As part of Division Bench Justice S. B. Pd. Singh authored all judgments dated September 2

Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice P. B. Bajanthri and Justice S. B. Pd. Singh delivered seven judgements on September 2, 2025.All the judgements dated September 2 by this bench were authored by Justice Singh. 

In Bibek Kumar Jaiswal @ Vivek Kumar Jaiswal vs. Shabnam Jaiswal @ Sabnam Jaiswal (2025), a case from Supaul, Justice Singh held that Family Court rightly dismissed the matrimonial case of the appellant seeking divorce. 

In Nilu Kumari vs. Sanjay Kumar (2025), a case from Hajipur, Justice Singh set  aside the judgement and decree by Principal Judge, Family Court, Vaishali. 

In Shashi Bhushan Poddar vs. Gyan Bharti @ Rekha Poddar & Anr. (2025), a case from Bhagalpur, Justice Singh upheld Family Court's judgement and decree which dismissed the matrimonial case of the appellant seeking divorce. 

In Arun Kumar vs. Sushmita Kumari (2025), a case from Begusarai, Justice Singh set aside judgment and decree by Principal Judge, Family Court, Begusarai, which had dismissed the divorce case. 

In Md. Naushad Hussain vs. Shahida Khaton & Anr. (2025), a case from Darbhanga, Justice Singh concluded:"Considering the fact that Talaq has already been performed between the parties and in the entire evidence, the appellant-husband has not denied the aforesaid assertion of the respondent and the respondent herself does not want to continue matrimonial relationship with the appellant-husband, we are not inclined to interference with the impugned judgment. The Family Court has rightly dismissed the Matrimonial Case No. 209 of 2012 filed on behalf of the appellant husband."   

In Pramod Pasi vs. The State of Bihar through Secretary Excise and Prohibition Department Govt. of Bihar & Ors. (2025), a case from Gopalganj, the Court recorded that the recovery of illicit liquor was only 7.8 litres which is a meager quantity. Justice Singh concluded:"Considering the small quantity of liquor, the concerned authority is hereby directed to collect fine of Rs. 10,000/-(Ten Thousands) from the petitioner and release the motorcycle in his favour within a period of one week from the date of receipt of this order, for which petitioner has no objection." He observed: "We are conscious of the fact that alleged recovery is meager quantity and the aforesaid order has been passed while invoking extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the reasons that unnecessarily petitioner shall not be subjected to various proceedings like Rule of 12A of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Rules, 2021 read with amended sub Rule 2 of Rule 12A in the year 2022 and 2023, Sections 58, 92 and 93 of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016, for an issue of 7.8 litres of illicit liquor and such order is required to prevent the multiplicity of proceeding in the interest of justice."

In Yogendra Yadav vs, The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Bihar Prohibition and Excise Department, Bihar & Ors. (2025), a case from Gaya, Justice Singh took note of the fact that the recovery of illicit liquor was only 1 litre which is a meager quantity. He observed: "Considering the small quantity of liquor, the concerned authority is hereby directed to collect fine of Rs. 5,000/-(Five Thousands) from the petitioner and release the motorcycle in his favour within a period of one week from the date of receipt of this order, for which petitioner has no objection." He added: We are conscious of the fact that alleged recovery is meager quantity and the aforesaid order has been passed while invoking extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the reasons that unnecessarily petitioner shall not be subjected to various proceedings like Rule of 12A of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Rules, 2021 read with amended sub Rule 2 of Rule 12A in the year 2022 and 2023, Sections 58, 92 and 93 of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016, for an issue of 1 litre of illicit liquor and such order is required to prevent the multiplicity of proceeding in the interest of justice."

Notably, a 17-page long judgement dated September 1, 2025 by the same Division Bench had set aside the judgment and decree dated February 25, 2019 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Gopalganj. This judgement too was authored by Justice Singh.  

 

As part of Division Bench Justice S. B. Pd. Singh sets aside judgment, decree by Principal Judge, Family Court, Gopalganj

"The essential ingredients in an offence of adultery are that: (i) There should be an act of sexual intercourse outside the marriage, and (ii) that such intercourse should be voluntary."

