Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra upholds the order by Sub- Judge XII, Gaya in a Partition Suit of 2017

In Ajay Kumar Singh & Anr. vs. Binod Pratap Singh & Ors. (2026), Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra delivered a 20-page long judgement dated September 8, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"the learned Trial Court has not committed any error of law in rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) of the C.P.C. and has rightly refused to reject the plaint. There is no valid ground to interfere with the well considered order passed by the learned Trial Court. The parties are at liberty to contest the suit on merits. They have right to get the necessary relevant issues framed in the suit including that of suit being barred by any provision of law and if any issue is framed, it will be open for the Trial Court to consider the same on merits after the parties have led evidence. In such a situation, the petitioners/defendants have not suffered any prejudice. 25. In the result, this Civil Revision is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs."

The civil revision petition was preferred by the petitioners for setting aside the order dated May 1, 2017 passed by Sub- Judge XII, Gaya in Partition Suit No. 146 of 2017 (25/2013, 68/2013) (Binod Pratap Singh v. Vinay Kumar Singh & Others) whereby the Trial Court dismissed the application filed by petitioners/defendant nos. 3 and 6 for rejection of the plaint of the suit under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 

The case was that respondent no.1, Binod Pratap Singh, had filed a partition suit for partition claiming 1/5th share in the suit properties which include immovable and movable properties alleging that all the suit properties are joint family property of the plaintiff and the defendants which are both ancestral as well as purchased properties in the name of different members of the family out of the family funds are inherited from his father Indradeo Prasad Singh. He impleaded his brothers, namely, Binay Kumar Singh,
Ajit Kumar Singh, Ajay Kumar Singh and his sister, namely, Sila Devi. He also impleaded his wife as well as respective wives of brothers as defendants in the said suit for partition. It is claimed that the properties in the name of family members were purchased by the father of the plaintiff or acquired through the family funds are also the suit properties as the same are the joint family properties of plaintiff and defendants who have been continuing in joint possession thereof and there is unity of title and possession
between the plaintiff and defendants, and defendant no.2, Ajit Kumar Singh, de facto Karta of the joint family is mismanaging and misappropriating the joint family properties who refused to make amicable partition of the suit properties.

The petitioners had filed an application dated July 1, 2014 under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) of the C.P.C. for rejection of plaint on the grounds, inter alia, that the suit properties also included the properties of the defendant nos. 4 to 7, who were not coparceners in the family and thus, the suit was not maintainable. In rejoinder to the said application, the plaintiff stated that the properties described in the plaint under the name of female members cannot be a ground for rejection of the plaint. 

The Trial Court vide the impugned order dated May 1, 2017, had rejected the application of the petitioner. It was held that the plaintiff had a valid cause of action to bring the suit and whether on the cause of action disclosed in plaint, the plaintiff would succeed or not is not a consideration for allowing the petition under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. It cannot be adjudicated at this stage from perusal of the plaint only that, cause of action as disclosed by plaintiff is vexatious, meritless or illusory.  

The plea regarding bar of the suit under the provisions of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 could be considered only after the parties lead their evidence and at this stage it cannot be held that the filing of the suit is itself prohibited under sub-Section (1) and (2) of Section 4 of the Benami Act. It is further held that on the basis of the pleas that the suit is not properly valued and the relief of the declaration of title has not been sought, a plaint cannot be rejected immediately under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. for if the pleas raised by the defendants are upheld, the plaintiff could avail the opportunity to apply for amendment of plaint also and plaintiff can be granted an opportunity to pay the deficit Court fees, if any. On the submission on behalf of the petitioners that plaintiff has concealed the date of death of his father, as such, the plaint is liable to be rejected, the learned Trial Court rejected the said contention and held that a plaint cannot be rejected on the ground that plaintiff has concealed a fact or has not pleaded a fact or incorrectly pleaded a fact as these facts are to be considered at the time of hearing of the suit.

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that defendant nos. 4 to 7, who are respective wives of the brothers, cannot be coparceners. Hence, properties standing in their name cannot be coparcenery property. A suit for partition is maintainable where the property is jointly held by the coparceners. However,
where the suit property is not in the name of Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) or in the name of coparceners, then a suit is not maintainable without seeking a declaration of title also. The counsel for the petitionerssubmitted that plaintiff has got no cause of action as no partition suit is maintainable with respect to ‘Stridhan’ and the present suit is barred by provisions of the Benami Act.

The counsel for the petitioners referred and relied on the judgments of this Court in the case of Bachchi Devi vs. Vinay Kumar (Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 12078 of 2010) decided on September 22, 2014 and Suresh Rai vs. Urmila Devi & Ors. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Pat 4322.

The counsel for the respondents submitted that in an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C., a plaint cannot be rejected in part. The law is well settled that if the plaint survives against certain defendant(s) and/or properties, Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the C.P.C. will have no application at all and the suit as a whole, must then proceed to trial. 

He has referred and relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kum. Geetha, D/o Late Krishna & Ors vs. Nanjundaswamy & Ors., reported in (2024) 14 SCC 390; 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1407. 

The counsel for the respondents also submitted that under Order VII Rule 11 (a) of the C.P.C., the Court cannot dissect the pleading into several parts and consider whether each of them discloses a cause of  ction. For the purpose of considering objection, the averments in the plaint should be assumed to be true and the Court has to find out whether their averments disclose a cause of action or a triable issue as such. The Court cannot probe into the facts on the basis of the controversy raised by the petitioners. He further submitted that the cause of action is very clearly described in the plaint and the plaintiff is seeking relief against the ancestral properties as well as from the properties purchased in the names of different family members for the benefit of joint family and the learned Trial Court has rightly rejected the application of the petitioners by the reasoned order which requires no interference by this Court within the ambit of its revisional jurisdiction.

It is pertinent to note that Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. is mandatory in nature. It provides that the  plaint shall be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (e) are made out. Where the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action or the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no other option but to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 (a) & (d) of the C.P.C.  

