Supreme Court's Division Bench reverses decision of Justice Partha Sarthy which endorsed cognizance order of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Biharsharif (Nalanda)

In Parmanand Prasad vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran observed:"In any case considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of offences and the sequence therein, it appears to be a false case and we are of the opinion that in this case, the High Court ought to have invoked the power under Section 482 of the Code and should have against the petitioner. We do not think there is any justification here in this case for the petitioner to undergo trial." It allowed the prayer of the petitioner and quash the criminal proceedings. The 3-page long order was passed on April 29, 2025.  

The petitioner was an accused in a complaint case instituted at the instance of Rohit Raj, the respondent no.2-complainant pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Biharshariff, Nalanda, Bihar, or the offences punishable under 379, 504, 506, 120(B) read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) where the Court took cognizance under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC against the petitioner. His petition against this order, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was dismissed by Justice Partha Sarthy of the Patna High Court. Being aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court. The Court had stayed further proceedings in the complaint against the petitioner by its order dated November 11, 2024. 

Section 323 deals with voluntarily causing hurt. This section punishes anyone who intentionally causes harm to another person, excluding cases covered under Section 334. The punishment for this offense can be imprisonment for up to one year, a fine of up to 1,000 rupees, or both.

Section 504 deals with intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace. This section penalizes individuals who intentionally insult someone, thereby provoking them to commit a breach of the peace or other offenses. The punishment for this offense can be imprisonment for up to two years, a fine, or both.

Section 506 deals with criminal intimidation. This section addresses criminal intimidation, which includes making threats to cause death or grievous hurt, or to commit other serious offenses. The punishment for this offense can vary depending on the severity of the threat, ranging from up to two years of imprisonment and/or a fine for simple intimidation, to up to seven years of imprisonment, a fine, or both for more severe threats.

The complaint stated that the petitioner along with another person had attacked on the respondent no.2-the complainant. There are no injuries and the case inter-alia is registered under Section 307 of the IPC, which addresses the offense of attempt to murder.. The fact of the matter is that prior to one month from filing of the aforesaid complaint, the petitioner had lodged an FIR against the respondent no.2-the complainant along with another person for having attacked the petitioner who is a practicing lawyer in Patna. It is from the very same transaction, where the complainant had gone to the office of the petitioner with the another person that the complaint was raised after one month. 

In his 7-page long order dated July 11, 2024, Justice Partha Sarthy had concluded: "in the opinion of the Court, there is no illegality in the order impugned dated 5.7.2023 passed in Complaint Case no.135C of 2023 by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Biharsharif (Nalanda) taking cognizance under sections 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code".

He observed: "Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material on record, this Court finds that in the complaint (Annexure-1) filed by the complainant, there is no direct allegation against the petitioner along with one another of having abused and assaulted the complainant and others. Though the petitioner has made substantial points of an earlier FIR having been lodged by him being Bihar P.S. Case no.28 of 2023 on 8.1.2023 with respect to the occurrence of the same date as in the present complaint, the Investigating Officer having found the contents of the said FIR to be true and having submitted chargesheet no.194 of 2023 on 28.2.2023 together with the delay in filing of the instant complaint, in the opinion of the Court, these points being the defence of the petitioner could not have been looked into by the learned trial Court at the time of taking cognizance. The Court was required only to see the contents of the complaint petition together with the statement of the complainant and the witnesses examined in support of the complaint during enquiry. The Court did not have the jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the allegations made in the complaint." He made reference to the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha Rani vs. Suraj Kumar & Anr.; (1985) 2 SCC 370 and M/s. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma P. Ltd. vs. M/s. Biological E. Ltd. & Ors.; (2000) 3 SCC 269.

Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma's bail order in a rape case challenged in Supreme Court, notice issued

In Shiv Shankar Kumar @ Shiv Shankar Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2024), Patna High Court's Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma had passed a 4-page long order dated August 21, 2024 saying, "let the petitioner, above named, in the event of arrest or surrender before the court below within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of the order, be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 25,000/-(Twenty Five Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Patna in connection with Complaint Case No. 1862(C) of 2023, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and with other...". This order was passed because the petitioner had clean antecedent and the police had submitted final form in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in view of the F.I.R. dated October 9, 2017 for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 354C, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Rimpi Srivastava, the opposite party No. 2 had filed the present Complaint Case No. 1862(C) of 2023 against the petitioner in which cognizance has been taken against the petitioner vide order dated November 30, 2023.

According to the prosecution, all the accused persons including the petitioner had committed rape upon the complainant and also made a video of the same and threatened her for dire consequences. It was alleged that one of the co-accused, namely, Pintu Singh stolen her ornaments after marrying her and fled away and when the complainant inquired about him, she found that the said Pintu Singh was already married and he had five children. It has been alleged that police has connived with the petitioner. 

Now the case has reached Supreme Court. On April 29, 2025, Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed an order in XXX vs.The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025) to condone the delay and issued notice.

Supreme Court approves verdicts of Trial Court and High Court acquitting murder accused persons from Khagaria

In Saudagar Singh@Dhana Singh vs. The State of Bihar Through Chief Secretary, Home Department & Ors. (2025) Criminal Appeal No.577 of 2018, the Division Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadean heard and dismissed an appeal saying, "we are of the view that there is no good reason for us to interfere with the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court. There are concurrent findings of two Courts below, i.e., the Trial Court and the High Court." Supreme Court's order was passed on January 30, 2025. 

The appellant, a resident of Etharua, Alauli, Khagaria was a de-facto complainant who was dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 299 of 2014 by which the acquittal appeal filed by the appellant before the High Court came to be dismissed, affirming the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. 

In this case the original accused persons were put to trial for the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The deceased was the son of the appellant in the Supreme Court. The Trial Court had acquitted all the accused persons of the offence of murder. The appellant was dissatisfied with the acquittal and he preferred an appeal before the High Court. But the High Court dismissed his appeal and affirmed the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. 

