Justices Bibek Chaudhuri, Chandra Shekhar Jha set aside the judgment by Fast Track Court-I, Samastipur, in a murder case

In Amit Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Chandra Shekhar Jha delivered a 26-page long judgement dated April 1, 2026, wherein, it set aside the judgment of conviction dated January 10, 2019 and order of sentence dated January  15, 2019 passed by the Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court-I, Samastipur, in a Session Trial of 2017. By the impugned judgment, the sole appellant, Amit Kumar, was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs.10,000. The High Court acquitted the appellant of all charges. The judgement was authored by Justice Chaudhuri. The trial court had acquitted co-accused Babita Devi, Juhi Kumari, Rahul Kumar and Raushan Kumar of all charges, including Sections 302, 307 and 120B IPC. 

The prosecution case, as set out in the fardbayan of the informant Sunil Kumar Rairecorded on June 14, 2017 at 7:00 AM, was that on June 13, 2017 at about 12:00 noon, while the informant was at his medicine shop, he heard commotion and rushed home. He found his 15-year-old daughter, Anshu Kumari @ Akanksha Kumari, lying in the courtyard of his uncle Ashok Rai’s house with her mouth and hands tied, body on fire. Neighbours extinguished the fire. The deceased allegedly told the informant that her hands, mouth and legs were tied, kerosene was sprinkled and she was set on fire. She repeatedly pleaded to save her two brothers as the assailants had threatened to burn them too. While being taken to hospital, she allegedly repeated the threat and the phrase “Juhi, your work is done”. At Paramount Care Hospital, Patna, on repeated querying in the ICU, she allegedly named only the appellant Amit Kumar (described as Juhi’s friend) as the perpetrator. She died during treatment in the intervening night of June 13, 2017 and June 14, 2017. Motive was alleged to be enmity arising from the elopement/kidnapping of Juhi Kumari (daughter of neighbour Sanjay Rai) in which the appellant and his family were involved; the informant had supported Sanjay Rai, leading to threats from the appellant. FIR was registered under Sections 341, 342, 307, 302 and 34 IPC. After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant and four others
under Sections 448, 342, 302 and 120B IPC.

The appellant and co-accused pleaded total innocence under Section 313 Cr.P.C., claiming false implication due to family enmity and long incarceration. The defence examined no witnesses but relied on contradictions in the prosecution evidence, the post-mortem report  and the admissions of the Investigating Officer. The entire prosecution case rested solely on oral dying declarations alleged to have been made by the deceased to various witnesses. There is no written dying declaration, no statement recorded by a Magistrate, and no independent corroboration. The trial court primarily relied upon the statements attributed to PW-1, PW-2, PW-12, PW-13 and PW-14 to hold that the deceased was conscious and capable of speaking and that her “final” naming of only the appellant in the ICU was reliable. During the trial, the prosecution examined as many as sixteen witnesses. Of these, one witness (PW-3) was an independent witness, having no relation to either party. Four witnesses (PW-5, PW-6, PW-7, and PW-8) were declared
hostile; they too are unrelated to the parties and are neighbours. Nine witnesses (PW-4, PW-9, PW-10, PW-11, PW-13, PW-12, PW-1, PW-2, and PW-14) support the prosecution’s version that the deceased had named the perpetrators. PW-15 is the medical officer who conducted the post-mortem examination, while PW-16 is the Investigating Officer of the case. 

PW-3 (Rohit Kumar Sharma), a villager who reached the spot immediately, and who was an independent witness categorically stated that when he arrived, the deceased was burning and “she was not speaking”. The independent witnesse, who had no reason to favour the appellant, uniformly contradict the prosecution’s claim that the deceased was making coherent, detailed dying declarations at the scene. His evidence assumes great significance because oral dying declarations attributed by interested family members require the strongest corroboration when independent witness who reached the spot contemporaneously state that the deceased was silent or incoherent. 

The High Court observed" "A careful scrutiny of the entire evidence, however, reveals irreconcilable material contradictions, medical impossibility and perverse appreciation." 

It relied on t he decision in  State of Punjab vs. Jagir Singh ((1974) 3 SCC 227: 1973 SCC (Cri) 886) a criminal that is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures. 

