In Madhuri Devi vs. Arjun Das @ Kariya & Anr. Etc. (SLP (Crl.) No(s).2126-2130/2025), the counsel of the petitioner drew the attention of the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Prashant Kumar Mishra towards the counter affidavit dated April 4, 2025, filed by respondent no.2-State of Bihar, which has been affirmed by the Superintendent of Police, Samastipur, Bihar. Special reference is made to paragraph nos.13, 14 and 15 of the counter affidavit filed by the respondent no.2-State.

The petitioner's counsel contended that the Superintendent of Police of Samastipur district supported the accused and the impugned order, forgetting that it was an FIR filed by the State, which resulted in conviction after due investigation and prosecution. 

Supreme Court expressed its surprise at the blatant stand in the affidavit filed by the Superintendent of Police of the district in support of the accused.

The Court was constrained to make Ashok Mishra, who had affirmed the affidavit dated April 4, 2025 filed in the present case and was holding the post of Superintendent of Police, Samastipur, Bihar, to be impleaded as respondent no.3 in all the matters.

The case arose out of impugned 10-page long final order dated December 11, 2024 passed by thr Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Rajesh Kumar Verma. The appellants have been convicted under Sections 302/34 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27(3) of the Arms Act, 1959 vide judgment dated August 13, 2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-V, Samastipur in two Sessions Cases which arose  out of Musrigharai P.S. Case No. 97 of 2021. By order dated

20.08.2024, they have been sentenced to undergo

imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/-

each under Section 302/34 read with Section 120B of the

IPC. Appellant/Sunil Kumar is further sentenced to

undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act, 1959. In

default of payment of fine, to further suffer S.I. for three

months.

Supreme Court's order reads: "Let the newly added respondent no.3 be served through the learned counsel for respondent no.2-State. A personal affidavit shall be filed by the newly added respondent no.3, explaining as to under what circumstances, such stand was taken by him in the affidavit in the present case. List on 01.08.2025."

Justice Dr. Anshuman refuses relief to Anmola Kumari who qualified written test and minimum 9 feet long jump despite pregnancy, for post of Prison Warder

In Anmola Kumari vs.  The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Home Department, Government of Bihar & Ors.(2025), Justice Dr. Anshuman of Patna High Court heard the petition filed in the nature of writ of certiorari for directing the respondent authorities to appoint the petitioner as Jail Warden on the basis of the marks obtained by her in Physical Evaluation Test (PET) in Long Jump as the qualifying marks for appointment as she was selected at the written conducted by the Central Selection Board (Constable appointment). The prayer was made to hold that lady carrying pregnancy are fully qualified for appointment to the above post even if they in long jump test jumped exactly 9 feet because of their temporary physical disqualification. Further, prayer was made to hold fresh physical evaluation test of Anmola Kumari, the petitioner for long jump test after delivery of child. 

Notably, 9 feet Long Jump was the minimum eligibility in the physical test which Anmola Kumari qualified.  

The other respondents were: Chairman Central Selection Board Constable Appointment, Bihar and Secretary Central Selection Board, Constable Appointment, Bihar. The counsel for Central Selection Board of Constable, Bihar, Patna had submitted that petitioner was not successful due to the reason that she could not get position in the selected list of candidates. There was no such provision in the recruitment/advertisement under which such benefit has to be granted to a pregnant lady. He also submitted that at the time of filing up the form of physical evaluation test, a declaration was demanded in which, petitioner has intimated to the Appointing Authority that she was not pregnant.  

The Court observed:  it transpires to this Court that there is no provision in the recruitment/advertisement process to grant such type of benefit and particularly prior to enter into recruitment process, a declaration was demanded in this regard but petitioner has submitted a false declaration." 

The Court seems to have misunderstood the submission by the counsel of the respondent regarding the factual position about declaration of her pregnancy. Anmola Kumari had submitted he application form during August 6, 2015-September 24, 2015 in response to a advertisement no. 03/2015. The written test was held on September 18, 2016. The Admit Card for the test was issued on September 1, 2016. The result of the written test was published on November 29, 2016. The Physical Evaluation Test e-Admit Cards for Jail Warder (Kakshpal) exam was issued on December 15, 2016.  It is crystal clear that the petitioner filled the form of physical evaluation test during November 29, 2016-December 15, 2016 with a declaration to the Appointing Authority that she was not pregnant. The Physical Evaluation Test was conducted during January 9, 2017-Janaury 19, 2017.

It is apparent that Anmola Kumari, the petitioner, a resident of Shankarbigha, Sakurabad, Jehanabad had rightly submitted at the time of filing up the form of physical evaluation test that she is not pregnant. Her declaration to the Appointing Authority is factually and biologically correct. It is apparent that the order of the High Court has erred in inferring that the "petitioner has submitted a false declaration" regarding her pregnancy. As a consequence of this incorrect inference, the Justice Anshuman's order dated March 20, 2025 concluded: "Now before the Court, she came with this pleading that she was pregnant therefore exemption be given to her. Demand of such relief by the petitioner is not permissible hence cannot be granted. Hence, this writ petition is hereby dismissed." Justice Anshuman is a Ph.D from Patna University, who started his practice in 1995. His father Jagdish Pandey and mother Indubala Pandey were advocates of the High Court. 

The order records that Yogesh Chandra Verma, the octogenarian senior counsel for petitioner had submitted that the petitioner wants to appear in the long jump test again six months after the end of her pregnancy period or alternatively she be declared successful. The senior counsel has been practicing in the High Court since 1968.

Justices Sourendra Pandey and Sandeep Kumar grant regular bail to Rajan Rai and Bhola Ray who are "accused of killing deceased by pressing his neck"

In Rajan Rai vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Sourendra Pandey of Patna High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner who faces the allegation that on March 12, 2024 while laying the pipe for watering his field there was scuffle between the accused persons and Gabbar Ray, the informant at 5.30 PM, the named accused persons including Rajan Rai, the petitioner "are said to have assaulted the informant and his parents, wife and his sister-in-law with lathi and danda. It is further alleged in the FIR that the petitioner and Bhola Rai had assaulted the father of the informant by bricks and danda and they also pressed the neck of the father of the informant who died on the spot." The petitioner's counsel drew the attention of the Court towards the post-mortem report wherein "ante-mortem injury was only 'abrasion on both knee of size 1/2" x 1/2' and the Doctor has reserved the opinion regarding cause of death..." The order recorded that the petitioner has three criminal antecedents and he was in custody since December 3, 2024. 

The Additional Public Prosecutor for the State vehemently opposed the prayer for bail of the petitioner. He submitted that there is specific allegation against the petitioner to have assaulted the informant and his parents, wife and his sister-in-law with lathi and danda as such he should not be released on bail. Justice Pandey's order dated May 13, 2025 reads:"Considering the aforesaid submissions of respective counsel and taking into account the fact that the post-mortem report does not support the allegations levelled against the petitioner and the petitioner is in custody since 03.12.2024, the petitioner above named, is directed to be released on bail..."

In Bhola Ray @ Bhola Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court granted bail to the petitioner who is "accused of killing deceased by pressing his neck" and by beating Sobhan Ray, the deceased using bricks and sticks and  him with on March 12, 2024 at 5.30 PM. The police station received information at 11.45 PM.

The case arose out of a  case of 2024 registered in Awtarnagar Thana, Saran. The FIR was registered against eight persons, namely Lalita Devi, Rajan Rai, Suresh Rai, Bhola Ray, Ramesh Rai, Rajiv Rai, Gyanti Devi and Rajeshwar Rai on March 13, 2024. Bhola Ray and Rajan Ray are directly accused in the FIR. Justice Kumar's order dated May 14, 2025 recorded that the petitioner was in custody since December 3, 2024.

The petitioner's counsel had submitted that "the post-mortem report does not support the allegations as alleged in the FIR." The Additional Public Prosecutor for the State vehemently opposed the prayer for bail of the petitioner. The order reads: Considering the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, this application for regular bail is allowed."

The trial of both the murder accused persons is pending before the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Saran at Chhapra.

 

Patna High Court's Vacation Bench from 19- 22 May

Patna High Court's Vacation Bench has been notified the Vacation Bench for the Annual Vacation of the Patna High Court. The vacation ends June 12, June, 2025. The Court shall function during the Vacation from 8:30 A.M. to 10:30 A.M. and then from 11:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. with a recess of half an hour between 10:30 A.M. to 11:00 A.M. All mentions relating to urgent civil and criminal matters (including DB matters) shall be made before the senior most presiding Judge for being taken up as per assignment during the vacations. From 19th May 2to 22nd May 2025, the following ten judges have been assigned all mentions relating to urgent civil and criminal matters.  

Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma has been assigned civil and criminal Application Motion Bench and all urgent civil and criminal matters not assigned to any other bench and criminal matters under section 482 BNSS and Bail Matters under Juvenile Justice Act.

Justices Rajiv Roy, Harish Kumar, Arun Kumar Jha, Alok Kumar Pandey, Sunil Dutta Mishra and Chandra Shekhar Jha have been assigned criminal matters under section 482 BNSS including criminal appeal (Single Judge) S.C./S.T. anticipatory bail.

Justices Ashok Kumar Pandey, Sourendra Pandey and Soni Shrivastava have been assigned criminal matters under section 483 BNSS including criminal appeal (Single Judge) S.C./S.T. regular bail.

Supreme Court's Division Bench sets aside judgement by Justice Yashwant Varma led Bench which had set aside verdict of Single Judge of Delhi High Court

In Interstate Construction vs. National Projects Construction Ltd (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan directed against the judgment and order dated August 1, 2023 passed by Delhi High Court's Division Bench of Justice Yashwant Varma in FAO (OS) (Comm) No.175 of 2021. The 34-page long judgement was delivered on May 15 2025. It was authored by Justice Ujjal Bhuyan. 

Justice Varma had allowed the appeal of National Projects Construction Corporation Limited,(NPCC) or the respondent hereinafter, filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 after setting aside that part of the judgment and order dated August 2, 2021 passed by a Single Judge of the High Court under Section 34 of the 1996 Act upholding the directions contained in paragraph 58(b) of the award dated October 28, 2020 as well as setting aside the directions of the arbitral tribunal as contained in paragraph 58(b) of the said award.

The respondent had engaged the services of the appellant for executing a contract relating to Ramagundam Super Thermal Power Project, Ramagundam, District Karimnagar in the then composite State of Andhra Pradesh. In this regard, two separate work orders were issued. 

Thereafter, contract agreement was entered into between the parties. As per clause 4 of the conditions of contract read with clause 15 of the special conditions attached to the work orders, all the disputes and differences between the parties were to be settled by way of arbitration. 

It is stated that appellant had completed the contract work in the year 1987. The respondent had paid the appellant the contractual dues after withholding certain sums on account of recoveries. The appellant disputed such recoveries. The appellant also raised certain claims which were not accepted by the respondent. 

In view of such disputes and differences, appellant invoked the arbitration clause by issuing notice dated May 17, 1993.

The respondent did not take immediate steps for appointment of an arbitrator. After considerable delay, by communication dated October 7, 1997, respondent appointed Shivamoy Ghosh, Additional General Manager, NPCC, Madras Sector, Chennai as the sole arbitrator to arbitrate on the subject dispute.

The appellant filed statement of claims before the learned arbitrator on January 20, 1998 claiming an aggregate amount of Rs.4,46,29,404.00 along with pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 24 percent per annum till final realization of the amount. 

The appellant sought for a direction from the  arbitrator to the respondent to supply various documents related to the dispute. However,  arbitrator only permitted the appellant an opportunity to inspect the documents and did not issue any direction to the respondent for supply of copies.

The aggrieved thereby, appellant filed a petition under Section 14 of the 1996 Act before the High Court seeking termination of the mandate of the  arbitrator and for appointment of a new arbitrator in his place. This petition was registered as OMP No. 214/2002. By order dated October 11, 2004, Single Judge terminated the mandate of Shivamoy Ghosh and appointed Shri A.S. Chandhiok, Senior Advocate, as the sole arbitrator.

The respondent challenged the said order of the Single Judge dated  October 11, 2004 before the Division Bench of the High Court in FAO (OS) No.241/2004. By order dated February 2, 2005, Division Bench appointed Shri L.R. Gupta, retired Director General of CPWD as the sole arbitrator.

Before L.R. Gupta, the arbitrator, respondent while filing its reply to the statement of claims filed by the appellant, also challenged the authority of one Jagdish Raj Yadav to file the claim on behalf of the appellant. In this regard an application dated February 23, 2007 was filed before the arbitrator. The arbitrator dismissed the said application vide the order dated August 3, 2007.

This order was challenged by the respondent before the learned Single Judge of the High Court by filing a petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, being OMP No.537/2007.

Notably, L.R. Gupta resigned as the sole arbitrator on June 23, 2008. 

By order dated January 30, 2007, Single Judge disposed of the petition filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act bearing OMP No.537/2007.

The appellant filed a petition under Section 15 of the 1996 Act before the High Court being OMP (T) (Comm) No.30/2018 seeking appointment of an arbitrator in place of L.R. Gupta who had resigned. The said petition was disposed of by the Single Judge of the High Court vide order dated May 31, 2018 reconstituting the arbitral tribunal by appointing Justice R.C. Jain, a former Judge of the High Court, as the sole arbitrator to arbitrate on the disputes between the parties. 

The new arbitrator held the first hearing on May 3, 2019 and finally pronounced the award on October 28, 2020. While the arbitral tribunal allowed the claims of the appellant under several heads, we are concerned with the contentious part of the award relating to payment of interest (claim No. 7).

The respondent filed a petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act before the Single Bench of the High Court for setting aside the award dated October 28, 2020. The same was registered as OMP (Comm) No. 78/2021. By the judgment and order dated August 2, 2021, Single Judge partly allowed the petition by setting aside the award with regard to future interest at the rate exceeding 9 percent per annum from the date of the award till the date of payment. 

The aggrieved by the judgment and order dated August 2, 2021 passed by the Single Judge, respondent preferred an appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act before the Division Bench of the High Court which was registered as FAO (OS) (Comm) No. 175/2021. In the appeal, senior counsel for the respondent (which was the appellant before the Division Bench) clarified that the challenge would be restricted to the directions issued by the arbitral tribunal insofar the issue 9 of interest was concerned. This was further clarified by submitting that the challenge was not with respect to the rate of interest or award of interest for the pre-reference/past period. 

Grievance highlighted was against the directions contained in sub-paragraph (b)(i) of paragraph 58 to the extent of the arbitral tribunal stipulating that interest for the period mentioned therein would be leviable not merely on the principal amount as awarded but upon the said amount inclusive of the amount of interest relating to the pre-reference/past period. Likewise, arbitral tribunal awarded interest on identical terms in subparagraph (b)(ii) of paragraph 58 which was objected to. Division Bench of the High Court vide the judgment and order dated August 1, 2023 (impugned judgment) allowed the appeal by setting aside the directions contained in paragraph 58(b).

Aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed the related SLP (C) No.23235/2023 before the High Court. By order dated October 19, 2023, the Court issued notice. In the hearing held on February 25, 2025, leave was granted. 

There was no challenge by either parties to the award on merit, challenge of the respondent being confined only to the interest part. 

While holding that appellant was entitled to award of interest for the pre-reference period i.e. from the date on which the cause of action arose till filing of the claim before the arbitral tribunal as well as for the pendente lite period and also for the future period, arbitral tribunal agreed with the respondent that no interest should be awarded to the appellant for the period when there was absolute laches on the part of the appellant. The Arbitral tribunal held that for the period from 01.01.2009 till 31.12.2016, that is for a period of about eight years, there was complete laches on the part of the appellant. Therefore, the arbitral tribunal declared that appellant would not be entitled to any interest for the aforesaid period.

The respondent filed a petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act before the High Court impugning the arbitral award dated 28.10.2020. Vide the judgment and order dated 2.08.2021, Single Judge upheld the claims awarded by the arbitral tribunal. On the question of interest, Single Judge framed the question as to whether interest awarded by the arbitral tribunal was exorbitant and unsustainable. The Single Judge held that arbitral tribunal’s decision to award pre-reference interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum did not warrant any interference. As regards pendente lite interest,  Single Judge while noting that arbitral tribunal had awarded 12 percent interest per annum for the period from 20.01.1998 till 31.12.2008 and again from 01.01.2017 till 28.10.2020, justified the decision of the arbitral tribunal not to award interest for the period from 01.01.2009 to 31.12.2016 as during this period the appellant was remiss and did not pursue its claim before the arbitral tribunal diligently. On the rate of interest, Single Judge held that interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum could not by any stretch be considered to be exorbitant or unreasonable but held that 18 percent future interest from the date of the award till the date of payment granted by the arbitral tribunal was ex facie erroneous as according to learned Single Judge the interest rate should have been 2 percent higher than the current rate of interest prevalent on the date of the award.

