Supreme Court Legal Services Committee asked to appoint a competent legal aid counsel for Nilam Devi

In The State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Nilam Devi @ Lilam Devi & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court responded to the letter of Nilam Devi addressed to the Registry of the Court, stating that she requires legal assistance as she was not in a position to engage a counsel on her  own. The Court's order reads: "The Supreme Court Legal Services Committee is requested to appoint a competent legal aid counsel, having at least 15 years of standing at the Bar, to represent respondent No.1. The learned counsel so appointed shall be supplied with a full set of all the papers in the special leave petition. He/she shall secure necessary instructions in the matter and file a counter affidavit by the next date of hearing. Re-list on 09.02.2026. Earlier interim order dated 27.06.2025 shall continue to operate till the next hearing." The case arose out of final judgment and order dated March 24, 2025 passed by Justice Bibek Chaudhary of Patna High Court. 

In its interim order the division bench of the Supreme Court stated that the directions passed by the High Court contained in para 12 of the Order dated 24.03.2025 qua the Additional Superintendent of Police and Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna was shall remain stayed. It made it clear that we are not granting stay against the directions of the High Court vis a vis the Station House Officer. The order recorded that "On a query made by the Court, learned counsel for the State submits that an FIR was lodged on 02.04.2025 under Sections 354, 504 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “the IPC”), Section 67A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Sections 8 and 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short “the POCSO Act”). 3. On the next date of hearing, learned State Counsel to submit a status report regarding the progress of investigation pursuant to lodging of the aforesaid FIR."

Supreme Court's order dated June 27, 2025 reads: "Given the directions of the High Court in the impugned order, we consider it appropriate that the then Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna, and the then Assistant Superintendent of Police, Danapur, Patna, petitioner Nos. 3 and 6 respectively, should file their individual affidavits in the context of the issues highlighted by the High Court in the impugned order.
It would be open to them to engage independent legal counsel to appear before this Court on their behalf."
 

Supreme Court reverses anticipatory bail denying order by Justice Nawneet Kumar Pandey

In Saurabh Bhardwaj vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and Alok Aradhe passed an order dated December 12, 2025, wherein, it reversed the order dated September 16, 2025 by Justice Nawneet Kumar Pandey of Patna High Court whereby he had denied anticipatory bail to the appellant. The case will be re-list on February 24, 2026. 

The Court's order reads: "Subject to the petitioner, Saurabh Bhardwaj, joining and co-operating with the investigation in connection with Complaint Case No. 2288 of 2020 registered for an offence punishable under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, he shall not be arrested till the next hearing. In addition, the petitioner shall scrupulously abide by the conditions stipulated in Section 482(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023." The respondent no. 2 is Saraswati Kumari, wife of Saurabh Bhardwaj and daughter of Virendra Sahani. 

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in connection with a Complaint Case registered for the offences punishable under Sections 498A of the Indian Penal Code.. The marriage of the complainant, according to the recitals of the complaint petition, was solemnized with the petitioner in the year 2016. The marriage was registered and a certificate was issued. Thereafter, the accused persons
demanded dowry of Rs. 5 lakhs. Out of the wedlock of the couple, a male child, Shubham Bhardwaj was born. It was also alleged that after retaining the belongings of the complainant, the accused persons ousted her from the matrimonial house. 

The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that having concealed the factum of her earlier marriage, the complainant solemnized her second marriage with the petitioner. The petitioner was not aware of the fact that she had already solemnized marriage with another person and had two sons. He also submitted that her first marriage was also mentioned in the enquiry report submitted by a police officer to the Superintendent of Police. He also submitted that in Mahila Hajipur P.S. Case No. 49 of 2020, after investigation, the police have submitted the final form, which is annexed with the record.

The counsel for the complainant had opposed the prayer for bail and submitted that it was not a fact that the petitioner was already married. He also submitted that the petitioner had filed cases for divorce twice against the complainant and withdrew both of the cases, which shows that the petitioner did not intend to divorce the victim. He also submitted that Principal Judge, Family Court, Vaishali, granted interim maintenance to the complainant of Rs. 9,000/- per month for herself and her children. The order was passed in the year 2022, but the petitioner is not obeying the order and has not paid a single rupee to the victim to which the learned counsel for the petitioner replied that he had challenged the order in revision before the High Court but fairly admitted that there is no stay against that order. The order of interim maintenance was passed by the Family Court in the year 2022, but not a single rupee was paid to the victim and according to the submission of the, she was on the verge of starvation. She was residing with her children, having no financial means. 

Justice Pandey had concluded: :7. Considering the above-mentioned facts and circumstances, I am not inclined to grant the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioner. Accordingly, it is rejected." Now the Supreme Court has reversed this order.

Justice Partha Sarthy dismisses appeal against Constable' s dismissal from service, State did not produce entire records of the departmental proceeding post acquittal in related criminal case before Court

"No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once."

-Article 20 (2), The Constitution of India

While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well-established that when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both the departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical or substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In such cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This is a position settled by the decision in G. M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Anr AIR 2006 SC 2129, since reinforced by a decision of recent origin in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2024) 1 SCC 175. 48. To assess the degree of similarity between the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in the disciplinary and criminal proceedings, it is indeed crucial to review the materials placed before the Court where such an issue arises. However, we regret, absence of the departmental file has disabled us from looking into the same. 49. Notwithstanding the above, a plain reading of the materials available on record only reveals that charge no.1 in the disciplinary closely resembled the allegations in the criminal proceedings. In fact, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated based on the written complaint of the informant....In Ram Lal vs. State of Rajasthan (2024) 1 SCC 175, this Court held that terms like "benefit of doubt" or "honourably acquitted" should not be treated as formalities. The Court's duty is to focus on the substance of the judgment, rather than the terminology used. 51.That apart, it is noteworthy that in course of the inquiry PW-2 had also declined to identify the appellant during cross-examination, and the informant was not called as a witness in the disciplinary proceedings. This sort of creates a parallel between the circumstances in both the criminal and disciplinary proceedings. 52.Besides, the appellant's case is strengthened by the principle of adverse inference. It can be reasonably inferred that the respondents deliberately withheld the scanned copy of the departmental file, which was essential for us to assess whether the charges, witnesses, evidence, and circumstances in both the criminal and departmental proceedings were substantially similar or identical, likely due to concerns over the potential adverse consequences. 53.In light of the preceding discussion and the adverse presumption that is available to be drawn, we hold that the finding of the appellant being guilty of charge no.1 cannot be sustained following his acquittal in the criminal proceedings, which seem to have involved substantially similar or identical charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances.

-Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Prashant Kumar Mishra in Maharana Pratap Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), April 23, 2025

Because the attention of the Single Judge of Patna High was not drawn towards Supreme Court's decision in Maharana Pratap Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), in Anant Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Justice Partha Sarthy of Patna High Court delivered a 12-page long judgement dated December 12, 2025, wherein, he concluded:" Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, learned counsel for the petitioner not having been able to point out any procedural irregularity and especially the delay of about 7 years in the petitioner preferring his memorial followed by the writ application against the order of dismissal passed by the S.S.P., Patna and the rejection of appeal by the D.I.G., Patna, both in the year 2006, in the opinion of the Court, the petitioner has not made out any case for interference in the orders impugned. 22. In view of the above, the Court finds no merit in the instant application and the same is dismissed."

In G. M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Anr AIR 2006 SC 2129, Supreme Court has held that it was not open to the respondents to reopen charge in subsequent departmental proceedings after acquittal in a criminal case on the same cause of action, as the matter had already been concluded when it was recognized that both the criminal and disciplinary proceedings were based on the same allegations, the same facts, the same evidence and the same witnesses. 

In the absence of the reference to this Supreme Court's judgement by the petitioner's counsel, Justice Sarthy observed:"20. Before concluding, it would also be relevant to take note of the fact that the petitioner having been dismissed in the year 2006 as also his appeal having been rejected in the year 2006, he moved by way of a memorial before the D.G.P., Bihar only in the year 2013. The D.G.P., Bihar rightly rejected the memorial on the ground of the same being time barred."

He also observed:"17. So far as the contention of the petitioner that the witnesses in the criminal proceedings as also the departmental proceeding were the same and the witnesses in the criminal case had not supported the case against the petitioner, it may be mentioned here that so far as the standard of proof required in a criminal case and in a departmental proceeding are concerned, the same are completely different. While in a criminal case the prosecution is required to prove the case beyond all reasonable doubt, in a departmental proceeding, the proof required against the delinquent is of preponderance of probability."

It is crystal clear that Justice Sarthy was persuaded by the submission of the counsel for the respondent who submitted that the ground of the petitioner’s acquittal in a criminal case is of no assistance to the petitioner so far as the departmental proceeding is concerned for the reason that the proof required in the the two proceedings are distinct and different. In support of this contention, learned counsel relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Samar Bahadur Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh& Ors.; (2011) 9 SCC 94.

The Supreme Court's observation reads:-“7. Acquittal in the criminal case shall have no bearing or relevance to the facts of the departmental proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are totally different. In a criminal case, the prosecution has to prove the criminal case beyond all reasonable doubt whereas in a departmental proceedings, the department has to prove only preponderance of probabilities. In the present case, we find that the department has been able to prove the case on the standard of preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, the submissions of the counsel appearing for the appellant are found to be without any merit.”

The High Court recorded the submission of the counsel of the respondent who also submitted that "even from the judgment passed in the criminal case, it would transpire that it is not a case of honourable acquittal of the petitioner but was for the reason of the relevant prosecution witnesses not having been examined. In support of this contention, learned counsel relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police vs. S. Samuthiram; (2013) 1 SCC 598." 

The Supreme Court's observation reads:"Honourable Acquittal 24. The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal” came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal [(1994) 1 SCC 541 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 594 : (1994) 26 ATC 619] . In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame”, “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.”

The counsel also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley & Ors.; (2024) 15 SCC 215/2024 LiveLaw (SC) 318. The relevant para reads:"11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to ne seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and laches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, inasmuch as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court.

12. This Court in Tridip Kumar Dingal and Others v. State of W.B. and Others.[(2009) 1 SCC 768 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119] has held to the following effect: (SCC p. 784, paras 56-58)

“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds gor refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.

57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [(1964) 15 STC 450 : 1964 SCCOnLine SC 10 : (1964) 6 SCR 261 : AIR 1964 SC 1006], Moon Mills Ltd. v.Industrial Court [1967 SCC OnLine SC 117 : AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v . Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC 136]).

This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110 : (1970) 25 STC 289], Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84]).

58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.”

The petitioner's counsel submitted that the petitioner was proceeded against in a criminal case for similar charges which ended in acquittal of the petitioner vide judgment dated 30.1.2013 passed in Trial no.521 of 2013 (G.R.no.152 of 2003) by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Patna. 6. The petitioner having been acquitted in the criminal case, he once again preferred an appeal before the D.I.G., Patna which was again rejected and the same was communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated June 7, 2013. 

The petitioner had preferred a memorial against the order of rejection of his appeal on December  5, 2006 which was rejected by order dated May 27, 2013 passed by the Director General of Police (D.G.P.), Bihar on the ground of the same being time barred. 

It is apparent from Justice Sarthy's judgement itself that admittedly the memorial against the order of rejection of the petitioner's appeal dated December  5, 2006 was rejected by order dated May 27, 2013 after a delay of over 7 years on the part of the D.G.P. 

It was against the order of the D.G.P. that the petitioner had preferred the appeal in the High Court. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted the charges levelled in the departmental proceeding as also the criminal case were identical and the witnesses examined on behalf of the respondents/prosecution were also the same. The witnesses not having supported the prosecution case led to acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case, there was no material for the Enquiry Officer to come to the conclusion that the charges against the petitioner had been proved.

