they have returned the goods of each other and they have no complaint against each other. Moreover, the girl an filed FIR in the Rajendra Nagar (New Delhi) Police Station. The counsel for the petitioner also submitted that police submitted final form in this case bearing final report dated October 31, 2019 stating that the case was found to be false. However, magistrate differing with the final form took cognizance under Section 406, 420 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Justice Ansul observed: "The crux of the allegation is that a marriage negotiation went bad. Even though some gadgets or money were exchanged but there is a document clearly showing that the parties returned their gifts and settled their dispute amicably. Still the instant case was filed and thereafter the daughter of the informant filed Central Delhi Rajendra Nagar P.S. Case No. 182 of 2018 on 19.09.2018. The lady in the FIR has not stated that the document signed by the parties on 22.07.2018 was either forged or obtained by any wrongful means. She has plainly written about the same and then has stated that she wishes to lodge the FIR in view of the later development." 

 

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a UAPA case

In Ram Pravesh Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh  and N. K. Singh passed a 5-page long order, wherein, it set aside the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The order reads:"....we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appellant is granted bail on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court." 

The counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the facts have been wrongly recorded by the High Court to the effect that the appellant was absconding. The appellant was, in fact, under incarceration from 2016 to 2024, in connection with a different FIR. Although it was stated that there were a number of cases in which the appellant was involved, he was acquitted in most of the cases. In any case, taking into consideration the period of incarceration undergone, he was entitled to bail, particularly, when the co-accused have been granted bail.

The appellant sought regular bail in connection with FIR No.88/2011, dated 17.06.2011, registered at Police Station Amas, District Gaya, Division-Sherghati, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 379, 384, 386, 435, 427, 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 27 of the Arms Act, Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and Section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. 

In the Supreme Court, the counsel appearing for the State admitted that it was not in dispute that the appellant was indeed under incarceration from 2016 to 2024. The finding recorded by the High Court is not correct. Additionally, the appellant has been under incarceration for a further period of more than 1 year. The co-accused was granted bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had recorded: 3. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner and others are said to have stopped the trucks near the Sao Kala Toll Plaza and have set ablaze the trucks. 5. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been acquitted in 40 cases registered against him and he has been granted bail in seven more similar cases. 6. Learned APP for the State Shri Jharkhandi Upadhyay submits that from the records, it appears that the petitioner is an absconder in a case of year 2011 and he is an active naxal." The High Court's order reads:"Considering the aforesaid submission of the learned APP for the State, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 8. Accordingly, this application is dismissed." Now the Supreme Court has reversed this order.  

Supreme Court inquires whether clerk of an advocate had proven the post-mortem report

In Naresh Sahni vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N K Singh passed a 3-page long order dated May 5, 2026, wherein, it recorded:"4. Perusal of the special leave petition reveals that the High Court to have had passed an order affirming the conviction way back on 26.04.2022 and the present special leave petition stands filed only on 17.11.2025, and that too without placing on record the testimonies of the witnesses. From the synopsis of the SLP (Pages H & I), it is apparent that it was only on 12.04.2025 that the petitioner made a request for providing a legal-aid counsel for the purpose of filing the special leave petition. Record does not reveal as to whether the petitioner/convict was informed of his statutory rights of getting assistance of a legal-aid counsel; whether he had chosen to prefer any special leave petition and requested for a legal-aid counsel; or that he had ever expressed his desire or was informed of his right of filing the special leave petition. Perusal of the grounds of the special leave petition reveals that it was a clerk of an advocate who had proven the post-mortem report. Whether this is factually correct or not is what needs to be ascertained." 

The petitioner has challenged the 20-page long judgment dated April 26, 2022 in Naresh Sahni vs. State of Bihar (2022) delivered by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices A. M. Badar and Sunil Kumar Panwar. Supreme Court has condoned the delay. The petitioner has been convicted for having committed an offence punishable under Section 302, IPC. He is under incarceration since March 3, 2010. 