Justice Chaudhary observed: "32. The prosecution has utterly failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. The multiple oral dying declarations are materially inconsistent on the most vital aspect of the identity of the perpetrator. The post-mortem evidence of asphyxia with carbon soot in the trachea and 90% burns renders coherent speech improbable. There is no eye-witness, no independent corroboration, and the investigation is perfunctory. The trial court’s appreciation is selective and perverse. The appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 33. The appeal is allowed."

The High Court drew on the judgement of the Supreme Court in Khushal Rao vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22, laid down guidelines for reliability and expressly noted situations where corroboration becomes necessary as a matter of prudence:
16. On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in India and in this Court, we have come to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, aforesaid, (1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made ; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence an has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; (5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human, memory and human character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it-; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties.
17. Hence, in order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of testing. the statement by cross-examination. But once, the court has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was the truthful version as to the circumstances of the death and the assailants of the victim, there is no question of further corroboration. If, on the other hand, the court, after examining the dying declaration in all its aspects, and testing its veracity, has come to the conclusion that it is not reliable by itself, and that it suffers from an infirmity, then, without corroboration it cannot form conviction. Thus, the necessity for corroboration arises not from any inherent weakness of a dying declaration as a piece of evidence, as held in some of the reported cases, but from the fact that the court, in a given case, has come to the conclusion that the particular dying declaration was not free from the infirmities referred to above or from such other infirmities as may be disclosed in evidence in that case."

Justicr Chaudhuri observed: "19. From plain reading of the evidence of the witnesses who are close relatives of the deceased, we find inherent contradictions, wilful exaggeration and unnatural tendency of development of so-called dying declaration rendering it highly suspicious. 20. In this context, while Paniben v. State of Gujarat, 1992 (2) SCC 474, remains a leading authority for the proposition that a dying declaration is not a weak piece of evidence and requires no corroboration if found reliable, the present case stands on an entirely different footing, as the alleged dying declaration is shrouded in serious doubt and fails to inspire confidence." 

In Paniben v. State of Gujarat, the Court observed: "18. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was
in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under:
(1) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. ((1976) 3 SCC 104 1976 SCC (Cri) 376: (1976) 2 SCR 764])
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav ((1985) 1 SCC 552 1985 SCC (Cri) 127: AIR 1985 SC 416]: Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar [(1983) 1 SCC 211: 1983 SCC (Cri) 169: AIR 1983 SC 164]).
(II) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not
the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the
assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor ((1976) 3 SCC 618: 1976 SCC (Cri) 473: AIR 1976 SC 1994]).
(IV) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. [(1974) 4 SCC 264: 1974 SCC (Cr) 426))
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P. [1981 Supp SCC 25: 1981 SCC (Cri) 645: AIR 1982 SC 1021])
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (Ram Manorath
v. State of U.P. (1981) 2 SCC 654: 1981 SCC (Cri) 581])
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu (1980 Supp SCC 455: 1981 SCC (Cri) 364: AIR 1981 SC 617])
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar [1980 Supp SCC 769: 1979 SCC (Cri) 519: AIR 1979 SC 1505])
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy itself whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (Nonhau Ram v. State of M.P [1988 Supp SCC 152: 1988 SCC (Cri) 342: AIR 1988 SC 912])
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said
declaration cannot be acted upon. (State of U.P. v.Madan Mohan ((1989) 3 SCC 390: 1989 SCC (Cri) 585: AIR 1989 SC 1519]

Justice Chauduri recollected that the Supreme Court in Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 2 SCC 684, has directly addressed multiple declarations and the requirement of consistency in material particulars

Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo, Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad set aside conviction of 5 in Ara Civil Court bomb blast case, upholds escape charges for 2

In The State of Bihar vs. Lamboo Sharma (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad delivered a-176 page long judgement dated March 26, 2026, wherein, in the penultimate paragraph, it concluded: "....we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to establish any of the charges against the appellants Shyam Vinay Sharma, Rinku Yadav, Md. Naim Miya @ Naim Miya, Md. Chand Miya @ Chand Miyan and Anshu Kumar. The impugned judgment and order of conviction of these appellants is hereby set aside and they are acquitted of all the charges. They shall be set at liberty forthwith if their detention is not required in any other cases. The conviction of the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay of all the charges except under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code, are hereby set aside. The sentence imposed by the learned trial Court on these two appellants for the offence under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code is upheld. Since both the appellants are in jail, they are to be set at liberty if they have already undergone the sentence imposed for the offence under section 224 of I.P.C. and their detention is not required in any other cases."