Earlier, Justice Shivaji Pandey had passed an order dated April 3, 2019, which reads:"Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was not given an opportunity to produce the witnesses in support of his defence. Let the State should produce entire records of the departmental proceeding before this Court for its perusal. As prayed for, list this case on 17.04.2019 at the top of the list." It seems intriguing as to why the State did not produce entire records of the departmental proceeding before this Court. 

Notably, this direction to the State regarding submission of the "entire records of the departmental proceeding before this Court for its perusal" does not seem to have been complied with till the last date of hearing on December 12, 2025.

The case filed on August 13, 2013. It was registered on August 21, 2013. 

Justice Pandey had passed an order dated April 19, 2019. It reads:"Let this case be referred to the another Bench after taking permission from Hon’ble the Chief Justice."

Justice Alok Kumar Sinha had passed an order dated August 18, 2025. It reads:"Learned counsel Mr. Uday Prasad Singh appears for the petitioner and prays for accommodation. 3. By way of last indulgence, this case is being adjourned and if on the next date also the petitioner is not ready t press the writ application then the Court may consider dismissing this case for non-prosecution. 4. Put up this case on 15.09.2025."

It took 12 years for the conclusion of the case in the High Court on December 12, 2025. The judgement is likely to be challenged before a Division Bench of the Court. 

Notably, Supreme Court in A.A. Mulla vs. State of Maharashtra 1996 (11) SCC 606 has held that; Article 20 (2) would be attracted in those cases where the facts are not distinct in subsequent punishment.

 

Patna High Court delivered 11 judgements on December 1

Patna High Court delivered 11 judgements on December 1, 2025 in The State of Bihar vs. Prafulla Chandra Chaudhary, Nishchay Manoj Kumar @ Nishchay vs. The State of Bihar, Alok Kumar vs. The Bank of Baroda, represented By The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Vs. Union of India, Alok Sahay vs. The State of Bihar, Alok Pandey vs. The State of Bihar, Shyamal Mishra vs. The State of Bihar, Monu Kumar Pandey vs. The State of Bihar, Shreekant Mishra vs. The State of Bihar, Anupma Kumari vs. The Vice Chancellor of Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agricultural University Pusa, Sujeet Kumar Saw @ Sujeet Kumar Sahu @ Sujit Kumar Sahu vs. The State of Bihar, Through The Addl. Chief Secretary, Mines and Minerals Department,Government of Bihar. 

Patna High Court delivered seven judgements on Nov. 29

Patna High Court delivered seven judgements on November 29, 2025 in Sitaram Sai @ Sitaram Sag vs. State of Bihar, Vijay Tanti @ Bijay Tanti and Ors. vs  State of Bihar , Sarjoo Ram vs. State of Bihar, Munna Tanti & Ors. vs. State of Bihar, Binod Kumar Bhagat vs. State of Bihar and Lakhan Tiwari vs. State of Bihar. 

Patna High Court delivered seven judgements on Nov. 28

Patna High Court delivered seven judgements on November 28, 2025 in Md. Husnain vs. The State of Bihar, Abbas Mian The State of Bihar, Arvind Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Vinay Kumar Gupta @ Binay Gupta vs. The State Of Bihar & Ors., Uday Kant vs. The State of Bihar, Yugeshwar singh @ Yugeshwar Kumar Singh @ Yugeshwar Prasad Singh vs. The state of Bihar through the Superintendent of Police, Madhubani and Satya Prakash @ Mehul Singh vs. The Union Public Service Commission through its Chairman. 

Patna High Court delivered 17 judgements on Nov. 27

Patna High Court delivered 17 judgements on November 27, 2025 in Om Prakash & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr., Parmanand Sharma vs. State of Bihar & Anr., Md. Shamim Khan vs. The State of Bihar, Mithilesh Pandey @ Mithilesh vs. The State of Bihar, Dhanwati Kunwar @ Dhanawati Devi vs. The State of Bihar, Veer Vikram Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Anup Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Ghanshyam Singh @ Ghanshyam Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary,Chando Yadav, vs. The State of Bihar, M/s Binod Storewell Private Limited, vs. The State of Bihar, Ashish Yadav vs. The State of Bihar, Md. Ramjani vs. The State of Bihar, Md. Fozail vs. The State of Bihar,Ranjeet Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Randhir Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Dr. Ganesh Lal Sinha @ Ganesh Lal Sinha vs. The State of Bihar, and Vijay Shankar Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through D.G.P. Patna, Bihar. 

Patna High Court delivered six judgements on Nov. 26

Patna High Court delivered six judgements on November 26, 2025 in Mamta Jha vs. Bibi Mehnaj Begum, Shamshad Ali vs. The State of Bihar, Md. Ibrahim Miyan (Driver) @ Abrahim Miya vs. The State of Bihar, Md. Afak @ Md. Afaque @ Afaque vs. The State of Bihar, Kumar Avilash vs. Nitu kumari and Reeta Devi vs. The State of Bihar. 

Patna High Court delivered 18 judgements on Nov. 25

Patna High Court delivered 18 judgements on November 25 in Jai Krishna Yadav vs. The State of Bihar Through Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna  Surendra Yadav Vs. The State of Bihar, Shankar Kumar Verma and Anr vs. The State of Bihar, Sarjug Prasad vs. Union of India as owner of General Insurance company, Kamlesh Kumar Singh Vs. The State of Bihar, Sima Kumari Vs. The State of Bihar, M/s Sanjay Kumar Proprietor Vinod Kumar Singh vs. The State Of Bihar and Ors, Kusheshwar Sah vs. The B.N. Mandal University, The North Bihar Power Distribution Company Ltd. and Ors vs. The State, Shambhu Nath, The Union of India vs. Panchanand Singh, The Union of India vs. Nawal Kishor Thakur, Radha Devi vs. The Union of India, Deo Narayan Yadav vs. The State of Bihar, Mamta Devi vs. The Bihar State Power Holding Company Limited,  The Union of India vs. Dr. Vibha Sinha, Anand Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Bihar, Ashish Yadav @ Ashish Kumar @ Babaji vs. The State of Bihar, and Satrughan Singh vs. The State of Bihar. 