In Saudagar Singh@Dhana Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. Criminal Appeal (DB) No.299 of 2014, the High Court's Division Bench of Justices V.N. Sinha and Jitendra Mohan Sharma had passed the 6-page long order on May 2, 2014.  The other respondents were: Khagaria residents, Paro Singh, Ramashish Singh and Fulchand Yadav @ Kapil Yadav @ Mukul Yadav from Srinagar, Sahebpur Kamal, Begusarai. It was authored by Justice V.N. Sinha.  

The appellant had assailed the judgment dated February 7, 2014, passed by 1st Ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Khagaria, in a Sessions Trial because as Private Respondent Nos. 2 to 4  (Paro Singh, Ramashish Singh and Fulchand Yadav @ Kapil Yadav @ Mukul Yadav) were acquitted of the charge under Section 302/34 of the IPC. 

The trial Court had concluded in paragraph 14 of the impugned judgment that on April 17, 2012 there was a police camp established in Amausi village but the police camp was not informed about the occurrence in the night of the occurrence, which is indicative of the fact that the prosecution party came to know about the incident in the morning and thereafter lodged the First Information Report on April 18, 2012 at 8:15 A.M. 

The prosecution case as set out in the fardbeyan of Saudagar Singh is  that on April 17, 2012 at about 7.30 P.M. he was at his Basa along with his son Pandav Singh, situated in Amausi Bahiyar (outer area of Amausi village). The three respondents along with two others came to the Basa of the informant armed with country made pistol and lathi, abused the informant and asked as to why did he not give Rs. 50,000/- for making Pairvi in Amausi murder case. Informant pleaded his inability to pay on the ground of being poor. Respondents forcibly caught his son Pandav Singh and dragged him towards the outer area of the village threatening both would be killed. It is alleged in the fardbeyan that informant attempted to save his son. The accused persons, however, threatened to kill both father and son but dragged the son of the informant Pandav Singh to Modo Bahiar. Informant also followed from behind and saw that the accused persons throttled his son by tying thin Gamcha (towel) in his neck. 

During trial this version was supported by Raj Kumar Singh (P.W.1) and Satya Narayan Singh (P.W.2) as it is said that on thrashing his wheat crop near the place of occurrence and P.W.2 was also present along with him. Umesh Singh (P.W.8) has also supported the occurrence. Hare Ram Singh (P.W.9) has deposed that there was alarm raised in the village (Icharua) that Pandav Singh has been killed and on hearing the alarm he along with villagers including informant (P.W.10) went to the place of occurrence.

The trial court disbelieved the prosecution case as set out by the informant in the fardbeyan as also in Court that on the date, time of occurrence he along with his son was at his hut (Basa in Amausi Bahiar) and in his presence son of the informant was dragged and taken by the accused persons and that the informant also followed the accused persons and in his presence his son was strangulated with the help of a thin Gamcha (towel) in the light of the evidence of P.W.9 in paragraph 2 that there was alarm raised in the village (Icharua) that Pandav Singh has been killed and on hearing the alarm P.W.9 along with villagers including informant had gone to the place of occurrence, which is indicative of the fact that at the time of occurrence informant was not at his Basa in Amausi Bahiar but was at his village Icharua. 

The informant was also disbelieved on the ground that in the First Information Report he had claimed that he even attempted to save his son but in paragraph 3 of his deposition informant stated that he did not try to save his son nor did he raise any alarm. The trial court has chosen not to place reliance on the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 as they failed to disclose any source of identification though P.W.2 admitted that it was a dark night and in the adjoining field there was maize crop of the height of 6 ft., as such, according to the trial court, it would not have been possible for P.Ws. 1, 2 to identify the miscreants in the dark night as in paragraph 2 P.W.2 has deposed that he was also under fear of death and that in paragraph 3 he has stated that he did not dare to light his torch. P.W.8 has been disbelieved as he has admitted that he did not make any statement in respect of the occurrence before any authority earlier. 

The informant (P.W.10), the Investigating Officer (P.W.12) the trial Court had concluded in paragraph 14 of the impugned judgment that on April 17, 2012 there was a police camp established in Amausi village but the police camp was not informed about the occurrence in the night of the occurrence, which was indicative of the fact that the prosecution party came to know about the incident in the morning and thereafter lodged the First Information Report on 18.4.2012 at 8:15 A.M.

In paragraph 18 of the impugned judgment, the trial Court had disbelieved the claim of the informant that he was an eye-witness of the occurrence with reference to the evidence of P.W. 2, which appears to be a mistake for P.W. 9 as in the earlier paragraph 13 of the judgment the trial Court with referenced to the evidence of P.W. 9 paragraph 2 had concluded that P.W. 9 and other villagers including informant went to the place of occurrence from their village after hearing alarm and thereby held that informant was not an eye-witness.

The High Court concluded: "it would appear that the trial Court has taken a plausible view of the evidence led by the prosecution party and there does not appear any perversity in appreciation of such evidence. In the circumstances, we are not inclined to proceed with the appeal any further, which is dismissed."

Supreme Court to hear criminal appeal 35 years after Trial Court verdict, 13 years post High Court's verdict in a dowry death case from Muzaffarpur

In Chinta Devi vs. The State of Bihar (2025), which awaits final hearing, the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan ordered on January 31, 2025 to list it after six weeks now that original records of the Patna High Court and Trial Court have been received by the Court. The criminal appeal was filed in the Supreme Court on July 23, 2013 and it was registered on May 13, 2014. The appeal arose from the judgement and order of Justices Aditya Kumar Trivedi and Mihir Kumar Jha of the High Court's Division Bench dated August 14, 2012. 

On October 4, 2013, the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices A. K. Patnai and J.S Khehar condoned the delay in their order and recorded that Nagendra Rai, senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that at least the quantum of sentence should be reduced as the petitioner has been convicted for life under Section 304-B. The order reads: "Issue notice limited to the question of sentence under Section 304-B, IPC."

304B  of IPC deals with dowry death. It reads:(1) Where the death of a women is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."
21. Section 304B of the I.P.C. as quoted above has to be necessarily understood in the context of the amended provision of the Evidence Act as incorporated under Section 113B, which reads as follows:-
"113-B. Presumption as to dowry death. - When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume
that such person had caused the dowry death." 

