Justice Ansul quashes order of 2020 by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna in a matter of new FIR post settlement of dispute relating to dowry, marriage

In Ashok Kumar Choubey @ Ashok Choubey & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Ansul delivered a 4-page long judgement dated May 27, 2026, wherein, he concluded: "7. In view of the matter that the dispute relating to dowry and marriage was settled between the parties and the new FIR relates to allegation of molestation and continuance of this prosecution is bad in law, malafide and abuse of the process of the Court. The FIR lodged at Delhi is continuing and the same may be taken to its logical conclusion. In view thereof, order dated 14.09.2020 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna (In-charge) in Jakkanpur P.S. Case No. 346 of 2018 is hereby quashed. 8. Accordingly, the application stands allowed." The judgement was reserved on March 18, 2026 upon hearing the parties. Prior to Justivce Ansul the case was heard by Justices Prabhat Kumar Singh, Partha Sarthy, Sandeep Kumar and Soni Shrivastava. 

Notably, Justice Sandeep Kumar had stayed the proceedings of the trial court by his order dated March 27, 2025 during pendency of the application. The case was filed in the High Court on January 24, 2022 and registered on February 4, 2022 in the matter arising out of P.S.case dated July 28, 2018.

The application was filed by the petitioners for quashing the order dated September 14, 2020 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna (In-charge) in Jakkanpur P.S. Case No. 346 of 2018 whereby and whereunder the learned Court has taken cognizance under Sections 406, 420 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The prosecution case was that the informant alleged that marriage of her daughter was fixed between respective parents Ashok Kumar Choubey (petitioner no. 1) and Om Prakash Tiwari. Ring Ceremony was held at Delhi at the residence of Petitioner no. 1. On May 12, 2018, Petitioner no 1 visited Patna and informant’s husband gave Rs. 6 lakhs cash to him. On June 15, 2018 informant and her husband visited at the residence of Petitioner no. 1 where the petitioners demanded Rs. 10 lakh cash and one Honda City Car. Thereafter, marriage was cancelled on July 21, 2018. Later the marriage was attempted to be settled but due to unavoidable issues the marriage negotiations broke down. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the parties had gathered before the SHO, Rajendra Nagar on July 22, 2018 i.e. the petitioner no. 1, the proposed bridegroom and father of the bride. Both the parties gave a letter to the SHO claiming that they have decided not to get the marriage ceremony conducted and they have returned the goods of each other and they have no complaint against each other. Moreover, the girl an filed FIR in the Rajendra Nagar (New Delhi) Police Station. The counsel for the petitioner also submitted that police submitted final form in this case bearing final report dated October 31, 2019 stating that the case was found to be false. However, magistrate differing with the final form took cognizance under Section 406, 420 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Justice Ansul observed: "The crux of the allegation is that a marriage negotiation went bad. Even though some gadgets or money were exchanged but there is a document clearly showing that the parties returned their gifts and settled their dispute amicably. Still the instant case was filed and thereafter the daughter of the informant filed Central Delhi Rajendra Nagar P.S. Case No. 182 of 2018 on 19.09.2018. The lady in the FIR has not stated that the document signed by the parties on 22.07.2018 was either forged or obtained by any wrongful means. She has plainly written about the same and then has stated that she wishes to lodge the FIR in view of the later development." 

 

Supreme Court makes its interim order absolute, grants protection from coercive steps

In Manoj Kumar Nirala & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 3-page long order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....we do not propose to make any direction other than what we had observed in the notice issuing order, i.e., the petitioner shall appear before the Trial Magistrate on each and every date trial is fixed by the Trial Magistrate, unless any exemption is granted to him. The interim order is made absolute. 6. We further make it clear that so long the petitioner continues to abide by the aforesaid condition, no coercive step will be taken against him for securing his personal appearance." In the interim order dated April 9, 2026, the Court had directed that "the petitioners shall not be arrested in connection with Complaint Case No. C-889 of 2024 filed before the Chief Judicial 2 Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari in 2024 under Sections 406, 420, 387, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, subject to the condition that they appear before the trial magistrate on each fixed day." 

The SLP arose out of impugned final order dated March 12, 2026 passed by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of the Patna High Court. The counsel for Sonu Kumar, the respondent no.2-complainant placed before the Supreme Court, an order dated April 23, 2026 passed by a Coordinate Bench in Om Prakash Chhawnika @ Om Prakash Chabnika @ Om Prakash Chawnika vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. S.L.P. (Crl.) No.16221 of 20251. On perusal of the order dated April 23, 2026, the Court recorded its concurrence with the views expressed by the Coordinate Bench.

The Court observed: "....we may observe that the special leave petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order of the High Court of Judicature at Patna rejecting his application for anticipatory bail. In view of such rejection, the petitioner is now under an apprehension of being arrested by the police even though no warrant of arrest had been issued under Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. On facts, therefore, at the time the petitioner applied for anticipatory bail before the High Court, he could have no reasonable apprehension of being arrested in connection with trial of a private complaint. The petitioner invited trouble for himself by unsuccessfully applying for anticipatory bail before the High Court." 

The case had arisen out of PS. Case of 2024 from Thana-East Chanparan. In his 3-page long order dated March 12, 2026, Justice Singh had rejected the prayer for anticipatory bail of petitioners upon considering the nature of accusation and bank statement. Apprehending their arrest in a complaint case, punishable for the offence under Sections 406, 420, 504, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code, the petitioners had approached the court. As per complaint petition, these petitioners had offered to sell their 10 dhur land to the complainant on payment of total Rs.30,00,000/-, whereupon, the complainant paid total Rs.29,88,222/- to these petitioners, but despite receiving the said money, these petitioners did not execute the sale-deed and further demanded Rs. 20 Lakhs from the complainant. Thereafter, when the complainant demanded his money, these petitioners did not return the same and also threatened the complainant to kill.

The counsel for the petitioners had submitted that petitioners are innocent and committed no offence. They were simply a victim of false implication. He had submitted that petitioners have not taken any money from the opposite party no. 2 in lieu of selling his land. As a matter of fact, the complainant/opposite party no. 2 had taken ornaments from the shop of petitioners and when petitioners demanded their money, the complainant has filed this false complaint case. The counsel for the complainant/opposite party no. 2 vehemently opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail and submitted that petitioners had cheated the complainant by taking a sum of Rs. 29,88,222/- from him, out of which, complainant paid Rs. 24,88,222/- in the bank account of petitioners and Rs. 5 lakhs in cash. In support of his submission, counsel for  the opposite party no. 2 had annexed bank statement of complainant/O.P.No.2 to supplementary counter affidavit.
 

Supreme Court grants pre-arrest bail to Sardar Iqbal Singh in a cheating case with regard to money dispute

In Sardar Iqbal Singh @ Iqbal Singh Bagga @ Iqbal Singh vs.The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajesh Bindal and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 4-page long order dated March 20, 2026 allowing the appeal for pre-arrest bail.. The prayer made in the appeal was for grant of pre-arrest bail to the appellant in connection with FIR No.308/2024 dated June 26, 2024 registered at Police Station Patrakar Nagar, Patna for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 504/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 

 

The counsel for the appellant submitted that from a plain reading of the FIR, it was evident that it was a money dispute between the parties. The complainant was seeking to get the same recovered by initiating criminal process, which was nothing but misuse thereof. The state's counsel submitted that the appellant cheated the complainant. 

 

Supreme Court observed: "5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the contents of the FIR, in our opinion, the appellant deserves concession of pre-arrest bail. 6. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. In the event of arrest, the appellant shall be released on bail in connection with aforesaid FIR No.308/2024 on furnishing of bail bonds to the satisfaction of the arresting officer. Needless to add that appellant will continue to cooperate during investigation.

Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha sets aside order by Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga

In Md. Reyaz & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 11-page long judgement dated February 25, 2026, wherein, he concluded:".... by taking note of guidelines as mentioned in para nos. 1, 5 and 7 of Bhajan Lal (supra), impugned order of discharge along with cognizance order dated 28.04.2022 with all its consequential proceedings, qua, all above named appellants arising thereof as passed in in SC/ST/GR Case No. 33 of 2017 arising out of Sadar P.S. Case No. 137 of 2017, pending before learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga is hereby quashed and set aside. 13. Hence, this application stands allowed. 14. TCR (Trial Court Records), if any, be returned to the learned Trial Court alongwith the copy of this judgment." 

The quashing petition was preferred to quash the order dated April 28, 2022 passed in SC/ST/GR Case of 2017 arising out of Sadar P.S. Case of 2017 passed by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga, where learned Exclusive Special Judge for SC/ST (POA) Act rejected the application of the appellants filed under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. for not framing the charge against them for the offence under Sections 409, 420, 419, 504, 506 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 3(i)(r)(s) of the SC/ST (POA) Act.