In Kiran Devi vs. Akhilesh Mishra & Anr. (2025), a miscellaneous appeal, Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice P. B. Bajanthri and Justice S. B. Pd. Singh passed a 17-page long judgement dated September 1, 2025 setting aside the judgment and decree dated February 25, 2019 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Gopalganj in M.M. Case No. 176 of 2011 M.M. Case No. 176 of 2011 stands and dismissed the case. The judgement was authored by Justice Singh. 

The appeal was filed under Section 19(1) of the Family Court Act, 1984 impugning the judgment and decree dated February 25, 2019 passed by Principal Judge, Family Court, Gopalganj, whereby the matrimonial suit, preferred by Akhilesh Mishra, the respondent No. 1, for a decree of divorce, on dissolution of marriage, was allowed subject to payment of Rs. 2,50,000/- as permanent alimony for life support of the appellant. The case of the respondent No. 1 as per petition filed before the Family Court was that the marriage of the appellant was solemnized with respondent No.1 in the month of May, 2005 as per the Hindu Rites and Custom. After the marriage, the appellant came to her matrimonial house and stayed there for few months and thereafter, she went to her parents’ house and stayed there for a year. The respondent-husband and his father made several attempts to take the appellant to her matrimonial house, but all the efforts went in vein. At last in June, 2006 the respondent No. 1 went to his Sasural along with some relatives on promise of his father-in-law and brother-in-law to sent the appellant with him but she did not come with the respondent No. 1. Subsequently, the respondent-husband came to know that appellant has illicit relationship with Ashok Sharma, the respondent No. 2 who often used to visit the house of the appellant. The respondent-husband also came to know that appellant was pregnant and a female child was born who died just after the birth. The respondent-husband made several attempts to reconcile the matter with the appellant but all his efforts went in vein. The appellant, thereafter filed complaint case in 2009 against the respondent-husband and other family members which was registered as Bhore P.S. case of 2010 under Sections 498(A), 406, 34 of the Indian Penal Code. In the this case, the respondent-husband and his father were rotting in jail for 6-7 months and ultimately after some time, on the intervention of relatives, a compromise was filed in the said case and appellant came to her Sasural but after sometime, the appellant went away from her Sasural with respondent No. 2. The respondent-husband also alleged that appellant and respondent-husband never cohabited since their marriage and appellant had completely deserted the matrimonial life of the respondent-husband. The respondent-husband, therefore, prayed that the marriage between the appellant and respondent No. 1 be declared dissolved and a decree of divorce be passed in his favour. 

In response to the summon/notice issued by the Court, appellant/O.P No. 1 appeared and filed her reply/written statement. In her written statement/reply, the respondent No. 1 had stated all the allegations levelled by the appellant against her is false, concocted and without any basis. She also stated that after the marriage in the year 2005, she went to the house of respondent-husband and started living in her matrimonial house but after sometimes, her in-laws family members started demanding dowry and torture
was inflicted for non-fulfillment of dowry demand. The appellant, in the meanwhile, conceived and a female child was born who died after birth. Thereafter, the respondent- husband and other family members started pressurizing the appellant for motorcycle and colour T.V. and ultimately, on April 20, 2009 they badly assaulted and ousted her from the matrimonial house. The father of the appellant and other relatives made several attempts and requested the respondent-husband and other in-laws to keep her at her matrimonial house but they denied to keep her at her matrimonial house. The appellant, thereafter filed Complaint Case No. 2761 of 2009 against the respondent-husband and other family members which was registered as Bhore P.S. Case No. 2 of 2010 under Sections 498(A), 406, 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The respondent-husband, thereafter filed a divorce case in 2009. In this case, a compromise took place and the respondent-husband was directed to keep the appellant with full dignity and honour. The appellant went to her matrimonial house and started living there but in the meantime, the respondent-husband got a job in Dubai and again appellant was tortured for demand of dowry. The respondent-husband again filed a divorce case in 2011 on the same very facts.

