In Amit Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Chandra Shekhar Jha delivered a 26-page long judgement dated April 1, 2026, wherein, it set aside the judgment of conviction dated January 10, 2019 and order of sentence dated January 15, 2019 passed by the Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court-I, Samastipur, in a Session Trial of 2017. By the impugned judgment, the sole appellant, Amit Kumar, was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs.10,000. The High Court acquitted the appellant of all charges. The judgement was authored by Justice Chaudhuri. The trial court had acquitted co-accused Babita Devi, Juhi Kumari, Rahul Kumar and Raushan Kumar of all charges, including Sections 302, 307 and 120B IPC.
The prosecution case, as set out in the fardbayan of the informant Sunil Kumar Rairecorded on June 14, 2017 at 7:00 AM, was that on June 13, 2017 at about 12:00 noon, while the informant was at his medicine shop, he heard commotion and rushed home. He found his 15-year-old daughter, Anshu Kumari @ Akanksha Kumari, lying in the courtyard of his uncle Ashok Rai’s house with her mouth and hands tied, body on fire. Neighbours extinguished the fire. The deceased allegedly told the informant that her hands, mouth and legs were tied, kerosene was sprinkled and she was set on fire. She repeatedly pleaded to save her two brothers as the assailants had threatened to burn them too. While being taken to hospital, she allegedly repeated the threat and the phrase “Juhi, your work is done”. At Paramount Care Hospital, Patna, on repeated querying in the ICU, she allegedly named only the appellant Amit Kumar (described as Juhi’s friend) as the perpetrator. She died during treatment in the intervening night of June 13, 2017 and June 14, 2017. Motive was alleged to be enmity arising from the elopement/kidnapping of Juhi Kumari (daughter of neighbour Sanjay Rai) in which the appellant and his family were involved; the informant had supported Sanjay Rai, leading to threats from the appellant. FIR was registered under Sections 341, 342, 307, 302 and 34 IPC. After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant and four others
under Sections 448, 342, 302 and 120B IPC.
The appellant and co-accused pleaded total innocence under Section 313 Cr.P.C., claiming false implication due to family enmity and long incarceration. The defence examined no witnesses but relied on contradictions in the prosecution evidence, the post-mortem report and the admissions of the Investigating Officer. The entire prosecution case rested solely on oral dying declarations alleged to have been made by the deceased to various witnesses. There is no written dying declaration, no statement recorded by a Magistrate, and no independent corroboration. The trial court primarily relied upon the statements attributed to PW-1, PW-2, PW-12, PW-13 and PW-14 to hold that the deceased was conscious and capable of speaking and that her “final” naming of only the appellant in the ICU was reliable. During the trial, the prosecution examined as many as sixteen witnesses. Of these, one witness (PW-3) was an independent witness, having no relation to either party. Four witnesses (PW-5, PW-6, PW-7, and PW-8) were declared
hostile; they too are unrelated to the parties and are neighbours. Nine witnesses (PW-4, PW-9, PW-10, PW-11, PW-13, PW-12, PW-1, PW-2, and PW-14) support the prosecution’s version that the deceased had named the perpetrators. PW-15 is the medical officer who conducted the post-mortem examination, while PW-16 is the Investigating Officer of the case.
PW-3 (Rohit Kumar Sharma), a villager who reached the spot immediately, and who was an independent witness categorically stated that when he arrived, the deceased was burning and “she was not speaking”. The independent witnesse, who had no reason to favour the appellant, uniformly contradict the prosecution’s claim that the deceased was making coherent, detailed dying declarations at the scene. His evidence assumes great significance because oral dying declarations attributed by interested family members require the strongest corroboration when independent witness who reached the spot contemporaneously state that the deceased was silent or incoherent.
The High Court observed" "A careful scrutiny of the entire evidence, however, reveals irreconcilable material contradictions, medical impossibility and perverse appreciation."
It relied on t he decision in State of Punjab vs. Jagir Singh ((1974) 3 SCC 227: 1973 SCC (Cri) 886) a criminal that is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.
Justice Chaudhary observed: "32. The prosecution has utterly failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. The multiple oral dying declarations are materially inconsistent on the most vital aspect of the identity of the perpetrator. The post-mortem evidence of asphyxia with carbon soot in the trachea and 90% burns renders coherent speech improbable. There is no eye-witness, no independent corroboration, and the investigation is perfunctory. The trial court’s appreciation is selective and perverse. The appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 33. The appeal is allowed."
The High Court drew on the judgement of the Supreme Court in Khushal Rao vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22, laid down guidelines for reliability and expressly noted situations where corroboration becomes necessary as a matter of prudence:
16. On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in India and in this Court, we have come to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, aforesaid, (1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made ; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence an has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; (5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human, memory and human character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it-; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties.
17. Hence, in order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of testing. the statement by cross-examination. But once, the court has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was the truthful version as to the circumstances of the death and the assailants of the victim, there is no question of further corroboration. If, on the other hand, the court, after examining the dying declaration in all its aspects, and testing its veracity, has come to the conclusion that it is not reliable by itself, and that it suffers from an infirmity, then, without corroboration it cannot form conviction. Thus, the necessity for corroboration arises not from any inherent weakness of a dying declaration as a piece of evidence, as held in some of the reported cases, but from the fact that the court, in a given case, has come to the conclusion that the particular dying declaration was not free from the infirmities referred to above or from such other infirmities as may be disclosed in evidence in that case."
Justicr Chaudhuri observed: "19. From plain reading of the evidence of the witnesses who are close relatives of the deceased, we find inherent contradictions, wilful exaggeration and unnatural tendency of development of so-called dying declaration rendering it highly suspicious. 20. In this context, while Paniben v. State of Gujarat, 1992 (2) SCC 474, remains a leading authority for the proposition that a dying declaration is not a weak piece of evidence and requires no corroboration if found reliable, the present case stands on an entirely different footing, as the alleged dying declaration is shrouded in serious doubt and fails to inspire confidence."
In Paniben v. State of Gujarat, the Court observed: "18. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was
in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under:
(1) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. ((1976) 3 SCC 104 1976 SCC (Cri) 376: (1976) 2 SCR 764])
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav ((1985) 1 SCC 552 1985 SCC (Cri) 127: AIR 1985 SC 416]: Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar [(1983) 1 SCC 211: 1983 SCC (Cri) 169: AIR 1983 SC 164]).
(II) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not
the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the
assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor ((1976) 3 SCC 618: 1976 SCC (Cri) 473: AIR 1976 SC 1994]).
(IV) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. [(1974) 4 SCC 264: 1974 SCC (Cr) 426))
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P. [1981 Supp SCC 25: 1981 SCC (Cri) 645: AIR 1982 SC 1021])
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (Ram Manorath
v. State of U.P. (1981) 2 SCC 654: 1981 SCC (Cri) 581])
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu (1980 Supp SCC 455: 1981 SCC (Cri) 364: AIR 1981 SC 617])
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar [1980 Supp SCC 769: 1979 SCC (Cri) 519: AIR 1979 SC 1505])
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy itself whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (Nonhau Ram v. State of M.P [1988 Supp SCC 152: 1988 SCC (Cri) 342: AIR 1988 SC 912])
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said
declaration cannot be acted upon. (State of U.P. v.Madan Mohan ((1989) 3 SCC 390: 1989 SCC (Cri) 585: AIR 1989 SC 1519]
Justice Chauduri recollected that the Supreme Court in Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 2 SCC 684, has directly addressed multiple declarations and the requirement of consistency in material particulars
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