The counsel for the appellants submitted that at the stage of framing of charge the appellants filed an application for discharge under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. praying therein that no offence under the SC/ST Act or under the IPC made out against them in the present case, as the core issue is land dispute arising out of oral agreement, where petitioner no. 2 was implicated only for the reason as he was witness of the agreement of sale, petitioner no. 3 was implicated being the wife of Md. Rakib Alam. It was submitted that there is no occasion to implicate petitioner no. 2 namely Md. Mehtab Alam @ Md. Mehtab. It was further submitted that even the abuse in the caste name as per FIR was just to aggravate the allegation as to implicate the appellants for the offences punishable under the Sections 3(i)(s), 3(i)(r) and 3(i)(w) of the
SC/ST Act. He also submitted that as per FIR, only “caste related abuse” was alleged to made during the
occurrence without specifying any caste. It was submitted that the occurrence alleged to be taken place at about 10:00 PM inside the house, therefore, allegation qua abusing in public view was not appears convincing. Neither sale deed was executed nor money was paid hence, no offence under the Indian Penal Code is made out. 

The counsel relied upon Supreme Court's decision in Murarilal Gupta vs. Gopi Singh, [(2005) 13 SCC 699. He also submitted that, in-fact informant himself was the land broker and he lodged this criminal case for putting pressure, against appellants. It was submitted that no money has been transferred in the accounts of any of the three appellants and as such they are not beneficiary out of alleged land deal. 

The counsel drew on the decision of Supreme Court in Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto vs. State of Bihar & Another, [SLP (Crl.) No. 12144 of 2025] and also State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others reported in 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335. He also relied upon the legal report of Hon’ble Supreme Court as available through Gulam Mustafa vs. State of Karnataka and Anr. [2023 SCC OnLine SC 603]. 

The paragraph no(s). 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the Keshaw Mahto Case (supra) for better understanding of the case, which is as under:-
11. This Court in Shajan Skaria vs. The State of Kerala & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249, laid down the ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act. It reads thus:-
“55. The basic ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are:
a. Accused person must not be a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; b. Accused must intentionally insult or intimidate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;
c. Accused must do so with the intent to humiliate such a person; and
d. Accused must do so at any place within public view.”
12. Section 3(1)(r) is attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation by the accused is
that the person who is subjected to is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In other words, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) cannot stand merely on the fact that the informant/complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless the insult or intimidation is with the intention to humiliate such a member of the community.
13. To put it briefly - first, the fact that the complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. Secondly, any insult or intimidation towards the complainant must be on the account of such person being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.
14. With a view to dispel any doubt and lend clarity, we deem it appropriate to mention that even mere knowledge of the fact that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r).
15. Further, for an offence to be made out under Section 3(1)(s), merely abusing a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. At the same time, saying caste name would also not constitute an offence.
16. In other words, to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(s) it would be necessary that the accused abuses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe “by the caste name” in any place within public view. Thus, the allegations must reveal that abuses were laced with caste name, or the caste name had been hurled as an abuse.
9. It would be apposite at this stage to reproduce paragraph no. 34 of the better understanding of the case, which is as under:-
34. Insofar and inasmuch as interference in cases involving the SC/ST Act is concerned, we may only point out that a 3-Judge Bench of this Court, in Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 966, has held that the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not inhibit this Court or the High Court from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Code, in the terms below: “15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The SC/ST Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands of upper-castes. The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the SC/ST Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin-fold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste-based atrocities. 
16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily civil or private where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the SC/ST Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr. P.C.”

Justice Jha referred to the paragraph no. 102 of the Supreme Court's decision in Bhajan Lal Case (supra) which reads as under:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first informant report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of nay offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent persons can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

Justice Jha observed: "11. Coming to the case in hand, it appears that dispute between the parties are civil in nature arising out of agreement related with land deal, where appellants are not the beneficiary and moreover, in view of aforesaid discussions qua making out a case for the offence under SC/ST Act, particularly in view of Keshaw Mahto Case (supra), no case for the aforesaid offence is made out."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh

In Md. Kasim vs State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 4-page long order dated February 19, 2026, wherein, it set aside order dated March 19, 2025 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh. Patna High Court  has dismissed the appellant’s prayer for bail in anticipation of arrest. 

The appellant figured as an accused in Complaint Case of 2016 dated 22nd November, 2016 under Sections 504, 406, 420, 384, 467, 468, 471, 472 and 120-B/149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act.

Supreme Court observed;"6. We are conscious that process has been initiated for declaring the appellant as a proclaimed offender owing to the fact that he was absconding for quite some time; however, we are of the considered opinion that interest of justice would be sufficiently served if the appellant is directed to appear before the trial magistrate on each and every date, unless exempted. Ordered accordingly. 7. In such view of the matter, the appeal is accepted and the impugned judgment and order is set aside. 8. It is directed that in the event of the appellant being arrested, he shall be released on bail on terms and conditions to be imposed by the trial court. 9. Needless to observe, the appellant shall not, directly or indirectly, by making inducement, threat or promise, dissuade any person acquainted with the facts of the case from disclosing such facts to the court. Also, it is made clear that unless exempted, the appellant shall appear in person before the trial magistrate on each and every day. If there be any breach, the protection granted hereby shall cease to operate."

Justice Singh's order rejected the petition for pre-arrest bail of the petitioner is dismissed as not maintainable. It had recorded the State's counsel that "petitioner has been declared absconder and process of Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. has been initiated against him to ensure his appearance in the Court as such petitioner is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail (Lavesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 8 SCC 730, State of MP v. Pradeep Sharma (2014) 2 SCC 17)

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Justice Sandeep Kumar quashes order granting sanction for prosecution by Secretary, Department of Law, Government of Bihar

In Mr. S. Kumar @ Shailesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar    & Anr.(2026), Justice Sandeep Kumar delivered a 29-page long judgement dated January 21, 2026 wherein, he quashed the order granting sanction for prosecution by Secretary, Department of Law, Government of Bihar. The judgement recorded that despite valid service of notice, none appeared on behalf of Milan Kumar Sudhaka, the opposite party no.2. Justice Kumar concluded:"33. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the impugned F.I.R vide Kadamkuan P.S. Case No.238 of 2024 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom including the impugned sanction order dated 28.12.2020 are hereby quashed qua the present petitioner. 34. Accordingly, the present quashing petition is allowed. "

The application was filed invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the order contained in memo dated December 28, 2020, passed by the Secretary, Department of Law, Government of Bihar whereby sanction for prosecution under section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was granted against the petitioner in connection with a Kadamkuan P.S. Case of 2014 registered on May 24, 2014. Subsequently, during the pendency of the petition, the petitioner moved an Interlocutory Application in 2024 seeking amendment in the prayer portion of the petition and assailed the F.I.R vide Kadamkuan P.S. Case of 2014 and also the charge-sheet of 2021 filed against the petitioner. 

The Complaint Case of 2014 was filed on April 4, 2014 in the Court of C.J.M., Patna by the complainant namely, Milan Kumar Sudhakar in the capacity of power of attorney holder of his grandmother, Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav, against two accused persons namely S. Kumar, the petitioner and one Sitaram Chaudhary. In the complaint petition, the complainant stated that power of attorney (POA) was executed in the year 2011 and 2013 by the principal one Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav in his favour to look after her property including her family home, i.e., a three storeyed building situated at B/17, Road No. 12, Rajendra Nagar, Patna since the principal along with her family was living in the United Kingdom. It was stated that the principal had acquired the property at Rajendra Nagar, Patna from her husband, namely Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav, who had passed away in the year 2008, through a registered deed in her favour, which was executed in presence of the witness namely one Kumar Indradev in the year 1985. Subsequently thep roperty was duly mutated in the name of the principal-Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav. The husband of the principal much prior to his death in the year 1999, had executed a POA in favour of the Kumar Indradev to look after the property situated at Rajendra Nagar. It was also stated that the principal Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav and her husband had two sons namely Gurvindar and Surender and one daughter Manjit Kaur.  

Later, it was alleged that on the strength of the POA when the complainant went to deposit the holding tax with the Patna Municipal Corporation, it came to his knowledge that the property at Rajendra Nagar was mutated in the name of one Kumar Gyanendra who was said to be the son of late Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav, whereas he was actually the son of the aforesaid Kumar Indradeo, who was previously given POA by the husband of the principal, i.e., late Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav in his lifetime. Upon learning of this illegal mutation, the complainant filed an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 before the Bankipur Circle Office and received a response that the name of Kumar Gyanendra was mutated vide Mutation No. 288/19A/2004-05 in Circle No. 29, Holding No. 687 in the year 2005 itself. It was alleged that the illegal mutation in favour of Kumar Gyanendra was effected asserting falsely that he was the son of Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav however, he was the son of the Kumar Indradev. The complainant accordingly informed the principal Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav and thereafter upon instructions of the aforesaid principal, the complainant filed a complaint case No. 1118 of 2012 against Kumar Indradeo and his son Kumar Gyanendra, wherein cognizance was taken under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, and 120B of the IPC against the two persons and the complainant also filed an Appeal against the illegal mutation, before the Commissioner, Patna Municipal Corporation, which was numbered as Appeal No. 17 of 2012. 

