Supreme Court refuses to interfere with Patna High Court's verdict after 36 years, despite finding it "strange" that Justice V N Sinha convicted Ajab Rai under Section 307 in breach of Explanation 2 to Section 299, although Ramadhar Rai died because of injury

In Rasik Lal Rai vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 6-page long order dated August 12, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"...in our view, the conviction of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302  IPC would not be proper. Even if we assume that the head injury was caused by the accused, there was no underlying fracture and, therefore, in absence of intention to cause death or of causing such bodily injury which in ordinary course is sufficient to cause death, an offence not graver than 304 Part II would be made out. However, what is strange is that if the High Court was of the view that there was no intention to cause death or of causing such bodily injury which in ordinary course is sufficient to cause death, once the person died there was no occasion to convict him under Section 307 IPC."

Supreme Court's order reads: "24. In our view, the accused besides other offences ought to have been convicted for offences punishable under Section 324 IPC, for causing injuries to the three injured persons, and under Section 326 IPC for causing injury to the deceased, read with Section 149 of IPC. This we say so because the head injury, which, according to PW11, caused the death, was not noticed in the initial medical examination of the deceased. For the sake of completeness, even if we accept that head injury was caused by the accused, the offence will not travel beyond 304 Part II of IPC in as much as it was a solitary blow with no underlying fracture. In absence of any appeal from the convicted accused, without disturbing conviction under other provisions, we deem it appropriate to alter the conviction of the accused-respondents from Section 307 IPC to Sections 324 and 326 IPC read with Section 149 IPC. 25. However, having regard to the fact that the incident is of the year 1990, and now more than 36 years have passed, we do not wish to interfere with the direction of the High Court that all sentences would stand reduced to the period of sentence already undergone. 26. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms."

Rasik Lal Rai, the informant/complainant had appealed against the judgment dated March 24, 2015 authored by Justice V.N. Sinha of Patna High Court passed in three connected proceedings i.e., Government Appeal (DB) No.11 of 1993, Criminal Appeal No.309/1992 and Criminal Revision No.145/1993 preferred against the judgment and order of Second Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur dated 08.12.1992 in Sessions Trial No.42/32 of 1991/92.

Supreme Court observed: "14. What is interesting is that the head injury which was found to be the cause of death was not noticed by PW9 when he had examined Ramadhar on the date of incident. 15. Based on the evidence led in the course of the trial, the Trial Court acquitted all accused of the charge of murder on the ground of serious inconsistency in medical evidence. Ajab Rai was, however, convicted under Sections 109/307 of IPC."  

The State had filed an appeal against acquittal of the accused from the charge of murder by the trial court, both simpliciter qua Ajab Rai and with the aid of Section 149 IPC qua other accused. The informant (the appellant before the Supreme Court) had filed a revision petition because at that time there was no right of an appeal to the victim. Even the convicted accused had preferred an appeal. The two appeals and the revision were decided by common impugned judgment and order dated March 24, 2015.

The informant/complainant was aggrieved by the order of the High Court, therefore, he approached the Supreme Court. 

Supreme Court recorded:"No appeal has been preferred either by the State or the convicted accused."

The submission on behalf of the appellant was that there was no occasion for the High Court to convict the
accused under Section 307 IPC when the person injured had succumbed to the injuries. In such circumstances, the conviction ought to have been under Section 302 IPC. In support of this  submission, the counsel for the appellant pointed out Explanation 2 to Section 299 of the IPC which provides that where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skillful treatment the death might have been prevented. It was submitted that mere fact that the injured remained under treatment for 11 days would not change the gravity of the offence because the person died on account of the injuries sustained in the incident and, therefore, it would be a case of murder inasmuch as the injuries were caused with an intention to cause death.

Supreme Court recorded:"Admittedly, the Autopsy Surgeon in its deposition has indicated that death was a consequence of the head injury." 

Supreme Court observed: "Admittedly, the deceased was hospitalized, and he remained in hospital for over 11 days. The autopsy report indicates an injury on the head. This specific injury was not noticed in the earlier medical examination. There is no explanation for this discrepancy in the prosecution evidence. Therefore, in absence of any clarificatory evidence from the prosecution side that this injury was present, though inadvertently overlooked by the doctor at the time of initial medical examination, the benefit of doubt would have to go to the accused as to whether that injury was caused by them. In such circumstances, it cannot be said with certainty that the sole fatal injury found on the body of the deceased was attributable to Ajab Rai or any of the accused persons."

Earlier, in The State of Bihar vs. Ajab Rai & Ors. (2015), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices V.N. Sinha and Ahsanuddin Amanullah had delivered a 8-page long judgement dated March 24, 2015, wherein, it concluded:"we are of the view that in view of the evidence on record, both ocular and medical, the offence proved in the present case is Section 307 and not 302 of the Penal Code. The court below has rightly held the respondents in the Government Appeal and appellants in the Cr. Appeal guilty of the offence under Section 307 and other allied Sections of the Penal Code and sentenced them accordingly. In the circumstances, we do not find any merit either in the Government Appeal or in the Cr. Appeal or in the Cr. Revision, which is dismissed. The sentence imposed on the respondents under the impugned judgment is modified to the extent that the period already undergone by them during trial as also during pendency of the appeal will meet the ends of justice. In the result, impugned conviction is upheld with modification in sentence." The judgement was authored by Justice Sinha. 

