Justice Satyavrat Verma rejected bail in a murder case

In Brajnod Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Satyavrat Verma passed an order dated February 26, 2026, wherein, he rejected the second attempt to secure bail in a case registered for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 342, 324, 307, 302, 337 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. 

Earlier, Justice Verma had passed a 3-page long order dated July 14, 2023 wherein, he had concluded:"8. Considering the submissions made by the learned A.P.P. for the State and learned counsel for the informant, the Court is not inclined to extend the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioners in connection with a Madhuban P. S. case of 2022 pending in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari/successor Court. 9. Accordingly, the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners is rejected."

The counsel for the petitioners submitted thatpetitioners are persons with clean antecedents. The informant alleged that while she along with her husband were returning home in the night, they were intercepted by the accused persons including the petitioners and they assaulted her husband by iron rod causing injury leading to his death. 

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that petitioners were falsely implicated in the present case. It was also submitted that it was night as such it cannot be alleged with certainty that it was the petitioners who had assaulted the husband of the informant by iron rod causing injury leading to his death. It was further submitted that during the course of investigation, it came out that the husband of the informant died on account of fall of a bamboo which was being erected. It was also submitted that even the witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution during the course of investigation. It was also submitted that the viscera was preserved and sent to the FSL for examination. It was submitted that though it was alleged that both the petitioners assaulted the husband of the informant by an iron rod causing injury leading to his death but then during the postmortem only one injury was found on the deceased. 

The A.P.P. for the State and counsel for the informant opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners and submitted that the police investigation was not admissible in evidence during the course of trial. 

Justice Purnedu Singh partly affirms judgment of conviction by Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Jamui in a Sessions Trial

In Luta Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Purnedu Singh of Patna High Court delivered a 14-page long judgment dated April 22, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"....The nature of the incident, the surrounding circumstances and the medical evidence indicating only simple injuries do not establish the requisite intention or knowledge to cause death so as to attract the provisions of Section 307 IPC. Rather, the materials on record demonstrate that the act of the appellant falls within the ambit of voluntarily causing hurt by a dangerous weapon. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that the offence under Section 307 IPC is not made out and the learned trial court has rightly appreciated the evidence in convicting the appellant under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code and also keeping in mind that the injury reports of both the injured persons are found to be simple incised injuries, caused by a sharp cutting weapon."

Justice Singh added:" 24. Accordingly, this Court finds that the impugned judgment of conviction dated 30.03.2012 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Jamui in Sessions Trial No. 377 of 2007 (arising out of Sono P.S. Case No. 93 of 2006, G.R. No. 1311/2006 dated 05.10.2006, whereby, the appellant has been convicted under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code, does not warrant interference so far as the finding of conviction is concerned." 

The judgment reads:....so far as the sentence is concerned, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the period already undergone by the appellant, the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for two years is modified and reduced to the period already undergone. To that extent, the appeal stands allowed. It is directed that if the appellant has already undergone the modified sentence, he shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless required in connection with any other case. The appellant is discharged from the liabilities of his bail bonds, if any. 26. Accordingly, the present appeal stands partly allowed."

The appeal was filed under Section 374(2) and 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the judgment of conviction dated March 30, 2012 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Jamui in a Sessions Trial of 2007 (arising out of Sono P.S. Case of 2006, whereby and whereunder, the appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years.

Sections 307 of IPC is as under:-

“ 307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to [imprisonment for life], or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life-convicts.—[When any person offending under this section is under sentence of [imprisonment for life], he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death].

Section 324 of IPC reads:"Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means.—Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.”

In absence of any corroboration of oral evidence of the other prosecution interested and injured witness, whose evidence itself reflects the existence of a land dispute between the parties, suggesting possibility of exaggeration. The medical evidence shows that the injuries are simple in nature, not supporting the allegation of intention to commit murder, moreover, the informant has not been examined, there is no independent witness, and there is unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, all of which cumulatively cast serious doubt on the prosecution version and clearly demonstrate absence of intention to cause death, rendering the charge under Section 307 IPC unsustainable.

Justice Singh relief on the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in case of Sivamani (Supra). 

The background of the occurrence was that the calf of the appellant was found grazing the crop of the informant which was objected by the informant and the on account of a trivial issue it escalated into a sudden quarrel between the parties without any premeditation or prior meeting of minds of the appellant. 

Justice Alok Kumar Pandey accepts unconditional apology from Advocate P.R. Singh for inadvertent mistake, recalls 2018 order by Justice Aditya Kumar Trivedi

In Akhilesh Prasad @ Akhilesh Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Alok Kumar Pandey delivered a 30-page long judgement dated March 26, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"43. From perusal of record, it is evident that occurrence is of the year 2005 and appellant has already suffered 21 years in litigation and he has suffered mental agony of facing the trial since 2005 and he has lost his precious time being a first offender. The appellant has remained in judicial incarceration for one year, one month and nine days. Hence, to put the appellant in jail for remaining period is too harsh as appellant is aged about 90 years. Hence, the court is of the view that if sentence of the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone that would meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, the sentence of the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone. 44. With the aforesaid modification in sentence, the instant appeal stands partly allowed. 45. The interlocutory application, if any, also stands disposed of. 46. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Superintendent of the concerned jail for compliance and for record. 47. The records of this case be also returned to the concerned trial court forthwith." 

