Supreme Court sets aside anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Satyavrat Verma in an Excise case

In Kumar Viplav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Courts Division Bench of Justices  B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan passed a 5-page long order dated May 11, 2026, wherein, it set aside the order dated January 30, 2026 passed by Justice Satyavrat Verma of the Patna High Court. 

The appeal had challenged Justuce Verma's order. The criminal appeal arose out of crime registered pursuant to FIR No. 19 of 2022 dated February 22, 2022 lodged with PS Maranchi (Pach Mohalla O.P.), District Patna, registered under Section 30(a) of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise (Amendment) Act, 2016. Anticipating arrest in connection with the offence in question, the appellant had preferred an application for anticipatory bail before the High Court. By order dated December 4, 2025, the High Court had granted  provisional anticipatory bail subject to verification that the appellant had no criminal antecedents. Thereafter, the appellant filed a modification application before the High Court to disclose a criminal antecedent under Sections 323, 341, 379, 387 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, all relatable to a single incident. Subsequently, by impugned order dated January 30, 2026, the High Court did not confirm the provisional order, thereby denying the relief of anticipatory bail. Hence, the appeal was filed in the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court's order reads:"Considering the circumstances on record, in our view, the appellant is entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail claimed. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated 30.01.2026."  

Earlier, Justice Verma had passed an order, which reads:"2. The Court is taking a consistent view of not modifying the order by which petitioner was granted anticipatory bail, in the event, if the same was obtained by concealing the criminal antecedent of the petitioner. 3. Accordingly, the instant modification application is dismissed." Supreme Cort has reversed this order by the High Court. 

As part of Division Bench Justice Partha Sarthy concludes:"Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2016 and the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019 are held to be constitutionally valid"

In Sudhakar Jha & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. reported in 2024 (3) PLJR 403 (DB), the Division Bench of the Patna High Court of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 174-page long judgement dated October13, 2023 upon hearing  the applications which challenged the constitutional validity of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2016 as also that of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Surplus Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019. The operative part is from page no. 128 on wards. It was heard with numerous anlogous cases.  The petitioners had also challenged the orders passed in their respective case by different authorities including the Additional Collector, the Commissioner of the Division and the Bihar Land Tribunal, all of which arose out of applications for pre-emption filed under section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. 

The applications contended that the amendments are against the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution as also against the principles of natural justice. It was ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution, against the legal rights and also takes away the vested right of an individual. Section 16(3) of the Act was repealed in an arbitrary manner without assigning any cogent reasons and the amendment was arbitrary, unconstitutional, unreasonable and ultra vires the parent Act. It should not be made applicable with retrospective affect. The amendment effected was not only in excess of the power granted under the Constitution; assent of the President; without which it was otiose, was not taken before its promulgation. The parties were harassed on account of pendency of the cases for decades and now the petitioners’ peremptory rights have been ordered to have abated. It was also contended that the amendment affected was beyond the competence of the State legislature and on account of repeal of section 45B of the Act, the statutory remedy of appeal/revision as was earlier available has been taken away without providing for any forum for adjudication of the disputes. The contention was that the amendments be declared ultra vires the Constitution and the same be set aside.

Kamal Nayan Choubey, senior counsel submitted that pursuant to Article 38 of the Constitution which provides a mandate for the State to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people and Article 39, which lays down six Directive Principles, some of which are to ensure means of equal livelihood to men and women, ownership and control of resources be distributed to serve the best interest of the people, avoid concentration of wealth, ensure equal pay for equal work of men and women etc; legislative steps were taken in all the States as also in the State of Bihar. The same led to the enactment of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation
Act, 1956 and the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. It was further contended that the Act which provided for fixation of ceiling area of land which a person could hold and the object of which was equitable distribution of land, after receiving the assent of the President was published in the gazette on April 19, 1962. At the time of all important amendments in the Act, whenever the State Government felt that major provisions are being deleted, the assent of the President was obtained. As the Presidential assent has not been obtained in the instant case, in absence thereof, the amendment is unconstitutional. He submitted that the Act was promulgated by the Government of Bihar pursuant to the subjects enumerated at item no.18 of the State List and item no.42 of the Concurrent List, of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. Further, the Act having been enacted after obtaining the assent of the President, the same cannot be taken away in this manner. Even if it is held to be a curable defect, unless the defect is cured the same cannot be implemented. 

Referring to the principles of law laid down in Taylor vs. Taylor, (1875) 1 Ch. D. 426 that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all, Choubey, the senior counsel had contended that the Presidential assent was a mandatory requirement and even now assent could be obtained; without which the amendments would have no effect.  It was next contended that the protection of Article 31A of the Constitution will not be available to the Amendment Acts, impugned herein, in absence of the President’s assent in view of the first proviso to Article 31A.

Choubey placed reliance on the judgments in Mahant Shankarshan Ramanuja Das Goswami vs. State of
Orissa & Anr., AIR 1967 SC 59; Sriram Narayan Medhi vs. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 199; State of Haryana vs. Jai Singh & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 418; Pt. Rishikesh & Anr. vs. Salma Begum, (1995) 4 SCC 718 and Anita Kushwaha vs. Pushap Sudan, AIR 2016 SC 3506.

Jitendra Kishore Verma, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that the right to pre-emption is a very old
right, history of which could be traced to the period of Mughals. The question to be asked is as to why section 16(3) of the Act was brought and has the constitutional goal or it’s purpose been achieved. For the purpose behind the ceiling law as also the law of pre-emption, placed reliance on judgments in Bhau Ram vs. Baij Nath Singh & Ors., AIR 1962 SC 1476 and Kedar Mishra vs. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 2016 SC 2110. He relied on judgment in Ram Sagar Rai vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., 2017 (1) PLJR 2019 to submit that section 16(3) of the Act was a beneficial legislation enacted to prevent fragmentation of holding and to facilitate consolidation. A statute is best interpreted when we know as to why it was enacted; reference may be made to the case of Gaurav Aseem Avtej vs. U.P. State Sugar Corporation. Ltd. & Ors., (2018) 6 SCC 518. In Atam Prakash vs. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 859 the right of pre-emption was held to be reasonable as also constitutionally valid. Reliance was also placed on the judgment in Suresh Prasad Singh vs. Dulhin Phulkumari Devi & Ors., 2010 (2) PLJR 167 (SC), wherein, it was held that the right has been recognised by the statute. 

J. S. Arora, learned senior advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioners placed reliance on the judgment in Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. S.B. Kamble & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 1193 to submit that for the State to claim immunity of Article 31B of the Constitution, although, the original Act was in the 9th Schedule, it was required that the amending Act also be in the 9th Schedule and for the same, assent of the President is required to be obtained. It was further submitted that the amendment creates ambiguity in so far as it does not provide as to how the landlord gets his land back. Even if a person was entitled to get the land as pre-emptor, the proceedings having abated, the person gets back his amount which included the consideration amount with 10% thus causing great hardship. The Court should examine it’s rationality, which in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in I.R. Coelho vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861, could be done even if the law was granted protection by including the same in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution. With regard to the Amendment Act, 2016, Arora submitted that in case land of some person was sold without his knowledge and later he comes to know about it being subject matter of a ceiling proceeding, on deletion of section 45B of the Act, he becomes remedy-less. This type of amendment cannot be upheld.

Nagendra Rai, the counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that section 45B of the Act was introduced by way of amendment in the year 1978. There are three categories of transfers. One of the period prior to 1959 for which there was no embargo, the second for the period from 1959 to 1970 when permission of the Collector was to be sought and lastly for the period after the cut-off date of September 9, 1970. Section 9 of the Act deals with exercise of option and how land transferred is to be adjusted. The judgment in Bisheshwar Prasad Yadav vs. State of Bihar & Ors., 1999 (3) PLJR 117 provides that land transferred in contravention of section 5 of the Act, to the extent not exceeding ceiling area be deemed to have been selected by him within the ceiling area. Reliance was also placed on the judgement in Mohammad Kajimuddin vs. State of Bihar, 2005 (4) PLJR 718 where it was held that transfers made in contravention of section 5(i) and (ii) of the Act will go in share of the land holder and shall not form part of surplus to be acquired by the State. It was lastly submitted that in Sunil Kumar vs. State of Bihar, 2004 (2) PLJR 820 the scope of application of section 45B of the Act has been dealt with. By deletion of section 45B, large number of persons will be left remedy-less.