On September 5, 2014, the Division Bench of Justices Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla and Shiv Kirti Singh passed an order which reads:"We are not inclined to grant bail to the appellant at this stage. Application for bail is rejected. However, liberty is granted to the appellant to renew her bail application after six months." It rejected the bail application on May 13, 2015 as well. But on July 22, 2016, the Division Bench of Justices Pinaki Chandra Ghose and Amitava Roy heard the senior counsel for the appellant and the counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar and passed an order which reads:"For the reasons stated in the application for bail and having regard to the fact that the appellant is of 75 years of age and detained in jail custody for more than 6 years and 8 months, she is directed to be released on bail, subject to the satisfaction of the trial Court." The appellant in question is Chinta Devi, the mother-in-law who was convicted for causing the death of her dauther-in-law Indu Devi on May 22, 1987.

In its 32-page long judgement in Chinta Devi and Kukum Kumari vs. The State of Bihar Criminal Appeal (DB) No.309 of 1990, the High Court's Division Bench set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code but affirmed the conviction and sentence for offences under Section 304B/34 and Section 498A/34 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as awarded by the trial court in the impugned judgment, subject to the observations and direction made in the case of appellant Kumkum Kumari. The appeal was heard along with Dilip Kumar Sharma vs. The State of Bihar Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 312 of 1990. In the High Court, the appellants, the residents of Purshottampur, Maniyari, Muzaffarpur were represented by Shailendra Kumar Jha, Amicus Curiae and the respondent was represented by Sashi Bala Verma, APP. The latter had submitted that Indu Devi, the deceased was burnt to death by causing fire after tying her hands and feet. The alibi of the husband, appellant Dilip Kumar Sharma showing himself to be present for his treatment at Jamshedpur, was fit to be rejected. The issue relating to the appellant Kumkum Kumari being either juvenile or minor should have been gone into and enquired into had there been a prayer made by the appellant in the trial court but in absence thereof, now this matter cannot be examined much less reopened by the High Court in view of the prima facie material on record. The judgement was authored by Justice Mihir Kumar Jha. 

Both these appeals arose out of the common judgment dated June 12, 1990 in a Sessions Trial whereunder, the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur had convicted the three appellants for offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC as well as for offence under Section 304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. They ere sentenced to under rigorous imprisonment for life for both offences under Section 302/34 as well as Section 304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code and additionally they have also been convicted for rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs. 2,000/- each for the offence under Section 498A/34 of the IPC and in default of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. They were further sentenced to undergo one year rigorous imprisonment for offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as well as a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each and in default thereof to undergo rigorous imprisonment of three months.

The High Court observed: "Law also stands well settled that in order to prove the charge of Section 304B of the I.P.C., the following essential ingredients have to be proven:-
(i) the death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal
circumstances,
(ii) such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage,
(iii) she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband,
(iv) such cruelty or harassment should be for, or in connection with, demand for dowry and'
(v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the women soon before her death."
It relied on the Supreme Court's decision Kunhiabdulla & Anr. vs. State of Kerala reported in 2004(4)SCC 23 wherein ingredients to prove the charge of Section 304B of the I.P.C. have been enumerated. The High Court analyzed the evidence on record in the light of these requirements of Section 304B of the I.P.C., to infer that "there is no dearth of material to establish the death of the deceased had taken place on account of injuries caused by burn and the fact that her such burn injuries were clubbed with a mark of tying of her hands and feet by rope would automatically lead to an conclusion that her death was caused in otherwise than under normal circumstances. There is also no dispute that the marriage of the deceased with the appellant Dilip Kumar Sharma had taken place in the year 1984 and the occurrence in question had taken place on 22.5.1987 and thus, within seven years of the marriage. The third and fourth requirement of the deceased being subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or relatives of the husband is also fully satisfied in this case, inasmuch as, there are four witnesses on the point of demand of dowry and cruelty being inflicted on the decease".

The High Court concluded: The appellants who are on bail, their bail bonds are cancelled and appellant Chinta Devi and appellant Dilip Kumar Sharma are directed to surrender before the court below for serving out the rest of their sentence. The appellant Kumkum Kumari must appear before the trial court for establishing her claim of being a child/juvenile on the date of occurrence.  

Kumkum Kumari, the appellant had raised the specific plea that on the date of occurrence i.e. on May 22, 1987, she was a minor. She had adduced the evidence of Dr. Preeti Bala, the D.W.5 who had examined her as per the direction of the court on February 19, 1988 and had ascertained her age around eighteen years on the date of such examination. But the Trial Court assessed the age of Kumkum Kumari on January 30, 1989 as twenty years despite the claim of the appellant Kumkum Kumari that on January 30, 1989 when her statement was being recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., was only 15 years of age, and reject Kumkum Kumari 's claim of being a minor on the ground that the evidence of Dr. Preeti Bala, the D.W.5 was based upon certain radiological reports and records which were not proved by the defence in accordance with Evidence Act. 

The High Court observed: "This Court would find such reasons given by the trial court to be only unacceptable, inasmuch as, whenever such question of age relating to minority/juvenility would arise, there has to be necessarily an enquiry by the court itself but from the records it is evident that no such enquiry was conducted by the trial court. At the relevant point of time in the year 1989, when such an issue had arisen in the case of the appellant Kumkum Kumari, the provision of Children Act had to be followed in letter and spirit which also envisages an enquiry for ascertaining and fixing the age. Section 8 of the Bihar Children Act, 1982 which was then in vogue had prescribed for holding an enquiry for recording opinion as with regard to age for declaration of children. Similarly, provision of Section 20 of the 1982 Act also prescribes enquiry by Children's Court regarding delinquent children and Section 24 had laid down no joint trial of a child and a person of not being a child could be held. Thus the mandate of law of an enquiry by the court concerned having been not undergone by the trial court, this Court would find the sentence of Kumkum Kumari to be bad."

The Court further observed: "In this connection, we, while exercising out appellate power keeping in mind the provision of Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, would hold that there has to be a fresh enquiry as with regard to the determination of the claim of the appellant Kumkum Kumari of her being a child in terms of the Bihar Children Act, 1982 read with her being a juvenile in terms of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Such age of the appellant Kumkum Kumari must be determined children/juvenile in terms of Bihar Children Act, 1982 and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children Act, 2000, her sentence would be determined afresh in keeping with the provision of the Bihar Children Act, 1982. If however, she is not found to be a child on the date of occurrence or her juvenile in terms of the 2000 Act on the date of occurrence, her sentence, as recorded by the trial court in the impugned judgment shall remain undisturbed."