Justice Pandey observed: "42. So far as sentence of appellant under Section-324 of I.P.C. is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is aged about 90 years, he is a first offender and appellant has remained in judicial incarceration for one year, one month and nine days. Occurrence is of the year 2005 and appellant has already suffered 21 years in litigation and he has suffered mental agony of facing the trial since 2005 and he has lost his precious time being a first offender. Hence, if the appellant is sentenced to the period undergone, that would meet the ends of justice." 

An  Interlocutory Application was filed on behalf of the appellant for recalling the order dated November 27, 2018, wherein it was submitted that appellant of the appeal namely, Akhilesh Prasad @ Akhilesh Singh was still alive. It was also submitted that due to a bona fide misunderstanding arising out of a telephonic communication, counsel for the appellant inadvertently informed the Court that the appellant had expired, whereas in fact, it was the father of the appellant who had died and not the appellant. It was also submitted that the incorrect statement was neither intentional nor deliberate and no benefit could have accrued to the appellant by making such a submission. However, an unconditional apology was also  tendered on behalf of the appellant for the inadvertent mistake. Prabhat Ranjan Singh was the counsel for the appellant who had made the inadvertent mistake. The Court was satisfied that the incorrect statement was made due to a bona fide misunderstanding arising out of a telephonic communication. 

The November 2018 order reads:"It has been submitted at the end of the learned counsel for the appellant that sole appellant Akhilesh Prasad @ Akhilesh Singh is dead. It has further been submitted that as fine has also been inflicted apart from substantial sentence whereupon, the siblings of appellant (since deceased) intent to proceed with instant appeal and so, substitution is needed and for that an adjournment of four weeks be granted. List accordingly. During midst thereof, the concerned should take proper step." Notably, it was the father of the appellant who had died, not the appellant. 

Accordingly, the 1-page long order dated November 27, 2018 by Justice Aditya Kumar Trivedi was recalled by Justice Pandey. The Criminal Appeal was restored to its original file and number. and I.A. No. 3 of 2018 was allowed. 

The appeal was directed against the judgment of conviction dated January 15, 2009 and order of sentence dated January 17, 2009 passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge, F.T.C.-IV, Jehanabad in Sessions Trial No. 566 of 2006/138 of 2006, arising out of Hulasganj Ghosi P.S. Case No. 67 of 2005 (G.R. Case No. 413 of 2005) whereby and whereunder the appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 447, 341 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years along with fine of Rs. 2,000/- under Section 307 of IPC and further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month in each Sections 447 and 341 of IPC. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

As per prosecution case, the informant Bharteshwar Prasad (PW-6), while undergoing treatment at the clinic of Dr. Pravin Kumar, gave his fardbeyan before A.S.I. Balmiki Singh of Islampur Police Station on March 21, 2005 at about 10:30 A.M., stating inter alia that on March 20, 2005 at about 8:00 P.M., he returned to his house at village Keur from Islampur Bazaar. As soon as he opened his door, his co-villager Akhilesh Prasad (appellant), armed with a farsa, came to his door along with two unknown persons and abused him in filthy language. Upon protest by the informant, the accused persons disclosed that the informant used to demand the outstanding rent from the wife and sister of the appellant, who had been residing in the informant’s house at Islampur without paying rent for the last two and a half years. On this issue, the accused/appellant allegedly threatened the informant that he would teach the informant and his son Arun such a lesson that they would forget to demand the rent. After a brief altercation, the appellant Akhilesh Kumar, who was having a farsa in his hand, assaulted the informant by giving a farsa blow on his head with an intention to kill him. Due to the assault, the informant sustained bleeding injuries and he became unconscious. He raised alarm for help upon which the local residents assembled at the place of occurrence. After seeing them, the accused persons fled away. The informant was taken to the clinic of Dr. Pravin Kumar at Islampur by the neighbours for treatment. During the course of treatment, he gained consciousness. On the basis of fardbeyan given by the informant/PW-6, Hulasganj Ghosi P.S. Case No. 67 of 2005 dated March 23, 2005 was registered for the offence under Sections 447, 504, 341, 323, 324 and 34 of the I.P.C. Routine investigation followed. Statement of witnesses came to be recorded and on the completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the appellant under Sections 447, 341, 326, 307 and 34 of the IPC. Thereafter, the trial court took cognizance under the aforementioned Sections of the IPC. The case was committed to the court of sessions after following due procedure. The  trial court framed charges against the appellant under Sections 447, 341, 307 and 34 of the IPC. Charges were read over and explained to the appellant to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused persons, the prosecution examined all together seven witnesses. 

Justice Pandey observed:"The presence of injured witness/informant at the place of occurrence cannot be discarded as he is sufferer of crime and has supported the story of prosecution on the point of place of  occurrence, time of occurrence and manner of occurrence. As such, even if the Investigating Officer of
this case has not been examined, the whole prosecution story cannot be thrown out in a case where the place of occurrence is otherwise proved. Even if some minor discrepancies or inconsistencies are found in the evidence of prosecution-witnesses regarding manner of appearance of some of the witnesses, the whole story of prosecution cannot be thrown out when crux of the prosecution story is quite intact and
supportive of manner of occurrence, time of occurrence and how the injured/informant suffered injuries. 

