High Court satisfied with waste management efforts by Municipal Corporation of Darbhanga

In Dheeraj Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary Cum Commissioner & Ors. (2025), Acting Chief Justice led Division Bench consigned the petition after observing that "All the issues appear to have been addressed by the respondents. The Storm Water Drainage Scheme has been approved at the cost of Rs.245 crores, which is being implemented by BUIDCO. An agreement has already been executed on 28.12.2023, which indicates that the date of the completion of the project would be 27.12.2026. In the project, there shall be 08 outfall drains with a total length of 46854 meters....". 

In its judgement dated June 20, 2025, the other respondents were Principal Secretary cum Commissioner, Department of Environment and Forest, Patna, Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Darbhanga. Central Railways through Divisional Manager, Samastipur and Bihar State Pollution Control Board, Bihar through its member secretary. 

The Court recorded that it was informed that the construction of 650 meters of drain from the Post Mortem Road situated in DMCH premises to Karpuri Chowk has been completed. Work schedule has been planned in advance, the details of which also have been provided in the affidavit. 

With regard to bio-medical waste disposal, the judgement noted that Municipal Corporation of Darbhanga has notified the Solid Waste Management Rules, 2016 and Bio-Medical Waste Management Rules, 2016, which are being implemented properly. The segregation of bio-medical waste is being done and the agency to collect the biomedical waste from DMCH and other private nursing homes, is operating on daily basis. An agency has been entrusted with the work, which has pitched in 04 vehicles and 10 personnel for collection and segregation of the biomedical waste."

It also reads: With respect to air pollution, a serious drive has been undertaken in the town of Darbhanga. Very meticulously, the persons spreading pollution have been identified and have been fined. A total amount of Rs.78,000/- by way of penalty has been recovered from them. The Municipal Corporation of Darbhanga has also conceived of a provision for penalty of environmental compensation against throwing of waste in open spaces/water bodies. Justice Kumar observed:"Considering the efforts taken by the respondents/State, we are satisfied that the directions passed by this Court have, to a large extent, been followed."

The petitioner was the son of President, Swatch Darbhanga Swasth Darbhanga Welfare Association. The petitioner had filed the public interest petition to draw attention towards the inaction of the respondents with respect to water logging in the town of Darbhanga; non-initiation of any steps for storm-drainage construction; for effective bio-waste disposal and for checking air pollution.

Role of circumstantial evidence in Supreme Court's judgement from 1952 cites 1838 case law

In Hanumant vs The State of Madhya Pradesh on AIR 1952 SC 343, Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan of Supreme Court of India concluded:"We cannot infer any intent to defraud or any intention to injure Amarnath, though in order to protect himself accused Patel made certain allegations against him. We therefore set aside the conviction of both the appellants under the third charge and acquit them. The result is that the consolidated appeal is allowed, the judgments of all the three courts below are set aside and the appellants are acquitted." The appellants were acquitted. The Court delivered the judgement dated September 23, 1952 after hearing the consolidated appeal by special leave from the two orders of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur passed on the March 9, 1950, in Criminal Revisions of 1949. 

In this case it all began with a complaint filed by the Assistant Inspector-General of Police, Anti-Corruption Department, Nagpur, against the appellants H. G. Nargundkar, Excise Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, and R. S. Patel. They were tried in the court of B. K. Chaudhri, Special Magistrate, Nagpur, for the offence of conspiracy to secure the contract of Seoni Distillery from April, 1947, to March 1951 by forging the tender and for commission of the offences of forgery of the tender and of another document. The Special Magistrate convicted both the appellants on all the three charges. He sentenced R. S. Patel to rigorous imprisonment for one year under each charge and to pay fines of Rs. 2,000, Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 1,000, under the first, second and third charges respectively. The appellant Nargundkar was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months under each charge and to pay fines of Rs. 2,000, Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 1,000, under the first, second and third charges respectively. Each of the appellants appealed against their respective convictions and sentences to the Court of the Sessions Judge, Nagpur. The Sessions Judge quashed the conviction of both the appellants under the first charge of criminal conspiracy under section 120-B, I.P.C. but maintained the convictions and sentences under section 465, I.P.C., on the charges of forging. Both the appellants went up in revision against this decision to the High Court but without any success. An application was then made under article 136 of the Constitution of India for special leave to appeal which was allowed by the Supreme Court on March 24, 1950.

