Patna High Court delivered 17 judgements on October 17, 2025 in Sunil Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Ali Ahamad vs. The State of Bihar through D.R.I., Patna, Suman Devi vs. The State of Bihar, Anju Singh vs. Indian Oil Corporation Limited Through Its Managing Director and Ors., Binod Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Laliteshwar Ram vs. The State of Bihar, Ajay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Dipak Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Dharmendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Dharmendra Kumar Paswan vs. The State of Bihar, Manish Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Raj Kumar Sah vs. The State of Bihar, Dileep Chaudhary vs. The State of Bihar, Rajkishore Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Rani Nilam Devi @ Rani Nilam vs. The State of Bihar, PACS, P.D.S. Shop, Gram Panchayat Basarhi (Bodhgaya) vs. The State of Bihar and Nurul Hasan Khan vs. Union of India, Through the Director General, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (D.R.I) New Delhi.
In Sunil Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025) and in Navneel Niraj vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Dr. Anshuman delivered a 47-page long judgement dated October 17, 2025 upon hearing the two appeals, wherein, it dismissed the appeal of Navneel Niraj and set aside the the order of conviction and sentence passed against Sunil Kumar for the offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC. Justice Chaudhuri authored the judgement. The argument was concluded on October 8, 2025 and the judgment was reserved.
Sunil Kumar had filed the appeal against the judgement from the Court of Sessions Judge, West Champaran, Bettiah in the High Court on January 25, 2019. It was registered on February 21, 2019.
The first order in the case was passed on February 22, 2019 by the Division Bench of Justices Hemant Kumar Srivastava and Rajendra Kumar Mishra. The High Court order dated April 9, 2019 by Division Bench of Justices Rakesh Kumar and Prakash Chandra Jaiswal had recorded: ''It has been argued that the appellant was not named in the F.I.R., but subsequently a case was developed, as if, this appellant was also one of the associates.'' High Court's Division Bench of Justices Chakradhari Sharan Singh and Khatim Reza had recorded in its order dated June 23, 2022 that the counsel ''appearing on behalf of the appellant has submitted that the appellant was not named in the F.I.R. and subsequently, during the course of investigation, his name emerged on the basis of him having been last seen with the victim and recovery of his mobile phone from the possession of co-convict Navneel Niraj.''
Division Bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Khatim Reza had passed a 4-page long order dated April 10, 2024, wherein, it recorded that Ramakant Sharma, the senior counsel had sought suspension of sentence of the appellant/applicant during the pendency of the appeal. The appellant was in custody since
December 18, 2018. The appellant/applicant was convicted under Sections 302/34 judgment dated December 18, 2018 passed by District & Sessions Judge, West Champaran, Bettiah, in Sessions Trial No. 551 of 2017 (CIS No. 483 of 2017, G.R. Case No. 1638 of 2017), which arose out of Bettiah Muffasil P.S. case of 2017. By order dated December 22, 2018, the appellant was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/. The prayer for suspension for sentence was earlier rejected thrice by this Court and on the last occasion, despite I.A. No. 02 of 2023 having been filed for suspension of sentence, the matter was dismissed as not pressed. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that he was not named in the FIR, but subsequently, during the course of investigation, his name transpired as having been seen last with the deceased/victim. His mobile phone was said to have been recovered from the possession of co-convict/Navneel Neeraj. The case was based on circumstantial evidence. The order reads:''Considering the nature of material collected against the appellant and his period of custody as also that there are no fair chances of this appeal being heard in near future, we are inclined to suspend the sentence of the appellant/applicant.'' The I.A. No. 03 of 2024 was disposed off. The sentence of the appellant/applicant was suspended and he was directed to be released on bail, during the pendency of the appeal.
The judgement dated October 17, 2025 concluded: 76. Taking together the above-mentioned circumstances, we arrive at an irresistible conclusion that the appellant, Navneel, is the person who committed the murder of two innocent unmarried girls by setting them on fire. We do not find sufficient evidence against the appellant, Sunil Kumar. 77. As a result, the order of conviction and sentence passed against passed against the appellant, Navneel Niraj, is affirmed. Accordingly, Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 196 of 2019 is dismissed on contest.'' It added:'' 78. As we do not find sufficient material against Sunil Kumar in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 128 of 2019, the order of conviction and sentence passed against him for the offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC is hereby set aside. The appellant, Sunil Kumar, is acquitted of the charges and shall be set at liberty. The appellant, namely Sunil Kumar, is discharged from the liabilities of the bail bond and sureties. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 128 of 2019 is allowed on contest.'' The case arose out of PS. case of 2017 from Muffasil Thana, West Champaran. The only point for consideration in these appeals was as to whether the learned Sessions Judge, Bettiah was right in holding appellants guilty for committing offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC on proper appreciation of evidence.
