From Archives:Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah set aside judgement by trial court, Munger

In State of Bihar vs. Gurusharan Ram & Ors. Criminal Revision No. 300 of 2004 (2012), Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah  as judge of Patna High Court had delivered a 6-page long judgement dated July 23, 2012, wherein, while disposing of the matter, had concluded: "this Court, exercising suo motu power of revision under the Code quashes the order dated 06.06.2000 passed by the VIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Munger in Sessions Case No. 270/45 of 2001 corresponding to Sessions Case No. 838 of 1999/13 of 2000. The Court below shall forthwith take steps for framing charges against the opposite parties and thereafter conduct the trial in accordance with law. The application stands disposed off in the aforementioned terms." The other two  respondents were: 2. Mukesh Ram and Tinku Ram. The case was filed in the High Court The case was instituted on the basis of the order dated February 26, 2004 passed in Kaushalya Devi & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2012) Cr. Revision No. 992 of 2002 by which the High Court had exercised suo motu revisional power and issued notice to the opposite parties asking them to show cause as to why the order dated 06.06.2000 passed by the VIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Munger in Sessions Case No. 270/45 of 2001 be not set aside. The order dated February 26, 2004 is not available on the High Court's website. The 4-page long judgement dated July 23, 2012 in the Kaushalya Devi's case too was authored by Justice Amanullah. Pranav Kumar was the A.P.P. in both the cases.   

In the Kaushalya Devi's case, the revision application was directed against the order dated July 22, 2002 passed in Sessions Case No. 270 of 2001/45 of 2001 by the VIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Munger by which the petition under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 filed by the petitioner was rejected. The case was filed and registered in the High Court on October 31, 2002. 

In his order, Justice Amanullah recorded that initially the case was filed against five named persons including the petitioners. Upon investigation initially the police submitted chargesheet only against the other three co-accused and not against the petitioners. Later on supplementary chargesheet was submitted against the petitioners also on the basis of further investigation. The other three co-accused had thus moved a petition under Section 227of the Code. By order dated June 6, 2000 the same had been allowed and they were discharged. The High Court while hearing the Kaushalya Devi's case on February 26, 2004 had issued notice to the other three co-accused as to why in exercise of suo motu revisional power the order dated June 6, 2000 be not set aside. Thus, a separate case was registered being Criminal Revision No. 300 of 2004 in which the High Court passed orders on July 23, 2012, quashing the order dated June 6, 2000 passed by the VIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Munger in Sessions Case No. 270 of 2001/45 of 2001 corresponding to Sessions Case No. 838 of 1999/13 of 2000. In the said case, the High Court has gone through the evidence as recorded in the case diary and has came to the conclusion that there was sufficient material for proceeding with the trial and discharging the accused at that stage was not proper. Thus, for the same reasons as recorded in Criminal Revision No. 300 of 2004 in the order passed on July 23, 2022 in the case, as far as petitioner no. 1 who is mother-in-law of the deceased and was revision application stands dismissed. The order impugned dated July 22, 2002 as far as petitioner no. 1 is concerned, was upheld. As far as petitioner no. 2, who was the sister-in-law (Nanad) of the deceased is concerned, her husband as well as various other villagers of the place where she resides in her matrimonial home had categorically stated that one of the co-accused, her brother namely, Mukesh Ram had gone to her matrimonial home to inform her about the death of the deceased and thereafter she alongwith her husband had gone to her maternal home (Naihar) on February 13, 1999. In view of the fact that she was already married and living separately with the husband and that on the fateful day also nothing has come during investigation to indicate that she was present in her maternal home where the incident took place, the High Court does not find that there is sufficient ground to proceed against her. Thus, the impugned order dated July 22, 2002 as far as petitioner no. 2 was concerned was set aside. Consequently, she stood discharged from the case as well as from the liabilities of her bail bonds and sureties. The interim order dated June 30, 2004 staying further proceeding in Sessions Case No. 270 of 2001/ 45 of 2001 stood vacated. The High Court ordered that the lower Court records be sent for proceeding with the trial in light of the order passed in the present case as well as in Cr. Revision No. 300 of 2004 passed on July 23, 2012. \

On the basis of the order dated February 26, 2004, the case was instituted and notices issued to opposite parties who entered appearance. It was also ordered by this very order that the case of State of Bihar vs. Gurusharan Ram & Ors. of 2004 be listed along with the case of Kaushalya Devi & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar of 2002.

