Justice Sandeep Kumar set aside notice of Managing Director, Bihar State Mining Corporation Limited for violating doctrine of audi alteram partem in Bhojpur case

In Shivshankar Kaushik Infrastructure Pvt. Limited vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Mines and Geology Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 16-page long judgement dated January 27, 2026, wherein. he concluded:"....the impugned letter dated 03.03.2023 imposing penalty upon the petitioner is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted to the respondents to consider the matter afresh and pass a speaking order after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 20. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition stands allowed." 

In the penultimate paragraph of the judgement, Justice Kumar observed:"18. In the present case, it appears from the records that the inspection was conducted behind the back of the petitioner and after inspection the petitioner was neither provided the inspection report nor show-cause was issued to him, and the impugned order imposing penalty has also been passed without hearing the petitioner, which is in complete violation of principles of natural justice and therefore non est. Moreover, the respondent authorities had provided merely 24 hours’ time to deposit the penalty amount and the petitioner under the threat of non-generation of his e-challans had deposited the aforesaid penalty amount. The action of the respondent authorities in grating only 24 hours time to deposit the huge penalty amount imposed upon the petitioner is totally arbitrary and therefore, unsustainable."

He pointed out that "17. It is a cardinal principle of law that no one should be condemned before being heard, which is also an integral part of the principles of natural justice. Considering the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishnadatt Awasthy (supra), it is clear that the principles of nature justice must be adhered to strictly. The doctrine of audi alteram partem has three basic essentials. Firstly, a person against whom an order is required to be passed or whose rights are likely to be affected adversely, must be granted a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Secondly, the authority concerned should provide a fair and transparent procedure and lastly, the authority concerned must apply its mind and dispose of the matter by a reasoned and speaking order.

The petitioner had prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorarı for quashing the notice dated March 3, 2023 issued by the Respondent Managing Director, Bihar State Mining Corporation Limited whereby and whereunder a penalty of Rs.96,97,705/- was  levied upon the petitioner for allegedly excavating 90060 cubic feet sand from beyond the permissible environment clearance area. It had also prayed for issuance of appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the Respondents to refund the penalty amount of Rs.96,97,705/- deposited by the
petitioner on March 3, 2023. It prayed for holding that Respondent Managing Director was not the competent authority to levy penalty upon a settlee under Rule 30(1) of the 2019 Rules.It prayed the High Court to hold that penalty cannot be levied upon a valid settee under Rule 56(2) of the 2019 Rules. It prayed for holding that letter dated March 3, 2023 was issued by the Respondent Managing Director is bad in the eyes of law since the same has been issued in glaring violation of the principles of natural justice as the petitioner has not been afforded any show cause notice whatsoever to controvert the allegations upon which the penalty has been levied. It also prayed the Court to hold that the levy of penalty was in gross violation of the maxim audi alteram partem as the petitioner was condemned unheard without an opportunity to defend the charges against it. It prayed the Court to hold that the imposition of penalty upon the petitioner was in violation of the 2019 Rules.

It was the case of the petitioner that the respondent-Bihar State Mining Corporation Limited had published a notice inviting e-auction for selection of sub-contractors for operation of sand ghats in the district of Bhojpur. The petitioner had participated in the said tender process and being the highest bidder, he was awarded Khangaon (Bahiyara) sand ghat after quoting an amount of Rs.5,53,41,610/-. Thereafter, the petitioner had deposited the requisite amount and accordingly, work order was issued in his favour. It was the case of the petitioner that an agreement was also executed between the petitioner and the respondent- Bihar State Mining Corporation Limited which was registered on June 27, 2022. Thereafter, the petitioner started carrying out the mining activities, but all of a sudden the Managing Director of the Bihar State Mining Corporation Limited issued the impugned letter dated March 3, 2023, whereby a penalty of Rs.96,97,705/- was levied upon the petitioner for excavating the sand beyond the permissible mining area and the petitioner was directed to deposit the penalty amount within 24 hours. The petitioner, had deposited the penalty amount under compulsion and threat of restriction on generation of e-transit challans.  

It was submitted by counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order of penalty dated March 3, 2023 indicates that on February 24, 2023 and February 25, 2023 inspection was conducted and it was found that the signboard and boundary wall were not erected and the sand was found to have been excavated outside the permissible area, however, neither the petitioner was intimated about any inspection nor the alleged inspection was conducted in his presence. It was further submitted that neither show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner nor any inspection report was provided to him before imposing the penalty. The petitioner had not excavated the sand beyond the permissible area and the imposition of penalty of such a huge amount is completely illegal and in violation of the principles of natural justice as the same has been
passed without issuance of any show-cause notice to the petitioner and without affording an opportunity to rebut the allegation.

In support of this submission, counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on decisions dated May 9, 2023 passed by a coordinate Bench of the High Court passed in in M/s. Uma Associates vs. State of Bihar & Ors.; the judgment dated August 1, 2025 passed in M/s. Shri Vijay Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. and the judgment dated August 1, 2024 passed in Maa Bhawani Traders vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.

Referring to Rule 20 and 56 of the Bihar Minerals (Concession, Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation & Storage) Rules, 2019, counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no provision in the Rules, regarding recovery of price of mineral for illegal excavation as a compensation. Also Rule-30 specifically provides that for the first time violation, a penalty of Rs.1,00,000/-can be imposed upon the setttlee, however, even assuming that the allegation against the petitioner was true then also the aforesaid imposition of penalty is totally illegal and not sustainable.

Justice Kumar noted that the central argument of the counsel for the petitioner was that the impugned penalty order was passed in complete contravention of the principles of natural justice as no show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner before imposing the penalty and even no opportunity of hearing was afforded to him. He observed:"15. I find substance in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that before passing the impugned order of penalty neither show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner nor he has been heard and further the enquiry report has also not been supplied to the petitioner. Even the learned counsel for the answering respondents is not in a position to show anything from the records indicating that before passing the impugned order either the show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner or that he has been heard. Further, the respondents had provided only 24 hours time to deposit the penalty amount. 