The Division Bench delivered the judgement upon hearing the Government Appeal, Cr. Appeal and Cr. Revision arise out of judgment dated December 8, 1992 passed by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur in sessions trial of 1991/92, whereunder respondents in the Government appeal, appellants in Cr. Appeal were held guilty of the charge under Sections 307, 148 of the IPC. Under Section 148 of the IPC all the convicts have been directed to suffer rigorous Imprisonment for one year. The appellants Ajab Rai, Vishwanath Rai, Indradeo Rai were directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The appellant Ajab Rai were also convicted for the offence under Section 109 of the IPC, and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years. The appellants Anil Rai, Gajendra Rai and Surendra Rai were directed to suffer sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 of the IPC. The appellants Anil Rai, Vishwanath Rai and Gajendra Rai were also  convicted for the offence under Section 342 of the IPC  and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

The prosecution case, as set out in the First Information Report of informant Rashik Lal was that while he was returning to his house from his forecourt situate in Villge Chandpur Dhamaun, Police Station- Patori, around 12:30 noon on July 15, 1990, reached near the entrance, the accused persons variously armed with lethal weapons like Lathia, Gandasa, spear, firearms attacked him on the orders of accused No. 1 Ajab Rai causing grievous injury, he fell down. Hearing the alarm of Rashik Lal, his nephew Ramadhar Rai who came running to save his uncle, was caught by Indradeo Rai, Vishwanath Rai and Anil Rai, Ajab Rai inflicted Gandasa blow causing head injury to the nephew. Vishwanath Rai also gave spear blow to Ramadhar Rai after he fell down. While the assault was on, Fakira Rai also arrived and was assaulted by Indradeo Rai with spear on his head, Surendra Rai with lathi causing grievous injury. The wife of Fakira Rai, Dayawati who intervened to save them, was also assaulted with lathi, gandasa by Ajab Rai causing injury on her left leg, whereafter she also fell down. While the assault on the men folk of the prosecution party was on, the female inmates of the house of the accused persons entered the house of the informant, carried away a box containing gold ornament and silver utensil worth Rs. 2500/-, clothes. The female inmates also carried away five bags of wheat causing damage to the belongings of the informant kept inside the house. The villagers named in the fardbeyan also came, saw the occurrence. The fardbeyan was recorded in the same evening at 8:00 P.M. by K. D. Singh, A.S.I., Town Police Station, Samastipur in Sadar Hospital which was forwarded to Patori Police Station where Patori P.S. Case was registered on July 17, 1990 for the offence  under Sections 307, 380 and other allied Sections of the IPC against Ajab Rai and nine others including the five who were put on trial along with Ajab Rai. During investigation of the case Ramadhar Rai died on July 26, 1990 while in treatment at P.M.C.H. The police submitted charge-sheet only against six who were put on trial.  

In support of the charge, prosecution examined 15 witnesses including three Medical Officers and two Police Officers. P.Ws. 7, 12 and 13 are formal witnesses as they have proved First Information Report, endorsement on the fardbeyan and endorsement on the Inquest Report. The seven other witnesses are the eye-witnesses of the occurrence including informant Rashik Lal Rai (P.W. 3), Fakira Rai (P.W. 6) and Dayawati Devi (P.W. 8). 

The trial court considered the evidence on record i.e. evidence of informant and the other two eye-witnesses as also the evidence of the Investigating Officer (P.W. 10) and the doctors (P.Ws. 9, 11 and 15) concluded that the prosecution case of assault, as deposed by the witnesses in court including the official witnesses i.e. the Medical Officer who examined the three injured and one deceased, offence under Section 302 of the IPC was not made out as accused persons used the firearm like a lathi, assaulted the injured with butt of the gun and other traditional weapons. One of the injured, nephew of the informant, Ramadhar Rai died after 11 days of the occurrence of the injury. From the post mortem report it did not appear that the accused persons who assaulted him had any intention to kill Ramadhar Rai.

The counsel of the appellants in criminal appeal had assailed the trial court judgment with reference to the evidence of the informant, the two injured and submitted that close perusal of their evidence would indicate that none of the three, either the informant or the two injured, were witness of the complete occurrence as from their version it would appear that they saw the occurrence only in part but deposed as eye-witness of the entire occurrence which does not appear to be true. 

The counsel had also submitted that even accepting the prosecution version, as set out and proved by the prosecution party, the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code was not made out as none of the appellants had any intention to kill either Ramadhar Rai or the informant or the other injured. At best the offence made out against them should have been under Section 326 of the IPC Code. In this connection, he also placed reliance on the injury, post mortem report of the deceased and injury report of the injured.

Ashwani Kumar Sinh and S.C. Mishra, the counsels for the State supported the judgment of trial court. The State submitted in support of the Government appeal that offence under Section 302 of the IPC was made out as Ramadhar Rai who came to save informant Rashik Lal was inflicted Gandasa blow causing head injury, nature whereof clearly establish that the intention of its author was to commit his murder as Ramadhar Rai was preventing the author of his injury from assaulting Rashik Lal. He also submitted that the evidence of the two injured also make out a case of murder and the appeal should be allowed, respondent Ajab Rai be convicted for the offence under Section 302 and others for the offence under Section 302/149 of the Penal Code.