Justice Pandey relied on para 22 of the Supreme Court's decision in Brahm Swaroop & Anr. vs. State of U.P., reported in AIR 2011 SC 280, which reads: "22. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. "Convincing evidence is required to
discredit an injured witness."

He drew on para 30 of the Court's judgment in Mano Dutt & Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 79, which observed as follows:-"30... Normally, an injured witness would enjoy greater credibility because he is the sufferer himself and thus, there will be no occasion for such a person to state an incorrect version of the occurrence, or to involve anybody falsely and in the bargain, protect the real culprit."

In State of U.P. vs. Kishan Chand & Ors. reported in (2004) 7 SCC 629, a similar view was reiterated observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. 

Justice Pandey considered as to whether the act of the appellant would attract the ingredients of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code or not. "36. It is well settled that in order to attract Section 307 IPC, intention or knowledge to cause death is the essential ingredient. Mere causing of grievous injury by a sharp cutting weapon is not sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of Section 307 IPC, unless intention or knowledge to cause death is clearly established." 

The judgement reads:"37. It has rightly been admitted by P.W. 6/informant that there was no intention on the part of appellant regarding causing death as despite having full opportunity, the appellant did not commit any act of assault repeatedly. The very act of appellant clarifies that the intention was not to kill the informant/victim and, at best, inference can be drawn with regard to causing injury to informant. Considering the fact that only a single blow was inflicted, there was no repetition of assault and there is absence of clear evidence regarding intention or knowledge to cause death, the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is quite tenable and sustainable in the light of given facts and circumstances of the case that from the materials on record, only offence under Section-324 of I.P.C. can be made out and, as such, conviction of appellant under Section-307 of I.P.C. is not sustainable. 38. In the background of the discussions made hereinabove and on taking an overall view, the impugned judgment is varied only to the extent that the conviction of appellant stands modified to that under Section-324 of I.P.C. 

In absence of evidence, no offence was made out under Section 341 of the IPC, the appellant was acquitted of the charge under Section-341 of I.P.C. There was no allegation of criminal trespass against the appellant either in the initial version of the prosecution-story or in the evidence of the prosecution-witnesses, including the informant. The informant’s version in the initial version of the prosecution story as well as in his evidence is that on March 20, 2005 at about 8:00 P.M., he returned to his house and as soon as he was opening the door of his house, the accused Akhilesh Prasad came and assaulted him on his head by means of farsa. Hence, it was evident that the incident of assault took place outside the door of informant’s house. In view of the above, no offence is made out under Section 447 of the IPC. Accordingly, appellant was acquitted of the charge under Section-447 of I.P.C.

Justice Ansul modifies order of sentence by Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C., Nawada in an attempt to murder case from Nawada

In Bijali Choudhary vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul of Patna High Court delivered a 8-page long judgement dated February 3, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"16. Having carefully considered the witnesses', testimony and the medical evidence, I find no grounds to interfere with the appellant's conviction. 17. However, the matter arises out of a land dispute and the Appellant is facing prosecution for last about eighteen years. Therefore, taking a holistic view to meet the ends of justice to be served upon the appellant, the sentence awarded to the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone by him. 18. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with the aforesaid modification in the sentence."

This appeal was preferred by the appellant for setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated December 8, 2010 and December 14, 2010 respectively passed by Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C., Nawada in a case which arose out of Akbarpur P.S. Case of 2008, whereby the Trial Court had convicted the appellant and sentenced under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code with R.I. for one year, under Section 307/34 IPC with R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs. 10,000/- (in default of payment of fine he will further go R.I. of six months) and under Section 27 of the Arms Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and fine of Rs. 5,000/.

As per fardbeyan, the prosecution case is that an informant, namely, Rambalak Yadav (P.W.-6) on the night of July 7, 2008 in when he was sleeping at Verandah alongwith his son Indradeo Prasad (P.W. 1) at about 11.30. P.M. he heard a sound of crying to shoot upon which he awakened and saw in the light of lantern that his villagers Dinesh Chaudhary and Bijali Chaudhary were standing armed with pistol with intention to kill him and they opened fire twice out of which one bullet was shot at left side neck and second shot did not hit him. Thereafter, they sought for rescue and on hearing the shouting his wife, Sugiya Devi and other neigbours Sarjug Mahto, Sanjay Mahto, Rambachan Yadav and others came there and they saw the accused persons fleeing in light of torch, thereafter, he was taken to the hospital. 

After completion of investigation and on the basis of materials collected during investigation, the Investigating Officer of this case submitted charge-sheet on December 31, 2008 under Sections 447, 324, 307/34 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant before the learned Trial Court. The trial court after perusal of materials collected during investigation and hearing the accused/appellant framed the charges under Sections 324 and 307/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant, which was explained to the appellant, to which, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 

