Limitation on Suits, Appeal Suits and Applications and Computation of Period of Limitation

In Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company vs. the State of Bombay (1957), the Supreme Court established a crucial legal principle that the statute of limitations acts as a bar to legal remedies rather than extinguishing underlying rights. This means that while the passage of time may prevent someone from seeking a remedy through legal action, it does not nullify or erase their fundamental legal entitlements or claims.

The limitation period starts from the date the "cause of action" arises, which is the date when the right to sue accrues. The Supreme Court in Trustee’s Port Bombay vs. The Premier Automobile (1971) held that the starting point of limitation is the accrual of the cause of action. 

In certain situations, the court may condone a delay in filing an appeal or application, if there are sufficient cause. Section 31 of the ‘Limitation Act’ provides for the retrospective and prospective effect of the act.  

The Supreme Court in Thirumalai Chemicals Ltd vs. Union of India (2011) observed that statutes of limitation are retrospective so far as they apply to all legal proceedings brought after their operations for enforcing causes of action accrued earlier.

The limitation on suits, appeal suits, and petitions is governed by the Limitation Act, 1963, which specifies different time frames depending on the type of claim, with common periods including 3 years for most contract-related claims, 12 years for suits related to immovable property possession, and a 90-day window for most appeals to the High Court from a lower court decision. Most laws either specifically mention that the provisions of the Limitation Act willy apply or they specify the limitation period. Foe example, Section 24 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 states that the "provisions of the Limitation Act shall, as far as may be, apply to an application made to a Tribunal." 

The law of limitation only bars the judicial remedy and does not extinguish the right. In other words, the statute of limitation prescribesonly the period within which legal proceedings must be initiated. In the case of Punjab National Bank and Ors vs. Surendra Prasad Sinha (1992), the Supreme Court held that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. Section 3 only bars the remedy but does not destroy the right which the remedy relates to. Section 3 of the Limitation Act bars remedies but preserves the enforceability of rights, emphasizing that while access to legal recourse may expire, the fundamental entitlements endure beyond the specified time frame.

The Limitation Act is divided into five parts. It has one Schedule. Originally, it had 32 Sections but later Sections 28 and 32 were repealed. 

Part I has 2 Sections which deal with title, extent, commencement and definitions (Sections 1-2). Section 2 (j) of the Limitation Act, 1963, defines ‘period of limitation’. It means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and ‘prescribed period’ means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

Part II has 9 Sections which deal with limitation on suits, appeals, and applications, bar of limitation, expiry of prescribed period when court is closed, extension of prescribed period in certain cases, legal disability, disability of one of several persons, special exceptions, continuous running of time, suits against trustees and their representatives and suits on contracts entered into outside the territories to which the Act extends (Sections 3-11). 

Part III has 13 Sections which deal with computation of period of limitation, exclusion of time in legal proceedings, exclusion of time in cases where leave to sue or appeal as a pauper is applied for, exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction, exclusion of time in certain other cases, effect of death on or before the accrual of the right to sue, effect of fraud or mistake, effect of acknowledgment in writing, effect of payment on account of debt or of interest on legacy, effect of acknowledgment or payment by another person, effect of substituting or adding new plaintiff or defendant, continuing breaches and torts, suits for compensation for acts not actionable without special damage and computation of time mentioned in instruments (Sections 12-24).

Part IV has 3 Sections which deal with acquisition of ownership by possession, acquisition of easements by prescription, exclusion in favour of reversioner of servient tenement and extinguishment of right to property (25-27).

Part V has 5 Sections but two of its Sections have been repealed. It deals with savings, provision for suits, etc., for which the prescribed period is shorter than the period prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and provisions as to barred or pending suits, etc. 

Section 29 of the Limitation Act reads: ''Savings.—(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872). (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. (3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law. (4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of “easement” in section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may for the time being extend.''

The Schedule provides description of suit, period of limitation and time from which period begins to run. It contains 137 Articles in the act which provide for periods of limitation. These 137 Articles in total are contained in three divisions:
First Division - Suits (Article 1-113), Second Division - Appeals (Articles 114-117) and Third Division - Applications (Articles 118-137). 