Supreme Court's order reads: "10. Let a Report, complete in all respects, dealing with the facts as have emerged from the special leave petition, be called for from the Registrar General of the High Court of Judicature at Patna. Let the needful be done within a period of one week from today. 11. The Registrar (Judl.) concerned is directed to communicate the order during the course of the day. 12. Records of the Courts below be immediately called for. A copy thereof, in digital form, be supplied to all concerned. 13. Perhaps on the next date of hearing the matter be considered on merits itself." The case arose from a Sessions Trial of 2011, which arose out of Mithanpura P.S. Case No. 34 of 2010 from the court of learned 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur. 

Justice Purnendu Singh affirms judgement of conviction under Section 323 by Additional Sessions Judge, Kaimur

In Sukhari Ram & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2026) which was heard along with Mahipat Ram vs, The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court delivered a 19-page long judgement dated April 30, 026, wherein, he concluded:"25. I find that the facts of the present case are squarely covered by the judgment passed by the Apex Court in case of Sivamani (supra) and in view of the aforesaid discussion of factual and legal aspects, it emerges that the alleged occurrence took place in a sudden manner on account of prior enmity between the parties and without any clear premeditation or prior meeting of minds of the accused persons. The nature of the incident, the surrounding circumstances, and the medical evidence, particularly the testimony of P.W.4 –Dr. Vinod Kumar Kashyap, indicate that although the informant sustained a head injury opined to be grievous in nature, the same has been attributed to a hard and blunt substance and the doctor has also admitted the possibility of such injury being caused by a fall on a hard surface, thereby creating doubt regarding the manner of assault. In the backdrop of inconsistent testimonies of the material witnesses, lack of reliable independent corroboration, and infirmities in investigation, tfhe evidence on record does not conclusively establish the requisite intention or knowledge to cause death so as to attract the provisions of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. Rather, the materials on record, at best, indicate an act of causing hurt by use of a blunt object, and thus,....this Court is of the considered opinion that the offence under Section 307 IPC is not made out and the conviction, if any, can be sustained only for a lesser offence in accordance with law. The learned trial court has rightly appreciated the evidence in convicting the appellants under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code, particularly in view of the injury reports showing injuries caused by hard and blunt substance." 

To sustain a conviction under Section 307 IPC, the Supreme Court in paragraph no. 9 of its judgement in Sivamani vs. State, reported in, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1581,  has held: “ 9. In State of Madhya Pradesh v.  Saleem, (2005) 5 SCC 554, the Court held that to sustain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, it was not necessary that a bodily injury capable of resulting in death should have been inflicted. As such, non-conviction under Section 307, IPC on the premise only that simple injury was inflicted does not follow as a matter of course. In the same judgment, it was pointed out that ‘…The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section.’ The position that because a fatal injury was not sustained alone does not dislodge Section 307, IPC conviction has been reiterated in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanha, (2019) 3 SCC 605. Yet, in Jage Ram (supra) and Kanha (supra), it was observed that while grievous or life-threatening injury was not necessary to maintain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, ‘The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.”

Before delivering the verdict, Justice Singh examined the case to find out whether the impugned judgment warrants interference by this Court on the charge levelled against the accused/appellants under Sections 307/34 and 323 of IPC. 

Justice Sing observed: "....taking an overall view, the Impugned judgment dated 17-01-2012 and order of sentence dated 21-01-2012 passed in S.T. No. 118/13 of 2003/07 (arising out of Durgawati P.S. Case No. 15/2003) is varied only to the extent that the conviction of the appellants stands modified to that under Sections 323 of the IPC. 27. However, so far as, the sentence is concerned, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the period already undergone by the appellants, the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year is modified and reduced to the period already undergone. It is directed that if the appellants have already undergone the modified sentence, they shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless required in connection with any other case. The appellants are discharged from the liabilities of their bail bonds, if any." 

Section 323 reads:"Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.—Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”

The appellants preferred the criminal appeals against the judgment dated January 17, 2012 and order of sentence dated January 21, 2012 passed in a Sessions Trial of 2013 which arose out of Durgawati P.S. Case 2003 by1st Additional Sessions Judge, Kaimur at Bhabua, whereby, the trial court convicted the appellants under Section 307/34 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years (for section 307 of IPC) and further these three appellants were also sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 1 years (for section 323 of IPC). The appellants assailed the impugned judgment primarily on the ground that the trial court failed to appreciate the evidence available on record in its proper perspective and has erred in recording the conviction of the appellants.

