Patna High Court judgments in 2025

January 2025

Rakesh Rai vs. The State of Bihar (Jan.17, 2025):  Justice Jitendra Kumar found the order dated November 1, 2023 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge 1st cum Special Judge SC/ST & Children Court, Buxar, in Adult Children Case of 2023 which arose out of Bagengola P.S. Case of 2020 whereby the court below had rejected the bail petition of the appellant, to be unsustainable in the eye of law. He set aside the order with reference to the preamble of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. Section 2 (35) of the J.J. Act states that "juvenile" means a child below the age of eighteen years.

Justice Kumar observed:"....I find that the learned Children Court has rejected the bail petition of the appellant on the grounds that he is actively involved in the alleged offence of murder and he is also associated with criminal activities and has a bad company and his release would bring him into association with other known criminals or expose him to moral, physical and psychological danger and his release would defeat the ends of justice. 11. However, as per the statutory provisions and binding judicial precedents, I find that involvement of the appellant in offence of serious nature is no ground for denying bail to a juvenile. 12. Moreover, the observation of learned court below that the appellant is associated with criminal activities and he has bad company is baseless. The Social Investigation Report does not show that the appellant was involved in any criminal activities prior to the present case. In fact, he was working as a labourer in Rajasthan on account of poor condition of his family. No crime has been shown to have been committed by him or any members of his family prior to the present case. 13. Even finding of the Children Court that the release of the appellant would bring him into bad company is also unfounded. As per Social Investigation Report, I do not find that he was a member of any criminal gang and his release may bring him into company of that gang. 14. There is also no possibility, as per Social Investigation Report, of exposing the appellant to moral, physical or psychological danger, if he is released on bail. 15. I also find that learned Children Court has misconceived the ends of justice when he has held that release of the appellant would defeat the ends of justice. Perhaps, learned Court below has been swayed by the seriousness of the alleged offence of murder. But ends of justice in the context of J.J. Act is totally different. The purpose and object of the J.J. Act is to reform and rehabilitate the juveniles and not to punish them. The preamble of the Act reads as follows:- “An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to children alleged and found to be in conflict with law and children in need of care and protection by catering to their basic needs through proper care, protection, development, treatment, social reintegration, by adopting a child-friendly approach in the adjudication and disposal of matters in the best
interest of children and for their rehabilitation through processes provided, and institutions and bodies established, hereinunder and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.” The counsel for the appellant had relied upon a judgment of the Patna High Court in Biswajit Kumar Pandey @ Lalu Kumar Vs. State of Bihar, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Pat 8499.

Juli Kumari vs. The State of Bihar (Jan 27, 2025): Dealt with issuance of summons, emphasizing it's a  serious step not to be done mechanically, citing Supreme Court precedents.

Surendra Kumar & Anr. vs. State Of Bihar (Jan 23, 2025): A criminal case where the court found the appellant's actions didn't constitute deception or harm to the complainant.

Rajesh Kumar vs The State of Bihar (Jan 18, 2025): Set aside a service dismissal, holding that producing documents without examining witnesses violates natural justice principles, citing a key Supreme Court case.

Lalita Devi vs. The State of Bihar (Jan 31, 2025): Granted bail with conditions, requiring specific affidavits from the petitioner and bailor regarding family ties and future conduct. 

BPSC 70th CCE Controversy: Stay Order (Jan 2025): The court initially issued a stay on the Bihar Public Service Commission (BPSC) 70th CCE results due to paper leak allegations, causing significant disruption. Dismissal of Petitions (March 2025): Later, the Patna High Court dismissed petitions seeking cancellation of the exam, allowing the results to proceed. 

February 2025

In Chandan Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Anr.(2025), Justice Anil Kumar Sinha denied bail to the alleged ‘solver gang’ leader accused in the NEET UG 2024 paper leak case, holding that the said gang polluted the fairness and integrity of the medical examination. The Court dismissed the Bail Application filed by the third-year MBBS student accused of leaking the solved question papers for the NEET UG exams. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) alleged that the accused was the head of Patna group of the solver gang who arranged ‘dummy candidates’ in return for Rs. 7,19,000 for securing a Government seat. Justice concluded:“I am of the considered view that the role of the petitioner and other members of the solver gang is the key role in the commission of the crime and attaining the final object of the crime. Had the leaked question paper been not solved by the academically strong candidate, the offence of this nature would not have been committed, jeopardizing the career and future of thousands of medical aspirants. The activities of solver gangs severely undermine the sanctity and integrity of the examination process.” 