Patna High Court delivered 18 judgements on Nov. 24

Patna High Court delivered 18 judgements on November 24, 2025 in Satyendra Mani Tripathi vs. The State of Bihar, Manindra Tiwari @Munna Tiwari vs. The State of Bihar, Jagat Shankar Prakash @ Jagat Shankar Prasad @ Jagat Shankar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr., Digvijay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Abhishek Kumar Pandey vs. The State of Bihar, Tripurari Kumar Yadav @ Tripurari Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Vishal Kumar vs. The State of Bihar,Saroj Kumari vs. The State of Bihar, Anurudh Rai @ Anurudh Singj vs. The State of Bihar, Subas Chandra Sah @ Subhash Chandra Sah vs. Bimal Kumar Sah, Ashok Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Khusboo Kumari @ Khushboo Kumari vs. The State of Bihar, Bhuwneshwar Kumar Shukla vs. The State of Bihar, Saheb Sahani vs. The State of Bihar, Amana Khatoon vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary, Department of Home (Police) Government of Bihar, Patna, Sonu Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Bihar, Patna, Pappu Mahto @ Ajit Prabhakar vs. The State of Bihar, Md. Yunus @ Khan Saheb @ Md. Yuneus Khan vs. The State of Bihar and Sanjiv Kumar Pandey @ Sanjiv Pandey vs. The State of Bihar. 

Rs. 6.15 Lakh crore written off in last 5 years: Union Finance Ministry in Parliament

Union Finance Ministry informed Parliament that Rs. 6.15 Lakh crore written off in the last 5 years. 

Finance Ministry's reply reads: "There has been no capital infusion in Public Sector Banks (PSBs) by the Government since FY 2022-23. PSBs have significantly improved their financial performance, turning profitable and strengthening their capital position. PSBS now rely on market sources and internal accruals to meet their capital requirements. PSBs have raised *1.79 lakh crore capital from market through equity and bonds since 1.4.2022 till 30.9.2025.'

It added: As per Reserve Bank of India (RBI) data, PSBS have written-off an aggregate loan amount of ₹6,15,647 crore, during the last five financial years and the current financial year till 30.9.2025 (provisional data). Banks write-off NPAs, including, inter-alia, those in respect of which full provisioning has been made on completion of four years, as per RBI guidelines and policy approved by banks' Board. Such write-off does not result in waiver of liabilities of borrowers to repay." 

It pointed out:"Further, recovery in written-off loans is an ongoing process and banks continue pursuing their recovery actions initiated against borrowers under the various recovery mechanism available to them, such as filing of a suit in civil courts or in Debts Recovery Tribunals (DRT), action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act 2002, filing of cases in the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 etc. As provisioning for bad loans have already been done and the write-off process does not entail any actual cash outflow, the bank's liquidity position remains intact. Moreover, banks evaluate/consider the impact of write-offs as part of their regular exercise to clean up their balance-sheet, avail tax benefit, optimise capital base, enhance lending capacity and boost investor sentiments.'

Recalling Advocates' Rights on Advocate's Day

In Re: Summoning Advocates Who Give Legal Opinion Or Represent Parties During Investigation of Cases And Related Issues (2025), Supreme Court's bench of Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Justices K.V. Chandran and N.V. Anjaria delivered the 78-page long judgement dated 31 October, 2025 that investigating agencies cannot summon advocates to seek case details. 

Advocate Day is celebrated on December 3, honouring the contributions of lawyers and legal professionals worldwide. The Advocate's rights were recalled on that occasion 

The Supreme Court has held that an investigating officer cannot summon an advocate to extract case details under Section 132 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA). The case was heard by the Court under its suo moto jurisdiction based on a reference by a Division Bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and N.K. Singh. 

The Division Bench which referred the case had stayed a police summons issued to a Advocate in Ahmedabad. It had observed that the summons raised critical questions and framed two issues: 

-Whether an investigating agency may directly summon a practising advocate where the advocate’s role is limited to advising or appearing for a client in a case? 

-Whether, assuming an exceptional situation exists, any special oversight should be imposed before such a summons is issued? 

The Court answered the first issue in the negative. It held that professional communications are privileged and they cannot be pierced merely because the police wish to seek clarifications from counsel regarding a client’s case. 

The Court pointed out that Section 132, which restricts disclosure of professional communications, sets out limited exceptions where a summon can be issued: if the communication was made in furtherance of an illegal purpose; where facts show a crime or fraud after commencement of the engagement. 

The Court observed that the investigating powers of the police under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) does not override confidentiality obligations created by law. The power to mandate attendance (Section 179) and produce documents (Section 94), must be exercised consistently with the privilege. 

The Court pointed out that investigators should obtain case material through witnesses and documents as the law allows, rather than seek to question counsel about the client.

The Court underlined that summons issued under the exceptions should be approved by a superior officer not below the rank of superintendent of police. The approving officer must record reasons showing why the case fits the proviso to Section 132. 

The Court observed that the privilege is anchored in client confidentiality and applies across litigious and non-litigious engagements. It added that the client confidentiality is traced into the right against self-incrimination under Article 20 of the Constitution.

The Court observed that any requirement to submit a document under Section 94 should be made to the jurisdictional court, and not directly to the police. The court will then rule on permissibility and admissibility in accordance with the law. 

The court should give notice to the affected party and hear objections. If the objections are not satisfactory, the digital equipment should only be accessed in presence of the advocate and the client. They can be assisted by any person who is conversant in digital technology. The Judgement specifically noted that their presence was important to minimise collateral exposure of confidential information relating to other clients.

The Court held that advocates and in-house counsel are distinct, as the latter are not covered under the Advocates Act, 1961. But the BSA recognises confidential communications with legal advisers under Section 134. The Judgement makes it clear that Section 134 is distinct and does not transform employer–in-house communications into the advocate-client privilege contemplated under Section 132.