The Supreme Court in Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali and Ors., reported in (2020) 7 SCC 366 succinctly explained the relevant principles in para 23, as herein under: 

“23. …….23.2. The remedy under Order 7 Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision.
23.3. The underlying object of Order 7 Rule 11(a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted.
23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi [Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315.] this Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words: (SCC p. 324, para 12)

‘12. … The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action.’ 

23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order 7 Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to. 

23.6. Under Order 7 Rule 11, a duty is cast on the court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinising the averments in the plaint [Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512] , read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law.

xxxxx xxxxx

23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.

23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration [Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Asstt. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137].

23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I [Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512] which reads as: (SCC p. 562, para 139) ‘139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.’
23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede and Co. [Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede and Co., (2007) 5 SCC 614] the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman [D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman, (1999) 3 SCC 267; See also Vijai Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 56 : AIR 1962 SC 941] 
23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11CPC.

23.14. The power under Order 7 Rule 11CPC may be exercised by the court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557] . The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain case [Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315.”

13. The plaint can be rejected at the threshold on the grounds set out under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C., so as to see that the defendants may not have to face the gamut of the litigation unnecessarily, even if the suit is found to be not maintainable and therefore, such powers are to be exercised at the earliest.
14. The hon’ble Supreme Court in Kum. Geetha, D/o Late Krishna and Others (supra) quoted and followed the said principle explained in the case of Dahiben (supra). It is further held in para 9 as under:
“9. If the statements in the plaint are taken to be true, the joint family properties may enure to the benefit of its members and they may well be available for partition. This is a matter of trial, the result of which would depend upon the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. At this stage, we are not concerned with the correctness of the averments, except to state that the plaintiffs have the carriage of the proceedings, and have to discharge the heavy burden of proving their case. Insofar as the application under Order 7 Rule 11CPC is concerned, this Court will proceed only that far, to examine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, and no further.”

15. This Court in the case of Sunanda Singh & Ors. v. Soni Shahi & Anr., reported in (2023) 5 BLJ 102 has held that only the averments in the plaint can be looked into while deciding application under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. The relevant para of the said judgment is reproduced as under:
“25. Now it is well settled that for the purpose of invoking Order VII Rule 11(d) C.P.C. no amount of evidence can be looked into and only averments made in the plaint are relevant. 26. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Abdul Gaffur vs. State of Uttrakhand (2008 (10) SCC 97) held that if the High Court is convinced that the plaint read as a whole does not disclose any cause of action, it may reject the plaint in terms of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.

27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Judgment dated 20.07.2012 in Bhau Ram vs. Janak Singh and Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 5343 of 2012) held that the law has been settled by this Court in various decisions that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C., the Court has to examine the averments in the plaint and the pleas taken by the defendant in its written statement would be irrelevant. Accordingly, the law is well settled that only the averments in the plaint can be looked into while deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. 

28. This Court in the case of I.T.C. Ltd. Vs. Shakuntala Devi reported in 2012 (2) PLJR 592 held that:-
“In view of the aforesaid principles and also on the basis of the apex Court on the issue of rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 (d) CPC, the following broad principles can be culled out:
(I) The averments made in plaint are germane have to be taken as correct;
(ii) The whole plaint has to be read not in formal but in a meaningful manner;
(iii) No part of defence or evidence is to be considered 
(iv) Being summary in nature, the Court should exercise this jurisdiction only when it becomes absolutely certain that the litigation is doomed to fail.”

29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.V. Guru Raj Reddy Vs. P. Neeradha Reddy & Anr. 2015 (2) PLJR (Supreme Court) 205 in Pragraph 5 and 6 held as follows:
“Rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC is a drastic power conferred in the court to terminate a civil action at the threshold. The conditions precedent to the exercise of power under Order VII, Rule 11, therefore, are stringent and have been consistently held to be so by the Court. It is the averments in the pliant that has to be read as a whole to find out whether it discloses a cause of action or whether the suit is barred under any law. At the stage of exercise of power under order VII, Rule 11, the stand of the defendants in the written statement or in the application for rejection of the plaint is wholly immaterial. It is only if he averments in the plaint ex-facie do not disclose a cause of action or on a reading thereof the suit appears to be barred under any law the plaint can be rejected. In all other situation, the claims will have to be adjudicated in the course of the trial. In the present case, reading the plaint as a whole and proceedings on the basis that the averments made therein are correct, which is what the Court is required to do, it cannot be said that the said pleadings ex-facie discloses that the suit is barred by limitation or is barred under any other provision of law. The claim of the plaintiffs with regard to the knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to the cause of action as pleaded will have to be accepted as correct. At the stage of consideration of the application under Order VII, Rule 11 the stand of the defendants in the written statement would be altogether irrelevant.”

16. Rule 11 of Order VII enjoins the Court to reject the plaint where it does not disclose a cause of action. There is no question of striking out any portion of the pleadings under this rule. The Court cannot dissect the pleadings into several parts and consider whether each of them discloses a cause of action. It is now well settled that in an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. a plaint cannot be rejected in part. The plaint has to be rejected as a whole or not at all in exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the C.P.C. It is not permissible to reject a plaint qua any particular portion of a plaint including some of the defendants and continue the same against others. If the plaint survives against certain defendant(s) and/or properties, Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the C.P.C. will have no application at all, and the suit as a whole must then proceed to trial. [See: Sejal Glass Ltd. v. Navilan Merchants Pvt. Ltd., reported in (2018) 11 SCC 780 which was followed in Madhav Prasad Aggarwal & Anr. v. Axis Bank Ltd. & Anr., reported in (2019) 7 SCC 158; and Kum. Geetha (supra)]. 

17. In the case of Kaulasan @ Bhola v. Ramdut, reported in AIR 1951 Pat 633; 1949 SCC OnLine Pat 97, it was held that a suit for partition of the joint Hindu family property, so far as the properties sought to be partitioned stand in the name of strangers to the coparcenery, must be regarded as a suit for declaration of title and consequential relief, and consequently ad valorem Court fees was payable. This judgment has been referred and relied by this Court in Mohammad Raza Khan v. Saheb Raza Khan and Ors., reported in AIR 1976 Pat 108; 1975 SCC OnLine Pat 100 and Bachchi Devi (supra).

18. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Suresh Rai v. Urmilla Devi and Ors. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Pat 4322 on which learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon is with respect to framing of preliminary issue under Order XIV Rule 2 (2) of the C.P.C. with regard to maintainability of suit. 
19. Absence of jurisdiction can be invoked at different stages and under different provisions of the C.P.C. Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. is one, Order XIV Rule 2 is another. However, both operates in distinct procedural spheres. Order XIV Rule 2 applies after completion of pleadings and framing of issues, where
the Court may decide a pure question of law arising from the admitted or undisputed facts without undertaking a full trial. Since Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. tests the sustainability of the plaint on its face, Order XIV Rule 2 concerns the adjudication of the preliminary legal issues after the pleadings are complete.

20. In the instant case the plaintiff has to prove various facts to show that the properties which were acquired in the name of different members were acquired out of the nucleus of the ancestral properties. The question of the right of the plaintiff to get a share in the properties and the considerations for payment of Court fees are different. The aforesaid decisions are, therefore, of no assistance to the petitioners.
21. Recently, the three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s Bhagya Estate Ventures Pvt. Ltd. v. Narne Estate Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. in Civil Appeal No. 4570 of 2023 considering the earlier judgments in Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi reported in 1986 SCC OnLine SC 394; T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Anr., reported in (1977) 4 SCC 467; and Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath & Ors., reported in 1987 SCC OnLine SC 638, observed that the purpose behind Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. is to ensure that the plaints or petitions which are defective for any of the reasons enumerated shall not be allowed to proceed further and shall be put to an end before they progress. It is further observed that it is already clarified position of law that without disposing of an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C., the Court
cannot proceed with the trial. Further, it is reiterated that “it is a settle position of law that when the Court is considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C., it must only peruse and consider the averments in the plaint to check whether the plaint is defective for any of the reasons provided under the
Rule or is a proper plaint. 

22. It is not the case of plaintiff in the suit that the respective wives of brothers are coparceners. On the contrary, it is specific case of the plaintiff that the suit property is the joint family property and he is not claiming absolute title over the said suit property. The relationship between the parties is not in dispute.
The Court has to adjudicate on the basis of the evidence that whether the suit property is joint family property or self acquired property and to decide whether the rigor of the provisions of the Benami Act including Section 4 of the same is applicable in the present case or not. 
23. Notably, whether the property is benami and is not covered by the exception, is an issue to be decided on the basis of evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Shaifali Gupta v. Vidya Devi Gupta and Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1181 has held as under:
“23. Section 4 of the Benami Act bars the suit, claim or action in respect of a property held benami by person at the behest of the person claiming to be its true owner. It reads as under: 
“4(1). No suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person shall lie by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property.”
24.The above provision bars an action in respect of ‘property held benami’. However, whether the property in respect of which the suit, claim or action has been brought about is a benami property or not, is the issue of prime consideration.
25. The plaint allegations all through describe the suit properties as the Joint Hindu Family properties and that they have been purchased either from the nucleus of the Joint Hindu Famil property or the income derived from the joint family business. The properties are not described as benami in the name of any member of the family. Therefore, from the plaint reading, the suit properties cannot ex-facie be held to be benami properties in respect whereof the suit may not be maintainable in view of Section 4 of the Benami Act.
26. The Benami Act further defines ‘benami property’ and ‘benami transaction’ under Sections 2(8) and 2(9) of the said Act. Benami property is the property which is the subject matter of benami transaction whereas benami transaction is a property held by a person in respect whereof consideration has been provided by some other person but would not include certain categories of properties such as where a person is holding a property in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of another person.
27. In such circumstances, whether a property is a benami, has to be considered not in the light of Section 4 of the Benami Act alone but also in connection with Sections 2 (8) and 2 (9) of the said Act i.e. whether the property if benami falls in the exception. It is only where the property is benami and does not fall within the exception contained in Sub-Section (9) of Section 2 that a suit may be said to be barred. However, the issue whether the property is benami and is not covered by the exception, is again an issue to be decided on the basis of evidence and not simply on mere averments contained in the plaint. The defendants have to adduce evidence to prove the property to be benami.
28. In Pawan Kumar v. Babu Lal [(2019) 4 SCC 367], a similar issue arose before this Court in a matter concerning rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 (d) CPC. This Court held that for rejecting a plaint, the test is whether from the statement made in the plaint it appears without doubt or dispute that the suit is barred by any statutory provision. Where a plea is taken that the suit is saved by the exception to the benami transaction, it becomes the disputed question of fact which has to be adjudicated on the basis of the evidence. Therefore, the plaint cannot be rejected at the stage of consideration of application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 
xxxx xxxx
31. More importantly, Section 14 of the Act simply provides that the property possessed by a female Hindu shall be held by her as a full owner. It does not bar or prohibit a suit in respect of such a property. Therefore, in the absence of any bar contained in the above provision, the suit plaint is not liable to be rejected as barred by law.”

Justices Bibek Chaudhuri, Rana Vikram Singh set aside judgment, decree of dismissal passed by Principal Judge, Family Court, Aurangabad, in a matrimonial case

Either party to marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of the Act, may also present a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground and (i) there has been no resumption of co-habitation as between the parties for a period of one year or upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial separation in a proceeding to which they were parties; or (ii) that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties for marriage for a period of one year or upwards after passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal right in a proceeding to which they were parties.

