Supreme Court partly sets aside order of Delhi High Court's Division Bench in Wikimedia Foundation vs. ANI Media Private Limited case

In Wikimedia Foundation Inc. vs. ANI Media Private Limited and Ors.(2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan allowed the civil appeal. It concluded:" we are of the firm view that the Division Bench had reacted disproportionately while issuing the impugned directions....we have no hesitation in our mind that such directions could not have issued. Accordingly, the impugned directions contained in para 5 of the impugned order dated 16.10.2024 are hereby set aside." The three other respondents were: Daniel Quilan, Vanamondle and Wikiholic.

The appeal was directed against the order dated October 16, 2024 passed by Delhi High Court's Division Bench comprising Justices Manmohan and Tushar Rao Gedela.

The order of the High Court reads: "On the last date of hearing, learned counsel for respondent No. l had drawn this Court's attention to a page published on the website 'Wikipedia 'wherein the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge in CS(OS)524/2024 was adversely commented upon. It was stated in the said publication that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge to release the identities of the editors who made the edits amounted to 'censorship and a threat to the flow of information’. This Court is of the prima facie view that the aforesaid comment on the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge amounts to interference in Court proceedings, and that too, on a website managed by Wikimedia Foundation Inc. who is a defendant in the suit. The sub judice principle, prima facie, seems to have been 'violated with impunity' by Wikimedia Foundation Inc. - the appellant herein. This Court is also informed by the learned counsel for respondent No. l that after the last hearing, the observations made by this Bench have been 'opened up for discussion' on Wikimedia Foundation Inc. website which, according to us, complicates and compounds the issue at hand....5. Since this Court is of the prima facie view that the aforesaid comments on the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and the discussion on the observations made by this Bench amount to interference in court proceedings and violation of the sub judice principle by a party to the proceeding and borders on contempt, this Court directs Wikimedia Foundation Inc.- the appellant herein to take down/delete the said pages and discussion with regard to the observations made by this Court within thirty six (36) hours...."

When the related special leave petition was moved on 17.03.2025, Supreme Court while issuing notice to ANI Media Private Limited observed:"We are concerned with the legality and validity of the directions issued by the High Court in paragraph 5 of the impugned order."

Supreme Court did not address the merit of the case between the parties. It was primarily concerned with the legality and propriety of the direction of the High Court to the appellant to take down/delete the pages and discussion with regard to the observations made by the High Court. That is the width and scope of this appeal.

ANI has instituted a suit before the High Court against Wikimedia Foundation, the appellant and others praying for an order against the defendants, restraining them from posting, publishing, uploading, writing, speaking, distributing and/ or republishing any false, misleading and defamatory content against the plaintiff on any platform, including the platform maintained by defendant No. 1 and also pass an injunction against the defendant No. 1 or its agents or any person acting on its behalf or under its authority, directing it to remove all false, misleading and defamatory content against the plaintiff available on its platform, which can tarnish the reputation of the plaintiff and further restrain its users and administrators from publishing anything defamatory against the plaintiff on its platform.

The order dated August 20, 2024 passed by Justice Navin Chawla, a Single Judge of the High Court reads: "The learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that defendant Nos. 2 to 4 are claimed to be the ‘Administrators' of defendant No. l. Learned senior counsel for defendant No. l submits that they have no connection with defendant Nos. 2 to 4. Keeping in view the above submissions, defendant No. l is directed to disclose the subscriber details of defendant Nos.2 to 4 to the plaintiff, through its counsel, within a period of two weeks from today. On receipt of the said information, the plaintiff shall take steps for ensuring service of summons and notice on the application on the said defendants."

The respondent had filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, Order X Rule 2 and Order XI read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the suit seeking initiation of contempt proceedings against the appellant for alleged willful disobedience to the order dated August 20, 2024. 