The Court declined to mandate a universal, magistrate-level pre-approval regime. It found that existing statutory provisions have occupied the field and there is no legislative vacuum to fill by issuing guidelines. Such guidelines would undermine legislative intent. The Judgement noted that summons which appear to fall within the exception, can be tested under the judicial review mechanism.

The Court considered this combination of recorded reasons, prior superior-officer approval, and existing judicial remedies sufficient to check abuse. This would avoid the creation of a parallel pre-clearance system not contemplated by any statute.

The Court set aside the impugned summons. It noted that the stated purpose was to elicit “true details” from the advocate about a client’s case, which is squarely within the zone of professional communications protected by the statute. The summons did not demonstrate facts bringing the case within the proviso to Section 132 , nor was there any indication of prior approval by a superior officer. 

The Court observed that routine summoning of counsel to extract information about clients would impede frank consultation and undermine the statutory scheme which protects professional communications.

Advocate Hitesh Jain, member, 23rd Law Commission resigns before 2027

Advocate Hitesh Jain has resigned as a full-time member of the 23rd Law Commission of India. The Union Law Ministry has confirmed it. His resignation was accepted by the President. Jain was appointed to the 23rd Law Commission of India on April 15, 2025 under the chairmanship of Justice (Retd.) Dinesh Maheshwari, former judge of the Supreme Court. 

According to the official notification issued by the Ministry of Law and Justice (Department of Legal Affairs) on November 13, 2025.

"The President is pleased to accept the resignation of Hitesh Jain, full-time Member, 23rd Law Commission of India with effect from the date of his resignation i.e. afternoon of 29.10.2025," the notification said. 

Jain is a litigation lawyer and Managing Partner at Parinam Law Associates. He was appointed as one of the four full-time members of the 23rd Law Commission on April 15, 2025. 

The Law Commission is an advisory body to the Government of India that undertakes research and recommends legal reforms. The 23rd Law Commission, chaired by Justice Maheshwari, was constituted on September 1, 2024, and has a term of three years, ending on August 31, 2027. The Commission will now operate with one less full-time member.

Since Independence, 22 commissions have submitted 289 reports, influencing major laws like the Code of Criminal Procedure (1973) and the Right to Education Act (2009). Notably, its recommendations are advisory and not binding. The Commission is chaired by a retired Supreme Court or High Court judge, with members including legal scholars and occasionally serving judges.

The 23rd Law Commission's Composition includes full-time chairperson, four full-time members, ex-officio members, the Secretary of Legal Affairs and Legislative Departments, and up to five part-time members. These appointments are made by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet comprising of the Prime Minister and the Home Minister. 

It's responsibilities include identifying obsolete laws, audit laws affecting marginalized groups, advise on referred legislation, review laws in light of Directive Principles, suggest reforms in judicial administration, and assess globalisation’s impact on food security and employment.

The 22nd Law Commission (February 2020 – August 2023) had worked on reports on the Uniform Civil Code and simultaneous elections. It recommended retaining Section 124A (sedition law) with clarifications due to internal security concerns.

Dr. Hiren Joshi, Joint Secretary/OSD (Comms & IT), PMO is in news

Dr. Hiren Joshi (54), Joint Secretary/OSD (Communications & Information Technology), PMO is in news without details. 

An electronics engineer from Pune with a PhD from the Indian Institute of Information Technology & Management, Gwalior, Joshi was an assistant professor at the Manikya Lal Verma Textile and Engineering College, Bhilwara. Dr. Joshi had over 18 years of teaching experience before he was hand-picked by Narendra Modi to handle his digital presence in 2008.

Prior to his inexplicable and intriguing departure, Modi's social media usage, were conducted under Joshi's supervision. He used to provide him a daily report on online activities at 11.30 pm. He used to shortlist 100 of the thousands of messages marked to Modi on his social media accounts.

Dr. Joshi used presented papers on analytical tools and new configurations in mobile architecture at national conferences before he was roped in by Modi. 

"The competent authority has approved the appointment of Shri Hiren Joshi as OSD (C&IT) to the Prime Minister in Level-14 (JS Rank) w.e.f 14.06.2019 on co-terminus basis or until further orders, whichever is earlier,” read the PMO note from July 2019 when he was elevated in the PMO where he was working since 2014.

Navneet Kumar Sehgal resigns as chairperson, Prasar Bharati Board amid speculations

Navneet Sehgal, the retired UP IAS officer of 1988 batch who hired Sudhir Chaudhary for ₹15 crores submitted his resignation as chairperson of the Prasar Bharati Board. The Union information and broadcasting ministry accepted his resignation on December 3. He tendered his resignation on December 2, 2025. 

The abrupt resignation "has set off a wave of speculation in official circles, particularly since no reason has been made public. Within government corridors, some insiders hint that the resignation may not have been entirely voluntary." 

Sehgal was appointed for a three-year term or until he turned 70. 

Prasar Bharti runs Doordarshan broadcasting service and Akashvani radio service among other He was appointed to this post in March 2024. Unlike him, his predecessor A Surya Prakash, completed his term in February 2020. Sehgal was appointed three-years after the departure of Surya Prakash. 

Unlike Surya Prakash, Sehgal had no experience in media. He was chosen by a three-member selection committee headed by then Vice President and Rajya Sabha chairman Jagdeep Dhankhar, along with Press Council of India chairperson Ranjana Prakash Desai and a presidential nominee. 

Sehgal had altered DD News during his brief tenure and outsourced shows DD. He was reportedly close to a business tycoon. 

Will Surya Prakash (75), the author of What Ails Indian Parliament or Ram Bahadur Rai (79), the author of Bharatiya Samvidhan: Ankahi Kahani be asked to suggest a suitable candidate to head Prasar Bharati Board in order to restore the autonomy of the Board? Or will there be yet another three-year vacancy? 