Rajeshwar Prasad Singh (P.W.6) father of Indu Devi set out the prosecution case stated that his daughter Indu Devi was married to the appellant Dilip Kumar Sharma in the year 1984. The informant also stated that his daughter had remained in her Sasural for a period of one year whereafter she had returned to her 'maika' i.e. the house of the informant. He has alleged that the appellant Kumkum Kumari sister of his son-in-law and Chinta Devi mother of his son-in-law had always been taunting and demanding dowry in the form of television, tape recorder, scooter and cash etc. In the year 1986, his daughter had returned back to her Sasural when his son-in-law the appellant Dilip Kumar Sharma after Ruksadi (second marriage) had taken the deceased Indu Devi to his house. The informant alleged that even after the second marriage of his daughter, the demand of dowry by the appellant was continued and when the same was not fulfilled, all the three appellants had kept on threatening his daughter (deceased) that if the goods demanded in dowry were not given, she (Indu Devi) would be done to death whereafter the appellant Dilip Kumar Sharma would solemnize another marriage. The informant had also specifically alleged that some four to five days prior to his recording of Fardbeyan, his daughter was assaulted and on coming to know of this assault on her, when he had gone to the house of the appellant and had requested them to send his daughter back with him to his house (informant's house) as she was his daughter. But his such request was turned down by the appellants who had stated that unless all the goods of dowry such as television, tape recorder, scooter and cash were given to them, the girl (Indu Devi) would not be allowed to go back to her house. 

The informant stated that on May 22, 1987 while he was when in village Khabra, in the house of his brother-in-law Ram Japu Ojha, he came to know that his daughter had been done to death after being burnt by her husband appellant Dilip Kumar Sharma, her sister-in-law, Kumkum Kumari and her mother-in-law Chinta Devi and on receipt of such information, he had rushed to the place of his son-in-law appellant Dilip Kumar Sharma and there he could come to know from the neighbours that at about 1.30 PM on the same day i.e. May 22, 1987, his daughter Indu Devi was burnt to death after sprinkling kerosene oil over her body and when the villagers had gone to save her (Indu Devi), they were also prevented from doing so. 

The informant had categorically alleged that the death of Indu Devi, the daughter of the informant had taken place on account of concerted overt acts on the part of the three appellants. On the basis of the Fardbeyan of the informant, the father of the victim girl Indu Devi, Maniyari P.S. Case No. 27 of 1987 was recorded for offence under Section 302/34 and 498A of IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The police after investigation had submitted the charge-sheet whereafter the case being triable by court of sessions was committed by an order dated November 17, 1987. The trial court, framed charges for offence under Section 302/34 of IPC, Section 304/34 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, had conducted the trial which, ended with the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence of all the appellants.

Supreme Court is likely to hear the appeal of Chinta Devi, the convict who is out on bail since July 2016 in March 2025. The current fate of Dilip Kumar Sharma, the husband and Kumkum Kumari, the sister-in-law who were also complicit in the death of Indu Devi for dowry is not known. 

Criminal antecedents, pendency of trial, not sufficient for denying benefit of suspension of sentence and bail: Patna High Court

In Mamlesh Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar, referring to Supreme Court's 6-page long order for suspension of sentence and release on bail in Jitendra and Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh wherein it was held that "mere pendency of the other trial where the appellant-Narendra Singh is an accused (on bail) cannot be regarded as sufficient for denying him the benefit of suspension of sentence in this case. After all, he is presumed to be innocent till found guilty", the order of Patna High Court's division bench of Justices Vipul M. Pancholi and Alok Kumar Pandey observed: "it can be said that presence of antecedents of the accused is only one of the several considerations for deciding the prayer for bail made by the appellant/accused. If the accused makes out a strong prima facie case, depending upon the fact situation and period of custody, the presence of antecedents may not be a ground to deny bail." The Criminal Appeal (DB) was filed on May 16, 2024 against conviction. It was registered May 20, 2024. The case arose out of Ara Nawada thana, Bhojpur in 2017. 

The appeal was filed under Section 374(2) read with Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment of conviction dated April 6, 2024 and the order of sentence dated April 18, 2024 rendered by the Additional Sessions Judge-XIII Bhojpur, in Sessions Trial Case, whereby the appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 27 of the Arms Act was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment (RI) for life and a fine of Rs. 50,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, the appellant was further to undergo RI for one year for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. The appellant was also sentenced to undergo RI for ten years and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, he was further convicted for three months for the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC and RI for five years and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, and, in default of payment of fine, the appellant was to undergo RI for one month for the offence punishable under Section 27 of Arms Act. All the sentence were to run concurrently.

The High Court also relied on 14 page-long judgement dated December 17, 2024 by Supreme Court's division bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Augustine George Masih in Ayub Khan vs. The State of Rajasthan, where it observed: "The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only one of the several considerations for deciding the prayer for bail made by him. In a given case, if the accused makes out a strong prima facie case, depending upon the fact situation and period of incarceration, the presence of antecedents may not be a ground to deny bail. There may be a case where a Court can grant bail only on the ground of long incarceration. The presence of antecedents may not be relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court may grant default bail. Again, the antecedents of the accused are irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending upon the peculiar facts, the Court can grant bail notwithstanding the existence of the antecedents. In such cases, the question of incorporating details of antecedents in a tabular form does not arise. If the directions in the case of Jugal Kishore are to be strictly implemented, the Court may have to adjourn the hearing of the bail applications to enable the prosecutor to submit the details in the prescribed tabular format.” The judgement of the Supreme Court was authored by Justice Oka. He observed:"No Constitutional Court can direct the Trial Courts to write orders on bail applications in a particular manner. One Judge of a Constitutional Court may be of the view that Trial courts should use a particular format. The other Judge may be of the view that another format is better." Justice Oka wrote: "A copy of this judgment shall be forwarded to the Registrar General of the High Court of Rajasthan who shall place the same before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the said Court on administrative side."