The Additional Commissioner, Patna Municipal Corporation had remanded the matter back to the Executive Officer for fresh consideration holding that the house owner was neither informed nor the succession was minutely examined. The Additional Commissioner also duly noted that the house owner (principal) Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav was shown to have passed away on November 7, 2004 whereas a VISA was issued to her on December 27, 2007. 

The complainant thereafter alleged that the petitioner-the Executive Officer in connivance with other accused persons got a report dated February 16, 2013 from the Revenue Officer wherein the Kumar Gyanendra was falsely and incorrectly shown to be the son of the husband of the principal Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav and they had deliberately ignored the documents adduced by the complainant such as, family certificate issued at Darbhanga proving that Kumar Gyanendra was not the son of the husband of the principal, i.e., late Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav. It was alleged in the complaint that subsequently, the petitioner in connivance with other accused persons passed a cryptic order wherein the further proceedings were stayed till the disposal of the Title Suit No. 507 of 2011 to unduly favour Kumar Gyanandra and his faher Kumar Indradeo. It was also alleged that the accused persons in collusion with Kumar Gyanandra and his father Kumar Indradeo also issued holding tax receipts bearing the name of Kumar Gyanandra wherein his parentage was shown incorrectly as Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav instead of his actual father Kumar Indradeo.

The C.J.M, Patna vide order dated April 5, 2014 had forwarded the complaint case under section 156(3) Cr.P.C for investigation to the Kadamkuan Police Station and thereafter the present F.I.R in Kadamkuan P.S. Case of 2014 was registered on May 24, 2014 against two accused persons including the petitioner. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was serving as the Executive Officer at the Circle Office, Bankipur, Patna Municipal Corporation and under such authority and in discharge of his duties, he passed the order of stay. He submitted that the petitioner being the Executive Officer had passed the stay order dated June 27, 2013 observing that with regard to the same property situated at Rajendra Nagar a Title Suit of 2011 was also pending and the house, in question, being in possession of Kumar Gyanendra, the revenue court had no jurisdiction to decide the title and therefore, had kept the proceeding of the case pending till the final disposal of the aforesaid Title Suit. He submitted that the core allegation as against the petitioner was that he had passed the aforesaid order dated June 27, 2013 which was cryptic in nature staying the proceedings before him till the disposal of the Title Suit in collusion with the opponents of the complainant for extraneous considerations, however he had emphasised that the order of stay was passed by the petitioner in exercise of his quasi judicial authority and the same can be assailed/appealed before the superior authority in accordance with law, which in fact was done and an appeal had been preferred before the Additional Commissioner, Patna Municipal Corporation. 

It was the contention of counsel for the  petitioner that merely passing an order for stay, in discharge of his official duties, could not lead to initiation of criminal proceeding on the basis of mere imputations of collusion with the beneficiaries of the mutation which was in fact carried out much prior to the petitioner even joining the post as the Executive Officer in the Circle Officer, Bankipur. The counsel for the petitioner pointed out that upon a bare perusal of the complaint petition, it would clearly manifest that the fraud was actually committed by Kumar Gyanendra and his father Kumar Indradeo with respect to the property of the principal situated at Rajendra Nagar and the present petitioner was in no way involved in any alleged fraud whatsoever. It was also emphasised that the mutation of the property situated at Rajendra Nagar was effected in the year 2005 itself and the consequent holding tax receipts were issued in the same year in favour of Kumar Gyanendra by the then Executive Officer one R.P Gupta and pertinently the petitioner was not posted in the aforesaid office at the relevant time when the mutation was carried.

It was submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that the impugned sanction order was passed without considering the legal opinion sought by the sanctioning authority. Since the impugned order for sanction was passed de hors the legal opinion wherein unequivocal stand had been taken that the actions of the petitioner cannot be characterized as malafide and that the petitioner never acted beyond his jurisdiction while passing the order of stay, it was therefore submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that no grounds for granting sanction against the petitioner exists in light of the section 197 Cr.P.C. which protects the public servants from vexatious prosecutions and consequently the impugned order of sanction for prosecution is bad in law and cannot be sustained. 

In support of his submissions the counsel drew strength from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of D. Devaraja vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain, (2020) 7 SCC 695, B. Saha vs. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177 and Gurmeet Kaur vs. Devender Gupta, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3761.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order of sanction was passed in complete violation of the provisions contained in section 2 and 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Adverting to its provisions, he submitted that the petitioner acting as a quasi judicial authority was shielded and no civil or criminal proceeding against the petitioner could have been initiated since the actions of the petitioner was clearly within the ambit of bona fide discharge of his official duties. The counsel for the petitioner had also drawn attention of the High Court to section 77 of the Indian Penal Code to argue that the impugned sanction is in the teeth of the aforesaid section 77 of the IPC. He pointed that the complainant on the strength of the POA in his favour had earlier instituted a separate complaint case bearing complaint case no. 1118 of 2012 against Kumar Gyanendra and his father Kumar Indradeo, wherein the Trial Court had already taken cognizance. In the earlier complaint case the petitioner was not arrayed as an accused. It was only subsequently that the complainant had instituted this complaint case against the petitioner being the Executive Officer and the co-accused being the Revenue Officer in the year 2014. He submitted that the present criminal proceedings was initiated only to settle a personal score among the parties who are fighting over the property at Rajendra Nagar and no prima facie case is made out against the petitioner. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Awdesh Sriwastava vs. State of M.P. reported as 2025 SCC OnLine SC 693.

Justice Kumar observed: "The petitioner while discharging his duty as the Executive Officer in the Circle Office, Bankipur, Patna had passed the order dated 27.06.2013 staying the proceedings of Mutation case till the conclusion of the Title Suit No.507 of 2011 since the same parties were ventilating their dispute in the aforesaid title suit for the very same property. There is no dispute that the aforesaid order dated 27.06.2013 has been passed by the petitioner in discharge of his official duty upon remand from the appellate authority." He referred to the decisions that have examined the question of applicability of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 to revenue authorities. In this regard, the High Court of Chhattisgarh in Rajkumar Tamboli vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. reported as 2024 SCC OnLine Chh 3651 delved deeply into the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 and its applicability to revenue officers.

Justice Kumar observed: "....it is quite vivid from definition of Section 2 of the Act of 1985 that the petitioner was empowered to give definite judgment in revenue proceeding. The petitioner at the relevant point of time was empowered to pass an order of mutation of subject land in the names of purchasers (co-accused) under Sections 178 and 110 of the Code respectively and he would fall within the meaning of person under Section 2(a) of the Act of 1985 who is empowered by law to give definitive judgment in revenue proceeding. 23. The question for consideration would be, whether the petitioners are entitled for protection under Section 3 of the Act of 1985 ?"

In Union of India vs. Upendra Singh (1994) 3 SCC 357, the Supreme Court held that even an officer, while discharging judicial or quasi-judicial duties, is amenable to the disciplinary proceedings into his conduct in discharge of the duty.

Justice Kumar underlined that "it is patently clear that the petitioner would fall within the ambit of protections afforded by the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. The protection is obviously not absolute and the State or appropriate authority could proceed against an erring officers in terms of section 3(2) of the aforesaid Act. 31. The order of stay passed by the petitioner which forms the basis for initiating the criminal prosecution is appealable before the appellate authority and any error committed by the petitioner therein could have been rectified by the appellate authority. From the records, it appears that an appeal was preferred agianst the order passed by the petitioner. The present petitioner by his order had stayed the mutation proceedings which was before him on remand from the appellate authority since there was a dispute over the title of the subject property. If the parties to the mutation proceedings were aggrieved by the order of stay passed by the petitioner then they could have availed remedies available under the law to assail the aforesaid order of stay. A bald statement that the order of stay passed by the petitioner being in favour of one of the parties to the mutation proceedings would not suffice to initiate a criminal prosecution against the petitioner. The criminal prosecution launched solely for passing an order of stay by the petitioner while discharging his duties, in the mutation proceedings simpliciter would squarely amount to malafide prosecution. 32. Further, in the present case, the sanction order is totally silent as to the circumstances under which the protection afforded to the petitioner from vexatious prosecution are required to be stripped. Moreover, the impugned sanction order also makes no mention of any material which would warrant initiation of criminal proceeding against the petitioner for staying the mutation case proceeding until the conclusion of the Title Suit which existed for the very same subject property. The substance of why a sanction is required to be passed for criminal proceedings was however entirely missed and skipped by the sanctioning authority, more so, when the petitioner was protected under the ambit of Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Therefore the impugned order of sanction suffers from clear non-application of mind and can not be sustained."

Supreme Court reverses judgement by Justice Chandrashekhar Jha in a Arms Act case

In Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R L Chongthu vs. State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh delivered a 46-page long judgment dated November 20, 2025, wherein, it reversed the judgement by Justice Chandrashekhar Jha of Patna High Court. The judgement was authored by Justice Karol. 