Land dispute of civil nature, cannot be turned into a criminal case

In Mala Choudhary & Anr. v. State of Telangana & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 870), Supreme Court held in its 21-pagee long judgement dated July 18, 2025 that a land dispute, which is civil in nature, cannot be turned into a criminal case simply to pressurise the other side. The Supreme Court imposed a cost of Rs. 10,00,000/- on the Complainant for misusing the process of criminal law in a case which was of purely civil nature.

A Criminal Appeal was filed against the final Order of the Telangana High Court, which dismissed a Petition seeking quashing of an FIR.

The Division Bench comprising of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta observed: “We feel that rather than awarding interest to the complainant, it is a fit case wherein the complainant should be penalized with exemplary cost for misusing the process of criminal law in a case which was of purely civil nature.”

The Division Bench said that the High Court acted with absolute pedantic approach, while disposing of the quashing the petition filed by the Appellants in the cryptic manner, without even touching the merits of the case.

Supreme Court Against Criminalisation of Purely Civil Disputes 

The Supreme Court in Mala Choudhary & Anr. vs. The State of Telangana & Anr., reiterated that Courts must vigilantly prevent the criminal justice system from being weaponised to settle what are essentially civil disputes; and High Courts, while exercising power under Section 482 CrPC, owe a duty to render reasoned orders – a perfunctory dismissal amounts to jurisdictional error susceptible to correction under Article 136.

The appellants, a 70-year-old widow of a retired Major General and her daughter (both Delhi residents), faced criminal proceedings in Telangana over an oral land sale arrangement that had simultaneously spawned a civil suit for specific performance. The Supreme Court found the FIR and subsequent arrest to be “a gross abuse of the process of law,” quashed the proceedings, imposed exemplary costs of ₹10 lakh on the complainant, and directed protective measures for the appellants.

The Supreme Court set aside the Telangana High Court’s cryptic order that had declined to quash the FIR.

The FIR under Sections 406 and 420 IPC, and all consequential proceedings were annulled.

₹10,00,000 was imposed by the Supreme Court on the complainant (agent of a builder) for misuse of criminal law, payable to the appellants.

Telangana Police was instructed to provide security whenever appellants visit the State.

Supreme Court reprimanded the High Court for a “laconic and perfunctory” approach under Section 482 CrPC.

It held that the dispute is purely contractual and already sub judice in a civil suit; therefore, criminal prosecution is unwarranted.

The Court relied on the authority that discourages criminal proceedings where civil remedies suffice. 

In Rikhab Birani vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025 SCC OnLine SC 823), Supreme Court reiterated that initiation of criminal proceedings for breach of contract, absent the element of initial dishonest intent, amounts to abuse. It was cited to underline that liability under Sections 406/420 IPC arises only when mens rea exists ab initio.

In Paramjeet Batra vs. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 11 SCC 673, Supreme Court laid down guiding principles for quashing FIRs where civil disputes masquerade as criminal. The Court adopted the “predominant object” test from Batra to sift civil from criminal contours.

In Sachin Garg vs. State of UP (2024 SCC OnLine SC 82), Supreme Court emphasised that monetary disputes stemming from contractual relationships should ordinarily travel the civil route barring demonstrable fraud. Relied upon to justify exemplary costs in egregious misuse cases.

In A.M. Mohan vs. SHO (2024) 3 SCR 722, Supreme Court was concerned with the arrest of senior citizens in a cheque-bounce context. The Court invoked it to condemn the undue custodial humiliation of the 70-year-old appellant.

In Lalit Chaturvedi vs. State of UP (2024 SCC 171), the Supreme Court held that High Courts must give cogent reasons while rejecting petitions under Section 482. The present decision extends that principle by tagging summary dismissals as “jurisdictional impropriety”.:

The Court posed the mirror of FIR narrative in front of the pleadings in the civil suit, identifying material inconsistencies concerning the sale consideration and subject-matter of the alleged oral agreement. This divergence showed embellishment only to invoke criminal jurisdiction.

Missing ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 IPC

-Section 406 (Criminal Breach of Trust): requires entrustment and subsequent dishonest misappropriation. Here, money was paid under a contractual arrangement; failure to perform does not ipso facto constitute misappropriation.

-Section 420 (Cheating): demands fraudulent intent at the inception of the transaction. The Court found no contemporaneous material suggesting that the appellants never intended to sell the land.

As a consequence, the FIR was devoid of a prima facie foundation in criminal law.

The Supreme Court has censured the High Court’s “pedantic” disposal, emphasising that Section 482 petitions are vital safety valves to curb misuse of criminal law. A failure to assign reasons undermines litigant confidence. 

The trial courts and High Courts have been put on notice that a mere overlap with civil proceedings necessitates a deeper look before allowing criminal prosecution to continue.

The ₹10-lakh cost sets a deterrent; litigants and lawyers may reassess the tactical filing of FIRs to pressure opposite parties.

The judgement illustrates that the Supreme Court is willing to overturn perfunctory Section 482 orders, prompting High Courts to craft reasoned decisions.

The Court issued directions for police protection and observations against needless custodial arrests can be invoked in similar scenarios nationwide.

Article 136 of the Constitution is invoked by the Supreme Court to exercise plenary powers not merely to correct lower-court errors but to quash proceedings outright where justice so demands.

Section 482 CrPC provides inherent power of High Courts to prevent abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. It permits quashing of FIRs and criminal proceedings at a pre-trial stage.

An essential component of most criminal offences; it refers to the mental state indicating intent or knowledge of wrongdoing at the time the act was committed.

Article 136 of the Constitution grants the Supreme Court special leave to entertain appeals against any judgment, decree, or order from any court/tribunal in the country; an extraordinary and discretionary jurisdiction.

Court can impose costs beyond simple reimbursement to penalise parties who have abused court processes or engaged in frivolous litigation.

Civil vs. Criminal Liability

Civil liability is concerned with private rights and remedies (e.g., damages, specific performance), whereas criminal liability involves offences against the State punishable by imprisonment, fine, etc. The same factual matrix can sometimes give rise to both, but courts examine intent and statutory ingredients to demarcate.