The law relating to Law of Limitation in India is the Limitation Act, 1859 and subsequently Limitation Act, 1963 which was enacted on October 5, 1963 came into force from January 1, 1964 for the purpose of consolidating and amending the legal principles relating to limitation of suits and other legal proceedings. 

Examples of limitation periods
Suit for recovery of money due on a contract: 3 years
Suit for possession of immovable property: 12 years
Suit for compensation for tort (personal injury): 1 year
Appeal to High Court from a District Court: 90 days

Positive exercise of discretion for condonation of delay should not be normally disturbed by superior court: Supreme Court

In Principal Secretary Road Construction Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. vs. Punam Kumari Sharma & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Justice Khatim Reza condoned the delay in filing the memo of appeal in positive exercise of discretion in his judgement dated January 20, 2025. Punam Kumari Sharma from Muzaffarpur filed a Special Leave of Appeal (Civil) on February 14, 2025 in the Supreme Court. It was registered on February 27. The case was last listed on March 7, 2025 before Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and and Prashant Kumar Mishra. It is likely to be listed on April 8, 2024.

In his order, Justice Reza has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy reported in 1998 (7) SCC 123, wherein it has been held as follows:-"It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in reversional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on whole untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court." The other three appellants in the case are: Engineer in Chief Road Construction Department, Superintending Engineer Road Construction Department, Muzaffarpur and Executive Engineer Road Construction Department, Muzaffarpur. The two other respondents are: State of Bihar through District Collector, Muzaffapur and the Circle Officer, Kanti, Muzaffarpur. The case was filed and registered in the High Court on November 27, 2018.  

The following cases were relied upon by the counsels during the course of hearing in the High Court:

In Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By L.Rs. & Ors. vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) decided on April 8, 2024 wherein in paragraph no. 26, the Supreme Court has held that “On a harmonious consideration of the provision of law and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:-

(i). Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

(ii). A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

(iii). The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;  

(iv). In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; 

(v). Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;  

(vi). Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

(vii). Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

(viii). Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”

In Ajay Dabra vs. Pyare Ram reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 92, Supreme Court has held as follows:-"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows: 'The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the 'sufficient cause' which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamount to showing utter disregard to the legislature.'  Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party."

In Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao vs. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, Supreme Court has held that “even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute.” 

In Municipal Council Ahmed Nagar & anr. vs. Shah Haidar Beg & Ors. reported in 2000 (2) SCC 48, the Supreme Court observed: "The real test for the sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time as such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the appellant so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the appellants have moved the writ court, the rights of third party have come into being which should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.” 

 Also read: Patna High Court's Division Bench sets aside judgement of High Court's Single Judge Bench on law of limitation on delay

Suit for negative declaration that defendant is not legally married to plaintiff is maintainable: Bombay High Court

In Haridas Mahadev Sasne vs. Tejasvini Krushna Bhosale (2025), Bombay High Court's Justice N.  J. Jamadar held that "a suit for a negative declaration that the defendant is not legally married to the plaintiff is maintainable Consequently, the civil Judge can not be said to have committed any error in rejecting the application for rejection of the plaint" and rejected the civil revision application in its order dated March 6, 2025. The case was filed on February, 6, 2024. 

It is a case wherein the plaintiff, the complainant sought a declaration that no marriage occurred between her and the defendant, who falsely claimed marital status. 

The Court observed: the submission that a suit for mere declaration without any consequential relief, is not maintainable also does not carry much conviction. In a case of the present nature, the declaration about the marital status itself assumes the character of a substantive relief. The plaintiff in such a case is not required to seek any further relief. The declaration of marital status bears upon the rights and obligations of the parties and also serves the purpose of vindication of legal character."

A pivotal question of law which arose for consideration, in the revision application, was “whether a suit for declaration simpliciter that there is no marital relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, is maintainable” ? 