The issues which were framed by the Trial Court are:-
1. Whether the case as framed is maintainable?
2. Whether the appellant has cause of action to file this case?
4. Whether the applicant is entitled to get decree for dissolution of marriage against the O.P ?
5. Whether the petitioner is entitled to any other relief or reliefs?

The High Court considered the following points for determination in this appeal:-
(i) Whether the appellant is entitled to the relief sought for in his petition/appeal.
(ii) Whether the impugned judgment of Principal Judge, Family Court, Patna is just, proper and sustainable/tenable in the eyes of law.

Justice Singh observed:"we find that respondent-husband has deposed in his evidence that appellant-wife always used to make quarrel with him and his family members but no any specific instance of date has been mentioned in the plaint as well as in his evidence. He has also admitted in his evidence that prior to filing of this divorce case, there were no relationship between the appellant and respondent No. 1. The respondent-husband has also not brought on record any proof regarding illicit relationship of appellant with respondent No. 2. The respondent-husband has also not brought on record any cogent and reliable evidence which could show that appellant and respondent No. 2 are living in adultery. The respondent-husband has also not filed petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights which would reflect that he was interested to resume conjugal life with the appellant. The respondent-husband has also not explained as to why he has filed second divorce petition with same allegation as records show that before filing of the present divorce petition, the respondent-husband has also filed M.M Case No. 62 of 2009 which was compromised. So far as allegation of adultery is concerned, the record clearly suggests that only in order to make a legal ground in the divorce case, these baseless allegations have been levelled by the respondent-husband."

The High Court in relied on Supreme Court's decision in Samar Ghose vs. Jaya Ghose reported in 2007 (4) SCC 511 that a sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty. More trivial irritations, quarrel, normal wear and tear of the married live which happens in day-to-day live would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.

It referred to the Supreme Court's decision in case of Narain Ganesh Dastane vs. Sucheta Naraih Dastane reported in, AIR 1975, SC, 1534. The relevant paragraph reads: 
"One other matter which needs to be clarified is that though under Section 10(1) (b), the apprehension of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious to live with the other party has to be reasonable, it is wrong, except in the context of such apprehension, to import the concept of a reasonable man as known to the law of negligence of judging of matrimonial relations. Spouses are undoubtedly supposed and expected to conduct their joint venture as best as they might but it is no function of a court inquring into a charge of cruelty to philosophise on the modalities of married life. Some one may want to keep late hours of finish the day's work and some one may want to get up early for a morning round of golf. The court cannot apply to the habits or hobbies of these the test whether a reasonable man situated similarly will behave in a similar fashion. 'The question whether the misconduct complained of constitutes cruelty and the like for divorce purposes is determined primarily by its effect upon the particular person complaining of the acts. The question is not whether the conduct would be cruel to a reasonable person or a person of average or normal sensibilities, but whether it would have that effect upon the aggrieved spouse. That which may be cruel to one person may be laughed off by another, and what may not be cruel to an Individual under one set of circumstances may be extreme cruelty under another set of circumstances". The Court has to deal, not with an ideal husband and ideal wife (assuming any such exist) but with the particular man and woman before it. The ideal couple or a near-ideal one will probably have no occasion to go to a matrimonial court for, even if they may not be able to draw their differences, their ideal attitudes may help them overlook or gloss over mutual faults and failures."

Justice Singh observed:"....it is crystal clear that respondent-husband has failed to prove the cruel behaviour of the appellant towards him and his family members by the strength of cogent, relevant and reliable evidence, while burden of proof of cruelty rests upon the respondent-husband. Not even single incident with reference to specific date of alleged cruelty has been urged in the plaint before the Family Court. Moreover, wife (appellant) is still ready to live with the respondent-husband. Furthermore, alleged certain flimsy act or omission or using some threatening and harsh words may occasionally happen in the day-to-day conjugal life of a husband and wife to retaliate the other spouse but that cannot be a justified/sustainable ground for taking divorce. Some trifling utterance or remarks or mere threatening of one spouse to other cannot be construed as such decree of cruelty, which is legally required to a decree of divorce. The austerity of temper and behaviour, petulance of manner and harshness of language may vary from man to man born and brought up in different family background, living in different standard of life, having their quality of educational qualification and their status in society in which they live. 23. Thus, considering the above entire aspects of this case and evidence adduced on behalf of both the parties, we find that respondent-husband has failed to prove the allegation of cruelty, much less, the decree of cruel behaviour of appellant which is legally required for grant of decree of divorce under section 13(1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act." 