The Court observed: "In dealing with circumstantial evidence the rules specially applicable to such evidence must be borne in mind. In such cases there is always the danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof and therefore it is right to recall the warning addressed by Baron Alderson, to the jury in Reg v. Hodge ((1838) 2 Lew. 227)" Alderson said:-"The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting circumstances to one another, and even in straining them a little, if need be, to force them to from parts of one connected whole; and the more ingenious the mind of the individual, the more likely was it, considering such matters to overreach and mislead itself, to supply some little link that is wanting, to take for granted some fact consistent with its previous theories and necessary to render them complete." 

Justice Mahajan observed:"12. It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence in of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and pendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."

The law with regard to conviction based on circumstantial evidence has been crystalised by the Supreme Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sharda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116, wherein it was held: “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793] where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807] 4 SCC 116.20
‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” 
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." 

In Shanti Devi vs. State of Rajasthan Criminal Appeal No. 954 of 2005, with regard to circumstantial evidence, “The principles can be set out as under:
    (i) The circumstances from which an interference of guilt is sought to be proved must be conjointly or firmly established.
    (ii) The circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused.
    (iii) The circumstances taken cumulatively must form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that with an all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused or none else.
     (iv) The circumstances should be incapable of explanation on any reasonable hypothesis, same that of the guilt of the accused.” [para 8]

In Padala Veera Reddy vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh (1989) Supp. (2) SCC 706, the principles are reiterated as follows;
    (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;
    (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;
    (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and
    (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.

 In C. Cenga Reddy vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh (1996) 10 SCC 193, the Court observed: “21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.”

In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs, The State of Maharshatra (2006) 10 SCC 681, the Court observed: “12. In the case in hand there is no eyewitness of the occurrence and the case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence. The normal principle in a case based on circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established; that those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused; that the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and they should be incapable of explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with their innocence.”

In Nizam vs. The State of Rajasthan (2015), the Court observed: "In case of circumstantial evidence, court has to examine the entire evidence in its entirety and ensure that the only inference that can be drawn from the evidence is the guilt of the accused. For establishing the guilt on the basis of the circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be firmly established and the chain of circumstances must be completed from the facts. The chain of circumstantial evidence cannot be said to be concluded in any manner sought to be urged by the prosecution."  

These principles have been reiterated in Bodhraj vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir (2002 (8) SCC 45, 
Bharat vs. State of Maharashtra (2003 (3) SCC 106), 
Jaswant Gir vs. State of Punjab (2005(12) SCC 438), 
Reddy Sampath Kumar vs. State of Andra Pradesh (2005 (7) SCC 603), 
Deepak Chandrakant Patil vs. State of Maharashtra (2006 (10) SCC 151, 
State of Goa vs. Sanjay Takran (2007 (3) SCC 755) and 
Sattatiyya alias Satish Rajanna Kartalla vs. State of Maharashtra (2008 (3) SCC 210).   

The word ‘Evidence’ has been derived from the Latin word ‘evidere’ which implies to show distinctly, to make clear to view or sight, to discover clearly, to make plainly certain, to certain, to ascertain, to prove. According to Sir Blackstone, ‘Evidence’ signifies that which demonstrates, makes clear or ascertain the truth of the facts or points in issue either on one side or the other. According to Sir Taylor, Law of Evidence means through argument to prove or disprove any matter of fact. The truth of which is submitted to judicial investigation.

All the statements which the court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under enquiry; such statements are called Oral evidence. All the documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the court; such documents are called documentary evidence. The definition of Evidence given in the Evidence Act is very narrow because in this evidence comes before the court by two means only- (1)   The statement of witnesses. (2)   Documents including electronic records.

Direct evidence is evidence of a fact based on a witness's personal knowledge or observation of that fact. A person's guilt of a charged crime may be proven by direct evidence if, standing alone, that evidence satisfies a judge beyond a reasonable doubt of the person's guilt of that crime.