The appellant was aggrieved by the refusal of Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court to exercise his inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in terms of judgment and order dated May, 9, 2025 passed in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R L Chongthu vs. State of Bihar (2025), wherein the prayer was made to quash and order taking cognizance dated June 1,2022 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sahasra in connection with Sahasra Sadar P.S. case of 2005 dated April 24, 2005. 

In his 24-page long judgement, Justice Jha had concluded:"....this Court does not find any illegality in the impugned order taking cognizance dated 01.06.2022 as passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa in connection with Saharsa Sadar P.S. Case No. 112 of 2005 against petitioner for the offences under Sections 109, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the IPC and Section 30 of the Arms Act and, therefore, same does not require interference by this Court. 34. Hence, the present quashing petition stands dismissed as being devoid of any merit, including any pending petition, if any. 35. As this case was lodged in 2003 for which cognizance was taken in the year 2022, whereafter almost no progress in the trial was made in last more than two years, the learned trial court is directed to conclude the trial expeditiously, preferably within six months of this order after taking this matter on Board, on day-to-day basis."

The appellant had approached the High Court praying for for quashing of cognizance order dated June 1, 2022 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa whereby the Jurisdictional Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 109, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code as well as Section 30 of the Arms Act and for quashing the supplementary charge-sheet of 2020 submitted under Sections 109, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the IPC and Sections 30 of the Arms Act, as the same is based on no fresh materials was found since the filing of the original charge-sheet of 2005 as well as first supplementary charge-sheet of 2006 where the allegation was not found true. He had also prayed for quashing of the sanction order dated April 27, 2022 granted by the State Government under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the prosecution of the petitioner in connection with Saharsa P.S.Case of 2005, as the same was not in conformity with the judgment of the Supreme Court. 

The petitioner did not get any relief from the High Court. Although belated he got relief from the Supreme Court. 

Referring to Justice Jha's judgement, the Supreme Court recorded:"The High Court rejected the application under Section 482, CrPC observing that various illegalities and irregularities pervaded the issuance of licenses by the appellant, in as much as certain persons who were physically unfit, were issued licenses; in some of the applications approved, the bodyguard of the appellant was listed in the “column of care”; in yet others licenses were issued a mere 2 days after calling for the police report, in which time the said report was obviously not furnished."

Unlike Justice Jha, Justice Karol observed:"....why the investigation in this case took more than a decade to be completed is lost on us. Apparently, it was found that the licenses issued by the appellant were also issued to a fictitious person even at the time when the order for further investigation was taken. Out of the 16 accused persons one person stood charge-sheeted in terms of the first chargesheet and the remaining, excluding the appellant and one Abhishek, were charge-sheeted by way of the second chargesheet. When only the actions of the appellant were subject matter of investigation by the time permission was taken as above- 11 years is quite obviously a timeline afflicted by delay. No reason is forthcoming for this extended period either in the chargesheet or at the instance of the Court having taken cognizance of such chargesheet. In other words, the appellant has had the cloud of a criminal investigation hanging over him for all these years. The judgments above referred to supra hold unequivocally that investigation is covered under the right to speedy trial and it is also held therein, that violation of this right van strike at the root of the investigation itself, leading it to be quashed. At the same time, it must be said that timelines cannot be set in stone for an investigation to be completed nor can outer limit be prescribed within which necessarily, an investigation must be drawn to a close. This is evidenced by the fact that further investigation or rather permission therefore, can be granted even after commencement of trial. [See: Rampal Gautam v The State (2016) Where though, Article 21 would be impacted would be a situation where, like in the present matter, no reason justifiable in nature, can be understood from record for the investigation having taken a large amount of time. The accused cannot be made to suffer endlessly with this threat of continuing investigation and eventual trial proceedings bearing over their everyday existence." 

Justice Karol concluded:"On this count, prosecution against the appellant is liable to be quashed. The conclusion is that even though, in the one case that has been consistently highlighted by the State, it cannot be said that the appellant acted within the scope of authority as given by Section 13(2A) of the Arms Act, but given that the administrative authorities have already discharged him, that issue need not be taken further. On the issue of sanction being improper and large delay in filing of chargesheet as also consequent action, we have decided in favour of the appellant. The appeal is accordingly allowed."

The petitioner's prayer to the effect that his prosecution was not in conformity with the judgment of the Supreme Court stands vindicated. 

The Supreme Court has issued the following directions –

(i) ‘Leave of the court’ to file a supplementary chargesheet, is a part of Section 173(8) CrPC. That being the position, the Court is not rendered functus officio having granted such permission. Since the further investigation is being made with the leave of the Court, judicial stewardship/control thereof, is a function which the Court must perform.

(ii) Reasons are indispensable to the proper functioning of the machinery of criminal law. They form the bedrock of fairness, transparency, and accountability in the justice system. If the Court finds or the accused alleges (obviously with proof and reason to substantiate the allegation) that there is a large gap between the first information report and the culminating chargesheet, it is bound to seek an explanation from the investigating agency and satisfy itself to the propriety of the explanation so furnished.

The direction above does not come based on this case alone. The Court has noticed on many unfortunate occasions that there is massive delay in filing chargesheet/taking cognizance etc. The Court has time and again, in its pronouncements underscored the necessity of speedy investigation and trial as being important for the accused, victim and the society. However, for a variety of reasons there is still a lag in the translation of this recognition into a reality.

(iii) While it is well acknowledged and recognised that the process of investigation has many moving parts and is therefore impractical to have strict timelines in place, at the same time, the discussion made in the earlier part of this Judgment, clearly establishes that investigations cannot continue endlessly. The accused is not out of place to expect, after a certain point in time, certainty- about the charges against him, giving him ample time to preparing plead his defence. If investigation into a particular offence has continued for a period that appears to be unduly long, that too without adequate justification, such as in this case, the accused or the complainant both, shall be at liberty to approach the High Court under Section 528 BNSS/482 CrPC, seeking an update on the investigation or, if the doors of the High Court have been knocked by the accused, quashing. It is clarified that delay in completion of investigation will only function as one of the grounds, and the Court, if in its wisdom, decides to entertain this application, other grounds will also have to be considered.

(iv) Reasons are not only important in the judicial sphere, but they are equally essential in administrative matters particularly in matters such as sanction for they open the gateway to greater consequences. Application of mind by the authorities granting or denying sanction must be easily visible including consideration of the evidence placed before it in arriving at the conclusion. 

Supreme Court sets aside bail denial order by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan

In Sonu Kumar @ Sonu Kumar Chaudhary vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Suryakant and Joymalya Bagchi  passed a 4-page long order dated October 31, 2025, wherein, it granted leave and set aside the 2-page long order dated March 17, 2025 by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of Patna High Court. The Supreme Court concluded:"It is, however, not in dispute that further investigation is still going on and the appellant, after he was subjected to custodial interrogation, is presently lodged in judicial custody. In such circumstances, when investigation is yet to be completed, the conclusion of trial will doubtless take some time, and the appellant has already served some time in custody, it seems to us that the appellant can be released on bail at this stage. 3. Consequently, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed. "

The appellant had prayed for enlargement on bail in FIR of 2019 registered at P.S. Bettiah Town, District West Champaran under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 472, 120(B)/34 IPC and Section 3 of the Bihar Protection of Interest of Depositors Act, 2002. The appellant, his brother and other family members had constituted a Cooperative Society, known as SWARN lndia Multi State Credit Co-Operative Society Ltd.. The investors were allured to invest in the Society with a promise of handsome returns. The amounts so deposited were, however, allegedly misappropriated; leading to registration of multiple FIRs against the appellant, his brother and other associates. The subject FIR was one of those cases in which the appellant was arrested on January 16, 2024. There were about nine other cases registered against him. The appellant claimed that he was neither a Director nor an authorised signatory of a bank account of the Society.  The State counsel pointed out that as per the allegations contained in the FIR, the appellant was the Managing Director of the Society. 

Upon hearing the case in the High Court, Justice Sharan noted that the petitioner along with other co-accused were said to have defalcated the money of the customers deposited in the Company Swarn India Multi Estate Credit Cooperative Society Limited. APP for the State vehemently opposed the bail petition. Justice Sharam concluded: "6. In the facts and circumstances of the case and the criminal antecedents of the petitioner, I am not inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail. The prayer for bail of the petitioner is hereby rejected at present." Supreme Court has set aside this order.  