Justice Ansul observed: "12. It appears from perusal of record that altogether eight witnesses have been examined during trial. P.W.-1, Indradeo Prasad, who is son of the informant has deposed that the accused persons fired indiscriminately and one bullet hit on the neck of his father and the other was misfired. P.W.-2, Ram Sugia Devi, who is the wife of the informant has stated that the accused persons had shot fire to her husband, Rambalak Yadav when he was sleeping at Verandah along with his son and he sustained injury. P.W.-3, Sanjay Yadav has stated that the accused persons have shot fire causing injury to the informant and her wife was rushing out from the house. P.W-4, Ganesh Yadav has stated that on hearing the sound of firing he went to Dalan of Rambalak Yadav where he saw gun-shot injury on his neck. P.W-5, Sanjay Mahto has stated that he had not seen the occurrence and came at the place of occurrence after hearing sound of firing and found the informant in injured condition. P.W. 6, Rambalak Yadav is the informant of the case and has supported the case as narrated in the fardbeyan. P.W. 7, Narendra Sharma who is the Doctor of the case and has stated that he was posted at Sadar Hospital, Nawadah and on 08.07.2008 at 2.10 A.M. he examined the informant, Rambalak Yadav and found 1/2 CM circular wound on the right side of the neck and injury was caused by firearm and, thereafter, he referred the informant to PMCH in serious condition. P.W. 8, Dhananjay Jha, the Investigating Officer has investigated the case and he proved the fardbeyan of the informant. 13. It also appears that there is an admitted land dispute between the parties. This casts shadow of doubt on the prosecution version. 14. In context of evidence of P.W. 3, the presence of the wife of the informant P.W. 2 Sugiya Devi appears to be doubtful. She claimed to be eye-witness of the occurrence while P.W. 3 stated that he rushed from his house after shot fire at a distance of half kilometer away and he saw the wife of the informant rushing towards the place of occurrence. 15. There is also no clarity as to who fired upon the injured the injured exactly." 

Supreme Court sets aside bail denying order by Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Bansilal Yadav @ Gautam Kumar Ydav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed a 3-page long order dated February 2, 2026, wherein, it concluded, "....we direct that the present petitioner(s) be released on bail on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Trial Court in connection with Sessions Trial No.675 of 2023 arising from FIR No.83 of 2023 dated 01.04.2023 registered at Police Station Laukaha, District Madhubani, Bihar. The Special Leave Petition(s) and pending application(s) are disposed of accordingly. The case arose out of impugned order dated July 18, 2025 by Patna High Court's Justice Sandeep Kumar. The petitioner had sought bail in connection with a Sessions Trial (which arose out of Laukaha P.S. case  of 2023) registered for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307, 302, 120(B), 504 of the Indian Penal Code.  Justice Kumar had observed:"4. From the report it appears that it is accused persons who are delaying the trial. 5. In these circumstances, no ground for reviewing the order dated 13.12.2023 passed in Cr. Misc. No.66935 of 2023 is made out. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed." Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioner was rejected by the High Court on December 13, 2023.

In his earlier order dated December 13, 2023 Justice Kumar had observed:"3. As per the prosecution case, due to land dispute, three persons from the prosecution side was killed by the accused persons and some other persons sustained grievous injury.....6. Considering the fact that the petitioner has participated in the killing of three persons, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. This application is dismissed. 7. The Court below is directed to expedite the trial of the petitioner." The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was in custody since April 2, 2023, he was quite innocent and has not committed any offence. A.P.P. had vehemently opposed the prayer for bail and had submitted that there was sufficient material available on record to connect the petitioner with the crime.

Supreme Court observed: "Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the period of incarceration undergone by the petitioner(s), and the fact that out of ten named accused, six have already been granted bail and two have not been sent up for trial, we are inclined to grant bail to the present petitioner(s)."

"this matter should not have reached Supreme Court, Patna High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction:Justice J. B. Pardiwala

In Vishwajeet Kumar @ Vishwajeet Saini vs. State of Bihar & Anr.(2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J. B. Pardiwala and K.V. Vishwanathan passed an order dated January 20, 2026. The Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) arose out of impugned final order dated November 24, 2025 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. Notably, the Trial as on date is pending in the Court of Exclusive Special Judge (SC/AT Act), Civil Court (Sadar), Patna.

The High Court of Patna had declined anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with ABP No. 79 of 2025 arising out of SC/ST P.S. Case No. 03 of 2018, registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 448, 341, 323, 324, 307, 379, 354(B), 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code respectively and Sections 3(l)(r)(g)(p)(w)(z) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, respectively. 

Supreme Court observed:"4. It appears from the materials on record that after the registration of FIR, investigation was undertaken and at the end of the investigation, the Investigating Agency thought fit to file a Closure Report in so far as the involvement of the present petitioner in the alleged crime is concerned. 5. Pursuant to the filing of the Closure Report, notice was issued by the Court concerned to the defecto-complainant. After hearing the defacto-complainant and the State, the Closure Report was ultimately accepted. The order passed by the Court concerned accepting the closure report attains finality. 6. In such circumstances, referred to above, the petitioner was not put to trial. Charge-sheet came to be filed against other co- accused.7. It appears that the original defecto-complainant i.e. the victim entered the witness box for her oral testimony and in the course of her oral testimony, she reiterated the very same allegations levelled by her against the petitioner in the FIR. Thereafter, she preferred an application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to add the present petitioner as an accused in the trial.

The petitioner being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Trial Court, adding him as an accused in exercise of powers under Section 319 of the Code, challenged the order before the High Court. However, the petitioner apprehending arrest at the hands of the Police prayed for anticipatory bail which came to be declined. This prosecution is of the 2018. This matter should not have travelled to the Supreme Court. It was expected of the High Court to exercise its discretion in accordance with law, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.