According to the prosecution, an organized gang had allegedly breached the integrity of the NEET UG examination by leaking the question paper. The accused’s name surfaced during the second supplementary charge sheet filed by the CBI, which identified him as the head of the Patna-based solver gang. The charge sheet booked the accused under Sections 120-B read with Sections 109, 201, 380, 409, 411, and 420 of the IPC, along with Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act). The prosecution alleged that the petitioner was actively involved in arranging solvers—academically proficient individuals tasked with solving the leaked question papers. Investigation revealed that these solvers were assigned specific subjects and operated from a guest house. The solved answers were subsequently disseminated among select candidates. 

Justice Sinha observed: “In the context of paper leaks, solver gangs play a significant role in solving the leaked question papers, which is subsequently distributed and disseminated by another gang members. Solver gang provide wrongful gain or wrongful assistance to one or more examinees of such public examination. The insiders of paper leak provide leaked question papers to solver gang and once the leaked question papers are obtained, the solver gang works on solving the question paper.” 

The Court underlined that the solver gangs consisted of individuals, who were academically strong and capable of providing accurate answers. It recorded: “After solving the leaked question paper, it is distributed amongst a group of examinees, who are willing to pay for the same. This distribution can happen through various means, including social media platforms, messaging apps, or even in person”. It added: “In the present case, the solver gang has operated in an organized manner by adopting corrupt practices in connivance with other members of the gang for monetary and wrongful gains. The petitioner and other members of the solver gang created an unfair advantage for those candidates, who can afford to pay for the answers, while honest candidates were put in disadvantageous condition. The petitioner and others polluted the fairness and integrity of the medical examination, undermining the trust of the candidates in the examination process.” Justice Sinha observed:“The allegation against the petitioner is serious in nature, having deep rooted conspiracy. Accordingly, I am not inclined to grant regular bail to the petitioner keeping in mind the aforesaid discussion, including the nature of accusation and the evidence collected in support thereof.”    

In Praduman Kumar Prasad vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Justice Arvind Singh Chandel of Patna High Court clarified in his judgement dated February 25, 2025 that the disciplinary authority has no power or right to start a fresh enquiry after the enquiry officer submits an enquiry report. The Court quashed the fresh inquiry order issued against a retired clerk (Petitioner) in the Child Development Project Office and directed the disciplinary authority to pass a final order on the existing inquiry report within two weeks. The Court held that initiating a de novo inquiry after an inquiry report has been submitted is impermissible in law. Justice Chandel concluded: “Thus, law is well settled that after submission of the enquiry report by the enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority has no power or right to start a fresh enquiry. However, vide impugned order 28.06.2023, the disciplinary authority started a fresh enquiry by issuing a fresh charge memo which is impermissible in law…In such view of the matter, the impugned order dated 28.06.2023 (Annexure P/18) is not sustainable and is, accordingly, set aside.” 

After the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner, he was transferred to the District Welfare Office, where a criminal case was registered against him under Sections 467, 468, 471, 406, 420, 120B and 34 of the IPC. As a result, he was suspended and a departmental inquiry was initiated. The first inquiry report led to his compulsory retirement. The Petitioner challenged this Order, where the High Court set aside the punishment and directed that the proceedings be restarted from the stage of the second show-cause notice. However, the disciplinary authority reissued the same charge memo, and after another inquiry, reimposed compulsory retirement. 

Justice Chandel referred to the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in State of Bihar vs. Md Shamim Akhtar (2023), wherein it was held, “In that event disciplinary authority has option of issuing of show cause notice to the concerned person to the extent of disagreeing with the inquiring officer’s report or finding and he had option of remanding the matter to the inquiring authority to commence the inquiry from the defective stage and complete the process of inquiry or he/she can complete the inquiry.” 

In Ashok Kumar vs. State of Bihar (2021), it was held, “No provision under the Rules contemplates a second departmental inquiry. In case, a Disciplinary Authority notices any serious defect having crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses could not be examined because of their nonavailability, he could have remitted the matter back to the Enquiring Authority for further inquiry as contemplated under sub-rule (1) of Rule 18 of the Rules.” 

The Court ordered, “The matter is remanded back to the disciplinary authority to pass a fresh order on the report of enquiry officer…Since this is the fourth round of litigation and the departmental enquiry is continuously going on for the last 11 years, the disciplinary authority is directed to pass order within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order…It is further directed that if the disciplinary authority remitted back the matter to the enquiry officer in the light of power given to him under Rule 18 (1) of the 2005 Rules then the enquiry officer would complete the enquiry proceeding as early as possible preferably within 90 days from the date of order passed by the disciplinary authority, if any.” The High Court allowed the Petition.  