The High Court's judgement reads: "24. So far as ground of adultery is concerned, adultery may be defined as the act of a married person having sexual intercourse with a person of opposite gender other than the wife or husband of the person. Under the present Hindu Marriage Act, adultery is laid down as one of the grounds for divorce or judicial separation.....26. The respondent-husband has not brought on record any proof to show that appellant was having illicit relationship with the respondent No. 2 nor he has proved that they were living in adultery and only in order to make a valid ground in the divorce petition, these allegations were levelled against the appellant without any supporting material evidence.

Suit for negative declaration that defendant is not legally married to plaintiff is maintainable: Bombay High Court

In Haridas Mahadev Sasne vs. Tejasvini Krushna Bhosale (2025), Bombay High Court's Justice N.  J. Jamadar held that "a suit for a negative declaration that the defendant is not legally married to the plaintiff is maintainable Consequently, the civil Judge can not be said to have committed any error in rejecting the application for rejection of the plaint" and rejected the civil revision application in its order dated March 6, 2025. The case was filed on February, 6, 2024. 

It is a case wherein the plaintiff, the complainant sought a declaration that no marriage occurred between her and the defendant, who falsely claimed marital status. 

The Court observed: the submission that a suit for mere declaration without any consequential relief, is not maintainable also does not carry much conviction. In a case of the present nature, the declaration about the marital status itself assumes the character of a substantive relief. The plaintiff in such a case is not required to seek any further relief. The declaration of marital status bears upon the rights and obligations of the parties and also serves the purpose of vindication of legal character."

A pivotal question of law which arose for consideration, in the revision application, was “whether a suit for declaration simpliciter that there is no marital relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, is maintainable” ? 

The plaintiff and the defendant were residents of the same village. They were acquainted with each other. The defendant took undue advantage of the proximity, and falsely claimed that defendant’s marriage was solemnized with the plaintiff on September 21, 2018 at Janjagruti Matrimonial Alliance Center, Chiplun. Asserting that no valid marriage was ever solemnized between the plaintiff and the defendant and the latter was falsely claiming that the plaintiff is the wife of the defendant, the plaintiff instituted a suit for a declaration that no marriage was solemnized between the plaintiff and the defendant on September 21, 2018 or on any other day, at Janjagruit Matrimonail Alliace Center, Chiplun or at any other place. The defendant appeared and resisted the suit. The defendant also filed an application for rejection of the Plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code asserting that the plaintiff was seeking a negative declaration that no marriage was solemnized between the plaintiff and the defendant. Such a negative declaration cannot be granted under the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act 1963. Thus, there was a bar to the Suit seeking negative declaration. Resultantly, the Plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.

The plaintiff resisted the application for rejection of the Plaint contending that if the averments in the plaint are read as a whole, it cannot be said that the plaintiff is seeking a negative declaration. Moreover, the Suit cannot be said to have been instituted under the provisions of Section 34 of the Act of 1963 only. The plaintiff was entitled to seek declaratory relief under Section 9 and Order VII Rule 7 of the Code de hors the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Act of 1963. At any rate, the plaintiff was seeking a declaration as to her status, and, therefore, the purported bar under Section 34 of the Act of 1963 was inapplicable. 

The civil judge was persuaded to reject the application observing that a suit of the present nature for negative declaration was maintainable. The relief sought by the plaintiff was of a substantive nature. Thus, there was no substance in the application. Being aggrieved, the defendant has invoked the revisional jurisdiction.