 -Section 13(1-A), Hindu Marriage Act

In Ajay Kumar Raut vs. Soni Devi, Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Rana Vikram Singh delivered a 5-page long judgment dated September, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"10. The respondents did not deny that after passing of the decree of restitution of conjugal rights, the marital relationship between the parties were restored. 11. On this ground alone, the appellant is entitled to get a decree for dissolution of marriage under Section 13[(1-A) (ii)] of the Hindu Marriage Act. 12. The learned trial Judge failed to consider the relevant provisions of law while dismissing the suit. The order impugned is not sustainable and the judgment and decree of dismissal passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Aurangabad, in Matrimonial Case No. 26/2020 on 02.07.2024 is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed. 13. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent is declared to be dissolved by a decree of divorce. Further, the Office is directed to draw the decree of divorce at the earliest." The judgement was authored by Justice Chaudhari.

The miscellaneous appeal was directed against the judgment and decree of dismissal of a suit for dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce, which was registered as Matrimonial Case No. 26 of 2020 before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Aurangabad. The husband of the Opposite Party was the appellant before the High Court, challenging the judgment and decree of dismissal dated July 2, 2024.

The case of the appellant was that his marriage was solemnized with the Opposite Party on January 21, 2014. After the marriage, the Opposite Party came to her matrimonial home to lead conjugal life with the appellant but subsequently she left her matrimonial home. On two occasions she visited her matrimonial home, once after marriage and secondly to attain the Shradh Ceremony of her father-in-law in the year 2015. From the very beginning of her marriage, the Opposite Party used to insist the appellant to leave her parents and stay separately with her. The appellant was not agreeable to such proposal of the respondent. During the pendency of the suit at the intervention of the trial court the appellant brought the respondent to his home on May 25, 2016. But on May 28 2016, she called her parents and told that they assaulted the petitioner mercilessly under Civil Court Campus, Aurangabad over which an FIR being Aurangabad Town
P.S. Case No. 164 of 2016 was lodged. Since, then the parties are living separately. The respondent flatly refused to live with the appellant as his wife. She not only humiliated and harassed him but the appellant was subjected to cruelty by his wife. 

In the year 2015, the appellant filed a suit for restitution of conjugal right under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. In retaliation thereof the respondent filed a case under Section 498A of the IPC and Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. She also filed an application under Section 125 of the CrPC against the appellant. 

The suit for restitution was decreed in favour of the appellant on July 10, 2018. In spite of the said decree, the respondent did not come back to her matrimonial home to continue the conjugal life with the appellant. It is contended that the appellant is an unemployed diploma holder, he was trying to get some job but his mental stability was shattered by the respondent. The respondent contested the suit by filing written statement whereby and where-under she denied all material allegations brought by the appellant against her. Marriage between the parties was admitted in the written statement. She also made counter allegation of physical and mental torture inflicted by the appellant upon her. In support of his case the appellant adduced evidence, however, he was not cross-examined by the respondent/Opposite Party.The mother of the appellant deposed during the trial as PW-2 that she was cross-examined by the Advocate for the respondent. PW-3 was a neighbour of the appellant.The respondent deposed during trial as DW-1. In her evidence she stated that the appellant did not want to keep the respondent with full honour and dignity as his wife. Before marriage, he had illicit relation with another lady, namely, Pinky Kumari. Subsequently, Pinky filed a complaint on the basis of which Aurangabad Town P.S. Case No. 205/2013 under Section 376 of the IPC was registered against the appellant. Even after the decree passed in the suit for restitution of conjugal right the appellant never came to the house of the respondent to take her back to his house to stay as husband and wife. 

Justice Chaudhari recorded: "7. From the evidence on record it is also found that the respondent filed a case under Section 498A of the IPC and under Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. She also filed another application claiming maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC. Thus, it is on record that the relationship between the appellant and the respondent is far from being happy and cordial."

Justice Chaudhary observed: "8. It is not in dispute that the appellant filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights against the respondent under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act on 19th September 2015. The said suit was registered as Matrimonial Case No. 136 of 2015 and it was decreed in favour of the petitioner on July 10, 2018."

Supreme Court reverses judgement authored by Justice Hemant Kumar Srivastava in murder case of 1993 from Obra, Aurangabad

In Ashok Upadhyaya & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J. B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran delivered a 13-page long judgement dated September 8, 2026 wherein, it concluded:"In that circumstance, the reasonable doubt regarding a hypothesis of innocence assumes relevance. We must emphasize that despite specific overt acts alleged on the other accused, the Trial Court acquitted them, affirmed by the High Court. 21. In the totality of the circumstances, we are persuaded to give the appellants herein the benefit of doubt and, hence, we acquit them." Justice Vinod Chandran authored the judgement. Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Hemant Kumar Srivastava and Rajendra Kumar Mishra had delivered the 37-page long judgement dated October 1, 2018. 

The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Srivastava, wherein, he had concluded:"36. Learned trial court has convicted the appellants under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and 27 of the Arms Act and I do not find any ground to interfere into the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence order and,  accordingly, I feel no hesitation to dismiss this appeal. 37. On the basis of the aforesaid discussions, this appeal is dismissed and the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence order are, hereby, confirmed. Appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds stand cancelled and they are directed to surrender before the trial court within six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the judgment to the trial court and if appellants fail to do so, the learned trial court shall take appropriate steps to procure the remand of the appellants so that they could serve their sentence." 

Reversing the judgement by Justice Srivastava,  Supreme Court's judgement reads: "22. The appellants shall be released from custody forthwith if they are remaining in custody and if not required in any other case. If they are on bail, their bail bonds shall stand cancelled. 23. The criminal appeal is allowed."

The prosecution case was of a murder by gunshot injury. There were five accused arrayed, out of which, three were acquitted and two convicted; the convicts were the appellants before the Supreme Court. 

It all began with a dispute regarding blockage of drainage, resulting in waterlogging in front of the house of the deceased, a quarrel erupted and the two families entered into a brawl, in which Uma Upadhayay, the Appellant No. 2 was accused of shooting the deceased, while Ashok Upadhaya, Appellant No. 1 fired at the other family members, injuring them. The prosecution examined twelve witnesses and the defence three. The judgement of conviction dated October 3, 1994 under Section 302 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 was delivered, as also the sentence dated October 5, 1994 handed down by the Additional Sessions Judge I, Aurangabad, were affirmed by the High Court; which judgment was assailed before the Supreme Court.