Justice Kumar underlined: "In my opinion, the penalty could have been imposed upon the petitioner only after a proper inquiry conducted in his presence, which is absent in the present case." 

In Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors., reported as (2025) 7 SCC 545, Supreme Court has emphasized the imperativeness of principles of natural justice, particularly, before an administrative authority acting in a quasi judicial function and has held as under:-
“43. The opportunity of hearing is considered so fundamental to any civilised legal system that the courts have read the principles of natural justice into an enactment to save it from being declared unconstitutional on procedural grounds [Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn., (1985) 3 SCC 545].
44. It has been argued before us that if the failure to provide hearing does not cause prejudice, observing the principle of natural justice may not be necessary. In this context, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379] speaking through Chinappa Reddy, J. considered such arguments to be “pernicious” and held that “[t]he non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary”. The Supreme Court, however, has drawn out an exception where “on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible, and under the law only one penalty is permissible, then the Court may not compel the observance of natural justice” [Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664 : (1981) 51 Comp Cas 210; Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 965]. 
45. Professor I.P. Massey [I.P. Massey, Administrative Law (8th Edn., 2012).] has commented on this shift as under: “Before the decision of the highest Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379], the rule was that the principles of natural justice shall apply only when an
administrative action has caused some prejudice to the person, meaning thereby that he must have suffered some “civil consequences”. Therefore, the person had to show something extra in order to prove “prejudice” or civil consequences. This approach had stultified the growth of administrative law within an area of highly practical significance. It is gratifying that in Jagmohan [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379] , the Court took a bold step in holding that a separate showing of prejudice is not necessary. The non-observance of natural justice is in itself prejudice caused. However, merely because facts are admitted or are undisputable it does not follow that the principles of natural justice need not be observed.”
46. In State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717], the Supreme Court observed that where an enquiry is not convened by any statutory provision and the only obligation of the administrative authority is to observe the principles of natural justice, the court/tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of the rule of fair hearing and violation of the facet of that rule. In other words, a distinction must be made between “no opportunity” or “no adequate opportunity”. In the case of the former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid and the authority may be asked to conduct proceedings afresh according to the rule of fair hearing. But in the latter case, the effect of violation of a facet of the rule of fair hearing has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice.
47. In Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. CCE [Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. CCE, (2015) 8 SCC 519 : (2015) 33 GSTR 1], this Court dealt with the prejudice question as under: (SCC p. 540, para 42) “42. So far so good. However, an important question posed by Mr Sorabjee is as to whether it is open to the authority, which has to take a decision, to dispense with the requirement of the principles of natural justice on the ground that affording such an opportunity will not make any difference? To put it otherwise, can the administrative authority dispense with the requirement of issuing notice by itself deciding that no prejudice will be caused to the person against whom the action is contemplated? Answer has to be in the negative. It is not permissible for the authority to jump over the compliance of the principles of natural justice on the ground that even if hearing had been provided it would have served no useful purpose. The opportunity of hearing will serve the purpose or not has to be considered at a later stage and such things cannot be presumed by the authority. This was so held by the English Court way back in the year 1943 in General Medical Council v. Spackman [1943 AC 627 (HL)]. This Court also spoke in the same language in Board of High School & Intermediate Education, U.P. v. Chitra Srivastava [Board of High School & Intermediate Education, U.P. v. Chitra Srivastava, (1970) 1 SCC 121] ….”
48. In a more recent decision in State of U.P. v Sudhir Kumar Singh [State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 706] , the position of law was summarised as under: (SCC pp. 748-49, para 42)
“42. …42.1. Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused.
42.2. Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their
infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also in public interest.
42.3. No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice.
42.4. In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person.
42.5. The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice.”

Supreme Court restores order by Justice Ajay Kumar Tripathi after 12 years, ove 5 years after his death, Justice I.A. Ansari's order sets aside

In Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority & Ors. vs. M/s Scope Sales Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court’s Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih delivered a 18-page long judgement dated January 23, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"...the impugned order of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the Single Judge restored with the result that the present appeals succeed." It was heard along with State of Bihar vs. M/s Scope Sales Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.(2026). The judgement was authored by Justice Datta. 

Justice Ajay Kumar Tripathi had passed the 18-page long order dated January 24, 2014 as a Single Judge.  

Justice Datta observed:"We must also bear in mind the nature and extent of jurisdiction that an intra-court appellate Bench of a high court exercise. Such appellate jurisdiction is conferred either under the Letters Patent or by the relevant statutory provisions. It is pertinent to note that both - Single Bench and Division Bench - exercise the same jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our view, the exercise of intra-court appellate jurisdiction is warranted only where the judgment or order under challenge is demonstrably erroneous or suffers from perversity. Such jurisdiction ought not to be invoked merely because another view is possible on the same set of facts, particularly where the view adopted by the Single Judge is a plausible and reasonable one. In other words, an intra-court appellate Bench ought not to substitute its own view, merely because such Bench considers its view to be better than the one taken by the Single Bench; so long as the view taken by the Single Bench is a plausible one, interference should stay at a distance." 

Justice Datta observed:"11. It is trite law that the remedy of a writ is discretionary in nature. Even
where a writ petition raises a substantial point of law, the High Court may decline to entertain it for a variety of reasons. Inter alia, relief may be denied to the suitor notwithstanding the existence of a strong legal case should grant of such relief not serve or advance public interest. If interfering with an impugned order/decision etc. would result in more harm to society, the writ courts may decline to exercise its jurisdiction. The high courts, being the custodian of the Constitution, carry the responsibility to maintain social balance by its interference when justice
of the case so demands and in not interfering when such an interference would affect public interest. 12. The above principle has been reiterated in a catena of precedents...."  

