Supreme Court grants interim protection to Rishu Shree against arrest for four weeks, finds no ground to interfere with Justice Arun Kumar Jha's judgement

In Rishu Shree vs. Union of India (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice V. Mohana passed a 2-page long order dated June 16, 2026, wherein, it granted interim protection against arrest to the petitioner for a period of four weeks. It granted liberty to the petitioner "to meanwhile apply for bail in the High Court. Such an application shall be decided by the High Court as per its own merits without being influenced by the observations or findings in the impugned order dated 18.05.2026. Further, the High Court is requested to preferably decide the bail application within the period during which interim protection has been granted through this order." 

The Division observed:"....we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment dated 18.05.2026 passed by the High Court."  

The Special Leave Petition was disposed of with pending applications. It arose out of impugned judgment in Rishu Shree vs. Union of India through its Secretary, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice & Ors. (2026), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 75-page long judgement dated May 18, 2026

Also read: Rishu Shree saga is linked to story of Advocate Gayatri Kumari, Sanjeev Hans, Gulab Yadav, Lalit and others-Part 1 

FIR under section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 & provisions of IPC quashed: Justice Sandeep Kumar

High Court quashes FIR against Sanjeev Hans, no relief for Gulab Yadav, Lalit in Advocate Gayatri Kumari rape case, matter also pending in Supreme Court   

 

 

Supreme Court sets aside 2019 judgement by Justices A.P. Sahi Anjana Mishra of Patna High Court, P.K.Shahi's arguments vidicated

In Priyanka Kumari vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajesh Bindal and Anil Chandurkar delivered a 14-page long judgment dated February 18,2026, wherein, it set aside the 9-page long judgment dated April 11, 2019 by Division Bench of 42nd Chief Justice A.P. Sahi and Anjana Mishra in LPA from 2018. The librarians in Bihar whose services were terminated because the University of Technology and Science, Raipur, Chhattisgarh university from which they obtained their degrees was later declared defunct. The Supreme Court has set aside the High Court's judgment and ordered their reinstatement. It held that degrees earned when the governing law was in force and recognized cannot be invalidated due to subsequent legal developments. Notably, the case was filed in the Supreme Court on September 21, 2022, verified on November 20, 2022 but registered on February 5, 2026.

Supreme Court concluded:" From the facts on record, it is evident that the services of the appellants were terminated only for the reason that the institution in which they had studied was declared to be unrecognised. Accordingly, the orders vide which the services of the appellants were terminated have to be declared as illegal. Ordered accordingly. 18. As a consequence, the impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. The Writ Petition filed by the appellants before the High Court is allowed. They are directed to be reinstated back in service, with continuity. However, considering the fact that they have not performed their duties for the intervening period, and it cannot be said to be a case where only the respondent-State is at fault, in our view, they should not be entitled to any back wages." The judgement was authored by Justice Bindal. The judgement of High Court's Division Bench was authored by Justice Sahi.  

The High Court's Division Bench had upheld the 20-page long judgement dated February 22, 2018 by Justice Anil Kumar Upadhyay, the Single Judge. Justice Upadhyay concluded:"....the court finds that the University in question was established under the State Act of Chhatisgarh and the Apex Court after due scrutiny of the legislative power in the matter of setting up of the University clearly held out the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of the Act to be ultra vires as a result thereof, the Apex Court has also quashed the notification notifying the University and as such the University constituted under Sections 5 and 6 of Chhatisgarh Act shall be deemed to be non-existent University and as such the degree obtained from such University is only a waste paper." The petitioners had obtained Bachelor of Library degree in the Sessions 2003-04 from the University of Technology and Science, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. In response to the advertisement issued in the year 2009, petitioners had applied for appointment on the post of Librarian. The University from which the petitioners had obtained B.Lib. Degree was constituted under the Act of the State of Chhatisgarh. On February 11, 2005 the Supreme Court quashed the provisions of Chhattisgarh Niji Kshetra Vishwavidyalaya (Sthapana or Viniyaman) Adhiniyam 2002 and as per the direction of the Supreme Court the University ceased to exist. However, liberty was granted to such institution to take affiliation from the State University. The petitioners had claimed that Department of Education, Chhattisgarh had certified that the degree obtained in the year 2004 was a valid degree. The petitioners claimed that degree of B.Lib. obtained by petitioners was valid and genuine. The petitioners claimed that the Education Department of the State of Bihar had also, on verification, found that the certificate granted to the petitioners as legal and valid and after five years of their appointment, the petitioners had been terminated without compliance of principles of natural justice.

In his judgement, Justice Sahi had observed: "The learned Single Judge has after narrating the facts as also the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Prof. Yashpal and another Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 420 has arrived at the conclusion that the appellants are not entitled to the academic benefits of the said University which has been declared to be non-existent under the judgment of the Apex Court aforesaid and therefore their employment on the basis of any degree by the University was rightly terminated." 

In the case of Prof. Yashpal & Ors. and Gopalji Agarwal vs. Union of India & Ors., in its 31-page long judgment, Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench declared the provisions of Section 5 and 6 of the Chhattisgarh Niji Kshetra Vishwavidyalaya (Sthapana Aur Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 2002 to be ultra vires and struck it down. It observed: "As a consequence of such declaration, all notifications issued by the State Government in the Gazette in the purported exercise of power under Section 5 of the aforesaid Act notifying the Universities (including respondent nos.3 to 94) are quashed and such Universities shall cease to exist. If any institutions have been established by such Universities, steps may be taken for their affiliation to already existing State Universities in accordance with the direction contained in paragraph 45 above. Parties would be at liberty to approach the High Court if any dispute arises in implementation of this direction. All Writ Petitions, Civil Appeals and Transferred Cases filed by the private Universities are dismissed."

Patna High Court delivered two judgements on November 11, Justice Jha remands sets aside order by Special Judge, PMLA, Patna, remands for fresh hearing

Patna High Court delivered two judgements on November 11, 2025 in Ajay Kumar Rai vs. The State of Bihar by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma (as part of Division Bench led by Acting Chief Justice) and Pushpraj Bajaj vs. The Union of India through the Assistant Director, ED, Patna Zonal Office, Patna by Justice Arun Kumar Jha. 

In his 33-page long judgement in the case of Pushpraj Bajaj, a Kolkata based resident, Justice Jha relied on Supreme Court's decision in Kushal Kumar Agrawal vs. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221, wherein the Court observed that the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 223 of BNSS puts an embargo on the power of the Court to take cognizance in the absence of opportunity of hearing being afforded to the accused and, thus, set aside the order taking cognizance by the learned Special Court on a complaint filed under Section 44 (1) (b) of PMLA. 

Justice Jha observed: "52. Now, having regard to the position of law as discussed herein above and specifically taking note of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kushal Kumar Agrawal (supra), I have no hesitation in holding that as the complaint has been filed after 01.07.2024 and cognizance has been taken on 08.01.2025, Section 223 of BNSS will apply to the present complaint. Thereafter, proviso to Section 223 of BNSS mandatorily provides for an opportunity of hearing to an accused before cognizance could be taken against him, which means no cognizance of an offence shall be taken by the Magistrate without giving the accused of an opportunity of being heard and admittedly, no opportunity has been given by the learned Special Court to the petitioner before taking cognizance of an offence."

He concluded:"....I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 08.01.2025 passed by the learned Special Court in Special Trial No. (PMLA) 10/2024 suffers from infirmity and, hence, the same is set aside. The matter is remanded to the learned Special Judge, PMLA, Patna for taking decision afresh in accordance with law after hearing the petitioner in terms of Section 223(1) of BNSS within a reasonable time. 54. Accordingly, the present revision petition stands allowed. 55. However, it is made clear that this Court has interfered with the impugned order merely on infirmity and illegality committed by the learned Special Court. This order shall not be treated to be an order expressing any opinion on the merits of the case."

The criminal revision was filed under Sections 438 read with Section 442 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 seeking setting aside of the order dated January 8, 2025 passed by the Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (PMLA), Patna in Special Trial No. (PMLA) 10/2024 along with proceedings emanating therefrom, whereby and whereunder the Special Court took cognizance for the offence punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 against the petitioner and others. 

Supreme Court sets aside bail denial order by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan

In Sonu Kumar @ Sonu Kumar Chaudhary vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Suryakant and Joymalya Bagchi  passed a 4-page long order dated October 31, 2025, wherein, it granted leave and set aside the 2-page long order dated March 17, 2025 by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of Patna High Court. The Supreme Court concluded:"It is, however, not in dispute that further investigation is still going on and the appellant, after he was subjected to custodial interrogation, is presently lodged in judicial custody. In such circumstances, when investigation is yet to be completed, the conclusion of trial will doubtless take some time, and the appellant has already served some time in custody, it seems to us that the appellant can be released on bail at this stage. 3. Consequently, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed. "

The appellant had prayed for enlargement on bail in FIR of 2019 registered at P.S. Bettiah Town, District West Champaran under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 472, 120(B)/34 IPC and Section 3 of the Bihar Protection of Interest of Depositors Act, 2002. The appellant, his brother and other family members had constituted a Cooperative Society, known as SWARN lndia Multi State Credit Co-Operative Society Ltd.. The investors were allured to invest in the Society with a promise of handsome returns. The amounts so deposited were, however, allegedly misappropriated; leading to registration of multiple FIRs against the appellant, his brother and other associates. The subject FIR was one of those cases in which the appellant was arrested on January 16, 2024. There were about nine other cases registered against him. The appellant claimed that he was neither a Director nor an authorised signatory of a bank account of the Society.  The State counsel pointed out that as per the allegations contained in the FIR, the appellant was the Managing Director of the Society. 

Upon hearing the case in the High Court, Justice Sharan noted that the petitioner along with other co-accused were said to have defalcated the money of the customers deposited in the Company Swarn India Multi Estate Credit Cooperative Society Limited. APP for the State vehemently opposed the bail petition. Justice Sharam concluded: "6. In the facts and circumstances of the case and the criminal antecedents of the petitioner, I am not inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail. The prayer for bail of the petitioner is hereby rejected at present." Supreme Court has set aside this order.  

As part of Division Bench Justice Alok Kumar Sinha partially sets aside order by Justice A. Abhishek Reddy in SARFAESI Act case

Patna High Court delivered nine judgements on October 15, 2025 in Vishal Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Jhabu Kumar Ram vs. The Union of India, The Union of India vs. Vishwa Mohan Kumar (In person), Raj Kishore Pandey vs. The State of Bihar, Vandna Devi vs. The State of Bihar, Javahar Prasad @ Jawahar Prasad vs. The State of Bihar, Dinesh Kapar vs. The Collector, Lakshman Sharma @ Lakshman Mandal vs. The State of Bihar and Vinod Kumar Mishra vs. The State of Bihar through the Director General of Police, Saran.

In Vishal Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the District Magistrate, Patna & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices P.B. Bajanthri and Justice Alok Kumar Sinha delivered a 11-page long judgement dated October 15, 2025, wherein, it set aside the 3-page long order dated April 29, 2025 by Justice A. Abhishek Reddy. 

In the penultimate paragraph, the Division Bench concluded:''18. The Learned Single Judge, while passing the impugned order dated 29.04.2025, failed to appreciate that the appellant’s claim for interest was not based on any commercial bargain but on principles of equity, fairness, and accountability. Even if the SARFAESI Act, 2002 or the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 do not expressly provide for payment of interest in such circumstances, this Court is of the view that the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India permits grant of just and equitable relief to ensure that a party is not made to suffer for reasons not attributable to them." 

The judgement concluded: "19. Accordingly, this Court holds that the appellant is legally entitled to interest on the amount of 1,87,75,000/-, as the retention of such a substantial sum by the Bank without corresponding delivery of possession was wholly unjustified. Appellant however cannot be granted interest from 19.06.2024 to 18.09.2024 as handling process time for the Bank would be around ninety days from the date of deposit, which has to be taken into account. The rejection of this claim by the Learned Single Judge in the impugned order dated 29.04.2025, therefore, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and stands set aside to that extent.  20. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The respondents are directed to pay to the appellant simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the amount of 1,87,75,000/- for the aforesaid₹ period i.e, from 19.09.2024 (the date of deposit) till 11.02.2025 (the date of delivery of possession), within a period of four months from the date of receipt of this judgment.'' The judgement was authored by Justice Sinha.

Justice Sinha observed:''This Court finds merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Bank, having accepted the entire consideration amount, was under an obligation—both legal and equitable—to deliver possession within a reasonable time. The plea of the Bank that the delay was due to pendency of litigation or the conduct of the borrower cannot absolve it of the responsibility to safeguard the interests of the bona fide auction purchaser. Once the sale was confirmed and the amount was accepted, the Bank became a trustee of the deposited funds to the extent that it could not unjustly retain or utilize the same without extending possession to the purchaser. The conduct of the Bank in withholding possession for nearly eight months, despite receiving full payment, has caused demonstrable financial prejudice to the appellant, who was deprived of the use of both his funds and the property.'' 

In his order dated April 29, 2025 in Vishal Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the District Magistrate, Patna & Ors. (2025), Justice Reddy recorded that pursuant to the order dated April 23, 2025, counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Bank stated that he has necessary instructions from the Bank stating that the Bank is ready to register the sale certificate/ sale-deed in favour of the petitioner subject to the final outcome of the S.A. No. 66 of 2024 which is pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), Patna. Taking note of the same, the writ petition was disposed of directing the respondent-Bank to register the sale certificate/sale-deed in favour of the petitioner as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of his order.

The counsel appearing on behalf of White house Apartment owners Association, the respondent No. 7 had prayed for safeguarding the interest of the association as the sale of the subject property was on as is where is basis and that there are dues of maintenance pending on the subject property and that the petitioner may be directed to pay the same.  

Justice Reddy observed: ''This Court is not inclined to grant any relief in favour of the respondent No. 7 as the writ petition is not filed by the respondent No. 7. However, liberty is granted to the respondent No. 7 to avail the legal remedies as available to them under the law for recovery of any maintenance dues, if any over the subject property.''

The counsel for the petitioner had prayed the High Court to direct the respondent-Bank to pay interest on the amounts paid by the petitioner from June, 2024, till the registration of sale certificate/ sale deed. Justice Reddy observed: ''this Court is not inclined to grant the said relief as the amount is deposited  pursuant to the participation of the petitioner in the auction conducted by the Bank for sale of the mortgaged property and the delay caused in registration of the sale certificate/ deed cannot be ground for paying any interest, therefore, prayed is rejected. 4. With the above directions, the present writ petition stands disposed of.''

Patna High Court's Justice Dr. Anshuman's bail order for MLC's son vindicated by Supreme Court's judgement?

In Udhaw Singh vs. Enforcement Directorate (2025), Supreme Court's division bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan observed:"Our attention is invited to a decision of a coordinate Bench in the case of Union of India through the Assistant Director v. Kanhaiya Prasad, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 306 After having perused the judgment, we find that this was a case where the decisions of this Court in the case of Union of India v. K. A.Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713 and in the case of Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626 were not applicable on facts. Perhaps that is the reason why these decisions were not placed before the coordinate Bench. The respondent-accused therein was arrested on 18th September, 2023 and the High Court granted him bail on 6th May, 2024. He was in custody for less than months before he was granted bail. There was no fining recorded that the trial is not likely to be concluded in a reasonable time. In the facts of the case, this Court cancelled the bail granted by the High Court. Therefore, there was no departure made from the law laid down in the case of Union of India v. K. A.Najeeb and Senthil Balaji." 

This observation of Justice Oka led division bench of Supreme Court made on February 17 2025 seems to vindicate the judgement of Dr. Anshuman of Patna High Court in Kanhaiya Prasad case, which has been set aside by Justice Bela Trivedi led division bench of Supreme Court on February 13, 2025. It is apparent that he is implying lapse on the part of the counsels of the respondent. On behalf the respondent, Senior Advocate. Notably, Ranjit Kumar had argued that the respondent has not been shown as accused in the predicate offence. 

Also read: Supreme Court directs Bihar MLC's son to surrender within one week in PMLA case, sets aside Patna High Court's bail order

Justice Oka led bench passed it's judgement after hearing an appeal from Udhaw Singh, the appellant from who was  arrested for the offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002. The appellant has undergone incarceration for a period of 1 year and 2 months. There are 225 witnesses cited, out of which only 1 has been examined. Therefore, the trial is not likely to be concluded within few years. Hence, a decision of this Court in the case of Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement will apply. Paragraphs 27 and 29 of the said decision read thus:

"27.Under the Statutes like PMLA, the minimum sentence is three years, and the maximum is seven years. The minimum sentence is higher when the scheduled offence is under the NDPS Act. When the trial of the complaint under PMLA is likely to prolong beyond reasonable limits, the Constitutional Courts will have to consider exercising their powers to grant bail. The reason is that Section 45(1)(ii) does not confer power on the State to detain an accused for an unreasonably long time, especially when there is no possibility of trial concluding within a reasonable time. What a reasonable time is will depend on the provisions under which the accused is being tried and other factors. One of the most relevant factor is the duration of the minimum and maximum sentence for the offence. Another important consideration is the higher threshold or stringent conditions which a statute provides for the grant of bail. Even an outer limit provided by the relevant law for the completion of the trial, if any, is also a factor to be considered. The extraordinary powers, as held in the case of K.A. Najeeb, can only be exercised by the Constitutional Courts. The Judges of the Constitutional Courts have vast experience. Based on the facts on record, if the Judges conclude that there is no possibility of a trial concluding in a reasonable time, the power of granting bail can always be exercised by the Constitutional Courts on the grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution of India notwithstanding the statutory provisions. The Constitutional Courts can always exercise its jurisdiction under Article 32 or Article 226, as the case may be. The Constitutional Courts have to bear in mind while dealing with the cases under the PMLA that, except in a few exceptional cases, the maximum sentence can be of seven years. The Constitutional Courts cannot allow provisions like Section 45(1)(ii) to become instruments in the hands of the ED to continue incarceration for a long time when there is no possibility of a trial of the scheduled offence and the PMLA offence concluding within a reasonable time. If the Constitutional Courts do not exercise their jurisdiction in such cases, the rights of the undertrials under Article 21 of the Constitution of India will be defeated. In a given case, if an undue delay in the disposal of the trial of scheduled offences or disposal of trial under the PMLA can be substantially attributed to the accused, the Constitutional Courts can always decline to exercise jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs. An exception will also be in a case where, considering the antecedents of the accused, there is every possibility of the accused becoming a real threat to society if enlarged on bail. The jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs is always discretionary." It further pointed out that "the appellant has been incarcerated for 15 months or more for the offence punishable under the PMLA. In the facts of the case, the trial of the scheduled offences and, consequently, the PMLA offence is not likely to be completed in three to four years or even more. If the appellant's detention is continued, it will amount to an infringement of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India of speedy trial."

Justice Oka recorded that the Solicitor General of India has stated that in the facts of the case, the decision in the case of V.Senthil Balaji may be followed. Hence, the appellant deserves to be enlarged on bail, pending trial.

The division bench concluded: "the appellant shall be produced before the Special Court within a maximum period of one week from today. The Special Court shall enlarge the appellant on bail on appropriate terms and conditions including the condition of regularly and punctually attending the Special Court and cooperating with the Special Court for early disposal of the case. A further condition shall be imposed directing the appellant to surrender his passport, if any." The appeal was allowed. The verdict was authored by Justice Oka. 

The appeal was against the judgement dated May 25, 2024 by Justice Jaspreet Singh of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench. The appeal was filed on December 3, 2024.

ED raids in Patna Railway Claims Tribunal scam case

A press release dated January 23, 2025, Directorate of Enforcement (ED), Patna states that ED, Patna in connection with money laundering case related to Patna Railway Claims Tribunal scam carried out search operations at four locations related to Judge R.K. Mittal and other involved advocates in Patna, Nalanda and Mangalore. It has arrested three advocates- Bidyanand Singh, Parmanand Sinha, and Vijay Kumar on January 22, 2025 for offense of money laundering related to this scam under the provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002. The accused were produced before the Special Court (PMLA). They have been sent to judicial custody. Rahul Navin is the Director of Enforcement and Yaduraj Singh is the Joint Director Patna Zonal Office.     

ED initiated investigation on the basis of FIRs registered by CBI, ACB, Patna regarding mass scale irregularity/ criminality in the death claim cases filed, processed and decided at Railway Claims Tribunal, Patna (RCT) against unknown public servants of Railway, Bidyanand Singh, Parmanand Singh, Vijay Kumar and others under various sections of IPC, 1860 and Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 

According to the FIRs, in pursuance of a criminal conspiracy, in accidental death claim cases, only a part of the decreed amount, actually awarded to the claimants, was received by the claimants and major chunk was siphoned off by the conspirators.

ED investigation revealed that Advocate Bidyanand Singh and his team of advocates including Advocate Parmanand Sinha and Advocate Vijay Kumar dealt around 900 cases where decrees/execution orders were issued by Judge R.K. Mittal wherein approximately Rs. 50 Crore compensation was awarded to the claimants. 

It is revealed that Advocate Bidyanand Singh and his team of advocates opened and operated the bank accounts of claimants without their knowledge and using the signatures and thumb impressions of these claimants transferred the claim amount received from the railways to their own accounts or withdrawn in cash. Later, they gave some amount to the claimants as compensation as per their will. The searches resulted in identification of assets acquired by the advocates and judge in their names and recovery of physical and digital records including signed blank bank cheques and signed blank papers by the claimants. Further investigation is under progress.

The Directorate originated on May 1, 1956, when an ‘Enforcement Unit’ was formed in the Department of Economic Affairs for handling Exchange Control Laws violations under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), 1947. In 1957, this Unit was renamed as ‘Enforcement Directorate’. In 1960, the administrative control of the Directorate was transferred from the Department of Economic Affairs to the Department of Revenue. FERA, 47 was repealed and replaced by FERA, 1973. For four years (1973 – 1977), the Directorate was under the administrative jurisdiction of the Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms. FERA, 1973 was repealed and the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) came into operation on June 1, 2000. The PMLA was enacted in 2002 and the ED was entrusted with its enforcement from July 1, 2005. The Fugitive Economic Offenders Act, 2018 (FEOA) has been enacted and ED is entrusted with its enforcement with effect from April 21, 2018. This enactments have been made under the International Anti Money Laundering regime. 

Supreme Court dismisses appeal of ED, sets aside orders of Special Court taking cognizance against accused

In Directorate of Enforcement vs. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, ED had filed complaints against the respondents and others under Section 44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). The complaint is for an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA, which is punishable under Section 4 of the Act. Both private respondents, namely, Bibhu Prasad Acharya and Adityanath Das. The Special Court took cognizance of the complaints and issued summons to the respondents and other accused persons. Both of them had filed writ petitions before the High Court challenging the cognizance taken by the Trial Court and prayed for quashing the complaints on the ground that both of them were public servants and, therefore, it was necessary to obtain prior sanction under sub-section (1) of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). By the impugned judgment, the High Court upheld the respondents' contentions and quashed the orders of taking cognizance passed by the Special Court on the complaints only as against the said respondents. The ED approached the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court's bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Augustine George Masih observed: "17. Section 65 makes the provisions of the CrPC applicable to all proceedings under the PMLA, provided the same are not inconsistent with the provisions contained in the PMLA. The words ‘All other proceedings’ include a complaint under Section 44 (1)(b) of the PMLA. We have carefully perused the provisions of the PMLA. We do not find that there is any provision therein which is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 197(1) of CrPC. Considering the object of Section 197(1) of the CrPC, its applicability cannot be excluded unless there is any provision in the PMLA which is inconsistent with Section 197(1). No such provision has been pointed out to us. Therefore, we hold that the provisions of Section 197(1) of CrPC are applicable to a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA."

The judgement was authored by Justice Oka. It reads: "18. Section 71 gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the PMLA notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. Section 65 is a prior section which specifically makes the provisions of the CrPC applicable to PMLA, subject to the condition that only those provisions of the CrPC will apply which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the PMLA. Therefore, when a particular provision of CrPC applies to proceedings under the PMLA by virtue of Section 65 of the PMLA, Section 71 (1) cannot override the provision of CrPC which applies to the PMLA. Once we hold that in view of Section 65 of the PMLA, Section 197(1) will apply to the provisions of the PMLA, Section 71 cannot be invoked to say that the provision of Section 197(1) of CrPC will not apply to the PMLA."

It also notes "A provision of Cr. P.C made applicable to the PMLA by Section 65, will not be overridden by Section 71. Those provisions of CrPC which apply to the PMLA by virtue of Section 65 will continue to apply to the PMLA, notwithstanding Section 71. If Section 71 is held applicable to such provisions of the CrPC, which apply to the PMLA by virtue of Section 65, such interpretation will render Section 65 otiose. No law can been interpreted in a manner which will render any of its provisions redundant."

It concluded: "In this case, the cognizance of the offence under Section 3, punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA, has been taken against the respondents accused without obtaining previous sanction under Section 197(1) of CrPC.Therefore, the view taken by the High Court is correct. We must clarify that the effect of the impugned judgment is that the orders of the Special Court taking cognizance only as against the accused B.P.Acharya and Adityanath Das stand set aside. The order of cognizance against the other accused will remain unaffected." The Court endorsed the verdict of Justice B. Siva Sankara Rao of Telangana High Court. 

It is not clear from the judgement as to why the order of cognizance against the other accused will remain unaffected. The judgement was delivered on November 6, 2024.

Supreme Court sets aside judgment of Jharkhand High Court that denied regular bail

In Prem Prakash vs. Union of India through Enforcement Directorate (2024), the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and K.V. Viswanathan set aside judgment of Jharkhand High Court which had dismissed the regular bail application of the appellant. The regular bail was sought in connection with a case registered for the offence under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 pending before the Court of Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi.  The bail application was under Section 45 of PMLA. 

The Court relied on  the decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs. Union of India (2022) wherein the Court categorically held that while Section 45 of PMLA restricts the right of the accused to grant of bail, it could not be said that the conditions provided under Section 45 impose absolute restraint on the grant of bail. It also relied on Court's decision in Manish Sisodia (II) vs. Directorate of Enforcement, wherein it was made amply clear that even under PMLA the governing principle is that “Bail is the Rule and Jail is the Exception”. 

The Court observed: "All that Section 45 of PMLA mentions is that certain conditions are to be satisfied. The principle that, “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” is only a paraphrasing of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Liberty of the individual is always a Rule and deprivation is the exception. Deprivation can only be by the procedure established by law, which has to be a valid and reasonable procedure. Section 45 of PMLA by imposing twin conditions does not re-write this principle to mean that deprivation is the norm and liberty is the exception. As set out earlier, all that is required is that in cases where bail is subject to the satisfaction of twin conditions, those conditions must be satisfied."

The judgement reads: we hold that the appellant has satisfied the twin conditions under Section 45. Inasmuch as from the material on record, this Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the appellant is not guilty of the offence of Money Laundering as alleged under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA and the Court is further satisfied that the appellant is not likely to commit any offence, if enlarged on bail.

It has recorded that the Court does not think that "the appellant can be denied bail based on the pendency of the other matter. We say so in the facts and circumstances of the present case as we do not find any justification for his continued detention. The appellant has already been in custody for over one year. The Trial is yet to commence."

Supreme Court grants bail to K. Kavitha, the Telangana lawmaker, quashes Single Judge Bench judgement of Delhi High Court

The judgement in the bail application case of K. Kavitha vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2024) and Enforcement Directorate was reserved by the Single Judge Bench of Justice Swarna Kanta Sharma of Delhi High Court on May 28, 2024. The 41-page long judgement was delivered on July 1, 2024. Justice Sharma's judgement concluded: "this Court is of the view that no case for grant of regular bail....is made out at this stage." 

This judgement of the High Court has been quashed and set aside by a 3-page long order of the Division Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and K.V. Viswanathan on August 27, 2024 in Enforcement Directorate vs. K. Kavitha (2024).

The High Court judgement reads:"....as far as benefit of proviso to Section 45 is concerned, when it is the case of applicant herself that she is a well-educated and accomplished woman, who has remained Member of Parliament, Member of Legislative Council, etc., this Court is bound to keep in mind the observations of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in case of Saumya Chaurasia (supra). The material collected by the Directorate of Enforcement, which has been discussed in the preceding paragraphs has pointed out that the applicant herein was one of the chief conspirators in the entire conspiracy relating to formulation and implementation of new Excise Policy of Delhi. In fact, some other accused persons were working on behalf of the applicant and as per her instructions, as noted in the preceding discussion. Thus, Smt. K. Kavitha cannot be equated to a vulnerable woman who may have been misused to commit an offence, which is the class of women for whom the proviso to Section 45 of PMLA has been incorporated, as held by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in case of Saumya Chaurasia (supra). Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that Smt. K. Kavitha is not entitled to the benefit of proviso to Section 45 of PMLA."  

The proviso to Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 confers a discretion on the Court to grant bail where the accused is a woman. 

Supreme Court's order reads: "The impugned judgment and order dated 01.07.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi in Bail Application No.1675 of 2024 and Bail Application No.1739 of 2024 are quashed and set aside." Kavitha was arrested by ED on March 15, 2024 and subsequently by CBI. The apex Court found the reasoning of the Single Judge Bench of Delhi High Court regarding "vulnerable woman" for denying the benefit of Section 45(1) of the PML Act to be totally misdirected.