Chief Justice Sahoo authored a 162-page long leading judgment and Justice Prasad authored a 14-page long concurring judgement. 

The High Court concluded: "In the result, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1150 of 2019 filed by appellant Shyam Vinay Sharma, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1162 of 2019 filed by appellant Rinku Yadav, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1185 of 2019 filed by appellant Md. Naim Miya @ Naim Miya, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1246 of 2019 filed by appellant Md. Chand Miya @ Chand Miyan and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1271 of 2019 filed by appellant Anshu Kumar are allowed. Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1210 of 2019 filed by appellant Lamboo Sharma @ Munna Sharma @ Sachidanand Sharma and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1290 of 2019 filed by appellant Akhilesh Upadhyay are allowed in part.  The death sentence reference is answered in negative." 

Ravindra Kumar was the Advocate for the appellant and Shashi Bala Verma and Ajay Mishra were was the Additional Public Prosecutors for State of Bihar. Pratik Mishra was the Amicus Curiae. Ravindra Kumar, was also the Amicus Curiae to represent the case of Rinku Yadav.

The judgement was delivered upon hearing the Death Reference No.01 of 2024, the reference under section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which corresponds to section 407 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 submitted to the High Court by the Additional Sessions Judge-VIII, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial Case No.35 of 2016 for confirmation of death sentence imposed on Lamboo Sharma @ Munna Sharma @ Sachidanand Sharma vide judgment and order dated April 5, 2023 so also the judgment and order dated August 17, 2019 passed by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial No.35 of 2016. 

As per the first information report lodged by Sub-Inspector Gauri Shankar Pathak before the Inspector Satyendra Kumar Shahi, S.H.O., Ara Town Police Station at Civil Court premises, Ara on January 23, 2025 at 1:35 p.m., approximately at about 11:25 a.m., a prisoner van carrying prisoners from the District Jail, Ara, arrived near the Court hazat (lock-up) for their appearance in the Court. After the van stopped, a female prisoner was first disembarked, followed by the other prisoners. A total number of 37 prisoners, including one female prisoner, were in the van. After the female prisoner was taken to the hazat, when three male prisoners were being escorted towards the Court hazat, Nagina Devi, a woman standing on the road, south to the prison van, detonated a bomb. The bomb blast caused severe injuries to Constable Amit Kumar (the deceased) of the armed forces, who was on duty to bring the prisoners from the jail to the Court so also to Havildar Shivji Prasad Singh and Constable Dwarika Prasad Pathak, both posted at Sadar Court, Ara and fifteen to sixteen persons present in Court also suffered severe injuries. The woman who detonated the bomb and was approximately 30 years old also suffered severe injuries on her face and the other parts of her body got mutilated. Smoke from the bomb spread everywhere, causing stampede and people started running hither and thither and taking advantage of such chaos, two prisoners i.e. appellant Lamboo Sharma and appellant Akhilesh Upadhyay, who were the two male prisoners amongst the three male prisoners disembarked from the prisoner van, escaped. The unknown woman who detonated the bomb died at the spot and the injured constable Amit Kumar (the deceased) who was sent to Sadar Hospital, Ara for treatment, was also declared dead by the doctor. All the other injured persons were immediately shifted to Sadar Hospital, Ara for treatment. It is further stated in the F.I.R that the name of the woman, who died in the bomb blast, was not known to the informant. The woman used to come to the Court previously when appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay were coming to the Court for their Court appearances and she used to meet those two appellants. The informant believed that the woman carried out the bomb blast to help the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay in escaping from the judicial custody, in which she herself was also killed. The bomb blast occurrence was the result of criminal conspiracy carried out by the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhya and the deceased unknown woman and other unknown accused persons helped the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay in escaping from judicial custody. Prior to this bomb blast incident, in the year 2009, appellant Lamboo Sharma with the help of other accused persons, had also detonated a bomb in the Ara Court premises in which one Advocate was killed and many others got injured. In the 2009 bomb blast occurrence committed in the Ara Court premises, appellant Lamboo Sharma was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Court and some other cases were also pending against him for trial before the Court. 

Notably, as per prosecution case, the appellant Lamboo Sharma was inside the jail and on the date of occurrence, he was produced along with others in a prisoner van from jail in the campus of Civil Court, Ara and after bomb blast, he escaped from judicial custody. 