He added:"15. Bearing in mind the larger public interest that was involved coupled with the fact that the plot of land in question was sought to be reserved for establishment of an educational institution, we are of the firm opinion that dismissal of the writ petition was an available option for the Single Judge. The view taken by the Division Bench that BIADA lacked the authority to cancel the allotment though prima facie may appear to be appealing, yet, the same is debatable.
15.1 Applying the principles governing the exercise of intra-court appellate jurisdiction, as laid down in the aforesaid precedents, to the facts of the present case, we observe that judicial discipline demanded due deference to the exercise of discretion by the court of first instance, particularly when such discretion was exercised on relevant considerations. The Single Judge having refused exercise of discretion on a ground which, in our opinion, is valid, the Division Bench ought to have been loath to allow the writ petition, and that too in exercise of its intra-court appellate jurisdiction. The judgment and order of the Single Judge was far from being wholly incorrect or perverse. 
15.2 Further, it is a matter of record that cancellation of allotment of the plot in question was necessitated by the requirement of the land for setting up and future expansion of an institute like IIT, a circumstance which was neither contemplated nor known at the time of the original allotment. The decision of BIADA to cancel the allotment was taken bona fide and in furtherance of a larger public purpose. BIADA, to demonstrate its bona fide, also offered to M/s. Scope an alternate piece of land, which it declined. There is no material on record which suggests that BIADA’s action is infected by any malice in fact. We also note that M/s Scope, in its writ petition, sought compensation in the alternative, in the event the primary relief could not be granted. While balancing the equities in favour of the parties, this aspect assumes considerable importance.
15.3 Taking these factors cumulatively – namely, the absence of any perversity in the order of the learned Single Judge, the larger public interest involved owing to involvement of an educational institution, and the availability of an alternate prayer for compensation–interference in the exercise of writ jurisdiction in the present case would hinder a project of undeniable national importance and, in our opinion, thwart public interest.
16. Beyond doubt, institutes such as the IITs not only cater to a large number of students but also play a critical role in the development of individuals, society, and the nation at large. Suffice it to observe, their importance cannot be measured merely in quantitative terms. For their effective functioning and sustained growth, the availability of adequate resources, including land, is indispensable. 
17. It is not that we are unmindful of the rights of the individual allottee, i.e., M/s. Scope. While such rights merit due respect and consideration, it cannot be placed on a pedestal higher than the collective public interest. Where the two come into conflict, individual interest must necessarily yield to the larger public good." 

Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority and the State of Bihar approached the Supreme Court in appeal, by special leave, challenging the 110-page long order dated October 21, 2014 of a Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices I. A. Ansari and Anjana Mishra in Letters Patent Appeal No. 335 of 2014 on an intra-court appeal presented by the first respondent. The Division Bench reversed the Single Judge’s judgment and orderdated January 24, 2014 of dismissal of M/s. Scope’s writ petition and consequently, allowed the writ petition of M/s. Scope.

Pursuant to an advertisement dated June 6, 2007 issued by BIADA inviting offers for auction of plots, M/s. Scope applied for allotment of a plot. Upon its emergence as the highest bidder, M/s. Scope was allotted Plot No. C-347, Patna Industrial Area, Patliputra, Patna, on June 9, 2007 for a sum of Rs. 2,32,20,000/- (subsequently for a sum of Rs. 3,38,98,000/- due to increase in area). M/s. Scope wanted to construct a multiplex cum shopping mall on the plot, possession whereof was delivered on October 9, 2007. In the meanwhile, a decision was taken to set up the Indian Institute of Technology at Patna. The campus of a Government Polytechnic was chosen to house the IIT until the IIT developed its own campus. The plot in question is adjacent to the campus of the polytechnic. Five months after delivery of possession of the plot in question in favour of M/s. Scope, BIADA, vide letter dated March 29, 2008 directed M/s. Scope to stop construction on the plot in question till further notice. The records show that the State decided to reserve the plot in question for future development of the IIT campus and, thus, had directed BIADA to initiate action for cancellation of allotment in favour of M/s. Scope. 

Consequently, BIADA, on November 10, 2008, issued a show cause notice to M/s. Scope proposing cancellation of the allotment (with refund and interest) followed by a second notice on 4th March, 2009. Vide its response dated  March 12, 2009, M/s. Scope pointed out that the notice did not cite any legal provision of the Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority Act, 1974 or the Rules framed thereunder which allowed BIADA to cancel the allotment or to take back possession of the plot in question on the ground of public interest; therefore, the proposed cancellation was without any legal authority. M/s. Scope also gave an estimate of the expenses incurred by it in course of construction activity. BIADA cancelled the allotment vide cancellation order dated April 4, 2009 and refunded the “cost of land originally deposited by the Unit amounting to Rs.3,38,98,000/-” along with 5% interest which was equivalent to the “rate of interest charged upon dues of BIADA from the allottees”. 

Aggrieved by it, M/s. Scope invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court seeking a writ of Certiorari for quashing of the cancellation order. The alternative prayer made by M/s. Scope in the writ petition, for award of “actual compensation and not fanciful compensation”. 

Notably, during pendency of the writ petition, and almost two years after its institution, BIADA vide letter dated November 25, 2011 proposed allotment of alternate plots in a nearby area which M/s. Scope refused finding the same inappropriate.  The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition on January 24, 2017. 

The Single Judge took note of the sudden development for establishment of IIT Patna which “compelled the respondent State authorities to do some out of the hat thinking to provide immediate infrastructure by way of a temporary campus, before the main campus could be developed for which identification of land and acquisition was a cumbersome and time taking process.