The judgement in Mala Choudhary vs. State of Telangana has affirmed that the criminal law cannot be a coercive debt-recovery mechanism or a substitute for civil adjudication. 

Reasoned orders are the sine qua non of justice delivery under Section 482 CrPC. 

The Supreme Court will directly quash proceedings and imposing punitive costs when injustice is manifest.

This judgment serves a double function—shielding bona-fide civil disputants from criminal harassment and cautioning complainants that strategic FIRs can rebound with heavy financial consequences. It is a lesson for litigants, lawyers, and trial courts. 

Prior to this, in the 6-page long judgement dated April 28, 2025, Justice Alok Kumar Pandey of Patna High Court in Ram Vinay Mahto vs. The State of Bihar (2025) had observed:"5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments has held that regular suit is appropriate remedy for settlement of dispute relating to property rights between private persons. The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be available except where there is violation of some statutory duty on the part of statutory authority is alleged. It is held that the High Court cannot allow its constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies under the general law, civil or criminal are available. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution being special and extra-ordinary should not be exercised casually or lightly on mere asking by the litigant. In this context, the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sohan Lal vs. Union of India & Anr. reported in AIR 1957 SC 529 and in Radhey Shyam & Anr. Vs. Chhabi Nath and Ors, reported in (2015) SCC 423 are quite relevant."

Prior to this, in his 6-page long judgement dated April 28, 2025, Justice Alok Kumar Pandey in Ram Vinay Mahto vs. The State of Bihar (2025) observed:"5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments has held that regular suit is appropriate remedy for settlement of dispute relating to property rights between private persons. The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be available except where there is violation of some statutory duty on the part of statutory authority is alleged. It is held that the High Court cannot allow its constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies under the general law, civil or criminal are available. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution being special and extra-ordinary should not be exercised casually or lightly on mere asking by the litigant. In this context, the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sohan Lal Vs. Union of India & Anr. reported in AIR 1957 SC 529 and in the case of Radhey Shyam & Anr. Vs. Chhabi Nath and Ors, reported in (2015) SCC 423 are quite relevant."

Earlier,  in a 7--page long judgement dated February 28, 2024 in Praduman Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jh relied on three Supreme Court's judgements in 1.M/s. Indian Oil Corporation vs. M/s. NEPC India Ltd. and Ors. [(2006) 6 SCC 736], Joseph Salvaraja A. vs. State of Gujarat and Others [(2011) 3 SCC (Crl.) 23]  and State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335] to reach similar conclusion. 

Supreme Court reverses judgment by Justice Vipul M. Pancholi,endorses argument by Senior Advocate Anjana Prakash

In Chandan Pasi & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N K Singh delivered a 11-page long judgement dated December 1, 2025, wherein, it concluded:".... we need not delve into the other grounds raised, questioning the concurrent conviction against the appellants herein. On this ground alone, the Appeals are allowed and the matter is sent back to the concerned Trial Court to recommence from the state of the recording of the Section 313 CrPC statements. We may clarify that the remand is limited to the cases of the three appellants before us and our observations herein shall not affect the sanctity of the findings already arrived at, qua the other accused persons. A trial is a function of memory; it is this memory that, when translated into spoken word testimony on oath, becomes evidence, and thus the same is susceptible to the vagaries of time. Keeping in view the fact that the offence is from the year 2016, and while being cognizant of the observations of the Constitution Bench in High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of U.P. 11, we direct the concerned Trial Court to do the needful within four months from the date of the communication of this judgment." 

It added:"Registrar (Judicial) to communicate this judgment and jorder to the learned Registrar General, High Court of Judicature Patna, who will forthwith communicate the same to the concerned court for necessary action and compliance."

On earlier occasions also, Supreme Court, while upholding the acquittal of an accused, had observed that High Courts must be proactive while checking compliance with Section 313 of Cr.PC (Section 351 of BNSS) at the inception of criminal appeals and remand the matter to the trial court in case of lapses, to avoid acquittals.

In the case of Chandan Pasi, the Court was astounded to note that the statements given by all three accused persons were carbon copies of each other. The Court was unable to understand how such statements passed muster at the hands of the Trial Judge. On this ground alone, the Bench allowed the Appeals and sent the matter back to the Trial Court to recommence from the state of the recording of the Section 313 CrPC statements. “We may clarify that the remand is limited to the cases of the three appellants before us and our observations herein shall not affect the sanctity of the findings already arrived at, qua the other accused persons”.

Justice Karol headed bench ordered the Trial Court to recommence the recording of the Section 313 CrPC statements in a criminal case, after finding that statements given by three accused persons were photo copies of each other. The Supreme Court also held that the prosecutor is an officer of the Court and cannot act as a defence lawyer.

The Court also mentioned that one of the non-negotiable requirements of a fair trial is that the accused persons should have ample opportunity to dispel the case and claims of the prosecution against them.

The appeals before the Court arose from the final judgments and orders by Justices Vipul M. Pancholi and R. C. Malviya of the High Court affirming the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence in a murder case. A total of six persons were sentenced to life imprisonment. Three of them had approached the Supreme Court.

The appeals emerged from the final judgments and orders dated 4th September, 2024 and 26th September, 2024 passed by Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.443 of 2017, which had affirmed the judgment of conviction dated 27th March 2017 and the order of sentence dated 29th March 2017 passed by the Court of District & Session Judge, Buxar in Sessions Trial No.256 of 2016, whereby a total of six persons were sentenced to life imprisonment along with a fine of Rs.10,000/- each under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code 1860, one year simple imprisonment each under Sections 448 & 323 along with Section 34 IPC with all of them running concurrently. Before the Supreme Court  three of the six convicts namely – Chandan Pasi, Pappu Pasi and Gidik Pasi. Here only it may be noted that there was a seventh accused person who was, by the process of law held to be a juvenile and thus dealt with in accordance with the applicable law. 