March 2025

In M/s Pramila Motors Pvt. Ltd. vs. M/s Okinawa Autotech International Pvt. Ltd. (2025), Justice Ashutosh Kumar of Patna High Court concluded in his judgement dated March 22, 2025 that designation of place of arbitration in arbitration clause as "venue" can be treated as "seat" of arbitration proceedings. He was considering a Petition under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for appointment of an independent/ impartial Arbitrator. He held that whenever there is designation of a place of Arbitration in an Arbitration Clause as being the “venue” of the Arbitration Proceedings, it would presuppose that the “venue” is the “seat” of the Arbitration Proceedings. Justice Kumar observed, "In the absence of any clause in the agreement apart from Clause 36.3, which speaks of the “venue” being Delhi, there cannot be any other inference or intention of the parties for the “venue” and the “seat” being different." 

The Petitioner and the Respondent entered into dealership agreement under which the Petitioner agreed to become a dealer for the electric vehicles manufactured by the Respondent at the terms and conditions mentioned in the agreement. Considerable amount of investments were made by the Petitioner for setting up the dealership. Clause 36 of the agreement provided for dispute resolution through arbitration. Clause 36.3 specified that the “venue” of arbitration would be New Delhi. Since the supply of Vehicles were not made on time, the Dealership Agreement was terminated at the instance of the Petitioner. For settling the dues of the Petitioner, a Notice was sent to the Respondent and when the same was not responded to, another was sent invoking the Arbitration Clause and asking the Respondent to either consent to the name of the Arbitrator provided by the Petitioner or propose a name at their end. This was replied with intimating that the right to appoint an Arbitrator was reserved with the Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer. No name of an independent/impartial Arbitrator was provided by the Respondent. When the Respondent didn't respond to the request of the Petitioner to settle account, present petition was filed. 

The counsel for the Respondent had submitted that the Court would not have the jurisdiction to entertain the Petition in view of Clause 36.3 which, in clear terms, provides that the “venue” of Arbitration would be in New Delhi, and thus, the jurisdictional Court would be the High Court of New Delhi. The name of the Arbitrator proposed by the Petitioner was also not consented. It was also submitted on behalf of the Respondent that in BGS SGS SOMA JV vs. NHPC Limited (2020), the Supreme Court has laid down that whenever there is an express designation of the “venue” and no designation of any alternative place as the “seat”, and no other significant contrary indicia, the inexorable conclusion would be that the stated “venue” is actually the juridical “seat” of the Arbitral Proceedings. 

The counsel for the Petitioner contended that the judgment of the Supreme Court in BGS SGS SOMA JV (supra) is not applicable in this case, as it was in the context of International Arbitration with “seat” outside India, whereas the present case is of Domestic Arbitration. Counsel for the Petitioner relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ms. Ravi Ranjan Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Aditya Kumar (2022), wherein it was held that “seat of arbitration” and “venue of arbitration” cannot be used interchangeably and that the “venue of the arbitration” cannot be the basis for determining the intention of the parties that the same place has the “seat of Arbitration”. The intention of the Parties as to the seat should be determined from other clauses in the agreement and the conduct of the parties. 

Justice Kumar observed that looking at the Agreement, it would become clear that the Parties intended to exclude all other Courts except Delhi. It mentioned Brahmani River Pellets Limited vs. Kamachi Industries Limited (2020) wherein it was held that where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of a Court at a particular place, only such Court will have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and it would be presumed that the parties intend to exclude all other Courts. If the parties agree that the “venue of arbitration” shall be at a particular place, the intention of the parties is to exclude all other Courts. "It may not be necessary to decide, otherwise, in case of non-use of words like “exclusive jurisdiction”, “only”, “exclusive”, “alone”, which actually do not make any material difference," the Court noted stressing that it has no jurisdiction to entertain any petition under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It stated that the expression “seat” and “venue” cannot be considered to be interchangeable. It was observed: "The unilateral intention of one of the parties to the agreement cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court which inherently lacks the jurisdiction because of the “venue” having been specified and there being no other contrary indicia to infer any other intention."   