The Supreme Court has recorded that on September 17, 2024, an opinion piece was published in the Indian Express (E-edition) titled why the case against Wikipedia in India is a challenge to freedom of speech and information. It was also hosted on the platform of the appellant. The article mentioned that while issuing contempt notice, the Single Judge had reportedly said: If you don’t like India, please don’t work in India: we will ask the Government to block your site. It implied that there was a failure to understand the nature of the medium i.e. Wikipedia, it was claimed that the court’s decision to hold some members accountable and punish a community of volunteers by disclosing their private information was a challenge to freedom of speech and information. The effect this would produce is that any form of critical information that a powerful organization does not like can be censored or become grounds for punishment which would set a wrong precedent.

The appellant preferred an appeal against the order dated August 20, 2024, before the Division Bench of the High Court under Section 104 of the Civil Procedure Code read with Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the said Code for setting aside of the order.

When the matter came before the Division Bench on October 14, 2024, the respondent complained that publishing of such a page on the platform of the appellant was intended to pressurize the Single Judge. When appellant sought for time to seek instructions the court directed the matter to be listed for hearing on October 16, 2024. On October 14, 2024, a talk page was hosted on the appellant’s platform opening up discussions on the ongoing proceedings between the parties before the High Court. On October 16, 2024, the impugned order was passed which referred to the discussion page. It is apparent that the Division Bench was palpably in error in holding that a prima facie case of interference in court proceeding, violation of the sub judice principle by a party to the proceeding and bordering on contempt was made out. The High Court failed to consider that appellant is merely an intermediary having the limited role of providing technical infrastructure to host the platform and does not edit, update, maintain or monitor the contents on the platform. This was applicable to the talk page as well as to the video. The appellant, not being the author, cannot be said to have violated the sub judice principle merely because the two pages were hosted on its platform. In any case, what were being hosted were secondary source material.

A decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India (2012) 10 SCC 603 provides for an order for postponement of publication in the event of violation of the subjudice principle but for determining such violation, the Constitution Bench set out the following criteria:
1. There is a real and substantial risk of prejudice to fairness of the trial or to the proper administration of justice;
2. Reasonable alternative methods will not prevent the risk to fairness of the trial. 

The High Court's Division Bench order did not discuss as to how the pages hosted on the platform to the appellant constitute a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the pending proceedings before the Single Judge. The impugned order seemed devoid of any reason. The direction to take down he said pages seemed to be an unreasoned, unwarranted one and in violation of the right to open justice guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It impinges upon the freedom of speech and expression, a guaranteed right under Article 19(1)(a).The view taken by the Division Bench that the contents of the pages hosted on the appellant’s platform borders on contempt seemed wholly unjustified. It failed to consider that the pages were derived from other published secondary sources. Those were publicly available. The passing of orders like the impugned order adversely affected right to free speech and the right to know. It impinged upon the right to freely access and use the medium of internet. The impugned order was unsustainable and was liable to be set aside.

In the penultimate paragraph of the judgement, the Supreme Court observed:"For the improvement of any system and that includes the judiciary, introspection is the key. That can happen only if there is a robust debate even on issues which are before the court. Both the judiciary and the media are the foundational pillars of democracy which is a basic feature of our Constitution. For a liberal democracy to thrive, both must supplement each other....Though the contention of the appellant is that it is an intermediary in terms of Section 2(1)(w) read with Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 providing only technical infrastructure that host the platform and does not (a) publish, add or remove content on the platform, (b) decide which users are vested with certain technical privileges or (c) continually judge and censor the content posted on the platform, thereby not liable for any third party information, data, or communication link made available or hosted by it, we are not inclined to examine this aspect of the matter since it may have a bearing on the proceedings of the pending suit.

 Also read: Wikipedia vs. ANI case reaches Supreme Court

Delhi High Court seized with ANI's case against Wikimedia Foundation's Wikipedia

 

FIR under section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 & provisions of IPC quashed: Justice Sandeep Kumar

Patna High Court's Justice Sandeep Kumar quashed F.I.R. registered for the offence under Sections 323, 341, 376, 376-D, 420, 313, 120-B, 504 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and under section 67 of the Information Technology Act and all the consequential proceedings arising out of the aforesaid F.I.R. including the order dated January 6, 2023 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, 1st, Danapur. The Magistrate had passed the order under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. for registration of the F.I.R.. 

In his 34-page long judgement in Sanjeev Hans vs. The State of Bihar & Ors (2024). Justice Kumar examined as to whether the offence of rape is made out against the petitioner or not besides non-compliance of Section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C.

The other respondents were: Director General of Police, Patna, Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna, Station House Officer, Rupaspur Police Station, Patna and Gayatri Kumari of Kataiya, Jamhur, Aurangabad.

Gayatri Kumari, the complainant is a practicing advocate in Allahabad High Court. She was practicing in Patna High Court from 2009 to 2015. In the month of February, 2016 while the complainant was staying at the residence of Senior Advocate Gajendra Prasad Yadav situated at Golden Plaza Apartment, Chitkohra for getting her case mentioned, a junior advocate namely, Shiv Nandan Bharti introduced her to Gulab Yadav, who was an M.L.A. It has also been alleged that said Gulab Yadav lured her by saying that he will get make her member of Women Commission and asked her to come to meet him along with her bio-data at his residence situated at Flat No.401, Bindeshwari Apartment. It is alleged that when the Complainant reached the house of said Gulab Yadav, he raped her at gun point and when the complainant was going to register F.I.R. then Gulab Yadav asked his servant Lalit to bring vermilion and put the same on the forehead of the complainant and said that they were married and they will get their marriage registered and asked for some time to get divorce from his first wife. 

She alleged that Gulab Yadav called the complainant to Pune to show the papers of the Court, by which divorce has been granted. On July 8, 2017 when thec complainant reached Hotel Bestil then Gulab Yadav introduced her to Sanjeev Hans, the petitioner and both raped her after mixing some intoxicating substance in her food. When the complainant regained her consciousness, Gulab Yadav showed her the video of her rape and sent the same on her mobile and threatened her to make the video viral. The complainant got scared and started to live in Allahabad and when she missed her periods, she informed Gulab Yadav about the same but Gulab Yadav asked her to take medicine for abortion which she consumed, however, she had to get admitted in hospital due to medical condition. Thereafter, Gulab Yadav got the complainant admitted in Rahul Judicial Classes, Delhi and arranged for her stay in a hostel in Mukherji Nagar, Delhi. 

She also alleged that Gulab Yadav used to call the complainant at different hotels and raped her where Sanjeev Hans, the petitioner also used to accompany Gulab Yadav. It has also been alleged that on February 13, 2018 at Ashoka Hotel, on February 14, 2018 at Park Avenue hotel and on March 27, 2018 at Le’ Meriden hotel, she was gang raped and resultantly she conceived and when she informed the accused about this, the accused persons threatened her. Out of fear, the complainant vacated her hostel and started living in Shalimar Bagh, Delhi where she gave birth to a male child on October 25, 2018 and when she informed this fact to Gulab Yadav, he told that it can not be his child as he has undergone vasectomy and said that the child is of Sanjeev Hans. When the complainant tried to contact Sanjeev Hans, he did not speak with her and since then the complainant is hiding from the accused persons as they are quite influential. It has further been alleged that the complainant went to Rupaspur Police Station for registering the F.I.R., but the Police did not register the F.I.R. by saying that the accused persons are quite influential and then the complainant sent the complaint to Superintendent of Police, Patna on October 28, 2021, however no action was taken in this regard. 

The complaint case was filed by the complainant before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Danapur, Patna for lodging the F.I.R. The Magistrate in his order dated November  18, 2021 recorded that the complainant has not produced any document in support of her claim of compliance of Section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C. and therefore, called a report from the concerned Police Station. Despite granting sufficient opportunity, the complainant did not appear for recording her S.A. and resultantly, the Magistrate vide order dated September 20, 2022 dismissed the complaint case under Section 203 of the Cr.P.C. Being aggrieved by the same, the complainant approached the High Court by way of filing Cr.W.J.C. No.1271 of 2022. This Court vide order dated 12.12.2022 has disposed of the said petition with certain directions. 

The relevant part of the order dated December 12, 2022 passed in Cr.W.J.C. No.1271 of 2022 reads as under:-

“Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State, this Court finds that there is no dispute with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in this case, police was conducting a preliminary enquiry into the matter and a report was required to be sent to the learned ACJM Court at Danapur. The said report has been submitted or not is not within the knowledge of learned counsel for the State.

Be that as it may, this Court is of the considered opinion that once the matter was pending at the stage of preliminary enquiry and the report had been called for from the police, the learned ACJM should not have acted in haste in taking up the enquiry at his level by treating it as a complaint case.

The Magistrate vide order dated 06.01.2023  allowed the prayer of the petitioner to send the complaint petition under sectionn156(3) of the Cr.P.C. to the Police for registration of the F.I.R and accordingly, the present F.I.R. has been lodged. The Investigating Officer of the case has filed an application in the Court of learned A.C.J.M.-1, Danapur for deputing a Magistrate so that blood sample of Gulab Yadav, the son of Gayatri Kumari, the respondent no.5 and the petitioner be collected for DNA test but the Magistrate vide order dated 06.03.2023 has rejected the prayer of the Investigating Officer by holding that he has no jurisdiction to pass an order for DNA test. 

The counsel for Gayatri Kumari, the respondent no.5 that respondent no.5 is a practicing advocate and Gulab Yadav and present petitioner used to commit rape with her. Since Gulab Yadav has undergone vasectomy, the presumption goes to establish that the petitioner is the biological father of the son of the respondent no.5. Thus, the DNA test of the petitioner and the son of the respondent no.5 is required in order to determine the biological father of the son of Gayatri Kumari, the respondent no.5.

The judgement reads: "This Court can consider the quashing of the F.I.R. for preventing the abuse of the process of the Court and otherwise to secure the ends of justice and in my opinion, it is a fit case for interference in view of glaring facts of the case. This Court finds that it is a malafide prosecution because of some dispute... "

The Court observed:"From reading of the complaint petition, I find that the complainant has not filed any affidavit as mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme in the aforesaid case and she has also not filed any document with the complaint petition showing compliance of section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, on account of non-compliance of section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C., the direction for registration of the F.I.R. vide order dated 06.01.2023 is against the law laid down by the Hon’ble SupremeCourt. The learned Magistrate though recorded non-compliance of the provisions of section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C. on 18.11.2021 but, has proceeded to pass the order dated 06.01.2023 for registration of the F.I.R. Before the learned Magistrate passed an order for registration of the F.I.R., he had passed an order for preliminary enquiry. On 18.11.2021, the learned Magistrate directed for calling for a report from the concerned Police Station through Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna in light of the complaint petition. On 11.05.2022, the Police submitted an application saying that the Police was directed to submit the report after conducting the enquiry outside the State. Thereafter, the case was started as a complaint case and because of the nonappearance of the complainant on a number of days, the complaint was dismissed on 20.09.2022. This Court vide order dated 12.12.2022 passed in Cr.W.J.C. No.1271 of 2022 has set aside the orders dated 12.05.2022 and 20.09.2022 passed by the learned Magistrate. Thereafter, on 06.01.2023, the preliminary enquiry report of the police was opened in the Court, which was submitted in a sealed cover, and after considering the same, the learned Magistrate directed for registration of the F.I.R. 

The moment the enquiry report was opened by the learned Magistrate on 06.01.2023, before directing for registration of the F.I.R., the fact that the complainant/informant claimed herself to be the wife of Gulab Yadav and she gave birth to a child claiming to be the son of Gulab Yadav was well within the knowledge of the Court as well as the complainant /informant. The complainant / informant while filing the complaint / FIR has not disclosed the true facts i.e. she was treating herself to be the wife of Gulab Yadav, whenever she was hospitalized she claimed herself to be the wife of Gulab Yadav and when a boy was born the name of Gulab Yadav was disclosed by the complainant/informant saying that the father of her son is Gulab Yadav. These materials have been collected by the Police during the enquiry and they have been suppressed by the complainant / informant in her complaint/F.I.R.

From reading of the F.I.R., it appears that the complainant / informant has made allegation against two persons i.e. Gulab Yadav and the present petitioner. The date of occurrence mentioned in the complaint/F.I.R. is from February, 2016 to the date of filing of the complaint petition i.e. 16.11.2021. Initially, the allegations are levelled against Gulab Yadav who is said to have committed rape with the complainant/informant. The name of the petitioner is mentioned for an occurrence which is said to have taken place on 08.07.2017 at a Hotel in Pune alleging that the complainant was sexually assaulted by both the accused persons and Gulab Yadav made a video of the same and thereafter threatened her of making the video viral. Further allegations levelled in the complaint/F.I.R. primarily against Gulab Yadav and the complainant/informant has mentioned the name of the petitioner as an accomplice of Gulab Yadav and has alleged that he also used to commit rape with her. The complainant/informant is admittedly a lawyer practicing since 2009 and the complaint has been filed after about five years of the alleged incident of rape.

The complainant has waited for five years to file the complaint and there is no satisfactory explanation for the delayed filing of the complaint petition.

The petitioner herself is a grown-up woman, who is practicing Law and as per her own statement she was in a relationship with Gulab Yadav. 

"Justice is nothing but a manifestation of the truth": Supreme Court

On January 8, 2025, in Om Prakash @ Israel @Raju @Raju Das vs. Union of India (2025), the Supreme Court's bench of Justices M. M. Sundresh and Arvind Kumar, the Court recalled the words of Lord Atkin in United Australia Limited v. Barclay’s Bank Ltd (1941), …"When these ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice clanking their medieval chains the proper course for the judge is to pass through them undeterred.” The judgement was authored by Justice Sundresh. 

The Court examined how the person was wrongly tried as a juvenile. The defence of his juvenile status could be raised even after conviction. It allowed the Appeal saying, "The impugned judgment stands set aside" refering to the judgement of Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma of Uttarakhand High Court dated August 23, 2019. 

Supreme Court's judgement states "the sentence imposed against the Appellant in excess of the upper limit prescribed under the relevant Act, shall stand set aside, while making it clear that the conviction shall continue. The Appellant shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case." The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is the relevant Act which replaced the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. But prior to that Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 addressed the issue of juvenile justice. 

The appellant was charged for the offence of culpable homicide amounting to murder. The incident took place on November 15, 1994. 

A statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), 1973 was recorded by the trial Court. It stated that his age was 20 years, as on March 7, 2001. 

After his conviction, the appellant, an illiterate raised the plea of juvenility during the hearing on sentence by stating that he was about 17 years of age at the time of the incident. Assuming his status as as a major with reference to his bank account, the trial Court sentenced him to death. n The High Court too did not refer the case to Juvenile Court refusing to give him the benefit of being a juvenile. But relying on his bank account and the cheque book endorsed the order of the 

trial Court. 

When the matter reached the Supreme Court, the appellant placed reliance upon the birth certificate issued by the Dariya Para Bodinath Board School dated April 28, 2001, agreed with the High Court and dismissed the appeal. The appellant filed a Review Petition, reiterating the fact that he was a minor at the time of the offence. It was also pointed out that it was appellant's deceased employer who filled the details to open his bank account. The Review Petition was dismissed. After the dismissal, a Mercy Petition was rejected by Governor of Uttarakhand. 

A Writ Petition was filed before the Supreme Court by the appellant’s parents and social worker under Article 32 of the Constitution. A copy of the school certificate dated June 19, 2003 from the headmaster and a transfer certificate dated April 28, 2001 was filed. This Writ Petition was dismissed on February 16, 2005 with liberty to invoke the curative jurisdiction of the Court. A Curative Petition was filed. A counter affidavit to the Curative Petition of Respondent No. 2 produced another certificate dated January 7, 2006 issued by the Dariya Para Bodinath Board School, after verifying the school certificate which reiterated the fact that the appellant was 14 years of age on the date of the incident. This Curative Petition was also dismissed by an order of the Supreme Court dated February 6, 2006.

After the amendment incorporating Section 7A into the 2000 Act, the appellant’s mother filed a Mercy Petition before the President of India. During the pendency of the Mercy Petition, the 2007 Rules came into effect. Notably, an ossification test of the appellant was done by a Medical Board constituted by the Meerut Jail, on a request made by the appellant by way of an application. The Medical Age Certificate issued therein also indicated that the Appellant was aged around 14 years at the time of the occurrence. 

Significantly, by the Presidential Order dated May 8, 2012, the death sentence of the appellant was commuted to life imprisonment, with a caveat that he shall not be released until the attainment of 60 years of age. An application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 was filed by the appellant, through which information was obtained from the bank that any minor above 10 years of age can have an independent bank account, provided he knew how to read and write, and also that no cheque book was issued for the bank account opened in the name of the appellant. 

Subsequently, a Curative Petition filed by the appellant was also rejected by the Registry as not maintainable. 

In 2019, the appellant filed a Writ Petition before the High Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution, laying a challenge to the Presidential Order while seeking yet another relief on the basis of Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act. This Writ Petition was dismissed by the High Court. It held that the power of judicial review over an executive order passed in exercise of Article 72 of the Constitution is limited, and the proceedings against the appellant had attained finality. 

The appellant approached the Supreme Court. Taking note of the background of the case, the Court observed: "Suffice it is to state that merits were not gone into in view of the clear stand of the State on the age of the Appellant."

The appellant was represented by Senior Counsel, Dr. S. Muralidhar. He submitted that the High Court committed an error in not considering the independent prayer sought for by the Appellant. It is not in dispute that the age of the Appellant was 14 years at the time of commission of the offence. There is no judicial finality attained and the phrase “any stage” used in Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act must be given an extended meaning. There is no contrary finding given against the appellant vis-à-vis the plea of juvenility, which he has raised at every stage. It is a case where grave injustice has been meted out, as can be demonstrated by the lack of adjudication. Therefore, the appellant is entitled for immediate release. The appellant has been unfairly kept under incarceration including the earlier solitary confinement It is untenable and illegal. The appellant should be adequately compensated for the loss of formative years suffered by him in the prison.

He drew the attention of the Court towards decisions wherein it was held that Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 can be invoked even after the final disposal of the case. This was held in Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 17 SCC 699 and Hari Dutt Sharma v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, Order of the Supreme Court dated February 7, 2022 in Writ Petition (Crl.) 367 of 2021.

It has been held that beneficial and retrospective applicability of change in law post the dismissal of the Curative Petition on February 6, 2006 in Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 13 SCC 211, Abdul Razzaq v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 15 SCC 637 and T Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe and another, (1983) 1 SCC 177.

It has been held that claim of juvenility can be raised and considered even after the President has exercised powers under Article 72, Constitution of India in Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1989) 1 SCC 204 and Ram Deo Chauhan v. Bani Kanta Das, (2010) 14 SCC 209. 

Justice M.M. Sundresh observed: "We are dealing with a case where grave injustice has been perpetrated, on account of the consistent failure on part of the judicial machinery to recognise and act upon the constitutional mandate vis-a-vis the plea of juvenility". 

The Court was reminded of the words of Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in Jasraj Inder Singh vs. Hemraj Multanchand (1977). “Truth, like song, is whole and half-truth can be noise;Justice is truth, is beauty and the strategy of healing injustice is discovery of the whole truth and harmonising human relations. Law's finest hour is not in meditating on abstractions but in being the delivery agent of full fairness. This divagation is justified by the need to remind ourselves that the grammar of justice according to law is not little litigative solution….”

Justice Sundresh observed: "Justice is nothing but a manifestation of the truth. It is truth which transcends every other action. The primary duty of a Court is to make a single-minded endeavour to unearth the truth hidden beneath the facts. Thus, the Court is a search engine of truth, with procedural and substantive laws as its tools. When procedural law stands in the way of the truth, the Court must find a way to circumvent it. Similarly, when substantive law, as it appears, does not facilitate the emergence of the truth, it is the paramount duty of the Court to interpret the law in light of its teleos. Such an exercises is warranted in a higher degree, particularly while considering a social welfare legislation.In its journey, the Court must discern the truth, primarily from the material available on record in the form of pleadings, and arguments duly supported by documents. It must be kept in mind that the entire judicial system is meant for the discovery of the truth, it being the soul of decision. For doing so, a Presiding Officer is expected to play an active role, rather than a passive one."

He observed: "At every stage, injustice has been inflicted by the Courts, either by ignoring the documents or by casting a furtive glance. The Appellant despite being illiterate, raised this plea one way or another, right from the trial Court up to the conclusion of the Curative Petition before this Court. The approach of the Courts in the earlier round of litigation cannot be sustained in the eye of law. There can be no reliance on the statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC, 1973 particularly when the Appellant was asked to give his particulars for the purpose of recording his statement. Even the said statement shows that he was 20 years of age at the time of making his deposition, which could only mean that he was 14 years of age at the time of the commission of the offence. The bank account has no relevance under the Acts and the relevant rules, and in any case, it is to be proved, though not contemplated under Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules. The statement given by the Appellant at the time of the hearing on his sentence, would also pale into insignificance, as even then he would have been a minor at the time of commission of the offence, under both the 2000 and the 2015 Acts." 

The judgement reads: "Though the 2000 Act was already enacted before the Appellant’s conviction, even assuming that only the 1986 Act was in vogue, the procedural mandate contemplated thereunder was also not followed by the trial Court and the High Court. Before this Court, the Appellant had relied upon the school certificate in the Criminal Appeal. It was once again relied upon in the Review Petition. Thereafter, additional documents were relied upon by the Appellant in the Writ Petition and also in the Curative Petition which was subsequently filed. In the Curative Petition, a counter affidavit was filed by the State certifying the documents furnished by the Appellant to be true. Nonetheless, the said petition was dismissed without according any reason." 

The judgement points out that "even the then existing State Rules were not duly followed, and if followed, the same would have ensured to the benefit of the Appellant." 

The Court observed:"We would only say that when the plea of juvenility was raised, it should have been dealt with under the existing laws at the relevant point of time, especially when there exists a tacit and clear admission as to the age of the Appellant. In fact, there is no need for such an inquiry in view of the aforesaid position. In our considered view, this Court could have dealt with the Writ Petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, as it raised an independent prayer for the enforcement of a right conferred under a social welfare legislation. In the subsequent Writ Petition filed before the High Court, two different prayers had been made, namely, the determination of the appellant’s plea of juvenility and consequent release, or alternatively, judicial review of the decision of the President or the Governor and consequent release. As the Executive cannot be construed to have undertaken an adjudication on the determination of the age of the accused, and with the first prayer being a distinct one invoking Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act, we feel that the High Court has committed an error in its reasoning. We would only state that this is a case where the Appellant has been suffering due to the error committed by the Courts."

The judgement makes it clear that "It cannot be construed that the Presidential Order is interfered with, as the issue that we are concerned with, is the failure of the Court in not applying the mandatory provisions of the 2015 Act with specific reference to the plea of juvenility. Therefore, it is not a review of the Presidential Order, but a case of giving the benefit of the provisions of the 2015 Act to a deserving person."

The Court recorded:"We have been informed that his conduct in the prison is normal, with no adverse report. He lost an opportunity to reintegrate into the society. The time which he has lost, for no fault of his, can never be restored."

The Court observed:"From the custody certificate filed on record, it appears that the Appellant has undergone imprisonment for almost 25 years, during which time, the society has undergone significant transformation which the Appellant might be unaware of and find difficult to adjust with."

The Court directed the Uttarakhand State Legal Services Authority to play a proactive role in identifying any welfare scheme of the State/Central Government, to facilitate the appellant’s rehabilitation and smooth reintegration into the society upon his release, with particular emphasis on his right to livelihood, shelter and sustenance guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. It also directed the State Authority to assist him in availing any such scheme under which he is found eligible and wishes to avail, and such assistance may be effected through the concerned District Legal Services Authority, if the State Authority finds the same expedient and necessary. 

It is crystal clear that justice has been delayed. The appellant's senior counsel had prayed for adequate compensation  for the loss of formative years suffered by him in the prison. But the Court has not awarded him any compensation. It emerges that in the absence of compensation for the appellant, he has recieved partial justice. He awaits complete justice even after more than two decades.