Justice Sinha observed: "7. Having considered the rival submission of the learned counsel for the parties and the evidence of the informant as also the two injured, we are of the view that true it is that Ajab Rai inflicted gandasa blow on the person of Ramadhar Rai causing head injury but not only the nature of the said injury was simple but also there was no repetition of blow by Ajab Rai, further though the unlawful assembly was armed with firearm yet only the butt of the gun was used to inflict such injuries which can be caused by hard, blunt substance...." Rasik Lal Rai was also one of the appellants before the High Court. 

Supreme Court reverses the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a murder case

In Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli passed a 3-page long order, wherein, it concluded:"5. Keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances of the case and, particularly, the fact that the identically situated accused are on bail, we are inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail, pending trial. 6. We direct that the petitioner shall be enlarged on bail subject to the satisfaction of the Trial Court, pending trial. 7. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of in the above terms. 

The petition had questioned the correctness of the order dated October 10, 2025 passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar of the Patna High Court in Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025),  whereby the bail application of the petitioner was rejected.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had already undergone 3 years and 5 months in custody, since he was arrested on February 21, 2023. He drew attention to the Firs Information Report to submit that while the petitioner was named in the first part of the incident which did not cause injury to any person and only a reference to indiscriminate firing was made, there was no reference to the petitioner in the second part of the incident which resulted in the death of four persons. The counsel also drew attention to the fact that identically situated accused are on bail. The counsel further submitted that Bachcha Rai whose name figures in the second part of the incident was also on bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had concluded:"I am not inclined to grant bail to petitioner no. 2, namely, Akhilesh Kumar, as the trial is on the verge of conclusion. 7. So far as the petitioner no. 1, namely, Aryan Kumar is concerned, this Court is inclined to grant bail on medical grounds so that he can get himself properly treated. 8. Accordingly, let the petitioner no. 1, above named, be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 10,000/- (ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned District and Additional Sessions Judge IV, Patna City, Patna/ concerned Court in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023, subject to the condition that both the bailors should be the close relative of the petitioner no. 1. 9. As a condition of this order, the petitioner no. 1, after being released on bail is directed to co-operate in the trial either by appearing personally or through his lawyer in the trial Court on each and every date fixed in the trial. Noncompliance of the condition will result in cancellation of the bail bonds of the petitioner no. 1. 10. The bail application is allowed with regard to petitioner no. 1 and is dismissed with regard to petitioner no. 2. 11. This bail petition stands partly allowed in the above terms." 

The petitioners had approached the High Court seeking bail in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 342, 448, 302, 307 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. From the report of the trial Judge, it appeared that out of nine chargesheeted witnesses, five witnesses were examined. 4. From the report of the Medical Officer, Beur Jail, Patna, it appeared that the petitioner no. 1 was seriously ill and he was admitted to PMCH again and again for his treatment. Notably, e. Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioners were rejected by Justice Kumar by his order dated March 5, 2024. He had concluded: "Considering the fact that it is a case of four murders, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioners."

Justice Satyavrat Verma rejected bail in a murder case

In Brajnod Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Satyavrat Verma passed an order dated February 26, 2026, wherein, he rejected the second attempt to secure bail in a case registered for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 342, 324, 307, 302, 337 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. 

Earlier, Justice Verma had passed a 3-page long order dated July 14, 2023 wherein, he had concluded:"8. Considering the submissions made by the learned A.P.P. for the State and learned counsel for the informant, the Court is not inclined to extend the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioners in connection with a Madhuban P. S. case of 2022 pending in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari/successor Court. 9. Accordingly, the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners is rejected."

The counsel for the petitioners submitted thatpetitioners are persons with clean antecedents. The informant alleged that while she along with her husband were returning home in the night, they were intercepted by the accused persons including the petitioners and they assaulted her husband by iron rod causing injury leading to his death. 

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that petitioners were falsely implicated in the present case. It was also submitted that it was night as such it cannot be alleged with certainty that it was the petitioners who had assaulted the husband of the informant by iron rod causing injury leading to his death. It was further submitted that during the course of investigation, it came out that the husband of the informant died on account of fall of a bamboo which was being erected. It was also submitted that even the witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution during the course of investigation. It was also submitted that the viscera was preserved and sent to the FSL for examination. It was submitted that though it was alleged that both the petitioners assaulted the husband of the informant by an iron rod causing injury leading to his death but then during the postmortem only one injury was found on the deceased. 

The A.P.P. for the State and counsel for the informant opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners and submitted that the police investigation was not admissible in evidence during the course of trial. 

Supreme Court sets aside judgement authored by Justice Vipul M. Pancholi in a morder case from Rohtas

In Rajesh Upadhayay vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manmohan, N.V. Anjaria delivered a 24-page long judgement dated December 18, 2025, wherein it set aside the 6-page order dated August 28, 2024 authored by Justice Vipul M.Pancholi as part of Division Bench of Patna High Court in Sheo Narayan Mahto @ Sheo Narayan Singh @ Shiv Narayan Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2024).   