Sections 307 reads:"Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life convicts.— When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.
Illustrations
(a) A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such circumstances that, if death ensued. A would be guilty of murder. A is liable to punishment under this section.
(b) A, with the intention of causing the death of a child of tender years, exposes it in a desert place. A has committed the offence defined by this section, though the death of the child does not ensue.
(c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of the first paragraph of this section.
(d) A, intending to murder Z by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same with food which remains in A’s keeping; A has not yet committed the offence defined in this section. A places the food on Z’s table or delivers it to Z’s servant to place it on Z’s table. A has committed the offence defined in this section.

The case of the prosecution, was that on February 12, 2003 at about 21:30 hours, the informant, Chhabilal Ram, was returning to his house from Durgawati Bazaar. When he reached near a well situated close to the house of Khobhari Ram in village Khaminaura, the accused persons, namely Rajendra Ram, Dularchand Ram, Sukhari Ram and Mahipat Ram, allegedly surrounded him and, on account of previous enmity, formed an unlawful assembly and assaulted him. It was also alleged that during the course of the assault, accused Mahipat Ram dealt a lathi blow on the head of the informant, causing injury as a result of which he fell down and raised alarm. Upon hearing the alarm, nearby persons reached the place of occurrence, whereupon the accused persons fled away. Thereafter, the injured was taken for treatment by his nephew, Om Prakash Ram. 

During the trial, the prosecution examined altogether eight witnesses and relied upon documents exhibited during the course of trial. 

Justice Singh observed: "19. It is well settled that an attempt to commit murder must be clearly distinguished from a mere intention to commit the offence or from acts that amount only to preparation for its commission. The law recognizes that the existence of a guilty intention alone is not sufficient to constitute an attempt. There must be something more than planning or arranging the means to commit the crime. Therefore, in order to secure a conviction under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, the prosecution must prove the presence of a definite intention or knowledge to cause death, accompanied by some overt act that directly moves towards the execution of that intention. In other words, the accused must not only possess the intention to commit murder but must also perform an act that clearly demonstrates the commencement of the offence."

The Supreme Court laid down the litmus test for determination of nature of offence in Pulicherla Nagaraju vs. State of A.P. reported in (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 500. In the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the Court needs to decide the pivotal question of existence of intention with care and caution. The following factors needs to be examined:
"(i) nature of the weapon used;
(ii)whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot;
(iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body;
(iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury;
(v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight;
(vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation;
(vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger;
(viii)whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation;
(ix) whether it was in the heat of passion;
(x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual
manner;
(xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows."

The Supreme Court grappled with a similar question in the case of Joseph vs. State of Kerala, reported in 1995 SCC (Cri) 165. The relevant paragraph reads: “3. In this appeal the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the intention to cause the injury which was found sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of the nature was not established. In support of this submission he relied on the circumstances namely that the whole incident took place because of a trivial incident which resulted in a quarrel and that the weapon used was only a lathi and in the circumstances it cannot be said that the accused intended to cause the death by inflicting that particular injury which objectively was proved by the medical evidence to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In other words he submits that clause 3rdly of Section 300 IPC is not attracted in this case. We find considerable force in the submission. The weapon used is not a deadly weapon as rightly contended by the learned counsel. The whole occurrence was a result of a trivial incident and in those circumstances the accused dealt two blows on the head with a lathi, therefore, it cannot be stated that he intended to cause the injury which is sufficient (sic). At the most it can be said that by inflicting such injuries he had knowledge that he was likely to cause the death. In which case the offence committed by him would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder. We accordingly set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded thereunder. Instead we convict the appellant under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentence him to five years' RI.”

In the case of Jugatram vs. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2020) 9 SCC 520, Supreme Court drew on its judgment in Joseph case. 