Circumstantial evidence is direct evidence of a fact from which a person may reasonably infer the existence or nonexistence of another fact. A person's guilt of a charged crime may be proven by circumstantial evidence, if that evidence, while not directly establishing guilt, gives rise to an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence is evidence of circumstances which can be relied upon not as proving a fact directly but instead as pointing to its existence. Circumstantial evidence is based largely on inference and uses inductive reasoning.

 In Raja Naykar vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2024), , the Court observed: “It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the prosecution that the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The Court holds that it is a primary principle that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ proved guilty before a court can convict the accused. It has been held that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. It has been held that the facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has further been held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has been held that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities the act must have been done by the accused. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is.” 

In Laxman Prasad @Laxman vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2023), the Court observed: “In a case of circumstantial evidence, the chain has to be complete in all respects so as to indicate the guilt of the accused and also exclude any other theory of the crime.” 

In Shailendra Rajdev Pasvan vs. State of Gujarat (2019), the Court observed: “It is well settled by now that in a case based on circumstantial evidence the Courts ought to have a conscientious approach and conviction ought to be recorded only in case all the links of the chain are complete pointing to the guilt of the accused. Each link unless connected together to form a chain may suggest suspicion but the same in itself cannot take place of proof and will not be sufficient to convict the accused.”

In Kalu @LaxmiNarayan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2019), the Court observed:“Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character.”

In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973), the Court observed: “Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. Rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the 73 5 court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable”

Can documents/material produced by accused be considered at stage of discharge by the Court?, Patna High Court says, no

In Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar vs. The State Of Bihar Through C.B.I. (2025), Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court observed:"In the present case, based on the materials produced by the prosecution the Court below was of the opinion that there are sufficient materials to proceed with the criminal case and it is settled law that documents/material produced by the accused cannot be considered at the stage of discharge". Having recorded the observation of the Special Judge, C.B.I.-I,  Justice Kumar's In 39-page long judgement dated May 16, 2025 concluded:"The impugned order dated 28.09.2015 passed by passed by the learned Special Judge, C.B.I.-I, Patna is hereby affirmed." 

The case was heard and decided along with two other petitions by Vishakha Sindhu and Vineet Kumar Verma who too had assailed the order of September 28, 2015 in a 2011 case by Special Judge, C.B.I.-I, Patna rejecting their discharge petitions. These petitions were disposed of by a common judgment. 

Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar was the Manager in the Central Bank of India, Main Branch, Patna, Vishakha Sindhu was the wife of petitioner and one of the Directors of M/s. Sidhi Exports Private Limited and Vineet Kumar Verma was the brother-in-law of Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar and also one of the Directors of M/S. Sidhi Overseas Private Limited. It was alleged that in connivance with each other they had abused the official position of Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar, the bank manager who had sanctioned pre/post shipment advances to the firms belonging to his relative and associate and thereby, caused wrongful loss to the tune of Rs.368.56 lakhs to the Bank. It was also alleged that they had committed forgery by altering original dates on the aforesaid illegal advances. 

It was alleged that Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar, the bank manager unauthorisedly made advances against foreign outward bills for collection to the extent of Rs.148 lakhs to M/s. Sidhi Exports Private Limited, a firm in which his wife was one of the Directors and with mala fide intention made debit entries in the current deposit nominal account no.259 and correspondingly credited the overdraft account of M/s. Sidhi Exports Private Limited. It was also alleged that the petitioner- Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar falsified the accounts of the Bank with mala fide intention and thereby caused wrongful loss of interest on the aforesaid amount to the bank. It was alleged that petitioner- Vishakha Sindhu one of the Directors of M/S Sidhi Export Private Limited and wife of Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar, dishonestly submitted an export bill for collection to the Central Bank of India, Main Branch, Patna after altering the name of original collecting Bank on the G.R. forms. She also suppressed the fact that the same bill had already been submitted to the Jammu & Kashmir Bank, the original collecting bank, for advance. It has been further alleged that petitioner - Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar knowingly accepted this forged document in order to cover up the aforesaid illegal act and dishonestly altered the date on the forwarding letter written by the firm to the bank and allowed advances, thereby cheated the Bank. The petitioner-Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar in connivance with the then Branch Manager, Central Bank of India, Main Branch, Patna, acted dishonestly and without authority sanctioned packing credit limit to M/s. Sidhi Overseas Private Limited without considering business antecedents of the aforesaid firm. He also dishonestly allowed heavy overdrawings in the packing credit account of aforesaid firm and therefore, the illegal actions of petitioner- Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar and other bank officials resulted in wrongful gain of Rs.80.93 Lakh to the firm and a corresponding loss of Rs.80.93 lakhs to the Bank. It was further alleged that in order to conceal the above-mentioned overdrawing positions, petitioner-Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar also altered the relevant records of the Bank.