In the case of Jugal Kishore vs. State of Rajasthan (2020) 4 RLW 3386, Rajasthan High Court had issued directions to the Trial Courts, which were to be implemented while deciding bail applications. Supreme Court observed that "the decision in the case of Jugal Kishore cannot be construed as mandatory directions to our Criminal Courts. At the highest, it can be taken as a suggestion which need not be implemented in every case. No Constitutional Court can direct the Trial Courts to write orders on bail applications in a particular manner. One Judge of a Constitutional Court may be of the view that Trial courts should use a particular format. The other Judge may be of the view that another format is better." The specific directions passed in Jugal Kishore case have been set aside by the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos.11675-11676 of 2022 (Rajasthan High Court v. State of Rajasthan and Anr.). 

The High Court's order has taken note of the 9-page long order dated May 13, 2024 in Manoj Manzil vs. The State of Bihar by the High Court's division bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Jitendra Kumar which suspended the sentence and granted bail, during the pendency of the appeal, although there were eighteen cases against the Manoj Manzil from Bhojpur before Special Judge, M.P./M.L.A Court-cum-Additional Sessions Judge-III, Bhojpur at Ara in a Sessions Trial.  

The High Court observed:" if the details with regard to the antecedents of the appellant are carefully examined, we are of the view that when the appellant has been released on bail in all the cases except the present case and in majority of cases, the FIRs have been filed against him after the year 2018, when the appellant was in custody, we are of the view that false implication of the present appellant cannot be ruled out."

It also observed:"we are of the view that when there is a gross delay of 48 hours in lodging the FIR and there is a delay of three days in sending the same to the Magistrate, and more particularly in view of the evidence led by the prosecution including deposition of PW-8 (Investigating Officer), PW-6 namely, Ranjan Kumar Singh, it transpires that the police reached to the place of occurrence immediately on 27.04.2017 and prepared the seizure list, even statement of the said witness (PW-6) was recorded on the very same day despite which no FIR was lodged against the assailants. What was the version given by PW-6 on the very same day has been suppressed by the prosecution. There is a previous enmity between the parties. Even medical evidence, prima facie, does not support the version given by PW-5, informant, who has claimed to be an eye witness. Thus, looking to the aforesaid peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that the present is a case where though the prosecution has pointed out about antecedents, as observed hereinabove, majority of cases were filed when the appellant was in custody, the request made by the appellant for grant of bail and for suspension of sentence requires consideration."

The order concludes: "appellant is ordered to be released on bail during pendency of the present appeal on executing bond of Rs. 15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand) and upon furnishing two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Additional Sessions Judge-XIII Bhojpur, in Sessions Trial Case
No. 42 of 2021 arising out of Ara Nawada P.S. Case No. 150 of 2017 and the sentence imposed by the trial court is suspended so far as this appellant is concerned. It is clarified that the aforesaid observations are tentative observations made by this Court while considering the request of the appellant for grant of bail." Justice Pancholi pronounced the order on February 13, 2025. 

The fact remains after the conclusion of the hearing and subsequent to the appreciation of the arguments, Justice Pancholi repeatedly made an oral observation that a case for acquittal has been made out.

Modifying Patna High Court's conditional bail, Supreme Court says, "bail conditions could not be such, which would tantamount to execution of the maintenance order"

In Basu Das vs. The State of Bihar and Others (2024), Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of Patna High Court dealt with a case wherein the petitioner apprehended his arrest for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Section 498A was incorporated in the IPC in the year 1983 to provide for adequate punishment for any cruelty inflicted on a married woman by the husband and his relatives. The punishment is imprisonment for three years and fine. The offence is cognizable as well as non-bailable. Section 34 states that “When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone”. The other respondent is Suhagi Devi. 

The petitioner, who is husband of complainant, was accused of having assaulted her and also ousted her from the matrimonial home in association of his family members over the dowry demand. The petitioner's counsel submitted that the petitioner is an innocent person and has committed no offence. The petitioner relied upon the judgment of the High Court in the case of Md. Naimul Haque Ansari @ Naimul Haque Ansari & Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar, reported in 2006 (3) PLJR 182.

On January 15, 2024, Justice Sharan's order reads: "In that view of the matter, let the above named petitioner, be released on bail....subject to the condition as laid down under Section 438 (2) of the Cr.P.C." The order reads: "Petitioner is ready to pay Rs.3000.00 (Rupees Three Thousand) per month to the complainant in the second week of every month. If the petitioner fails to pay the aforesaid amount on two consecutive months, informant/complainant shall be at liberty to move before the learned Court below for cancelling the bail bond of the petitioner. It goes without saying that the aforesaid payment shall be subject to any order being passed in matrimonial maintenance case or any other collateral proceedings." He directed that the complainant "to furnish the bank account details of the complainant in the learned Court below. If she fails to furnish the same, the aforesaid amount will be deposited in the learned Court below which will be released in favour of the complainant after she furnishes her bank account details. If so advised, either of the parties will be at liberty to make an application before the learned Court below for referring the matter to the District Mediation Center for the purpose of reconciliation or one time settlement." 

The Supreme Court heard the appeal which arose out of Justice Sharan's judgment and order whereby, he had granted anticipatory bail to the appellant, in connection with the case filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, District-Katihar, Bihar for the offence punishable under Section-498A read with Section-34 of the IPC, had imposed a condition. The complainant's counsel submitted that the appellant is not making any payment towards her maintenance though the concerned Court has passed the order for maintaining her, and though the respondent no.2, the complainant filed the execution proceedings in that regard. 

The Court observed: "However, in our opinion, while granting anticipatory bail to the appellant, such punitive condition of making payment for maintaining the respondent no.2-complainant, could not have been passed by the High Court. It is needless to say that the bail conditions could not be such, which would tantamount to execution of the maintenance order." The Supreme Court's order reads:"In that view of the matter, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case,we are inclined to accept the present appeal and grant anticipatory bail to the present appellant." The Supreme Court's bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma passed the order on December 17, 2024.