The judgement of the High Court records:''....we find the following circumstances: (i) Navneel had a crush over Mamta (ii) Mamta’s marriage was settled with the son of one Vidyarthi Thakur. (iii) Navneel threatened Vidyarthi Thakur and his family members asking them not to fix his son’s marriage with Mamta. (iv) Mamta did not want to marry Navneel. (v) Over the same issue, Mamta and her mother was also assaulted by Navneel and Muffasil P.S. Case No. 71 of 2017 was registered against him. (vi) On 19th April, 2017 most of the villagers of village Pokhar Bhinda went to another village to attend a marriage party. (vii) All male members of the house of Mamta also attended the said marriage party. (viii) The room where Mamta and Samata were sleeping was set on fire at about 2:00 a.m. in the night. (ix) Mamta woke up as soon as some watery liquid fell on her body. She saw Navneel through the ventilator. (x) After the room was set on fire, both the girls started screaming. Hearing their cries for help, PW-4 (Bhagmuni Devi), PW-3 (Tara Devi), and the sister-in-law of Bhagmuni Devi rushed to the place of occurrence within 2–4 minutes. Tara Devi saw Navneel and some other persons fleeing from their house. (xi) Navneel was arrested on 26th April, 2017, from the Indo-Nepal Border (xii) No explanation has been offered by Navneel as to why he was at the Indo-Nepal Border on 26th April, 2017. (xiii) From the autopsy surgeon’s report, it is proved that both Mamta and Samata died due to shock resulting from severe burn injuries. (xiv) Navneel was medically examined on 27th April, 2017, and the medical officer found old, healed superficial burn injuries on different parts of his body. The medical officer opined that the said injuries were about five days old. The time of the injuries found on Navneel’s body almost tallies with the date of the incident."
Ramakant Sharma, the senior counsel on behalf of the appellant submitted the basic cannon of criminal administration of justice saying that the accused persons were not under obligation to prove their innocence in a criminal trial. It is for the prosecution to prove beyond any shadow of doubt the charge against the accused persons. He referred to an unreported decision of the Patna High Court dated 30th August, 2024, in Saurav Sharma and Anr. vs. State of Bihar Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1271 of 2017. In this case there was no eyewitness to the incident, and the prosecution’s case rested on two dying declarations given by the deceased. Upon examination of the dying declarations, it was revealed to the Court that Kamla Devi (the deceased) told each of the witnesses a different version of the incident with regard to the manner of occurrence. The said witnesses did not see the appellants at the place of occurrence or fleeing from it. In that decision, there was also no certification from the medical officer who was allegedly present at the time of recording the so-called dying declaration of deceased. Thus, from the evidence produced by the prosecution, it does not appear on record whether the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make a declaration. Moreover, there is no endorsement from the doctor that the patient was conscious when her statement was recorded by the police. He relied on para 14 of the Supreme Court's decision in Uttam vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2022) 8 SCC 576, wherein the Court laid down certain principles that the Court must consider while dealing with a case based on a dying declaration. The relevant part of the judgment reads:
“14. In Paniben v. State of Gujarat [Paniben v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 403] , on examining the entire conspectus of the law on the principles governing dying declaration, this Court had concluded thus : (SCC pp. 480-81, para 18)
“18. … (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. M.P. [Munnu Raja v. State of M.P., (1976) 3 SCC 104: 1976 SCC (Cri) 376] )
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav [State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, (1985) 1 SCC 552 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 127] ; Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar [Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar, (1983) 1 SCC 211: 1983 SCC (Cri) 169] .
(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor [K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 618 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 473] .)
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. [Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P., (1974) 4 SCC 264 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 426])
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P. [Kake Singh v. State of M.P., 1981 Supp SCC 25:1981 SCC (Cri) 645] )
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. [Ram Manorath v. State of U.P., (1981) 2 SCC 654 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 581]) (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu [State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu, 1980 Supp SCC 455 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 364] .)
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar [Surajdeo Ojha v. State
of Bihar, 1980 Supp SCC 769 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 519] .)
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (Nanhau
Ram v. State of M.P. [Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P., 1988 Supp SCC 152 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 342] )
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan [State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan, (1989) 3 SCC 390 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 585].)”
The senior counsel referred to Supreme Court's decisions. In Sardar vs. State of U.P., reported in (1954) 2 SCC 214, wherein, the Court has cautioned on the question of appreciation of dying declaration in the following paragraph: -
“15. It is settled law that it is not safe to convict an accused person merely on the evidence furnished by a dying declaration without further corroboration because such a statement is not made on oath and is not subject to cross-examination and because the maker of it might be mentally and physically in a state of confusion and might well be drawing upon his imagination while he was making the declaration.”
In Jan Mohammad and Anr. vs. State of Bihar reported in 1953(1) SCC 5, the Supreme Court observed
in paragraph 11 as under:-
“11. The other statement was recorded by Sub-Inspector Bikram Singh. We do not agree with the appellants' counsel that it is not admissible in evidence, for, in our opinion, it clearly comes under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. But its value as a piece of evidence is a different matter altogether. While we are far from suggesting that a police officer is disqualified by any rules of law from recording a dying declaration in exceptional circumstances where resort to a Magistrate or other responsible officer would mean such delay as might prevent the declaration being taken down at all, we are not satisfied why in this case, if reasonable efforts had been made, a Magistrate in the town of Gaya could not have been secured to record the dying declaration. There are other infirmities besides. The declaration was not recorded in the language of the deceased, and apparently not taken down as it was given. It was elicited in answer to questions, but the questions put have not been noted. The learned Judges say that the Sub-Inspector might have been in a hurry to hear the full statement of Nizamuddin, who was nearing his end. But that is precisely the reason why he should have immediately proceeded to write down to the dictation of Nizamuddin without lengthy interrogations. Indeed, it would have taken less time if the statement had been recorded verbatim. Nizamuddin, it must be remembered, did not die till an hour or so later. Gobind Singh, the only other witness to the declaration is not a man of any status. He was a nurse getting Rs 28, and he states that he arrived when Nizamuddin had already started making the statement.”
Supreme Court has made similar observation in paragraph no. 3 of its decision in Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2002) 6 SCC 710.
The Judgement records that even if a statement is not recorded as a dying declaration, it is relevant under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.
The counsel on behalf of the State submitted that the prosecution was able to prove the charge against the appellants beyond any shadow of doubt. Even if the dying declaration is discarded, the chain of circumstances is so closely interlinked that it leads only to the hypothesis of the appellants’ guilt and is inconsistent with their innocence.
Justice Chaudhuri observed: ''In that view of the matter, relying on a very recent decision in the case of Hare Ram Yadav v. State of Bihar, reported in (2025) 1 SCC 339, we do not find any reason to discard the testimony of such witnesses. On the same point, we may refer to another judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of A.P. v. S. Rayappa, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 512.''
Both the appeals were filed in the High Court against the common judgment passed in Sessions Trial No. 141 of 2017 corresponding to G.R. No. 1638 of 2017 registered under Section 302/328/120B of the IPC and Sessions Trial No. 551 of 2017 whereby and whereunder the appellants were convicted of offences under Section 302/34 of IPC and they were sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and fine of Rs. 50,000/.
One Bhagmuni Devi made statement before the Inspector of Police cum SHO, Mufassil P.S. of Bettiah in District of West Champaran on April 19, 2017 at about 11:30 A.M. that there was a marriage ceremony of one of her neighbours, namely, the son of Bahadur Sharma on April 19, 2017. On the previous night all the male members of the family of the informant attended “Barat” (Marriage party) of the bride-groom and left the village. In the house there were only the female members including the informant, her mother-in-law and her two daughters, namely, Mamta Kumari aged about 24 years and Samta Kumari aged about 15 years. They returned to their house from the house of the neighbour of the informant at about 11.00 P.M. and went to sleep in their room. At about 2:00 A.M. at night, the informant woke up hearing a cry (बचाओ- बचाओ). She found that the sound was coming from the eastern side room of their house. She rushed to the said room and found both Mamta and Samta burning. The entire room was under fire. She also saw under the flames of fire that appellant Navneel Niraj and five others unknown persons were fleeing away through the entrance door of the house. Then the informant and others douse the fire and admitted them to M.J.K. Hospital, Bettiah. From Bettiah Hospital, both the injured were referred to Motihari Hospital. On the way to Motihari Hospital, Samta Kumari died. Mamta Kumari was admitted to Motihari Hospital. The informant also stated that accused Navneel Niraj wanted to marry the daughter of the informant that is Mamta Kumari. Mamta was not agreeable to marry him. Due to such reason Navneel
assaulted both the informant and deceased Mamta Kumari previously with the help of a knife. Over the said issue a criminal case being Bettiah Muffasil P.S. Case No. 71 of 2017 was registered. After registration of the said case Navneel repeatedly threatened the informant and her daughter Mamta and, lastly on April 18, 2017, threatened the informant and Mamta that if he was arrested in connection with the said case, he would terminate all of them by burning. Thus, the informant alleged that as a criminal case was registered against Navneel Niraj, he along with his five unknown associates, threw petrol inside the bedroom of Mamta and Samta and set the room on fire, as a result of which both of them received serious burn injury and Samta died. Few days after registration of F.I.R., Mamta also succumbed to her injury at Motihari Hospital.
The statement of Bhagmuni Devi was recorded by the S.H.O. Bettiah Muffasil P.S was treated as F.I.R. On the basis of the said statement, formal F.I.R. was drawn against Navneel Niraj and other unknown persons under Section 302/120B of the I.P.C. The S.H.O. of the concerned Muffasil P.S. took up the case for investigation. Subsequent to his transfer his successor in office took the charge of the investigation and on
conclusion of the investigation submitted chargesheet against four accused persons, namely, Navneel Niraj, Amit @Golu, Shekhar Kumar, Naveen Singh and, Sunil Kumar. Since accused Shekhar Kumar @Vivek Kumar was juvenile on the date of offence, his record was split up and sent to the Juvenile Justice Board for trial. The remaining four accused persons were charged for the offences under Sections 302/34, 326/34, 387/34 506/34 and 120B of the I.P.C. persons pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried when charge was framed and explained to them, prosecution was called upon to produce the witnesses to prove the charge. During the trial, the prosecution examined as many as ten witnesses.
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