Justice Arun Kumar Jha dismisses writ petition, imposes cost of Rs 50, 000, petitioner's counsel tenders apology to High Court

In Vinod Kumar Mishra vs. The State of Bihar through the Director General of Police, Saran & Ors. (2025), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court passed a 5-page long judgement dated October 15, 2025. The judgement concluded:''I am of the considered opinion that the concealment/suppression of vital facts makes the petition of the petitioner liable to be dismissed but with substantive cost and reliance could be placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of General Manager, Haryana Roadways vs. Jai Bhagwan and Anr., (2008) 4 SCC 127 wherein for suppression of facts, exemplary cost of Rs.1,00,000/- was imposed. 10. In the light of aforesaid discussion, the present petition is dismissed with cost. The cost is quantified at Rs.50,000/-, which shall be paid by the petitioner in the coffer of Patna High Court Legal Services Committee within a period of four weeks from today. If not paid, the Registry is directed to recover the same by taking appropriate action against the petitioner.'' 

The other seven Respondents were: Inspector General of Police, Saran, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Saran, S.S.P., Saran, Rural SP, Saran Bihar, DSP, Chhapra,Saran, Officer In Charge, Chhapra, Saran and Awadh Bihari Pandey

The writ petition was filed for quashing the FIR in connection with a Chapra Town P.S. case of 2023 dated June 18,  2023 registered under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code.

The judgement recorded that from perusal of record, it appears that by order dated June 24, 2025, on the prayer of counsel for the petitioner, the Coordinate Bench ordered that till further orders, the petitioner would not be arrested in connection with Chhapra Town P.S. case of 2023. Awadh Bihari Pandey, the informant of Chapra Town P.S. case of 2023 was made party as Respondent no.8 and he appeared in this case and filed counter affidavit as well as one I.A.No.01 of 2025 for vacating the interim order of stay dated June 24, 2025 whereby arrest of the petitioner was stayed till further orders. 

It was submitted on record by Awadh Bihari Pandey, the Respondent no. 8 that the petitioner had not approached the High Court with clean hands and earlier the petitioner had moved to the High Court by filing Cr. Misc. No.67248/2023 seeking bail. By order dated December 13, 2023, the provisional bail was granted to the petitioner with direction to pay Rs.32.10 lacs to the informant within four months. But due to default of the petitioner, even after repeated extensions, provisional bail granted to the petitioner, vide order dated December 13, 2023, was cancelled and the petitioner was directed to surrender before the learned court below immediately vide order dated May 9, 2025 passed in Cr. Misc. No.67248/2023. But the petitioner concealed this fact and filed Cr.W.J.C.No.1304/2025 and got a favourable order staying his arrest. The same was in complete violation of the orders of the High Court dated May 9, 2025 passed in Cr.Misc. No.67248 of 2023. 

The counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that there was no requirement while filing the writ petition for mentioning the fact about dismissal of bail petition or orders passed by the Coordinate Bench about grant of provisional bail. The counsel, however, tenders apology for inconvenience caused to the High Court.

Justice Jha observed: ''When the petitioner approached this Court seeking quashing of the FIR and prayed for stay of his arrest, the petitioner was duty bound to apprise this Court regarding all the facts in connection with the FIR for which quashing has been sought. A bare reading of two orders of this Court dated 09.05.2025 and 24.06.2025 passed in Cr. Misc. No.67248 of 2023 and Cr.W.J.C.No.1304 of 2025, respectively, makes it abundantly clear that as soon as the petitioner did not get any favourable order in Cr. Misc. No.67248 of 2023, he moved before this Court by filing the present writ petition concealing this important fact about dismissal of his bail petition and other directions of the Coordinate Bench in Cr. Misc. No. 67248 of 2023. The act of the petitioner in not mentioning the facts about Cr. Misc. No.67248 of 2023 amounts to active concealment and playing hide and seek with this Court. The petitioner is guilty of not approaching the Court with clean hands and playing fraud upon it.'' 

The High Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath & Ors., AIR 1994 SC 853, wherein, the observation of the Chief Justice Edward Coke of England made about three centuries ago was quoted. It reads: “fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal” and held that the courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties.  

Drawing in this decision, Justice Jha observed: One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands and finally their Lordships held that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.

Supreme Court reverses anticipatory bail rejection order by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan

In Dharmendra Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Chief Justice B.R Gavai and Justice K. Vinod Chandran passed a 2-page long order dated October 13, 2025 after condoning the delay. The order reads:'' 4. By way of an ad-interim relief, in the event of arrest, the petitioner is directed to be released on
bail...". It added: ''Needless to state that the petitioner will cooperate with the investigation and report to the Investigating Officer as and when directed to do so.'' The SLP (criminal) arose out of impugned final order dated December 2, 2024 by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of Patna High Court

In Dharmendra Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2024), Justice Sharan had passed a 2-page long order dated December 2, 2024, wherein, he had concluded:''6. Considering the facts and circumstances of case and the nature of offence, I am not inclined to enlarge the petitioner on anticipatory bail. The prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner is hereby rejected.''

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in Nautan P.S. Case No. 225 of 2023 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 409, 420, 467, 468/34 of the Indian Penal Code. According to the prosecution case, the petitioner along with other co-accused persons are said to have committed fraud of Rs.11 lakh by opening various savings accounts, term deposits, other accounts and issuing fake deposit certificates. 

The senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was innocent and was falsely implicated in this case. The allegation levelled against the petitioner was not specific rather general and omnibus in nature. He submitted that in terms of Clause7 (xii) of the Uttar Bihar Gramin Bank Accountability Policy, the accountability of an employee is: “No accountability will be fixed for any lapse, which has not been pointed out in the two successive audit reports or four years from the date of the event (i.e. occurrence of lapse) whichever is later”. He also submitted that the departmental proceeding was still going on. The petitioner had one criminal antecedent. The APP for the State as well as the counsel for the Regional Manager, Uttar Bihar Gramin Bank, Regional Office, Siwan, Bihar, the opposite party no. 2 had opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail and submitted that the investigation was still going on.

Supreme Court reverses anticipatory bail rejection order by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan in a case from Khagaria

In Abhinav Pandey vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and Vipul M. Pancholi passed an order dated September 8, 2025, wherein, bail was granted to the petitioner. The order reads: "In the meanwhile, in the event of arrest of the petitioner, he shall be released on bail in connection with the FIR No. 1019 of 2021, registered with Police Station-Mufassil, District-Khagaria, Bihar, if not required in any other case, subject to the satisfaction of the Arresting officer/ Trial Court. 

In his order dated February 7, 2025, Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of Patna High Court had denied anticipatory bail to the petitioner. The petitioner had approached the High Court as he apprehende his arrest in a case registered for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 147 read with section 120B of Indian Penal Code. 

Earlier also the anticipatory bail application of the petitioner had filed before this Court in Cr. Misc. No. 5565 of 2023 but he had withdrawn and the anticipatory bail application of the petitioner was dismissed with a liberty to surrender before the court below and seek regular bail. Justice Sharan had observed: "Now, the petitioner had not surrendered before the court below and filed the second anticipatory bail application on the new ground. Considering the aforesaid fact, I am not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is dismissed.". Supreme Court has reversed this order. 

Supreme Court upholds order by Justice Soni Shrivastava refusing grant of anticipatory bail

In Kauleshwar Prasad Sah vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court’s Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 2-page long order dated August 25, 2025 in the case related to a scam in the University and the alleged financial defraud by all the petitioners. . It reads:”It is also a fact that the special leave petitions preferred by Mr. Jitendra Kumar (SLP (Crl.) No.7000/2025 @ D.No.22186/2025), Mr. Manoj Gupta(SLP (Crl.) No. 7168/2025 @ D.No. 24324/2025), Dr. Ashok Kumar (SLP (Crl.) No.8245/2025 @ D.No.27267/2025) and Mr. Sunil Agarwal(SLP (Crl.) No.8215/2025 @ D.No.27269 of 2025) asking pre-arrest bail have been rejected by this Court. 2) Considering all these aspects, we are not inclined to grant anticipatory bail as prayed for. Accordingly, the special leave petitions stand rejected….3) However, the officers are at liberty to take recourse as permissible.” The special leave to appeal (Criminal) arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated April 17, 2025 in Kauleshwar Prasad Sah vs. The State of Bihar through Spl. Vigilance Unit, Patna, Bihar passed by the Patna High Court. 

In Kauleshwar Prasad Sah vs. The State of Bihar through Spl. Vigilance Unit, Patna, Bihar (2025), in her 7-page long order dated April 17, 2025, Justice Soni Srivastava of Patna High Court had concluded:”…it appears that there is strong allegation of conspiracy as against the present petitioner showing his involvement and also considering the fact that similarly situated co-accused persons have already been denied the anticipatory bail by co-ordinate benches of this Court vide order dated 13.02.2025 passed in Cr.Misc. No. 74836 of 2024, Vide order dated 08.04.2025 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 32493 of 2024, Cr. Misc. No. 22548 of 2024, Cr. Misc No. 33718 of 2024, Cr. Misc No. 31143 of 2024, Cr. Misc. No. 32191 of 2024, Cr. Misc. No. 32719 of 2024 and Cr. Misc. No. 83228 of 2024 and also considering the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Devinder Kumar Bansal (Supra), I am not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner and his prayer for bail is hereby, rejected. 12. This application stands dismissed.” 