The A.P.P. for the State took the Court through the order dated June 6, 2000 by which the opposite parties were discharged. He submitted that the order is erroneous both on facts as well as in law. The police had submitted chargesheet against the opposite parties on the basis of materials which came during investigation and thus to discharge the opposite parties prior to trial was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. The counsel submitted that the Court had wrongly understood both the statement of the doctor as well as one Dhaneshwar Ram and given the benefit to the opposite parties. He submitted that the informant, who was the mother of the deceased, in her reinstatement as well as brother-
in-law (Bhainsur) of the informant had supported the prosecution story and during supervision also sufficient materials were found to exist for the opposite parties to be sent up for trial and accordingly chargesheet was submitted. He submitted that the doctor in his statement at paragraph no. 89 of the case diary had stated that on February 8, 1999 he had treated the deceased who had complained of pain. He stated that on February 9, 1999 also somebody had come to take advice with regard to the deceased having pain and he had given some medicine and also asked him to bring the patient so that she could be properly
treated. It was also stated that neither the boy returned nor the patient was brought to him. He submitsed that if her in-laws found that the deceased was having problems and needed treatment then they ought to have brought the deceased to the doctor on the 10th which was not done and only on February 12/13, 1999 when she was supposed to have died. Thus, according to him, there was no explanation as to why for 3-4 days she was not taken to the doctor in spite of her complaining of pain. He further submitted that there was consistent allegation that the opposite parties had harassed the deceased since opposite parties no. 2 and 3 being the brother-in-law (Dewar) were trying to establish illicit relationship with the deceased which was resisted and opposite party no. 1 being the father-in-law had also taken the side of the sons, that is, opposite parties no. 2 and 3. It was thus submitted that there was sufficient material to put the opposite parties on trial. The A.P.P. assailed the findings of the trial court with regard to Dhaneshwar Ram whose statement was at paragraph no. 89 of the case diary. He submitted that Dhaneshwar Ram had not stated that he had gone to the informant to inform about her death. He had only stated that opposite party no. 1 had asked him to inform the informant. The counsel submitted that there was no explanation in the entire investigation which explains as to why the opposite parties no. 2 and 3, who were the Dewars, had not gone and informed about the death. He further submitted that nothing had come during investigation to infer that the informant or her family members were aware of the death and had participated in the cremation. Thus, according to him it was sufficient to hold that the opposite parties were not keen to inform the informant about the death which raises bona fide and genuine suspicion with regard to the conduct and commission of the crime.  

Justice Amanullah had verified the statements and submissions of learned A.P.P. for the State from the case records and was in agreement with the stand taken by him.

The A.P.P. contended that the decision of the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M.Punchhi and K.T. Thomas in Shri Satish Mehra vs Delhi Administration & Anr. 1997 BBCJ 53 (SC) as quoted and relied upon in the order dated June 6, 2000 did not support the case of the opposite parties and rather the ratio goes in favour of the prosecution inasmuch as in the said case the Supreme Court has held that if the Court feels that trial would be an exercise in futility and sheer wastage of time, the proceedings should be terminated. He submitted that in the present case due to adequate material and evidence being available, the Court at the stage of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not justified to discharge the opposite parties in the manner it was done by the order dated June 6, 2000. 