Drawing on these judgements, Justice Singh observed: "24. Admittedly, from the prosecution case itself, it transpires that the alleged occurrence arose out of previous enmity between the parties and is stated to have taken place suddenly at night, without any clear evidence of premeditation or prior meeting of minds, the incident having occurred in the course of a sudden confrontation. Further, the prosecution evidence suffers from material infirmities..." 

Supreme Court stays execution of death sentence of appellants confirmed by Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Sourendra Pandey

In Aman Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 13-page long judgement dated April 27, 2026, wherein, it wrote: "4. The execution of the death sentence of the appellant(s) shall remain stayed pending the hearing and final disposal of the present appeal(s). 5. The original record of the case be summoned from the Trial Court and the High Court. A copy of the translated record shall be supplied to the counsel for the parties."The order was passed upon hearing the proceedings which arose from the 67-page long judgment and order dated January 22, 2026 of the Patna High Court in Death Reference No.2/2024 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.691 of 2024. The matter will come up for hearing after twenty weeks. The case to High Court from the District Court, Rohtas.  

In the High Court, Ansul, senior counsel who had represented the informant had submitted that the records  showed that the Investigating Officer had not acted fairly and had created a mess by deliberately omitting to do what ought to have been done. It was submitted that the accused persons/defence cannot be allowed to take benefit of such acts or omissions of the prosecution which seem to have been deliberately done to favour the accused persons, otherwise it would amount to give premium to the accused for the wrongs of the prosecution which in the present case was apparently committed designedly to favour the appellants.  The senior counsel had relied upon paragraph 13 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the  Ram Bihari Yadav vs. State of Bihar reported in (1998) 4 SCC 517 and Harendra Rai vs. State of Bihar reported in (2023) 13 SCC 563,wherein, the Supreme Court had held that the three main stakeholders in a criminal trial, namely, the Investigating Officer, Public Prosecutor, and the Judiciary, all utterly failed to keep up their respective duties and responsibilities cast upon them. The Supreme Court had taken note of the subsequent conduct of the accused and had drawn adverse inference. The  Supreme Court had taken judicial notice of the judgment in the habeas corpus petition regarding conduct of the accused, the investigating agency, the Public Prosecutor and the Presiding Officer conducting the trial. 

The High Court was persuaded my the senior counsel's arguments, but the Supreme Court does appear to be persuaded. 

The order dated April 27 reads: "14. The Registry shall forthwith communicate this order to all the High Courts through their respective Registrar Generals; Member Secretary, National Legal Services Authority; and Member Secretaries of Legal Services Authorities of all the States and Union Territories for necessary compliance."

The Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench referred to its earlier 122 page long judgement dated May 20, 2022 in Manoj & Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 1 (2023) 2 SCC 353, by the Court's 3-Judge Bench of Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and Bela. M. Trivedi wherein, it stated that the Court in the context of death reference cases, has underscored that while reformation is a foundational goal of criminal punishment, repeatedly affirmed in its jurisprudence, the absence of a structured and measurable framework, coupled with the inadequate implementation of meaningful prison reforms, has significantly hampered the system’s ability to achieve genuine rehabilitation. The judgment was authored by Justice S. Ravindra Bhat. 

The Court proposed the formulation of practical guidelines to aid courts in systematically collecting and evaluating mitigating circumstances, moving beyond vague considerations such as general conduct or family background, and thereby enabling a more informed assessment of an accused’s potential for reformation, while also serving as a precursor to a comprehensive legislative framework. Crucially, the Court emphasized that it is incumbent upon trial Courts to consider such mitigating circumstances at the earliest possible stage of proceedings in cases involving a potential death sentence, so as to ensure a balanced sentencing approach and to avoid slipping into a purely retributive response driven by the brutality of the crime, an outcome that the Court observed has become increasingly common by the time such matters reach the appellate stage.

The 3-Judge Bench observed :".....we are constrained to take note of a troubling trend being presented in multiple cases wherein reports on mitigating and aggravating circumstances are not being called for at the earliest stages of proceedings in a case involving a potential death sentence, namely, at the stage of sentencing before the trial Court or even at the stage of the reference for confirmation before the High Court. This omission creates a piquant situation in which such crucial material is, for the first time, sought only at the stage of appeal before this Court, thereby causing a long gap and avoidable delay in the collection of information essential for a proper, timely and informed determination on the question of sentence. Delayed consideration of these factors undermines the very objective of a balanced sentencing process and impedes the meaningful application of reformative principles."