This appeal was filed in the High Court against the judgment of conviction dated April 3, 2024 and order of sentence dated April 9, 2024 rendered by the Court of Additional District & Sessions Judge 19th, Rohtas at Sasaram in a Sessions Trial of 2022, which arose out of Baghaila P.S. case of 2021where-under and whereby, the Trial Court had convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 20,000/- for the offences under Sections 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- for the offences under Sections 342/149 of the IPC, To undergo imprisonment for a term of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- for the offence under Section 147 of the IPC, to undergo imprisonment for a term of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the offences under Sections 504/149 of the IPC, to undergo imprisonment for a term of two year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the offence under Section 148 of the IPC. The appellant was also to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of four years and to pay a fine of Rs. 3,000/- for the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.  

The appellant-original complainant questioned judgment and order dated August 28, 2024 by the High Court, whereby the High Court had suspended the sentence imposed on respondent No.2 and released him on bail during the pendency of the Appeal. Supreme Court's judgment records that the appellant-informant’s father named Krishna Behari Upadhyay was murdered. As per the prosecution story, on December 11, 2021 at about 4.30 p.m., the appellant along with his father Krishna Behari Upadhyay reached at Mahavir temple of the village to light ‘Diya’ and to do ‘Arti’. At that time, the accused persons and the co-villagers Bashishthha Singh alias Munna Singh, Ajit Singh, Naga Kumar, Raghunandan Kumar and Sheo Narayan Mahto- respondent No.2 herein wielding the arms and weapons reached, at the temple. Hurling abuses, all of them surrounded the appellant and his father, telling said Krishna Behari Upadhyay that he was not performing Puja and was engaging in politics. The prosecution case was that  that Pandit Krishna Behari Upadhyay tried to close the main gate of the temple, but the accused persons pushed the gate and made a forcible entry inside the temple. Ajit Singh and Raghunandan Kumar caught hold of Krishna Behari Upadhyay and Munna Singh was stated to have fired at him with a revolver. It was stated respondent No.2 also had a country-made pistol with him and that he as well as another Rajesh Mehto alias Rajesh Kumar were instigatively uttering that the Pandit should be killed as he was excessively indulging in politics. Because of gun fire shots, Krishna Behari Upadhyay fell down inside the temple premises and was in a pool of blood. The appellant somehow managed to flee away from the place and informed his family members. Om Prakash Tiwari and Ritesh Mukhia who were the family members, as well as the other co-villagers reached at the place of the offence. They saw Munna Singh, Ajit Kumar, Naga Kumar, Raghunandan Kumar and Rajesh Kumar Mahto alias Rajesh as also respondent No.2-Sheo Narayan Mahto running away in the Eastern direction. Upon being taken to the hospital, Krishna Behari Upadhyay was declared dead. A Fardbeyan was given by the appellant on December 11, 2021, pursuant to which the police registered the First Information Report for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 342, 504, 506, 302 and 120 (B), IPC, and for the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act against the six persons, including respondent No.2. On February 2, 2022, respondent No.2 surrendered before the Trial Court. Chargesheet was filed on March 28, 2022. The Sessions Court convicted and sentenced respondent No.2. In the appeal proceedings before the High Court, respondent No.2 filed an application praying for suspension of sentence, which was allowed by the High Court and during the pendency of the appeal, respondent No.2 was ordered to be released on bail, suspending the sentence imposed on him.

The Supreme Court observed: "The High Court took the view that the role attributed to respondent No.2 in the incident was of instigation, therefore, the sentence could be suspended....5. There is no escape from the fact that respondent No.2 is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149, IPC and is imposed with sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life with payment of fine. He is also convicted for the offence under the Arms Act. Respondent No.2 had undergone incarceration so far for three years. His appeal has been awaiting final outcome....5.2. The nature of role played by respondent No.2 was the aspect weighed with the High Court in suspending the sentence awarded to him, the High Court was further persuaded itself to justify the suspension of sentence of respondent No.2 on the ground inter alia that that the FIR was sent to the Magistrate’s court after a gap of three days and that the original copy of the inquest report was not produced. 5.3 At the outset, it may be observed that the High Court was in evident error in resting upon the said two counts. Delay of three days in sending the copy of the FIR to the court of the Magistrate and the non-production of original copy of the inquest report could be said to be illogical considerations applied by the High Court, insofar as those aspects do not have any bearing on the credence of the prosecution’s case which was otherwise established on evidence before the Trial Court. These considerations could not have guided the application of mind of the High Court. 5.4 The High Court was swayed away to observe that the role played by respondent No.2 in the incident was of instigation only. It may be true that respondent No.2 was instigator when the deceased Krishna Behari Upadhyay was shot at, however, it is revealed from the record and the evidence, which the High Court has also accepted and observed, that respondent No.2 also had with him a country-made pistol. 5.5 As stated above, respondent No.2 had pistol with him and he along with Rajesh Kumar and other accused persons had been shouting ‘kill him’ (Pandit Krishna Behari Upadhyay)." 

Justice Anjaria who authored the judgment observed:"Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending appeal and release of appellant on bail. Conceptually, there is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence." 

He relied on the decision in State of Haryana vs. Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175, wherein, the Supreme Court had emphasized that "the Appellate Court is expected to record proper reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of sentence or the order appealed, further observed that before suspension of sentence could be ordered, there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects. It was stated that order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as matter of routine." 

Justice Anjaria observed: "It is also the settled principle that the Appellate Court should not reappreciate evidence at stage of Section 389, CrPC and try to pick some lacunae or loopholes here and there in the case of prosecution. The presumption of innocence of the accused which is a principle applied in criminal jurisprudence, holds good only until the accused is tried. Once the accused is convicted at the end of the trial, the presumption of innocence does not continue."

He relied on the decision in Shakuntala Shukla vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.(2021) 20 SCC 818, the Supreme Court was considering the question of grant of bail during pendency of appeal at the instance of appellant who was convicted under Section, 302/149, 201 read with Section 120-B, IPC. It was observed inter alia that the High Court should be slow in granting bail to an accused convicted under Section 302/149, IPC and that once convicted, the presumption of innocence would vanish. ‘The High Court has not at all appreciated and considered the fact that the learned trial court on appreciation of evidence has convicted the accused for the offences under Sections 302/149, 201 r/w 120-BIPC. Once the accused have been convicted by the learned trial court, there shall not be any presumption of innocence thereafter. Therefore, the High Court shall be very slow in granting bail to the accused pending appeal who are convicted for the serious offences punishable under Sections 302/149, 201 r/w 120-B IPC.’ (Para 11).

Justice Anjaria referred to the decision in Omprakash Sahni vs. Jai Shankar Chaudhary & Anr.(2023) 6 SCC 123, Supreme Court reiterated that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted only in exceptional cases more particularly so in cases involving conviction under Section 302, IPC. It was further observed that the court should consider the relevant factors like nature of accusation made against the convict, the manner of commission of crime, the gravity of the offence, etc. Distinction was brought out between grant of relief of suspension of sentence in the cases where fixed term sentence is imposed versus the cases where the convicted person is sentenced to life imprisonment, by relying on its own decision in Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai vs. State of Gujarat (1999) 4 SCC 421, ‘When a convicted person is sentenced to a fixed period of sentence and when he files an appeal under any statutory right, suspension of sentence can be considered by the appellate court liberally unless there are exceptional circumstances. Of course, if there is any statutory restriction against suspension of sentence it is a different matter. Similarly, when the sentence is life imprisonment the consideration for suspension of sentence could be of a different approach.’ (Para 3)

Even in respect of cases where the sentence awarded is for a fixed term, Supreme Court in Chhotelal Yadav v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (1999) 4 SCC 421 observed that ‘there is a caveat that if there are exceptional circumstances, then the Court may decline to suspend the sentence even in cases where fixed term of sentence is imposed’. It was specifically observed that in respect of plea of suspension of sentence where the sentence is of life imprisonment, such relief has to informed by a gross and apparent error in the judgment of the Trial Court. ‘What could be those exceptional circumstances is not something exhaustive. It is for the Court concerned to look into those exceptional circumstances as may be pointed out by the State. However, the only consideration that should weigh with the appellate court while considering the plea for suspension of sentence of life imprisonment is that the convict should be in a position to point out something very palpable or a very gross error in the judgment of the Trial Court on the basis of which he is able to make good his case that on this ground alone, his appeal deserves to be allowed and he be acquitted.’ (Para 16)

Justice Anjaria underlined that "The dictum that the benefit of suspension of sentence, if at all to be granted in the cases involving conviction under Section 302, IPC, it has to be only in exception cases, is well settled in the catena of judgments. In Vijay Kumar vs. Narender & Ors.(2002) 9 SCC 366 it was observed that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302, IPC, the court should consider relevant factors like the nature of accusation made against the accused, the manner in which crime is alleged to have been committed and the seriousness of offence. The view was reiterated in Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal & Anr. (2005) 5 SCC 281, Vasant Tukaram Pawar v. State of Marashtra8, Gomti v. Thakurdas & Ors.9."

Justice Anjaria observed:"7. Looking to the crime scenario in the instant case, the murder of father of complainant-Pundit Krishna Behari Upadhyay took place inside the temple. The appellant complainant (PW2) in terms deposed that respondent No.2 had pistol in his hand. When all the accused persons came, the father of the appellant got frightened, went inside the temple. Thereupon, as is stated, the accused persons, including respondent No.2, pushed the door of the temple and made a forced entry inside, catching hold of Pandit Krishna Behari Upadhyay. The victim fell down having received gun shot injury to be in a pool of blood. As per the evidence appreciated by the Trial court leading to conviction of respondent No.2 under Section 302 read with Section 149, IPC, the firearm was used by Munna Singh whereas respondent No.2 with pistol in his hand was instigating. Munna Singh and respondent No.2 had firearms with them. Respondent No.2 had with him a country-made pistol. 8. It is also to be noted that two of the accused persons are absconding." 