Judgement of Additional Sessions Judge, Araria set aside, the appellants accused of the offence of attempt to rape, acquitted

In Laxhmi Yadav Vs. State of Bihar (2024), the appeal was preferred by the appellants on being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment of conviction passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Araria, whereby and whereunder the appellants/ convicts were convicted under Sections 376/511 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).  

Section 376 of IPC elaborates the punishment for rape . The word "rape" is defined under Section 375 of IPC. The punishment for committing rape is rigorous imprisonment for ten years which may extend to life imprisonment. Section 376 elaborates three sub-sections and five sub-parts. Section 376 (1) mentions the punishment for rape. Section 376 (2) states that if the persons in authority commit rape, they will also be liable to the same punishment. Section 376 (3) states that if any person rapes a woman under the age of 16 years , he will be liable to be punished for twenty years. The offence under Section 376 is a non-bailable and cognisable offence, which means that the accused can't avail bail as a matter of right. The bail to the accused would be granted at the court's discretion. 

Section 511 of the IPC deals with the punishment for attempting to commit offences that are not specifically covered under other sections. Section 511 reads: “Whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable by this Code with imprisonment for life or imprisonment, or to cause such an offence to be committed, and in such attempt does any act towards the commission of the offence, shall, where no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such attempt, be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the imprisonment for life or, as the case may be, one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence, or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both.”

This section underscores the principle that an attempt to commit a crime is, in itself, a punishable act. It highlights the importance of intent and action towards the commission of a crime, even if the crime is not completed. By penalizing attempts, Section 511 aims to curb criminal activities at their inception, thereby enhancing the overall safety and security of society.

The counsel for the appellants, Vipul Sinha, the Amicus Curiae submitted that admittedly, all the material prosecution witnesses are closely related to the informant and are highly interested. During the course of investigation, not a single independent witness has come forward to claim himself/herself to be the eye witness to the occurrence of attempt to rape on September 15, 2000 at 6 A.M. but a complaint was filed on the next day. This created doubt over the authenticy of the prosecution version. The parties were on litigating terms from before as the proceedings under Sections 107 and 144 Cr.P.C were also initiated against them from before. Hence, to settle the personal vendetta with the accused appellants, this false case was registered against them. He pointed out that the recovered clothes were not sent for any chemical examination neither from bare perusal of the records, it appears that the victim/complainant was medically examined. 

The Court's order noted that "all the prosecution witnesses are highly interested witnesses. The offence relates to attempt of rape which comes within the purview of cognizable offence and for the cognizable offence, it is prerequisites that F.I.R should be registered. But in the instant case, instead of registering an F.I.R, a complaint was filed by taking a plea that Officer-in-charge had not the registered the F.I.R. Section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C facilitates that any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information under cognizable offence, he/she may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence. Hence, this Court finds lacuna for not lodging the F.I.R in this case."

The Court's judgement records that according to the evidence of the victim, the appellants Laxmi Yadav and Bidhyanand Yadav caught hold her and torn her blouse but the said blouse has not been exhibited as material exhibit. From perusal of the prosecution evidence, it is also apparent that the victim sustained injuries on her person at the time of occurrence but there is no medical evidence on record to support and corroborate the prosecution case in respect of the fact that the victim has sustained injuries on her person.

The judgement concluded that there was an inordinate delay of one day in registering a case without explaining the delay. The prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond the shadow of all reasonable doubts with respect to the manner and motive of the occurrence. There is contradiction in the evidences of the prosecution witnesses and most of the witnesses are highly interested witnesses. Hence, the appellants are entitled to get the benefits of doubt.

In his judgment dated June 19, 2024, Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar set aside the judgement of conviction dated August 24, 2006 and order of sentence dated August 25, 2006 passed by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Araria, in Sessions Trial No. 643/2001 and 92/2001 and acquitted all the appellants of all the charges after getting the benefits of doubt.

Sedition:Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) incorporated in Section 150 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)

Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 reads: "Sedition.—Whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards, the Government estab­lished by law in India, shall be punished with im­prisonment for life, to which fine may be added, or with impris­onment which may extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine. Explanation 1.— The expression “disaffection” includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity. Explanation 2.— Comments expressing disapprobation of the meas­ures of the Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section. Explanation 3.— Comments expressing disapprobation of the admin­istrative or other action of the Government without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section."

It is noteworthy that Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) has been incorporated in Section 150 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).

Section 150 of BNS reads: "Acts endangering sovereignty, unity and integrity of India-Whoever, purposely or knowingly, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or by electronic communication or by use of financial mean, or otherwise, excites or attempts to excite, secession or armed rebellion or subversive activities, or encourages feelings of separatist activities or endangers sovereignty or unity and integrity of India; or indulges in or commits any such act shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.––Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures, or administrative or other action of the Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means without exciting or attempting to excite the activities referred to in this section."

BNS repeals 22 provisions of the IPC. It modifies 175 existing provisions and incorporates nine new Sections. BNS has 356 provisions.

In S.G. Vombatkere Vs. Union of India, a 3-judge bench of the Supreme Court led by the Chief Justice of India, Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud and Justices J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra held that as the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 124-A of Indian Penal Code (IPC) 1860 required reviewing the judgement of a Constitution Bench in Kedar Nath Singh Vs State of Bihar (1962), it would not be appropriate for a smaller bench to do the same. The petitions have been referred to a larger Constitution Bench. The order was passed on September 12, 2023. The case is mentioned as a Seven Judges Bench Matter on the Court's website.

The order reads: "There is a challenge in this batch of petitions to the constitutional validity of Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code 18601 on the ground that it is ultra vires Article 19(1)(a) and Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The constitutional validity of Section 124A IPC was tested on the basis of a challenge that it was ultra vires Article 19(1)(a) in Kedar Nath Singh Vs State of Bihar. The Constitution Bench upheld the provisions of Section 124A. 