April 2025

In Dr. Mamta Sinha v. The State of Bihar & Anr.(2025), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a-26 page long judgment dated April 25, 2025 wherein, he quashed a 22 year old case against female doctor accused of removing patient’s Kidney of a patient. The Court decided the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition preferred by the accused doctor under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC), seeking to quash an Order of the Trial Court which dismissed her discharge application. Justice Jha observed, “Considering the aforesaid factual and legal submissions and by taking note of facts, as admittedly the petitioner is the wife of Dr. Shailesh Kumar Sinha, who conducted the operation upon O.P. No.2 on 13.09.2000, where petitioner was only said to be present and further by taking note of the report of P.G.I., Chandigarh, which is a document of unimpeachable character, therefore, taking note of Devendra Nath Padhi case (supra), Bhajan Lal Case (supra) and other legal reports as discussed above, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order dated 23.02.2024 as passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge X, Patna in Sessions Trial No.440 of 2023 arising out of Complaint Case No.1750(c) of 2003 along with all its consequential proceedings qua petitioner is fit to be set aside/quashed to secure the ends of justice.” 

As per the prosecution case, the Opposite Party (Complainant) lodged a Complaint stating that he was working as a mail man in Railway Mail Services at Patna Railway Station. In June 2000, he was suffering from acute abdominal pain associated with the passing of red-white substances along with urine. He was facing difficulty in passing urine and hence, he got himself examined in the dispensary of Central Government Health Scheme at Kankarbagh. He was advised by the doctor posted there for Ultrasonography of the whole abdomen. As per the sonographic report, he was found suffering from mild Hepatomegaly and also with mild Benign. His right kidney was found intact and no abnormality around the kidney was found. Further, on the advice of the doctor at Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS), other pathological examinations were done, where all the reports were found within normal limit. Thereafter, someone at CGHS recommended the name of the accused no. 1 Dr. Shailesh Kumar Sinha, where the Complainant got himself examined. He was suggested few other pathological examination and medicine was also prescribed to him. The accused no.1 found him suffering from ‘Chyluria’. He confirmed his diagnosis by performing Cystoscopy and subsequently, on his advice, he was operated for his disease. The accused no. 1 was accompanied by his team consisting of his wife i.e., the Petitioner, two Assistants, and one anaesthetist. Post operation, the Complainant’s complication increased as he started having severe pain in the right side of the abdomen. Even after all examinations, the complications kept increasing. After remaining in the hospital for a couple of days, he was discharged but his complications were not resolved. He then got himself examined by a physician who suggested USG examination. The report showed that the right kidney “not seen”. He suspected that his right kidney was removed without his consent. 

Consequently, the case went to the Trial Court, which dismissed the Petitioner’s discharge application against which she approached the High Court. 

Justice Jha noted: “This Court is aware about the legal position that defence version cannot be looked into at this stage but as report of the PGI, Chandigarh discussed in para-17 of the judgment is a document of such unimpeachable character, to which, this Court has no hesitation to accept at this stage in view of Devendra Nath Padhi case (supra), where all previous reports and medical history of complainant/O.P. No.2 were taken into consideration.” The Court observed that the version of allegations as set out through Complaint Petition, nowhere suggests prima facie any cognizable offences as alleged for offences punishable under Sections 307, 326, 420, 467, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) qua Petitioner. He pointed out: “Interestingly, no cognizance was taken for criminal conspiracy punishable u/s 120-B of the IPC. Hence, this case also falls under the golden guideline nos. (1), (3) and (7) as settled through Bhajan Lal case (supra)”. The High Court allowed the Petition and quashed the proceedings against the accused. 

May 2025 

In Amit Kumar & Ors. v. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Justice Bibek Chaudhuri of Patna High Court delivered a 62-page long judgement dated May 7, 2025 wherein, he concluded that outsourcing in Government Departments is legally permissible but it is crucial to ensure compliance with Labour Laws and Regulations. The Court stressed thus in a Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking directions in the nature of mandamus for placing the Petitioners on the vacant post of Executive Assistant in the Purnea District. 

Justice Chaudhuri observed, “Outsourcing in government departments is legally permissible, but it is crucial to ensure compliance with Labour Laws and regulations. Government departments can outsource tasks and services, but they must ensure that the outsourced employees are treated fairly and their rights are protected.” 

In 2013, Bihar Prashashanik Sudhar Mission, General Administration Department, Government of Bihar, Patna (BPSM) issued a notification for preparation of a panel for the appointment of Executive Assistants on a contract basis. Clause-1 of the said notification provided the minimum eligibility criteria for the candidates, which was matriculation and basic knowledge of computer operation system (MS Word, MS Excel, MS Power Point, etc.). The notification also stated that the said contractual appointment would initially be for one year. However, there was stipulation for extension of the period of appointment for such candidates. The procedure of selection was stated in Clause-4 of the said notification, which stipulated that on the basis of applications filed in the district level, a committee under the Chairmanship of the District Magistrate would prepare a panel keeping in mind the rules/roster relating to reservation and the candidates would be appointed on the basis of seniority against vacant posts. 