Therefore, this portion of the award was set aside by the Single Judge; instead Single Judge awarded future interest holding that it could not have been in excess of 9 percent per annum. Therefore, Single Judge partly allowed the petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act to the extent of setting aside the award of future interest at a rate exceeding 9 percent per annum from the date of the award till the date of payment.

This brought the Court to the impugned judgment and order dated 01.08.2023. We have already noted about the limited nature of challenge made by the respondent during the hearing of the appeal filed under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. The senior counsel appearing for the respondent clarified that the challenge to the award stood restricted to the directions issued by the arbitral tribunal insofar the issue of interest was concerned. He clarified that the challenge was not with respect to either the rate at which interest was awarded or the grant of interest for the pre-reference/past period. The grievance was confined to the directions contained in paragraph 58(b)(i) of the award and the similar nature of interest in paragraph 58(b)(ii) inasmuch as the arbitral tribunal proceeded to award interest on identical terms: on the principal amount plus the amount of interest for the pre-reference/past period. Thr Division Bench referred to Section 31(7)(a) and (b) of the 1996 Act as well as placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Sayeed Ahmed and Company Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh  lite period have been subjected to further levy (2009) 12 SCC 26 and came to the following two conclusions:

i)Section 31(7) recognizes only two periods for which interest may be awarded. The two periods are, firstly from the date on which the cause of action arose till passing of the award and secondly from the date of the award till actual payment. Therefore, the distinction between pre-reference/past period and pendente lite period no longer existed. The period from the date of cause of action i.e. July, 1987 till the date of the award dated 28.10.2020 would constitute the period contemplated under Section 31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act. The period commencing from the date of award till payment would be the second period within the meaning of Section 31(7)(b) of the 1996 Act. 

Therefore, the arbitral tribunal committed an illegality in awarding interest for three periods: pre-reference/past periods, pendente lite and for the future period.

ii) Arbitral tribunal committed further illegality in forging the principal amount with interest as would be evident from paragraph 58(b) of the award. Interest awarded for the pre-reference period as well as for the pendente lite period have been subjected to further levy of interest for the said periods by adding the interest amount with the principal amount awarded. This amounted to levying compound interest which is impermissible. Accordingly, the directions contained in paragraph 58(b) were set aside by the Division Bench.

In the Court's considered view, the reasonings given by the Division Bench are fallacious. We say so for the reasons mentioned hereunder. Section 31 of the 1996 Act is the relevant provision.

It deals with the form and contents of arbitral award. Section 31 has eight sub-sections. Sub-section (7) is central to the debate and after the amendment with retrospective effect from 23.10.2015. 

The Court observed:"We are unable to agree with the view expressed by the Division Bench. Even in Sayeed Ahmed and Company (supra) relied upon by the Division Bench, the Bench held that Section 31(7) had carved out two periods, the first period being from the date on which the cause of action arose till the date on which the award is made and the second period being from the date of award till the date of payment. As regards the first period, the Bench clarified that it includes the pre-reference period plus pendente lite period. Though the arbitral tribunal had granted interest for three periods: pre-reference period, pendente lite and post award period, the first two period basically comprises of the period contemplated under clause (a) of sub-section (7) of Section 31. It is another matter that the arbitral tribunal awarded varying degrees of interest for the two sub-periods: 18 percent per annum for the pre-reference period and 12 percent as pendente lite, excluding from the said period, the period of eight years when the appellant was found to be remiss in pursuing its claims before the arbitral tribunal. This is also permissible as we shall explain.

Therefore, Sayeed Ahmed and Company (supra) does not exclude or does not say that interest should not be granted for the pre-reference period. All that it explains is that Section 31(7)(a) has joined the two periods of interest: pre-reference and pendente lite."

It added: "This position has been clarified by a recent decision of the High Court in Pam Developments Private Limited Vs. State of West Bengal (2024) 10 SCC 715 After extracting Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act, the High Court held that power of the arbitrator to grant pre-reference interest, pendente lite interest and post award interest under Section 31(7) of the 1996 is now fairly well settled. The Bench, thereafter, culled out the following legal propositions in this regard highlighting the difference in the position of law qua the Arbitration Act, 1940 vis-à-vis the 1996 Act."

This position has been further explained by a recent decision of this Bench in North Delhi Municipal Corporation vs. S.A. Builders Ltd. (2024) SCC Online SC 3768. After adverting to Section 31(7) of the 1996. Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act, the Supreme Court explained it as under:

36.1. From a minute reading of sub-section (7), it is seen that it has got two parts: the first part i.e. clause (a) deals with passing of award which would include interest up to the date on which the award is made. The second part i.e. clause (b) deals with grant of interest on the ‘sum’ awarded by the arbitral tribunal.

The Court noted that the Bench had observed that under Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act, an arbitral tribunal has the power to grant – (i) pre-award (ii) pendente lite (iii) post-award interest. The Bench explained the reason for award of such interest in the following manner:

From the provisions contained in Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act, it is evident that an arbitral tribunal has the power to grant (i) pre-award (ii) pendente lite (iii) post-award interest. Intention behind awarding pre-award interest is primarily to compensate the claimant for the pecuniary loss suffered from the time the cause of action arose till passing of the arbitral award. 

Further, this is also to ensure that the arbitral proceeding is concluded within a reasonable period to minimise the impact of the pre-award interest as well as interest pendente lite; thereby promoting efficiency in the arbitration process. Similarly, grant of post-award interest also serves a salutary purpose. It primarily acts as a disincentive to the award debtor not to delay payment of the arbitral amount to the award holder.

Thus, what Section 31(7)(a) has done is that there is now a statutory recognition of the power of the arbitral tribunal to grant pre-reference interest from the date on which the cause of action arose till the date on which the award is made. There was a vacuum in the Arbitration Act, 1940 as there was no such provision for granting pre-reference interest. It was through judicial pronouncements that such power of the arbitrator to grant pre-reference interest was conferred. Now under Section 31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act, such power is statutorily recognized.

A careful and minute reading of clause (a) of sub-section (7) of Section 31 of the 1996 Act makes it clear that the arbitral tribunal has the discretion to include in the sum awarded interest at such rate as it deems reasonable on the whole or any part of the money awarded for the whole or any part of the period from the date on which the cause of action arose till the date on which the award is made. 

The Supreme Court excluded that part of the sentence ‘on the whole or any part of the money’ from its analysis since it thought it was not relevant to the controversy. If we exclude this portion, what then becomes discernible is that the arbitral tribunal has the discretion to include in the sum awarded : firstly, interest at such rate as it deems reasonable; and secondly, for the whole or any part of the period between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made. This would mean that the arbitral tribunal can exclude a period from the date on which the cause of action arose till the date on which the award is made for the purpose of grant of interest, as has been done in the present case. It would also mean that the arbitral tribunal can grant interest for the whole or any part of the period between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made. It can be a composite period or the said period can be further sub-divided, as done in the present case i.e. from the date of cause of action to filing of the claim and from the date of filing of the claim till the date of the award excluding the period when the appellant was found to be remiss. It would also mean that there can be one rate of interest for the whole period or one or more rates of interest for the sub-divided periods as has been done in the instant case.

In Court's opinion, this would be the correct approach to interpret Section 31(7)(a), given the scheme of the 1996 Act.

That being the position, we are of the view that the Division Bench had fallen in error by holding that the arbitral tribunal had no jurisdiction to award interest for two periods i.e.pre-reference and pendente lite when the statute provides for only one period viz. from the date when the cause of action arose till the date of the award. The view expressed by the High Court is not the correct interpretation of Section 37(1)(a) of the 1996 Act as explained by us supra as well as in Pam Developments Private Limited (supra) and S.A. Builders Ltd. (supra).

The Supreme Court dealt with the second issue on which the High Court set aside the directions of the arbitral tribunal contained in paragraph 58(b) of the award. According to the Division Bench, the arbitral tribunal had committed an illegality in forging the principal amount with interest while computing the awarded amount on which future interest is to be paid. Interest awarded for the past period could not have been subjected to further levy of interest during the pendente lite or post award period on merger with the principal amount as this would amount to levy of compound interest.

This aspect of the matter is no longer res integra.