Justice Anjaria observed: "9. In the light of the above highlighted principles applied to the facts of the present case and having regard to the relevant considerations such as nature of accusation, events in the crime and even the attribution of role of the appellant, it has to be held that the High Court should not have suspended the sentence, and releases respondent No.2. A clear error was committed by the High Court. The participation and role played by respondent No.2 in the entire commission of offence has to be viewed as grave and could not have been discounted for its seriousness to suspend his sentence imposed upon conviction under Section 302 read with Section 149, IPC. 9.1 It goes without saying that observations in this order are limited to the aspect of suspending the sentence of respondent No.2 and releasing him on bail, not to influence the course of merit of the trial. 10. For foregoing reasons and discussion, impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 28.08.2024 suspending the sentence of respondent No.2 is hereby set aside. Respondent No.2 Sheo Narayan Mahto to is directed to surrender within ten days. The police authorities shall ensure that respondent No.2 is sent behind the bars within the above time permitted for surrendering. 11. The present appeal is accordingly allowed."

P.S.:Subsequent to the order of the High Court dated August 28, 2024, the last order in the case was passed on May 8, 2025 by Justice Pancholi led bench in Re.: I.A. No.01 of 2025. The 3-page long order reads:"The appellant/applicant has filed the present interlocutory application with a request that the Registry be directed to send back the Trial Court Records of Sessions Trial Nos.45 of 2024 & 381 of 2024, arising out of Baghaila P.S. Case No.96 of 2021 to the Court of learned ADJ-19th Rohtas, Sasaram....3. Learned counsel for the appellant/applicant has pointed out that one of the accused has been convicted by the Trial Court whose trial was separated and, therefore, the said accused has filed the criminal appeal before this Court. This Court called for the Trial Court from the concerned Trial Court and the record is with the Registry of this Court. However, trial of other co-accused, whose trial has been separated, is still pending before the Court and, therefore, the original record is required to be transmitted to the Trial Court. 4. In view of the aforesaid request made by the appellant/applicant, office is directed to keep photo copies of the entire record of Sessions Trial Nos.45 of 2024 and 381 of 2024, arising out of Baghaila P.S. Case No.96 of 2021 and thereafter transmit the original record to the learned ADJ-19th, Rohtas, Sasaram so that the trial of the other co-accused, which has been separated, can be proceeded further. Learned counsel for the appellant/applicant has shown willingness to pay the cost of the same. 5. In view of the aforesaid, Registry is directed to transmit the record of Sessions Trial Nos.45 of 2024 and 381 of 2024, arising out of Baghaila P.S. Case No.96 of 2021 to learned ADJ-19th, Rohtas, Sasaram forthwith by special messenger at the cost of the applicant (informant) of this interlocutory application. 6. Registry is also directed to keep photo copies of the entire record of Sessions Trial Nos.45 of 2024 and 381 of 2024, arising out of Baghaila P.S. Case No.96 of 2021 and thereafter transmit the original record to the learned ADJ-19th, Rohtas, Sasaram so that the proceedings in the present appeal may proceed further. 7. Accordingly, this interlocutory application, i.e., I.A. No.01 of 2025 stands disposed of."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Dr. Anshuman in a case of scuffle

In Manjay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 4-page long order dated November 3, 2025 allowing the criminal appeal. The Court set aside the impugned order by Justice Dr. Anshuman of the Patna High Court. The appellants were granted anticipatory bail, subject to the terms and conditions that may be imposed by the concerned Trial Court.

The appellants had approached the Supreme Court apprehending their arrest. The Court observed: ''4. Since the appellants have joined the investigation and cooperated with the same, we are inclined to set aside the impugned order, and grant anticipatory bail to the appellants.'' 

In Ramesh Rai @ Ramesh Kumar & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Justice Dr. Anshuman passed a 3-page long order dated November 12, 2024 which stated that petitioner Nos.3 (Sajan Kumar), 4 (Pankaj Kumar) and 5 (Pawan Kumar) shall be released on anticipatory bail as they have clean antecedent, in the event of arrest or surrender before the Court below within a period of 4 weeks from today, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.30,000 each with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of A.C.J.M.-14, (East), Muzaffarpur in connection with Bochaha P. S. Case No.131 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the Cr.P.C. So far as petitioner Nos.1 (Ramesh Rai), 2 (Rajesh Rai) and 6 (Manjay Kumar) was concerned, this Court was not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6 as their antecedent was not clean, therefore the bail application of the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6 was rejected. Dr. Anhsuman concluded:'' 10. However, Trial Court is directed to consider the regular bail application of the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6, if they surrender within 4 weeks from today and pray for regular bail, then Trial Court shall pass order without being prejudice of the present order preferably on the same day.'' 

The petitioners had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offences punishable in connection with Bochaha P. S. Case No.131 of 2024 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 342, 323, 324, 307, 353, 354, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code.

As per the prosecution, the FIR was lodged against 8 named and 15-17 unknown accused persons including the petitioners against whom there is allegation of abusing and scuffling with the informant and police party due to which injury took place.

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are innocent and have committed no offence. He submitted that the petitioners were falsely implicated due to village politics and land dispute. He further submits that the allegation is general and omnibus in nature. He further submitted that the petitioner due to land dispute, the scuffle took place between both the parties and in this scuffling, police party has also been injured. He also submitted that petitioner Nos.3, 4 and 5 had clean antecedent whereas petitioner No.1, 2 and 6 did not have clean antecedent. 