Supreme Court concluded:"We need not say anything further as the original order passed by the Trial Court adding the petitioner as an accused has been challenged before the High Court and the High Court is in-seisin of the original order.12. In such circumstances, referred to above, we order that in the event of arrest of the petitioner by the Police in connection with the offence referred to above, he shall be released on bail, subject to terms and conditions that the Investigating Officer may deem fit to impose.13. Once the petitioner is released by the IO, he shall thereafter appear before the Trial Court and furnish fresh bail.14. Whether the petitioner should face the trial or not will be subject to the final outcome of the petition pending in the High Court.15. With the aforesaid, the Special Leave Petition stands disposed of."

Drawing on decision of the Supreme Court, passed in Bachu Das vs. State of Bihar & others, Justice Singh had concluded:"4. Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme court in case of Bachu Das (supra), instant appeal filed for pre-arrest bail to the appellant, is dismissed as being not maintainable."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Dr. Anshuman in a case of scuffle

In Manjay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 4-page long order dated November 3, 2025 allowing the criminal appeal. The Court set aside the impugned order by Justice Dr. Anshuman of the Patna High Court. The appellants were granted anticipatory bail, subject to the terms and conditions that may be imposed by the concerned Trial Court.

The appellants had approached the Supreme Court apprehending their arrest. The Court observed: ''4. Since the appellants have joined the investigation and cooperated with the same, we are inclined to set aside the impugned order, and grant anticipatory bail to the appellants.'' 

In Ramesh Rai @ Ramesh Kumar & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Justice Dr. Anshuman passed a 3-page long order dated November 12, 2024 which stated that petitioner Nos.3 (Sajan Kumar), 4 (Pankaj Kumar) and 5 (Pawan Kumar) shall be released on anticipatory bail as they have clean antecedent, in the event of arrest or surrender before the Court below within a period of 4 weeks from today, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.30,000 each with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of A.C.J.M.-14, (East), Muzaffarpur in connection with Bochaha P. S. Case No.131 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the Cr.P.C. So far as petitioner Nos.1 (Ramesh Rai), 2 (Rajesh Rai) and 6 (Manjay Kumar) was concerned, this Court was not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6 as their antecedent was not clean, therefore the bail application of the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6 was rejected. Dr. Anhsuman concluded:'' 10. However, Trial Court is directed to consider the regular bail application of the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6, if they surrender within 4 weeks from today and pray for regular bail, then Trial Court shall pass order without being prejudice of the present order preferably on the same day.'' 

The petitioners had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offences punishable in connection with Bochaha P. S. Case No.131 of 2024 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 342, 323, 324, 307, 353, 354, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code.

As per the prosecution, the FIR was lodged against 8 named and 15-17 unknown accused persons including the petitioners against whom there is allegation of abusing and scuffling with the informant and police party due to which injury took place.

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are innocent and have committed no offence. He submitted that the petitioners were falsely implicated due to village politics and land dispute. He further submits that the allegation is general and omnibus in nature. He further submitted that the petitioner due to land dispute, the scuffle took place between both the parties and in this scuffling, police party has also been injured. He also submitted that petitioner Nos.3, 4 and 5 had clean antecedent whereas petitioner No.1, 2 and 6 did not have clean antecedent. 

The APP for the State opposes the prayer for bail and submitted that the petitioners were named in the F.I.R. and direct allegation of assault against them. 

Prior to this he had passed an an order dated June 20, 2024 which reads: ''Perused the order dated 03.02.2025 passed in Special Leave to Appea (Crl) No. 1532 of 2025 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.''

Justice Jitendra Kumar sets aside judgement by Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur

In Braj Kishore Sharma & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Jitendra Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 15-page long judgement dated September 11, 2025 upon hearing the appeal against the impugned judgment dated October 6, 2010 and the order of sentence dated October 7, 2010, passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1 in Sessions Trial No. 790 of 2009 in a case from Musahari, Muzaffarpur. The trail court had found the Appellants guilty under Sections 452, 324, 326 and Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. They were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and fine of Rs.5,000/- each under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine of Rs.2,000/- each under Section 452 of the IPC. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

The prosecution's case arose out of a case from July 29, 2008 against four persons, including the appellants and co-convict, Ram Sanjeevan Singh. The FIR was lodged on the basis of the fardbeyan of the victim, namely, Meera Devi by Sub-Inspector B.K. Sharma on July 29, 2008 at 9:15 hrs. at Dr. Rajesh Kumar’s Clinic, Muzaffarpur. The prosecution case, as per the fardbeyan, was that on the date of the alleged occurrence i.e on July 27, 2008, only the Informant and her seven years old minor daughter, Nishu Kumari were at her home and the other family members, like her husband and son were away from the village. On July 27, 2008, at 9 O’ clock in the evening, she was sleeping alone and her minor daughter was sleeping on adjoining bed and when she was on the verge of sleeping, all of a sudden she felt the arrival of Brajesh Kishore Sharma like a dream and he was sitting on her chest putting his knees on her. His wife, Vibha Devi, was also standing beside her head and pressing her neck and mouth. Ram Sanjeevan Singh was also standing beside her, carrying a knife in his hand. Shashi Bhushan Sharma was also carrying knife. She started struggling for life (chatpatane lagi). On exhortation of Vibha Devi, Sanjeevan and Shashi Bhushan Sharma, Ram Sanjeevan Singh attacked her with his knife, injuring the left side of her stomach and blood started oozing out. Considering her dead, all the accused persons slowly left her room and fled away. It was the further case of the Informant that after the occurrence, she somehow came out of her house in unconscious condition raising halla and crying chor chor. But nobody came instantly to her rescue. When she was struggling for life at the door, her Gotini, Rangila Sharma, (the wife of her brother-in-law) came at her door after half an hour and helped her. She also informed all the concerned by mobile No. 9470307783. She also claimed that all the accused persons are co-villagers and committed the occurrence on account of previous litigation going on between her husband and the accused Brajesh Kishore Sharma, in the Courts of Ranchi and Muzaffarpur.