It added: "12. It is also necessary to note that in a significant number of cases involving a potential death sentence, the quality of defence afforded to the accused remains inadequate, resulting in ineffective legal representation at crucial stages of the proceedings. Such deficiencies are often reflected in lackadaisical investigation and slackness in trial proceedings. There is hardly any attempt to collect data relating to mitigating and aggravating circumstances, thereby depriving the Courts of a complete and balanced perspective necessary for a just determination and imposition of sentence. The absence of competent and effective prosecution and defence not only undermines the fairness of the process but also increases the risk of a disproportionate, unjust, and uninformed sentencing outcome. This state of affairs renders it expedient to strengthen the legal aid framework in such cases, by ensuring the provision of skilled and adequately resourced legal representation, so that the accused is effectively assisted and the Court is meaningfully aided in discharging its functions in accordance with constitutional principles. 13. In wake of the above discussion and the concerns noted in the preceding paras particularly in relation to the ineffective consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances and the need to ensure meaningful legal representation in cases involving a potential death sentence, the following directions are being issued: - A. The report pertaining to aggravating and mitigating circumstances shall, as a matter of course, be called for by the trial Court itself once the accused is convicted, prior to the determination of sentence.
B. In the event such a report has not been called for or placed on record before the trial Court, the High Court shall mandatorily call for the same at the stage of admission of the death reference.
C. The concerned authorities shall ensure that such reports are comprehensive, duly verified, and furnished within a stipulated timeframe so as to avoid any delay in the adjudicatory process, and to aid and enable the Courts to undertake a meaningful, informed, and constitutionally compliant sentencing exercise. Upon receipt of such report, the Court concerned shall afford adequate opportunity to the parties to peruse the same and to advance oral submissions thereon. In cases where the reports procured by the trial Court are found to be ineffective or lacking in proper details, the High Court would be at liberty to call for a fresh report.
D. In every death sentence confirmation reference brought before the High Courts and this Court, the Legal Services Committee concerned shall assign a dedicated legal team comprising one Senior Counsel and at least two advocates having a minimum of 7 years practice, to represent the convicted person. Such
representation shall be provided irrespective of whether the convict has engaged private counsel, so as to ensure full and effective assistance to the Court in matters involving death penalty, which necessitate a careful balancing of the interests of justice, societal concerns, and the possibility of reformation and rehabilitation. The appointed legal team shall be furnished with the complete case records and afforded adequate time to prepare, conduct research, and present a comprehensive assessment of mitigating circumstances. The legal aid team so appointed shall work in cohesion with the representing private counsel, if any.
E. Each High Court, under the aegis of the High Court Legal Services Committee, shall constitute and maintain a dedicated panel of advocates for handling death reference matters.
F. The National Legal Services Authority shall frame and circulate appropriate guidelines identifying the relevant fields of enquiry for gathering mitigating circumstances and may engage trained teams, including legal and social science professionals, to undertake fieldwork involving interaction with the convict, their family, and relevant authorities, for the purpose of collecting detailed information regarding background, antecedents, socio-economic conditions, mental health status, and other relevant factors. Such information shall be made available to the appointed legal team, which shall, in turn, place before the Court a holistic and well-documented account of the convict’s potential for reformation along with all pertinent mitigating and aggravating circumstances to assist in a just and informed determination of sentence."

In view of the orders passed by the Supreme  Court in matters involving capital punishment, the 3-Judge Bench issued the following directions: a. The respondent-State of Bihar shall place before this Court the report(s) of all the Probation Officers relating to the appellant(s) within a period of sixteen (16) weeks. 
b. The Superintendent of Prison, Buxar Jail, Bihar, shall submit a report with regard to the nature of work which have been performed by the appellant(s) while in jail and a report with regard to the conduct and behaviour of the appellant(s) while in jail within a period of sixteen (16) weeks. 
c. The Superintendent of Prison, Buxar Jail, Bihar, shall also get done the psychological evaluation of the appellant(s) from the Government Medical Hospital. The report of the evaluation shall be submitted to this
Court through the Standing Counsel for the State of Bihar within a period of period of sixteen (16) weeks.
d. Ms. Devika Rawat, Associate (Mitigation) and Ms. Sana Vohra, Associated with the Square Circle Clinic, NALSAR University of Law, are permitted to have access to the appellant(s) –Aman Singh and Sonal Singh respectively, who are presently lodged in Buxar Jail, Bihar, to conduct multiple in-person interviews for the purpose of collecting information relevant to sentencing and to submit a Mitigation Investigation Report on behalf of the appellant(s) through the appellants’ Advocate-on-Record within twenty (20) weeks. 
e. The Superintendent, Buxar Jail, Bihar, shall ensure that, for the sake of confidentiality, these interviews shall be conducted in a separate interviewing space without any prison official or police staff being within
earshot distance, and audio recorders be permitted to be used to record the interviews.
f. The person(s) nominated by Ms. Devika Rawat and Ms. Sana Vohra are permitted to accompany them to translate during the interview. 
g. Ms. Devika Rawat and Ms. Sana Vohra are granted permission to obtain documents pertaining to the appellant(s), including but not limited to medical records, jail conduct, certificates of any educational, vocational or employment opportunities undertaken, etc. that the appellant(s) may wish to submit for the purpose of sentencing information.
7. The Registry is directed to transmit a copy of this order to the Standing Counsel for the State
of Bihar, who shall, in turn, ensure that the order is communicated to the relevant authorities for compliance. The Registry shall, in addition, send a due intimation to all the concerned authorities immediately for compliance.
8. All the reports shall be duly compiled and placed before this Court on the next date of hearing. 

Also read:Division Bench led by Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad confirms death sentence in a case from Rohtas, Justice Sourendra Pandey authors concurring opinion, two accused persons still absconding 

Supreme Court sets aside Justice Purnendu Singh's indefensible order ridden with glaring infirmities, requests High Court's roster bench to decide the case afresh, within 1 month

In Anjani Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through Addl. Chief Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 3-page long order dated April 202, 026, wherein, it condoned the delay, granted leave and allowed the appeal after taking note of the order dated October 9, 2025 passed by Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court. It concluded: "4. The impugned order speaks for itself. The infirmities are so obvious and glaring that the same neither warrants detailed exposition nor is there any necessity to issue notice to the respondents. 5. The impugned order being indefensible, is set aside. We request the roster Bench of the High Court to decide Criminal Miscellaneous No.60503 of 2024 afresh upon granting due opportunity of hearing to the parties and in accordance with law, as early as possible and, subject to its convenience, within a month from date of receipt of a copy of this order. 6. We keep all contentions on merits open for being urged by the parties before the roster Bench."

In the impugned 2-page long order dated October 10, 2025 in Anjani Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Singh had observed:"2. The present quashing application has been notified on “Urgent Mentioning” made on behalf of the petitioner. 3. In spite of repeated calls, no one has appeared on behalf of the parties. 4. I proceed to pass order on merit on the basis of materials available on the record. 5. The present quashing application has been filed for for following issues:-'For setting aside/quashing of cognizance order dated 18.12.2023 passed in complaint case No. (C)1252/2023 by Ld. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate XIII, Saran whereby cognizance has been taken under Section 420/466/471 and 120(B) of Indian Penal Code for complaint filed for alleged offence under Section 194, 420, 466, 468, 469, 471, 504 and 120(B) of Indian Penal Code and all other consequential proceeding.' 6.The charge-sheet was submitted on 29.09.2020 and the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate XIII, Saran took cognizance under Section 420, 466, 471 and 120B of the IPC having found sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused persons. 7. This Court finds that the instant case is one of the cases in which the parties may exercise to settle their dispute amicably and the learned District Court may also give opportunity to them, so that they can settle their dispute outside the Court. 8. The present quashing application stands disposed of with the aforesaid liberty."

Supreme Court detected obvious and glaring infirmities in Justice Singh's order and requested the roster bench to hear the case afresh.