In State of Haryana vs. S.L. Arora (2010) 3 SCC 690, a 2-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court observed that as regards pre-award period,interest has to be awarded as specified in the contract and in the absence of any contract, as per the discretion of the arbitral tribunal. However, with regard to the post-award period, the interest is payable as per the discretion of the arbitral tribunal and in the absence of exercise of such discretion, at the mandatory statutory rate of 18 percent per annum. Award of interest like award of cost are ancillary matters. Therefore, the expressions sum for which the award is made and the sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award contextually refers to the award on the substantive claims and not ancillary or consequential directions relating to interest or cost. It was held that arbitral tribunals did not have the power to award interest upon interest or compound interest either for the pre-award period or for the post-award period.

A 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. vs. Governor, State of Orissa (2015) 2 SCC 189 opined that it was not possible to agree with the conclusion in S.L.Arora (supra) that Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act does not require that interest which accrues till the date of the award be included in the sum from the date of the award for calculating the post award interest. Justice Bobde (as His Lordship then was) authoring the majority opinion was of the view that the conclusion reached in S.L. Arora (supra) did not seem to be in consonance with the clear language of Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra) declared that S.L.Arora (supra) was wrongly decided in that it held that a sum directed to be paid by an arbitral tribunal and the reference to the award on the substantive claim did not refer to interest pendente lite awarded on the sum directed to be paid upon award and that in the absence of any provision of interest upon interest in the contract, the arbitral tribunal did not have the power to award interest upon interest or compound interest either for the pre-award period or for the post-award period. It has been clarified that the ‘sum’ includes the principal as adjudged together with the interest granted.

A three-Judge Bench of this Court in UHL Power Company Ltd. vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2022) 4 SCC 116 declared that the judgment in S.L. Arora (supra) has since been overruled by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra). The majority view in Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra) is that post-award interest can be granted by an arbitrator on the interest amount awarded.

This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions (please see Delhi Airport Metro Express Private Ltd. vs. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (2022) 9 SCC 286 and Morgan Securities and Credits Private Ltd. vs. Videocon Industries Limited (2023) 1 SCC 602.

In S.A. Builders (supra), this very Bench of the Court after a thorough analysis of Section 31(7)(a) and Section 31(7)(b) of the 1996 Act had come to the following conclusion:

It emerged from the analysis that "the ‘sum’ so awarded by the arbitral tribunal which may include interest from the date when the cause of action arose to the date of the award, would carry further interest of 18 percent from the date of the award to the date of payment unless the arbitral award otherwise directs (referring to the pre 23.10.2015 position). Thus, the legislative intent is that the awarded sum whether inclusive of interest or not, in case included, then from the date of cause of action to the date of award, would carry further interest from the date of the award to the date of payment."

The Court concluded: "It has been held that the sum awarded would mean the principal amount plus the interest awarded from the date of cause of action upto the date of the award. The sum awarded in Section 31(7)(a) would mean principal amount plus the interest awarded. Thereafter, as per Section 31(7)(b) of the 1996 Act, the sum (principal amount + interest) would carry further interest at the rate of 2 per cent higher than the current rate of interest prevalent on the date of the award to the date of payment. Therefore, in view of the clear legal position delineated as above, impugned judgment of the Division Bench dated 01.08.2023 cannot be sustained."

Complying with Supreme Court's verdict, President seeks Court's opinion

In exercise of the powers conferred upon me by clause (1) of Article 143 of the Constitution of India, Droupadi Murmu, President of India has referred the following questions to the Supreme Court of India for consideration and to report its opinion thereon, namely:- 

1. What are the constitutional options before a Governor when a Bill is presented to him under Article 200 of the Constitution of India? 

2. Is the Governor bound by the aid & advice tendered by the Council of Ministers while exercising all the options available with him when a Bill is presented before him under Article 200 of the Constitution of India? 

3. Is the exercise of constitutional discretion by the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution of India justiciable? 

4. Is Article 361 of the Constitution of India an absolute bar to the judicial review in relation to the actions of a Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution of India? 

5. In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed time limit, and the manner of exercise of powers by the Governor, can timelines be imposed and the manner of exercise be prescribed through judicial orders for the exercise of all powers under Article 200 of the Constitution of India by the Governor? 

6. Is the exercise of constitutional discretion by the President under Article 201 of the Constitution of India justiciable?

7. In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed timeline and the manner of exercise of powers by the President, can timelines be imposed and the manner of exercise be prescribed through judicial orders for the exercise of discretion by the President under Article 201 of the Constitution of India?

8. In light of the constitutional scheme governing the powers of the President, is the President required to seek advice of the Supreme Court by way of a reference under Article 143 of the Constitution of India and take the opinion of the Supreme Court when the Governor reserves a Bill for the President's assent or otherwise?

9. Are the decisions of the Governor and the President under Article 200 and Article 201 of the Constitution of India, respectively, justiciable at a stage anterior into the law coming into force? Is it permissible for the Courts to undertake judicial adjudication over the contents of a Bill, in any manner, before it becomes law?

10. Can the exercise of constitutional powers and the orders of/by the President / Governor be substituted in any manner under Article 142 of the Constitution of India?

11. Is a law made by the State legislature a law in force without the assent of the Governor granted under Article 200 of the Constitution of India?

12. In view of the proviso to Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India, is it not mandatory for any bench of this Hon'ble Court to first decide as to whether the question involved in the proceedings before it is of such a nature which involves substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of constitution and to refer it to a bench of minimum five Judges?

13. Do the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India limited to matters of procedural law or Article 142 of the Constitution of India extends to issuing directions /passing orders which are contrary to or inconsistent with existing substantive or procedural provisions of the Constitution or law in force?

14. Does the Constitution bar any other jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to resolve disputes between the Union Government and the State Governments except by way of a suit under Article 131 of the Constitution of India?

Under Article 143(1), the President can refer any question of law or fact of public importance to the Supreme Court for its opinion, which has constitutional significance.

It is noteworthy that the President has sought Court's opinion in compliance with Supreme Court's decision dated April 8, 2025 in The State of Tamil Nadu vs. The Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) on judicial review of the exercise of power by the Governor under Article 200 and the exercise of power by the President under Article 201, the President has sought the opinion of the Court. 

The Court had observed:"434 (XX)Whenever, in exercise of the powers under Article 200 of the Constitution, a bill is reserved for the consideration of the President on grounds of patent unconstitutionality that are of such a nature so as to cause peril to the principles of representative democracy, the President, must be guided by the fact that it is the constitutional courts which have been entrusted with the responsibility of adjudicating upon the questions of constitutionality and legality of an executive or legislative action. Therefore, as a measure of prudence, the President ought to make a reference to this Court in exercise of his powers under Article 143 of the Constitution" at page no. 399-400. 

The Court answered the questions of the law saying, "In discharge of his functions under Article 200, the Governor has three options to choose from when a bill passed by the State legislature is presented to him –i. First, to assent; ii.Secondly, to withhold assent; or iii. Thirdly, to reserve the bill for the consideration of the President."

In conclusion, the judgement reads: "The first proviso to Article 200 should be read in conjunction with the option of withholding of assent provided in the substantive part of Article 200. It is not an independent course of action and has to be mandatorily initiated by the Governor in cases where the option of withholding of assent is to be exercised." It clarified that the decision of the Court in State of Punjab vs. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab reported in (2024) 1SCC 384) lays down the correct position of law in this regard. 

The judgement observed that President and Governor do not hold the power to exercise ‘absolute veto’ on any bill, asserted Supreme Court's division bench of Justices J. B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan in it's 414 page long judgement on April 8, 2025. It reads:"We direct the Registry to send one copy each of this judgment to all the High Courts and the Principal Secretaries to the Governors of all States." It made it crystal clear that when Governor of any State reserves a bill for the consideration contrary to the aid and advice tendered to him by the State Council of Ministers, it shall be open to the State Government to assail such an action before the relevant High Court or the Supreme Court."