The plaintiff and the defendant were residents of the same village. They were acquainted with each other. The defendant took undue advantage of the proximity, and falsely claimed that defendant’s marriage was solemnized with the plaintiff on September 21, 2018 at Janjagruti Matrimonial Alliance Center, Chiplun. Asserting that no valid marriage was ever solemnized between the plaintiff and the defendant and the latter was falsely claiming that the plaintiff is the wife of the defendant, the plaintiff instituted a suit for a declaration that no marriage was solemnized between the plaintiff and the defendant on September 21, 2018 or on any other day, at Janjagruit Matrimonail Alliace Center, Chiplun or at any other place. The defendant appeared and resisted the suit. The defendant also filed an application for rejection of the Plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code asserting that the plaintiff was seeking a negative declaration that no marriage was solemnized between the plaintiff and the defendant. Such a negative declaration cannot be granted under the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act 1963. Thus, there was a bar to the Suit seeking negative declaration. Resultantly, the Plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.

The plaintiff resisted the application for rejection of the Plaint contending that if the averments in the plaint are read as a whole, it cannot be said that the plaintiff is seeking a negative declaration. Moreover, the Suit cannot be said to have been instituted under the provisions of Section 34 of the Act of 1963 only. The plaintiff was entitled to seek declaratory relief under Section 9 and Order VII Rule 7 of the Code de hors the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Act of 1963. At any rate, the plaintiff was seeking a declaration as to her status, and, therefore, the purported bar under Section 34 of the Act of 1963 was inapplicable. 

The civil judge was persuaded to reject the application observing that a suit of the present nature for negative declaration was maintainable. The relief sought by the plaintiff was of a substantive nature. Thus, there was no substance in the application. Being aggrieved, the defendant has invoked the revisional jurisdiction.

The counsel for the respondent took the Court through the Plaint, averments in the application for rejection of the Plaint and the reply. He urged

that a person is not entitled to seek a negative declaration under Section 34 of the Act of 1963. It was submitted that the text of Section 34 of the Act of 1963 warrants that the person seeking a declaration must claim to be entitled to any legal character, status or right. A declaration that the plaintiff is not married to the defendant does not

fall within the ambit of the main part of Section 

In the case at hand, the plaintiff is seeking a mere declaration without any consequential relief. Therefore, the proviso to Section 34 of the Act, 1963 precludes the Court from granting a mere declaration. In these circumstances, according to counsel for the respondent a declaratory suit of the present nature is clearly barred. He urged that though there is a conflict of views of the different High Courts on the aspect of maintainability of such a suit, a Division Bench Judgment of Karnataka High Court in the case of Bhuvaneshwari vs . Revappa Alias Rani Siddaramappa Kolli (Since Deceased) by L.Rs 2009 SCC OnLine Kar 738 has categorically ruled that a relief seeking negative declaration as to marriage is beyond the scope of the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Act of 1963. The decision to the contrary by Calcutta High Court in the case of Joyita Saha vs. Rajesh Kumar Pande, AIR 2000 Calcutta 109 does not adequately deal with this aspect. Therefore, the decision in the case of Bhuvaneshwari case commands more persuasive value.

The counsel for the respondent, submitted that the declaration sought in the instant case cannot be said to be negative in character. Section 34 of the Act of 1963 is not the sole source of a declaratory relief. Section 9 of the Code is expansive enough to include a Suit for declaration that the defendant, who falsely claims to be married to the plaintiff, is not the husband of the plaintiff. Therefore, the very premise of the application for the rejection of the Plaint on the count that Section 34 of the Act of 1963 bars a Suit of the present nature, is flawed. He also submitted that the judgment of the Karnataka High Court can not be construed to lay down the ratio that a Suit for a declaration that the plaintiff is not married to the defendant cannot be instituted. The controversy in the case before the Karnataka High Court was regarding the maintainability of a Suit seeking a declaration that the defendant was not the wife of the plaintiff, before the Family Court. Adverting to the provisions contained in Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 the Karnataka High Court ruled that a relief in the nature of a negative declaration in respect of a marriage does not fall within the ambit of the provisions contained in the Explanation to Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. 