P. K. Shahi, Advocate General appearing for the State of Bihar submitted that there was no argument by the petitioners on the legislative competence of the State to legislate. The grounds that an Act can be held to be not constitutionally valid, are mainly the same being in violation of Part III of the Constitution, the State lacking legislative competence or the same being violative of some other provision of the Constitution. The power to legislate was solely with the State, which would be evident form perusal of Item no.18 of the State List under the Seventh Schedule. It was submitted that only in the case of a law falling under the scope of Article 31A of the Constitution that the assent of the President was required. So far as the principal Act as originally enacted in the year 1961 is concerned, the same deals with the acquisition and vesting of land. The Act received the President’s assent on March 8, 1962 and was published in the Bihar Gazette (Extraordinary) on 19.4.1962. Section 16(3) or section 45B of the Act not being in violation of any provision of the Constitution, no presidential assent was required. It was submitted that the right of pre-emptor was not a fundamental right but a statutory right which flowed from the Act. No law can be invalidated only on account of some person facing difficulty. The ground on which an Act could be declared unconstitutional are that it contravenes any fundamental right, legislating on a subject which is not assigned to the relevant legislature, contravenes a mandatory provision of the Constitution or in case of a State law it seeks to operate beyond its boundaries and impinges upon the legislative power of the Union Parliament. The Advocate General submitted that it was not that section 45D of the Amending Act, 2016 was challenged but the entire Amendment Act was under challenge. The newly added section 45D provides that after repeal of section 45B of the Act, the proceedings pending before the State Government or the Bihar Land Tribunal shall be deemed to be abated and the proceedings reopened earlier under the now deleted section 45B of the Act and pending before the Collector shall also stand abated. This amendment was introduced to give a quietus to the issues. It was lastly submitted that whole of the principal Act could also be repealed and in so repealing, neither any Presidential assent was required nor any other provision of the Constitution would come in the way of such repeal.

Basant Kumar Choudhary, senior advocate appearing for the respondents, submitted that the original Ceiling Act is a progressive legislation. So far as section 16(3) of the Act which dealt with the right of pre-
emption is concerned, the same was a supplementary right and not main purpose of the Act. The High Court in Banarsi Yadav vs. Krishna Chandra Das, 1971 BJR 1077 held that the Act being a protective legislation cannot be challenged on the ground of violation of Articles 14 and 19, section 16(3) of the Act was held to be valid and the reference made held to be incompetent. It was also submitted that section 16 of the Act did not help in consolidation and section 16(3) is not protected by the 9th Schedule. The informed wisdom of the State Legislature cannot be questioned nor are the amendments ultra vires. A Full Bench of the High Court vide its judgment dated March 12, 1951 declared the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 as ultra vires on the ground of it infringing Article 14 of the Constitution, which led to the first Constitutional amendment and such laws were included in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution. The Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 was enacted, it received the assent of the President on 8.3.1962 and was published in Bihar Gazette (Extraordinary) on 19.4.1962. It was an Act to provide for fixation of ceiling, restriction on subletting and resumption by certain raiyats for personal cultivation of land, acquisition of status of raiyat by certain under-raiyats and acquisition of surplus land by the State, the object being equitable distribution of land. 

By the Amendment Act, 2019, sub-section (3) of section 16 of the Act, which gave the right of pre-emption was repealed and sub-section (4) was added to section 16 which provided that all cases or proceedings pending before any of the authorities/tribunals/Court shall be deemed to have abated and the purchase money together with the sum equal to 10% shall be refunded to the depositor without any interest. By the Amendment Act, 2019, amendments were carried out in section 16 of the Act. Section 16(3) which gave the Right of Pre-emption was repealed and newly added section 16(4) provided that all cases of proceedings after repeal of section 16(3) shall abate and the purchase money together with 10% thereof, without any interest, shall be refunded to the depositor.

By the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2016, besides adding new sub-sections (3) and (4) to section 30 and sub-section (4) to section 32, section 45B of the Act was repealed. Further, a new section 45D was added which provided that the proceedings pending before the State Government or the Bihar Land Tribunal or those reopened under the deleted section 45B and pending before the Collector shall all stand abated. 

The judgement was authored by Justice Partha Sarthy. In the penultimate paragraph, it reads: "....the Court finds no merit in the challenge by the petitioners in these batch of cases to the Constitutional validity of the two Amendment Acts. Both, the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2016 and the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019 are held to be constitutionally valid. 49. Both the amendment Acts of 2016 and 2019 having been held to be Constitutionally valid, the question which would arise is as to how would the individual cases, arising out of an application of right to pre-emption under section 16(3) of the Act and which are pending adjudication at different stages are to be decided. The right of preemption which arose from section 16(3) of the Act having been repealed by the Amendment Act, 2019, it may be stated that clause 2(2) of the Amendment Act, 2019 provides that after repeal of section 16(3) of the Act, all cases or proceedings pending before the State Government, Board of Revenue, the Bihar Land Tribunal, the Divisional Commissioner, the Collector, the Additional Collector, the Deputy Collector Land Reforms or in any other Court shall be deemed to be abated and pursuant to the repeal any purchase money together with the sum equal to 10% thereof shall be refunded to the depositor, without any interest."

The judgement concluded: "52. The applications stand disposed of in the following terms:-(i) The applications so far as the challenge to the constitutional validity of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2016 as also that of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Surplus Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019 are concerned, stand dismissed.... Both Section 45D and 16(4) provide for the consequence upon repeal of Section 45B and Section 16(3) of the Act. The language of Section 45D is different from that of Section 16(4). While Section 16(4) provides that all cases of proceedings pending before the Tribunal or the Authorities mentioned therein 'or in any other Court' shall abate, the words 'or in any other Court' does not find mention in Section 45D. Thus, in this view of the matter, the Court is of the opinion that those matters arising out of an application under Section 45B of the Act having been decided by the Authorities or the Tribunal and applications preferred against the said orders being pending in this Court, though the Constitutional validity of the Amendment Act, 2016 has been upheld, these cases will have to be listed before the appropriate bench having roster, for it to be decided on it's own merits.....”

 

Constitutionality of Aadhaar Act pending in Supreme Court, Justice Ajit Kumar points out "a very sorry state of affairs" in UIDAI, a failed entity as per CAG

In Prashant Rajak vs  The Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology & Ors. (2026), Justice Ajit Kumar of Patna High Court passed a 3-page long order dated March 16, 2023, wherein, he concluded:"4. It is a very sorry state of affairs, which this Court has witnessed today, that in so many cases, for correction Central Identities Data Repository" (CIDR) in the Aadhaar date of birth, the applicants are forced to knock the doors of this Court. It is expected that the Director, UIDAI Regional Office, Patna, would issue appropriate instruction to the persons who are dealing with such issues, so that this Court is unnecessary not burdened with such petitions where, for correction of date of birth, the statutory requirement of documents are already being fulfilled and the persons who are at the helm of affairs are to carry out the formalities, and accordingly, the necessary corrections are required to be made in the Aadhar database, which somewhere is not being addressed properly." 

The order refers to "Central Identities Data Repository" (CIDR) envisaged under the Aadhaar Act, 2016. As per Section 2 (h) of the Aadhaar Act, CIDR "means a centralised database in one or more locations containing all Aadhaar numbers issued to Aadhaar number holders along with the corresponding demographic information and biometric information of such individuals and other information related thereto. "

Justice Kumar added:"5. Considering the nature of relief sought, this Court finds it appropriate to direct this petitioner to approach the Director, UIDAI Regional Office, Patna, within a period of one week, and on his appearance it is expected that necessary corrections shall be made looking to the nature of the document, which is required for making such corrections. 6. With the above observations, the instant writ petition stands disposed of." One week deadline given to  Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI ended on March 21, 2026.  The respondents were: Secretary, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, UIDAI Through its Chief Executive Officer (CEO), CEO, UIDAI, Director, UIDAI Regional Office, 4th Floor, Lalit Bhawan, Bailey Road, Patna.