During the Trial 12 witnesses were examined on behalf of the Prosecution, namely: (i) P.W.1- Sarita Devi, who is Nanad of the Informant, (ii) P.W.2- Smt. Rangila Sharma, who is the Gotini of the Informant, (iii) P.W.3- Mukesh Kumar, who is a co-villager of the informant, (iv) P.W.4- Kamni Devi, who is the Sister of the Informant, (v) P.W.5- Rishikesh Kumar, who is the son of the Informant, (vi) P.W.6- Arun Kumar Sharma @ Chaitanya Sharma, who is a co-villager of the informant, (vii) P.W.7- Nishu Rani, who is 7 year old daughter of the Informant, (viii) P.W.8-Girish Kumar Sharma, who is the husband of the Informant, (ix) P.W.9- Meera Devi, who is the Informant herself, (x) P.W.10- Dr. Rajesh Kumar, who conducted medico-legal examination of the victim, (xi) P.W.11- Surendra Mandal, who is the second I.O of the case and (xii) P.W.12- Vinay Kumar Sharma, who was the S.H.O. and the first I.O of the case.

The prosecution brought on record the nine documentary evidence: (i) Ext.1- Signature of Girish Kumar Sharma, (P.W.8) as a witness on the fardbeyan, (ii) Ext.2- Signature of Girish Kumar Sharma (P.W.8) on the seizure list, (iii) Ext.2/1- Signature of Girish Kumar Sharma (P.W.8) on the seizure list, (iv) Ext.3-Signature of Meera Devi, Informant (P.W.9) on the seizure list, (v) Ext.4- Injury Report of the victim, (vi) Ext.5- Fardbeyan, (vii) Ext.6- Endorsement and signature of Surendra Mandal (P.W.11) on the fardebayan, (viii) Ext.7 and (ix) Ext.8 are Seizure lists.

After closure of the prosecution evidence, the appellants were examined under Section 313 Cr.PC confronting them with incriminating circumstances which came in the prosecution evidence, so as to afford them opportunity to explain those circumstances. During this examination, they admitted that they had heard the evidence of prosecution witnesses against them. But they did not explain any circumstance, though they claimed that the prosecution evidence is false and they are innocent and have been falsely implicated. The Court noted that no witness was examined on behalf of the accused persons in their defence, nor was any document brought on record in defence.  

The Court found that "after appreciating the evidence on record and considering the submissions of the parties, passed the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, whereby the appellants and one co-accused were found guilty and sentenced and hence, the present appeal was filed." 

The Court noted that the Appellant No.1,died during Pendency of the appeal. The appellant/Braj Kishore Sharma died but his son, Shashi Bhushan Sharma, who was already co-appellant, continued the appeal on behalf of his father.

The counsel for the appellants submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentencepassed by Trial Court was not sustainable in the eye of law or on facts. The Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence on record and erroneously passed the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. The Trial Court failed to appreciate that the earliest version of the prosecution case as disclosed by the seven year old Nishu Rani (daughter of the Informant/Victim) was withheld by the prosecution. The Investigating Officers of the case, Vinay Kumar Sharma and Surendra Mandal clearly admitted that after six hours of the occurrence on July 27, 2008, the statement of Nishu Rani, was recorded. Even Nishu Rani admitted in her deposition that her statement was recorded in the night of 27-28, July 2008 and it was also admitted by the I.O., Vinay Kumar Sharma, (P.W.12) that the statement of Nishu Rani was handed over to the next I.O., Surendra Mandal, (P.W.11) at the time of handing over the charge of investigation to him. It is however admitted by the I.O., Surendra Mandal (P.W.-11) that the said statement of Nishu Rani was not on record. He also submitted that the suppression/withholding of the first version of the prosecution case was deliberate on the part of the prosecution for the reason that in the initial version of the prosecution, no accused/Appellants were named in the statement, because they were not aware who assaulted the victim. This ignorance about the names of the real culprits also gets reflected from the attending circumstances. 

As per the prosecution case, after occurrence, when Rangila Sharma (P.W.-2)/Gotini of the Informant, reached the house of the victim, she informed all the family members including the husband and sister of the Informant/Victim about the occurrence. But as per the evidence of such persons, who got information from (P.W.-2) about the occurrence, they were not informed about the names of the culprits. They were simply informed that the victim had got injured and they should come immediately.

The counsel for the Appellants brought to the notice of the High Court that the FIR was not lodged on the basis of the first version of the prosecution case. As per Nishu Rani, her statement was recorded in the night of the occurrence itself. But on the basis of that statement, no FIR was lodged. After two days of the occurrence, when the husband of the victim/informant came to his house, the victim gave her fardebayan to the police in the presence of her husband after consultation and deliberation with her family members and falsely implicated the appellants on account of the previous enmity between the Informant’s family members and the accused persons. It was only Mukesh Kumar (P.W.3), who deposed in his examination-in-chief that when he reached the house of the victim/informant on her crying, he came to know on inquiry from the Informant/Victim that the accused/Appellants had assaulted the Informant. But the I.O., Surendra Mandal, (P.W.-11) clearly deposed in his cross-examination that Mukesh Kumar (P.W.-3) had not stated in his statement under Section 161 Cr.PC that he had enquired from Meera Devi and she had disclosed the names of the appellants as assailants. He also submitted that only the Informant/Meera Devi (P.W.-9) and Nishu Rani (P.W.-7) are eye witnesses and undisputedly other private witnesses were only hearsay witnesses. He further submitted that P.W.-7/Nishu Rani was seven years old at the time of the occurrence and at the time of her examination, she was nine years old. But before her examination as a prosecution witness, her competency test to depose, as required under Section 118 of the Evidence Act, was not conducted. Hence, for want of such competency, the evidence of Nishu Rani has no evidentiary value.

The appellant's counsel submitted that the victim/Informant (P.W.-9) was also not reliable in view of the fact that her fardbeyan was recorded after two days after consultation and deliberation with her husband and other family members and there was strong motive of the Informant to falsely implicate the Appellants on account of admitted previous enmity. He further submitted that some unknown persons, for reasons not known to the Appellants, committed the alleged occurrence, but on account of previous enmity, the Appellants were falsely implicated by the Informant.

The counsel for the State and for the informant defended the impugned judgment and order of sentence. They submitted hat the prosecution had proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts and the appellants were appropriately sentenced. They also submitted that the case was proved by the Informant and her daughter, Nishu Rani, who were the eye-witnesses to the occurrence. The prosecution case was also supported by the seizure lists and the injury report. The counsel for the Informant also submitted that the informant/victim was entitled to get compensation under the Bihar Victim Compensation Scheme, 2014, because she was clearly found to be victim in the case, because she had suffered grievous injury on account of the offence committed by the culprits.

Justice Kumar observed: ''From perusal of the evidence on record, I find that altogether twelve prosecution witnesses have been examined and only the Informant (P.W.-9) and her minor daughter, Nishu Rani (P.W.-7) are eye-witnesses and all other private witnesses are hearsay witnesses. Moreover, out the total nine private witnesses, one is the Informant herself and six other witnesses are her close family members including her husband, son, daughter, sister, Nanad and Gotini. Other two private witnesses are co-villagers. I further find that (P.W.-12) was the S.H.O. and the first I.O. of the case. I further find that this witness has deposed that just after six hours of the occurrence, he had recorded the statement of Nishu Rani/the seven years old daughter of the Informant/Victim. Such evidence of P.W.-12 is also supported by the deposition of Nishu Rani herself (P.W.-7), who has clearly deposed that her statement was recorded in the night of the occurrence at 3:00 am. Such evidence is also supported by the second I.O., Surendra Mandal (P.W.-11). But it is also admitted by P.W.-11 that the said statement of Nishu Rani is not on record.
24. As such, I find that the first version of the prosecution case has been withheld by the prosecution. Previous enmity between the Informant and the Appellants is also admitted in the fardbeyan of the Informant herself when the Informant has stated in her fardbeyan that the occurrence had taken place on account of litigation going on between her husband and Braj Kishore Sharma. I also find, as per the evidence on record that P.W.-2 is the first person to reach the place of occurrence on the cry of the Informant/victim and she informed about the occurrence to the husband and sister of the Informant/victim, but the husband, Girish Kumar Sharma (P.W.-8), and sister, Kamini Devi (P.W.-4) has clearly deposed that she was only informed that the Informant was injured by knife. The names of the culprits were not stated to them. Had the Informant or her daughter been knowing the names of the culprits, they must have disclosed them to the husband of the victim and other close family members of the Informant. As such, serious doubt is created in the prosecution case against the Appellants, particularly, in the background of admitted previous enmity between the husband of the Informant and the accused/Appellants and strong motive on the part of the Informant to falsely implicate the appellants. All the Appellants were previously known to the Informant and her family and had they been involved in the alleged occurrence, their names must have been disclosed since the beginning itself, but their names were not immediately disclosed to anybody. In fact, (P.W.-4), the sister of the Informant has clearly deposed in her examination-in-chief that she got information about the occurrence in the next morning of the occurrence that her sister/Informant has been grievously injured by someone by knife. Only one witness, (P.W.-3)/ Mukesh Kumar has deposed that when he reached the house of the Informant, the Informant disclosed to him the name of the Appellants as culprits of the occurrence. But as per the I.O., Surendra Mandal/(P.W.-11), Mukesh Kumar/P.W.-3 had not given such statement to him under Section 161 Cr.PC during investigation."