A panel was prepared by the Committee under the Chairmanship of the District Magistrate and thereafter, a memo was issued by the Secretary Health-cum- Executive Director, State Health Committee, Bihar, Patna, the District Magistrate directing that the Executive Assistant from the panel would be posted at State Hospitals in the District of Purnea on the basis of counselling of the empanelled candidates. Counselling was held where 34 candidates from the panel appeared and they were appointed on contractual basis to work under the District Health Committee, Purnea in different hospitals as Executive Assistants. By a notification, an Order was passed relating to service conditions of contractual employees posted in different departments as per the recommendation of a High Level Committee, recommending execution of certain proposals. The Petitioners filed representation before the authorities, praying for their absorption in the vacant posts lying in different departments in the District of Purnea as Executive Assistants. It was contended that the District Magistrate acted illegally and contrary to the gazette notification. 

The High Court observed: “In a very recent decision, in the case of Chaudhary Charan Singh, Haryana Agricultural University, Hisar & Anr. v. Monika & Ors., (Civil Appeal No. 10800 of 2024), decided on 29th of November, 2024, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the issue as to whether an outsourced employee is entitled to get weightage for regular employment in the University, held that outsourcing policy stipulates that the services may be outsourced as and when required partly or completely by the departments, where posts have not been sanctioned, on contract basis.” The Court said that the State Government is entitled to take policy decision that the Data Entry Operators would be deputed by the Government Departments through a service provider under outsourcing policy. 

The Court observed:“… However, the said policy decision cannot be made effective retrospectively, directing the contractual employees, who were discharging the similar duties for a long period of time, to submit themselves to a selection process to be conducted by BELTRON with fresh applicants, without terminating their job on the ground of efficiency”. 

The Court was of the opinion that subsequent decision of outsourcing of service providers in data centres under various departments of the State Government is not applicable in case of the Petitioners. “In the instant case, petitioners are treated differently from their fellow Executive Assistants, working in the district of Ara and Araria…his issue has not been decided in any of the writ petitions disposed of by different Benches of this Court in the light of the executive decisions taken time to time by the BPSM under the General Administration Department”. The Court held that the Writ Petition is maintainable and the Petitioners are entitled to the following reliefs – A. Memo issued under the signature of the District Magistrate Purnea, by which the list of the Petitioners has been submitted to the BELTRON for taking appropriate action is quashed and set aside. B. The Petitioners are entitled to perform their duties as Executive Assistants on the basis of notification, till the attainment of 60 years of age or till the end of the scheme, whichever is earlier. C. The District Magistrate, Purnea is directed to place the service of the Petitioners in the vacant posts of Executive Assistants, if any, in any of the Data Centres, run by various Departments of the State Government within a period of four weeks from the date of the Order. If no such vacancy is available, the Petitioners may be posted in the Data Centres of other districts in the State of Bihar. D. The Petitioners, however, are not entitled to receive back-wages/salary from the month of August, 2021 as they did not render any service in any of the Department of the State Government. The High Court allowed the Writ Petition. 

In ABC v. The State of Bihar & Ors.(2025), Justice Jitendra Kumar delivered a judgement on May 7, 2025 wherein, he observed, “Living in adultery” denotes a continuous course of conduct and not isolated acts of immorality. One or two lapses from virtues may be acts of adultery, but would not be sufficient to show that the woman was “living in adultery”. The Court held thus in a Criminal Revision Petition preferred by a husband against the Order of the Family Court which directed him to pay Rs. 3,000/- per month to his wife and Rs. 2,000/- per month to his daughter towards their maintenance. 

The Bench said that adulterous life is no doubt disqualification for any wife to get maintenance from her husband under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC), however, any physical relationship of a lady with any person prior to her marriage does not come within the definition of ‘adultery’ because adultery is an offence against one’s spouse. “… adulterous life of any wife subsequent to her marriage is undoubtedly a disqualification for any married wife to get maintenance from her husband”, it added. 

In 2012, the Respondents i.e., wife and daughter of the Petitioner-husband filed a case under Section 125 CrPC for their maintenance against the Petitioner and his parents. Later on the parents were deleted from the array of the Opposite Parties before the Court. It was alleged that the marriage between the parties was solemnized in 2010 as per Hindu rites and customs and out of the wedlock, a girl was born. Allegedly, the Respondent-wife was subjected to physical assault on account of non-fulfilment of demand of additional dowry. She left the matrimonial home and it was further alleged that her husband was having illicit relationship with a lady. It was also alleged that her husband and parents-in-law wanted her to die so that her husband could remarry the said lady and get handsome dowry. 

It was also stated that she was ready to live with her husband but her husband was not ready to keep her in his matrimonial home. Regarding income of her husband, it was alleged that her husband was in Government job and his income from cultivation and business was Rs. 24,000/- per month. On the other hand, the Petitioner-husband alleged that his marriage was forcibly solemnized with the Respondent at a temple and he also disputed the paternity of the daughter as she was born just after about 4.5 months of the marriage. It was further claimed that she was having illicit relationship with her brother-in-law and was not interested to continue her matrimonial life with the Petitioner. He also claimed that his monthly income was only Rs. 11,000/-. He denied the allegation of demand of dowry and torturing therefor. 

The High Court observed:“… the petitioner-Avadh Kishore Sah has never filed any matrimonial petition before Family Court or any Civil Court regarding declaration in regard to paternity of O.P. No.3/Gudiya Kumari. Hence, there is no declaration by any Family Court or Civil Court to the effect that O.P. No.3/Gudiya Kumari is not legitimate daughter of the petitioner or she is illegitimate daughter of any other man.” The Court further elucidated that the proceeding under Section 125 CrPC is summary in nature and meant to prevent the vagrancy and destitution of wife and children and provide a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing, and shelter to them. Justice Kumar underlined: “However, as it has been already discussed and found in previous paragraphs of the judgment, strict standard of proof is not required in a proceeding under Section 125 Cr.PC unlike in matrimonial proceedings, where strict proof of marriage or paternity is essential. Prima facie, satisfaction of the Court regarding marital status of the parties and the paternity of the child is sufficient to pass order under Section 125 Cr.PC”. 

Justice Kumar also observed that any finding regarding marital status of the party or paternity of the child in a proceeding under Section 125 CrPC is tentative and not final and it is always subject to Order of any Civil Court or Family Court, which are the competent Courts to conclusively decide the marital status of the party or legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child. He concluded: “Hence, there is mandatory legal presumption that O.P. No.3 is legitimate daughter of the petitioner, and there is no pleading or evidence on record to rebut this conclusive proof”, it added. Moreover, the Court took note of the fact that the Respondent has no source of income to maintain herself and daughter. “In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the quantum of maintenance awarded by Family Court is not excessive in view of the requirement of O.P. Nos. 2 and 3 as well as income of petitioner as per the evidence on record”. The High Court dismissed the Petition and upheld the Order granting maintenance. 

June 2025

In Prashat Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Bibek Chaudhuri, Patna High Court delivered a judgement dated June 23, 2025, wherein, he reiterated that an Application under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act is a not a Complaint within the meaning of Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code and therefore a Magistrate need not take cognizance of it. The Court was considering a Revision Petition filed by Husband and In-Laws challenging the cognizance taken by the Magistrate on the Wife's Application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, 2005. 

Justice Chaudhuri observed, "...an application under the D.V. Act, 2005 is not a complaint within the meaning of Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. or 223 of the BNSS. Therefore, there is no need to take cognizance upon an application under the D.V. Act, 2005. The learned Magistrate on receipt of the application shall only fix a date for hearing within three days from the date of filing of the application under Section 12(4) of the said Act...." 

The Petitioners were the husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law of the opposite party no.2 (wife and daughter-in-law) in a domestic violence case filed by the latter under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The Magistrate took cognizance upon the Application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, 2005. The Appeal filed against the Magistrate's action by the Petitioners was dismissed by way of the impugned order. Reasoning By Court The Court at the outset noted that the only question involved in the Revision Petition is that as to whether an Application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act is a complaint within the meaning of Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. and whether the order of cognizance is bad in law or not. 

Drawing on Supreme Court's decision in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi vs. Vidhi Rawal (2025 INSC 734), the Court reiterated that an application under the D.V. Act, 2005 is not a complaint within the meaning of Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. or 223 of the BNSS. Justice Chaudhari observed:".....this Court finds that the order of cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate as well as the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge dismissing the appeal against the order of cognizance is bad in law. Both the Courts below did not consider the provision under Sections 12 and 13 of the D.V. Act, 2005......" He directed the Magistrate to issue Notice upon the Present Petitioners for hearing of the application under Section 12 of the said Act. The Petition was accordingly allowed. 

July 2025

In para 47 of the judgement dated July 8, 2025 by High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy in The Principal Secretary to the Governor of Bihar, Governors Secretariat, Patna vs. Kumari Anjana & Ors. (2025) upheld the decision dated March, 2025 by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan, the Single Judge Bench in CWJC 2965 of 2024 Kumari Anjana vs. The State of Bihar (2025). The Division Bench concluded:".... We make it doubly clear that we have not commented on the rationale and the correctness of the judgment in the case of the writ petitioner, which has not been challenged by any one of the parties here” referring to the direction for re-instating the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits forthwith and setting aside of the order of termination of the petitioner.     

In Kumari Gita Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. CWJC No.10706 of 2025, Justice Purnendu Singh of the High Court passed an order dated July 8, 2025 wherein, he allowed the writ petition granting relief to the petitioner. Hon’ble Court took note of the certificates uploaded on Education Department’s website as part of her Application Form vide the application dated 25.11.2021 and the genuineness of her certificates which were verified in the verification order dated 04.03.2025 addressed to Vigilance Bureau, Bihar.  The judgement reads:”6. This Court finds that before such verification is done by the Investigation Bureau in light of communication made by the District Programme Officer, Establishment, Bhojpur,  the action of the Headmaster of the school, insofar as restraining the petitioner from attending the school without issuing any show cause and containing any gist of accusation, can be held to be without jurisdiction. The action of the headmaster and the clerk of the school insofar as restraining the petitioner is against the service conditions rules. The Headmaster of the school, who is not the disciplinary authority, has acted without authority of law, is directed to allow the petitioner to attend the school, and not stop her in performing her duty in anticipation and disciplinary action to be taken against her in future. 7. The action of the District Programme Officer, Establishment, Bhojpur insofar as directing the Headmaster to restrain the petitioner vide memo No.3105 dated 25.05.2025 to attend the school, is also without jurisdiction, in want of disciplinary proceeding/action taken against the petitioner.” Advocates Dr. Gopal Krishna and Dr. Shiv Shankar Yadav represented the petitioner. 

August 2025

September 2025

In Urmila Kumari vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna & Ors. (2025), Justice Nani Tagia of Patna High Court delivered the 5-page long judgement dated September 4, 2025 concluded: "Consequent upon setting aside of the order 12.07.2021 passed by Regional Deputy Director Education, Patna Division, Patna, the petitioner would be deemed to have retired from service and his pension be restored with immediate effect. The petitioner shall also be paid arrears of pension from the period when he has been denied such pension by reason of the impugned order in the writ petition, within a period of six months from today, i.e. 04.09.2025. 13. In the event the arrears of pension of the petitioner is not paid within the period prescribed hereinabove, the same shall carry an interest of 5%. 14. The writ petition is disposed off with the above directions." The petitioner's advocate included Senior Advocate Yogesh Chandra Verma, Dr. Gopal Krishna and Anuj Kumar. Justice Tagia drew on the decision of High Court's Division Bench in Geeta Kumari vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2024) delivered on October 29, 2024. 

In Deepankar Shree Gyan vs. The Honble Chancellor of Universities, Bihar through the Secretary, Governors Secretariat, Patna (2025), Justice Tagia delivered an order dated September 8, 2025, wherein, order issued by the Registrar of the Aryabhatta Knowledge University, Patna was set aside and quashed. Consequent thereto the petitioner was "reinstated in service with all consequential benefits". Senior Advocate Yogesh Chandra Verma and Advocates Dr. Gopal Krishna, Priyanka Singh, Adarsh Singh,Vikash Kumar Jha and Khalid Faizan represented the petitioner.  

October 2025

November 2025 

December 2025 

In Madhwi Jha and Ors vs. The Patna University & Ors (2025), Patna High Court delivered a judgement dated December 23, 2025, wherein, Justice Alok Kumar Sinha quashed the termination orders and directed Patna University to reinstate the petitioners to their respective posts. He concluded:"Upon an anxious consideration of the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners and the respondents, the pleadings on record, the documentary evidence placed before this Court, and the findings recorded on the issues framed hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that the action of the respondent–University in denying regularisation to the petitioners cannot be sustained in law”.  While deciding a batch of writ petitions filed by employees whose services were terminated only because they participated in a strike organised by their employees’ union, the Court ruled that merely participating in a strike cannot automatically lead to termination of service unless the strike is illegal or the employee is guilty of misconduct. The Court held that termination without enquiry, notice or due process violates principles of natural justice and constitutional rights.Justice Sinha criticised the action of the employer and held that such terminations were illegal, arbitrary and against settled principles of law. The Court observed: “Even otherwise, participation in a strike, by itself, cannot automatically justify termination of service, particularly in the absence of any finding of illegality of the strike or misconduct attributable to the petitioners. If the respondents intended to treat the alleged absence as misconduct or abandonment of service, the same could not have been presumed unilaterally. A proper domestic enquiry should have been held giving opportunity to the petitioners to defend themselves.”

The High Court noted that the employees were removed from service immediately after a settlement was reached between the University and the employees’ union. The termination orders relied solely on the strike period, which the Court found to be unfair and punitive in nature. Even though the employer tried to show the termination as a simple disengagement of daily wage workers, in substance it amounted to punishment, which is not legally permissible. 

The petitioners had approached the Court seeking quashing of an office order issued by Magadh Mahila College, Patna University, under the signature of the Head Clerk, acting on alleged telephonic instructions from the Vice-Chancellor. The order terminated their services for participating in a strike held during August 10, 2015-September 9, 2015. The petitioners' counsel submitted that the termination order was completely arbitrary, illegal and stigmatic, and violated Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. It was pointed out that a binding settlement had been entered into between the University and the employees’ union, which was duly approved by the Vice-Chancellor, and this settlement specifically provided that no employee would be victimised for participating in the strike. It was argued that despite this settlement, only the petitioners were selectively terminated, while other similarly placed daily wage and ad-hoc employees, including those junior to them, were allowed to continue in service. This, according to the petitioners, amounted to clear hostile discrimination. The High Court rejected the argument that the petitioners should have been asked to approach the Industrial Disputes Act forum. The Court held that writ jurisdiction was fully maintainable in this case since the challenge was to arbitrary administrative action violating constitutional rights. 

The Court observed: “… the availability of a remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, cannot be said to be an equally efficacious remedy in the facts of the present case, where the petitioner seeks judicial review of administrative action on constitutional and legal grounds. In such circumstances, relegating the petitioner to an alternative forum would amount to denial of effective and immediate relief.” The Court made it clear that whether an employee is permanent, daily wager or casual worker, removal from service for participating in a strike amounts to alleging misconduct. Such an allegation cannot be made without following due process. The Court categorically stated that a show cause notice, charge-sheet and proper domestic enquiry are mandatory in such situations. Justice Sinha observed: “No such procedure has been carried out in the present case which emerges as an admitted position. In such view of the matter, Annexure-18 dated 10.09.2015 being stigmatic order not preceded by issuance of show cause or charge-sheet or holding of enquiry becomes totally illegal. Such an allegation necessarily required a proper enquiry and adherence to the principles of natural justice. The impugned termination, having been effected without issuance of any charge sheet, without affording an opportunity of hearing, and without any enquiry, is thus procedurally infirm”. He held that since the termination was based on alleged absence during the strike period, and since the strike itself was covered by a settlement approved by the competent authority, the termination order could not stand in law. 

The Court found serious fault with the claim that the termination was done based on telephonic instructions, observing that such instructions have no legal value. The Court observed: “Further, the assertion that the disengagement was effected on the basis of alleged telephonic instructions, without any formal written order of the competent authority, only reinforces the illegality of the action. Termination of service, particularly one having civil consequences, must emanate from a competent authority through a lawful and reasoned order”. The Court observed that even if the termination is assumed to be non-stigmatic, it would still amount to retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act. Since the mandatory conditions under Section 25-F were not followed, the termination was illegal from the very beginning. The Court held: "It is trite that even daily wage employees are entitled to protection against arbitrary State action and they are certainly entitled to equal treatment and fairness in disengagement. The impugned action, viewed in light of the continued engagement of juniors and similarly situated persons, therefore cannot be sustained. Further, the respondents have not placed on record any reasons, much less recorded reasons, justifying departure from the statutory norm of last-come-first-go. In the absence of such recorded justification, the selective retrenchment of the petitioner, while retaining juniors, is in direct contravention of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is well settled that compliance with Section 25-G is not an empty formality but a substantive safeguard intended to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory retrenchment. Any retrenchment effected in violation of the said provision is rendered legally unsustainable”. The Court also held that retaining junior employees while terminating seniors violated the constitutional guarantee of equality. It ruled that such action was arbitrary, discriminatory and clearly violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 

The High Court rejected the University’s reliance on government policies regarding appointment embargo and outsourcing, noting that these policies were neither applied uniformly nor shown to have resulted in actual abolition of posts or outsourcing of work.The Court held that such executive instructions cannot be used retrospectively to defeat legitimate expectations of employees. The Court observed: “Once the petitioners were found eligible and recommended for absorption by a competent committee in 2003, the respondent University could not indefinitely postpone or deny implementation by subsequently invoking policy decisions, particularly when those very policies were not applied uniformly and were relaxed or bypassed in favour of other employees”. The Court also recognised that long years of service against sanctioned posts, through a proper selection process and without any fault on the part of the employees, creates a strong equitable right for regularisation.