Also read: Supreme Court declares the "ten Bills" as deemed to have been assented by Governor, sets deadlines for President and Governor

Justices Vipul Pancholi led bench dismisses bail application, complies with Supreme Court's order which setting aside order of Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh led bench in a murder case

Complying with Supreme Court's Division Bench's order dated February 11, 2025, Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Vipul M. Pancholi and Alok Kumar Pandey decided Suchit Bind vs. The State of Bihar (2025) on March 26, 2025 by drawing on the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Omprakash Sahni vs. Jai Shankar Chaudhary & Anr., reported in (2023) 6 SCC 123, in which the Supreme Court has observed in para-33 of its judgement as under:-
“33. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law, the endeavour on the part of the court, therefore, should be to see as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and accepted by the trial court can be said to be a case in which, ultimately the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal. If the answer to the abovesaid question is to be in the affirmative, as a necessary corollary, we shall have to say that, if ultimately the convict appears to be entitled to have an acquittal at the hands of this Court, he should not be kept behind the bars for a pretty long time till the conclusion of the appeal, which usually takes very long for decision and disposal. However, while undertaking the exercise to ascertain whether the convict has fair chances of acquittal, what is to be looked into is something palpable. To put it in other words, something which is very apparent or gross on the face of the record, on the basis of which, the court can arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that the conviction may not be sustainable. The appellate court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 CrPC and try to pick up a few lacunae or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution. Such would not be a correct approach.” 

The Division Bench of Justices M.R. Shah and J.B. Pardiwala had set aside the judgement dated September 16, 2022 of the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Chakradhari Sharan Singh and Khatim Reza.  

In 15-page long order, the High Court concluded: "we are of the view that the present is not a fit case in which powers under Section-389 of Cr.P.C. are required to be exercised in favour of the present applicant and thereby suspend the sentence of the present applicant. 22. We are of the view that no case has been made out by the applicant/appellant for suspension of sentence and grant of bail on merits and, therefore, merely because the applicant is in custody for last four years, he cannot be released on bail. The application deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed." 

It also relied on Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma vs. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2008) 5 SCC 230, in which the Supreme Court has observed in para-30 it is well settled, as observed in Vijay Kumar [(2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195 : JT 2002 Supp (1) SC 60] that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, the Court should consider all the relevant factors like the nature of accusation made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the desirability of releasing the accused on bail after he has been convicted for committing serious offence of murder, etc. It has also been observed in some of the cases that normal practice in such cases is not to suspend the sentence and it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted.”

The High Court observed: "the Appellate Court should not re-appreciate evidence at the stage of Section 389 Cr.P.C. and try to pick up a few lacunae or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution." It also observed that "we are of the view that, at this stage, while deciding the prayer for suspension of sentence of the minor lacunae or loopholes of the prosecution cannot be examined."

SLP was filed in the Supreme Court against the impugned order of the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhir Singh and Chandra Prakash Singh in I.A. No.2 of 2023 in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.167 of 2022 wherein the sentence of second respondent was suspended and he was released on bail.  The allegation against the appellants was of killing the brother of the informant. In Narendra Prasad @ Nagendra Prajapati vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma had observed: "We have considered the arguments advanced at the Bar in light of the impugned order and also the fact that the appeal is of the year 2022 which is pending before the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna. On perusal of the  impugned order, we find that the contentions of the second  respondent herein /accused has been noted, but no contention on behalf of the Additional Public Prosecutor or the learned counsel for the informant has been noted by the High Court and  the relief of suspension of sentence and bail has been granted to the second respondent-accused in a case where the accused have been convicted by the Sessions Court under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC." The judgement was delivered on February 11, 2025. 

The counsel for the appellants had submitted that as per the allegation Suchit Bind, the appellant no. 1 inflicted axe blow on the head of the deceased but in the postmortem the doctor has opined that the injury was caused by hard blunt substance. The other two appellants were: Sechu Bind and Abhimanyu Bind. The the sentence of the appellant nos. 2 and 3, namely, Sechu Bind and Abhimanyu Bind was suspended and the appellant nos. 2 and 3, namely, Sechu Bind and Abhimanyu Bind were released on bail by the order dated January 4, 2023 of High Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhir Singh and Alok  Kumar Pandey after hearing after hearing I.A. No.1 of 2023. The former has authored the order. The sentence of the appellant no. 1, namely, Suchit Bind was suspended and the appellant no. 1 be released on bail by his order dated May 3, 2023 after hearing I.A. No.2 of 2023.

The Supreme Court's judgement reads: "We find that the approach of the High Court has not been in accordance with what is required to be considered in the matter of suspension of sentence and grant of bail in an appeal filed as against a conviction of life sentence and fine. In this regard, the judgments of this Court are very instructive.

The Court concluded: "In the circumstances, on that short ground alone, we set aside the impugned order. We remand the matter to the High  Court. We request the High Court to reconsider IA No.2 of 2023 in accordance with law and as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of one month from the date the parties, who are represented by their respective counsel, would appear before the High Court. The parties shall appear before the High Court of Judicature at Patna either in person or through counsel on 17.03.2025 without expecting any separate notices being issued by the High Court. In the event the second respondent herein fails to appear or be represented before the High Court on 17.03.2025, the High Court shall take appropriate steps to secure his presence." After the order of the High Court was set aside the applicant surrendered before the jail authority on March 24, 2025 and he is in custody since then.

The Supreme Court had clarified that it had not made any observations on the merits of I.A.No.2 of 2023 in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.167 of 2022. The appeal was allowed. The case was before Additional District and Sessions Judge XI, Kaimur at Bhabua in a Sessions Trial of 2019, arising out of Durgawati police case of 2019. The trial court had convicted the applicant for committing the offence punishable under Section-302 of I.P.C. He was sentenced to suffer life imprisonment.

Kamakhya Giri NDPS case reaches Supreme Court

Patna High Court's Division bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Vipul M. Pancholi had upheld the  judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated March 8, 2019 and March 14, 2019 respectively, rendered by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (NDPS) Act, Aurangabad arising out of a case of 2016, whereby all the appellants were convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 8-20 (b) ii (C) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 14 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,50,000/- each and in default of payment of fine to undergo S.I. for six months each. 

In its judgement dated August 2, 2023, the Division Bench observed: "Thus, only because a Magistrate was not present when samples were drawn, we have no other reasons to doubt the correctness of the prosecution version that the appellants were carrying narcotics with them. 29. We have also gone through the reasoning recorded by the Trial Court while passing the impugned order of conviction and we are of the view that the Trial Court has not committed any error while passing the impugned order of conviction and, therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the same in the present appeals filed by the appellants-accused." The judgement has been challenged in the Supreme Court. The appeal was called on for hearing  on May 13, 2025.

The FIR states that pursuant to a secret information on October 2, 2016, at about 08:10. a.m. that a pick-up van bearing Registration No. BR 04M 0561 which was being used in transportation of huge quantity of Ganja. The pick-up van was intercepted and stopped near Batane river. During search, four persons, namely, Raushan Kumar, Ram Lakhan Tiwary, Upendra Giri and Suraj Sao @ Rukhi Sao were found sitting in the van. It was stated that during search, 898 kg of Ganja was recovered and seized. 

The counsel of the appellants- accused submitted that out of ten witnesses, eight witnesses are police personnel and, therefore, they are interested witnesses. Two other formal witnesses have been examined by the prosecution. However, the prosecution has failed to examine any independent witnesses. Thus, the Trial Court ought not to have relied upon the deposition given by the interested witnesses. It is further submitted that there is no recovery of Ganja from physical possession/conscious possession of the appellants-accused and the seized Ganja was found from the pick-up van, as alleged by the prosecution. However, so far as carrying out the search is concerned, the Investigating Agenc has not complied with the mandatory provisions of NDPS Act. Search was not carried out in presence of Gazetted Officers or Magistrate and, therefore, on the ground of violation of mandatory provisions of NDPS Act, the Trial Court ought to have acquitted the appellants-accused. 

The counsel appearing for the defence also contended that while collecting the samples from the packets which were prepared by the Investigating Agency, proper procedure has not been followed and, therefore, the report given by the concerned FSL may not be believed by this Court. It was further submitted that theguidelines issued by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Mohanlal & Anr., reported in (2016) 3 SCC 379 has not been followed and thereby there is violation of provisions contained in Section 52A of the NDPS Act.

The counsel of the accused Ram Lakhan Tiwary submitted that the accused was only an occupant of the vehicle and he was not at all aware about the fact that alleged Ganja is being kept in the said pick-up van. He urged that impugned order of conviction passed by the concerned Trial Court be quashed and set aside.