Justice Srivastava referred to Supreme Court’s paragraphs 23-26 of the decision in Devinder Kumar Bansal vs. The State of Punjab (Special Leave to Appeal (CRL). No.3247 of 2025) reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 291. It reads:  “23. The presumption of innocence, by itself, cannot be the sole consideration for grant of anticipatory bail. The presumption of innocence is one of the considerations, which the court should keep in mind while considering the plea for anticipatory bail. The salutary rule is to balance the cause of the accused and the cause of the public justice. Over solicitous homage to the accused's liberty can, sometimes, defeat the cause of public justice. 24. If liberty is to be denied to an accused to ensure corruption free society, then the Courts should not hesitate in denying such liberty. Where overwhelming considerations in the nature of aforesaid require denial of anticipatory bail, it has to be denied. It is altogether a different thing to say that once the investigation is over and charge sheet is filed, the Court may consider to grant regular bail to a public servant- accused of indulging in corruption. 25. Avarice is a common frailty of mankind and Robert Walpole's famous pronouncement that all men have their price, notwithstanding the un-savoury cynicism that it suggests, is not very far from truth. As far back as more than two centuries ago, it was Burke who cautioned: "Among a people generally corrupt, liberty cannot last long". In more recent years, Romain Rolland lamented that France fell. because there was corruption without indignation. Corruption has, in it, very dangerous potentialities. Corruption, a word of wide connotation has, in respect of almost all the spheres of our day to day life, all the world over, the limited meaning of allowing decisions and actions to be influenced not by the rights or wrongs of a case but by the prospects of monetary gains or other selfish considerations. 26. If even a fraction of what was the vox pupuli about the magnitude of corruption to be true, then it would not be far removed from the truth, that it is the rampant corruption indulged in with impunity by highly placed persons that has led to economic unrest in this country. If one is asked to name one sole factor that effectively arrested the progress of our society to prosperity, undeniably it is corruption. If the society in a developing country faces a menace greater than even the one from the hired assassins to its law and order; then that is from the corrupt elements at the higher echelons of the Government and of the political parties.” 

The petitioner had approached the Court apprehending his arrest in connection with Special Case No. 48 of 2021 arising out of Special Vigilance Unit (SVU) P.S. Case No. 02 of 2021 registered under sections 109, 120B, 201, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471,506 of the Indian Penal Code as well as sections 13(2) r/w 13 (1) (b) r/w 12 of Prevention of Corruption Act. As per the FIR, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, while working as the Vice Chancellor, Magadh University, Bodh Gaya hatched a criminal conspiracy with the assistance of Finance Officer, Veer Kunwar Singh University, the Registrar, Patliputra University private firms namely, Ms Poorva Graphics & M/s XLICT software Pvt. Ltd and other unknown accused persons and fraudulently and dishonestly cheated the Government to the extent of Rs. 20 crores during the year 2019-21 in the matter of purchase of various items related to the use of University during examination and otherwise, it is alleged that ignoring the advice of the competent officer, the accused persons raised bill to the extent of Rs. 20 crores from Magadh University and Veer Kunwar Singh University without assessing the requirement and violating the tender procedure and justification of rates etc. The Finance Officer, Veer Kunwar Singh University and Registrar Patliputra University cleared all the fraudulent bills of the private firms. The petitioner, who was officiating as the Finance Officer of Patliputra University, was deputed to Magadh University as Finance Officer by the order of the Chancellor/Governor of Bihar where he served in the capacity of Finance Officer from April 15, 2021 to July 4, 2021. The allegation against the petitioner was that he connived with the main accused, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the then Vice Chancellor and other accused persons to clear the fraudulent bills of accused nos. 3 and 4. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted before the High Court that from bare perusal of the First Information Report, it can be inferred at the outset that the petitioner is not named in the FIR and his name has surfaced during the investigation and the charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioner on 20.03.2023. It has been further submitted on behalf of the petitioner that petitioner is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the present case. It was further submitted that being the Finance Officer, the petitioner is bound to act in accordance with the orders of the Vice Chancellor. Section 16 of the Act also reflects that the Finance Officer has no role in making any financial decisions for the University, rather he holds a formal role as a co-signatory upon the payment of cheques. It has been further submitted that the petitioner had lodged complaints with secretary, Governor Secretariat about the mishaps of the University long before the initiation of the present case. Annexure-4 to the present application has been brought on record to substantiate the said submission. 

The Special Public Prosecutor for the Vigilance (SVU) opposed the prayer for bail and has drawn the attention of this Court to the averments made in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the SVU. It has been stated in paragraphs-10, 13 and 14 of the counter affidavit that the petitioner was in connivance with the prime accused and other accused persons. There was a fraud in supply made by the accused nos. 2 and 3 and knowing these facts the Examination Controller and the petitioner signed the cheques. Hence, the petitioner is a part of criminal conspiracy due to which huge amount of Government of Bihar was misappropriated. The counsel for the Special P.P. for the SVU hence, submits that a huge loss has been caused to the state exchequer and the petitioner is part of the said conspiracy. The attention of the Court has also been drawn to the fact that the anticipatory bail application of several similarly situated accused persons have already been rejected by the High Court. In support of their contentions, the counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments in Santosh So Dwarkadas Fafat vs. State of Maharastra (2017) 9 SCC 714, Siddharth vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2022) 1 SCC 676, Aman Preet Singh vs. CBI through Director 2021 SCC Online SC 941,  Satender Kumar Antil vs. CBI & Anr. Reported as (2021) 10 SCC 773 and Mahdoom Bava vs. CBI reported as 2023 SCC OnLine SC 299. 

Supreme Court stays proceedings before Trial Court, Justice Bibek Chaudhuri refused to quash FIR in a private dispute under corporate law

In Sarita Bajaj & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed an order dated July 18, 2025 staying further proceedings before the Trial Court. Justice Bibek Chaudhuri of Patna High Court had passed a 20-page long judgement dated May 9, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"....I have no other alternative but to hold that in the instant case, the F.I.R. being Kotwali P. S. Case No. 45 of 2024, dated 18th August, 2023, cannot be quashed. 32. The issue involving forgery and a criminal investigation has not been complained of by any instrumentality of the State. The dispute is absolutely private in nature involving two full brothers and their families in respect of partition and subsequent financial irregularity of family-owned companies. Therefore, no writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India lies. 33. The instant writ petition is, thus, dismissed on contest."

Drawing on the judgement passed by National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), Principal Bench, New Delhi, Justice Chaudhari was "convinced that the allegation made by the Petitioner for outstanding loan is frivolous as the Learned Court has already adjudicated the matter in detail and has come to its finding."  He observed:"The writ courts often do not delve deeply into factual disputes and the evidences as to whether the signatures done on Securities Transfer Form (SH-4) was fabricated or not and so the Court can not come to the conclusion as to whether the signature is forged or not but has come across the Judgement of NCLAT, New Delhi where it is seen that the Petitioners were previously capable of producing false document."

Sarita Bajaj, the Petitioner had invoked Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the FIR registered on January 16, 2024 at Kotwali Police Station in 2024 for the offences alleged to have been committed under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 

On January 16, 2024, Sushil Kumar Bajaj, the brother of Ajay Kumar Bajaj, Petitioner No. 2, had submitted a written complaint to the Station House Officer of Kotwali Police Station, alleging inter alia, that Ajay Kumar Bajaj (son of Late Purshottam Das), Awi Bajaj (son of Ajay Kumar Bajaj), Sarita Bajaj (wife of Ajay Kumar Bajaj), and Asit Baran Paul (Chartered Accountant) were involved in fabricating documents to unlawfully transfer of shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., which belonged to him, into the names of Awi Bajaj and Sarita Bajaj. He also alleged that the accused forged a letter to illegally withdraw funds from the account of Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., and subsequently transferred the money to another company, Mandyati Dealcom Private Limited. The complainant, Sushil Kumar Bajaj, and the 4th accused, Ajay Kumar Bajaj, are entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)/Family Partition agreement. According to the agreement, it was decided that Bajaj Buildcon Private Limited, along with other associated companies, would be transferred to Ajay Kumar Bajaj. The parties agreed to close all existing bank accounts of the respective companies and subsequently will transfer the shares. 

The terms of the Family Partition clearly indicated that the first party refers to Sushil Kumar Bajaj and his family, while the second party refers to Ajay Kumar Bajaj and his family. Clause 1 of the memorandum outlines the companies that will be transferred to the first party (the informant), and Clause 2 details the companies that will be given to the second party (Ajay Kumar Bajaj) and his family. The informant acknowledged the existence of this partition deed in his written complaint. It was confirmed that following the transfer of ownership, the shares of the respective companies will also be transferred to the names of the relevant parties and their families. In accordance with the agreed arrangement, Petitioner No. 1, Sarita Bajaj, and Petitioner No. 3, Awi Bajaj, were appointed as Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. On February 27, 2021, the informant submitted his resignation from the Directorship of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. and executed a formal instrument of transfer as required under Section 56 of the Companies Act, 2013. 