The APP for the State opposes the prayer for bail and submitted that the petitioners were named in the F.I.R. and direct allegation of assault against them. 

Prior to this he had passed an an order dated June 20, 2024 which reads: ''Perused the order dated 03.02.2025 passed in Special Leave to Appea (Crl) No. 1532 of 2025 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.''

As part of Division Bench Justice Sourendra Pandey set aside judgement of conviction by POCSO judge, Muzaffarpur

On September 26, 2025, Patna High Court delivered 26 judgements in Suraj Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Jyoti Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Chunnu Das vs. The State Of Bihar, Amar Yadav @ Amar Kumar Yadav vs. The State of Bihar, Dipak Kumar Rai vs. The State of Bihar, Most. Lal Muni Devi & Ors vs. Murahu Singh, Lovely Kumari vs. Punit Kumar, Rahul Kumar Raushan vs. The State of Bihar, Sikandar Paswan @ Sikendar Paswan vs. The State of Bihar, Manishankar Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar  Manish Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Ajay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Ravindra Kushwaha vs. The State of Bihar, Jai Prakash Pandey vs. The State of Bihar, Satyendra Kumar Yadav vs. The State of Bihar, Khushboo Sawayam Sidha Mahila Vikas Sawyamlambi Sahakari Samiti Limited vs. The State of Bihar, Lal Babu Ram vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Ram Ratan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Vinod Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, M/s Shubh Laxmi Tent House vs. The State of Bihar through Chief Secretary, Rajendra Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Sunil Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Department of Vigilance, Government of Bihar, Craig Allen Moore @ Crag Allen Moore vs. The State of Bihar through its Home Secretary, Patna, Vijay Bharti vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna, and Brahmdeo Thakur vs. State of Bihar.  

In Suraj Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sourendra Pandey delivered a 35-page long judgement dated September 26, 2025, wherein, it concluded: ''57. In the present case, as we have already observed, material contradictions among prosecution witnesses and the non-production of the alleged viral video make it difficult to convict the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. The evidence which has been led by the prosecution does not stand to prove as contemplated under Criminal Jurisprudence and therefore possibility of false implication cannot be ruled out. As in the present case, we have seen that evidences contain material contradictions and the place of the occurrence being not proved without an iota of doubt. The circumstances which has been alleged by the prosecution thus remains in doubt. 58. In view of the aforesaid discussions and taking into account the various judicial pronouncements, we find that the conviction of the appellant cannot be upheld with the kind of evidence which is inconclusive and accordingly the conviction and sentence of the appellant cannot be sustained and is, therefore, set aside giving him the benefit of doubt. 59. The appellant is in incarceration in connection with this case, so he will be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case. 60. This appeal is allowed.'' The judgement was authored by Justice Pandey. 

Justice Pandey relied on Supreme Court's decision in Raju & Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2008) 15 SCC133, wherein the Court held that though the testimony of the victim is believable at par with that of an injured witness but her testimony cannot always be presumed to be gospel truth. He also relied on the decision in Santosh Prasad @ Santosh Kumar vs. State of Bihar reported in (2020) 3 SCC 443, wherein it was held that ''11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration.'' 

The criminal appeal arose out of the judgment of conviction dated October 13, 2022 and the order of sentence dated October 14, 2022 passed by the 7th Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, POCSO(W), Muzaffarpur in connection with Mahila P.S. Case of 2021. By the impugned judgment the appellant/Suraj Kumar and co-accused Jyoti Kumar were convicted for the offences under Sections 341, 342, 323, 506/34 and 376(D) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of twenty years and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000 for the offences under Sections 376(D) IPC as well as under Section 6 of the POCSO Act; to undergo imprisonment for a term of one month and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 for the offence under Section 341 of the IPC; to undergo rigorous imprisonment of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 342 of the IPC; to undergo rigorous imprisonment of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to also undergo imprisonment of one month for the offence under Section 323 of the IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine to also undergo imprisonment of three months for the offence under Section 506 of the IPC. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

The prosecution case was based on the written application dated 23.04.2021 given by the informant/victim (P.W. 1). In her written report she has stated that on April 7, 2021 at about 11:30 P.M. in the night while she went out of her house to attend the natural call, accused Jyoti Kumar and Suraj Kumar (appellant) forcibly made her to sit on the motorcycle and shutting her mouth took her towards Taraura Dam where both accused raped her one by one. Jyoti Kumar has also made video of the incident for which victim forbade him on which both of them slapped her. Victim also tried to raise alarm but on account of the place being isolated it was heard by none. Both the accused persons also threatened her to kill her father in case of disclosure of the incident to anyone. It was also alleged that the recorded video of the incident was made viral by the accused Jyoti Kumar. 