The counsel for the respondent took the Court through the Plaint, averments in the application for rejection of the Plaint and the reply. He urged

that a person is not entitled to seek a negative declaration under Section 34 of the Act of 1963. It was submitted that the text of Section 34 of the Act of 1963 warrants that the person seeking a declaration must claim to be entitled to any legal character, status or right. A declaration that the plaintiff is not married to the defendant does not

fall within the ambit of the main part of Section 

In the case at hand, the plaintiff is seeking a mere declaration without any consequential relief. Therefore, the proviso to Section 34 of the Act, 1963 precludes the Court from granting a mere declaration. In these circumstances, according to counsel for the respondent a declaratory suit of the present nature is clearly barred. He urged that though there is a conflict of views of the different High Courts on the aspect of maintainability of such a suit, a Division Bench Judgment of Karnataka High Court in the case of Bhuvaneshwari vs . Revappa Alias Rani Siddaramappa Kolli (Since Deceased) by L.Rs 2009 SCC OnLine Kar 738 has categorically ruled that a relief seeking negative declaration as to marriage is beyond the scope of the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Act of 1963. The decision to the contrary by Calcutta High Court in the case of Joyita Saha vs. Rajesh Kumar Pande, AIR 2000 Calcutta 109 does not adequately deal with this aspect. Therefore, the decision in the case of Bhuvaneshwari case commands more persuasive value.

The counsel for the respondent, submitted that the declaration sought in the instant case cannot be said to be negative in character. Section 34 of the Act of 1963 is not the sole source of a declaratory relief. Section 9 of the Code is expansive enough to include a Suit for declaration that the defendant, who falsely claims to be married to the plaintiff, is not the husband of the plaintiff. Therefore, the very premise of the application for the rejection of the Plaint on the count that Section 34 of the Act of 1963 bars a Suit of the present nature, is flawed. He also submitted that the judgment of the Karnataka High Court can not be construed to lay down the ratio that a Suit for a declaration that the plaintiff is not married to the defendant cannot be instituted. The controversy in the case before the Karnataka High Court was regarding the maintainability of a Suit seeking a declaration that the defendant was not the wife of the plaintiff, before the Family Court. Adverting to the provisions contained in Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 the Karnataka High Court ruled that a relief in the nature of a negative declaration in respect of a marriage does not fall within the ambit of the provisions contained in the Explanation to Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. 

He further submitted that the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court has made a passing observation that the relief of the instant nature is beyond the scope of section 34 of the Act, 1963. The Court has not considered the issue elaborately. The provisions and precedents which govern the field have not been considered. Thus, the said decision can be said to be a precedent sub silentio. To this end, reliance was placed on a Supreme Court judgment in the case of A-One Granites vs. State of U.P. and Ors. (2001) 3 SCC 537.

According to him, as a matter of principle, it cannot be said that a suit for negative declaration is not at all maintainable. The Court essentially deals with the legal character, right or status. The form of declaration is not material. He placed reliance on a judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Narhar Raj (died) by L.Rs and Ors. vs. Tirupathybibi and Anr. 2002 SCC OnLine AP 1032. wherein the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that a suit for a relief of negative declaration is maintainable.

The Court took note of the nature and contours of a declaratory decree. A declaratory decree, in effect, cements and strengthens the legal character, right or status a person asserts, and denied by another. A declaration as to legal character or status protects from adverse attacks on title to such right, character or status and obviates further litigation by putting a judicial imprimatur over such right, character or status. Ordinarily a declaratory relief is accompanied by the consequential relief. However, it is not inconceivable that, in a given case, declaration itself assumes the character of a substantive relief. Undoubtedly, in a vast majority of cases, declaratory relief is sought under section 34 of the Act, 1963. However, that is not the sole repository of the power to grant a declaration. A civil Court in exercise of its ordinary civil jurisdiction, referable to section 9 of the Code, may grant a declaration dehors the provisions contained in section 34 of the Act, 1963.

In order to appreciate the submissions of the  counsel for the applicant, the provisions of section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 was cited. It reads: "Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.—Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its

discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief. Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.

A bare perusal of the provision indicates that any person entitled to any legal character or any right in relation to any property, may sue for declaration. The words “character” and “property” are of expansive nature. To illustrate,

“character” may include the status and relation qua another person. The character may encompass within its scope an office, privilege and position with regard to a given entity. All attributes which the law vests in a person on account of an office, position, status or relation may fall within the ambit of the term “legal character”.