He further submitted that the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court has made a passing observation that the relief of the instant nature is beyond the scope of section 34 of the Act, 1963. The Court has not considered the issue elaborately. The provisions and precedents which govern the field have not been considered. Thus, the said decision can be said to be a precedent sub silentio. To this end, reliance was placed on a Supreme Court judgment in the case of A-One Granites vs. State of U.P. and Ors. (2001) 3 SCC 537.

According to him, as a matter of principle, it cannot be said that a suit for negative declaration is not at all maintainable. The Court essentially deals with the legal character, right or status. The form of declaration is not material. He placed reliance on a judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Narhar Raj (died) by L.Rs and Ors. vs. Tirupathybibi and Anr. 2002 SCC OnLine AP 1032. wherein the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that a suit for a relief of negative declaration is maintainable.

The Court took note of the nature and contours of a declaratory decree. A declaratory decree, in effect, cements and strengthens the legal character, right or status a person asserts, and denied by another. A declaration as to legal character or status protects from adverse attacks on title to such right, character or status and obviates further litigation by putting a judicial imprimatur over such right, character or status. Ordinarily a declaratory relief is accompanied by the consequential relief. However, it is not inconceivable that, in a given case, declaration itself assumes the character of a substantive relief. Undoubtedly, in a vast majority of cases, declaratory relief is sought under section 34 of the Act, 1963. However, that is not the sole repository of the power to grant a declaration. A civil Court in exercise of its ordinary civil jurisdiction, referable to section 9 of the Code, may grant a declaration dehors the provisions contained in section 34 of the Act, 1963.

In order to appreciate the submissions of the  counsel for the applicant, the provisions of section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 was cited. It reads: "Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.—Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its

discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief. Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.

A bare perusal of the provision indicates that any person entitled to any legal character or any right in relation to any property, may sue for declaration. The words “character” and “property” are of expansive nature. To illustrate,

“character” may include the status and relation qua another person. The character may encompass within its scope an office, privilege and position with regard to a given entity. All attributes which the law vests in a person on account of an office, position, status or relation may fall within the ambit of the term “legal character”.

Secondly, the declaration can be sought against any person denying the first person’s title to such character or right, and also against any person interested to deny first person’s title to such legal

character or right.

Thirdly, the proviso to section 34, precludes the Court from granting a declaration simpliciter where the plaintiff though able to seek further consequential relief, than a mere declaration omits to do so. The proviso thus warrants a further inquiry whether in the facts of the case, the plaintiff is able to seek further consequential relief and yet omitted to do so. Obliviously the necessity and adequacy of consequential relief, in addition to declaration, would hinge upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

The declaration under section 34 of the Act, 1963 is, however, not exhaustive of the power of the civil Court to grant declaratory reliefs. A profitable reference, in this context, can be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddy and Ors. vs. Konduru Seshu Reddy and Ors. AIR 1967 Supreme Court 436 wherein the Supreme Court traced the development of the law with regard to declaratory action and enunciated that section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (Old), was not exhaustive of cases in which a declaratory decree may be made and the civil Courts have the power to grant such declaration independent

thereof. The observation in the paragraph 11 reads: "In our opinion, s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act is not exhaustive of the cases in which a declaratory decree may be made and the courts have power to grant such a decree independently of the requirements of the section. It follows, therefore, in the present case that the suit of the

plaintiff for a declaration that the compromise decree is not binding on the deity is maintainable as falling outside the purview of S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act."

The Supreme Court further expounded the law in the case of M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. vs. His Highness Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singhji Deo of Maihar and Ors. AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1810.  The Court enunciated that section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 merely gives statutory recognition to well recognized type of declaratory relief and subjects it to a limitation, but it cannot be deemed to exhaust every kind of declaratory relief or to circumscribe the jurisdiction of Courts to give declarations of right in appropriate cases falling outside Section 42.