Justice Kumar concluded: "In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I find that there is serious doubt about the involvement of the accused/Appellants in the occurrence which led to the grevious injury to the informant/victim (Meera Devi). Hence, the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the Appellants beyond all reasonable doubts. It would be travesty of justice to uphold the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence against the appellants. 26. Hence, the appeal is allowed setting aside the impugned judgment and order of sentence, acquitting the appellants of all the charges, giving them benefit of doubt. 27. The Appellants are already on bail. Hence, they are discharged from the liability of their bail bonds."

With regard to the compensation to the victim, Justice Kumar observed," 28. Though the appellants have been acquitted of the charge, it is well proved as per the evidence on record that the informant/Meera Devi was grievously injured by a sharp edged weapon during the occurrence. Hence, she is victim of this case
and entitled to get compensation as per Bihar Victim Compensation Scheme, 2014 as made under Section 357A Cr.PC. 29. In this regard, it would be relevant to refer to Sunil Kumar Jha Vs. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine PAT 960, delivered by a Division of this Court of which I was a part, wherein subject of compensation to the victims has been dealt with in great detail adverting to relevant statutory provisions and case laws, holding as follows:-
“105. It clearly emerges from the aforesaid statutory provisions and case laws that the Court conducting a criminal trial is duty bound to pass reasoned order, on the conclusion of the trial, regarding compensation to victims as per Section 357 and Section 357 A Cr.PC, irrespective of conviction, acquittal or discharge. Such order has to be passed by the Trial Court even when the victim has not filed an application for compensation. In such order, the Court is required to give finding whether the alleged offence has been committed or not, and if committed who is victim of the committed offence, and if there is any victim in terms of Section 2 (wa) Cr.PC, whether victim is entitled to compensation under Section 357 and Section
357 A Cr.PC and if yes, how much and from whom.
106. The Appellate and Revisional Court are equally duty bound to pass such order regarding compensation to the victims in their final judgments even if the appeals/revisions have been filed by a party other than the victim, only condition being that appeal or revision or any other proceeding arising out of the crime is pending before the Court.
107. Moreover, victims are entitled to benefits under State Victim Compensation Scheme made under Section 357A Cr.PC even when the concerned offence has been committed prior to the scheme coming into force if the trial, appeal or revision are pending on or after the scheme came into force.
108. In case of conviction of the Accused, compensation payable to the victim may be imposed upon the convict as per his paying capacity either by way of fine or otherwise under Section 357 Cr.PC and if the compensation directed to be paid under Section 357 Cr.PC is not sufficient to rehabilitate the victim, the Court is empowered to recommend the Legal Services Authority to pay the compensation to the victim from the State fund created under Victim Compensation Scheme made under Section 357A Cr.PC. In case of acquittal of the Accused-Appellant, the Court is duty bound to resort to Section 357A Cr.PC to recommend Legal Services Authorities to pay compensation to the victim as per Victim Compensation Scheme of the State as made under Section 357A Cr.PC.”

Justice Kumar concluded: ''I recommend Bihar State Legal Services Authority to pay compensation to the victim/Meera Devi as per Bihar Victim Compensation Scheme, 2014 within a period of two months from the date of receipt of this order. 31. Office is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the Secretary of Bihar State Legal Services Authority, for information and needful.

Supreme Court grants interim bail to a murder accused, against Patna High Court's grant of conditional bail

Supreme Court's bench of Justices Abhay S Oka and Augustine George Masih granted interim bail on July 12, 2024 after hearing an appeal against a Patna High Court's order dated April 19, 2024 granting conditional bail in Jitendra Paswan Vs State of Bihar (2024). The order of Justice Dr. Anshuman of the High Court stated that the murder accused be released on bail after six months. The appeal against the High Court's order was filed on June 26, 2024 and registered on July 5, 2024. It was verified on July 6, 2024. 

The High Court's order reads: "let the petitioner Jitendra Paswan in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 7478 of 2024 be released on bail, but after six month from today, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.30,000/- (Rupees Thirty thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of ACJM-XIV, Gopalganj in connection with Vijaipur P.S. Case No. 265 of 2021, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 437(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure with other following conditions:
(i) One of the bailors should be the family member of the petitioners who shall provide an official document to show his bona fide;
(ii) the petitioners shall appear on each and every date before the Trial Court and failure to do so for two consecutive dates without plausible reason will entail cancellation of his bail bonds by the Trial Court itself;
(iii) the petitioners shall appear before the concerned police station every month for one year to mark attendance;
(iv) the petitioners shall in no way try to induce or promise or threaten the witnesses or tamper with the evidence, failing which the State shall be at liberty to take steps for cancellation of the bail bonds; and
(v) the petitioners shall desist from committing any criminal offence again, failing which the State shall be at liberty to take steps for cancellation of the bail bonds." 

The High Court has recorded the submission of the Jitendra Paswan wherein he has submitted that he is innocent and has committed no offence. As per the FIR, he is only an order giver and there is no specific allegation against him. Moreover, the accusation has been levelled in the background of the land dispute. The petitioner is in custody since 26.09.2023 and is accused in 11 more criminal cases, but in all the cases, he has been granted bail

While granting the interim bail, the Supreme Court observed: "This is extremely strange. Some courts are granting bail for 6 months or 1 year and this is new trend now. It is like that I am granting you bail but I will release you after 6 months.". The next date of hearing is September 2, the State is supposed to file its reply before that.