The petitioner-Sindhu Ratna Kul Bhaskar in connivance with other bank officials, dishonestly and in an unauthorised manner allowed foreign outward bill for collection advances to M/s. Sidhi Overseas Private Limited, thereby causing the bank to deliver money to the said firm and these actions caused a wrongful gain of Rs.91.50 lakhs to the firm. The petitioner-Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar in conspiracy with petitioner -Vineet Kumar Verma induced the Central Bank of India to deliver money to the said firm, as a result of which, the firm made a wrongful gain of Rs.69.13 lakhs. It was also alleged that in order to cover up overdrawing position, petitioner-Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar made false credit entry dated August 16, 1999 of Rs.19 lakhs in the packing credit account of M/s. Sidhi Overseas Private Limited by debiting a non-existent Other Term Loan account.  

The counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Velji Raghavji Patel vs. State of Maharashtra reported as 1964 SCC OnLine SC 185 and Central Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi vs. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. Calcutta S.C.C. 591, G. Sagar Suri & Anr. vs. State of UP. & Others reported as (2000) 2 SCC 636, ALPIC Finance Ltd. vs. P. Sadashivan & Anr. reported as (2001) 3 SCC 513, Uma Shankar Gopalika vs. State of Bihar & Anr., Indian Oil Corporation vs. NEPC India Ltd. & Ors. reported as (2006) 6 SCC 736, Rajwant Singh vs. State of Bihar & Anr. reported as 2007 (1) PLJR 406 : 2006 SCC OnLine Pat 463, Nikhil Merchant vs. CBI & Anr. reported as 2008(9) SCC 677, R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab reported as 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21; M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Another v/s Special Judicial Magistrate & Others reported as (1998 ) 5 SCC 749 ; Bhajanlal & Ors. reported as 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Ors. vs.Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Others reported as AIR 1988 S.C. 709 : (1988) 1 SCC 692; Bejai Singh Dugar v/s Certificate Officer Bhagalpur & Others 1965 BLJR - 341 (DB);Smt. Sarla Devi Agrawal vs. State of Bihar reported as 1979 BBCJ 213 (DB); Damodar Prasad Nathani vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. 1999 (1) PLJR 522; Kanhya Lal vs. The vs. the State of Bihar 2002(2) BBCJ 278 and K.K. Ahuja vs. V.K. Vora and Anr. 2009 (10) SCC 48. 

The counsel for the C.B.I. relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Odisha vs. Devendra Nath Padhi reported as (2005) I SCC 568; CBI vs. Aryan Singh & Ors. reported as (2023) 18 SCC 399 and P. Vijayan vs. State of Kerela & Anr. reported as (2010) 2 SCC 398.

Justice Kumar relied on paragraph nos. 14 to 16 of Supreme Court's decision in Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Jagjit Singh reported as (2013) 10 SCC 686, paragraph no.14 to 18 of the decision in Anil Bhavarlal Jain & Anr. vs. The State of Maharshtra & Ors. reported as 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3823 and in State of Gujarat vs. Dilipsinh Kishoresinh Sao reported as (2023) 17 SCC 688.

He observed:"In the present case, the offence, as alleged in the F.I.R. involves defrauding the financial system of the country by the persons who are responsible officer bearers of the Bank. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforese-quoted decisions has held that such offences caused adverse ripple effect in the society and are in the nature of moral turpitude. When an offence of cheating, fraud etc. has been committed by the borrower after weaving a conspiracy with the Bank officials, as alleged in the F.I.R., would not make a case suitable for interference by this Court. 51. Moreover, this Court at this stage, will not not go into the merits of the case and examine threadbare the defence of the accused persons if a strong prima facie case for trial is made out particularly offences affecting the financial and economic system. In the present case, the petitioners have failed to make out a case that the allegations are totally groundless and therefore, the criminal case should not proceed against them." 