The edifice of the submission of counsel for the applicant is that section 34 of the Act, 1963, bars the declaration, as sought in the instant case, and, therefore, the plaint deserves to be rejected stands dismantled. A civil Court is competent to grant a declaration regarding the marital status dehors the provisions contained in section 34 of the Act, 1963.

The Court examined as to whether a negative declaration as to marital status can be granted. First and foremost, from the phraseology of section 34 of the Act, 1963, an inexorable inference can not be drawn that such a negative declaration, cannot be made. The term legal character is of wide amplitude. The ‘marital status’ as a personal attribute and qua a particular person, squarely falls within the ambit of legal character. If a person can seek a declaration that he is legally weeded to the defendant, a fortiori , there does not seem any impediment in seeking a declaration that he is not married to the defendant. The negative form

of declaration is nothing but assertion of a particular positive marital status. If the defendant denies or is interested in denying such marital status asserted by the plaintiff, a declaration can be legitimately sought under the provisions of section 34 of the Act, 1963 itself.

The Court observed: "there seems to be a cleavage in the judicial opinion of the High Courts on the tenability of such a suit for negative declaration as to marital status." In the case of Bhuvaneshwari which constituted the sheet anchor of submission of counsel of the applicant, a Division Bench of Karnataka High Court while deciding the question as to whether a suit seeking declaration that the defendant is not the wife of the plaintiff is maintainable before the Family Court, after considering the provisions contained in section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 which confers the jurisdiction upon a Family Court, held that the relief in the nature of negative declaration in respect of a marriage, is not tenable before the Family Court. After recording this view, the Division Bench ventured to add that the relief of such nature was even beyond the scope of section 34 of the Act, 1963. The observations in paragraph 22 of the judgment are relevant and hence extracted. It reads:-"In fact, we find a relief of this nature is even beyond the scope of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act as a negative declaratory relief to declare that the marriage had never taken place, is not one that can come within scope of Section 34 of the Specific' Relief Act. Accordingly, when it is a relief that cannot be granted in law, there is no way the civil court can grant a declaratory relief."

A Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, in the case of Joyita Saha case ruled that since the marriage itself was denied and the prayer was made in the suit for a declaration that there was no marriage between the parties, the suit as framed was quite maintainable in law. The controversy, however, seems to have been settled by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Balram Yadav vs. Fulmaniya Yadav (2016) 13 SCC 308. In this case, the High Court of Chattisgarh had allowed an appeal against a decree passed by the Family Court to the effect that the respondent was not the legally married wife, on the ground that a negative declaration was outside the jurisdiction of the Family Court. Referring to the provisions contained in sections 7 and 8 of the Family Court Act, 1984 the Supreme Court held that in case there is a dispute on the matrimonial status of any person, a declaration in that regard has to be sought only before the Family Court. It makes no difference as to whether it is an affirmative or negative relief. What is important is a declaration regarding marital status. 

The observations in paragraph 7 are material and hence it is extracted. It reads: "Under Section 7(1) Explanation (b), a Suit or a proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of both marriage and matrimonial status of a person is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court, since under Section 8, all those jurisdictions covered under Section 7 are excluded from the purview of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. In case, there is a dispute on the matrimonial status of any person, a declaration in that regard has to be sought only before the Family Court. It makes no difference as to whether it is an affirmative relief or a negative relief. What is important is the declaration regarding the matrimonial status. Section 20 also endorses the view which we have taken, since the Family Courts Act, 1984, has an overriding effect on other laws."

The counsel of the applicant attempted to distinguish this judgment by canvassing a submission that the ratio in this decision is restricted to the Family Court, and that a civil Court would not be empowered to grant negative declaration as to marital status. 

Bombay High Court observed: "The submission simply does not merit countenance." The High Court underlined that "the civil Court has power to grant declaratory relief even independently of section 34 of the Act, 1963. The principle that the form of declaration does not matter and it is the status or legal character with regard to which the Court makes the declaration that is of substance, applies with even greater force to the proceedings before the civil Court which has inherent jurisdiction to decide all suits of civil nature unless their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred."