Supreme Court sets aside bail rejection order by Justice Dr. Anshuman in a case of criminal misconduct by a public servant

In Rajni Priya vs. The State Through Central Bureau of Investigation, Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhuyan allowed the criminal appeal. The Court's 3-page long order reads: "The order dated 20.06.2025 of the High Court rejecting the bail prayer of the appellant is set aside. The appellant shall be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the Trial Court concerned may deem fit and proper to impose in the facts and circumstances of the case."  

The appeal arises from a 4-page long order dated June 20, 2025 passed by Dr. Anshuman of the Patna High Court rejecting the bail prayer of the appellant in connection with RC Case No.14(A)/2017 corresponding Special Case no.12/2020. The contention of the counsel for the appellant was that the prosecution case was in respect of fraudulent transfer from account of the organization. It was contended that appellant acted as a co-signatory for a very short duration when allegedly there were limited unlawful transactions. Moreover, the other co-signatory had been granted bail. It was also contended that since appellant had already suffered over two years of incarceration; she being a lady was entitled to be released on bail pending trial. 

The counsel for the respondent opposed the prayer for bail of the appellant but could not dispute that co-signatory has been granted bail and that appellant had already suffered more than two years of incarceration pending trial. 

The High Court had heard the criminal miscellaneous application filed under Sections 483 and 484 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for grant of regular bail to the petitioner who was in custody in connection with R.C. Case No.14(A)/2017 corresponding to Special Case No.12 of 2020, under Sections 409/420/467/468/471/34/120B of the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 13(2)/13(1)(c)/(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 pending in the Court of Special Judge, CBI-II, Patna. 3. Earlier prayer for bail of the petitioner was rejected by the High Court vide order dated 22.02.2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No.11113 of 2024. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that charge was already framed against the petitioner in this case and he was in custody since August 11, 2023. He submitted that no purpose would be solved keeping the petitioner in custody and petitioner was being unnecessarily harassed.

Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 deals with the criminal misconduct by a public servant. Section 13 [(1) reads: "A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,-(a)if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or any property under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do; or(b)if he intentionally enriches himself illicitly during the period of his office.Explanation 1. - A person shall be presumed to have intentionally enriched himself illicitly if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession of or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account for.Explanation 2. - The expression 'known sources of income' means income received from any lawful sources.]" Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act reads:"Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine."

In his order, Justice Dr. Anshuman had concluded:"After going through the report of the stage of the Trial it transpires that there are total 26 accused persons in this case and charge has been framed on 28.02.2025, total 64 witnesses and 226 documents are on the record, which are the basis of the Trial. The Court of CBI has indicated that the Trial is likely to be concluded approximately within one and half years. 7. In the light of the submissions made by the parties, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the accused at present. Hence, the prayer for bail of the petitioner is hereby rejected. 8. It is directed to the CBI to adduce evidence of the material witnesses at the earliest preferably within six months."  

Reversing Justice Dr. Anshuman's order, the Supreme Court observed:"...without expressing any opinion on the merits of the prosecution case, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to be released on bail pending trial at this stage." 

Patna High Court upholds constitutional validity of Bihar Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal (Constitution And Service Condition) Rules, 2023 and amendment of 2024

Several writ petitions were filed initially for declaration of Bihar Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal (Constitution And Service Condition) Rules, 2023 to be bad in law, arbitrary, beyond jurisdiction and ultra vires the provisions contained in section 166 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act, 1988) on various grounds but primarily on the issue of lessening the number of Tribunals for the purpose and for not providing for the correct procedure filing of claim petitions, in sync with the provisions contained in Secion166 (2) of MV Act, 1988 of filing the claim petition before the Tribunal. 

In The General Insurance Council vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), the 38-page long judgement dated February 21, 2025 by Patna High Court recorded the petitioners' objections but dismissed them. 

 

The High Court's division bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy held that "the rules of 2023 along with the amendment of 2024 are completely in consonance with the provisions contained in Section 165, 166 and 176 of the M.V. Act, 1988" as also the dictum of the Supreme Court in Gohar Mohammad case and Anita Kushwaha case. The challenge in these writ petitions failed.  All the writ petitions were dismissed. The judgement was authored by Justice Kumar. It was delivered on February 21, 2025. Notably, the High Court has directed that "there shall be no prohibition for the Advocates appearing for the parties before the Tribunals."

The petitioners' counsel had commented upon adversely with respect to the constitution and composition of the Search Committee for appointing the Chairman and the Members of the Tribunal as in the amendment/notification, the Search Committee comprised mainly administrative Officers, thus falling foul of the judgment in Madras Bar Association vs. Union of India; (2021) 7 SCC 369.

In the year 2021, a State Level Tribunal was constituted in terms of the powers granted to the State Government under Section 165 and 176 of the MV Act, 1988. Against the notification constituting State Level Tribunal vide notification number 683 and 684 dated 11/08/2021, several writ petitions were filed by affected persons including Insurance Companies, which was stayed by a Bench of the High Court by order dated December 21, 2022 passed in the batch of writ petitions, the lead case being CWJC No. 2183 of 2022. The stay was granted in view of the amendment brought about in Section 166 (3) of the MV Act, 1988 with effect from Apil 1, 2022 providing for limitation period for 6 months for filing applications for compensation from the date of occurrence of the accident and the notification by the State Government in not making such corresponding provisions. 

Thereafter, the Department of Transport came out with a fresh draft notification on April 19, 2023, on which objections were invited. By the said notification, District Level Tribunals were formed. The notification no. 683 and 684 were withdrawn. 

The objections raised by the concerned parties were rejected by the Secretary, Transport Department. Thereafter vide notification dated May 29, 2023, the rules of 2023 were notified which was gazetted on May 30, 2023. 

By the Rules, the Tribunals were constituted at the district level and the composition of the Search Committee for the Members and the Chairman of the Tribunal remained the same, namely, Secretary/Principal Secretary/ Additional Chief Secretary, Transport Department; Secretary, Law Department; an Officer nominated by the General Administrative Department and; a Deputy Secretary or Officer on Special Duty in Transport Department. Though the Rules of 2023 were gazetted but it was not found available on the official website of the Transport Department, Government of Bihar. 

After about four months, a fresh draft notification dated September 20, 2023 was uploaded on the website of the Transport Department, inviting objections. In this draft notification, the Tribunals were constituted at the divisional level with practically no change in the composition of the Search/Screening Committee. 

The objections were with respect to clause 7 that no representation of the Judiciary was provided in this selection and appointment of the Chairperson and clause 8 whereby the Transport Department had been given the authority to remove the Chairperson of the Tribunal on the grounds of misbehaviour, incompetence, laxity in discharge of duties or of passing order in contravention of rules enforced by the Government etc.

The objection was that such power of removal of Chairperson should not have been left with the bureaucracy. There were objections also with respect to clauses – 10 to 14 as also for lessening the number of Tribunals by making such Tribunals operate at divisional level. 

The rule was ultimately notified and gazetted on October 26, 2023. This led to filing of the present writ petitions challenging the vires of the rules on ground of incompetence of the State Legislature/State Government to make rules in contravention of the provisions contained in the Central/Parent Act of 1988 and for it to be arbitrary and not in keeping with the principles decided in Gohar Ahmad vs. Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Others; (2023) 4 SCC 381 and Madras Bar Association case.

During the hearing of these writ petitions, the Advocate General had intimated the court that the Government would give a re-look at the challenged rules, specifically with respect to the constitution of Selection Committee and the removal of the incumbents appointed to the Tribunal. All the writ petitions, therefore, were adjourned awaiting the revisit of those rules by the Government and perhaps proposing amendment in the rules to bring it in consonance with the judgment in Madras Bar Association case.

The Advocate General denied the charge that the newly constituted Tribunals were not permitting Advocates to appear.  

Several other issues also were raised, one of which was that the Government had introduced the rules with effect from April 1, 2019 against the advice of the Advocate General, which issue was also required to be considered.

In the meantime, the Government on a re-look at the challenged rules, came out with notification contained in letter no. 9965 dated August 27, 2024, making changes in rule 7 of the earlier 2023 rules with regard to appointment of Members and Chairman of the Tribunal and the constitution of the Selection Committee for the said appointments. The Chief Justice of the Patna High Court or any Judge nominated by him was to be made Chairman of that Selection Committee and the other Members of the selection committee would be the Registrar General of the Patna High Court, Secretary/ Principal Secretary/Additional Chief Secretary or any Representative Officer of the Transport Department; Secretary-cum-Legal Adviser, Law Department and Representative Officer of the General Administration Department.

Rule 8 also was amended which dealt with resignation and removal of Chairman of the claims Tribunal.

It was brought to the notice of the Court that initially only seven Tribunals were conceived of but the number was increased to ten divisional level Tribunals covering the State of Bihar. Thus necessary amendments were made in the prayer of the writ petitioners and even with such amendment, the challenge mounted earlier continued. 

The challenge inter alia was that the State Government had the power to issue notification only with respect to territorial jurisdiction under Sections 165 (1) (4) of the M.V. Act, 1988 and to appoint Members of the Tribunal under Section 165(2) thereof. It was urged that under Section 176 of the M.V. Act, 1988, the scope of issuance of such notification is limited and the State Government was incompetent to make rules on the condition of service of the Members of the Tribunals and selection of Presiding Officers. The use of the words in Section 176 of the MV Act, 1988 makes it very clear that rules could be made for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Sections 165 to 174 of the M.V. Act of 1988 with respect to, (a) the form of application for claims for compensation and the particulars, it may contain and the fees, if any, to be paid in respect of search applications; (b) the procedure to be followed by the claims Tribunal in holding an inquiry under this chapter; (c) the powers vested in a Civil Court which may be exercised by a claims Tribunal; (d) the form and the manner in which and the fee ( if any) on payment of which, an appeal may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal and; (e) any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed.

Thus the rule making power of the State could not have been extended to what has been done in the present set of rules.