The A.P.P. took the High Court through the evidence of Raghubir Ram which is at paragraph no. 27 of the supplementary case diary and who is the husband of one of the accused, namely Rama Devi @ Rambha Devi, who is the sister-in-law (Nanad) of the deceased. He has stated that the informant and the brother-in-law of the informant had come to the house of the opposite parties on February 13, 1999 and were asking the opposite parties as to why they were not informed about the death of the deceased. Thus, it was stated that the informant and her family was not informed of the death and the body disposed off, which clearly proves that there was something to hide and thus discharge of the opposite parties at that stage was unjustified. It was stated that it will lead to miscarriage of justice. He also stated that his mother-in-law namely, Kaushalya Devi was unwell and bedridden since last two and a half months and thus the story and stand of the opposite parties that she had also accompanied the deceased while she had gone to ease herself is also falsified. He submitted that even the husband of the deceased was informed only belatedly, as per his own statement on February 14, 1999, which also goes to prove that the accused did not want anyone to see the body so as to enable them to know the real cause of death. Justice Amanullah had appreciated the assistance rendered by the A.P.P. for the State in the case.

Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha sets aside order by Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga

In Md. Reyaz & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 11-page long judgement dated February 25, 2026, wherein, he concluded:".... by taking note of guidelines as mentioned in para nos. 1, 5 and 7 of Bhajan Lal (supra), impugned order of discharge along with cognizance order dated 28.04.2022 with all its consequential proceedings, qua, all above named appellants arising thereof as passed in in SC/ST/GR Case No. 33 of 2017 arising out of Sadar P.S. Case No. 137 of 2017, pending before learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga is hereby quashed and set aside. 13. Hence, this application stands allowed. 14. TCR (Trial Court Records), if any, be returned to the learned Trial Court alongwith the copy of this judgment." 

The quashing petition was preferred to quash the order dated April 28, 2022 passed in SC/ST/GR Case of 2017 arising out of Sadar P.S. Case of 2017 passed by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga, where learned Exclusive Special Judge for SC/ST (POA) Act rejected the application of the appellants filed under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. for not framing the charge against them for the offence under Sections 409, 420, 419, 504, 506 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 3(i)(r)(s) of the SC/ST (POA) Act.

The counsel for the appellants submitted that at the stage of framing of charge the appellants filed an application for discharge under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. praying therein that no offence under the SC/ST Act or under the IPC made out against them in the present case, as the core issue is land dispute arising out of oral agreement, where petitioner no. 2 was implicated only for the reason as he was witness of the agreement of sale, petitioner no. 3 was implicated being the wife of Md. Rakib Alam. It was submitted that there is no occasion to implicate petitioner no. 2 namely Md. Mehtab Alam @ Md. Mehtab. It was further submitted that even the abuse in the caste name as per FIR was just to aggravate the allegation as to implicate the appellants for the offences punishable under the Sections 3(i)(s), 3(i)(r) and 3(i)(w) of the
SC/ST Act. He also submitted that as per FIR, only “caste related abuse” was alleged to made during the
occurrence without specifying any caste. It was submitted that the occurrence alleged to be taken place at about 10:00 PM inside the house, therefore, allegation qua abusing in public view was not appears convincing. Neither sale deed was executed nor money was paid hence, no offence under the Indian Penal Code is made out. 

The counsel relied upon Supreme Court's decision in Murarilal Gupta vs. Gopi Singh, [(2005) 13 SCC 699. He also submitted that, in-fact informant himself was the land broker and he lodged this criminal case for putting pressure, against appellants. It was submitted that no money has been transferred in the accounts of any of the three appellants and as such they are not beneficiary out of alleged land deal. 

The counsel drew on the decision of Supreme Court in Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto vs. State of Bihar & Another, [SLP (Crl.) No. 12144 of 2025] and also State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others reported in 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335. He also relied upon the legal report of Hon’ble Supreme Court as available through Gulam Mustafa vs. State of Karnataka and Anr. [2023 SCC OnLine SC 603]. 