On February 27, 2021, on 27.02.2021, the informant executed two instruments of transfer. One instrument was executed with Sarita Bajaj, transferring 1,11,800 (One Lakh Eleven Thousand Eight Hundred) shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., which belonged to the informant, to her, in strict compliance with the terms of the family partition. It is important to note here that while the informant also resigned from Balaji Electrosteels Limited, as indicated in a notice, dated August 30, 2021, he did not transfer the shares of Balaji Electrosteels Limited, despite being obligated to do so. On February 27, 2021, the informant executed another instrument of transfer, through which he transferred 3,20,000 (Three Lakh Twenty Thousand) shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. ltd to Awi Bajaj. These share transfers were carried out in full compliance with the provisions of the Companies Act, and the relevant details were duly communicated to the Registrar of Companies. In fact, the informant formally surrendered the shares to be transferred, and a certificate of transfer was subsequently issued. The instruments of transfer were properly stamped, executed in the presence of witnesses, and have never been contested or disputed previously. It is important to note that on February 28, 2021, a meeting of the Board of Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. was held, during which it was resolved to accept the informant's resignation from the Directorship of the company. Ajay Kumar Bajaj was authorized to file DIR-12 and any other required documents with the Registrar of Companies, as per the provisions of the Companies Act. Another Board meeting of Balaji Electrosteels Limited took place, and through a resolution, dated August 31, 2021, the informant's resignation from the company was formally accepted. On April 3, 2021, another meeting of the Board of Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. was held. The informant claims that he was not notified, informed, or made aware of the meeting.

The informant had already initiated proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, in 2022, seeking a declaration that the instruments of transfer, dated February 27, 2021 were forged and illegal, along with other related reliefs. Notably, certain terms of the Memorandum of Family Partition were not complied with or honoured by the informant. In response, Ajay Kumar Bajaj had filed a suit for partition in the Court of Sub-Judge-1, Patna, which has been registered as a Title Suit of 2023. Among other allegations, the informant alleged that Kanika Buildcon Private Limited took a loan of Rs. 9,13,00,000.00 (Nine Crore Thirteen Lakh) only from Mandyati Dealcom Private Limited for the period between 2010 and 2017. The informant also claimed that according to their understanding, the loan does not incur any interest. 

Under the terms of the family partition, Kanika Buildcon was transferred to the informant, while Mandyati Dealcom was transferred to Ajay Kumar Bajaj. As a result, the rights and liabilities associated with the respective companies were also transferred to the respective parties. Ajay Kumar Bajaj sent a letter under the provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Code, demanding that Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. pay an amount of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- (Eighteen Crore Thirty Seven Lakh Fifty One Thousand Four Hundred) only. 

Besides this, an application was filed by Mandyati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. against Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench in 2022, seeking recovery of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- (Eighteen Crore Thirty Seven Lakh Fifty One Thousand Four Hundred) only, which includes both the principal amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- and interest of Rs. 17,15,01,400. 

During the proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, it was admitted that Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. owes Rs. 1,22,50,000. On November 8, 2023, the Tribunal admitted the application and initiated the insolvency resolution process for Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. filed an appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, registered as Company Appeal (AT) No. 1540 of 2020. In connection with this, a demand draft for Rs. 1,22,50,000/- was handed over to Mandyati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd., as evident from the order, dated December 4, 2023.

Notably, in the counter affidavit, filed by Sushil Kumar Bajaj, the Respondent No. 5, dated February 4, 2025, the High Court found that the accused individually and unlawfully transferred the share of Respondent No. 5 (the informant) amounting to Rs. 1,98,50,000/- to Awi Bajaj (Petitioner No. 3), and Rs. 69,10,000/- to Sarita Bajaj (Petitioner No. 1). These transfers were made using forged share transfer deeds. The transfer was not authorized by the Board of Directors, nor were the transferees’ signatures obtained.

Although the transfer of shares was recorded with a Board Resolution, dated April 3, 2021, Respondent No. 5 (the informant) was not notified of the meeting, nor were the transferees informed. In collusion with C.A., Asit Baron Paul, the accused parties falsified the share transfer, and forged documents were submitted, which are now part of the records at the Register of Companies.. In regard to the loan amount, being levied on the Kanika Buildcon (which is operated by Respondent No. 5) the Respondent submits that before the partition, both the petitioners and Respondent No. 5 (the informant) jointly handled the company and financially supported each other. As part of this arrangement, Kanika Buildcon managed by Respondent No. 5, took a loan/advance of Rs. 9,13,00,000/- from Mandyati Dealcom, owned by the accused (petitioners), between September, 2010 and April, 2017, which was mostly repaid.

However, after the family partition, Mandyati Dealcom unexpectedly demanded Rs. 18,06,20,352/- (eighteen crores, six lakhs, twenty thousand, three hundred and fifty-two), while only Rs. 1,22,50,000/- remained outstanding against the original loan of Rs. 9,13,00,000/-. Later, Respondent No. 5 discovered that Ajay Kumar Bajaj had filed a false case in the Company Court, claiming that, as a Director of Kanika Buildcon, he had written a letter to Sushil Bajaj (Respondent No. 5/informant), the then Director of Mandyati Dealcom, accepting a loan of Rs. 10,00,00,000/- with interest. For the same, an application was filed under Section 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) by the Petitioners in December, 2022, claiming an amount of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- which include principal amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- and the interest of 17,15,01,400/- till 31.07.2022. Date of default for the same was mentioned as August 2, 2021. In the application under Section 7 of IBC, the Appellant claimed that conditions of loans were set out in writing in letter, dated September 20, 2010, written by Director of the Corporate Debtor Company to the Financial Creditor. The matter was first adjudicated by NCLT, Kolkata Bench and later went in appeal to NCLAT New Delhi.

 

Supreme Court warns Shailesh Kumar, an advocate from Begusarai

In Shailesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's bench of Justices Surya Kant and N.K Singh observed:"The application is totally frivolous. The same is, accordingly, dismissed. However, we refrain to impose exemplary costs on the petitioner at this time. If he will move any such application in future, strict action will be taken against him." It was filed on October 29, 2024 and registered on January 27, 2025 against Court's final judgment and order dated October 5, 2024. The order May 9, 2025 states that the case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated October 5, 2024 in M.A. No.1500/2024 in SLP (Crl.) No. 12133/2024 passed by the Supreme Court of India but final judgment and order seems to be unavailable on the Court's website. The order dated February 2, 2024 reads: "The petitioner, who appears in person, is not present. The matter was listed on 10.11.2023 and also on 12.12.2023. However, none had appeared. On two dates, no adverse orders were passed.The special leave petition is dismissed in default."

The order dated August 30, 2024 by bench of Justices Surya Kant and Ujjal Bhuyan had recorded: "The petitioner has informed this Court that now he is law graduate. He candidly acknowledges that earlier he had 42 mobile numbers and about 15 bank accounts. That being so, it would be expedient and in the interest of justice that the petitioner appears before the Trial Court and extends full cooperation in the pending proceedings."

Supreme Court's order dated December 12, 2023 shows that the case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated April 12, 2023 in CRWJC No. 2430/2018 passed by the Patna High Court but the judgment and order in question seems to be unavailable on the High Court's website. 

Justice Bibek Chaudhuri refuses to quash FIR because forgery is a serious offence with criminal liability, decided not to evaluate merit of allegations at FIR stage

In Sarita Baja & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary, Home Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Justice Bibek Chaudhuri of Patna High Court concluded:"The issue involving forgery and a criminal investigation has not been complained of by any instrumentality of the State. The dispute is absolutely private in nature involving two full brothers and their families in respect of partition and subsequent financial irregularity of family-owned companies. Therefore, no writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India lies. The instant writ petition is, thus, dismissed on contest." The judgement was delivered on May 9, 2025. The two other petitioners are: Ajay Kumar Bajaj and Awi Bajaj. The other four respondents are: Additional Chief Secretary, the Home Department, Government of Bihar, Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna, Station House Officer, Kotwali, Patna and Sushil Kumar Bajaj.

The Court refused to quash the FIR lodged in Kotwali, Patna dated August 18, 2023 because "Forgery (under Section 463 IPC) and using forged documents (under Section 471 IPC) are considered serious offences with substantial criminal liability. This Court recognize that quashing an FIR for such serious offenses like forgery could undermine the integrity of the legal system and prevent the discovery of the truth. At the stage of the FIR, the Court will not evaluate the merit of the allegations. This Court believes that the police are required to investigate the facts and verify the authenticity of the documents before a final decision is made." 

The Court observed:"The writ courts often do not delve deeply into factual disputes and the evidences as to whether the signatures done on Securities Transfer Form (SH-4) was fabricated or not and so the Court can not come to the conclusion as to whether the signature is forged or not but has come across the Judgement of NCLAT, New Delhi where it is seen that the Petitioners were previously capable of producing false document."