In view of the above and after finding that the cancellation of allotment was not diseased by mala fide, the Single Judge found that there were convincing reasons arising out of larger public good to effect cancellation of the order of allotment and to take possession of the land as a natural corollary thereof. It was further noted that fact of an IIT being set up, was not “even in the horizon when the decision to auction the land with the petitioner was taken”. The Single Judge held that cancellation was permissible and well within the ambit of Section 9(3) of the BIADA Act, which provides for the power of the State Government to seek, at any time, the restoration of land which is placed at the disposal of the Authority. 

M/s. Scope contested the order of dismissal of its writ petition in an intra-court appeal where it succeeded. Its appeal was allowed vide the impugned order.

Justice Datta recollected Supreme Court's judgement in State of Maharashtra vs. Prabhu (1994) 2 SCC 481. A 3-Judge Bench had held that the High Court should refuse to interfere in its equity jurisdiction when the same would be detrimental to public interest.  

Justice Tripathi did not get the satisfaction of witnessing the endorsement of his order by the Supreme Court. He died on May 2, 2020, from a cardiac arrest at the AIIMS Trauma Centre, New Delhi during pandemic. He was placed on a ventilator in critical condition in April 2020. He was elevated as an Additional Judge of the Patna High Court on October 9, 2006 and was made a permanent judge of that High Court on 21 November 2007. Justice Tripathi was appointed as the Chief Justice of Chhattisgarh High Court from July 7, 2018. On March 23, 2019, Justice Tripathi resigned as Chief Justice of Chhattisgarh High Court after being appointed as Judicial Member in the anti-corruption ombudsman, Lokpal of India.On March 27, 2019, he took oath as a Judicial Member of the Lokpal of India. He had served as the President of Patna Golf Club.

 

 

Voting for UP Bar Council elections postponed, Bihar State Bar Council election results sub judice before Election Tribunal No. III of Bar Council of India

Amidst bitter protest in Lucknow during the Uttar Pradesh Bar Council elections, the Bar Council elections have been postponed indefinitely. Returning Officer and former High Court Justice A.R. Mausmai decided to postpone the voting until orders. The protesting Advocates tore up pamphlets and threw them and also smashed chairs and tables. They claimed that there was already a tick next to a candidate's name on the ballot paper.  Voting for the much-awaited four-phase election of the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh had commenced on January 16. A total of 25 members will be elected from among 333 candidates who are in the fray.The first phase of the election was held in districts beginning with the letters A, B and C, where advocates cast their votes on January 16 and 17.  The second phase of voting took place on January 20 and 21 in districts starting with the letters D to J. The third phase was scheduled for January 27 and 28 in districts beginning with the letters K to M, while the final and fourth phase was  to be held on January 30 and 31 in districts starting with the letters P to V. After the completion of polling, all ballot boxes was planned to be sent to Prayagraj by February 3, 2026. The date for counting of votes has not been announced as yet. In Lucknow, polling was underway amidst uproar during the third phase on January 27 and 28 at the high court campus.

Each advocate is entitled to vote for 25 candidates. On a single ballot paper, voters can cast votes for up to 25 candidates of their choice. On earlier occasions, voting was conducted only at the district level within district court complexes. But the current elections are being held at three levels within each district. The main polling centre has been established at the district court complex, where most advocates from the city will vote. Besides this ocal booths have been set up at sub-divisional courts for the convenience of advocates. A total of 2,49,808 advocates holding Certificates of Practice (CoP) are authorised to vote in the election. 

Notably, the nomination fee for the Uttar Pradesh Bar Council elections is ₹1.50 lakh, along with an additional ₹25,000 for the voter list covering 80 districts, collected by the Bar Council. The fee is higher than that for parliamentary, legislative assembly, and presidential elections. Each candidate was required to pay the nomination fee.

The UP Bar elections are being monitored by a high-powered committee constituted by the Supreme Court. The committee is chaired by former chief justice of the Jharkhand high court, justice Ravi Ranjan. Its members include former Allahabad high court judge S.R. Masuri and former Delhi high court judge Rekha Palli. The state’s election officer is former Allahabad high court judge Arvind Kumar Tripathi, while former judge Surendra Singh has been appointed as the observer.

The districts which went for voting on January 16–17 2026 were: Agra, Aligarh, Allahabad, Ambedkarnagar, Amethi, Amroha, Auraiya, Azamgarh, Baghpat, Bahraich, Ballia, Balrampur, Banda, Barabanki, Bareilly, Basti, Bhadohi, Bijnor, Budaun, Bulandshahr, Chandauli, and Chitrakoot.

It is noteworthy that in M. Varadhan vs. Union of India & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Justices Surya Kant, Ujjal Bhuyan and N.K. Singh had passed a 50-page long order dated November 18, 2025. The 26 Respondents are: 1. Union of India, 2 Bar Council of India, 3. Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh, Through Chairman, 4. Bar Council of Assam, Through Chairman, 5. Bihar State Bar Council Through Chairman, 6. Bar Council of Chhattisgarh, Through Chairman, 7. Bar Council of Delhi, Through Chairman, 8. Bar Council of Gujarat, Through Chairman, 9. Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh, Through Chairman, 10. Bar Council of Jammu and Kashmir, Through Its Chairman, 11. Jharkhand State Bar Council, Through Chairman, 12. Bar Council of Karnataka, Through Chairman, 13. Bar Council of Kerala, Through Chairman, 14. Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh, Through Its Chairman, 15. Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa, Through Chairman, 16. Bar Council of Manipur, Through Chairman, 17. Bar Council of Meghalaya, Through Chairman, 18. Odisha State Bar Council, Through Chairman, 19. Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana, Through Chairman, 20. Bar Council of Rajasthan, Through Chairman, 21. Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry, Through Chairman, 22. Bar Council of Telangana, Through Chairman, 23. Bar Council of Tripura, Through Chairman, 24. Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh, Through Its Chairman, 25. Bar Council of Uttarakhand, Through Chairman and 26. Bar Council of West Bengal, Through Chairman. The case was filed on October 31, 2023, registered on November 23, 2023 and verified on December 1, 2023. It was listed for hearing on January 13, 2026. It is listed for hearing on February 24, 2026.