The paragraph no(s). 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the Keshaw Mahto Case (supra) for better understanding of the case, which is as under:-
11. This Court in Shajan Skaria vs. The State of Kerala & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249, laid down the ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act. It reads thus:-
“55. The basic ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are:
a. Accused person must not be a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; b. Accused must intentionally insult or intimidate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;
c. Accused must do so with the intent to humiliate such a person; and
d. Accused must do so at any place within public view.”
12. Section 3(1)(r) is attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation by the accused is
that the person who is subjected to is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In other words, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) cannot stand merely on the fact that the informant/complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless the insult or intimidation is with the intention to humiliate such a member of the community.
13. To put it briefly - first, the fact that the complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. Secondly, any insult or intimidation towards the complainant must be on the account of such person being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.
14. With a view to dispel any doubt and lend clarity, we deem it appropriate to mention that even mere knowledge of the fact that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r).
15. Further, for an offence to be made out under Section 3(1)(s), merely abusing a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. At the same time, saying caste name would also not constitute an offence.
16. In other words, to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(s) it would be necessary that the accused abuses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe “by the caste name” in any place within public view. Thus, the allegations must reveal that abuses were laced with caste name, or the caste name had been hurled as an abuse.
9. It would be apposite at this stage to reproduce paragraph no. 34 of the better understanding of the case, which is as under:-
34. Insofar and inasmuch as interference in cases involving the SC/ST Act is concerned, we may only point out that a 3-Judge Bench of this Court, in Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 966, has held that the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not inhibit this Court or the High Court from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Code, in the terms below: “15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The SC/ST Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands of upper-castes. The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the SC/ST Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin-fold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste-based atrocities. 
16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily civil or private where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the SC/ST Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr. P.C.”

Justice Jha referred to the paragraph no. 102 of the Supreme Court's decision in Bhajan Lal Case (supra) which reads as under:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first informant report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of nay offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent persons can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

Justice Jha observed: "11. Coming to the case in hand, it appears that dispute between the parties are civil in nature arising out of agreement related with land deal, where appellants are not the beneficiary and moreover, in view of aforesaid discussions qua making out a case for the offence under SC/ST Act, particularly in view of Keshaw Mahto Case (supra), no case for the aforesaid offence is made out."

Supreme Court elaborates on scope of exercise of power under Section 227, Cr.P.C, sets aside High Court's judgement in NDPS case

The appellant was accused of commission of offence under Section 27(a) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985. After the investigation, a final report was filed against all the accused including the the appellant herein (accused No.13) was charge sheeted only for offence under Section 27(b) of the NDPS Act. The order dated September 14, 2022 passed by Madras High Court filed against the order dated July 26, 2022 passed by the Additional District Judge (ADJ)-Special Court under Essential Commodities Act Cases, Coimbatore under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), 1973 to discharge him. As per the order dated July 26, 2022, the application for discharge filed by the appellant was dismissed. The Revision Petition filed against it was also dismissed.

While hearing the appeal, the Supreme Court's bench of Justices C.T. Ravikumar and  Rajesh Bindal dwelt on the scope of exercise of power under Section 227, Cr.P.C. It drew on the Court's decision  in P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala & Anr.(2010). The Court held:Before considering the merits of the claim of both the parties, it is useful to refer to Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which reads as under:
“227. Discharge. — If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.” If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.

The Court observed: "At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.” 

The Court also drew on Court's decision in Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2010) to consider the scope of Section 227, Cr.P.C. 

The Court observed: "The position of law enunciated in the said decisions would reveal that while calling upon to exercise the power under Section 227, Cr.P.C., the judge concerned has to consider only the record of the case and the documents produced along with the same. If on such consideration the court forms an opinion that there is no sufficient ground to proceed against the accused concerned, he shall be discharged after recording the reasons therefor. It is also evident from the precedence on the aforesaid question that while exercising the said power, the Court could sift the materials produced along with the final report only for the purpose of considering the question whether there is ground to proceed against the accused concerned."

The Court's judgement concluded that the appeal is allowed and the order passed by the Madras High Court filed against the order passed by the ADJ are quashed and set aside. As a necessary sequel, the appellant who is accused in pending on the files of Additional District Judge-Special Court under Essential Commodities Act Cases, Coimbatore is discharged from the said case, by allowing the prayer of appellant for discharge.