The petitioner had invoked Constitutional writ jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the FIR registered on January 16, 2024 alfor the offences alleged to have been committed under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 

On January 16, 2024, Sushil Kumar Bajaj, the brother of Petitioner No. 2, had submitted a written complaint to alleging that Ajay Kumar Bajaj (son of Late Purshottam Das), Awi Bajaj (son of Ajay Kumar Bajaj), Sarita Bajaj (wife of Ajay Kumar Bajaj), and Asit Baran Paul (Chartered Accountant) were involved in fabricating documents to unlawfully transfer of shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., which belonged to him, into the names of Awi Bajaj and Sarita Bajaj. He further alleged that the accused forged a letter to illegally withdraw funds from the account of Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., and subsequently transferred the money to another company, Mandyati Dealcom Private Limited. The complainant, Sushil Kumar Bajaj, and the 4th accused, Ajay Kumar Bajaj, are full brothers. On February 17, 2021, both parties had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)/Family Partition agreement. According to the agreement, it was decided that Bajaj Buildcon Private Limited, alongwith other associated companies, would be transferred to Ajay Kumar Bajaj. Additionally, the parties agreed to close all existing bank accounts of the respective companies and subsequently will transfer the shares. The terms of the Family Partition clearly indicate that the first party refers to Sushil Kumar Bajaj and his family, while the second party refers to Ajay Kumar Bajaj and his family. Clause 1 of the memorandum outlines the companies that will be transferred to the first party (the informant), and Clause 2 details the companies that will be given to the second party (Ajay Kumar Bajaj) and his family. The informant has acknowledged the existence of this partition deed in his written complaint. Additionally, it has been confirmed that following the transfer of ownership, the shares of the respective companies will also be transferred to the names of the relevant parties and their families. In accordance with the agreed arrangement, petitioner No. 1, Sarita Bajaj, and Petitioner No. 3, Awi Bajaj, were appointed as Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt.Ltd. On 27.02.2021, the informant submitted his resignation from the Directorship of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt.Ltd. vide a notice dated 27.02.2021 and executed a formal instrument of transfer as required under Section 56 of the Companies Act, 2013. On the same date, i.e., on 27.02.2021, the informant executed two instruments of transfer. One instrument was executed with Sarita Bajaj, transferring 1,11,800 (One Lakh Eleven Thousand Eight Hundred) shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., which belonged to the informant, to her, in strict compliance with the terms of the family partition. It is important to note here that while the informant also resigned from Balaji Electrosteels Limited, as indicated in a notice, dated 30.08.2021, he did not transfer the shares of Balaji Electrosteels Limited, despite being obligated to do so.

On 27.02.2021, the informant executed another instrument of transfer, through which he transferred 3,20,000 (Three Lakh Twenty Thousand) shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. ltd to Awi Bajaj. These share transfers were carried out in full compliance with the provisions of the Companies Act, and the relevant details were duly communicated to the Registrar of Companies. In fact, the informant formally surrendered the shares to be transferred, and a certificate of transfer was subsequently  issued. The instruments of transfer were properly stamped, executed in the presence of witnesses, and have never been contested or disputed previously. It is important to note that on 28.02.2021, a meeting of the Board of Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. was held, during which it was resolved to accept the informant's resignation from the Directorship of the company.

Notably, Ajay Kumar Bajaj was authorized to file DIR-12 and any other required documents with the Registrar of Companies, as per the provisions of the Companies Act. Similarly, another Board meeting of Balaji Electrosteels Limited took place, and through a  resolution, dated 31.08.2021, the informant's resignation from the company was formally accepted. On 03.04.2021, another meeting of the Board of Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. was held. The informant claims that he was not notified, informed, or made aware of the meeting the informant has already initiated proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, under C.P. No. 250 KB/2022, seeking a declaration that the instruments of transfer, dated 27.02.2021 are forged and illegal, along with other related reliefs.

It is important to note that certain terms of the Memorandum of Family Partition have not been complied with or honoured by the  informant.

In response, Ajay Kumar Bajaj filed a suit for partition in the Court of Sub-Judge-1, Patna, which was registered as Title Suit No. 02 of 2023.

The informant alleges that Kanika Buildcon Private Limited took a loan of Rs. 9,13,00,000.00 (Nine Crore Thirteen Lakh) only from Mandyati Dealcom Private Limited for the period between 2010 and 2017. The informant further claims that according to their understanding, the loan does not incur any interest. It is important to note that under the terms of the family partition, Kanika Buildcon was transferred to the informant, while Mandyati Dealcom was transferred to Ajay Kumar Bajaj. As a result, the rights and liabilities associated with the respective companies were also transferred to the respective parties. Ajay Kumar Bajaj sent a letter under the provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Code, demanding that Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. pay an amount of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- (Eighteen Crore Thirty Seven Lakh Fifty One Thousand Four Hundred) only. Additionally, an application has been filed by Mandyati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. against Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, under CP (IB) No. 327/KB/2022, seeking recovery of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- (Eighteen Crore Thirty Seven Lakh Fifty One Thousand Four Hundred) only, which includes both the principal amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- and interest of Rs. 17,15,01,400/-.

During the proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, it was admitted that Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. owes Rs. 1,22,50,000. On 08.11.2023, the Tribunal admitted the application and initiated the insolvency resolution process for Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. filed an appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, registered as Company Appeal (AT) No. 1540 of 2020. In connection with this, a demand draft for Rs. 1,22,50,000/- was handed over to Mandyati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd., as evident from the order, dated 04.12.2023.

The Court found that the accused individually and unlawfully  transferred the share of Respondent No. 5 (the informant) amounting to Rs. 1,98,50,000/- to Awi Bajaj (Petitioner No. 3), and Rs. 69,10,000/- to Sarita Bajaj (Petitioner No. 1). These transfers were made using forged share transfer deeds. The transfer was not authorized by the Board of Directors, nor were the transferees’ signatures obtained.

Although the transfer of shares was recorded with a Board Resolution, dated April 3, 2021, Respondent No. 5 (the informant) was not notified of the meeting, nor were the transferees informed. In collusion with C.A., Asit Baron Paul, the accused parties alsified the share transfer, and forged documents were submitted, which are now part of the records at the Register of Companies.

In regard to the loan amount, being levied on the Kanika Buildcon (which is operated by Respondent No. 5) the Respondent submits that before the partition, both the petitioners and Respondent No. 5 (the informant) jointly handled the company and financially supported each other. As part of this arrangement, Kanika Buildcon managed by Respondent No. 5, took a loan/advance of Rs. 9,13,00,000/- from Mandyati Dealcom, owned by the accused (petitioners), between September, 2010 and April, 2017, which was mostly repaid. However, after the family partition, Mandyati Dealcom unexpectedly demanded Rs. 18,06,20,352/- (eighteen crores, six lakhs, twenty thousand, three hundred and fifty-two), while only Rs. 1,22,50,000/- remained outstanding against the original loan of Rs. 9,13,00,000/-. 

Later on, the Respondent No. 5 discovered that Ajay Kumar Bajaj had filed a false case in the Company Kanika Buildcon, he had written a letter to Sushil Bajaj (Respondent No. 5/informant), the then Director of Mandyati Dealcom, accepting a loan of Rs. 10,00,00,000/- with interest. For the same, an application was filed under Section 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) by the present Petitioners in December, 2022, claiming an amount of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- which include principal amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- and the interest of 17,15,01,400/- till 31.07.2022. Date of default for the same was mentioned as 02.08.2021. In the application under Section 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, the Appellant claimed that conditions of loans were set out in writing in letter, dated 20.09.2010, written by Director of the Corporate Debtor Company to the Financial Creditor. The matter was first adjudicated by National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench and later went in appeal to National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi. 

It finding reads: “24. Ajay Kumar Bajaj was Director from 12.05.2014 Buildcon Private Limited' i.e.. the Corporate Debtor. Letter dated 20.09.2010, which is sheet anchor of the Financial Creditor to contend that there was interest component of 12% P.A. clearly becomes unauthorised and unreliable. Ajay Kumar Bajaj was not Director on 20.09.2010 of the Corporate Debtor and could not have written to the Financial Creditor, containing the terms and conditions of loan whereas no loan was ever extended by Financial Creditor to the Corporate Debtor of the terms and conditions as contained in the Letter dated 20.09.2010. Letter dated 20.09.2010 was impeached and termed as fabricated Letter.” 

It also found: "30. The sequence of the event and transaction between the Parties clearly proves that transfer of the amount by Financial Creditor to the Appellant were done by one Family Company to another Family Company and was not by way of loan nor any disbursal for any time value of money has been proved from any material on the record.” 

Taking note of these findings, the High Court observed that it "is convinced that the allegation made by the Petitioner for outstanding loan is frivolous as the Learned Court has already adjudicated the matter in detail and has come to its finding."