Supreme Court warns Shailesh Kumar, an advocate from Begusarai

In Shailesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's bench of Justices Surya Kant and N.K Singh observed:"The application is totally frivolous. The same is, accordingly, dismissed. However, we refrain to impose exemplary costs on the petitioner at this time. If he will move any such application in future, strict action will be taken against him." It was filed on October 29, 2024 and registered on January 27, 2025 against Court's final judgment and order dated October 5, 2024. The order May 9, 2025 states that the case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated October 5, 2024 in M.A. No.1500/2024 in SLP (Crl.) No. 12133/2024 passed by the Supreme Court of India but final judgment and order seems to be unavailable on the Court's website. The order dated February 2, 2024 reads: "The petitioner, who appears in person, is not present. The matter was listed on 10.11.2023 and also on 12.12.2023. However, none had appeared. On two dates, no adverse orders were passed.The special leave petition is dismissed in default."

The order dated August 30, 2024 by bench of Justices Surya Kant and Ujjal Bhuyan had recorded: "The petitioner has informed this Court that now he is law graduate. He candidly acknowledges that earlier he had 42 mobile numbers and about 15 bank accounts. That being so, it would be expedient and in the interest of justice that the petitioner appears before the Trial Court and extends full cooperation in the pending proceedings."

Supreme Court's order dated December 12, 2023 shows that the case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated April 12, 2023 in CRWJC No. 2430/2018 passed by the Patna High Court but the judgment and order in question seems to be unavailable on the High Court's website. 

Supreme Court partly sets aside order of Delhi High Court's Division Bench in Wikimedia Foundation vs. ANI Media Private Limited case

In Wikimedia Foundation Inc. vs. ANI Media Private Limited and Ors.(2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan allowed the civil appeal. It concluded:" we are of the firm view that the Division Bench had reacted disproportionately while issuing the impugned directions....we have no hesitation in our mind that such directions could not have issued. Accordingly, the impugned directions contained in para 5 of the impugned order dated 16.10.2024 are hereby set aside." The three other respondents were: Daniel Quilan, Vanamondle and Wikiholic.

The appeal was directed against the order dated October 16, 2024 passed by Delhi High Court's Division Bench comprising Justices Manmohan and Tushar Rao Gedela.

The order of the High Court reads: "On the last date of hearing, learned counsel for respondent No. l had drawn this Court's attention to a page published on the website 'Wikipedia 'wherein the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge in CS(OS)524/2024 was adversely commented upon. It was stated in the said publication that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge to release the identities of the editors who made the edits amounted to 'censorship and a threat to the flow of information’. This Court is of the prima facie view that the aforesaid comment on the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge amounts to interference in Court proceedings, and that too, on a website managed by Wikimedia Foundation Inc. who is a defendant in the suit. The sub judice principle, prima facie, seems to have been 'violated with impunity' by Wikimedia Foundation Inc. - the appellant herein. This Court is also informed by the learned counsel for respondent No. l that after the last hearing, the observations made by this Bench have been 'opened up for discussion' on Wikimedia Foundation Inc. website which, according to us, complicates and compounds the issue at hand....5. Since this Court is of the prima facie view that the aforesaid comments on the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and the discussion on the observations made by this Bench amount to interference in court proceedings and violation of the sub judice principle by a party to the proceeding and borders on contempt, this Court directs Wikimedia Foundation Inc.- the appellant herein to take down/delete the said pages and discussion with regard to the observations made by this Court within thirty six (36) hours...."

When the related special leave petition was moved on 17.03.2025, Supreme Court while issuing notice to ANI Media Private Limited observed:"We are concerned with the legality and validity of the directions issued by the High Court in paragraph 5 of the impugned order."

Supreme Court did not address the merit of the case between the parties. It was primarily concerned with the legality and propriety of the direction of the High Court to the appellant to take down/delete the pages and discussion with regard to the observations made by the High Court. That is the width and scope of this appeal.

ANI has instituted a suit before the High Court against Wikimedia Foundation, the appellant and others praying for an order against the defendants, restraining them from posting, publishing, uploading, writing, speaking, distributing and/ or republishing any false, misleading and defamatory content against the plaintiff on any platform, including the platform maintained by defendant No. 1 and also pass an injunction against the defendant No. 1 or its agents or any person acting on its behalf or under its authority, directing it to remove all false, misleading and defamatory content against the plaintiff available on its platform, which can tarnish the reputation of the plaintiff and further restrain its users and administrators from publishing anything defamatory against the plaintiff on its platform.

The order dated August 20, 2024 passed by Justice Navin Chawla, a Single Judge of the High Court reads: "The learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that defendant Nos. 2 to 4 are claimed to be the ‘Administrators' of defendant No. l. Learned senior counsel for defendant No. l submits that they have no connection with defendant Nos. 2 to 4. Keeping in view the above submissions, defendant No. l is directed to disclose the subscriber details of defendant Nos.2 to 4 to the plaintiff, through its counsel, within a period of two weeks from today. On receipt of the said information, the plaintiff shall take steps for ensuring service of summons and notice on the application on the said defendants."

The respondent had filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, Order X Rule 2 and Order XI read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the suit seeking initiation of contempt proceedings against the appellant for alleged willful disobedience to the order dated August 20, 2024. 

The Supreme Court has recorded that on September 17, 2024, an opinion piece was published in the Indian Express (E-edition) titled why the case against Wikipedia in India is a challenge to freedom of speech and information. It was also hosted on the platform of the appellant. The article mentioned that while issuing contempt notice, the Single Judge had reportedly said: If you don’t like India, please don’t work in India: we will ask the Government to block your site. It implied that there was a failure to understand the nature of the medium i.e. Wikipedia, it was claimed that the court’s decision to hold some members accountable and punish a community of volunteers by disclosing their private information was a challenge to freedom of speech and information. The effect this would produce is that any form of critical information that a powerful organization does not like can be censored or become grounds for punishment which would set a wrong precedent.

The appellant preferred an appeal against the order dated August 20, 2024, before the Division Bench of the High Court under Section 104 of the Civil Procedure Code read with Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the said Code for setting aside of the order.

When the matter came before the Division Bench on October 14, 2024, the respondent complained that publishing of such a page on the platform of the appellant was intended to pressurize the Single Judge. When appellant sought for time to seek instructions the court directed the matter to be listed for hearing on October 16, 2024. On October 14, 2024, a talk page was hosted on the appellant’s platform opening up discussions on the ongoing proceedings between the parties before the High Court. On October 16, 2024, the impugned order was passed which referred to the discussion page. It is apparent that the Division Bench was palpably in error in holding that a prima facie case of interference in court proceeding, violation of the sub judice principle by a party to the proceeding and bordering on contempt was made out. The High Court failed to consider that appellant is merely an intermediary having the limited role of providing technical infrastructure to host the platform and does not edit, update, maintain or monitor the contents on the platform. This was applicable to the talk page as well as to the video. The appellant, not being the author, cannot be said to have violated the sub judice principle merely because the two pages were hosted on its platform. In any case, what were being hosted were secondary source material.

A decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India (2012) 10 SCC 603 provides for an order for postponement of publication in the event of violation of the subjudice principle but for determining such violation, the Constitution Bench set out the following criteria:
1. There is a real and substantial risk of prejudice to fairness of the trial or to the proper administration of justice;
2. Reasonable alternative methods will not prevent the risk to fairness of the trial. 

The High Court's Division Bench order did not discuss as to how the pages hosted on the platform to the appellant constitute a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the pending proceedings before the Single Judge. The impugned order seemed devoid of any reason. The direction to take down he said pages seemed to be an unreasoned, unwarranted one and in violation of the right to open justice guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It impinges upon the freedom of speech and expression, a guaranteed right under Article 19(1)(a).The view taken by the Division Bench that the contents of the pages hosted on the appellant’s platform borders on contempt seemed wholly unjustified. It failed to consider that the pages were derived from other published secondary sources. Those were publicly available. The passing of orders like the impugned order adversely affected right to free speech and the right to know. It impinged upon the right to freely access and use the medium of internet. The impugned order was unsustainable and was liable to be set aside.

In the penultimate paragraph of the judgement, the Supreme Court observed:"For the improvement of any system and that includes the judiciary, introspection is the key. That can happen only if there is a robust debate even on issues which are before the court. Both the judiciary and the media are the foundational pillars of democracy which is a basic feature of our Constitution. For a liberal democracy to thrive, both must supplement each other....Though the contention of the appellant is that it is an intermediary in terms of Section 2(1)(w) read with Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 providing only technical infrastructure that host the platform and does not (a) publish, add or remove content on the platform, (b) decide which users are vested with certain technical privileges or (c) continually judge and censor the content posted on the platform, thereby not liable for any third party information, data, or communication link made available or hosted by it, we are not inclined to examine this aspect of the matter since it may have a bearing on the proceedings of the pending suit.