Justice Pancholi headed Division Bench of the High Court had passed an order dated September 26, 2024. It wrote:"The matter has been listed under the caption ‘To Be Mentioned’ for rectification of Uploading date and Transmission date appearing in the prescribed column at the bottom of the last page of the judgment, which has been recorded as ‘11.08.2024’, whereas the same ought to have been ‘11.09.2024’. The same is corrected. The date be read as 11.09.2024."

It had passed a 34-page long judgement in Joni Pasi @ Ravindra Pasi vs. The State of Bihar (2024), the High Court had delivered a judgement dated September 4, 2024 as well. It was head along with Birendra Pasi & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2024). The other 4 respondents were: Chandan Pasi, Pappu Pasi @ Hindustan Pasi, Botal Pasi and Gidik Pasi. 

Justice Pancholi had observed:"It is true that the prosecution has failed to examine independent witnesses. However, merely because such witnesses have not been examined, the version given by the prosecution witnesses cannot be discarded. It is well settled that the deposition given by the interested or the related witnesses cannot be discarded only on the ground that they are the interested witnesses. Their deposition is to be examined closely. If the deposition given by such witnesses is found trustworthy, reliable and plausible, conviction can be recorded on the basis of the deposition given by such witnesses, who are eyewitnesses to the incident in question. In the present case, PW’s 6, 7 and 9 are the near relatives of the deceased. However, their presence at the place of occurrence was natural. Even, in the present case, as observed jereinabove, the medical evidence also supports the version given by the said eyewitnesses. The prosecution has even proved the motive on the part of the appellants-accused to commit the alleged crime, i.e., both the accused side and the prosecution side were on inimical terms for very long and a girl of accused side was kidnapped by the prosecution side. Thus, in the present case, merely because the independent witnesses have not been examined, the version of the prosecution is not required to be discarded."

He recorded:"Learned senior counsel for the appellant has also contended that the police station case number has not been mentioned in the inquest report as well as in the postmortem report. However, it is required to be observed that inquest report was prepared at the place of incident at 08:45 AM and, at that time, formal FIR was not registered. Further, from the deposition of PW 3 (Investigating Officer), it is also revealed that he had sent the dead body for postmortem examination from the place of incident itself and, therefore, there are all chances that police station case number has not been mentioned even in the postmortem report. Even otherwise, formal FIR was registered at 01:45 PM (13:45 hours) and, as per the postmortem report (ext.-1), the dead body was received at 2:00 PM. Thus, merely because the police station case number has not been written in the postmortem report, it cannot be said that the case of the prosecution itself is doubtful. Even the defence raised by the appellants-accused before the trial court is also not required to be believed in view of the evidence produced by the prosecution. We have also gone through the reasoning recorded by the trial court and we are of the view that the trial court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment and order."

He concluded:"Accordingly, both these appeals stand dismissed. 23.Since all the five appellants of Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 443 of 2017 are on bail, their bail bonds are hereby cancelled. The trial court is directed to take immediate steps for sending them to jail custody for serving the remaining sentence." Supreme Court has reversed this inference by Justice Pancholi. 

The factual background is that on 31st March 2016, the informant Kachan Pasi along with his father Ghughali Pasi, mother Kouta Devi and sister-in-law Dharmsheela Devi were returning from the fields of one Nanhaku Singh when the accused persons surrounded the above-named and assaulted Ghughali Pasi with a katta, who died as a result thereof. Particular allegations of such assault were also levelled against Joni Pasi @Ravindra Pasi. 

The Trial Court had convicted. All the accused persons before the Trial Court filed appeals under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 19733 in which the High Court upheld the findings of the Court below.

Ms. Anjana Prakash was the Senior Counsel for the appellants, who is a former judge of the Patna High Court. h

The primary contention in the SLPs rested on the noncompliance of Section 313, CrPC. The Supreme Court had indicated in the order issuing notice that, should the ground of proper compliance be made out, only then, we would proceed to examine other grounds.

Justice Karol observed: 'One of the non-negotiable requirements of a fair trial is that the accused persons should have ample opportunity to dispel the case and claims of the prosecution against them. This ample opportunity can take many forms, whether it is adequate representation through counsel or the opportunity to call witnesses to present their side of the case or to have the occasion to answer each and every allegation against them, on their own, in their own words. The last one happens under Section 313 CrPC. This Court, in many judgments, delineated the scope and object of Section 313 CrPC. The position is no longer up for debate. Even so, we may refer to certain pronouncements for the sake of completeness."

He observed: “It is equally disturbing for us to see that in the desire to secure a conviction for the accused persons, the prosecutor also let their duty of assisting the Court in conducting the examination of the accused under this section fall by the wayside. The prosecutor is an officer of the Court and holds a solemn duty to act in the interest of justice. They cannot act as a defence lawyer, but for the State, with the sole aim of making the gauntlet of punishment fall on the accused.”

He noted that the primary contention in the Special Leave Petition was based on the noncompliance of Section 313, CrPC. The Court explained that the accused persons should have ample opportunity to dispel the case and claims of the prosecution against them. He underlined: “This ample opportunity can take many forms, whether it is adequate representation through counsel or the opportunity to call witnesses to present their side of the case or to have the occasion to answer each and every allegation against them, on their own, in their own words. The last one happens under Section 313 CrPC”.

Under Section 351 of BNSS or Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973, it is mandatory for the court to question the accused generally on the case after the prosecution evidence has been presented. This provision is crucial for ensuring that the accused has an opportunity to explain the evidence against them. The absence of such questioning can have adverse implications on the trial.

Section 351 of BNSS or Section 313 of the CrPC allows the court to directly question the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against them. The provision is intended to:

-Ensure the accused understands the allegations and evidence against them.

-Provide the accused an opportunity to explain or rebut the evidence.

-Assist the court in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Section 313 is a mandatory provision. It ensures that the principles of natural justice are upheld by giving the accused a chance to respond to the evidence presented by the prosecution.

If the court fails to put relevant questions to the accused under Section 313, it can lead to a miscarriage of justice. The necessity to question the accused under Section 313 CrPC is fundamental to a fair trial.