The essence of the reasoning of the Court is contained in paragraphs 25 and 26. Paragraph 26 of the judgment is extracted below :-
“26. In view of the conflicting decisions of the Federal Court and of the Privy Council, referred to above, we have to determine whether and how far the provisions of Sections 124-A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code have to be struck down as unconstitutional. If we accept the interpretation of the Federal Court as to the gist of criminality in an alleged crime of sedition, namely, incitement to disorder or tendency or likelihood of public disorder or reasonable apprehension thereof, the section may lie within the ambit of permissible legislative restrictions on the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression. There can be no doubt that apart from the provisions of clause (2) of Article 19, Sections 124-A and 505 are clearly violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. But then we have to see how far the saving clause, namely, clause (2) of Article 19 protects the sections aforesaid. Now, as already pointed out, in terms of the amended clause (2), quoted above, the expression “in the interest of … public order” are words of great amplitude and are much more comprehensive then the expression “for the maintenance of”, as observed by this Court in the case of Virendra v. State of Punjab. Any law which is enacted in the interest of public order may be saved from the vice of constitutional invalidity. If, on the other hand, we were to hold that even without any tendency to disorder or intention to create disturbance of law and order, by the use of words written or spoken which merely create disaffection or feelings of enmity against the Government, the offence of sedition is complete, then such an interpretation of the sections would make them unconstitutional in view of Article 19(1) (a) read with clause (2). It is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way would make them consistent with the Constitution, and another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction. The provisions of the sections read as a whole, along with the explanations, make it reasonably clear that the sections aim at rendering penal only such activities as would be intended, or have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence. As already pointed out, the explanations appended to the main body of the section make it clear that criticism of public measures or comment on Government action, however strongly worded, would be within reasonable limits and would be consistent with the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression. It is only when the words, written or spoken, etc. which have the pernicious tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order that the law steps in to prevent such activities in the interest of public order. So construed, the section, in our opinion, strikes the correct balance between individual fundamental rights and the interest of public order. It is also well settled that in interpreting an enactment the Court should have regard not merely to the literal meaning of the words used, but also take into consideration the antecedent history of the legislation, its purpose and the mischief it seeks to suppress [vide (1) Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. State of Bihar and (2) R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India]. Viewed in that light, we have no hesitation in so construing the provisions of the sections impugned in these cases as to limit their application to acts involving intention or tendency to create disorder, or disturbance of law and order, or incitement to violence.”

The petitioners have sought a reference of the correctness of the decision in Kedar Nath Singh (supra) to a larger bench principally for the following reasons :
(i) The provisions of Section 124A conflate the State with the Government. Article 19(2) authorises the State to impose reasonable restrictions on the right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The State cannot be equated with the Government. Hence, a ‘disaffection’ towards Government cannot necessarily be read as seditious in character in relation to the State;
(ii) Though the Government has introduced a legislation in Parliament for the purpose of replacing the existing Penal Code which has been referred to a Standing Committee, the enactment of a new law will not obviate the need to adjudicate upon the constitutional validity of Section 124A for the simple reason that any new legislation of a penal character cannot have retrospective effect;
(iii) Section 124A is a pre-constitutional enactment and does not carry the same presumption of constitutionality as a law enacted after the Constitution was adopted;
(iv) The provisions of Section 124A have only been tested on the anvil of Article 19(1)(a). In view of the development of law that has taken place in the six decades since the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Kedar Nath Singh, it would be necessary to re-evaluate the validity of Section 124A on the basis of the doctrines which have evolved in those years particularly having a bearing on the ambit of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution; and
(v) The provisions of Section 124A were made cognizable for the first time by the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. Hence, even during colonial times, the provision was non-cognizable in nature.

The Court's order records that R Venkataramani, Attorney General for India and Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India requested the Court to defer considering whether a reference should be made to a larger bench, since Parliament is in the process of re-enacting the provisions of the Penal Code and the Bill has been placed before a Standing Committee.

The Court's order reads: "We are not inclined to accept the request for deferring the consideration of the constitutional challenge in this batch of matters. The provisions of Section 124A of the IPC continue to remain on the statute book. Even if the new law which is proposed to be placed by the Government before the legislature results in a modification of the existing provision of Section 124A, there is a presumption that a penal statute would have prospective and not retrospective effect. Existing prosecutions under Section 124A will likely be governed by that provision. Consequently, the validity of the prosecutions which have been launched or would be launched so long as Section 124A continues to remain on the statute would have to be assessed under it. The issue of the validity of the provision for the period that it continues to operate would, therefore, need to be determined. The decision of the Constitution Bench in Kedar Nath Singh (supra) which has been referred to above read down the provision of Section 124A. The Court held that the provision of Section 124A read as a whole along with the Explanations, makes it reasonably clear that it aims at rendering penal only such activities as would be intended, or have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence. Viewed in this light, the Court held that the provisions of Section 124A would be consistent with Article 19(1)(a). In the course of its discussion of the validity of the statutory provision, the Constitution Bench also came to the conclusion that:"'The Government established by law' has to be distinguished from the person's for the time being engaged in carrying on the administration. "Government established by law" is the visible symbol of the State. The very existence of the State will be in jeopardy if the Government established by law is subverted.' On this aspect, it has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the above observations do not make a distinction between the State which falls within the ambit of Article 19(2) of the Constitution and the Government, which does not."

The order noted: "At the point in time when the Constitution Bench ruled on the validity of the provision, the challenge on the ground that Section 124A violated Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution was tested only on the anvil of that article. This must be read in the backdrop of the constitutional position as laid down by this Court at the relevant time, which was that a challenge to the validity of a statutory provision on the ground that it violated a specific article in Part III, say Article 19(1)(a), would have to be adjudged on the basis of whether the law was sustainable with reference to Article 19(2) of the Constitution. There was no challenge on the ground that Section 124A violated Article 14 nor did the Constitution Bench have occasion to consider the validity of the provision against a constitutional challenge on the basis of Article The position as it has evolved in constitutional jurisprudence is that the fundamental rights do not exist in silos. There is, in other words, a coalescence of several of the rights protected by Part III. Article 14, which presents an overarching principle of reasonableness permeates Articles 19 and 21 as well. 13 The submissions which have been urged on behalf of the petitioners would warrant consideration by a Bench of at least five Judges of this Court. In our view, the appropriate course of action for a three Judge Bench of this Court would be to direct that the papers be placed before the Chief Justice of India so that, if so considered appropriate, the batch of cases can be heard by a Bench of five or more Judges, since the decision in Kedar Nath Singh’s case (supra) was rendered by a Constitution Bench." 