Notably, "at any stage" principle in Cr.P.C enables the Court to address issues, gather evidence, and ensure a fair and just outcome by allowing interventions throughout the criminal process. 

Justice Kumar observed that documents/material produced by accused cannot be considered at stage of discharge by the Court. The fact is Section 313 Cr.P.C. (Power to examine the accused) allows a court to examine the accused at any stage of the proceedings, without prior warning, to clarify any issues. It also mandates examination after the prosecution witnesses have been examined and before the accused presents their defense.  Section 258 of CrPC (Power to stop proceedings) states that In summons-cases, a Magistrate can stop proceedings at any stage before judgment, even after evidence has been recorded, under specific conditions.  Section 306 CrPC (Tender of pardon to accomplice) states that Chief Judicial Magistrates or Metropolitan Magistrates can tender a pardon to an accomplice at any stage of the investigation, inquiry, or trial. It is apparent that the court did not pay heed to victim's rights. The victims have the right to be heard at every stage of the proceedings, including during investigation and trial. 

 

If the petitioners approach the Division Bench, they are likely to get relief especially with regard to consideration of new evidence.  

Judicial conscience of Court totally disturbed due to insensitiveness of investigating agency, Public Prosecutor

In Dulari Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's bench Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sourendra Pandey observed:"In the present case, however, the Public Prosecutor who conducted the case at Bhagalpur was not acting with due diligence and care. The records speak for themselves. No summon was issued to the other prosecution witnesses, no explanation came from the two police personnel who were charge-sheet witnesses, even Senior Superintendent of Police did not act on receipt of the letter from the court. In fact the FIR itself was registered after the informant made a complaint to the Dy.SP. he judicial conscience of this Court is totally disturbed on finding the kind of insensitiveness on the part of the investigating agency and the Public Prosecutor who were involved in this case. The trial court seems to have acted in haste in closing the prosecution evidence without taking care of it’s own order dated 08.11.2023 by which an explanation was called from the I.O. The Court had a duty to find out the truth and for this purpose the Presiding Officer of the trial court was required to exhaust all such procedures which were available to him in law to secure the presence of the witnesses. This Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that the judgment of acquittal in this case, having been passed in haste is liable to be set aside."

The Court set aside the impugned judgment. It directed trial court to take steps to secure presence of the prosecution witnesses in accordance with law. It asked the Senior Superintendent of Police, Bhagalpur to ensure presence of the police officers who are charge-sheet witnesses of this case on the dates fixed in the matter. He drew on Supreme Court's decision in V.N. Patil vs. K. Niranjan Kumar reported in (2021) 3 SCC 661.

The bench directed Shravan Yadav, Haldhar Yadav, Kanki Devi,  Lalan Yadav, Sunil Yadav, Sushil Yadav and Reeta Devi @Reena Devi, the respondent nos. 2 to 8 respectively to surrender in the trial court within four weeks from the date of the judgement. Since the respondent nos. 3 to 8 were on bail during trial, the trial court shall allow them to continue on bail. The respondent No. 2 was in custody at the time of delivery of impugned judgment, therefore, he would be taken into custody. The judgment of acquittal passed on February 1, 2024 by the Additional District & Sessions Judge-V, Bhagalpur in Sessions Trial of 2019 which arose out of Jagdishpur (Goradih) P.S. case of 2018 dated July 22, 2018 whereby and whereunder the trial court was pleased to acquit Respondent Nos. 2 to 8 of the charges under Sections 304(B)/34,302/34, 201/34 & 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The prosecution case was based on the written application of the mother of the deceased (PW-2) addressed to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Bhagalpur in which she stated that she had got her daughter married to Shravan Yadav, resident of Bhagalpur in the year 2012 and out of the wedlock, her daughter has got two children. After marriage, her daughter’s husband Shravan Yadav, father-in-law Haldhar Yadav, mother-inlaw Kanki Devi, devar Lalan Yadav and Sunil Yadav, Sushil Yadav and Reeta Devi were continuously torturing and beating her daughter for Rs one lakh and cow due to which her daughter used to come to her naihar many times to save her life. It was also alleged that six months ago, upon compromise with the husband of her daughter and her in-laws showing good faith, the informant allowed her daughter to go to her sasural and also gave two cows worth Rs.60,000/-, but again the in-laws started assaulting her daughter and harassed her. On July 22, 2018, the informant came to know that her daughter was murdered by her husband and inlaws, they concealed the dead body and ran away after locking their house. The informant alleged that she gave written complaint in Goradih Police Station but no action was taken.