Secondly, the declaration can be sought against any person denying the first person’s title to such character or right, and also against any person interested to deny first person’s title to such legal

character or right.

Thirdly, the proviso to section 34, precludes the Court from granting a declaration simpliciter where the plaintiff though able to seek further consequential relief, than a mere declaration omits to do so. The proviso thus warrants a further inquiry whether in the facts of the case, the plaintiff is able to seek further consequential relief and yet omitted to do so. Obliviously the necessity and adequacy of consequential relief, in addition to declaration, would hinge upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

The declaration under section 34 of the Act, 1963 is, however, not exhaustive of the power of the civil Court to grant declaratory reliefs. A profitable reference, in this context, can be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddy and Ors. vs. Konduru Seshu Reddy and Ors. AIR 1967 Supreme Court 436 wherein the Supreme Court traced the development of the law with regard to declaratory action and enunciated that section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (Old), was not exhaustive of cases in which a declaratory decree may be made and the civil Courts have the power to grant such declaration independent

thereof. The observation in the paragraph 11 reads: "In our opinion, s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act is not exhaustive of the cases in which a declaratory decree may be made and the courts have power to grant such a decree independently of the requirements of the section. It follows, therefore, in the present case that the suit of the

plaintiff for a declaration that the compromise decree is not binding on the deity is maintainable as falling outside the purview of S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act."

The Supreme Court further expounded the law in the case of M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. vs. His Highness Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singhji Deo of Maihar and Ors. AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1810.  The Court enunciated that section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 merely gives statutory recognition to well recognized type of declaratory relief and subjects it to a limitation, but it cannot be deemed to exhaust every kind of declaratory relief or to circumscribe the jurisdiction of Courts to give declarations of right in appropriate cases falling outside Section 42.

The edifice of the submission of counsel for the applicant is that section 34 of the Act, 1963, bars the declaration, as sought in the instant case, and, therefore, the plaint deserves to be rejected stands dismantled. A civil Court is competent to grant a declaration regarding the marital status dehors the provisions contained in section 34 of the Act, 1963.

The Court examined as to whether a negative declaration as to marital status can be granted. First and foremost, from the phraseology of section 34 of the Act, 1963, an inexorable inference can not be drawn that such a negative declaration, cannot be made. The term legal character is of wide amplitude. The ‘marital status’ as a personal attribute and qua a particular person, squarely falls within the ambit of legal character. If a person can seek a declaration that he is legally weeded to the defendant, a fortiori , there does not seem any impediment in seeking a declaration that he is not married to the defendant. The negative form

of declaration is nothing but assertion of a particular positive marital status. If the defendant denies or is interested in denying such marital status asserted by the plaintiff, a declaration can be legitimately sought under the provisions of section 34 of the Act, 1963 itself.

The Court observed: "there seems to be a cleavage in the judicial opinion of the High Courts on the tenability of such a suit for negative declaration as to marital status." In the case of Bhuvaneshwari which constituted the sheet anchor of submission of counsel of the applicant, a Division Bench of Karnataka High Court while deciding the question as to whether a suit seeking declaration that the defendant is not the wife of the plaintiff is maintainable before the Family Court, after considering the provisions contained in section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 which confers the jurisdiction upon a Family Court, held that the relief in the nature of negative declaration in respect of a marriage, is not tenable before the Family Court. After recording this view, the Division Bench ventured to add that the relief of such nature was even beyond the scope of section 34 of the Act, 1963. The observations in paragraph 22 of the judgment are relevant and hence extracted. It reads:-"In fact, we find a relief of this nature is even beyond the scope of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act as a negative declaratory relief to declare that the marriage had never taken place, is not one that can come within scope of Section 34 of the Specific' Relief Act. Accordingly, when it is a relief that cannot be granted in law, there is no way the civil court can grant a declaratory relief."

A Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, in the case of Joyita Saha case ruled that since the marriage itself was denied and the prayer was made in the suit for a declaration that there was no marriage between the parties, the suit as framed was quite maintainable in law. The controversy, however, seems to have been settled by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Balram Yadav vs. Fulmaniya Yadav (2016) 13 SCC 308. In this case, the High Court of Chattisgarh had allowed an appeal against a decree passed by the Family Court to the effect that the respondent was not the legally married wife, on the ground that a negative declaration was outside the jurisdiction of the Family Court. Referring to the provisions contained in sections 7 and 8 of the Family Court Act, 1984 the Supreme Court held that in case there is a dispute on the matrimonial status of any person, a declaration in that regard has to be sought only before the Family Court. It makes no difference as to whether it is an affirmative or negative relief. What is important is a declaration regarding marital status. 

The observations in paragraph 7 are material and hence it is extracted. It reads: "Under Section 7(1) Explanation (b), a Suit or a proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of both marriage and matrimonial status of a person is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court, since under Section 8, all those jurisdictions covered under Section 7 are excluded from the purview of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. In case, there is a dispute on the matrimonial status of any person, a declaration in that regard has to be sought only before the Family Court. It makes no difference as to whether it is an affirmative relief or a negative relief. What is important is the declaration regarding the matrimonial status. Section 20 also endorses the view which we have taken, since the Family Courts Act, 1984, has an overriding effect on other laws."

The counsel of the applicant attempted to distinguish this judgment by canvassing a submission that the ratio in this decision is restricted to the Family Court, and that a civil Court would not be empowered to grant negative declaration as to marital status. 

Bombay High Court observed: "The submission simply does not merit countenance." The High Court underlined that "the civil Court has power to grant declaratory relief even independently of section 34 of the Act, 1963. The principle that the form of declaration does not matter and it is the status or legal character with regard to which the Court makes the declaration that is of substance, applies with even greater force to the proceedings before the civil Court which has inherent jurisdiction to decide all suits of civil nature unless their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred."

 

Question about validity of death penalty was raised in the 7th Lok Sabha

On August 22, 1984, P. Venkatasubbaiah, Union Minister of State the Ministry of Home Affairs informed the 7th Lok Sabha that the power of the President under article 72 of the Constitution to commute a sentence of death is absolute and unfettered and a decision is taken by the President on the merits of each prisoner’s case. During the three year period ending with August 14, 1984 the President was pleased to commute the death sentences of five condemned prisoners. He was replying to a question from Lakshman Mallick who had asked about the the number of death sentences commuted by the President during the last three years; and the guidelines for commuting the death sentences. 

Lakshman Mallick had asked about the the number of death sentences, during the last three years, state-wise and years-wise, confirmed after the appeal rejected by the Supreme Court. The minister informed that as of August 14, 1982, 1983 and 1984, there were a 3, 31 and 8 prisoners respectively, who were executed or the awaiting execution after rejection of their Mercy Petition. The minister provided State-wise and year-wise, who were executed or are awaiting execution after their mercy petitions were rejected by the President during the same Period after rejection of their appeals by the Supreme Court.

Out of the 3 who faced execution in 1982, one was from Maharashtra and 2 were from Delhi. Out of the 31 prisoners who faced execution in 1983, 2 were from Bihar, 1 from Gujarat, 2 from Haryana, 1 from Karnataka, 2 from Madhya Pradesh, 6 from Maharashtra, 5 from Punjab, 1 from Rajasthan, 6 from Tamil Nadu, 3 from Uttar Pradesh and 2 from Delhi. Out of the 8 prisoners who faced execution in 1984, 1 was from Jammu and Kashmir, 1 from Maharashtra, 4 from Punjab, 1 from Tamil Nadu and 1 from Uttar Pradesh.   

He had also asked whether Government have received any comments from the public or expert lawyers regarding its abolition. The minister replied, "No comments from the public or expert lawyers were received after the Supreme Court in Bachan Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1980 Supreme Court 898) had uphold the validity of the death penalty".

Notably, in Deena v. Union of India (1983), the Supreme Court directed the constitution of a committee of experts to re-examine whether hanging as a method of execution in capital punishment is in line with constitutional standards, 40 years after this method was upheld.