The order of September 12, 2023 concluded saying, "We accordingly direct the Registry to place the papers before the Chief Justice so that an appropriate decision can be taken on the administrative side for the constitution of a larger Bench in the present case."

Prior to that in pursuance of Supreme Court's order, the Government initiated the process of re-examining the provisions of Section 124A of the IPC. R Venkataramani, Attorney General for India informed the Court about it. The Court was hearing nine petitions challenging the Constitutionality of Section 124 A of the IPC relating to the offence of sedition.

Notably, in Common Cause Vs. Union of India (2016) had passed an order on September 5, 2016 saying, "we are of the considered opinion that the authorities while dealing with the offences under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code shall be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Kedar Nath Singh vs. State of Bihar [1962 (Suppl.) 3 SCR 769] Except saying so, we do not intend to deal with any other issue as we are of the considered opinion that it is not necessary to do so."

On May 9, 2022, an affidavit was filed in the Court on behalf of Union of India, averring as under: 

“3. I state and submit that so far as Section 124A is concerned, there are divergence of views expressed in public domain by various jurists, academicians, intellectuals and citizens in general. While they agree about the need for statutory provisions to deal with serious offences of divisive nature affecting the very sovereignty and integrity of the Country, acts leading to destabilizing the government established by law by means not authorised by law or prohibited by law. Requiring a penal Provision for such purposes is generally accepted by everyone in legitimate State interest. However, concerns are raised about its application and abuse for the purposes not intended by law.

4. The Hon’ble Prime Minister of India has been cognizant of various views expressed on the subject and has also periodically, in various forums, expressed his clear and unequivocal views in favour of protection of civil liberties, respect for human rights and giving meaning to the constitutionally cherished freedoms by the people of the country. He has repeatedly said that one of India’s strengths is the diverse thought streams that beautifully flourish in our country.

5. The Hon’ble PM believes that at a time when our nation is marking ‘Azadi Ka Amrit Mahotsav’ (75 years since independence) we need to, as a nation, work even harder to shed colonial baggage that has passed its utility, which includes outdated colonial laws and practices. In that spirit, the Government of India has scrapped over 1500 outdated law since 2014-15. It has also ended over 25,000 compliance burdens which were causing unnecessary hurdles to people of our country. Various offences which were causing mindless hindrances to people have been de-criminalised. This is an ongoing process. These were laws and compliances which reeked of a colonial mind set and thus have no place in today’s India.

6. The Government of India, being fully cognizant of various view being expressed on the subject of sedition and also having considered the concern of civil liberties and human rights, while committed to maintain and protect the sovereignty and integrity of this great nation, has decided to re-examine and re-consider the provision of section 124A of the Indian Penal Code which can only be done before the Competent Forum.

7. In view of the aforesaid it is this respectfully submitted that this Hon’ble Court may not invest time in examining the validity of Section 124A once again and be pleased to await the exercise of reconsideration to be undertaken by the Government of India before an appropriate forum where such reconsideration is constitutionally.”

In its order Supreme Court observed: "In view of the above, it is clear that the Union of India agrees with the prima facie opinion expressed by this Court that the rigors of Section 124A of IPC is not in tune with the current social milieu, and was intended for a time when this country was under the colonial regime. In light of the same, the Union of India may reconsider the aforesaid provision of law."

It wrote: "This Court is cognizant of security interests and integrity of the State on one hand, and the civil liberties of citizens on the other. There is a requirement to balance both sets of considerations, which is a difficult exercise. The case of the petitioners is that this provision of law dates back to 1898, and pre-dates the Constitution itself, and is being misused. The Attorney General had also, on an earlier date of hearing, given some instances of glaring misuse of this provision, like in the case of recital of the Hanuman Chalisa. Therefore, we expect that, till the re-examination of the provision is complete, it will be appropriate not to continue the usage of the aforesaid provision of law by the Governments."

The Court's direction reads: In view of the clear stand taken by the Union of India, we deem it appropriate to pass the following order in the interest of justice:
a. The interim stay granted in W.P.(Crl.)No.217/2021 along with W.P.(Crl.)No.216/2021 vide order dated 31.05.2021 shall continue to operate till further orders.
b. We hope and expect that the State and Central Governments will restrain from registering any FIR, continuing any investigation or taking any coercive measures by invoking Section 124A of IPC while the aforesaid provision of law is under consideration.
c. If any fresh case is registered under Section 124A of IPC, the affected parties are at liberty to approach the concerned Courts for appropriate relief. The Courts are requested to examine the reliefs sought, taking into account the present order passed as well as the clear stand taken by the Union of India.
d. All pending trials, appeals and proceedings with respect to the charge framed under Section 124A of IPC be kept in abeyance. Adjudication with respect to other Sections, if any, could proceed if the Courts are of the opinion that no prejudice would be caused to the accused.
e. In addition to the above, the Union of India shall be at liberty to issue the Directive as proposed and placed before us, to the State Governments/Union Territories to prevent any misuse of Section 124A of IPC.
f. The above directions may continue till further orders are passed."

On November 22 2023, the Court passed an order appointing Prasanna S. and Pooja Dhar as nodal counsel. The order reads: "The nodal counsel shall prepare a common compilation of case law, documents and written submissions filed by the parties in terms of the Circular dated 22 August 2023 issued for regulating the course of submissions in larger Bench cases. Parties shall file all submissions by 31 December 2023 with the nodal counsel. The nodal counsel shall prepare soft copies of the common compilations duly indexed in terms of the above circular. The common compilation shall be e-filed on or before 9 January 2024. The common compilation shall be made available to all the parties. The compilation shall be in the electronic form and shall be emailed to cmvc.dyc@gmail.com. The Registry shall notify the date for hearing of the reference in the month of January 2024." The case was filed on June 24, 2021. It was verified and registered on June 28, 2021.  The case is pending for final hearing before a 7-judge bench. 

Now, the Constitution Bench will have to adjudicate on the constitutionality of Section 150 of BNS along with the constitutionality of Section 124A of the IPC.