The fact of there being a homicide, was unequivocally proved from the medical evidence. This fact had ramifications insofar as the presence of the eyewitnesses at the scene of occurrence. A motive was alleged of the blockage of drain, which was spoken by the related witnesses and even the independent witness, PW4, a neighbour. As per the prosecution case, the accused came to the house of the deceased who was bathing his buffalo, a quarrel erupted when one of the accused exhorted the killing and Appellant No. 2 fired a shot at the deceased, killing him instantaneously. The body was said to have been carried to the police station, as is indicated in the First Information Statement (FIS) recorded from one of the sons of the deceased, PW10. In the FIS the incident was narrated, of the five accused coming to the house of the deceased and pursuant to a quarrel, on exhortation by one of them, Appellant No. 2 having shot the deceased on the left side of the chest and the others having assaulted the witnesses with lathis and Appellant No. 1 having shot at the women and children. It was stated by the informant that his brothers PW2 and PW3 also witnessed the incident and so did the villagers who converged on the scene of occurrence on hearing the altercation. The FIS did not speak of the presence of PW5 and PW6, allegedly injured witness and PW8, an independent witness. 

The prosecution came with direct evidence of eyewitnesses, all of whom were close relatives of the deceased and staying in the same house. Despite villagers having converged at the point, none of them were proffered as an eyewitness. PW2, though, spoke of the incident as an eyewitness, according to him, the body of his father was taken from the place of occurrence to the hospital, as stated in cross-examination; contrary to what was stated by the first informant. 

Justice Vinod Chandran observed:"In this context, we must notice that one of the defence witnesses stated that he saw the body lying on the roadside and there was Naxal-activity in the area. We must consider this deposition with the factum of the sons having taken the body to the police station from the scene of occurrence. There is no reconnaissance made of the scene of occurrence by the Police, and nothing has been recovered from the scene of occurrence. The blood stained clothes of the relatives of the deceased were also not seized and sent for medical examination....9. PW12 is the Investigating Officer (I.O), whose testimony discloses no effective investigation having been conducted. The arrest of one of the accused was made from a different police station, where he surrendered and the other accused, surrendered before Court. But for speaking of writing to the Superintendent of Police, to cancel the licence of the gun issued to one of the accused, nothing is produced to indicate one of the accused having a licence for a gun. A rod is said to have been recovered from the house of A1 which is allegedly used for cleaning the barrel of the gun. This was never produced in Court or brought in evidence. There was no attempt to take the accused into custody and carry out recoveries. More importantly, though PW10 speaks of having visited the scene of occurrence on the very same night, he did not even prepare a map of the scene of occurrence to bring out various aspects, substantiating the testimony of the eyewitnesses, including the handpump, buffalo shed or the distance of the house from the scene of occurrence and so on and so forth; all crucial corroboration for the eyewitness testimony. As far as the recovery of blood stains, the I.O had explained that it was raining heavily and there was no telltale signs found on the scene of occurrence. It is his testimony that the statements of PW5 and PW6 were taken on 25.08.2003 which is the second day from the incident."  

The judgement recorded that the Doctor could not say as to whether the injury was caused by a pistol or by a gun. The expert opinion regarding the survival of a person who had sustained injury No.2 and the testimony that  the injury could have been caused within 24 hours assumes relevance when we consider the defence evidence....The eyewitnesses have not stated in one voice as to where the dead body was taken. PW10 categorically stated that the dead body was taken to the police station and not the hospital while some others, including PW2 spoke of the body having been taken to the hospital. The inquest report and the testimony of I.O clearly indicate that the body was taken to the police station. PW6 in her testimony states that her father-in-law had not died immediately, and she could feel his pulse when he was taken from the scene of occurrence. 

Justice Chandran observed: "14. It is surprising that the body was taken to the police station while in the normal circumstances it would have been taken to the hospital. Here we again notice the testimony of the
Doctor who conducted the postmortem, that the injury which led to the death of the deceased could not result in an instantaneous death and the person who sustained it, could survive for 3 to 6 hours."

The judgement recorded that the defence examined three witnesses, two of whom are inconsequential. In the normal circumstances, we would have discarded DW1’s evidence also but coupled with the circumstances of the case and the discrepancies coming out from the eyewitnesses’ testimonies, we cannot but notice it. 16. DW1 is a person from the adjacent village, who was on his way, to his sister’s matrimonial house to inquire about his ailing sister; on the fateful day. On the way, at night, he heard shouts and gunshots, upon which he aimed the torch light at the place from which the sound emanated. He is said to have seen a man lying prostrate with few carrying lathis and guns surrounding him. They were shouting slogans of Inqilab Zindabad. The assailants turned on him and questioned him, when he felt threatened and he fled from the spot. There was nothing recovered from the scene of occurrence, though explained as due to the heavy rains. Not even the map of scene of occurrence was prepared by the I.O. The weapons of assault, the gun and the pistol remained elusive. No attempt was made to recover or seize it, nor was even the license produced to show one of the accused having a licensed firearm. The nature of the licensed firearm would have been evident from the license, and it could have led to forensic examination of the cover of the cartridge, which was recovered from the dead body, whether it matches the type of gun for which the license was issued.

Justice Chandran observed: "18. More pertinently, the eyewitnesses speak of A1 carrying a ‘licensed’ weapon and A2 carrying a pistol. On the mere sight of a weapon, it cannot be identified as one licensed. We pertinently observe that, this smacks of premeditation to frame the accused, who is known to have a licensed weapon. But unfortunately, the I.O did nothing to produce the license and prove at least that the accused had access to such a weapon. The circumstances, as we see, do not lead solely to the hypothesis of guilt and a lingering doubt, quite reasonable in the facts and circumstances brought out by the prosecution itself, that there could be a hypothesis of innocence." 