It was argued that in Kerala State Electricity Board vs. Thomas Joseph; 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1737, it has been held that if a rule goes beyond the rule making powers conferred by the statue, the same would be required to be declared invalid. A rule could not supplant any provision for which power has not been conferred and the basic test to determine and consider is the source power which is relatable to the rule. Similarly, a rule must be in accord with the parent statute and cannot travel beyond it. The doctrine of ultra vires envisages that a rule making body must function within the purview of rules making authority conferred on it by the parent act. There is no inherent power of its own,which could be invoked to make rules. It was also argued that the Supreme Court in Global Energy Limited vs.Central Electricity Commission; (2009)15 SCC 570, has clarified that the rule making power for carrying out the purpose of the act is a general delegation which may not be used for laying down any other guidelines. By reason of such a provision alone, the regulation making power cannot be exercised so as to bring into existence or affect substantive rights or obligations or disabilities which are not contemplated in terms of the provisions of the act.

The Second challenge was regarding the fact that notwithstanding the notification of 2024, bringing about changes in rule 7 and 8 of the 2023 rules, the Screening Committee was still not free from executive control. The Secretary of the Tribunal ought not to be an administrative Officer of the Transport Department as the Transport Department is more often than not, a litigant before such Tribunal. The independence of the Tribunal will only be secured when even the administrative function would be in the hands of judicial body, otherwise there would be complete absence of any link with the parent department.

In support of the contention, it was argued that in Madras Bar Association case. it was clearly sounded that independent judicial Tribunals for determination of the rights of citizens and for the adjudication of the disputes and complaints of the citizens, is a necessary concomitant of the rule of law.

The argument on this point thus was concluded that with the Secretary of the Tribunal hailing from the sponsoring department, it cannot be said that there would be no control of the bureaucracy over the Tribunal.

A non-Judicial Member in any capacity ought not to be appointed in Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal. 

The third argument advanced was that divisional level Tribunals provided under rules of 2023, makes access to justice illusory. Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation, the fruits of which ought not to have been kept up and hanging for poor and indigent. No reasonable explanation appears to be available with the Government for shifting the jurisdiction from district level to divisional level. Reference in this context was made to the judgment in Anita Kushwaha vs. Pushap Sudan; (2016) 8 SCC 509, which declared that access to justice is indeed a facet of right to life, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution as also a facet of right guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law and equal protection of laws.

The other argument raised was whether the rules made, could be enforced retrospectively. The 2023 rules were amended on August 27, 2024 declaring that it shall apply on all pending cases filed on or after April 1, 2019.

In support of the argument, it was suggested that chapter- 11 of the MV Act, 1988 was amended In the year 2019, but it came into force only from April 1, 2022. Section 212 (2) of the MV Act, 1988 further provides that any modification or annulment in the rule so made, shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under the rule, scheme or notification.

Lastly, it was argued that the form for filing the complaint provided by the Transport Department on the portal falls foul of Section 166 (1) and (2) of the MV Act, 1988. It was also pointed out that no provision has been made in the form issued by the Transport Department on the web portal about accidents occurring outside the State of Bihar but the claimants being residents of Bihar. There is no option for them to file their claims in the State of Bihar. Thus, larger public interest has been adversely affected with the promulgation of the rules 2023 and the amendment brought out in the year 2024. It was thus argued that the rules are practically uninformed by reason and therefore are arbitrary.

Responding to the contentions, the Advocate General argued that a statutory rule cannot be declared ultra-vires on the grounds of inconvenience and that too without any basis for concluding the same but only on presumptions. A statutory rule could be declared ultra vires only if it is shown that it is beyond the Legislative competence or is in breach of any enactment or violates any provision of the Constitution. With the establishment of ten Tribunals at divisional level, with utmost clarity that the numbers shall not remain perpetually the same, the Government of the day has only shown its consciousness and alacrity to the situation. On periodical review, as and when necessity for creation of more Tribunals would be felt in the interest of the accident victims, the Government would consider the same and increase the number of Tribunals. In fact, initially, only seven Tribunals were conceived of at divisional level but the number was immediately increased to ten, repelling any doubt that when need would arise, more number of Tribunals will not be created. The ten newly dedicated claims Tribunals, according to the Government, have been constituted for the purpose of providing speedy justice to the people. The jurisdictional area of the Tribunal has also been clearly defined along with the divisional headquarter where the Tribunal would be located. Such a decision was not made without any assessment of pending cases. Even the future accretion in the number of cases have been taken into account for making dedicated divisional level Tribunals. The assessment was based on the inputs that number of pending cases did not justify more than ten Tribunals, especially when such Tribunals were exclusively dedicated for deciding claim cases. Hitherto, one court of the District Judge/Additional District Judge was operating as a Tribunal in that district. The finance involved is not the consideration of the Government. The number has been fixed at ten presently, which could be changed if situation so demands. The highest number of pending cases is in Patna division is only 73; in Saran division, there are only 10 pending cases. Similarly the numbers of such cases is less in Bhagalpur, Munger, Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga etc. The earlier Tribunals were dealing with such claim cases along with the other areas of litigation.

The State contended that the rules have been framed after considering the due process of law.

The Court examined the provisions contained in sections 165, 166 and 176 of the MV, Act 1988.

The Court observed:"the provisions of the Parent Act, the State Government’s power to make rules constituting one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals is clearly established. Section 166 provides for the contents of the application for compensation arising out of an accident. Section 166 (2) which was introduced w.e.f. 14.11.1994 gives the option to the claimant to either file his claim before the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimants reside or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed. From the perusal of the rules of 2023, the presumption of the rules not being in sync with the provisions contained in Section 166(2) of the MV Act, 1988 appears to be unfounded and uncalled for."

It records: "no victim or their legal representatives would have to move physically for filing their claim applications. For filing claim applications, an online portal has been developed by the State Government for convenience of accident victims, considering their physical as well as mental conditions. Any claimant could file their claim application by using their own personal credentials. It could be filed from any place using any cyber cafe. The rules of 2023 do not infringe, in any way, the freedom of selection of claims Tribunal of its choice in accordance with the section 166 (2) of the Parent Act. They could also appear before such Tribunal virtually."

It relied on Supreme Court's decision in Gohar Mohammad, wherein it  had directed that the State authorities would take appropriate steps to develop a joint web portal/platform to co-ordinate and facilitate the stakeholders for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of Motor Vehicles Amendment Act and the Rules in coordination with any technical agency and be notified to the public at large. In the light of what was directed in Gohar Mohammad by the Supreme Court, an online portal has been developed by the State Government. A facility of digital mode of hearing of cases has also been provided. 

In the light of the judgment in Gohar Mohammad case, a new investigative process has been notified by the Central Government, which has been endorsed by the Supreme Court, which mandates that the victims have to file their details in prescribed format to police and all reports by police after verification and investigation is to be submitted through a portal developed by MORTH. It only facilitates the filing of claim petition which has not to be filed like any suit before the Civil Court. 

There is no bar on the lawyers appearing in these Tribunals either physically or virtually. 

A conjoint reading of Section 165, 166 and 176 of the MV Act, 1988 would reflect that the rules of 2023 (amended in 2024) would clearly pass the muster. 

The Court observed that with the change in the composition of the Screening Committee, making it in line with the judgment in Madras Bar Association case, removes that defect also in the rules viz. the committee would be under the influence of the parent Department of Transport. 

The contentions raised on behalf of the writ petitioners with respect to the power of the Government to make such rules and the extent of it stands answered. The Government has the power to make rules and also decide about number of Tribunals in the State of Bihar. 

In Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company vs Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd; ( 1983) 1 SCC 147, a five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had held that “scales of justice are just not designed to weigh competing social and economic factors. In such matters, legislative wisdom must prevail and judicial review must abstain”. 

The judicial review of Government Policies/rules encapsulates determining whether they infringe upon the fundamental rights of citizens, contravene constitutional provisions, violate statutory regulations and display manifest arbitrariness, capriciousness or malafides. The High Court referred to Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education vs. Paritosh Bhupesh Kumar Sheth: 1984 (4) SCC 27.

The focus of judicial scrutiny is limited to the legality of the policy, excluding any evaluation of its wisdom and soundness. The Court cannot compel the Government to formulate a policy, evaluate alternatives or assess the effectiveness of existing policies. This constraints stems from the principle of separation of powers, where the Courts lack the democratic mandate and institutional expertise to delve into such matters. While the Court cannot look into these aspects, the Court can definitely check the Constitutional validity of a policy or a rule or a statute. The Court referred to the decision IN RE: Section 6A of Citizenship Act, 1955, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2880)

Fixing a cut-off date retrospectively is not to be read in isolation but with the provision contained in the rules of 2023 and the amendment of 2024 regarding repeals and savings. The power to make law by an authority also entails in it a power to repeal law or to make it prospective or retrospective. The watershed date is with a reason, namely, that all cases after a particular date would stand transferred to the newly constituted Tribunals with the territorial jurisdiction defined so that the newer cases are decided speedily. 

The Court opined that with respect to creating ten Tribunals, which reduces the number from many to limited resulting in the distortion of the principle of access to justice, it needs be noticed that in Anita Kushwaha case, the Supreme Court clearly held that it forms a necessary component of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court formulated four facets constituting the essence of access of justice, namely, (1) the State must provide an effective adjudicatory mechanism; (2) the mechanism so provided must be reasonably accessible in terms of distance; (3) the process of adjudication must be speedy; and (4) the litigants access to adjudicatory process must be affordable. 

In his judgement, Justice Ashutosh Kumar concluded: "Testing the validity of the rules of 2023 and the amendment of 2024 on this score, we have no difficulty in holding that the Tribunals so constituted provide an effective adjudicatory mechanism, which is in consonance with the provisions of Section 166 (2) of the Parent Act. Out of 38 districts, 10 Tribunals, which number could increase in future as well, clearly covers the State of Bihar with contiguous districts falling within the territorial jurisdiction of each of the Divisional Tribunal. This does not make it any less accessible than what a litigant would expect. With the new portal having been developed and the investigative process endorsed by the Supreme Court having been introduced, the accessibility to justice has become speedier, cheaper and transparent. The process also makes it affordable."

Dr. Gopal Krishna

 

The author is a  law and philosophy researcher, advocate, and a bilingual writer on the subject of science, river basin, environmental and occupational health, ecocide, disarmament, consciousness of big data, citizenship, agriculture and justice. He has formally studied law, philosophy, mass communication and public health. He has authored reports, papers and book chapters on Interlinking of Rivers (diversion of rivers), the world’s largest infrastructure project and Unique Identification (UID)/Aadhaar Number and National Population Register (NPR), the world’s largest information infrastructure project. Holding a Ph.D from Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi on the subject of corporate crimes with specific reference to industrial disaster of Bhopal, Gopal’s Post-Doctoral work was on relationship between dataveillance, inequality and totalitarianism. His work on inter-state migrants in the hazardous industries like shipbreaking industry and asbestos industry captures the movement of waste from richer areas to poorer areas and the precarious condition of migrants. He is the editor of ToxicsWatch and has delivered expert testimonies before the Indian, European and German Parliamentary Committees in the matter of national and international legislations- Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, Consumer Protection Act. Biological Diversity Amendment Bill, Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, National Identification Authority of India Bill, hazardous waste trade, and proposed UN’s legally binding instrument to regulate, transnational corporations and other business enterprises. His work makes a case for the implementation of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. 

Supreme Court stays order of Lokpal of India to bring High Court's judges within ambit of Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act

In the matter of IN RE : ORDER DATED 27/01/2025 PASSED BY LOKPAL OF INDIA AND ANCILLIARY ISSUES, a 3-judge bench of Supreme Court issued notice to the Union of India, Registrar, Lokpal of India and the complainant, returnable on March 18, 2025 at 10.30 a.m. The Registrar, Lokpal has been directed to mask the identity of the complainant and serve notice upon the complainant through the Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court, where the complainant resides. The Court's order reads: "In the meantime there shall be stay of the order dated 27.01.2025 passed by the Lokpal of India in Complaint No.05/2025. We injunct the complainant from disclosing the name of the Hon'ble Judge against whom he has filed the complaint. The complainant is further directed to keep the complaint strictly confidential. Shri Kapil Sibal and Shri B.H. Marlapalle, learned senior counsel, have graciously offered to assist the Court, since the matter is of a great significance concerning the independence of the judiciary....Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India, waives notice for the Union of India. Written submission, if any, may be filed in the meantime."

The Lokpal of India had passed an order on January 27, 2025 after examining two complaints filed by the same complainant against a sitting Additional Judge of a High Court. The complainant alleged that the named judge had influenced the concerned Additional District Judge of a particular State and a Judge of the same High Court who had to deal with the suit filed against the complainant by a private company, to favour that company. It is alleged that the private company was earlier client of the named High Court Judge, while he was practicing as an advocate at the Bar. 

The order of the Lokpal reads:"Recently, we had an occasion to examine a complaint against the previous Chief Justice of India. After examining the relevant provisions of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act. 2013 (for short, the Act of 2013), it was concluded vide order dated 03.01.2025 in Complaint No 255/2024 that the judges of the Supreme Court including the Chief Justice of India even though public servants in terms of Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, Act of 1988), are not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Lokpal. Because, they do not come within the sweep of the expression public servant predicated in Section 2(1)(o) read with Section 14 of the Act of 2013. In that, the Supreme Court is a body or adjudicatory authority established in terms of Article 124 of the Constitution of India; and not under an Act of Parliament as such. It was clarified in that decision that the issue of applicability of the stated principle to other courts established by an Act of Parliament was not being discussed."

It observed: "unlike the Supreme Court of India, the High Courts for the concerned State during the pre-constitution period or so to say British India, had been established under the Indian High Courts Act, 1861 enacted by the British Parliament. This Act authorised creation of High Courts in British India, especially in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay through Letters Patent issued by the British Monarch. The Government of India Act. 1935, also passed by the British Parliament, restructured the High Courts which were already functioning in British India regime; and recognized that the High Courts were established by virtue of various Letters Patents and Regulating Act issued by the British Monarch. Pertinently, the Constitution of India. vide Article 214, intrinsically recognises the existence of all the High Courts established under the Act of 1861, the Act of 1935 and the Letters Patents issued by the British Monarch; and restates that there shall be a High Court for each State. In contrast. Article 124 is for "Establishment" and Constitution of the Supreme Court of India, as it was not in existence hitherto. After the Constitution of India came into being, the High Courts established during the British India period, under the Act of 1861 or the Act of 1935 and Letters Patent issued by the British Monarch, continued to function as the High Court of the concerned State enlisted in the First Schedule of the Constitution. Notably, the Act of the Dominion Legislature has been regarded as a Central Act. means an Act of Parliament in terms of Section 3 (7) of the General Clauses Act. 1897. 5. In due course of time, however, the States so formed and specified in the First Schedule of the Constitution. had to be reorganized. Because of reorganization of the States... "

Taking note of the legislative history, the Lokpal of India inferred that the High Court of being an "authority" empowered by law to discharge adjudicatory functions, has been established by an Act of Parliament as a "body" of Judges for that State. Thus. the High Court would qualify the description of at least two juristic entities 'by whatever name called''. out of the eight mentioned in Section 14(1)(f) of the Act of 2013 established by an Act of Parliament. which are mutually exclusive descriptions owing to use of expression "or" in that provision. It will be too naive to argue that a Judge of a High Court will not come within the ambit of expression "any person" in clause (f) of Section 14(1) of the Act of 2013. The expression "Judge" has always been understood as not only every person who is officially designated as a Judge, but also every person. The definition of Judge in Section 19 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) as also the enactment of Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act. 1964 (Act 40 of 1964) and re-enacted Section 21 with the third category of public servant, including sub-clause (iv) of clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act of 1988 — defining expression public servant to mean any Judge. 

The Lokpal of India drew on what is stated on paragraph 35 of the majority view exposited by Justice Shetty in the case of K.Veeraswamy vs. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655. it is plainly expounded that a Judge of the superior court cannot therefore be excluded from the definition of public servant and would squarely fall within the purview of the Prevention of Corruption Act,1947 (analogous to Act of 1988). Applying the underlying principle and the logic as given in this reported decision, the expression 'any person in Section 14(1)(f) of the Act of 2013 must include a Judge of the High Court established by an Act of Parliament as well. 

It observed that a fortiori, the judges of the High Court would come within the sweep of Section 14 of the Act of 2013 read with Section 2(1)(o) thereof. "We say so also because. the definition of public servant in Section 2(1)(o) of the Act of 2013 explicitly excepts only one category of officials or public servants from the jurisdiction of the Lokpal from amongst the species mentioned in Section 14 of the Act of 2013, in respect of whom the jurisdiction is exercisable by any Court or other authority under the Army Act, 1950, the Airforce Act, 1950, the Navy Act, 1957 and the Coast Guard Act,1978. Concededly; the Act of 2013 does not provide for such explicit exception for the judges of the Court established by an Act of Parliament, including Judges of the Constitutional and other Courts established by an Act of Parliament — who must come within the expanse sweep of sub-clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the stated Act." 

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India in K. Veeraswamy case through its majority opinion ordains that to adequately protect a judge from frivolous prosecution and unnecessary harassment the President of India will consult the Chief Justice of India, who will consider all the material placed before him, tender his advice for giving sanction to launch prosecution or for filing FIR against the judge concerned after being satisfied in the matter, as opined by Justice B.C. Ray in paragraph 12 of the reported decision, while agreeing with the opinion of Justice K. Jagannatha Shetty for himself and Justice M.N.Venkatachaliah (as His Lordship then was). The two Judges, in paragraph 60 of the same reported Judgement, had observed as follows: 

"We therefore, direct that no criminal case shall be registered under Section 154 CrPC against a judge of the High Court, Chief Justice of a High Court or the judge of the Supreme Court unless the Chief Justice of India is consulted in the matter."

The thrust of the exposition of the majority view, is that no criminal case shall be "registered" against a judge of the High Court, Chief Justice of High Court or judge of the Supreme Court, unless the Chief Justice of India is consulted in the matter. 

The Lokpal's order reads: "We are conscious of the fact that a complaint before the Lokpal cannot be stricto sensu equated with a criminal case being registered under Section 154 of CrPC or the corresponding provision in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 (for short. BNSS). However, considering the scheme of Section 20 of the Act of 2013 on receipt of a complaint and before the Lokpal decides to proceed further by ordering a preliminary inquiry by its inquiry wing or any nominated agency or investigation, it is required to examine whether there exists a prima facie case to proceed further. Such process inevitably involves a probe into the allegations against a Judge of the High Court. For effectuating preliminary inquiry, assistance of specified agency has to be taken who in turn is bestowed with an authority under Section 20 read with Section 27 of the Act of 2013, to obtain comments of the public servant and of the Competent Authority including do questioning of third persons and of official records of the courts, if the allegation against the public servant is concerning any judicial process. Further, this inquiry is and would be a prelude to issue of direction to the investigating agency to register a criminal case against the named public servant and to investigate the same under supervision of Lokpal. Having regard to the consequences emanating from the directions to be issued by the Lokpal under Section 20 of the Act coupled with the dictum in K. Veeraswami's case adverted hitherto, the appropriate course, Ex abundanti cautela, is to abide by the direction given by the majority view of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court and to approach the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India as a pre-condition or quintessence to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act of 2013."

It was conscious of the fact that "the allegation in this complaint also involves the named Additional District Judge. who is working in a court or body of judges which may have been established by an Act of the State Legislature.  He may be a public servant within the meaning of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, but not directly amenable to the jurisdiction of the Lokpal-as not being public servant within the meaning of Section 2(1)(o) read with Section 14 of the Act of 2013. However, eventually if an inquiry is to be ordered against the judge of the High Court. and in that inquiry any incriminatory material emerges against the named Additional District Judge. he can be prosecuted in this very action as being involved in an act of abetting. bribe giving or bribe taking or conspiracy of any allegation of corruption under the 1988 Act, by virtue of sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act of 2013.  A priori. we deem it appropriate to forward the subject complaints and relevant materials received in the Registry in these two matters. to the office of the Hon.ble Chief Justice of India for his kind consideration. Awaiting the guidance of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, consideration of these complaints, for the time being, is deferred until four weeks from today, keeping in mind the statutory time frame to dispose of the complaint in terms of Section 20 (4) of the Act of 2013."

The order concludes: "We make it amply clear that by this order we have decided a singular issue finally - as to whether the Judges of the High Court established by an Act of Parliament come within the ambit of Section 14 of the Act of 2013, in the affirmative. No more and no less. In that, we have not looked into or examined the merits of the allegations at all. The Registry is directed to issue/upload copy of this order by redacting the name of the High Court and of the State including revelation of any description suggestive of giving identity of the person involved, where-ever it occurs in this order, to maintain confidentiality as mandated by the Act of 2013 and the Rules framed thereunder. 

The order was passed Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Chairperson, Lokpal and Members of Lokpal Justices L Narayana Swamy, Sanjay Yadav, Ritu Raj Awasthi and Sushil Chandra, Pankaj Kumar and Ajay Tirkey. 

ED raids in Patna Railway Claims Tribunal scam case

A press release dated January 23, 2025, Directorate of Enforcement (ED), Patna states that ED, Patna in connection with money laundering case related to Patna Railway Claims Tribunal scam carried out search operations at four locations related to Judge R.K. Mittal and other involved advocates in Patna, Nalanda and Mangalore. It has arrested three advocates- Bidyanand Singh, Parmanand Sinha, and Vijay Kumar on January 22, 2025 for offense of money laundering related to this scam under the provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002. The accused were produced before the Special Court (PMLA). They have been sent to judicial custody. Rahul Navin is the Director of Enforcement and Yaduraj Singh is the Joint Director Patna Zonal Office.     

ED initiated investigation on the basis of FIRs registered by CBI, ACB, Patna regarding mass scale irregularity/ criminality in the death claim cases filed, processed and decided at Railway Claims Tribunal, Patna (RCT) against unknown public servants of Railway, Bidyanand Singh, Parmanand Singh, Vijay Kumar and others under various sections of IPC, 1860 and Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 

According to the FIRs, in pursuance of a criminal conspiracy, in accidental death claim cases, only a part of the decreed amount, actually awarded to the claimants, was received by the claimants and major chunk was siphoned off by the conspirators.

ED investigation revealed that Advocate Bidyanand Singh and his team of advocates including Advocate Parmanand Sinha and Advocate Vijay Kumar dealt around 900 cases where decrees/execution orders were issued by Judge R.K. Mittal wherein approximately Rs. 50 Crore compensation was awarded to the claimants. 

It is revealed that Advocate Bidyanand Singh and his team of advocates opened and operated the bank accounts of claimants without their knowledge and using the signatures and thumb impressions of these claimants transferred the claim amount received from the railways to their own accounts or withdrawn in cash. Later, they gave some amount to the claimants as compensation as per their will. The searches resulted in identification of assets acquired by the advocates and judge in their names and recovery of physical and digital records including signed blank bank cheques and signed blank papers by the claimants. Further investigation is under progress.

The Directorate originated on May 1, 1956, when an ‘Enforcement Unit’ was formed in the Department of Economic Affairs for handling Exchange Control Laws violations under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), 1947. In 1957, this Unit was renamed as ‘Enforcement Directorate’. In 1960, the administrative control of the Directorate was transferred from the Department of Economic Affairs to the Department of Revenue. FERA, 47 was repealed and replaced by FERA, 1973. For four years (1973 – 1977), the Directorate was under the administrative jurisdiction of the Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms. FERA, 1973 was repealed and the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) came into operation on June 1, 2000. The PMLA was enacted in 2002 and the ED was entrusted with its enforcement from July 1, 2005. The Fugitive Economic Offenders Act, 2018 (FEOA) has been enacted and ED is entrusted with its enforcement with effect from April 21, 2018. This enactments have been made under the International Anti Money Laundering regime. 

Patna High Court sets aside judgment by Special Judge, Vigilance-II, Patna in Koshi Hydal Power Station, Birpur, Saharsa case

In Vishwanath Gangul v. State of Bihar, Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar, Patna High Court found force in the submissions made on behalf of the appellants. He inferred that the submissions of the Vigilance is devoid of any merits. By its judgement, the High Court set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated February 7, 2012 passed by Special Judge, Vigilance-II, Patna in connection with Special Case No. 7 of 1998, arising out of Vigilance P.S. Case No. 7/1998. It acquitted all the appellants of all the charges. They were discharged from the liabilities of their bail bonds.

The appeals were filed against the judgment of conviction and order of Special Judge, Vigilance-II, Patna, whereby and whereunder the accused appellants and others were found guilty and convicted and convicts Kapildeo Narain Prasad Sinha, Vishwanath Ganguli, Shashinath Jha, Deep Narain Mandal and Anil Kumar Rai were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC, rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section 467 I.P.C, rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section 468 I.P.C, rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence under Section 471 of the I.P.C. The convicts Kapildeo Narain Prasad Sinha, Vishwanath Ganguli, Shashinath Jha and Deep Narain Mandal were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year under Section 13(10(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The convict Anil Kumar Rai was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

The case of the prosecution was that an inquiry was conducted by the Crime Investigation Department and it was found that the estimate was prepared in the year 1986 for capital maintenance of Unit No. II of Koshi Hydal Power Station, Birpur, Saharsa under the supervision of Larson & Turbo Company, Calcutta. This estimate was prepared by the engineers of Larson & Turbo after physical verification of Unit No-II at Birpur. This estimate was prepared for Rs. 5,75,795/-, but the file relating to the said estimate could not return from Head Office, Bihar State Electricity Board (BSEB), Vidyut Bhawan, Patna to Birpur and then in November, 1988, on the same basis, another estimate was prepared for Rs. 6,36,852/-. There was difference of time of one year and eleven months in between the first and second estimate and during that period there was price rise and due to which the amount of second estimate was raised. The estimates were prepared by the local Executive Engineer, Assistant Engineer and Junior Engineer. 

The second estimate was sent to Chief Engineer, Hydal and Investigation S.B. Ram for its acceptance, who sent it to the then Project Manager, Jal Vidyut Pratishtan, Sikidri K.P. Sinha and Executive Engineer (Civil) Ranchi V.N. Ganguli. These two persons arbitrarily enhanced the estimate to Rs. 8,93,330/- without obtaining price list of the articles. In enhancement of the estimate cost, the role was played by S.P. Ram, K.P. Sinha, V.N. Ganguli and D.N. Mandal, the then Executive Engineers, Koshi Hydal Power Station. It was also alleged that Phulanand Jha, the then Electrical Execution Engineer (now dead) was also one of the associates in enhancement of rate of estimate. D.N. Mandal was camping in Ranchi from Birpur only for this work. The second estimate of Rs. 6,36,852/- was also prepared by him and again a third estimate of Rs. 8,93,330/- was prepared in connivance of D.N. Mandal and other officials. In the file relating to the estimate which was sent to Chief Engineer Ranchi for its acceptance, it was specifically provided that the basis of estimate is Larson & Turbo but the accused persons did not obtain any rate of articles from Larson & Turbo and arbitrarily they enhanced the estimates. 

It was alleged that the materials required for capital maintenance of the second unit was purchased from the market without giving any advertisement or without obtaining any quotation, and as such, the accused persons arbitrarily enhanced the amount of third estimate. The accused persons even did not contact the Larson & Turbo company at the time of preparation of estimate. After that the work was got done by M/s Gaurav Constructions, Birpur on the basis of third estimate and its payment was made by Chief Engineer, Hydal and Investigation, Ranchi. M/s Gaurav Constructions & Company is not authorized for the work, rather it works as middleman and in fact the work was got done by technically expert firm in Ranchi.

On the basis of this report, Vigilance P.S. Case No. 7 of 1998 was registered under Sections 120(B), 420, 468, 467, 471 of the IPC, Section 5(2) r/w 5(1)(d) of the P.C Act, 1947, corresponding to Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988. After completion of the investigation, charge sheet was submitted against altogether six accused persons above named under the aforesaid sections and thereafter cognizance was taken and the accused persons were put on trial. 

The counsel of the Vigilance has submitted that three estimates were prepared for capital maintenance of Unit No-II of Koshi Hydal Power Station, Birpur. The difference of amount in first and second estimates was due to time gape of one year and eleven months and price rise during that period. The first and second estimates are not under allegation in this case because it were prepared under the assistance of Larson @ Tubro company. However, the third estimate was prepared by the accused persons in connivance with each other without consultation of Larson @ Tubro Company, whereas it was specifically provided that estimate was to be prepared with the assistance of Larson @ Tubro and price fixed by it. 

Notably, Sant Kumar Sharma, the Investigating Officer (IO) has also stated in his evidence in para-5 that during the course of investigation, he came to know that the estimate was to be prepared with the assistance of Larson @ Tubro and the work was to be done by it, but in spite of that the accused persons did not follow the mandate without assigning any reason in this regard and arbitrarily prepared the third estimate enhancing the cost. 

The counsel for the Vigilance had submitted that the work was to be done by Larson @ Tubro company, but in spite of that the accused persons did not prefer to get the work done by Larson @ Tubro without assigning any reason in this regard and they arbitrarily got the work done by Gaurav Construction company. From the materials available on record, it is apparent that the accused persons prepared third estimate enhancing the amount of second estimate arbitrarily without any valid reason in connivance with each others and for their own benefit which caused loss of Rs, 2,56,478/- to the BSEB. The appellant's counsel submitted that prosecution was required to prove with cogent evidence of material but the entire case is based upon surmises and conjecture. The Court found appellant's submission to be convincing.