The written application was sent to the Officer Incharge of Goradih Police Station to ensure proper action as per law. On being receipt of this written application, Jagdishpur (Goradih) P.S. case of 2018 dated August 2, 2018 registered for the offences under Sections 304B/201/34 IPC.

Justice Prasad's judgement dated May 9, 2025 reads: "A copy of this judgment be sent to the Director General of Police, Bihar. This Court requests the DGP, Bihar to consider taking appropriate action."

There is no negative equality; benefit conferred without legal basis cannot be relied upon as a principle of parity: Justice Harish Kumar

In Mansoor Alam, Son of Mohammad Mehboob Alam @ Manghu Mian vs.The State of Bihar through the Additional Chief Secretary, Minority Welfare Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Justice Harish Kumar delivered a judgement on June 18, 2025. 

Relying on a judgments in Sant Ram Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., reported in AIR 1967 SC 1910, Abraham Jacob & Ors. vs. Union of India, reported in (1998) 4 SCC 65, Union of India & Anr. vs.Central Electrical & Mechanical Engineering Services (Ce&Mes) Group ‘A’ (Direct Recruits) Assn., CPWD, reported in, (2008) 1 SCC 354, Paluru Ramkrishnaiah & Ors. vs.Union of India & Anr. reported in (1989) 2 SCC 541, Union of India & Ors. vs. Rakesh Kumar, reported in (2001) 3 Supreme 48. The Employees’ State Insurance Corporation vs. Union of India & Ors., (Civil Appeal No. 152 of 2022) and Tej Prakash Pathak & Ors. vs. Rajasthan High Court & Ors., reported in (2013) 4 SCC 540, it was submitted that in similar circumstances, Shia Waqf Board had taken a decision to give pension/family pension to its employee at par with the employees of the State Government, but when discrimination has been caused, some of the aggrieved persons approached this Court and when in the case of some of the employees, suitable orders have been passed and have been allowed pensionary benefits, the State Government without having any justifiable reason by issuing the impugned order that snatched away the rights and entitlement of the petitioners and other identically situated employees.

The Court observed: the doctrine of ultra vires envisages that a Rule making body must function within the purview of the Rule making authority, conferred on it by the parent Act. As the body making Rules or Regulations has no inherent power of its own to make rules, but derives such power only from the statute, it must necessarily function within the purview of the statute. Even if delegated legislation should not travel beyond the purview of the parent Act. In view of the settled legal proposition and the facts that till date the proposed Regulation has not received the sanction of law and/or published in the official gazette, any reliance to claim the pension/family pension is not at all permissible in the law. The decision of the Waqf Board or any order issued in this behalf is per se cannot be said to be administrative and executive instruction and has no force of law in absence of any provision in the instant Regulations and the prescription of the Act, 1995."

The Court refered to Supreme Court's decision where it examined whether a mandamus could have been issued to the State to carry out amendment. The Court finally held that the answer could only be in the negative.

Justice Kumar's judgement reads: "it would also be pertinent to observe that the contention of the petitioners that at some instances, some of the employees have been accorded pensionary benefits have not persuaded this Court in any manner. Merely, because the benefit has been wrongly granted to another employee that by itself shall not entitle another employees to similar benefits." He concluded:"Well settled it is that there is no negative equality; benefit conferred without legal basis cannot be relied upon as a principle of parity. In view of the discussions made hereinabove in the premise of the settled legal position, this Court does not find any merit in all the writ petitions. Accordingly, all the writ petitions are hereby dismissed. The parties shall bear their own cost."