The order reads:"The controversy in this batch of cases, including various applications filed from time to time, revolves around fair, transparent, and timely conduction of elections for the State Bar Councils. 2. It is not necessary for us to go into the allegations or counter-allegations made by various stakeholders. All that we take notice of is that there are twenty-three State Bar Councils in India, out of which elections to the State Bar Councils of Bihar and Chhattisgarh have already been conducted. 3. In the case of Bihar, the results have been declared, and some aggrieved members have already approached the Election Tribunal No. III of the Bar Council of India. We do not wish to express any opinion in relation to the fairness of the aforesaid election since the matter is sub-judice before the Tribunal."

It added: "The entire election process, including counting of votes, shall be controlled and monitored through their direct supervision by the High-Powered Election Committees, constituted hereinafter. 12. With a view to facilitate the effective conduction of these elections, we deem it appropriate that elections to different State Bar Councils ought to take place in a phased manner. To that end, we issue the following directions: I. The State Bar Councils of Telangana and Uttar Pradesh, where the elections have already been notified, shall conclude their elections by 31.01.2026. The counting of votes and subsequent declaration of results shall, in any case, be concluded on or before 28.02.2026. The elections will be conducted under the direct supervision of the High-Powered Election Committee – Phase I, comprising the following three members: (i) Justice Ravi Ranjan, former Chief Justice, Jharkhand High Court (Chairperson); (ii) Justice A.R. Masoodi, former Judge, Allahabad High Court; and (iii) Justice Rekha Palli, former Judge, Delhi High Court.

The order also reads: "14. In addition to the High-Powered Election Committees constituted above, we also deem it appropriate to constitute a three-member High-Powered Election Supervisory Committee, on a pan- India basis, which shall be headed by a former Judge of this Court and shall also comprise one former Chief Justice of a High Court and one renowned Senior Advocate, who does not contest election(s) of the Bar Councils or the Bar Associations. For the same, in this regard, we appoint the following as members of such Supervisory Committee: (i) Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia, former Judge, Supreme Court of India (Chairperson); (ii) Justice Ravi Shankar Jha, former Chief Justice, Punjab & Haryana High Court; and (iii) Shri V. Giri, Senior Advocate." It observed: "19. During the course of hearing, it is seen that several lawyers have individual and varied grievances. We are afraid such individual grievances cannot be addressed in these proceedings. Liberty is, hence, granted to them to apply before the High-Powered Election Committee(s) for redressal of their individual issue(s). 20. Any person who is aggrieved by the decision of the High-Powered Election Committee shall be at liberty to approach the High-Powered Supervisory Committee. The decision taken by the Supervisory Committee shall be final. No civil court or High Court shall entertain any petition(s) against such decision. 21. To enable the Committees constituted herein to perform their functions, we direct the Bar Council of India to make available adequate secretarial assistance to the respective Committees, as required. 22. In addition, the respective Chairpersons and Members of the High-Powered Election Committees, as well as the Chairperson and Members of the High-Powered Election Supervisory Committee, shall be entitled to a reasonable honorarium along with other perks, the amount and modalities of which may be finally decided by the Chairperson of the High-Powered Election Supervisory Committee in consultation with the Bar Council of India."

Also read: Bihar Bar Council Journal removes names of members of Bihar State Bar Council due to pending dispute before Central Election Tribunal 

First SupremeCourt judgment which interprets Section 175(4) of BNSS

Supreme Court dismissed Bihar State Bar Council's special leave petition against Shahnaz Fatma "as withdrawn", vindicates Justice Sandeep Kumar's judgement

In Bihar State Bar Council vs. Shahnaz Fatma & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed a 1-page long order dated July 14, 2025. The Council was compelled to withdraw its petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) which arose out of 10-page long impugned final judgment dated April 25, 2025 by Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy of Patna High Court's Division Bench in Bihar State Bar Council, through its Officiating Secretary vs. Shahnaz Fatma & Ors. (2025). The Division Bench had upheld the 22-page long judgement dated July 5, 2024 by Justice Sandeep Kumar in Shahnaz Fatma vs. Bihar State Bar Council & Ors. 

Bihar State Bar Council filed a case on May 20, 2025 in the Supreme Court. It was registered on June 17, 2025. It was verified on June 23, 2025. The Respondents in the Supreme Court were: 1. Shahnaz Fatma, 2. The Disciplinary Committee, Bar Council of India, 3. The Bihar School Examination Board (Senior Secondary). 4. The State of Bihar, 5. The Chairman, Bar Council of India and 6. Prem Kumar Jha.

Supreme Court's order reads:"After arguing at some length, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, on instructions, seeks permission to withdraw this petition. Permission is granted. The special leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn." R. Balasubramanian was the senior advocate.  

The other Respondents in the High Court were:Disciplinary Committee, Bar Council of India, through its Officiating Secretary, Bihar School Examination Board (Senior Secondary), through its Secretary, State of Bihar, through the Director, Secondary Education, Government of Bihar, Chairman, Bar Council of India and Prem Kumar Jha, Member Bihar State Bar Council. P.K. Shahi, Advocate General had appeared on behalf of the BCI, Shantanu Kumar was Advocate for the BSBC and Amit Shrivastava, senior advocate was the amicus curiae before Justice Kumar, the Single Judge Bench of the High Court.

Advocate Shahnaz Fatma has successfully questioned and challenged the resolution dated June 20, 2021 passed in General Body of Bihar State Bar Council, order dated December 18, 2021 passed by Bar Council of India. Justice Sandeep Kumar's judgement has been vindicated both in the High Court and the Supreme Court. 