 Also read: Wikipedia vs. ANI case reaches Supreme Court

Delhi High Court seized with ANI's case against Wikimedia Foundation's Wikipedia

 

Acting Chief Justice led bench takes note of trees which require felling for roads between village Kumardih to Gidhaur in Jamui

Development: Whenever there is a conflict between a road and trees, roads ought to be given priority. 

In Bimal Kumar Mishra vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue and Land Reforms, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy recorded that "sanction has been granted by the Forest Department for felling trees standing on the land over which 200 metres road is to be constructed" and concluded:"It is expected that the road shall be constructed within a reasonable period of time, preferably within a period of four months. The writ petition stands consigned." The judgement was delivered on May 9, 2025. The PIL was filed on February 9, 2023 and registered on February 24, 

On April 28, 2023, the order of High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice and Justice Madhuresh Prasad recorded that "The petitioner is concerned with a link road between Village Kumardih to Gidhaur in the district of Jamui. The petitioner submits that the link road has been sanctioned and a contractor awarded the work but nothing has happened till date. The learned Additional Advocate General on instructions submits that there is an encroachment case filed and the property is a public land from which certain trees have to be removed." Divisional Forest Officer, Jamui, Bihar had suo motu impleaded as the additional 12th respondent. In its order dated July 21, 2023, it is recorded that "...1.5 kilometers road was to be constructed between Giddhaur, Jamuni road to village Kumardih and what is to be completed is only 200 meters, wherein a number of trees are standing. It is also stated therein that permission was sought for with the Forest Department to cut down the trees, which has not been considered till now."

The High Court's order dated August 18, 2023 had recorded:"...now the sanction has been accorded and the small strip of road which was to be constructed, which is the prayer in the writ petition would be satisfied insofar as the commencement of construction immediately." 

The eleven other respondents were:Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Jamui, Additional Collector, Jamui, Sub-Divisional Officer, Jamui Sadar, Jamui, Deputy Commissioner Land Reforms, Jamui Sadar, Jamui, Block Development Officer, Giddhaur, Jamui, Circle Officer, Giddhaur, Jamui, Principal Secretary, Rural Works Department, Government of Bihar, Engineer-in-Chief, Rural Works Department, Government of Bihar, Executive Engineer, Rural Works Department, Work Division, Jhajha, Jamui, Sub- Divisional Officer, Rural Works Department, Work Sub-Division, Giddhaur, Jamui and Divisional Forest Officer, Jamui.

It is apparent that Divisional Forest Officer, Jamui was eager to save the trees from felling. Had a study been done to secure the trees, co-existence of both trees and roads could have been possible without sacrificing the former.   

Justice Jitendra Kumar endorses order of Principal Judge, Family Court, Bhagalpur for maintenance of wife, daughter

In Avadh Kishore Sah @ Awadhesh Sah vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Justice Jitendra Kumar concluded:"I do not find any perversity of finding of any fact, or error of law, requiring any interference in the impugned order" dated January 14, 2020 passed by Principal Judge, Family Court, Bhagalpur. Justice Kumar clarified in his 32-page long judgement that the finding of the High Court regarding validity of the marriage between the parties and paternity of the child is tentative in nature, subject to any contrary finding of competent Civil Court or Family Court.

The Principal Judge had directed the petitioner to pay Rs.3,000/- per month to his wife and Rs.2,000/- per month to his daughter. The maintenance to the daughter is payable till her marriage as per the impugned order and arrears of the maintenance amount was directed to be paid in three installments within six months. The two other respondents are: Soni Devi, wife of Awadhesh Sah and Gudiya Kumari, daughter of Awadhesh Sah from Kalapganj, Mirjanhat, Mojahidpur, Bhagalpur who had filed a case under Section 125 Cr.PC for their maintenance against the petitioner and his parents on July 26, 2012. The petitioner was in government job and his income from cultivation and business was Rs.24,000/- per month.The marriage between the petitioner and Soni Devi was solemnized on march 18, 2010 and out of the wedlock, Gudiya Kumari was born. She had alleged that her husband, the petitioner was having illicit relationship with Khushbu Kumari and wanted to marry her to get handsome dowry.

The petitioner stated that his marriage was forcibly solemnized with Soni Devi at Bababudha Nath Temple, Bhagalpur. He also disputed the paternity of Gudiya Kumari, the daughter of Soni Devi. He stated that Gudiya Kumari was born to Soni Devi on August 8, 2010, whereas his marriage with Soni Devi was solemnized on March 18, 2010. Gudiya Kumari was born just after about 4 and ½ months of his marriage with Soni Devi. Awadhesh Sah claimed that his wife/Soni Devi was having illicit relationship with Vishnudeo Sah, her brother-in-law and she was not interested to continue her matrimonial life with him.  

The High Court recorded that as per Section 125 Cr.PC, wife was entitled to get maintenance from her husband, if she is living separately from her husband with sufficient reason, but not living in adultery, and she has no means to maintain herself and the husband, despite having sufficient means, neglects or refuses to maintain her. As per case laws, here wife means only a legally wedded wife.

As per Section 125(1)(b) Cr.PC, any legitimate or illegitimate minor child whether married or not but unable to maintain himself/herself is entitled to get maintenance from his/her father. 

The Court observed: "It is also settled principle of law that proceeding under Section 125 Cr.PC is summary in nature and meant to prevent the vagrancy and destitution of wife and children and provide a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to them. Hence, strict standard of proof is not required in proceeding under Section 125 Cr.PC unlike in matrimonial proceedings, where strict proof of marriage or paternity is essential."

The High Court referred to Supreme Court's decision in Kamala vs. M.R. Mohan Kumar, (2019) 11 SCC 491. The relevant para of the judgment reads:
“15. Unlike matrimonial proceedings where strict proof of marriage is essential, in the proceedings under Section 125 CrPC, such strict standard of proof is not necessary as it is summary in nature meant to prevent vagrancy. This Court has held that when the parties live together as husband and wife, there is a presumption that they are legally married couple for claim of maintenance of wife under Section 125 CrPC. Applying the well-settled principles, in the case in hand, Appellant 1 and the respondent were living together as husband and wife and had also begotten two children. Appellant 1 being the wife of the respondent, she and the children, Appellants 2 and 3 would be entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC.”

In Santosh vs. Naresh Pal, (1998) 8 SCC 447, Supreme Court has held that "...In a proceeding for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC the learned Magistrate was expected to pass appropriate orders after being prima facie satisfied about the marital status of parties. It is obvious that the said decision will be a tentative decision subject to final order in any civil proceedings, if the parties are so advised to adopt."

It emerges from Section 7, 8 and 20 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 that if the Civil Court or the Family Court passes any decree in regard to the validity of the marriage or paternity of the child not in consonance with the finding of the High Court in the proceeding under Section 125 Cr.PC, "the decree of the Civil Court/Family Court would prevail and the party concerned would be at liberty to modify the order passed under Section 125 Cr.PC, by moving application under Section 127 Cr.PC, which provides for alteration or modification of the order in changed circumstances."

The High Court observed: "It is also settled principle of law that in revisional jurisdiction, the High Court has no power to reassess evidence and substitute its own finding in regard to positive finding regarding validity of the marriage or paternity of the child, unless there is patent perversity of finding of the fact or error of jurisdiction or that of law. But in case of negative finding of Court in regard to validity of marriage or paternity of child, the High Court is required even in revisional jurisdiction to re- evaluate the evidence and come to a conclusion whether the findings or conclusions reached by the Family Court are legally sustainable or not, because on account of negative finding, the child is bastardized and wife is branded as unchaste woman."

The Court referred to Supreme Court's decision in Pravati Rani Sahoo vs. Bishnupada Sahoo, (2002) 10 SCC 510. It reads: “5.... Section 125 CrPC is intended to curtail destitution and also to ameliorate orphancy. The High Courts should be slow to interfere with a positive finding in favour of marriage and paternity of a child. Hence in such instances this Court has pointed out that High Courts shall not interfere with such fact findings. But that principle cannot be imported in the present case where a child happened to be bastardised as a consequence of the order passed by the Magistrate and the claimant was in effect found to be a woman of unvirtuous morality. In such a situation the High Court should have entertained revision and re-evaluated the evidence and come to a conclusion whether the findings or conclusions reached by the Magistrate are legally sustainable or not. While maintaining the difference in the overall approach between an appeal and a revision, the jurisdiction of the court has to be exercised by the High Court in revision."