Acting Chief Justice bench refuses to interfere with order of Justice Mohit Kumar Shah

In Md. Gholam Rasul @ Gulam Rasul vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Land Reform and Survey, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Acting Chief Justice led Division Bench concluded:"We do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment" of Single Judge Justice Mohit Kumar Shah in Md. Akhtar Alam Son vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Land Reforms and Survey, Govt. of Bihar (2025). The bench found the appeal to be  meritless and dismissed it. The judgement dated June 17, 2025 reads:"The appellant apprehends that in view of such a direction by the learned Single Judge, and in the event of hearing of the aforenoted encroachment case being expedited, the appellant, who is alleged to be the encroacher, would not be heard by the Circle Officer. This apprehension is absolutely misplaced. All that the impugned judgment directs is that the case be concluded at the earliest. This does not preclude the authority concerned from hearing the parties and passing a reasoned order, which can only happen if the parties to the dispute are heard."

Justice Shah bench had heard the petition seeking direction to the Circle Officer, Azam Nagar, Katihar, to conclude the proceedings of the pending Encroachment Case No. 1 of 2024-25 within a fixed time frame because the encroachment proceedings were not concluded. His order dated January 9, 2025 reads:"I deem it fit and proper to direct the Respondent No. 4 to conclude the proceedings of the aforesaid Encroachment Case No. 1 of 2024-25, if the same has not already been concluded, by passing the final order under Section 6(1) of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956, after hearing the affected parties and in accordance with law, within a period of six weeks of receipt / production of a copy of this order." He had disposed of the writ petition in terms of these directions. The Division Bench did not find any error in these directions. 

Nepali citizen granted relief in NDPS case by Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Surendra Sah Surendra Sah @ Surender Sah Kanu @ Surender Shah vs. The State of Bihar (2025),  Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated July 6, 2020 and the order of sentence dated July 7, 2020 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-II, West Champaran, Bettiah, in a trial of 2019. Surendra Sah, a resident of Bada Teuki, Pokhariya, Parsa, Nepal, the appellant was acquitted of all the charges levelled against him.The appeal was allowed. The appellant was discharged from the liabilities of his bail bonds. 

The appellant was been convicted under sections 20(b)(ii)(c) and 23(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985. For the offence under section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the N.D.P.S. Act, the appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and a fine of Rs. one lakh was imposed. Under section 23(c) of the N.D.P.S. Act, the appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and a fine of Rs. one lakh was imposed. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

The case emanated from a secret information regarding transport of a consignment of charas coming to India from Nepal, which was received by one Padma Vangil, the Head Constable of 44th Company Seema Suraksha Bal (SSB), Narkatiaganj. The description of the person carrying/transporting the consignment was also disclosed as wearing a white checked shirt, blue coloured pant and a green coloured towel (gamcha). Accordingly, the officers of the S.S.B. were informed and a joint special quick response team was constituted to carry out the operation of intercepting the consignment. According to the informant, as stated in the written complaint, the informant along with other personnel reached the disclosed location near border pillar no. 411(56) a person was spotted matching the description as disclosed in the information, accordingly, the said person was stopped and he was was given an option for getting himself searched by a Gazetted Officer or by a Magistrate or by the informant, to which, the apprehended person replied that the informant can carry out the search. Thereafter, the search was being carried out in presence of two independent witnesses. It was next alleged that the object appeared to be charas which was packed in 8 plastic bundles. The substance was tested by using the narcotics detection kit which gave positive result for charas. Thereafter, the contraband was weighed using an electric weighing machine and was found to be weighing 02 kilograms. 