Justice Chandran drew on the decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116, which speaks of such hypothesis of innocence, if available, restraining the court from entering a conviction. He observed:"19. True, the said theory was propounded and followed in cases of purely circumstantial evidence. In the present case, there was direct evidence proffered by the prosecution insofar
as the eyewitnesses are concerned. However, we must emphasize that the majority of the eyewitnesses were close relatives; PW2, PW3, PW5, PW6 and PW10. We have already found that, though, the narration of the incident, more or less tallied, there are discrepancies and circumstances, which persuade us not to place an unflinching reliance on those testimonies. Related witnesses merely for their relationship with the deceased cannot be called interested witnesses. But when, from the circumstances, as in the present case, where there is found a ring of falsity in their testimonies, a closer scrutiny is warranted. If the incident occurred at the front yard of the house, then the related witnesses are not chance witnesses and could be relied on. But there is no clear substantiation in this case, as to the scene of occurrence. The independent witness PW8, though, spoke of having accompanied PW2, there was no corroboration on that aspect by PW2, making him also a doubtful eyewitness. 20. Due to the discrepancies and the inconsistencies, we are
unable to place faith on the oral testimony of eyewitnesses."

Bihar Advocates Action Forum Dharna

The Bihar Advocates Action Forum organized Dharna before the Government of Bihar on September 8, 2026 in the premises of Advocate Association (Shatabdi) Bhawan, Patna High Court.

The advocates are demanding the following from the Government of Bihar:-

1. In the light of the State of Jharkhand at least Rs. 15,000/- per month pension be given to every advocate of Bihar who attains the age of 65 years.

2. Payment of stipend be started immediately to enhance Rs. 20,000/- from Rs.5000/- for the period of 5 years from the date of entry in legal profession.

3. Exhaustive Advocate Protection Act be enacted immediately.

4. The advocates be attached with Ayushman Bharat and medical aid Rs. 15 lacs be provided to advocates.

5. Provision for Budgetary allocation of Rs. 5,000/- Crore in every Financial year be made for the welfare of the advocates.

6. Payable amount as Death Claim and Retirement Claim by Bihar State Advocate Welfare Trust Committee be enhanced Rs.25 Lakhs and ensure the payment equally for both claims within the period of one month from the date of presentation of the Claim and a provision be made to include those advocates who were debarred after attaining the age of 50 years, on payment of fixed amount so that every advocate may avail the facility of the Trust Committee.

7. Ensure the sitting arrangement for all advocates in the Court premises by constructing of Vakalatkhana and renovation of constructed Vakalatkhana, well equipped library with modern technological facilities, Lady advocate common room, Auditorium etc.

8. The incomplete construction work and the work of Electric supply, lift etc of the Advocate's Association (Shatabdi) Bhawan, Patna High Court be completed immediately so that it may be made functional for sitting of the advocates.

9. Formation of Advanced Health Centre (Hospital) in the every Court premises with MBBS Doctor.

Supreme Court sets aside order by Patna High Court imposing condition of Rs 10,000/month in absence of any order of the competent court granting such maintenance

In Rakesh Mahto @ Rakesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026),   Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi September 03, 2026 passed a 5-page long order dated September 3, 2026, wherein, it concluded: "6. In our view, the impugned condition ought not to have been imposed in absence of any order of the competent court granting such maintenance. As we have been informed that the application seeking maintenance is pending, and no orders have yet been passed directing the appellant to pay maintenance, we deem it appropriate to set aside the aforesaid condition. 7. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms. 8. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of." 

Earlier, in Rakesh Mahto @ Rakesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court had passed a 3-page long order dated February 26, 2026, wherein, he had concluded that "7. Let the petitioner, above named, in the event of his arrest or surrender before the concerned Court below within four weeks from today, be released on anticipatory bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 10,000/- (Ten Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned S.D.J.M., Siwan,/concerned Court below in connection with Siwan Mahila P.S. Case No. 26 of 2025, subject to the conditions laid down in Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973/ Section 482(2) of the BNSS and with further condition that: (I). The petitioner is directed to pay a maintenance amount of Rs. 10,000/- from the month of February 2026 to the complainant/informant." 

Justice Kumar's order reads:"The maintenance for the month of February 2026 shall be paid to the complainant/informant within ten days from today, and thereafter, the maintenance amount shall be paid to the complainant /informant every month before the 10th day of each month.” 8. It is made clear that the order of maintenance passed by this Court shall be subject to the outcome of the maintenance case in the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court concerned, if any. 9. Needless to state that, if the petitioner fails to abide by the terms and conditions, as stated hereinabove, the State shall be at liberty to file an appropriate application, before the learned concerned Court below for cancellation of bail granted to the petitioner." The opposite no. 2 is Punita Kumari, daughter of Panalal Mahto Resident of village Nonia Tola, Goreakothi, Siwan. 

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in connection with Mahila P.S. Case No. 26 of 2025, for the offence under Sections 85, 82(1), 316(2), 3(5) of the B.N.S., and section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 3. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner and others are accused of assaulting and torturing the victim for demand of Rs. 50,000/- as a dowry. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was innocent and he had falsely been implicated in this case. There is no specific allegation against the petitioner of demand of dowry. The petitioner has clean antecedent.

 

Supreme Court sets aside "utterly misconceived" order by Patna High Court, restores criminal application Dharmendra Kumar from Shiv Nagar, Karpi, Arwal

In Dharmendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026) , Supreme Court's Division bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva passed a 4-page long order dated September 1, 2026, wherein, it restored Criminal Miscellaneous No. 15460/2025 "to the file of the High Court for consideration afresh on merits and in accordance with law." It observed:" 4. The learned Judge seems to have lost sight of the fact that the appellant had sought cancellation of the anticipatory bail and had cited grounds therefor. It was not a case of the grant of bail itself being subjected to challenge, by way of a petition for cancellation. 5. This aspect of the matter required to be examined independently to ascertain whether any of the alleged grounds cited by the appellant were established and warranted cancellation of the bail earlier granted. Such an exercise did not entail the learned Judge sitting in appeal over the grant of anticipatory bail by a coordinate Bench. The order passed by the learned Judge is, therefore, utterly misconceived and is liable to be set aside. 6. As all the parties are before this Court, there is no reason as to why this appeal should be kept pending. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed, setting aside the order dated 29.07.2026 passed by the High Court." 

Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court had rejected this application by his order dated July 29, 2026 as he did not find "sufficient ground to interfere with the impugned order" dated December 20, 024 passed by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of the Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court. Justice Kumar had passed his 2-page long order dated July 29, 2026 in Dharmendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026) Criminal Miscellaneous No. 15460/2025. The application before the High Court was filed for cancellation of anticipatory bail granted to the Mukesh Kumar, the opposite party nos.2 and Shivam Kuma, opposite no. 3 by Justice Sharan of a Co-ordinate Bench.

Justice Kumar perused the F.I.R. He recorded: "It appears that the petitioner, who is the informant of the case, had appeared before the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court and opposed the prayer of the opposite party nos.2 and 3 for grant of bail and after considering the submissions of the parties, the Co-ordinate Bench had granted anticipatory bail to the opposite party nos.2 and 3." He observed:"If the petitioner was/is aggrieved by the order of the Co-ordinate Bench, he could have moved before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the order of the Co-ordinate Bench. This Court cannot sit in appeal over the exercise of discretion granting anticipatory bail by the Coordinate Bench of this Court. Therefore, I do not find any error in the impugned order."

Dharmendra Kumar, the appellant had submitted that he had approached the High Court seeking cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 with sufficient grounds for such cancellation. 

Supreme Court recorded: "3. By the impugned order dated 29.07.2026, a learned Judge of the High Court opined that he could not sit in appeal over the exercise of discretion by the coordinate Bench in granting anticipatory bail to respondent Nos. 2 and 3." 

Supreme Court detects error in judgement of 2015 authored by Justice Anjana Prakash, acquits accused in murder of Braj Bhushan Singh from Arara, Adapur, East Champaran in 2001

In Dhrub Singh Etc. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran delivered a 14-page long judgement dated September 1, 2016, wherein, it detected error in the 20-page long judgement dated December 9, 2015 by the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Anjana Prakash and Rajendra Kumar Mishra. It concluded:"The High Court egregiously erred in looking at a complaint against the I.O not produced in the trial, to find the evidence led to be clinching insofar as the culpability of the accused. A faulty  investigation cannot inure to the benefit of the accused, but when there is no reliable evidence, merely because the I.O was recalcitrant or a complaint of collusion was raised against him, the Court cannot presume the guilt of the accused. There is complete lack of evidence in the present case and the testimonies, as we observed, do not inspire confidence. 12. We, hence, acquit the accused and direct that they be released forthwith if any of the appellants are in custody, if not required in any other case, and if they were released on bail, their bail bonds shall stand cancelled. 13.The Appeals stand allowed.” The Supreme Court's judgement was authored by Justice Chandran. The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Prakash. 

Dhrub Singh, the appellant was convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302/149 I.P.C., 5 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 I.P.C., 2 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 148 I.P.C. and 3 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 27 of the Arms Act with a fine of Rs.3000/ by judgment dated November 29, 2010 passed by the 7th Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran, Motihari in a Sessions Trial of 2002. 15. Justice Prakash had concluded: "15. On looking into the records of the case, we find that soon after the occurrence a protest petition had been filed against the Investigating Officer that he was making a collusive investigation which explains as to why he did not record the statements of independent witnesses nor send the blood stained earth for chemical examination, nor seize the blood stained clothes on the person of the deceased or the witnesses. In such circumstances, the argument that the prosecution has not been able to prove the manner of occurrence or the presence of the witnesses for the aforesaid reason has to be rejected. As for the manner of occurrence, we find that the consistent evidence is that all the witnesses were walking behind each other and suddenly the accused persons sprang upon them and shot at the deceased from the back, on account of which he fell down on his face. From their evidence the fact that they did not hear any accused before the firing or even during the firing is well explained since from the manner narrated it appears that the occurrence had not taken place within minutes. In such circumstances, when Pappu Singh was not being seen before firing at the deceased from the back and the rest firing at the witnesses to scatter them off or even to kill them is well plausible. Also the fact that scratches were found on the face of the deceased further corroborates the prosecution case that after the firing from the back the deceased had fallen on his face. As for the injuries being oval or circular has no meaning in the present case since it is most natural that a person’s hand would shake and not be completely stable while firing is made within a split of second especially when the target is moving. The doctor no doubt stated in his cross examination that when he said that the occurrence had taken place within 36 hours he had meant that it could be within 24 to 36 hours, is not acceptable by the Court. Once he has stated in his examination-in-chief that it was within 36 hours it certainly means that it was within 36 hours and such minute timing of death so precisely could not be given by him especially when he has mentioned that rigor mortis was present. 16. As for alternative argument of considering the case of non-assailants, even while we are inclined to disbelieve the prosecution case in so far as the Appellant Chunnu Singh having ordered Appellant Pappu Singh to fire is concerned, but fact remains that all the accused variously armed had come together and fired which makes out a case of accused having common intention/object to commit murder of the deceased. In such circumstances, we find no merit in such submission. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in these appeals. The same is dismissed."