The petitioner had prayed for a direction upon the Respondent Authorities to make correction against Date of Birth, in his AADHAR card in accordance with his matriculation certificate. He has disclosed his Aadhaar Number which is refereed in the Court's order. The disclosure is contrary to the provisions of the Aadhaar Act. 

The petitioner committed the blunder of referring to 12-digit Aadhaar number as Aadhaar card, which has not been rectified by the Court. Under Section 2 (a) of the Aadhaar Act “Aadhaar number” means an identification number issued to an individual under sub-section (3) of section 3. 

Section 3 (3) reads:"On receipt of the demographic information and biometric information under sub-section (1), the Authority shall, after verifying the information, in such manner as may be specified by regulations, issue an Aadhaar number to such individual." 

Such an individual refers to a resident of India. Section 2(v) states that “resident” means an individual who has resided in India for a period or periods amounting in all to one hundred and eighty-two days or more in the twelve months immediately preceding the date of application for enrolment. 

Section 3 (1) reads: "Every resident shall be entitled to obtain an Aadhaar number by submitting his demographic information and biometric information by undergoing the process of enrolment:Provided that the Central Government may, from time to time, notify such other category of individuals who may be entitled to obtain an Aadhaar number."

Section 2 (k) states that “demographic information” includes information relating to the name, date of birth, address and other relevant information of an individual, as may be specified by regulations for the purpose of issuing an Aadhaar number, but shall not include race, religion, caste, tribe, ethnicity, language, records of entitlement, income or medical history. 

Section 2 (g) states that “biometric information” means photograph, finger print, Iris scan, or duch other biological attributes of an individual as may be specified by regulations. 

Supreme Court's 1448-page long judgment dated September 26, 2018 mentions " “demographic information" on 149 occasions, "biometric information” on 347 occasions, "core biometric information” on 72 occassions and "biological attributes" on 20 occasions. 

As per Section 2 (b) “Aadhaar number holder” means an individual who has been issued an Aadhaar number based on "biometric information” under this Act. The petitioner in question is such an individual. 

The counsel for the Union of India submitted that  that the petitioner with representation may appear before the Director, UIDAI Regional Office, Patna, on any working day, and the necessary correction in the Aadhar database shall be made by looking to the statutory documents, which are required for necessary corrections. It not clear whether UIDAI has complied with the deadline given by the High Court. 

Is it not strange that even before the adjudication of the Constitutionality of Aadhaar Act by the 7-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court vested interests like World Bank Group and NATO are making biometric profiling based Central Identities Data Repository CIDR of Aadhaar Numbers, the online database irreversible by making it's use a business as usual activity unmindful of its illegitimacy? 

Justice Ansul quashes, sets aside judgment of conviction, order of sentence by 1st Additional District & Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge Excise, Jamui, modifies order by 2nd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bhojpur

In Aneesh Manjhi vs. The State of Bihar  (2026), Justice Ansul of Patna High Court delivered a 6-page judgement dated January 27, 2026 wherein, he quashed and set aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated June 30, 2021 passed1st Additional District & Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge Excise, Jamui in a case of 2018. He took oath as a judge of the High Court on January 27, 2026, taking total number of working judges in the High Court to 38. The court has 53 sanctioned posts, which means that even after his joining, 15 posts still remain vacant. 

In his first judgement as judge, Justice Ansul observed:"....it appears that there is no independent witness to support the prosecution case and all the witnesses are official witnesses and the breath analyzer machine has not been produced to substantiate the charge under Section 37(b) of Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 and also there is nothing on record to suggest that whether breath analyzer machine was capable to give correct report. Again no blood test of accused seems to have been conducted which is a major flaw. The procedure for search and seizure has not been followed, therefore, it creates a serious doubt and thus the appellant deserves to be acquitted of the charges levelled against him." 

The trial court had convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 37(b) of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 and awarded sentence to a fine of Rs. 50,000/- and on default of payment of fine the appellant will have to suffer imprisonment for three months. The High Court noted that the appellant had already suffered prior to conviction, the same shall be adjusted against three months sentence. Consequently, the appellant was acquitted from the charges levelled against him. Since the appellant was on bail, he was discharged from his liabilities of bail bonds and sureties.

As per fardbeyan of informant, namely, Kamlesh Kumar Singh, ASI, Malaypur Police Station, the case of the prosecution was that he had lodged a written report stating that on August 20, 2018 at about 14.30 o'clock when he along with his patrolling party proceeded he got an information on mobile that the appellant was in inebriated condition and creating nuisance in the locality. In order to verify his intoxicating condition, he was examined by breath analyzer machine and it was found that he has consumed 0.19 Ml alcohol, thereafter, on the basis of the written report the case, i.e., Malaypur P.S. Case was registered for the offences under Section 290 of the IPC and 37(b) of Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016. The trial court after perusal of materials collected during investigation and hearing the accused/appellant took cognizance on February 28, 2019 under Section 290 IPC and Section 37(b) of Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016, thereafter, the charges were framed on May 4, 2019 under Section 290 IPC and Section 37(b) of Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 against the appellant, which was explained to the appellant, to which, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined six witnesses.

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Sentencing order by 2nd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bhojpur modified  

In Jitendra Singh @ Jitendra Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul of Patna High Court delivered a 7-page judgement dated January 27, 2026 wherein, he concluded:"13. Having carefully considered the witnesses', testimony and the medical evidence, I find no grounds to interfere with the appellant's conviction. 14. However, the matter arises out of a land dispute and no previous conviction has been proved against the appellant. He has remained in custody for six years six months and is facing prosecution for last nine years and is in his 30's. Taking a holistic view, ends of justice would be saved if he is sentenced to period already undergone. Accordingly, the sentence awarded to the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone by him. 15. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with the aforesaid modification in the sentence."

The appeal was preferred by the appellant for setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated July 9, 2021 and July 31, 2021 respectively passed by 2nd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bhojpur at Arrah in a case of 2019 which arose out of a P.S. Case of 2017, whereby the concerned Trial Court convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and fine of Rs. 50,000/- only and for the offences under Section 504/34 IPC one year and six months R.I. and fine of Rs. 10,000/- only. 

The prosecution case, as per fardbeyan of informant, namely, Harendra Singh (P.W.-2) was that the appellant who was the cousin of the informant Harendra Singh came to his native village on April 24, 2017. On the same day, due to a domestic dispute, the appellant, appellant's brother namely, Krishna Singh and his mother Parvati Devi were abusing the informant at around 02:00 P.M. and when the informant and his mother stopped them from abusing, the accused suddenly came out of the room with a pistol in his hand and fired a shot at the informant, which hit him on his back and he fell down. After falling down, the accused fired another shot. Upon the informant's shouting the accused left the house with the pistol in his hand and said that whoever comes in his way will be shot. The informant's father and a villager Yogendra Singh took the injured to the police station and then to Sadar Hospital Arrah for treatment where after primary treatment by the doctor, he was referred to P.M.C.H., Patna where he was treated from April 24, 2017 to April 29, 2017. During this period no statement was recorded by any police officer. Due to this, the informant gave a written application to Arrah Mufassil on May 1, 2017. Based on the written application of the informant, Arrah Mufassil P.S. Case was registered under Sections 341, 323, 504, 307 read with 34 of the IPC and under Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant and other co-accused persons namely Krishna Singh and Parvati Devi. 