On the basis of this written application, Mahila P.S. Case No. 45 of 2021 dated April 23, 2021 was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 342,  376(D), 509, 506, 323/34 of the IPC and Sections 4/6 of the POCSO Act and Sections 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act and Section 67(A) of the Information Technology Act.  After completion of investigation of the case, the Investigating Officer (the I.O.) submitted Chargesheet dated June 17, 2021 under Sections 341, 342, 376(D), 509, 506 and 323/34 of the IPC and Sections 4/6 of the POCSO Act and Sections 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act. The cognizance of the offences under Sections 341, 342, 376(D), 323/34, 506/34 of the IPC and Section 4/6 of the POCSO Act and Section 14(2) of the POCSO Act was taken on July 9, 2021 against appellant Suraj Kumar. Charges were read over and explained to the appellants Suraj Kumar in Hindi to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The defence has examined eight witnesses on behalf of the prosecution and exhibited some documentary evidences in course of trial. There was only one Defence Witnesse, namely Anandi Devi. Thereafter, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. The appellant denied all  the allegations and took a plea that he was innocent.

The trial court after examining all the evidences available on the record found that in a case of sexual assault, it was not easy for a girl to disclose immediately to anybody. Therefore not reporting the matter to the police immediately alone cannot discredit the testimony of the girl which is otherwise cogent and trustworthy. The victim also supported the incident in her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. trial court appreciated the fact that not finding spermatozoa on the body of the victim was just because the life of spermatozoa was generally for 72 hours which had already elapsed in this case at the time of her medical examination. According to the mark-sheet of the victim she was minor on the date of occurrence just one month short to the age of eighteen years. The trial court found that the defence could not shift the burden and the prosecution had successfully proved the fundamental facts of this case establishing the link between the offence committed and the accused committing the offence. The trial court on the FSL report, with respect of the leggings of the victim in which no blood or semen was detected, held that the cloth of the victim was seized after gap of number of days from the date of occurrence therefore it was quite  natural that the blood or semen could not be detected on the seized cloth. It ultimately concluded that the prosecution was able to prove the facts of this case of committing the offence of penetrative sexual assault upon the minor victim. When the victim resisted for making video of the incident she was threatened by the accused for not disclosing the incident to anybody otherwise her father will be killed and that was why she did not reveal about the incident to her family members until the video was made viral. The prosecution also proved the facts constituting the offences under Sections 323 and 506 of the IPC. The charge under Section 14(2) of the POCSO Act could not be proved by the prosecution for the reason of non-compliance of mandatory certificate under Sections 65(B) of the Indian Evidence Act. The presumption under Sections 29 and 30 did not come in the aid of prosecution in this regard as well. 

Bela Singh, counsel for Bina Devi's daughter, the informant opposed the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant primarily on the fact that all the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution was able to prove the factum of the incident with the help of both oral and documentary evidence. She submitted that all the prosecution witnesses including the victim supported the case of the prosecution and there were minor contradictions which cannot be taken into account as the same is bound to occur because of the nature of offence committed against the minor victim. She also submitted that the family members of the victim through their deposition had corroborated the prosecution story without any infirmity in the same and therefore the conviction cannot be challenged on such ground. She submitted that as far as the submissions made on behalf of the appellant with regard to delay in lodging of the FIR was concerned, the same was immaterial as it was specifically stated by the prosecutrix that the two accused persons were threatening of dire consequences and also had threatened to make the video viral. It was because of such threatening that the victim could not gather strength to report the incident to her immediate family  members within time and therefore the delay in lodging of the FIR. She submitted that from the evidence on record the age of the victim girl was found to be within 18 years and therefore there was no quarrel with regard to her being a minor and therefore the conviction under the provisions of POCSO Act was justified. At last, she submitted that the present case involved two sequence of offences committed by the appellant i.e. firstly they committed rape upon the victim and recorded the same on mobile phone and thereafter made the said video viral. She submitted that in view of such incriminating circumstances the appellant does not deserve to be acquitted and there was no infirmity in the impugned judgment and order of sentence and the appeal was fit to be dismissed. 

But the High Court was not persuaded by her arguments. After hearing the counsels of both the parties, the judgment was reserved on September 17, 2025. The criminal appeal was filed in the High Court on February 15, 2023 and registered on February 24, 2023.  

Earlier, on September 8, 2025, High Court's Division Bench of Justices Prasad and Pandey has passed an order. It reads: "These two appeals were called out earlier on 4th September, 2025. On that day, none appeared for the parties. 2. Today, when these appeals have been called out, learned counsel for the informant and learned Additional Public Prosecutor for State are present but no one appears on behalf of the appellants. 3. In these circumstances, we appoint a Panel lawyer from the Patna High Court Legal Services Committee. 4. Mr. Manoj Kumar No. 1, learned Advocate is present in the Court. We request him to represent the appellants."  

Prior to that High Court's Division Bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and A. Abhishek Reddy had passed a 5-page long order dated February 15, 2024, wherein, it had observed: ''6. Considering the nature of accusation against the appellants/applicants and the materials collected against them, we have not been persuaded to suspend their sentences during the pendency of the appeals. 7. The prayer for suspension of sentence of both the appellants/applicants is, accordingly, rejected. 8. However, considering the period of custody of the appellants/applicants and the mandate of Section 374(4) Cr.P.C., we deem it appropriate to give these appeals an early hearing." The order was authored by Justice Kumar. 

It seems to be a fit case for appeal in the Supreme Court.