Justice Kumar concluded:".... I am of the view that the impugned orders are not sustainable in law. Accordingly, the impugned recommendation letter dated 18.12.2021 issued by the Bar Council of India as well as the notifications/orders dated 03.01.2022 and 04.01.2022 issued by the Bihar State Bar Council are hereby set aside. The respondent-Bihar State Bar Council is directed to restore the name of the petitioner on the roll of the Advocates maintained by the Bar Council of India and also restore all consequent privileges and right to the petitioner as were available before passing the impugned orders/letters." With these observations and directions, he allowed the writ petition of Advocate Shahnaz Fatma.

Also read: Chief Justice led Division Bench upholds decision of Justice Sandeep Kumar against Bar Council of India's order against Advocate Shahnaz Fatma 

Patna High Court sets aside Bihar State Bar Council, Bar Council of India (BCI) orders, restores Advocate Shahnaz Fatma on the roll of BCI 

"A Writ Court has the power to mould the relief. Justice cannot be forsaken on the alter of technicalities": Supreme Court

In Vashist Narayan Kumar vs.The State of Bihar & Ors. (2024), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and K.V. Viswanathan delivered a 18-page long judgement dated January 2, 2024, wherein, it set aside the judgement by Justice P. B. Bajanthri as part of a Division Bench of Patna High Court. Justice Viswanathan who authored the judgement observed:"We are not impressed with the finding of the Division Bench that there was no prayer seeking quashment of the results declared over the web. A reading of the prayer clause in the writ petition indicates that the appellant did pray for a mandamus directing the respondents to consider the candidature treating his date of birth as 18.12.1997 and also sought for a direction for issuance of an appointment letter. A Writ Court has the power to mould the relief. Justice cannot be forsaken on the alter of technicalities." 

Justice Viswanathan concluded: "26. For the reasons stated above, we set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in LPA No. 1271 of 2019 dated 22.08.2022 and direct the respondent-State to treat the appellant as a candidate who has “passed”, in the selection process held under the advertisement No. 1 of 2017 issued by the Central Selection Board (Constable Recruitment), Patna with the date of birth as 18.12.1997. We further direct that if the appellant is otherwise not disqualified, the case of the appellant be considered and necessary appointment letter issued. We further direct that, in the event of there being no vacancy, appointment letter will still have to be issued on the special facts of this case. We make the said direction, in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. We further direct that the State will be at liberty in that event to adjust the vacancy in the next recruitment that they may resort to in the coming years. We notice from the written submissions of the State that 21,391 vacancies have been notified in Advertisement No.1 of 2023 and it is stated that the procedure for selection is ongoing. We place the said statement on record. We direct compliance to be made of the aforesaid direction within a period of four weeks from today. 27. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. No order as to costs." 

With regard to the appellant's error in question, the Court observed: "It is a trivial error which appears to be a genuine and bona fide mistake. It will be unjust to penalise the appellant for the same."

Vashist Narayan Kumar, the appellant hailed from a small village named Dheodha, Nawadah in Bihar. He belonged to the downtrodden segment of the society. He aspired to become a Police Constable and had applied for the post under the reserved category. Having possessed the eligibility criteria of being an intermediate (10+2 pass), he also cleared the written examination and the Physical Eligibility Test. The appellant submitted his educational certificates/mark sheet as well as his caste certificate for document verification. On June 11, 2018, the final results reflected him as having failed. The only reason was that, while in the application form uploaded online, his date of birth was shown as December 8, 1997, in the school mark sheet, his date of birth was reflected as December 18, 1997. The appellant gave representations but failed to receive any response. He filed a writ petition before the High Court. His explanation was simple and straight forward. He stated in his writ petition that, after noticing the advertisement issued by the Central Selection Board on July 29, 2017, he from his remote village went to the Cyber café at Pakribarawan - a nearby town. With the assistance of a person running the Cyber café, he filled in his form and uploaded it online and he received application No. 7236126 indicating thereby that the online application had been duly filled. His case was that, while filling up the form, by an inadvertent error, the date of birth had got recorded as “08.12.1997” instead of “18.12.1997”. He derived no benefit from it as either way he fulfilled the eligibility criteria and the age requirement. He prayed for the relief in the nature of a mandamus to the respondents to consider his claim for selection and direct them to issue an appointment letter treating the date of birth as 18.12.1997, as reflected in his educational certificates.

Supreme Court recalled that this vey Division Bench in Divya vs. Union of India & Ors., 2023:INSC:900 = 2023 (13) Scale 730, while declining relief to candidates who acquired eligibility after the date mentioned in the notification carved out a narrow exception. There, the judgment in Ajay Kumar Mishra vs. Union of India & Ors., [2016] SCC OnLine Del 6563, a case very similar to the facts of the present case, was noted.

The counsel for the appellant, in her written submissions, cited the following judgments in support of her
proposition that inadvertent error in filling up the date of birth when no advantage is derived will not constitute a wilful misrepresentation and contended that in all those cases reliefs were given to the candidates:
i) Arkshit Kapoor vs. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 10154 [para 20]
ii) K. Sangeetha vs. Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (2018) SCC OnLine Mad 5075 [Paras 9 &
11]
iii) Anuj Pratap Singh vs. Union Public Service Commission, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 10982 [Paras 15,16
& 21]
iv) Shubham Tushir vs. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 9831 [Paras 4 & 10]
v) Staff Selection Commission & Anr. Vs. Shubham Tushir LPA No. 237 of 2020 before the Delhi High
Court 
vi) Poonam Pal vs. M.P. Gramin Bank, (2022) SCC OnLine MP 2921 [Paras 9-12]

In Prince Jaibir Singh vs. Union of India & Ors. in C.A. No. 6983 of 2021, the Supreme Court in its judgement dated November 22, 2021 rightly observed that though technology is a great enabler, there is at the same time, a digital divide. 

In Vashist Narayan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2022), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices P. B. Bajanthri and Rajiv Roy had delivered a 3-page long judgement dated August 22, 2022, wherein, it concluded:"For seeking mandamus one must establish his statutory right that his name is reflected in the final select list. In the absence of these ingredients, the appellant has not made out a case so as to interfere with the impugned order" dated July 30, 2019 passed by Justice Shivaji Pandey. The Division Bench judgement authored by Justice Bajanthri dismissed the appeal. 

Division Bench led by Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad confirms death sentence in a case from Rohtas, Justice Sourendra Pandey authors concurring opinion, two accused persons still absconding

In Aman Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sourendra Pandey of Patna High Court's Division Bench delivered a 67-page long judgement dated January 22, 2026 confirmed the death sentence in a Death Reference case of 2024 and dismissed the criminal appeal preferred by the appellants. The Judgement was authored by Justice Prasad. The second appellant was Sonal Singh. It was heard along with the criminal appeal The State of Bihar vs. Aman Singh & Anr. (2026).

The death reference registered under Section 366 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the criminal appeal preferred by the two appellants arose out of the judgment of conviction dated May 2, 2024 and the order of sentence dated  May 9, 2024 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-19, Rohtas at Sasaram in Sessions Trial of 2022 arose out of a Darihat P.S. case 2021 dated July 13, 2021 registered under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. 

By the impugned judgment and order, the appellants were convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302/34 IPC and were sentenced to death. The trial court recorded the guidelines of the Supreme Court as laid down in case of Machhi Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1983 SC 957. It also referred the principles relied upon by the Supreme Court in case of Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in (1980) 2 SCC 684. The trial court held  that in this case, three unarmed persons have been ruthlessly butchered by the sword wielding convicts for a dispute pertaining to a small piece of land. Altogether five ante-mortem severe massive external and internal injuries were inflicted on the person of each of the deceased. The trial court found that consequent upon the death of the deceased persons, no male major person has been left to perform the rights and rituals ordinarily required in Hindu family. The trial court further considered as to whether there can be a justification in life imprisonment of the convicts or not. The court held that the incessant tears of the widows and the children cannot be dried out, however, by way of capital punishment, their sufferings are supposed to be mitigated. They may console themselves if convicts are awarded capital punishment. They are supposed to lead a secure and peaceful lives. On the contrary, if the convicts are awarded life imprisonment, they are supposed to come out after 14 years, only to revive the wounds of the surviving family members of the deceased. The trial court considered the aggravated factors which exist in this case. The nature and circumstances of the offence, the role of the accused in the commission of such a heinous crime of murder/massacre of the three deceased persons, the culpability of the deceased persons. The trial court held that in the facts of the case, the death penalty is the only sentence that can be given to the convicts for their offence under Section 302/34 IPC.

The appellants Aman Singh and Sonal Singh approached the High Court to pray for setting aside the impugned judgment and order of the trial court. 

The informant's senior counsel relied upon the paragraph ‘13’ of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Bihari Yadav vs. State of Bihar and Harendra Rai vs. State of Bihar reported in (2023) 13 SCC 563 wherein the Supreme Court had held that the three main stakeholders in a criminal trial, namely the Investigating Officer, Public Prosecutor, and the Judiciary, all utterly failed to keep up their respective duties and responsibilities cast upon them. It had taken note of the subsequent conduct of the accused and has drawn adverse inference. It had taken judicial notice of the judgment in the habeas corpus petition regarding conduct of the accused, the investigating agency, the Public Prosecutor and the Presiding Officer conducting the trial. 

Amicus Curiae relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dayal Singh vs. State of Uttranchal (2012) 8 SCC 263 to submit that it was the consistent view of the Supreme Court that if the lapse or omission is committed by the investigating agency, negligently or otherwise, the prosecution evidence was required to be examined dehors such omissions to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not. In Paras Yadav vs. State of Bihar (1999) 2 SCC 126, the Supreme Court held that the contaminated conduct of officials should not stand in the way of evaluating the evidence by the courts, otherwise the designed mischief would be perpetuated and justice would be denied to the complainant party. The counsel relied upon the recent judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Edakkandi Dineshan @ P. Dineshan & Ors. vs. State of Kerela 2025 INSC 28 to submit that on account of defective investigation, the benefit would not accrue to the accused persons on that ground alone. Variance in statement of witnesses if minor would not drive their testimony unworthy. In Goverdhan & Anr. vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2025) 3 SCC 378, their Lordships of the Supreme Court reiterated that minor discrepancies in details not touching the core of the case do not affect credibility and corroboration cannot be expected with mathematical precision. It was held that in case of rustic witnesses-appreciation of evidences from rural background witnesses, behavourial pattern and perceptive habits must be judged. Accordingly discrepancies, contradictions and embellishments in essential parts do not militant against the core truth if there was impress of truth and conformity to probability. The plea of alibi requires substantiation by leading evidence. It was submitted that keeping in view the judicial pronouncements when the evidences are examined, it would be found that the prosecution was duly proved the motive behind the occurrence. It was a land dispute which was the genesis of the occurrence and it was the consistent case of the prosecution right from the fardbeyan to the deposition of the prosecution witnesses, who have fully supported the prosecution case 

The prosecution case was based on the fardbeyan of Shakuntala Devi, wife of Late Vijay Singh recorded by ASI Bimlesh Kumar on July 13, 2021 at 23:00 hrs. near postmortem house, Sadar Hospital, Sasaram. 

