Patna High reiterates the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare. Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden.
In Dr. Shishir Kumar Gangwar vs. Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agriculture University, Pusa, Samastipur through its Registrar & Ors. (2025), Justice Harish Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 25-page long judgement on October 13, 2025, wherein, it concluded that there was substance in the writ petition, hence the charge memo, as contained in Memorandum April 2, 2025 as also the supplementary charge-sheet as contained in Memo dated July 9, 2025 are set aside. It remitted the matter to the disciplinary authority to proceed further in the matter in accordance with law keeping in mind the specific prescription of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 and the mandate of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. vs. B.V. Gopinath, reported in, (2014) 1 SCC 351.
Relying on the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of B.V. Gopinath, Justice Kumar observed: ''33. In view of the settled legal positing and the discussions made hereinabove, the issue answered accordingly; The Board of Management, being disciplinary authority, having power of delegation under the statute may delegate its power to the Vice-chancellor only to the extent of drawing the charge memo, but subject to approval by the disciplinary authority, before its issuance. Any memo of charge by the Chief Vigilance Officer without explicitly getting its approval by the Board of Management (Disciplinary Authority) cannot be held to be valid.''
The petitioner invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to challenge a Memorandum dated April 2, 2025 issued under the signature of Chief Vigilance Officer, for and on behalf of the disciplinary authority Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agriculture University, Pusa as also the departmental proceeding whereby and whereunder a charge-sheet for major penalty under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965[CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965] was proposed to be held against the petitioner on the imputation of misconduct and misbehaviour set out in the statement of charge. Challenge was also made to the Memorandum date July 9, 2025, issued under the signature of Chief Vigilance Officer, for and on behalf of the disciplinary authority whereby a supplementary charge-sheet for major penalties under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 was proposed to be held against the petitioner on the imputation of misconduct and misbehaviour mentioned in the article of charges. Since the aforenoted memorandum has been brought to the knowledge of the petitioner after filing of the present writ application, the same was challenged.
The petitioner, was initially appointed to the post of Associate Professor on contract in the Animal Project
Research Institute, Pusa. In the meanwhile, an advertisement dated December 4, 2017 was issued for appointment to the post of Programme Coordinator (Senior Scientist and Head) of Krishi Vigyan Kendra under Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agriculture University (RPCAU), Pusa. The petitioner submitted application for the post aforenoted along with other applicants. The application forms of the candidates were duly scrutinized and a call letter in favour of the candidates, including the petitioner, was issued to participate in the selection process. A selection committee was constituted and after interview the committee recommended the name of the petitioner for appointment to the post of Programme Coordinator (Senior Scientist and Head). The recommendation was duly approved by the Vice-chancellor and the Board of Management whereupon offer of appointment contained in letter dated June 18, 2019 was issued. On completion of probation period of two years, the services of the petitioner was confirmed vide letter dated August 28, 2021 w.e.f. June 18, 2019. On June 6, 2024, a show-cause notice, duly issued by the Chief Vigilance Officer, RPCAU, Pusa was served upon the petitioner as to why his services be not terminated, since the services rendered as SRF and Visiting faculty undertaken by the petitioner do not qualify for counting in experience, as those were project based contractual appointment. Since the petitioner did not possess the experience in the stipulated pay structure or for the stipulated period, thus was not eligible for appointment. The petitioner gave a response to the show-cause on July 18, 2024 refuting the allegation. On being found it unsatisfactory, the Chief Vigilance Officer issued impugned Memorandum dated April 2, 2025 for major punishment, which was challenged in the writ petition.
After filing of the writ petition, the petitioner also came to know that a second memorandum containing supplementary charge-sheet for major penalty was also issued under Memo dated July 9, 2025 with a subsequent imputation that the petitioner was not eligible for the post at the time of submitting application on account of non-fulfillment of the essential age limit criteria. The maximum age limit for the post was 45 years, however, the petitioner at the time of submission of application was 46 years, 7 months and 27 days old. Furthermore, the petitioner was not entitled to any relaxation in age limit, as he was not a regular employee of RPCAU, Pusa at the time of submitting his application.
The senior advocate for the petitioner assailed the impugned orders as well as initiation of departmental proceeding. He submitted that the alleged delinquence of the petitioner, if any, was known to the respondents in the year 2017, but the impugned memo of charge came to be issued in the year 2025, after a delay of eight years and, as such, belated initiation of departmental proceeding, besides it caused prejudice, the same is bound to affect his defence and thereby causing irreparable prejudice. It was submitted that this was not the case of the respondents or even the imputation against the petitioner that the documents/certificate submitted by the petitioner, were not genuine, forged and fabricated or manufactured one, rather the documents and the certificates were duly scrutinized by the screening committee in the office of RPCAU, Pusa, leading to issuance of the call letter. The petitioner faced the interview and on being recommended by the duly constituted selection committee, he was offered appointment after getting approval of the Vice-chancellor and the Board of Management of the University.
The senior counsel urged that the Board of Management of the University in its meeting held on December 6, 2023 had resolved to proceed for detailed enquiry under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 for major penalty. After deliberation at length in each case, the Board of Management approved that the Vice-chancellor was authorized for approving Enquiry Officers and Presenting Officers, issuance of charge sheets, taking day-to-day decisions relating with the enquiry proceedings under CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and submit enquiry report to the Board of Management for taking decision in the cases wherein the Board of Management was the disciplinary authority. Referring to the minutes of the meeting, it was submitted that once the Board of Management has delegated the power to the Vice-chancellor, the memorandum of charge can only be issued by the Vice-chancellor of the University itself and non-else. Issuance of the Memorandum containing charge-sheet for major penalty under the signature of Chief Vigilance Officer for and on behalf of the disciplinary authority is wholly without jurisdiction. Moreover, at delegated power must be conferred by the committee alone. He thus submitted that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden.
The senior counsel relied on decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in A. K. Roy & Anr. vs. State of Punjab & Ors., reported in, AIR 1986 SC 2160, Sahni Silk Mills (P) Ltd. and another vs. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, reported in, (1994) 5 SCC 346 and Director General, ESI & Anr. vs. T. Abdul Razak, reported in, (1996) 4 SCC 708.
The petitioner's counsel relied on Supreme Court's decisions in Steel Authority of India vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, reported in, (1980) 3 SCC 734, Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Madras & Anr. Vs. F. X. Fernando, reported in, (1994) 2 SCC 746 and Union of India & Ors. vs. B.V. Gopinath, reported in, (2014) 1 SCC 351.
In relation to the issue of inordinate delay in issuing charge memo, he drew upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. vs. Bani Singh & Anr., reported in, AIR 1990 SC 1308, P.D. Agrawal vs. State Bank of India & Ors., reported in, (2006) 8 SCC 776, P. V. Mahadevan vs. MD, T.N. Housing Board, reported in, (2005) 6 SCC 636 and State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Chaman Lal Goyal, reported in, (1995) 2 SCC 570. The senior counsel concluded his submission that the impugned orders were unsustainable in law as well as on facts, inter alia, on the ground of delay and the same being issued by an authority, who is not competent to do so and the memo of charge contains no list of witnesses and documents and even if the allegation taken to be true, no case of misconduct is made out in absence of the allegation of suppression having been made by the petitioner and his testimonials/certificates are found
to be forged and fabricated.
Justice Kumar recorded that in the case of Bani Singh (supra), a delay of twelve years in initiating disciplinary proceedings without satisfactory explanation was held unfair and the enquiry was not permitted to proceed at such a later stage. The apex Court held that normally, pending or contemplated disciplinary proceedings have no impact on an employee’s right to be considered for promotion. Only when charges are framed after a prima facie case is made out, the sealed cover procedure applies. Where proceedings have not reached that stage, consideration for promotion cannot be withheld merely due to pendency of such proceedings. In the said case, even a preliminary enquiry on complaints regarding the officer’s integrity had not been completed, so the Screening Committee was wrong to defer his selection for the selection grade. Inordinate and unexplained delay of twelve years in initiating disciplinary proceeding renders enquiry unfair, as the pending unframed charges cannot withhold promotion consideration.
In the case of P. D. Agrawal (supra), the Supreme Court observed that delay in initiating departmental enquiry does not vitiate proceedings unless the delinquent demonstrates prejudice caused thereby.
In P. V. Mahadevan case (supra), the Supreme Court noticing the fact that irregularity committed in the year 1990 led to disciplinary action in the year 2000, though the explanation that the matter came to light in the year 1994-95 and the audit report was already rejected, but no convincing explanation was given for the inordinate delay. The Court held that a protracted disciplinary enquiry causing mental agony and suffering to the employee, the same should be avoided, not only in the interest of the employee but also in public interest and to inspire confidence among Government servants.
In Chaman Lal Goyal (supra), the Supreme Court unequivocally held that the delay if long and explained, the Court may quash the charges. However, what constitutes ‘too long’ depends on the facts of each case. If delay is likely to prejudice, the petitioner defence, the enquiry must be stopped. Whenever such a plea is raised, the Court must balance the factors for and against on the totality of circumstances.
The High Court's judgement observed:''the authority with delegated power cannot sub-delegate the delegated power unless legislature provides so, is well settled principle. In the case of A. K. Roy (supra), the Court held that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare merely indicates that sub-delegation of powers is not normally allowable though the legislature can always provide for sub-delegation. Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. In the said case, the power to initiate prosecution for offence under Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was delegated by the State Government, through Rule 3, to the Food (Health) Authority, which was further delegated to Food Inspector. The Court held that the Food Authority had no power to delegate as rules framed under the statute cannot go against the provisions of statute.''
In the case of Sahni Silk Mills Pvt Ltd. (supra), the supreme Court held: “The Courts are normally rigorous in requiring that statutory power be exercised only by the persons or bodies authorised by the statute. Delegated power must be exercised by the conferred authority alone. However, in the present administrative set-up, extreme judicial aversion to delegation cannot be carried too far. A public authority may employ agents to exercise its powers, which is why many statutes authorise delegation either expressly or impliedly. With the enormous rise in statutory activities, the maxim delegatus non potest delegare is not being strictly applied, especially in cases of administrative discretionary power. It is almost settled that the legislature may permit any statutory authority to delegate its power to another authority, provided the statute lays down the policy framework within which the delegatee must act. The real controversy arises in cases of sub-delegation, since when Parliament has specifically appointed an authority to discharge a function, it cannot be readily presumed that the delegate has the freedom to empower another person or body to act in its place.”
As to whether the memorandum containing the charge-sheet/supplementary charge-sheet issued by the Chief Vigilance Officer, for and on behalf of the disciplinary authority was valid or suffers from the vice of sub-delegation of power dehors the Rule and the decision taken by the Board of Management, who is the disciplinary authority in the case in hand; but before answering this issue, it would be pertinent to take note of other decisions.
In the case of Steel Authority of India (supra), the Supreme Court noticed that under the Company’s Discipline and Appeal Rules, only the Personnel Manager as the disciplinary authority to frame charges and constitute an inquiry committee. Since there was no approved rule authorising any other head of department for this purpose, charge-sheets issued and inquiry committee constituted by the Chief Medical Officer was held to be unauthorised. Consequently, the dismissal order passed by the Personnel Manager on the basis of such inquiry reports by such unauthorized inquiry committee was held invalid.
In the case of F.X. Fernando (supra), the Supreme Court considering the fact that on the direction of the State Government, the Registrar (Head of Department) issued a charge-sheet on March 20, 1989 to a Stateservice officer upon conferring the power under notification dated March 17, 1988 held the charge-sheet was valid. The Court also observed that the Registrar though not empowered to impose penalty, could validly issue charge-sheet and appoint an Enquiry Officer when such power was conferred by State
Government under the notification.
The similar issue was also considered in B.V. Gopinath (supra) where the Supreme Court on being found that the charge-sheet not having been issued by the disciplinary authority held to be invalid. Under Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, the disciplinary authority must draw up or cause to be drawn up the definite and distinct articles of charge. The phrase “cause to be drawn up” only permits a subordinate authority to prepare a draft, but the charges must be approved and finalised by the disciplinary authority. Thus, a charge-sheet without such approval is without authority of law.
In the aforesaid settled legal background, this Court notices the facts of this case. It is not in dispute that the disciplinary proceeding has been initiated under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 reads as follows:
“(3) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a Government servant under this rule and rule 15, the disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up-
(i) the substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charge;
(ii) a statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each article of charge, which shall contain-
(a) a statement of all relevant facts including any admission or confession made by the Government servant;
(b) a list of documents by which, and a list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be
sustained.
Justice Kumar observed:''25. Bare reading of the aforesaid rule, it is manifest that it is a disciplinary authority, who shall or shall cause to be prepared the article of charge and statement of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour and that memo of charge shall contain a list of documents/witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained. 26. Admittedly in the case in hand, the Board of
Management being the disciplinary authority in its meeting as per Agent Item No. 21.8 authorized the Vice-chancellor to approve appointment of Inquiry Officers and Presenting Officers, issue charge sheet and make day-to-day decisions related to the inquiry proceedings under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. If under the Rule, the disciplinary authority is empowered and authorized to issue the article of charge and statement of imputation of misconduct and misbehaviour, then the same is required to be done by the disciplinary authority alone and none else. Even if it is accepted that after deliberation, the Board of Management has authorized the Vice-chancellor for approving the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer for issuance of charge-sheet and take day-to-day decision relating with the enquiry proceeding and submitted the enquiry report to the Board of Management for taking decision, the Memo of charge issued under the signature of Chief Vigilance Officer, for and on behalf of the disciplinary authority is not unsustainable in law, without its approval having been done by the Board of Management.''
In the case of B.V. Gopinath (supra), the Court while emphasizing the Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India, which ensures that no person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service can be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed observed that to effectuate and ensure compliance with the mandatory requirements of Article 311(2), the Government of India has promulgated the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The disciplinary proceedings against the delinquent found to be initiated in terms of Rule 14 of the Rules, 1965. It is further observed that Rule 14(3) clearly lays down that where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a government servant under Rule 14 or Rule 15, the disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up the substance of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charges. The Court further ruled that the term “cause to be drawn up” does not mean that the definite and distinct articles of charges once drawn up do not have to be approved by the disciplinary authority. The term “cause to be drawn up” merely refers to a delegation by the disciplinary authority to a subordinate authority to perform the task of drawing up substance of proposed “definite and distinct articles of charge-sheet”. These proposed articles of charge would only be finalised upon approval by the disciplinary authority. Rule 14(4) again mandates that the disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the government servant, a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and the supporting documents including a list of witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be proved. It is, therefore, not possible to interpret this provision as providing that once the disciplinary authority approves the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings, the charge-sheet can be drawn up by an authority other than the disciplinary authority. This would destroy the underlying protection guaranteed under Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India. Such procedure would also do violence to the protective provisions contained under Article 311(2) which ensures that no public servant is dismissed, removed or suspended without following a fair procedure in which he/she has been given a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the charge-sheet. Such a charge-sheet can only be issued upon approval by the appointing authority i.e. Finance Minister.
In the case of B.V. Gopinath (supra), the Supreme Court also underscored the principle of rule against delegation by explaining the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare and referred the decision of Sahni Silk Mills (P) Ltd. (supra). The Supreme Court held that the charge-sheet/charge memo having not been approved by the disciplinary authority is non est in the eye of the law.
The two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu vs. Promod Kumar, IPS and Another, reported in (2018) 17 SCC 677 clarified the necessity of approval of initiation of disciplinary proceeding distinguished from approval of charge-sheet. The Court noticing the decision rendered in B.V. Gopinath (supra) held that if any authority other than the disciplinary authority is permitted to draw the charge memo, the same would result in destroying the underlying protection guaranteed under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. The Court unequivocally held that the rule requires something to be done in particular manner it should be done in the same manner and not at all.
Taking note of mandatory requirement of Rule 8(4) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, the Court observed that since the charge memo being drawn up or caused to be drawn up by the disciplinary authority is not complied with find no illegality in the order passed by the High Court on this issue, whereby it quashes the disciplinary proceeding, however, the Supreme Court also extended liberty to the disciplinary authority to issue a charge memo afresh after taking approval from the disciplinary authority.
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