After completion of investigation and on the basis of materials collected during investigation, the Investigating Officer of this case submitted charge-sheet dated April 30, 2018 under Sections 341, 323, 504, 307/34 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant before the Trial Court. The trial court after perusal of materials collected during investigation and hearing the accused/appellant took cognizance on May 16, 2018 under Sections 341, 323, 504, 307/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, thereafter, the charges were framed on August 9, 2019 under Sections 341, 323, 504, 307 and 34 of the IPC against the appellant, which was explained to the appellant, to which, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined altogether five witnesses. On the basis of evidences/circumstances which emerged during the trial, the trial court examined the appellant/accused under Section 313 of the CrPC, wherein, he completely denied the evidences during the trial and claimed his complete innocence. The Trial Court had convicted the appellant for the offences under Section 307 of the IPC and sentenced him. 

Justice Ansul observed: "11. It appears from perusal of record that altogether five witnesses have been examined during trial. P.W.-1, Sunaina Devi, who is mother of the informant has deposed that the appellant has shot two bullets which hit on the back of the informant. Thereafter, he was taken to the hospital. She has further deposed that due to partition of land in the family the present occurrence has taken place. P.W.-2, Harendra Singh, the informant of this case has supported the prosecution case as narrated above. P.W.-3, Rekha Devi has been declared hostile during trial. P.W-4, Dr. Ashok Kumar Pandey, who is the doctor and had examined the informant, has deposed that oval shaped wound injury below the neck, i.e., 0.6 cm X 0.4 cm was found on the informant. P.W-5, Sambhunath Panday, the Investigating Officer of this case has supported the case of the prosecution. 12. It also appears that there is delay of six days in lodging the FIR. The delay is sought to be explained by treatment at PMCH. It seems that neither the treatment record at PMCH nor the version provided at PMCH has been brought on record thus making the initial version unavailable. This casts shadow of doubt on the prosecution version in view of Hon'ble Supreme Court decision rendered in the case of Thulia Kali vs. The State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1972) 3 SCC 393." Being aggrieved with the trial court's judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellant had preferred the appeal before the High Court. 
 

Application for bail of Child in Conflict with Law (CICL) cannot be rejected on the ground of heinous offence: Justice Bibek Chaudhuri

In Juvenile “X”, through His Natural Guardian His Father Namely, Ashok Mistry @ Ashok Mistri vs. The State of Bihar (2024) which was adjudicated along with 24 similar cases from Gaya, Rohtas, Patna, Aurangabad, Supaul, East Champaran, West Champaran, Kaimur, Katihar, Vaishali, Banka, Saran, Muzaffarpur and Sitamarhi, Justice Bibek Chaudhuri of the High Court had delivered a 33-page long judgement wherein he underlined that Juvenile Justice Boards (JJBs) and the Courts of Appeal cannot deal with the applications for bail and connected appeals on the consideration that the offences committed by the petitioners are heinous offences. 

Justice Chaudhuri concluded: "Both the Boards and the Courts of Appeal must be free from this mind set that an application for bail of CICL cannot be rejected on the ground of heinous offence. At the same time, the Board and the Courts of Appeal shall remain alive to impose conditions for bail in the manner through which the future of CICL is protected. He may be kept under the supervision and guidance of a proper person so that he may not come in association of known criminals or that the order of bail expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger or it will defeat ends of justice. For the reasons stated above, I am inclined to allow these batch of revision on contest. The petitioners / CICLs shall be released on bail....." 

Justice Chaudhuri's direction reads:"Let a copy of this judgement be transmitted by the Registry of this Court to all the District Judges within two weeks for circulation to all the Juvenile Justice Boards and Children’s Courts, constituted under the said Act (Act 2 of 2016) for their appraisal as to the mode and manner and the factual and legal consideration while granting or rejecting a prayer for bail or connected Appeal under the said Act. Office is directed to send the email of this order to the respective Courts." 

He drew on the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Juvenile X through his father vs. State of U. P. and Anr., reported in 2021 SCC Online All 1091, which had succinctly dealt with the requirement to be followed by the Probation Officer while filing Social Investigation Report. The relevant paragraph 19 of the judgement reads: "‘Form-6’ of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016, contains a detailed proforma of the social investigation report. The report has three parts; the first part requires the Probation Officer to give the data or information regarding the close relatives in the family, delinquency records of the family, social and economic status, ethical code of the family, attitude towards religion, relationship amongst the family members, the relationship with the parents, living conditions etc. Thereafter, the report requires the Probation Officer to provide the child's history regarding his mental condition, physical condition, habits, interests, personality traits, neighbourhood, neighbours’ report, and school, employment, if any, friends, the child being subject to any form of abuse, circumstances of apprehension of the child, mental condition of the child. The most important part of the report is the third part i.e. the result of inquiry where the Probation Officer is required to inform the Board about the emotional factors, physical condition, intelligence, social and economic factors, suggestive cause of the problems, analysis of the case including reasons/contributing factors for the offence, opinion of experts consulted and recommendation regarding rehabilitation by the Probation Officer/Child Welfare Officer. It is incumbent upon the Juvenile Justice Board to take into consideration the social investigation report and make an objective assessment of the reasonable grounds for rejecting the bail application of the juvenile.” Justice Chaudhary inadvertently referred to para 23 instead of para 19 of the Allahabad High Court's judgement dated October 1, 2024 in Criminal Revision No. 611 of 2023.   

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad led Division Bench directs I.G. Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar, to issue appropriate guidelines to all Jail Superintendents to abide by Constitutional Mandate against unauthorized detention

High Court awards a consolidated amount of Rs. 2 lakh to the petitioner by way of compensation for his unauthorized detention by the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Gaya Jee 

In Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Singh Vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary (Home), Police Department, Bihar (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sourendra Pandey delivered a 12-page long judgement dated November 13, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"Having considered the entire materials and the submissions as recorded hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion that a consolidated amount of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) would be a reasonable amount which may be awarded to the petitioner by way of compensation for his unauthorized detention by the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Gaya Jee. 12. Since we have come to know that this practice is going on in other jurisdictions of the Jail Superintendents in the State, the I.G., Prisons and Correctional Services is directed to issue appropriate guidelines to all the Jail Superintendents in the State of Bihar requiring them to strictly abide by the Constitutional Mandate and order of the Court without any exception. Such guideline shall be issued within a period of two weeks from today. The Respondent State of Bihar shall pay the compensation amount of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) to the petitioner within one month from today. Following the settled principle as discussed in the case of K.K. Pathak (supra), we direct that the amount so paid to the petitioner shall be realized from the erring official in accordance with law." Pranav Kumar, I.G. Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar, the respondent no.3 was present through virtual mode during the hearing. 

The other nine respondents were:Director General of Police, Bihar, Inspector General of Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar, Jail Superintendent , Central Jail District-Gaya, Deputy Jailor, Central Jail, District-Gaya, Senior Superintendent of Police, District-Gaya, SHO Sarbahda Police Station, District-Saran, District Magistrate, Gaya, Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya and Officer-in-Charge, Sarbahda P.S., District- Gaya.

This writ application was taken up for consideration on November 12, 2025. The writ application raised an issue of serious concern for a Constitutional Court. It is well said that a Constitutional Court acts as a guardian to protect the fundamental rights of a citizen when it comes to protect his Right to Life and Liberty. In the case, the petitioner was confined in the Central Jail at Gaya Jee in connection with Sarbahda P.S. Case of 2025 registered on July 31, 2025 for the offences punishable under Section 30(a) and 37 of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016. In the said case, he was granted bail vide order dated September 23, 2025 by the competent Court and the Exclusive Special Excise Judge, Court No. 2, Gaya Jee issued a warrant to release him unless he is liable to be detained for some other matter. The warrant of release dated September 29, 2025 was communicated to the Superintendent, Central Jail at Gaya Jee.What happened thereafter are some disturbing features of this case. It appears that prior to receipt of the warrant to release, the Superintendent of Jail, Gaya Jee had received a production warrant from the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Buxar requiring production of the petitioner in connection with Buxar P.S. Case No. 87 of 2025. The counter affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 has been filed enclosing certain documents. Annexure ‘R-1/B’ is the order requiring production of the petitioner in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Buxar (Bihar) on 04.09.2025 by 10:00 AM as he was involved in a case of theft punishable under Section 303(2) of the Bhartiya Nyay Sanhita. Despite receipt of the production warrant, the Superintendent of Jail, Gaya Jee did not produce the petitioner in the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Court at Buxar on 04.09.2025. 

The counter affidavit to show that the Superintendent of Jail, Gaya Jee informed the learned court of Exclusive Special Judge, Excise, 2nd Gaya Jee, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya Jee and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Buxar with regard to the requirement to produce the petitioner in the light of the production warrant. The Superintendent of Jail was looking for adequate force and vehicle with fuel from the Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya Jee in order to produce the petitioner in Buxar Court. The respondents have not brought on record any other communication by way of response from the office of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya Jee. It is also not clear whether the court at Gaya Jee was moved for seeking an order to take the petitioner to Buxar Court. The fact remains that even after his release order, the petitioner continued in detention.

The attention of the High Court was drawn towards the communication as contained in letter dated 06.10.2025 written by the Superintendent of Central Jail, Gaya Jee to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya Jee wherein he has clearly recorded that after receipt of the release order from the local court, the petitioner has been released but had been kept confined on the strength of a production warrant. It is to be kept in mind that the date fixed in the production warrant was 04.09.2025 which had already expired. This is why it has also been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that in terms of Section 304 read with Section 305 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, once the date fixed in the production warrant expired and the order of release had already reached in the hand of the Superintendent of Central Jail, Gaya Jee, he had no option but to release the petitioner. It is pointed out that prior to receipt of the release order, the present authority could have requested the Buxar Court to issue a fresh warrant of production and the petitioner could have been produced on the strength of a fresh warrant of production before receipt of the release order. It was submitted that, in fact, in his communication dated 06.10.2025, the Superintendent, Central Jail made a wrong statement that after receipt of the release order, the petitioner was already released. His own statement in the said letter that the petitioner was still kept confined in the jail on the strength of the production warrant demonstrates that the continued detention of the petitioner was not authorized by any competent court of law, thus, his confinement in jail is in breach of the fundamental right of the petitioner. He was kept in jail for days even after release without there being any order of a competent court.

The Court noted the submission of P.N. Sharma, AC to AG that perhaps, this practice was an ongoing practice, though, it was not placed on affidavit and he has no specific instruction in his regard but what was gathered from his experience at the Bar as an Officer of the Court perhaps, this was the practice which is being followed.

AC to AG further submitted that prima-facie, it cannot be denied that the petitioner was not actually released from jail even after the receipt of the release order. He was produced in Buxar Court only on 17.10.2025. During the intervening period, there was no authorized detention of the petitioner.

Justice Prasad observed:"....this Court has no iota of doubt that in this case, the life and liberty of the petitioner has been curtailed to a great extent by keeping him in confinement for 18 days without any authorized detention order from a competent court of law. This Court is further disturbed from the fact that perhaps the same thing is happening as a matter of practice in the State of Bihar. This is a wider issue. While holding that the action of the State respondents in not releasing the petitioner actually from jail and keeping him confined in jail for 18 days without any authorized detention order is wholly illegal and is to be held as a breach of the fundamental right of the petitioner, we propose to award adequate compensation to the petitioner for his illegal detention and such compensation would be required to be realized from the erring official. It is wellsettled in law that if because of misuse of power by an executive/officer acting on behalf of the State, any compensation is required to be allowed to a citizen, such compensation should not go from the public exchequer, rather such money should be realized from the erring official.

The High Court noted that AC to AG informed that the petitioner was made to appear virtually before the In-charge, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Buxar on 04.10.2025 and he had been remanded to custody until 17.10.2025. Thus, his submission is that, in fact, it is not 18 days confinement without any authorized detention order, the actual unauthorized detention would come down to five days if counted from 29.09.2025 which was the date of the receipt of the release order of the petitioner in Sarbahda P.S. Case No. 91 of 2025.

Pranav Kumar, I.G., Prisons and Correctional Services submitted that on perusal of the entire records, he noticed that the petitioner was confined in jail even after September 29, 2025 without there being any order of a competent court of law, according to him, this was occasioned due to the intervening Durga Puja Holidays. The High Court, pointed out to him that even during Durga Puja Holidays, an In-charge Court was always available for this purpose and, in fact, the virtual appearance of the petitioner was done on October 4, 2025 which was during the Puja Holidays only, therefore, it cannot be allowed to be contend that the illegal detention of the petitioner from September 29, 2025 until his virtual production on October 4, 2025 was due to any reason beyond the control of the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Gaya Jee. The I.G., Prisons and Correctional Services was immediately realised this and was admitted that “Yes, there is an illegal detention for atleast five days”. 

Justice Prasad observed: "7. There being an admitted position that it is a case of unauthorized detention of the petitioner from 29.09.2025 until 04.10.2025 and this practice is going on without drawing much attention of the Department, this Court being a Constitutional Court cannot remain a silent spectator. The I.G., Prisons and Correctional Services has informed this Court that he has taken action against the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Gaya Jee in administrative side and will take it to a logical end, however, keeping in view the admitted facts of the case as we have already held that it is a case of illegal detention, we proceed to award compensation to the petitioner."

The judgement reads: "8. On the quantum of compensation, we have invited even I.G., Prisons and Correctional Services to say as to what would be a reasonable amount of compensation to the petitioner. He has submitted that a sum of Rs.10,000/- may perhaps be appropriate. Learned AC to AG has submitted that the Court should take a lenient view of the matter and a sum of Rs.10,000/-for each day of detention would be an appropriate amount of compensation."

The judgement recorded that the counsel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the quantum of compensation to be fixed by the High Court should not be an indicative and symbolic one. "It is a matter in which admittedly, the liberty of the petitioner has been curtailed without following the established procedure of law, therefore, a clear case of violation of the Constitutional mandate under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been made out. It is submitted that in such cases, in fact, the Government should have a policy to award ex-gratia compensation to an illegal detenue and such amount which are required to be paid to a person for his illegal detention be realised from the erring official so that the Public Exchequer which is the Custodian of public money should not be burdened with cost and compensation. He has relied upon a judgment of a learned Writ Court in case of K.K. Pathak @ Keshav Kumar Pathak Vs. Ravi Shankar Prasad and Others reported in 2019 (1) PLJR 1051 in which this principle has been discussed. It has also been pointed out that an appeal preferred against this judgment of the learned Writ Court in SLP (Crl) No. 003566/2019 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not succeed and the same was dismissed vide order dated 26.04.2019."

The counsel for the petitioner had prayed for an adequate compensation which according to him should not be less than Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) per day. He had relied upon a 9-page long judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Pankaj Kumar Sharma vs. Government of NCT of Delhi & Others reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6215 in which a Writ Court of Delhi High Court's Justice Subramonium Prasad was pleased to award a compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the petitioner for his illegal detention for about half an hour. 

The Delhi High Court relied on the judgement of the Supreme Court in D. K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal, 1997 (1) SCC 416, wherein it had directed the following requirements to be fulfilled in case of arrest. Paragraph 35 of the said judgment (D.K. Basu) reads as under:-

“35. We, therefore, consider it appropriate to issue the following requirements to be followed in all cases of arrest or detention till legal provisions are made in that behalf as preventive measures:

(1) The police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling the interrogation of the arrestee should bear accurate, visible and clear identification and name tags with their designations. The particulars of all such police personnel who handle interrogation of the arrestee must be recorded in a register.

(2) That the police officer carrying out the arrest of the arrestee shall prepare a memo of arrest at the time of W.P.(C) 3851/2023 Page 4 of 9 arrest and such memo shall be attested by at least one witness, who may either be a member of the family of the arrestee or a respectable person of the locality from where the arrest is made. It shall also be countersigned by the arrestee and shall contain the time and date of arrest.

(3) A person who has been arrested or detained and is being held in custody in a police station or interrogation centre or other lock-up, shall be entitled to have one friend or relative or other person known to him or having interest in his welfare being informed, as soon as practicable, that he has been arrested and is being detained at the particular place, unless the attesting witness of the memo of arrest is himself such a friend or a relative of the arrestee.

(4) The time, place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee must be notified by the police where the next friend or relative of the arrestee lives outside the district or town through the Legal Aid Organisation in the District and the police station of the area concerned telegraphically within a period of 8 to 12 hours after the arrest.

(5) The person arrested must be made aware of this right to have someone informed of his arrest or detention as soon as he is put under arrest or is detained.

(6) An entry must be made in the diary at the place of detention regarding the arrest of the person which shall also disclose the name of the next friend of the person who has been informed of the arrest and the names and particulars of the police officials in whose custody the arrestee is.

(7) The arrestee should, where he so requests, be also W.P.(C) 3851/2023 Page 5 of 9 examined at the time of his arrest and major and minor injuries, if any present on his/her body, must be recorded at that time. The “Inspection Memo” must be signed both by the arrestee and the police officer effecting the arrest and its copy provided to the arrestee.

(8) The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination by a trained doctor every 48 hours during his detention in custody by a doctor on the panel of approved doctors appointed by Director, Health Services of the State or Union Territory concerned. Director, Health Services should prepare such a panel for all tehsils and districts as well.

(9) Copies of all the documents including the memo of arrest, referred to above, should be sent to the Illaqa Magistrate for his record.

(10) The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation.

(11) A police control room should be provided at all district and State headquarters, where information regarding the arrest and the place of custody of the arrestee shall be communicated by the officer causing the arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the arrest and at the police control room it should be displayed on a conspicuous notice board. “

The Delhi High Court emphasised the Supreme Court’s observations in Para 44 in D K Basu (supra) also observed as under (Para 11):-

“44. The claim in public law for compensation for unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict liability and is in addition to the claim available in private law for damages for tortious acts of the public servants. Public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. Award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the established violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21, is an exercise of the courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen.

The Delhi High Court judgement also relied on the Nilabati Behera case [(1993) 2 SCC 746 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 527 : 1993 Cri LJ 2899] in which heirs of a victim of custodial torture were granted compensation.

46. In Nilabati Behera case [(1993) 2 SCC 746 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 527 : 1993 Cri LJ 2899] , it was held: (SCC pp. 767-68, para 32) “

Adverting to the grant of relief to the heirs of a victim W.P.(C) 3851/2023 Page 7 of 9 of custodial death for the infraction or invasion of his rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it is not always enough to relegate him to the ordinary remedy of a civil suit to claim damages for the tortious act of the State as that remedy in private law indeed is available to the aggrieved party.

The citizen complaining of the infringement of the indefeasible right under Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be told that for the established violation of the fundamental right to life, he cannot get any relief under the public law by the courts exercising writ jurisdiction. The primary source of the public law proceedings stems from the prerogative writs and the courts have, therefore, to evolve „new tools‟ to give relief in public law by moulding it according to the situation with a view to preserve and protect the Rule of Law.

While concluding his first Hamlyn Lecture in 1949 under the title „Freedom under the Law‟ Lord Denning in his own style warned: „No one can suppose that the executive will never be guilty of the sins that are common to all of us. You may be sure that they will sometimes do things which they ought not to do: and will not do things that they ought to do.

But if and when wrongs are thereby suffered by any of us what is the remedy? Our procedure for securing our personal freedom is efficient, our procedure for preventing the abuse of power is not. Just as the pick and shovel is no longer suitable for the winning of coal, so also the procedure of mandamus, certiorari, and actions on the case are not suitable for the winning of freedom in the new age.

They must be replaced by new and up-to-date machinery, by declarations, injunctions and actions for negligence…. This is not the task of Parliament … the courts must do this. Of all the great tasks that lie ahead this is the greatest.

Properly exercised the new powers of the executive W.P.(C) 3851/2023 Page 8 of 9 lead to the welfare state; but abused they lead to a totalitarian state. None such must ever be allowed in this country.‟ 

The Delhi High Court judgement, also relied on Nilabati Behera v. State of Orisa & Ors., 1993 (2) SCC 746, while dealing with the power of a constitutional court to award compensation rather than relegating such person to file a suit for recovery of damages, the Supreme Court observed as under:- (Para 12)

“22. The above discussion indicates the principle on which the court’s power under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution is exercised to award monetary compensation for contravention of a fundamental right. This was indicated in Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR 508] and certain further observations therein adverted to earlier, which may tend to minimise the effect of the principle indicated therein, do not really detract from that principle. This is how the decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR 508] and others in that line have to be understood and Kasturilal [(1965) 1 SCR 375 : AIR 1965 SC 1039 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 144] distinguished therefrom.

We have considered this question at some length in view of the doubt raised, at times, about the propriety of awarding compensation in such proceedings, instead of directing the claimant to resort to the ordinary process of recovery of damages by recourse to an action in tort. In the present case, on the finding reached, it is a clear case for award of compensation to the petitioner for the custodial death of her son.”

It was submitted that the High Court has recently in the case of Arvind Kumar Gupta vs. State of Bihar and Others reported in 2025 (6) BLJ 52 dealt with this aspect of the matter, though, in case of illegal arrest resulting in unauthorized detention and has been pleased to award Rs.1,00,000/- to each of the Respondents Nos. 9 and 11 for their unauthorized detention in police custody. 

The attention of the High Court was drawn towards the judgment in Arvind Kumar Gupta (supra) which we quote hereunder for a ready reference:-“27. In the case of Rudal Sah vs. State of Bihar and Another reported in AIR 1983 SC 1086 while dealing with a case of unlawful detention in jail, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held: “...In these circumstances, the refusal of this court to pass an order of compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing mere lipservice to his fundamental right to liberty which the State Government has so grossly violated.”

The High Court held that in Pankaj Kumar Sharma vs. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors. reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6215, a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court had reviewed the case laws on the subject and upon finding that the petitioner was made to suffer in the lockup for only half an hour, the Single Judge directed for payment of compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the petitioner recoverable from the salaries of Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 who were the erring officials. Having regard to the well settled law on the subject, in the admitted facts of this case where these police officials have contravened the procedures and thereby caused injustice to Respondent Nos. 9 and 11 by keeping them in police custody without any sanction of law, we are of the considered opinion that Respondent Nos. 9 and 11 both are entitled for a compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) each. The State shall be liable to pay Rs.1,00,000/- to each of Respondent Nos. 9 and 11 within a period of 30 days from today and recover the same from Respondent Nos. 7, 8 and 12 who have admitted the violation of the fundamental rights of Respondent Nos. 9 and 11 by not complying with the established procedure of law. It is well-settled that for any misuse of power by an officer of the State, if the State is being saddled with cost or compensation, the same be recovered from the erring officials. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of this Court in the case of K.K. Pathak @ Keshav Kumar Pathak vs. Ravi Shankar Prasad and Others reported in 2019 (1) PLJR 1051 which attained finality as the same has not been interfered with by the Supreme Court in SLP (Crl) No. 003566/2019.

Justice Prasad observed:"11. Having considered the entire materials and the submissions as recorded hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion that a consolidated amount of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) would be a reasonable amount which may be awarded to the petitioner by way of compensation for his unauthorized detention by the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Gaya Jee."

Also read: Fate of a Habeas Corpus petition, after disposal of the case by High Court, CBI finds Rajnath Sharma, the "absconding person" was killed, burnt in police custody

 

Justice G. Anupama Chakravarthy asks petitioner to avail alternative remedy by filing representation under Bihar Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016

In Raj Kishore Pandey vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Food and Consumer Protection Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Justice G. Anupama Chakravarthy passed a 5-page long judgement dated October 15, 2025 and disposed off the writ petition. The judgement reads: ''5. Admittedly, from the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition, it is evident that the petitioner has an alternative remedy of filing a representation available under Section 32(vii) of the Bihar Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016....the writ petition is disposed of with a direction to the petitioner to file the representation within two months from the date of receipt of this order before the Principal Secretary.'' The five other respondents were: Divisional Commissioner, Tirhut Division,Muzaffarpur, District Magistrate cum Collector, East Champaran at Motihari, Sub-Divisional Officer, chakiya ,East Champaran at Motihari,  District Supply Officer, East Champaran at Motihari and Block Supply Officer, Chakiya(East Champaran).

The writ petition was filed for the following reliefs:-
“(i) To issue an appropriate order/s, direction/s including writ preferably in the nature of CERTIORARI for quashing the order dated December 18, 2018 passed in P.D.S. Revision Case passed by Divisional Commissioner Tirhut Division Muzaffarpur, the Respondent no. 2  whereby he dismissed the PDS Revision Case and held that order dated June 1, 2015 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer Chakiya East Champaran and order dated January 13, 2017 passed by the Collector East Champaran in S. Appeal Case cancelling the license of the petitioner bearing PDS License were speaking orders and there was no illegality in the order by the lower Court. (ii) To quash the Memo dated June 1, 2015 passed by the S.D.O Chakiya East Champaran whereby and whereunder PDS License of the petitioner was cancelled.
(iii) To quash the order dated January 13, 2017 passed in Appeal Case by the Collector whereby and whereunder appeal preferred by the Petitioner was dismissed and affirmed the order Passed by the S.D.O. Chakiya.
(iv) To direct Sub-Divisional Officer, Chakiya ,East Champaran at Motihari, the Respondent no. 04 to restore the license of the petitioner hence forth.

The counsel for the respondents drew the attention of the High Court towards Section 32 (vii) of the Bihar Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016. Section 32 (vii) of the Bihar Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016 reads: “32. (vii) The Principal Secretary/ Secretary of the department may call for the records related to the order passed under the provisions of this Order by the Divisional Commissioner or the District Officer or the licensing authority or the Sub Divisional Officer suo moto or upon a representation by someone, and if he is satisfied that the Divisional Commissioner or the District Officer or the licensing authority or the Sub Divisional Officer (a) has exercised such powers which are not entrusted to him, (b) has exercised his powers illegally without considering the facts of the case, (c) has failed in use of his powers, he may pass an order which he thinks fit.”

It was one of the five judgements delivered by Justice Chakravarthy on October 15, 2025, wherein, she directed the petitioners to avail alternative remedy under the relevant laws. Besides Raj Kishore Pandey vs. The State of Bihar, these judgements were delivered in Vandna Devi vs. The State of Bihar, Javahar Prasad @ Jawahar Prasad vs. The State of Bihar, Dinesh Kapar vs. The Collector and Lakshman Sharma @ Lakshman Mandal vs. The State of Bihar.

As part of Division Bench Justice S. B. Pd. Singh authored all judgments dated September 2

Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice P. B. Bajanthri and Justice S. B. Pd. Singh delivered seven judgements on September 2, 2025.All the judgements dated September 2 by this bench were authored by Justice Singh. 

In Bibek Kumar Jaiswal @ Vivek Kumar Jaiswal vs. Shabnam Jaiswal @ Sabnam Jaiswal (2025), a case from Supaul, Justice Singh held that Family Court rightly dismissed the matrimonial case of the appellant seeking divorce. 

In Nilu Kumari vs. Sanjay Kumar (2025), a case from Hajipur, Justice Singh set  aside the judgement and decree by Principal Judge, Family Court, Vaishali. 

In Shashi Bhushan Poddar vs. Gyan Bharti @ Rekha Poddar & Anr. (2025), a case from Bhagalpur, Justice Singh upheld Family Court's judgement and decree which dismissed the matrimonial case of the appellant seeking divorce. 

In Arun Kumar vs. Sushmita Kumari (2025), a case from Begusarai, Justice Singh set aside judgment and decree by Principal Judge, Family Court, Begusarai, which had dismissed the divorce case. 

In Md. Naushad Hussain vs. Shahida Khaton & Anr. (2025), a case from Darbhanga, Justice Singh concluded:"Considering the fact that Talaq has already been performed between the parties and in the entire evidence, the appellant-husband has not denied the aforesaid assertion of the respondent and the respondent herself does not want to continue matrimonial relationship with the appellant-husband, we are not inclined to interference with the impugned judgment. The Family Court has rightly dismissed the Matrimonial Case No. 209 of 2012 filed on behalf of the appellant husband."   

In Pramod Pasi vs. The State of Bihar through Secretary Excise and Prohibition Department Govt. of Bihar & Ors. (2025), a case from Gopalganj, the Court recorded that the recovery of illicit liquor was only 7.8 litres which is a meager quantity. Justice Singh concluded:"Considering the small quantity of liquor, the concerned authority is hereby directed to collect fine of Rs. 10,000/-(Ten Thousands) from the petitioner and release the motorcycle in his favour within a period of one week from the date of receipt of this order, for which petitioner has no objection." He observed: "We are conscious of the fact that alleged recovery is meager quantity and the aforesaid order has been passed while invoking extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the reasons that unnecessarily petitioner shall not be subjected to various proceedings like Rule of 12A of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Rules, 2021 read with amended sub Rule 2 of Rule 12A in the year 2022 and 2023, Sections 58, 92 and 93 of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016, for an issue of 7.8 litres of illicit liquor and such order is required to prevent the multiplicity of proceeding in the interest of justice."

In Yogendra Yadav vs, The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Bihar Prohibition and Excise Department, Bihar & Ors. (2025), a case from Gaya, Justice Singh took note of the fact that the recovery of illicit liquor was only 1 litre which is a meager quantity. He observed: "Considering the small quantity of liquor, the concerned authority is hereby directed to collect fine of Rs. 5,000/-(Five Thousands) from the petitioner and release the motorcycle in his favour within a period of one week from the date of receipt of this order, for which petitioner has no objection." He added: We are conscious of the fact that alleged recovery is meager quantity and the aforesaid order has been passed while invoking extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the reasons that unnecessarily petitioner shall not be subjected to various proceedings like Rule of 12A of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Rules, 2021 read with amended sub Rule 2 of Rule 12A in the year 2022 and 2023, Sections 58, 92 and 93 of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016, for an issue of 1 litre of illicit liquor and such order is required to prevent the multiplicity of proceeding in the interest of justice."

Notably, a 17-page long judgement dated September 1, 2025 by the same Division Bench had set aside the judgment and decree dated February 25, 2019 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Gopalganj. This judgement too was authored by Justice Singh.  

 

Supreme Court to examine validity of Section 58 of Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 read with specific Rules

In The State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Shankar Baranwal (2025), Supreme Court's bench of Chief Justice B.R.Gavai. Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice N.V. Anjaria passed an order dated August 9, 2025. It issued notice as it is all set to to examine validity of Section 58 of Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 read with Rules 12 A and 12 B of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Rules, 2021. Its order reads:"Until further orders, there shall be stay insofar as the direction issued by the High Court to make the payment by the valuer is concerned. The case arose out of impugned 7-pag long final judgment and order dated April 16, 2025 in Shankar Baranwal vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025) passed by the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices P. B. Bajanthri and S. B. Pd. Singh. 

The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Bajanthri. The petitioner had prayed for issuance of writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing the order dated January 17, 2022 passed in Excise Revision Case No. 282/2021 by Additional Chief Secretary, Bihar, Patna whereby and whereunder the order dated September 10, 2021, passed in Excise Appeal Case No. 523/2021 by the Commissioner, Excise, Patna and order dated July 17, 2021, passed in Confiscation Case NO. 118/2021 by the District Magistrate, Kaimur at Bhabua, which arose out of Durgawati P.S. Case No. 74/2020 have been confirmed and Safari car bearing Registration No. UP-60V-0160 of the petitioner was confiscated and also for giving direction to release the aforesaid vehicle of the petitioner. 

Justice Bajanthri observed: "It is to be noted not even reference to value of the vehicle purchased and depreciation year wise with reference to any policy or the Government or General Insurance Company. In the absence of assessment and randomly evaluation of vehicle in wholesale is highly deprecated. Irrespective of movable and immovable property cannot be valued with the naked eye by the bureaucrats of the State of Bihar and proceed to undertake auction and causing the state exchequer under loss and for the concerned person. In almost each and every case Motor Vehicle Inspectors are evaluating valuation of the vehicle in wholesale without there being individual assessment of the vehicle or property with reference to evaluation like date of purchase and value of what would be value as on the date of seizure of the vehicle and on the date of auction. 5. Having regard to the facts that one liter of liquor has been seized from the subject matter of vehicle, petitioner shall not be penalized in seizing vehicle and auctioning the vehicle at throw away price and realised amount remitting arbitrary and illegal." 

In the light of these observations, the High Court concluded: "the confiscation order, appellate authority order and revision authority order stands modified to the above extent, while exercising extra ordinary jurisdiction under article 226 of constitution", in order to avoid further legal proceedings. 

Supreme Court stays fresh tender process approved by High Court's Acting Chief Justice led bench

In Medicare Environmental Management Pvt. Ltd.vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and Augustine George Masih issued notice, returnable within eight weeks. Its order dated June 3, 2025 reads:"In the meanwhile, further tender process shall remain subject to the outcome of the present special leave petition." This implies that the judgement of the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy which approved the fresh tender process has been stayed. 

The Division Bench had heard both the writ petitions filed by Medicare Environmental Management Pvt. Ltd and Sangam Mediserve Pvt. Ltd. who had prayed for setting aside the order dated June 26, 2023 issued under the signature of the Member Secretary, Bihar State Pollution Control Board (BSPCB), Patna, whereby the entire tender dated December 22, 2022, for all the seven locations was cancelled despite the respondents/Board having issued the letter of selection for locations at Muzaffarpur and Bhagalpur in favour of Medicare Environmental Management Pvt. Ltd. and for locations Gopalganj and Purnia in favour of M/s Sangam Mediserve Pvt. Ltd.  The High Court had dismissed both the writ petitions by its 26-page long judgement dated May 7, 2025.

The tender was issued because the BSPCB was of the view that there was need for setting up seven Common Bio-Medical Waste Treatment Facility (CBWTF), one each in Patna, Gopalganj, Madhubani, Purnia, Sasaram, Muzaffarpur and Bhagalpur in accordance with the Bio-Medical Waste Management Rules, 2016. BSPCB took the decision to cancel the entire tender as it was a composite tender (one tender for all the seven locations) and issued fresh tender for each of the locations and not a composite tender. Both the petitioners have challenged the decision as being arbitrary, unreasonable and based on no logic. They have submitted that before cancelling the entire tender, the successful bidders ought to have been issued notice.

One of the two petitioners, Medicare Environmental Management Pvt.  Ltd.  submitted that for one of the
bidders, namely, M/s Sangam Mediserve Pvt. Ltd., the second petitioner having submitted an erroneous and wrongly filled-up financial bid, the entire tender ought not to have been cancelled. The BSPCB had some justification for cancelling the tender with respect to locations at Gopalganj and Purnia, but there would absolutely be no ground for cancelling the entire tender even if it be a composite tender of all the seven locations. 

BSPCB should have segregated the respective tenders and went ahead with the selection of the bidders in whose financial bids there was no problem and which selection was completely unaffected by the wrong bidding of M/s Sangam Mediserve Pvt. Ltd. 

It was submitted that in Government contracts, the authorities are expected to uphold fairness, equality and rule of law while dealing with contractual matters. The “Right to Equality” under Article 14 of the Constitution of India is breached whenever an arbitrary decision is taken. The Court's attention was drawn towards the the decision of the Supreme Court in Mihan India Ltd. vs. GMR Airports Ltd. & Ors. : (2022) 19 SCC 69. In this case, bids were invited for development of a Multi-Model International Passenger Cargo Hub Airport at Nagpur, but before the agreement could be executed with the highest bidder, the bidding process was annulled without any direction for fresh tender process.

The Supreme Court held the view that once the selection of the concessionaire had been declared, then raising objections at the stage of the execution of the concession agreement in the garb of asking clarification with respect to certain formalities, amounted to arbitrary exercise of powers by the authorities, which is not permissible under the law. The Supreme Court relied upon its own judgment in Union of India vs. Dinesh Engineering Corporation : (2001) 8 SCC 491, wherein while dealing with the rejection of the bid of the respondent therein by the Railways in a tender floated for procurement of certain items of spare parts for use in GE governors, the Supreme Court had held that the power to reject bids cannot be exercised arbitrarily; merely because the Railways had the power to do so. Any arbitrary exercise of power to reject bids was held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was held that held that a public authority, even in contractual matters, should not have unfettered discretion and in contracts having commercial elements. Even though some extra discretion is to be conceded to such authorities. 

In Mihan India Ltd. case, the Supreme Court in para 64 of the decision took note of the decision in City & Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. vs. Shishir Realty (P) Ltd. : (2002) 16 SCC 527. It reads:“75. Before we state the conclusions, this Court would like to reiterate certain well pertaining to Government contracts. When we speak of Government contracts, constitutional factors are also in play.
Government bodies being public authorities are expected to uphold fairness, equality and rule of law even while dealing with contractual matters. It is a settled principle that right to equality under Article 14 abhors arbitrariness. Public authorities have to ensure that no bias, favouritism or arbitrariness are shown during the bidding process. A transparent bidding process is much favoured by this Court to ensure that constitutional requirements are satisfied.
76. Fairness and the good faith standard ingrained in the contracts entered into by public authorities mandates such public authorities to conduct themselves in a non-arbitrary manner during the performance
of their contractual obligations.
77. The constitutional guarantee against arbitrariness as provided under Article 14, demands the State to act in a fair and reasonable manner unless public interest demands otherwise. However, the degree of
compromise of any private legitimate interest must correspond proportionately to the public interest, so claimed.
78. At this juncture, it is pertinent to remember that, by merely using grounds of public interest or loss to the treasury, the successor public authority cannot undo the work undertaken by the previous authority. Such a claim must be proven using material facts, evidence and figures. If it were otherwise, then there will remain no sanctity in the words and undertaking of the Government. Businessmen will be hesitant to enter Government contract or make any investment in furtherance of the same. Such a practice is counterproductive to the economy and the business environment in general.”

Drawing on this principle, the Supreme Court did not approve of such cancellation of tender in its entirety. 

Justice Kumar who authored the judgement of the Division Bench observed:"In the present set of facts in these two writ petitions, the situation is different." The judgement pointed out that the financial bid of M/s Sangam Mediserve Pvt. Ltd., which was found to be L-1 for two locations, namely, Gopalganj and Purnia, was erroneous. Although for the two locations, namely, Gopalganj and Purnia, there was an alternative of declaring the L-2 for those two locations as L-1 but "This could but have led to spate of litigation as many of the contenders/bidders had participated and offered their bids for number of locations."

The judgement reads:"Since it was a composite tender, any wrong assessment of any one of the bidders to be the lowest or the highest for a particular location would have had a cascading/waterfall effect on all the tenders. In the circumstances and in all fitness of things, it appears that the Bihar Pollution Control Board took a decision of cancelling the entire tender process and re-tendering it. To us, the decision does not appear to be arbitrary or fanciful or imbued with any mala fides." 

Referring to both the petitioners, Justice Kumar observed: "The parties never got an opportunity of any investment and it was only at the threshold stage when the agreement would have been entered into by the successful bidders, that this decision was taken." He concluded: "The reason for cancelling the tender, in its entirety, does not appear to us to be arbitrary or mala fide. Whether it is wise or unwise or that a better option could have been exercised by the respondents/Board has not been addressed by us for the reasons of our limitations of the jurisdiction."