In her fardbeyan, the informant, who was wife of one of the deceased and who was examined as a prosecution witness in course of trial. On July 13, 2021 at 18:00 hours, when her husband Vijay Singh and her son Deepak Singh were at home then, her Pattidars, namely, (1) Ajay Singh, (2) Sonal Singh and (3) Aman Singh started ploughing the disputed land adjacent to the house. When her husband and her son went to stop them, then they started abusing them and assaulted them with fist and lathi. Somehow, her husband and her son fled away from there to Rang Bahadur Singh’s door. After some time, the accused persons while chasing came to Rang Bahadur Singh’s door and they abused her husband and her son and also started assaulting them with lathi/danda. In the meanwhile, her younger son Rakesh Singh also came there from Dehri and on seeing his father and brother getting assaulted, after pacifying the fight he took his father and brother to his old house towards kitta. These three accused persons armed with sword while chasing them reached purana kitta and started hitting her husband and sons with sword. Sonal Singh with an intention to kill, hit her elder son Deepak Singh as a result of which he got cut on his neck, face, cheek, head and chest and blood started oozing out and he became unconscious. Aman Singh attacked her younger son Rakesh Singh with sword in his hand with an intention to kill him, Rakesh got cuts on both his hands, face, neck and head and fell unconscious. When her husband on seeing his children getting injured went to save them then Ajay Singh hit him with sword on his neck as a result of which he got a serious injury on his neck, he started bleeding profusely and he fell unconscious. Meanwhile, Gayatri Devi wife of Ajay Singh came with a spear in her hand and gave it to her husband and said that they should not be left alive, attack with this spear. Thereafter, the informant and her elder daughter-in-law reached there and asked for help from neighbouring people but no one came to help them. Thereafter, her niece Rajesh Singh, son of Rang Bahadur Singh came there and when he was getting all the injured to hospital, no villager came to help him. Then they informed the police. When police came, the police took her injured husband and two sons to hospital where doctor declared all three of them dead. On the basis of the fardbeyan of the informant, P.S. case was registered under Section 302/34 IPC. The S.H.O. Darihat (PW-5) took over the responsibility of investigation upon himself.

Justice Prasad relied on Supreme Court's decision in Ram Vijay Singh vs. State of U.P. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 142, wherein the Court had discussed the settled position that falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) principle was foreign to our criminal law jurisprudence. A 3-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that “….. A part statement of a witness can be believed even though some part of the statement may not be relied upon by the Court….”. He observed:"I, therefore, find from the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3, it can be safely deduced that their depositions with regard to the place of occurrence, time of occurrence and manner of occurrence have gone unquestioned."  

He noted that it is well settled that a mere delay in lodging of the FIR cannot be a ground to throw away the prosecution case. Reference in this regard is made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chotkau vs. State of U.P. reported in (2023) 6 SCC 742. The credibility of the prosecution witnesses would be required to be looked into. 

In the case of Chotkau, the Supreme Court observed: “64. To come to the above conclusion, reliance was placed upon a decision of a three-Judge Bench in Balram Singh v. State of Punjab (2003) 11 SCC 286: 2004 SCC (Cri) 149. In Balram Singh, the three-Judge Bench of this Court rejected the contention with regard to the delay in transmitting the FIR to the Magistrate, on the ground that : (SCC p. 291, para 10) “10. … while considering the complaint in regard to the delay in the FIR reaching the jurisdictional Magistrate, we will have to also bear in mind the creditworthiness of the ocular evidence adduced by the prosecution and if we find that such ocular evidence is worthy of acceptance, the element of delay in registering a complaint or sending the same to the jurisdictional Magistrate by itself would not in any manner weaken the prosecution case.”

Justice Prasad recollected Supreme Court's decision in Baso Prasad & Ors. vs. State of Bihar reported in (2006) 13 SCC 65, wherein the Court observed, inter alia, with regard to the presence of rigor mortis in the following words:- “….. The start of rigor mortis depends on the temperature and weather conditions…” He observed: "65. I, therefore, find that in this case the prosecution case fully stands on its own legs. There is no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the learned trial court whereby these appellants have been convicted for the offences punishable under Section 302/34 IPC. I affirm the judgment of conviction dated 2nd May, 2024 passed in Sessions Trial No. 10 of 2022 arising out of Darihat P.S. Case No. 111 of 2021 and the direction of the learned trial court to the District Legal Services Authority, Rohtas, Sasaram for award of maximum compensation under the scheme to each of the three widows. The compensation must be paid, if not already paid, within a period of one month from the date of this judgment."

On the point of sentence, the judgement recorded the the counsel of the appellants prayed to the Court to  modify the death sentence awarded to the appellants to a life imprisonment. It was submitted that although the trial court referred the judgments of the Supreme Court in Bechan Singh vs. State of Punjab 1980 (2) SCR 864 and Machhhi Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470: 1983 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 681, it did not take into consideration the mitigating circumstances including that there are chances of reformation of the appellants. The counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Navas @ Mulanavas Vs. State of Kerala (2024) 14 SCC 82. The Court's attention was drawn towards various case laws discussed by the Supreme Court to lay down the principle of proportionality. 

Justioce Prasad appreciated trial court's judgement which noticed that none of the convicts was injured in the occurrence, the severity and brutalities of the offences committed by the convicts would no way justify their acts. The other two accused persons have been absconding till date and they have not surrendered before the court nor they have been arrested. The matter could have been resolved through civil litigation but the temperament of the convicts did not suit the same. 

In his 2-page long concurring judgement, Justice Pandey observed: "72. I have gone through the judgment recorded by my esteemed brother, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad. While I entirely agree with the views expressed above, I am reminded of the great epic “Mahabharat” which is a tale of devastating feud over land and power between cousins. The Kauravas were the aggressors, who attempted to kill relatives for property or to seize the reign of the empire. Mahabharat culminates with a message that aggressors meet a tragic end as divine punishment for their “adharm”, i.e. to try to kill their brother (cousins) to seize power. 73. The story of Mahabharat leads us to one and only one conclusion that the appellants, who were the aggressors should be punished for their sin/crime, which has not only taken the three human lives but have also killed three women who after loosing their husbands have become lifeless, their children have been left to cry all over their lives and therefore I uphold the conviction of the appellants. I agree that it is one of the rarest of the rare cases in which the option to impose sentence of imprisonment of life or a special sentencing cannot be consciously exercised. I confirm the sentence imposed by the learned trial court."