The counsel for the appellant submitted that the main thrust of the defence of the appellant is complete denial of the facts as narrated by the informant rather the true fact of the matter was that the father-in-law of the appellant had invited the appellant and his wife to attend a appellant had gone to market along with Bhagmat Sah and Shravan Mahto in order to purchase certain goods, but he was apprehended by the police and was taken on a motorcycle from the market place itself. He drew on the fardbeyan of the informant to underscore that the informant was conspicuously silent on the location of the said object/contraband on the person of the appellant. It is not the case of the prosecution that the contraband was concealed by the appellant in his clothes/belt or that the appellant was carrying a bag/packet of any kind. The counsel also pointed out that according to the informant the appellant suddenly threw the object and attempted to flee away, which appears to be a fanciful and concocted allegation. The counsel for the appellant referring to the provisions contained under section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act submitted that since the informant himself was not a Gazetted Officer, the search being carried by the informant violates the statutory right of the appellant. He emphasized that the trial Court failed to appreciate the defence of the appellant and also the flagrant disregard and complete breach of the provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act while carrying out the search and seizure. It was emphatically argued that the non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act relating to pre and post search, seizure and arrest conditions by the informant and the investigating officer completely vitiates the entire prosecution case. There was total violation of the section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act since the search, seizure and arrest of the appellant was done in absence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate at the place of occurrence. The P.W.-3/informant was the Head Constable and during the raid he was acting in the capacity of Party Commandant of the team, which is corroborated by the signature of P.W.-03 on the seizure list wherein P.W.-03 has signed the same as HC/GD. Therefore, it was submitted that P.W.-03 was not authorized under law to carry out the search and seizure. Drawing on Section 42(1) of the N.D.P.S. Act, it was submitted that an officer having any prior information was required to reduce such information in writing. Further, section 42(2) of the Act mandates that such information mandatorily within 72 hours be sent to immediate superior officer. However, in the instant case, even though the P.W.-03/informant had prior information about the contraband being transported to India, yet no written information was given to the superior authorities, rather the P.W.-03/informant has merely deposed that an information was given to superior authority but no supporting evidence was adduced by the prosecution.

It was also submitted that while conducting search and seizure in addition to the safeguards provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the safeguards provided under the NDPS Act was also required to be followed. The harsh provisions of the Act cast a duty upon the prosecution to strictly follow the procedure and compliance of the safeguards.

The counsel relied upon the Constitution Bench decision rendered in the case of State of Punjab vs. Baldev Singh reported as 1999 (6) SCC 172 18. It was submitted that the effect and non-compliance of section 42(2) and 50 of the N.D.P.S. has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case Beckodan Abdul Rahiman vs. The State of Kerala reported in of paragraph no.3 and paragraph no.4. 

In State of Punjab vs. Balbir Singh [1994(3) SCC 299] it was held that under Section 42(2) the empowered officer who takes down any information in writing or records the grounds under proviso to Section 42(1) should forthwith send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior. If there is a total non compliance of the provisions the same affects the prosecution case. To that extent it is mandatory. To the same effect is the judgment in Saiyad Mohd. Saiyad Umar Saiyad & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat [1995 (3) SCC 610].” He also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Jagraj Singh @ Hansa reported as 2016 (11) SCC 687 and has submitted that in the aforesaid
case similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court.

On the point of non-compliance of section 50 of the NDPS Act, the counsel for the appellant has also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Delhi vs. Ram Avtar alias Rama reported in (2011). 

The counsel submitted that the official witnesses merely concocted the entire story. He drew on decision of the  Supreme Court rendered in the case of Kishan Chand vs. State of Haryana (2013) 2 SCC 502 and has submitted that in the aforesaid decision the Supreme Court has considered the compliance of Sections 42, 50 and 57. He also relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court passed in Pratibha Devi vs. State of Bihar reported as 2016 SCC OnLine Pat 10482. He further relied upon the decision of the the High Court passed in Bhuvneshwar Singh @ Bhanu Singh vs. State of Bihar [Cr. Appeal No.183 of 1998], more particularly, paragraph no.15. He also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Mohanlal reported as 2016 (3) SCC 379 and has submitted that in the aforesaid decision the Supreme Court has considered the fact that whether it is incumbent upon the Officer-in-charge to forthwith file an application for drawing representative samples before the Magistrate after recovery of contraband. 

The appellant's counsel also relied upon the decisions in Dudh Nath Pandey vs. State of U.P. reported as (1981) 2 SCC 166 and Munshi Prasad and Others vs. State of Bihar reported as (2002) 1 SCC 351.