Period for limitation would be counted from the date of grant of probate: Patna High Court

In Gupteshwar Prasad vs. Dina Nath Prasad (2025), Patna High Court's Justice Anshuman as part of the Division Bench along with Justice Bibek Chaudhary delivered a 29-page long judgment dated December 18, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable on application for issuance Probate/Letters of Administration and application for revocation of Probate/Letters of Administration. An application for issuance of probate/letters of administration under Article 137 of the Limitation Act does not create any absolute bar; rather it confers a continuous right, which may be exercised at any time after the death of the deceased as long as right to do so survives. But, Article 137 creates a situation wherein a delay beyond three years after death of the deceased give rise to suspicion, and greater the delay, greater would be the suspicion. But such delay must be explained in accordance with the provisions laid down in Sections 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Once execution and attestation are proved, suspicion of delay no longer operates. But, on the other hand, application for cancellation or revocation for grant of probate/letters of administration shall create absolute bar if the concerned party does not approach the court of law within the period of limitation, and the period of limitation shall be counted from the date of grant of probate due to the reason that the grant of probate by a competent Court operates as a judgment in rem and once the probate or Will is granted, such probate is good with respect to parties to the proceeding as well as for the whole world. The reference is hereby answered. 15. After answering the reference it shall be appropriate for this Court to direct the office to place all the first appeals before appropriate Bench for consideration on merit." 

Justice Dr. Anshuman relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Lynette Fernandes vs. Gertie Mathias, (2018) 1 SCC 271 ::2018 (1) BLJ 92 (SC), wherein it dealt with the precise issue of the period of limitation applicable for an application for cancellation of a probate or letters of administration. This court held as follows:
"One must keep in mind that the grant of probate by a Competent Court operates as a judgment in rem and once the probate to the Will is granted, then such probate is good not only in respect of the parties to the proceedings, but against the world. If the probate is granted, the same operates from the date of the grant of the probate for the purpose of limitation Under Article 137 of the Limitation Act in proceedings for revocation of probate. In this matter, as mentioned supra, the Appellant was a minor at the time of grant of probate. She attained majority on 09.09.1965. She got married on 27.10.1965. In our considered opinion, three years limitation as prescribed Under Article 137 runs from the date of the Appellant attaining the age of majority i.e. three years from 09.09.1965. The Appellant did not choose to initiate any proceedings till the year 25.01.1996 i.e., a good 31 years after she attained majority. No explanation worthy of acceptance has been offered by the Appellant to show as to why she did not approach the Court of law within the period of limitation. At the cost of repetition, we observe that the Appellant failed to produce any evidence to prove that the Will was a result of fraud or undue influence. The same Will has remained unchallenged until the date of filing of application for revocation. No acceptable explanation is offered for such a huge delay of 31 years in approaching the Court for cancellation or revocation of grant of probate.

In paragraph-17 of the said judgment it has been held that the petition for revocation of letters of
administration was time barred. Upon bare reading of the above mentioned discussion of all the decisions, particularly, three Judges Bench, it transpires to us that the following types of petitions are filed under the Succession Act, particularly, relating to issuance of probate/letters of administration:
I. Application for issuance of probate;
II. Application for issuance of letters of administration;
III. Application for revocation of probate;
IV. Application for revocation of letter of administration;

Dr. Anshuman observed:"14. So far as the right to apply for probate accrues on the date of death of testator, the application for grant of probate or letters of administration is not an application in law, but is an application for grant of probate or letters of administration for the Court’s permission to perform a legal duty created by a Will or for recognition as a testamentary trusty. It is a continuous right which can be exercised any time after the death of the deceased, as long as the right to do so survives and the object of the trust exists or any part of the trust, if created, remains to be executed. So far as the restriction casted in the judgment of Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra) and Krishna Kumar Sharma (supra), it is only to the extent that Article 137 of the Limitation Act shall not create any absolute bar on an application for grant of probate or letters of administration; rather it is a continuous right which can be exercised any time after death of the deceased as long as the right to do so survives. Delay beyond three years after death of the deceased would create suspicion, and greater the delay, greater would be the suspicion. Such delay must be explained but cannot be equated with an absolute bar of limitation and once execution and attestation are proved, suspicion of delay no longer operates. But Hon’ble three Judges Bench in Ramesh Nivrutti Bhagwat (supra) creates absolute bar in filing of an application for cancellation or revocation for grant of probate. If the concerned party does not approach the court of law within the period of limitation, then, according to law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, the petition for revocation of letters of administration would be time barred and period for limitation would be counted from the date of grant of probate, as the grant of probate by a competent Court operates as a judgment in rem. Once the probate to the Will is granted, then such probate is good not only in respect of the parties to the proceeding but also against the world at large and if probate is granted, the same operates from the date of grant of probate for the purpose of limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act in proceeding for revocation of probate as held in Lynette Fernandes (supra)." 

Notably, the First Appeal was filed in 2001 against the Judgment and decree dated June 22, 2001 passed by the District Judge, Gopalganj, in a Title Suit of 1987. First Appeal was filed against the judgment and decree dated June 22, 2001 passed by the District Judge, Gopalganj, in Probate Case of 1997 and First Appeal of 2003 was filed against the judgment and decree dated May 28, 2003 passed in the Title Suit of 1992, which arose out of Probate case of 1990 by the 1st Additional District Judge, Buxar, by which the suit was allowed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent by granting probate to the defendant-appellant. 

Consequent thereupon, the matter relating to date of reckoning, needs authoritative adjudication in consonance with the event of accrual of cause of action and found plausible in view of Section 211(2) as well as 213 of the Act and for that question was formulated in a 27-page long order dated February 27, 2020 by Justice Aditya Kumar Trivedi, the Single Bench. The formulated question reads:“What would be meaning of accrual of cause of action for the purpose of reckoning the period in the background of intricacies having been referred hereinabove in the context of principle laid down by the Apex Court as referred hereinabove relating to applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 relating to a petition for probate/letter of administration?”.

The question which was framed and the matter was placed before the Division Bench after taking permission of the Chief Justice, these appeals came before the Division Bench for answering those questions of reference, which was acknowledged in order by the Division  Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Dr. Anshuman dated November 17, 2025 that is to say applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 as well as relating to the starting point of applicability in a petition for probate/letters of administration under Indian Succession Act. This order was authored by Justice Chaudhary, who noted that Justice Trivedi, the Single Bench had referred the matter on the question of applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act relating to the starting point of applicability in a petition for probate/letters of administration under Indian Succession Act. 

The First Appeal was filed and registered in the High Court on August 30, 2001.