The High Court has recorded that "the petitioner has not proved that his wife-Soni Devi was living in adultery."

The petitioner's claimed that Gudiya Kumari is not his legitimate daughter and she being born out of illicit relationship of Soni Devi with someone else, is illegitimate child of other man and hence, he is not liable to pay any maintenance to her.

The High Court pointed out that as per Section 112 of Evidence Act that a child born during continuation of a valid marriage between his/her mother and any man, the child is held to be legitimate son/daughter of that man, unless it is shown by that man that he had no access to his wife at any time when the child could have been conceived. Section 112 of the Evidence Act, 1872 reads as follows :-
“112. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy.—The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.”

The High Court relied on Supreme Court's decision in Aparna Ajinkya Firodia vs. Ajinkya Arun Firodia, as reported in (2024) 7 SCC 773, has observed that Section 112 embodies the rule of law that the birth of a child during the continuance of a valid marriage or within 280 days (i.e., within the period of gestation) after its dissolution shall be “conclusive proof” that the child is legitimate unless it is established by evidence that the husband and wife did not or could not have any access to each other at any time when the child could have been conceived. The object of this provision is to attach unimpeachable legitimacy to children born out of a valid marriage. When a child is born during the subsistence of lawful wedlock, it would mean that the parents had access to each other. Therefore, the Section speaks of “conclusive proof” of the legitimate birth of a child during the period of lawful wedlock.

The Supreme Court has further observed that “access” or “non-access” does not mean actual cohabitation but means the “existence” or “non-existence” of opportunities for sexual relationship. Section 112 refers to point of time of birth as the crucial aspect and not to the time of conception. The time of conception is relevant only to see whether the husband had or did not have access to the wife. Thus, birth during the continuance of marriage is “conclusive proof” of legitimacy unless “non-access” of the party who questions the paternity of the child at the time the child could have been begotten is proved by the said party.

In Goutam Kundu Vs. State of West Bengal & Anr. as reported in (1993) 3 SCC 418, the Supreme Court recalled the well- known maxim pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant (he is the father whom the marriage indicates). The presumption of legitimacy is this, that a child born of a married women is deemed to be legitimate, it throws on the person who is interested in making out the illegitimacy, the whole burden of proving it. The law presumes both that a marriage ceremony is valid, and that every person is legitimate. Marriage or filiation (parentage) may be presumed, the law in general presuming against vice and immorality. The High Court relied on this decision.

 

Supreme Court grants bail in fake POCSO case

In Ankit vs. State of Rajasthan (2022),  Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 3931/2022, order dated 15.12.2022, Supreme Court's bench of Justices B.R Gavai and Vikram Nath granted regular bail to a man accused under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, for kidnapping and raping a minor girl aged 16. The bench accepted the plea of the accused and observed: “Taking into consideration the nature of allegations and further that the charge sheet is filed and the trial has commenced and the petitioner is behind the bars for almost two and a half years, we are inclined to allow the prayer for bail.”

In this case, the FIR against the accused alleged that the minor girl was kidnapped from her parental house at night by the accused and two others and rape was committed repeatedly on her. The accused was 20 years old at the time of the incident. It is alleged that he, along with three other co-accused persons was involved in committing rape upon the daughter of the complainant after abducting her from her home during midnight. The accused has been in incarceration for a period of over 2 years.

The accused’s lawyer argued that the allegations are completely frivolous and vague and it appears that the entire FIR has been written in an afterthought manner as if the father of the alleged victim was present there, in order to to falsely implicate the petitioner and his friend, who happens to be cousin of the alleged victim and there is property dispute between the family. Also, on account of previous enmity between the parties over land dispute, other cases are also pending before various courts.

The petitioner's case was that he and the victim were in a relationship and when the victim’s family came to know about it, they fabricated the entire case. He also argued that as per the medical reports of the alleged victim, nothing could be revealed to show the involvement of the accused in commission of the alleged offence as mentioned in the FIR, nor any injuries were found on the body of the alleged victim which could reveal use of force or vigor upon her.

It was submitted that the three other co-accused, besides the accused in question, were named in the FIR but none of them have been charge sheeted.

Notably, Rajasthan High Court had denied bail to the accused on three occasions. 

Pope Francis cited Martin Heidegger, the author of "Being and Time" in his his last encyclical

On October 24, 2024, Pope Francis released his last encyclical wherein he refers to Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), the author of Being and Time (1927). The books' 1927 edition was edited by the author of On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1928), Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) who established phenomenology as the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. 

The opening paragraph of Heidegger's book reads: 'For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression "being". We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed." 

It reads: "Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word 'being' ? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning of Being. But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression 'Being'? Not at all. So first of all we must reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question. Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being."

Heidegger writes: "it will not be possible to interpret that ontology adequately until the question of Being has been clarified and answered and taken as a clue-at least, if we are to have regard for the soil from which the basic ontological concepts developed, and if we are to see whether the categories have been demonstrated in a way that is appropriate and complete. We shall therefore carry the discussion of these presuppositions only to the point at which the necessity for restating the question about the meaning of Being become plain. There are three such presuppositions."
1 . First, it has been maintained that 'Being' is the 'most universal' concept....An understanding of Being is already included in conceiving anything which one apprehends as an entity.'But the 'universality' of 'Being' is not that of a class or genus. The term 'Being' does not define that realm of entities which is uppermost when these are Articulated conceptually according to genus and species...The 'universality' of Being 'transcends' any universality of genus. In medieval ontology 'Being' is designated as a 'transcendens'. 

Drawing on Plato and Aristotle, Heidegger recalled how Hegel defined 'Being' as the 'indeterminate immediate' and makes this definition basic for all the further categorical explications of his 'logic'.  

2. Secondly, it is maintained that the concept of 'Being' is indefinable. This is deduced from its supreme universality, and rightly so...'Being' cannot indeed be conceived as an entity;....nor can it acquire such a character as to have the term "entity" applied to it. "Being" cannot be derived from higher concepts by definition, nor can it be presented through lower ones. But does this imply that 'Being' no longer offers a problem? Not at all. We can infer only that 'Being' cannot have the character of an entity. Thus we cannot apply to Being the concept of 'definition' as presented in traditional logic, which itself has its foundations in ancient ontology and which, within certain limits, provides a quite justifiable way of' defining "entities". The indefinability of Being does not eliminate the question of its meaning; it demands that we look that question in the face. 

3· Thirdly, it is held that 'Being' is of all concepts the one that is self evident. Whenever one cognizes anything or makes an assertion, whenever one comports oneself towards entities, even towards oneself, 1 some use is made of 'Being'; and this expression is held to be intelligible 'without further ado', just as everyone understands "The sky is blue', 'I am merry', and the like. But here we have an average kind of intelligibility, which merely demonstrates that this is unintelligible. It makes manifest that in any way of comporting oneself towards entities as entities-even in any Being towards entities as entities-there lies a priori an enigma. The very fact that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the meaning of Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again.

In his 590-page long Being and Time (1962 edition), Heidegger refers to these three kinds of Being:1) availableness (‘readiness-to-hand’ or ‘handiness’); 2) occurrentness (‘presence-at-hand’ or ‘objective presence’; and 3) existence, which is the kind of Being that characterizes human existence or ‘Dasein’. These three are not meant as an exhaustive list of the kinds of Being. He suggests other kinds of Being which includes: life, numbers, and perhaps nature. The works of art also have a distinct kind of Being. 

The relevant part of the Pope's encyclical reads: "For Heidegger, as interpreted by one contemporary thinker, philosophy does not begin with a simple concept or certainty, but with a shock:'Thought must be provoked before it begins to work with concepts or while it works with them. Without deep emotion, thought cannot begin. The first mental image would thus be goose bumps. What first stirs one to think and question is deep emotion. Philosophy always takes place in a basic mood (Stimmung)'."

-Byung-Chul Han, Heideggers Herz. Zum Begriff der Stimmung bei Martin Heidegger, München, 1996, p. 39 cited in https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/20241024-enciclica-dilexit-nos.html#_ftn12

The German word Stimmung refers to something between mood and atmosphere. Being in a mood means a subjective feeling that separates oneself from others.

The encyclical concludes saying: "In a world where everything is bought and sold, people’s sense of their worth appears increasingly to depend on what they can accumulate with the power of money. We are constantly being pushed to keep buying, consuming and distracting ourselves, held captive to a demeaning system that prevents us from looking beyond our immediate and petty needs."