The case of the prosecution according to the Informant Kundan Kumar (P.W.7), son of the deceased, was that on April 19, 2001 at about 2.30 p.m. he left home along with the deceased Braj Bhushan Singh, their Sepoy Chandeshwar Singh, co-villager Bhagirath Thakur and cousin Nilesh Kumar Sharma for their agricultural farm. When they were in the middle of Arara village and Laxmipur School at about 03.30 p.m. suddenly 7-8 persons came, who were identified as Chunnu Singh, Pappu Singh, out of which Chunnu Singh told Pappu Singh to fire at the deceased Braj Bhushan Singh and he did so on taking position from the back, on account of which his father fell down. At that very moment Appellant Dhrub Singh fired at him but he was somehow saved. They all started running but Brajesh Singh ordered that everyone should be killed else they would go to the police, at which Appellants Dharmendra singh @ Tarzan and Dharmendra Singh started firing but their shots did not hit them. They noticed a patrolling party approaching, at which the accused started fleeing, saying that the deceased had been killed which needed to be reported to Madan Singh that the work had been accomplished. They then took the deceased to Dunkan Hospital, Raxaul but the doctor declared him dead. The dead body of his father was brought home. The motive for the occurrence was that the daughter of Major Harendra Singh had been kidnapped on 29.8.2000 by his co-villager Ramesh Singh. The past Mukhiya Madan Mohan Singh, Dharmendra Singh son of Madan Mohan Singh, Chunnu Singh, Dharmendra Singh @ Tarzan, Subhash Singh, Sanjeet Singh, Manoj Singh, Arvind Singh, Brajesh Singh had come to his village and proposed to his father that he was a reputed person and he should try to use his influence for recovering the girl. His father had made enquiry but it was found that Ramesh Singh had fled away with the girl, on account of which the girl was not recovered. Madan Mohan Singh had felt insulted on account of the inability of the Appellant and had started instigating others that the deceased had played with the reputation of their villagers. On September 12, 2000 Adapur a P.S. case had been instituted in regard to the case aforesaid. His brother Sanju Dubey (P.W.5) was also sought to be implicated in the case but final report was submitted in his regard. Then in another case, namely, Adapur P.S. case of 2000, once again his name was given but final report was submitted. His cousin brother Satyendra Dubey was a candidate for Mukhiya election and there was every chance of his winning which had caused apprehension in the mind of Madan Mohan Singh, the previous Mukhiya, Arera, who had got the deceased killed. 

Supreme Court's judgement reads:“11. We are unable to find the prosecution having established the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. As we noticed, the eye-witness testimony does not inspire confidence and there are no recoveries made or seizures effected as would have been done in a proper investigation. The case is not of a faulty investigation but of no investigation having been carried out. Even the inquest was carried out before the FIS was recorded; making it pre-meditated." 

Supreme Court's judgement recorded that it was a case of murder in broad day light presumably on an election day which had led to the conviction of the six accused, five of whom approached the Supreme Court in these appeals. The 1st accused served his term and was released on remission. The prosecution case was that the deceased along with four others, a son, an employee, a nephew and a villager was proceeding to his fields, when the accused ambushed the party, started indiscriminate firing with exhortation made to kill all and the deceased was shot in the back. The victim succumbed to the gun shot injury and the persons who accompanied him started running away when a patrol car came with a  Magistrate, presumably roaming around on the election day, when the accused too ran away. The victim was taken to the hospital where he was declared dead. The prosecution went to trial with nine witnesses.

Justice Chandran observed: "The I.Os testimony goes contrary to what the Government Advocate argued, of the victims having gone on a ridge. PW9 specifically speaks of the place of occurrence being a lane which led from Madanpur Distributary Canal towards Arara on the east; a clear pathway made for pedestrians. It is also stated by the I.O that on both sides of the pathway there were fields, which were ploughed recently. Though a sketch of the place of occurrence was prepared, the blood stained earth seized from the place was not sent for testing in a laboratory. He spoke of a tension in the area due to the kidnapping of a girl and also spoke of naxalite movement in the area. The I.O also did not seize the clothes of the deceased or the clothes worn by the witnesses, who, allegedly carried the body to the hospital, in the petrol car. The High Court noticed that though the I.Os attention was drawn to the previous
statement of the witnesses, the cross examination was long, winding and utterly undecipherable. 9. The High Court having narrated the prosecution case and the testimonies of the witnesses, looked into the records of the case and found a complaint against the I.O accusing him of having made a collusive investigation. We cannot but notice that no such complaint was elicited from any of the eyewitnesses and in any event this does not explain the shoddy investigation carried out by the I.O. However, the High Court relying on the complaint made against the I.O found that this is the reason for not recording the statements of the independent witnesses, the blood stained earth being not sent for chemical examination and the failure to seize the blood stained clothes of the deceased and the witnesses. Observing that the investigation was collusive, reliance was placed on the testimony of the witnesses, terming it as ‘consistent evidence’ to accept their version, to convict the accused. The expert evidence on the possibility of the deceased being shot in a sitting position was brushed aside with the conjecture that a shooting hand would shake and when the target is moving, the shape of the injuries are not relevant. The High Court peremptorily came to the finding that the accused armed with a variety of weapons, ambushed the victim and fired indiscriminately causing the death of one person thus proving the common intention/object to commit murder of the deceased, based only on the eye-witness testimony. 10. We cannot but observe that the motive projected is sticky to say the least. The expert medical opinion was against the eye- witness testimony on how the incident occurred. There was no recovery of weapons nor were any cartridges seized from the scene of occurrence; especially when the eye-witnesses spoke of indiscriminate shooting. The eyewitnesses also spoke of five of them walking in a straight line with the deceased leading from the front. The clear case was that the accused came from the back and shot at the deceased on the back. Very unlikely, when the party led by the deceased was walking in a straight line and the ambush as also the firing came from the back. The expert evidence that there was an indication from the nature of the wound, that victim was sitting and that the firing was made from close quarters persuades us to disbelieve the eye-witness testimony. The eyewitnesses were all close to the deceased and admittedly there was a tension in the locality between the group led by the father of A1 in the adjacent village and that led by the deceased; which could have prompted the eyewitnesses to frame the accused. The motive projected of the sister of A3 having been kidnapped by a villager of the deceased cannot be believed since there is no connection established between the boy, who is said to have kidnapped the girl and the deceased. The eyewitnesses were all related witnesses and their presence could have been established by their clothes, which would have been blood-stained if they carried the victim in the patrol car to the hospital. Their presence is doubtful and they had a running dispute with the accused, coupled with the non-examination of independent witnesses puts the prosecution case under a cloud and makes it highly doubtful."