Chief Justice Sahoo observed that the F.I.R. story that the deceased unknown woman was previously coming to the Court and meeting the two appellants cannot be accepted. in the case of Utpal Das and others vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2010) 6 Supreme Court Cases 493 that the first information report does not constitute substantive evidence. It can, however, only be used as a previous statement for the purpose of either corroborating its maker or for contradicting him and in such a case, the previous statement cannot be used unless the attention of the witness has first been drawn to those parts by which it is proposed to contradict the witness. 

In his judgement, Chief Justice Sahoo pointed out that the prosecution did not succeed by adducing cogent evidence in establishing any previous meeting between the deceased woman and appellants either in jail or in Court complex. 

He noted that vital incriminating circumstance was not put in accused statement. The circumstance as deposed to by P.W.10, P.W.15 and P.W.26 that the deceased woman was trying to handover the bag to the appellants Lamboo Sharma or Akhilesh Upadhyay was not put to any of them in their accused statements recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C.

In Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam reported in (2013) 12 SCC 406, it has been held that in a criminal trial, the purpose of examining the accused under section 313 of Cr.P.C., is to meet the requirement of principles of natural justice. The accused may be asked to furnish some explanation as regards the incriminating circumstances associated with him and the Court must take note of such explanation. It is further held that the circumstances which were not put to the accused in his examination under section 313 of Cr.P.C., cannot be used against him and it must be excluded from consideration.

In Indrakunwar vs. The State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1364, it has been held that the object of section 313 of Cr.P.C. is to enable the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. The intent is to establish a dialogue between the Court and the accused and this process benefits the accused and aids the Court in arriving at the final verdict, which is not a matter of procedural formality but based on cardinal principle of natural justice. It is also held that the circumstances that are not put to the accused while recording the statement under the section 313 of Cr.P.C. are to be excluded from consideration and the Court is obligated to put, in the form the questions, all incriminating circumstances to the accused so as to give him an opportunity to articulate his defence. Non-compliance with the section may cause prejudice to the accused and may impede the process of arriving at a fair decision.

In Ganesh Gogoi vs. State of Assam reported in (2009) 7 SCC 404, relying upon the earlier decision in Basavaraj R. Patil & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2000) 8 SCC 740, it was held that the provisions of section 313 of Cr.P.C. are not meant to nail the accused to his disadvantage but are meant for his benefit. The provisions are based on the salutary principles of natural justice and the maxim audi alteram partem’ has been enshrined in them. Therefore, an examination under section 313 of Cr.P.C. has to be of utmost fairness.

In Shaikh Maqsood Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2009) 6 SCC 583 and Ranvir Yadav vs. State of Bihar reported in (2009) 6 SCC 595, theSupreme Court has held that it is the duty of the trial court to indicate incriminating material to the accused. Section 313 of Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality. An improper examination/inadequate questioning under section 313 of Cr.P.C. amounts to a serious lapse on the part of the trial Court and is a ground for interference with the conviction. 

Justice Sahoo observed: "We are of the humble view that since the prosecution is utilizing the evidence of these three witnesses i.e. P.W.10, P.W.15 and P.W.26 regarding the attempt made by the unknown woman to hand over a bag to the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay against these two appellants, which is a vital circumstance, the learned trial Court was required to put this circumstance, in the form of questions to these two appellants seeking for their explanation. Since the same has not been done, we are of the view that it has actually and materially prejudiced them and has resulted in the failure of justice as it has deprived them in giving their explanation. Thus, in view of the settled law, we are not able to use such particular circumstance against any of them and it must be excluded from consideration."

The judgement of the High Court took note of the withholding of statement of the daughter of the deceased namely Soni Devi, whose statement was recorded both under sections 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C., who could have thrown light on the use of mobile no.8083172236 by her mother by the prosecution and non-examination in the trial court. It reads: "Law is well settled that the statement of a witness recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. is not substantive evidence. Substantive evidence is one which is given by witness in Court on oath in presence of the accused. Statement of a witness under section 164 of the Code is recorded in absence of accused and as such it is not substantive evidence. The statement of a witness under section 164 Cr.P.C. is recorded being sponsored by the investigating agency. During course of trial, if the witness does not support the prosecution case and declared hostile by the prosecution then the prosecution with the permission of the Court can confront his previous statement made before the Magistrate to him. A statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. can be used either for corroboration of the testimony of a witness under section 157 of the Evidence Act or for contradiction thereof under section 145 of the Evidence Act." 

In State of Delhi vs. Shri Ram reported in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 490, it is held that the statements recorded under section 164 of the Code are not substantive evidence in a case and cannot be made use of except to corroborate or contradict the witness. An admission by a witness that a statement of his was recorded under section 164 of the Code and that what he had stated there was true would not make the entire statement admissible, much less could any part of it be used as substantive evidence.

In Baij Nath Sah vs. State of Bihar reported in (2010) 6 SCC 736, the Supreme Court held that a statement under section 164 can be only utilized as a previous statement and nothing more.

Chief Justice Sahoo recorded that the evidence on record clearly indicated that when the bomb blast took place, there was darkness and nothing was visible in the darkness for about ten to fifteen minutes and the people were running hither and thither to save their lives. In such a scenario, merely because the Micromax mobile phone set was lying nearer to the body of the deceased intact, it is very difficult to accept that the deceased woman was the user of such mobile phone. When material witnesses who could have thrown light that the deceased had got any link with such Micromax mobile have been withheld, adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution. 

In Takhaji Hiraji vs. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing & Ors. reported in (2001) 6 SCC 145,  it has been held that it is true that if a material witness, who would unfold the genesis of the incident or an essential part of the prosecution case, not convincingly brought to fore otherwise, or where there is a gap or infirmity in the prosecution case which could have been supplied or made good by examining a witness who though available is not examined, the prosecution case can be termed as suffering from a deficiency and withholding of such a material witness would oblige the Court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution by holding that if the witness would have been examined, it would not have supported the prosecution case. The Court of facts must ask itself as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was necessary to examine such other witness, and examined and yet was being withheld from the Court. If the answer be positive, then only a question of drawing an adverse inference may arise. 

There is no evidence on record that Savitri Devi in whose name the mobile number was registered which was lying near the deceased woman or the three mobile subscribers namely Sanjay Kumar, Musa Nut and Vijay Prasad were not available to be examined. Had they been examined, Savitri Devi could have thrown light as to how her mobile phone set was lying nearer to the deceased woman at the spot and whether she had handed over the same for the use of the deceased. Similarly, the three mobile subscribers would have thrown light as to in whose possession mobile SIM cards were there for its use. 

Chief Justice Sahoo observed: "We are of the view that an essential part of the prosecution case, which could have been proved by adducing the evidence of the aforesaid four witnesses has not been done. The examination of such witnesses was very crucial to establish the link between the deceased woman and the appellants in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, we are constrained to draw adverse inference against the prosecution for withholding such important witnesses."

With regard to the electronic evidence in the form of call detail records (CDR) and tower location data of the mobile numbers which were produced by the prosecution, Amicus Curiae submitted these were not admissible in evidence in absence of requisite certificate under section 65(4) of Evidence Act. The certificate under section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act which is a pre-requisite for admissibility of electronic evidence has not been brought on record and therefore, the electronic documents brought on record by the prosecution by way of exhibits are completely inadmissible.

The  judgement noted that the I.O. has stated in the cross-examination that the CDR does not bear the signature of any official and that no statement was recorded from the person from whom the CDR was obtained. Neither any Nodal Officer of the telecom (service provider) nor any person occupying responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device has been examined in this case. 

Notably, Section 59 of the Evidence Act states that all facts, except the contents of documents or electronic records, may be proved by oral evidence. As per section 3 of the Evidence Act, the expression ‘electronic records’ shall have the meaning as assigned in the Information Technology Act, 2000. Section 2(ta) of 2000 Act defines ‘electronic record’ which means data, record or data generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form or micro form or computer generated micro fiche. Section 61
of the Evidence Act states that the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. Section 62 of the Evidence Act defines ‘primary evidence’ as meaning the documents itself produced for the inspection of the Court. Section 63 of the Evidence Act speaks of the kind or types of ‘secondary evidence’ by which documents may be proved. Section 65 of the important and it states that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in certain cases which have been enumerated under clauses (a) to (g) of such section. Whereas ‘existence’ goes to ‘admissibility’ of a document, ‘contents’ of a document are to be proved after a document becomes admissible in evidence. 

Section 65A of the Evidence Act speaks of ‘contents’ of electronic records being proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. Section 65B of the Evidence Act speaks of ‘admissibility’ of electronic records which deals with ‘existence’ and ‘contents’ of electronic records being proved once admissible into evidence. Section 65B(1) opens with a non-obstante clause, and makes it clear that any information that is contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document, if the conditions mentioned in the section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof of production of the original as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible. The deeming fiction is for the reason that ‘document’ as defined by section 3 of the Evidence Act does not include ‘electronic records’. 

Section 65B(2) of the Evidence Act refers must be satisfied in respect of a computer output, and states that the test for being included in conditions 65B(2) (a) to 65(2)(d) is that the computer be regularly used to store or process information for purposes of activities regularly carried on in the period in question. The conditions mentioned in sub-sections 2(a) to 2(d) must be satisfied cumulatively.

The judgement reads:"....we are of the view that mere absconding of the two appellants from judicial custody may not be alone sufficient to hold that they in connivance with others caused the bomb blast in the Ara Civil Court complex on the date of occurrence...." 

Notably, Lamboo Sharma, the appellant was lawfully detained for commission of various offences and he escaped from judicial custody and section 224 of I.P.C, inter alia, provides for punishment if a person escapes or attempts to escape from any custody in which he is lawfully detained, therefore, Chief Justice Sahoo observed: "we are of the humble view that the learned trial Court has rightly found him guilty under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code." 

In his concurring judgement, Justice Prasad made observations with regard to appointment of Amicus Curiae wherein he drew on Supreme Court's judgement in Bhola Mahto vs. The State of Jharkhand reported in 2026 INSC 257 which had referred to the decision of the Court in Anokhi Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2019) 20 SCC 196. He concluded:"11. I believe that the procedure followed in the present case in the matter of appointment of Amicus Curiae and securing the presence of the convicts particularly condemned prisoner and giving them an opportunity to interact will set a precedent."

Justice Anil Kumar Sinha dismisses a civil writ, terms it "a textbook case of delay and laches where the petitioner has chosen to wake up from the slumber after nearly two decades"

In Surjeet Singh Sahni vs. State of U.P. and Others, reported in (2022) 15 SCC 536, Supreme Court's Division Bench Justices M.R Shah and B.V. Nagarathna has held that mere filing representation does not extend the period of limitation and if it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court should dismiss it at the threshold and ought not to dispose of the writ petition by relegating the writ petitioner to file representation and /or directing the authority to decide the representation. Patna High Court relied on this decision to dismiss a civil writ on April 1, 2026. 

In its 6-page long judgement dated February 28, 2022, Supreme Court's Division Bench concluded:"The High Court has rightly refused to grant any relief which as such was in the form of specific performance of the contract. No writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India shall be maintainable and/or entertainable for specific performance of the contract and that too after a period of 10 years by which time even the suit for specific performance would have been barred by limitation. 7. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, there is no substance in the present special leave petition and the same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed." 

The petition had approached the Supreme Court through a special leave petition because he was aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment  and order dated September 9, 2021 passed by the Allahabad High Court in Writ C No.40336 of 2017 by which the High Court had dismissed the said writ petition. The petitioner entered into a Sale Deed with the respondent –NOIDA vide Sale Deed dated 19.09.2001 whereby the petitioner sold a Plot No. 163 of Khata No. 254 to the NOIDA under the provisions of Section 6 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 and in terms of the Resolution in 102nd meeting of NOIDA. According to the petitioner, Clause No. 12 of the Sale Deed clearly provided that a plot of 10% area (to be calculated of the total land sold) shall be allotted to the petitioner on payment of 10% of the amount as being paid under the Sale Deed. In addition, it clearly recorded that "Original Farmer" shall also be entitled to "Rehabilitation Bonus". After a period of 10 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed, the petitioner made a representation to NOIDA vide representation dated March 10, 2010 requesting to allot a plot as agreed in terms of the Sale Deed. That thereafter the petitioner preferred Writ Petition No.5599 of 2011 before the High Court inter alia praying that directions to the NOIDA to allot 10% of the land of the acquired area of the land of the petitioner for Abadi purposes in terms of Clause 12 of the Sale Deed dated September 19, 2001 and as per Resolution in 102nd meeting of NOIDA Board held on January 7, 1998. Though the writ petition was filed after a period of 11 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed and though the writ petition was barred by delay and laches, the High Court entertained the writ petition, however, disposed of the writ petition vide order dated April 7, 2017 directing the NOIDA to decide the representation of the petitioner expeditiously and preferably within a period of six weeks. NOIDA rejected the representation. 

Aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the NOIDA dated May 23, 2017 rejecting the representation, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.40336 of 2017 by which the petitioner again prayed to allot 10% plot to him as provided under Clause 12 of the Sale Deed dated September 19, 2001 and as per the Resolution passed in 102nd meeting of NOIDA Board on January 7, 1998. The High Court by the impugned judgment and order dismissed the writ petition inter alia holding firstly, that Writ Petition arising out of contract between parties is not maintainable and petitioner should have filed a Suit for specific performance; secondly, Writ Petition has been filed after a delay of 16 years and delay is fatal for challenge to acquisition or for any claim arising out of it; thirdly, Clause 12 of Sale Deed provided for allotment of land to original Khatedar and as the petitioner had purchased land in 1970 therefore it's clear that petitioner was not original agriculturist; and the establishment of NOIDA in 1976 shall have no bearing on the matter. 

Justice Shah who authored the judgement observed: "The High Court by passing the order dated 07.04.2017 as such did not realise and/or appreciated that the writ petition itself was required to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches as the same was filed after a period of 11 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed under which the right was claimed. We have come across number of such orders passed by the High Courts directing the authorities to decide the representation though the representations are made belatedly and thereafter when a decision is taken on such representation, thereafter it can be said on behalf of the petitioner that the fresh cause of action has arisen on rejection of the representation. Therefore, when such orders are passed by the High Courts either relegating the petitioner to make a representation and/or directing the appropriate authority to decide the representation, the High Courts have to consider whether the writ petition is filed belatedly and/or the same is barred by laches and/or not, so that in future the person who has approached belatedly may not contend that the fresh cause of action has arisen on rejection of the representation. Even in a case where earlier representation is rejected, the High Court shall decide the matter on merits." 

The judgement reads: "5. As observed by this Court in catena of decisions, mere representation does not extend the period of limitation and the aggrieved person has to approach the Court expeditiously and within reasonable time. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court should dismiss it at the threshold and ought not to dispose of the writ petition by relegating the writ petitioner to file a representation and/or directing the authority to decide the representation, once it is found that the original writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. Such order shall not give an opportunity to the petitioner to thereafter contend that rejection of the representation subsequently has given a fresh cause of action."

Relying on this judgement of the Supreme Court, Justice Anil Kumar Sinha dismissed the writ petition in Ram Sewak Thakur vs. Chancellor of the Universities of Bihar Raj Bhawan, Patna & Ors (2026) by its 9-page long order dated April 1, 2026. The other six respondents were:The State of Bihar through the Additional Chief Secretary, Education Department, Government of Bihar, Director, Higher Education Department, Government of Bihar, 4. Lalit Narayan Mithila University, through its Registrar, Darbhanga, Vice Chancellor, Lalit Narayan Mithila University, Darbhanga, Pro Vice Chancellor-cum-Chairman of the Grievance Redressal Cell, Lalit Narayan Mithila University, Darbhanga and Registrar, Lalit Narayan Mithila University, Darbhanga.

Justice Sinha observed: "10. Delay and laches is a recognized doctrine. “Laches” is derived from french language and means remissness and slackness. The Supreme Court, in the case of Union of India and Others v. N. Murugesan and Others, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 25, has held that laches involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right and therefore must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy." He added: "In paragraph 21 and 22 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:-
“21. The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning "remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy."

Justice Sinha referred to the judgment of Chairman, State Bank of India and Another v. M.J. James, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 301, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:-“36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four years and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the ground that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case." 

The petitioner had challenged the notification dated June 6, 2004 and December 26, 2009 seeking its modification after inordinate delay. Though the case of the petitioner is that he kept on filing representations on several occasion, but the petitioner has approached this Court after a long gap of nearly about 18 years raising claim of regularization on the post of Assistant. The petitioner retired on February 28, 2023 and woke up from deep slumber and filed this writ application after nearly two decades on a dead cause of action which can be termed as stale claim. 

Justice Sinha  concluded:" Following the law laid down by the Supreme Court that the writ court should be conscious and alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure and pleasure, the court is under a legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. 14. This court is of the view that this is a textbook case of delay and laches where the petitioner has chosen to wake up from the slumber after nearly two decades. Applying the law case, this Court finds no merit in the writ petition. The writ petition is clearly barred by delay and laches. 15. Accordingly, the present writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs."