Supreme Court directs Sub-Judge-I, Patna to dispose of a Title Suit of 2018 within one year

In Usha Sinha vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's  Division Bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and S.V.N Bhatti passed a 3-page long order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, it wrote: "....we direct that Title Suit No.41 of 2018 pending on the file of learned Sub-Judge-I, Patna be disposed of within a period of one year from today." 

The case was instituted by the petitioner. The petitioner’s complaint to the Station House Officer was registered as non-FIR No.20/2013. Based on the Police Report, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, initiated proceedings under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, qua the land. On 13.06.2013, the SDM, Sadar converted the Section 144, Cr.P.C. proceedings to Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. and transferred the same to the Court of Executive Magistrate, Sadar. The Executive Magistrate, Patna Sadar vide order dated 2nd December, 2014 passed the final order declaring respondent No.7 to be in possession over the disputed land. Against the said order, the petitioner filed Criminal Revision before the Sessions Judge but was unsuccessful. Further a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed before the High Court which is resulted in the impugned order.

By the impugned 12-page long order dated September 10, 2024, Justice Bibek Chaudhury of the High Court after noticing the pendency of the Civil Suit, namely, Title Suit No.41 of 2018 before the Sub-Judge-I, Patna filed by the petitioner herein and while dismissing the petition filed under Section 482, Cr.P.C., relegated the claim of ownership to be decided by the Civil Court. 

Justice Chaudhuri had concluded: "25. It is needless to say that the object 145 of the Cr.P.C. is merely to maintain law and order and to prevent breach of peace by maintaining one or either of the parties in possession, which the Court finds they had immediately before the dispute, until the actual right of the parties has been determined by the Civil Court. 26. Therefore, the Civil Court is the appropriate forum for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession of any property. The issue as to whether any person has the right to possess the property or not cannot be decided by the Criminal Court. The Criminal Court under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. shall protect the existing possession, be it lawful or unlawful. In order to evict a person/persons from possession of a particular piece of land, decree of a Civil Court is required. 27. It is ascertained from the record that the petitioner did not appear to contest the case before the learned Executive Magistrate and the order under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. was passed ex parte. The order in Criminal Revision No. 32 of 2015 was also passed ex parte. 28. The petitioner has not come up with a case that the impugned order suffer from abuse of the process of the Court or the impugned order is required to be set aside to secure ends of justice. Both the parties are claiming ownership over the property on the basis of certain documents, veracity of which can only be decided by the Civil Court. 29. Under the facts and circumstances of this case and in view of the discussions made hereinabove, I do not find any ground to invoke the inherent power of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 30. The instant Criminal Miscellaneous Case is thus, dismissed, on contest. 

The Criminal Miscellaneous Case had arise out of an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, filed by the petitioner, praying for quashing of an order dated July 16, 2015, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, VI Court at Patna, in Criminal Revision of 2015, whereby and whereunder, the Judge had dismissed the Revision filed by the petitioner against the order, dated December 2, 2014, passed by the Executive Magistrate, Patna Sadar in Case No. 520 (M) of 2013 under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. The petitioner had submitted that the land in question originally belonged to one Babu Jodhan Prasad Singh and subsequently by successive transfer, the land was owned by the vendor of the petitioner. 

The case of the petitioner is that for land of Tauzi No. 131 of Mauza – Jaganpura, Babu Shiv Narayan Chaudhary and Jodhan Prasad filed a Rent Suit No. 11 of 1910 and thereafter in Executive Case No. 1015 of 1913, whole Tauzi including Plot No. 1200, measuring 96 decimals came into their possession. The petitioner has narrated the entire story of devolution of interest in the said property by his vendor, Pramod Kumar Sinha. Further case of the petitioner is that the Respondents on the basis of fake and forged document tried to disturbed the peaceful possession of the petitioner over the said land and as such she was constrained to file a Land Dispute Case No. 27 of 2013-14 in the Court of DCLR, Patna Sadar under the provisions of Bihar Land Dispute Resolution Act, 2009. In the said proceeding, the Respondents appeared before the DCLR in pursuance of notice and filed written statement therein. After hearing the parties, the DCLR held that the petitioners have title and possession over the land by its order dated 5th of October, 2013. An order of declaration of title and possession of the petitioner was also passed by the DCLR. It was further directed that the petitioner has been forcibly and illegally dispossessed and she may be given possession of the land in question. On the basis of police report, given in Case No. 20 of 2013, dated 12th of April, 2013, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar Patna, initiated a proceeding under Section 144 of the Cr.P.C. and thereafter 2013, the Executive Magistrate converted the said proceeding to a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the said proceeding under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C., the petitioner was the first party and Opposite Party Nos. 2 to 10 were the second party. 

The Executive Magistrate, Patna Sadar vide order, dated 2nd of December, 2014, passed the final order declaring the possession of the Respondents over the disputed land. Against the said order, the petitioner filed Cr. Revision before the Sessions Judge, Patna bearing Cr. Revisional No. 32 of 2015. The said Revision was subsequently transferred to the Additional Sessions Judge – VI Court at Patna for hearing and disposal. The petitioner was informed by the Court of the learned Additional Sessions – VI, Patna that the date of hearing of the Revision would be fixed on 21st of July, 2015. However, on that date, the petitioner came to know that the Revision Application was finally disposed of by the Court of Revision vide order dated 16th of July, 2015. It is contended by the petitioner that when the petitioner’s ownership and possession was decided and declared by the DCLR under the Bihar Land Dispute Resolution Act, the said order is binding upon the learned Executive Magistrate. The learned Executive Magistrate as well as the Revisional Court did not consider the said fact and the impugned orders are liable to be quashed and set aside. By filing a supplementary affidavit, dated 3rd of February, 2016 that the Cr. Revision No. 32 of 2015 was disposed of by the Additional Sessions Judge – VI, without giving any opportunity to the petitioner of hearing. On 6th of August, 2024, the petitioner filed 3rd supplementary affidavit, stating, inter alia, that after purchase of the land in question, the husband of the petitioner Sunil Kumar (HUF), mutated his name in respect of the said land and has been paying malguzari to the Government of Bihar. The HUF of Sunil Kumar was a partner in M/s Satyendra Kumar & Company and the said land was mortgaged to Indian Overseas Bank on 3rd of November, 2006 till 24th of July, 2015. The Executive Magistrate passed order dated 26th of April, 2014 in the absence of the petitioner and the case was posted for evidence of the 1st party. On 30th of August, 2014, the case was posted for ex parte hearing against the petitioner. 

The Advocate of the petitioner, who are entrusted to look after the case, did not take any action and accordingly the case was fixed for evidence of the second party on 22nd of November, 2014 and final order has been passed on 2nd of December, 2014. It is alleged that there was over-writing on the dates
fixed for hearing of the proceeding under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. The petitioner and her son filed Title Suit No. 41 of 2018 in the Court of the Sub-Judge-I, Patna for declaration of title and permanent injunction, restraining the defendants / second party from interfering with the possession of the petitioner. The said suit is still pending before the learned Sessions Judge, XIV Court, Patna, for consideration of the petition under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, filed by the petitioner.

In such a backdrop, the Supreme Court has observed: "4. We find no good ground to interfere with the impugned order."

Justices Bibek Chaudhuri, Chandra Shekhar Jha modify order of conviction and sentence by Special Judge, POCSO Court, Vaishali in case from 2016

In Birju @ Raja vs. The State of Bihar Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Chandra Shekhar Jha delivered a 31-page long judgment dated April 10, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....we modify the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant. 54. The appellant, namely, Birju @ Raja, is convicted under Section 235(1) of the Cr.P.C. for the offence punishable under Section 366 and Section 376 of the I.P.C. In respect of  other offences, charged, the appellant is acquitted.55. For the offence punishable under Section 366 of the I.P.C., the appellant is liable to be sentenced to suffer imprisonment of either description, for a term which may extend to 10 year and shall also be liable to fine. 56. For the offence punishable under Section 376 of the I.P.C., he shall also be punished with imprisonment of either description, which shall not be less than 10 years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine." Justice Chaudhuri authored the judgement. 

The offences Sections 366 and 376 of the IPC are serious and non-bailable offences of sexual violence. Section 366 deals with kidnapping, abducting, or inducing a woman to compel marriage or force illicit intercourse. Section 376 defines the punishment for rape.

The judgement added: "57. We have considered the fact that the appellant is a young man. No previous offence was proved against him. Undoubtedly, he committed a heinous offence but considering the age of the appellant and the fact that his entire life is left, when he can live a life of a responsible citizen, we propose to pass the following order of sentence: -(a) The appellant, Birju @ Raja, is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years with fine of Rs. 20,000/-, in default to suffer further imprisonment of six months for the offence punishable under Section 366 of the I.P.C.  (b) The appellant is also sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and also to pay fine of Rs. 20,000/-, in default to suffer further imprisonment for six months for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the I.P.C. (c) Substantive sentence of imprisonment shall run concurrently. However, sentence for non-payment of fine shall run separately. (d) If the fine amount is realized, 80 per cent of the said fine amount be paid to the victim no. 1 as compensation. 58. The appellant is acquitted of the remaining charges."

Justice Chaudhuri observed:"....we would like to observe at the outset that every accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty. The presumption of innocence is a human right. However, subject to statutory exceptions, the said principle forms the bedrock of criminal jurisprudence. For this purpose, the nature of the offence, its seriousness and its gravity must be taken into consideration. The Courts must remain vigilant to ensure that the application of such presumption does not result in injustice or mistaken conviction. Under the Prevention of Children from Sexual Offences Act, the concept of reverse burden has been introduced, as in certain other serious offences under enactments such as the NDPS Act, Negotiable Instrument Act, Prevention of Corruption Act and Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, etc. The provisions contained in the aforesaid enactments and particularly in Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, 2012, are in the nature of an exception to the general principle that the burden of proof always lies upon the prosecution. In the instant case, since we are concerned with the principle of reverse burden contained in Section 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, we propose to deal with the law relating to reverse burden POCSO Act."

The judgement drew on the decision in Sachin Baliram Kakde vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 8972, the Supreme Court in the context of presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, 2012, held as follows: - “18. Thus, when a person is prosecuted for commission of the offence specified in the said section, the Court is required to presume that he said person has committed the said offence unless the contrary is proved. 19. The presumption, however, cannot be said to be irrebuttable. Infact, no presumption is irrebuttable in law, as this cannot be equated with conclusive proof. The provisions of section 29 of the POCSO Act mandates the Court to draw the presumption unless contrary is proved. 20. One has to keep in mind, as expressed by an eminent jurist that presumptions are bats in law, they fly in a twilight but vanish in the light of facts.” 30. It is no longer res integra that the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act is not absolute. It is the duty of the prosecution to prove the foundational fact of the case, and only thereafter can the presumption under Section 29 and 39 be invoked. The statutory presumption stands activated only upon proof of the foundational facts by the prosecution. Even once such presumption is activated, the burden upon the accused is not to rebut the same beyond reasonable doubt. It is sufficient if the accused is able to create a serious doubt regarding the veracity of the prosecution case or brings on record material, rendering the prosecution version highly improbable. 31. Bearing this principle in mind, this Court shall now appreciate the evidence on record in order to come to a definite finding and the final conclusion in the instant appeal."

Res integra refers to legal issues that remain unresolved or untouched by precedent, affording judges the discretion to decide.  

The judgement reads:"41. We are not unmindful to note that in every case of rape, there must be physical injury around the private part and other parts of the body of the victim where there is complete subjugation out of fear and the victim found that any resistance against such act of the accused would be futile effort. Absence of injury does not support a case of consensual sex. 42. On the question as to whether the physical relationship between the appellant and the victim no. 1 was consensual or she was forced to commit sexual intercourse, the evidence of victim as well as circumstances leading to such activity are relevant. In Premkumar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that physical relationship between the victim and the accused was consensual because of the fact that it appeared in evidence that the victim and the accused had love relationship for long. In the instant case, on the contrary, it is specifically denied by the victim no. 1 that she had love relationship with the appellant. In the F.I.R. also, the informant, being the uncle of the victim no. 1, stated that the appellant and two other boys used to disturb the victims for quite some time. Therefore, there is absolutely no evidence that the victim had love relationship with the appellant." It referred to the decision in Nirmal Premkumar v. State, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 260, which was cited by the counsel of the appellant.

The criminal appeal had challenged the judgement, dated September 26, 2018, whereby and whereunder, the appellant was convicted under Section 235(1) of the Cr.P.C. for committing an offence punishable under Sections 363/376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4/6/10 of the POCSO Act, 2012. By an order dated October 5, 2018, the Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Vaishali at HM Hjipur sentenced the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with fine of Rs. 20,000/- for the offence under Section 363 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. He was also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with fine of Rs. 20,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 366A read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. The appellant was further sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 12 years and fine of Rs. 25000/- for the offence punishable under Section 376 (2)(i) read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. Further sentence of rigorous imprisonment of 12 years with fine of Rs. 25,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012. Further sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with fine of Rs. 20,000/-. Further sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 12 years and fine of Rs. 25000/- for the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and further sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 7 years and fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012. It was also directed that the appellant shall suffer simple imprisonment for 5 months each for non-payment of fine amount on each count. All the sentences of rigorous imprisonment were directed to run concurrently. 

In the appeal, the appellant had challenged the  judgement of conviction and sentence on the following grounds:(a) Prosecution failed to bring home the charge against the accused; (b) No eye-witness to support the case of kidnapping of the minor girl of the informant, and her friend could be examined by the prosecution; (c) The Investigating Officer failed to ascertain the registration no. and identity of the Scorpio Car, with the help of which the victims were kidnapped. (d) The prosecution failed to prove the place of illegal confinement of the victims; (e) Prosecution also failed to prove involvement of three accused persons in the offence as alleged; (f) The prosecution case is full of contradiction with the evidence; and (g) The learned Trial Judge held the appellant guilty for the offence only on the basis of statement of the victim under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. without considering the fact that such statement is only corroborative in nature."

The case was that one Sonu Kumar of village-Ajmatpur within the Police Station-Rajapakar in the district of Vaishali lodged a written complaint on July 3, 2016, stating, that on July 3, 2016 at about 07.00 a.m., her niece Soni Kumari, daughter of Binay Kumar Sharma, aged about 14 years along with one Savita Kumari, a minor girl aged about 13 years went to Ghora Chowk, which was stated to be at a distance of about 1 k.m. away to purchase some biscuits. However, they did not return even after considerable period of time. The informant came to know from the parents of his niece that three young men of village Baranti, namely, Birju @ Raja, Chhotu Kumar and Ranjan Singh, used to eve-tease and disturb them for some period of time. The informant made a complaint against them to their respective parents and they assured that their respective sons would not further commit such wrong in future. As the victim girls did not return to their respective homes, the informant suspected that had been kidnapped for some illicit purpose and lodged the complaint so that no harm might be caused to the said minor girls. On the basis of the said complaint, police registered a case, dated July 4, 2016, under Section 363/366A. 

Upon completion of investigation, the police submitted a charge-sheet against all three accused persons under Section 363/366A/376(2)(i) of the I.P.C. and Section 4/6/8/10 of the POCSO Act, 2012. Since the charge-sheet was submitted under the POCSO Act, 2012, the case was committed to the Court of the Special Judge, POCSO Court, Vaishali at Hajipur for trial and disposal. During trial, the prosecution examined 10 witnesses. On the basis of the evidence on record, both the oral and documentary, the trial judge convicted the accused//appellant and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment on different heads of charges.

The judgement was challenged in the High Court. The counsel for the appellant submitted that nobody saw the appellant or his associates to elope the victim girls from Ghora Chowk. It is the case of the prosecution that the victim girls were taken to Kolkata by the appellant and his associates but the Investigating Agency could not identify the space where the victims were allegedly confined. As per the prosecution case, they were allegedly kidnapped on July 3, 2016. The victim no. 1 was recovered from the side of the high road near her village in the early morning of July 22, 2016. After recovery, she was taken to the Police Station. Thereafter, her medical examination was done. Victim’s statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded on the date of her recovery, i.e., on July 22, 2016. Victim No. 2 was also confined in the same room along with victim no. 1. According to her, she stayed with the accused persons for three days. Thereafter, she somehow fled away and informed the incident to an Auto Driver. The Auto Driver handed her over to the police of Kolkata. She was sent to a Home run by Childline for about two months. Thereafter, in the month of September, she was recovered by the Investigating Officer. It was also submitted that there is absolutely no witness examined by the prosecution during trial, who corroborated the prosecution case regarding involvement of the appellant. 

Justice Chaudhuri observed:"We also find that though the victim claimed that sh.e was aged about 15 years at the relevant point of time, the radiologist opined after conducting ossification test that the victim was aged between 17 and 19 years. If we consider the margin of errors to two years, then the approximate age of the victim at the relevant point of time was either 17 years or 21 years. It is needless to say that the margin of error shall be taken into consideration on the higher side to the benefit of the appellant. 50. The Investigating Officer did not take any attempts to seize:- (i) Date of birth certificate of the school or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned Examination Board, if available and in the absence thereof; (ii) Birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipality authority or a Panchayat; and (iii) only in absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other medical age determination test. 51. In the absence of any birth certificate from the school or birth certificate given by the corporation, we have no other alternative but to rely on the ossification test of the victim, on perusal of which it is very uncertain to note that the victim was a minor on the date of commission of offence. 52. Even assuming that the victim was a major and she was subjected to rape by the appellant and for commission of such offence, she was abducted and forcibly confined in a room, the appellant is liable to be convicted under Section 366 for forcing the victim to illicit intercourse and Section 376 of the I.P.C." 

Justice Sandeep Kumar quashes closure report of police, sets aside order by Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Begusarai, directs re-investigation of death of petitioner's deceased mother

In Tezaswini Kumari vs. The State Of Bihar Through Its Director General Of Police & Ors. (2026), Justice Sandeep Kumar delivered a 40-page long judgement dated April 8, 2026, wherein, he  concluded: "37.....this Court is of the considered opinion that the death of the deceased mother of the petitioner deserves to be re-investigated in order to bring to the forefront the actual and the whole truth. Accordingly, the closure report No.179 of 2021 dated 31.10.2021 submitted by the police in Birpur P.S. Case No.49 of 2021 is hereby quashed. 38. In such circumstances, the investigation of Birpur P.S. Case No.49 of 2021 is directed to be conducted de novo by Sri Vikas Vaibhav, Inspector General of Police, Bihar. Sri Vikas Vaibhav shall commence the fresh investigation of Birpur P.S. Case No.49 of 2021 forthwith and he shall be free to constitute his own team. The police officers of Begusarai district shall extend all cooperation in the expeditious investigation and supervision of this case. The investigation shall be conducted in a holistic and comprehensive manner in accordance with law. 39. Since this Court has directed for re-investigation of the case, the impugned order dated 09.04.2025 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Begusarai, is hereby quashed and set aside....42. Let a copy of this judgment be communicated through FAX or e-mail to the Director General of Police, Bihar as well as the Superintendent of Police, Begusarai forthwith for its compliance." In effcect, the judgement quashes closure report of police, sets aside order by Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Begusarai, directed re-investigation of death of petitioner's deceased mother. 

The writ petition was filed by the petitioner seeking re-investigation/de novo investigation in the death of her mother. It was the case of the petitioner that the investigation conducted by the local police in relation to the death of her mother is incomplete and deliberately directed away from the real line of investigation, and therefore, warrants investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) or a Special Investigating Team (SIT). 

Th writ petition prayed for Issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ(s) or order(s) or direction(s) to transfer the said FIR bearing No.49 of 2021 dated April 5, 2021, registered under Section 302, IPC lodged with Birpur Police Station, Begusarai to Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) or alternatively direct for the constitution of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to investigate in the
present matter.  It also prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ(s) or order(s) or direction(s) directing the respondent authorities to conduct a de novo investigation in
the said FIR bearing No.49 of 2021 dated April 5, 2021, registered under Section 302, IPC lodged with Birpur Police Station, Begusarai. The petitioner preferred to move an Interlocutory Application bearing I.A. No. 01 of 2025 seeking to amend the prayer portion of the main writ petition and add an additional prayer, which was allowed vide order dated June 27, 2025. It sought direction for setting aside the order dated April 9, 2025 in complaint case number 211114 of 2022 whereby and whereunder the Court of Om Prakash, Judicial Magistrate First Class, Begusarai while treating the protest petition filed by the petitioner in Birpur P.S. Case No.49 of 2021 as a complaint case, after making inquiry under Section 200 and Section 202 of Cr.P.C. has been pleased to dismiss the same under Section 203 of the CrPC.”

The petitioner was the daughter of Rinku Kumari, who was found dead on April 4, 2021 at Kasturba Gandhi Balika Avasiya Vidyalaya, Muzaffara, Begusarai. According to the prosecution, the deceased left her house on April 4, 2021 in the morning, for the school, where she was working as a warden, saying that she will come back home by evening. However, at around 2:00 P.M., the petitioner received a phone call and when the petitioner reached there along with her family members, she saw the dead body of her mother, lying on the floor. Later she was shown pictures of her deceased mother by the police officials and local people who had gathered there, in which her mother was seen to be in sitting position, with a noose around the neck and the rope looped from a ceiling fan and her body was covered with dirt and dust. Thereafter, the petitioner along with her family members performed the last rites of her mother and on the very next date i.e. on April 5, 2021 the petitioner approached Birpur Police Station, Begusarai and the present F.I.R. bearing Birpur P.S. Case No.49 of 2021 dated April 5, 2021 came to be registered. It was the case of the petitioner that when she approached the Birpur Police Station on April 5, 2021 to register an FIR naming Kaushal Kumar and Rohit Kumar as accused, the S.H.O. of Birpur Police Station, refused to lodge an FIR against the suspected accused persons stating that the petitioner was not present at the time of the incident and insisted that the F.I.R. will get registered only if the petitioner gave an application in accordance with what the S.H.O. directs and only thereafter, the F.I.R. came to be lodged based on the new complaint which was drafted as per the direction of the S.H.O. and prepared by the scribe (Katib) namely, Prabhakar Kumar and was later signed by the petitioner.

It was also the case of the petitioner that about three years ago from the date of occurrence, Kaushal Kumar and Rohit Kumar, who were the neighbours of the family of the petitioner, had taken Rs.15,00,000/- from the mother of the petitioner for transferring a piece of land to her, however, neither did they transfer the land nor did they return the money. Subsequently, a panchayati was held, in which both the persons had assured the deceased that they will return the money on April 4, 2021 but on the same date i.e., on April 4, 2021 the mother of the petitioner was found dead under mysterious circumstance, which according to the petitioner, warrants a serious investigation of the two suspected accused persons. 

The petitioner's counsel submitted that from the very beginning, the local police officials had been trying to protect the suspected accused persons, since they have considerable influence in the local community which was illustrated by the fact that despite repeated requests by the petitioner, who was the informant of the case, the Police has failed to name the suspected accused persons in the FIR. It was submitted that the petitioner was assured that after conducting preliminary investigation, name of the persons provided by the petitioner shall be arrayed as accused persons, however, the same was not done and the authorities have failed to conduct a proper investigation. The case was investigated only in a manner to support the narrative of suicide, ignoring the apprehension that the death of the mother of the petitioner was not a case of suicide but a case of murder. The petitioner had visited the competent authorities several times for taking proper action but she remained unheard. 

Being dissatisfied, the petitioner sent an e-mail dated April 10, 2021 describing the entire fact of the matter was sent to the Director General of Police and other high ranking functionaries of the State requesting them for their intervention in the matter. The petitioner also wrote a letter dated April 16, 2021 to the Superintendent of Police, Begusarai stating all her grievances against the investigating authority. Later, on June 7, 2021 the petitioner had also moved a protest petition against the closure report filed by the Police in the Court of ACJM-VI, Begusarai. The lackadaisical attitude of the local police officials was illustrated by the fact that they have not even bothered to record the statements of Kaushal Kumar and rather made Rohit Kumar as a prosecution witness. The investigative authorities failed to enquire into the fact that as per the statement of the Adeshpal i.e. the peon of the school, namely, Ajit Kumar Bablu, the deceased had informed him regarding her visit to school and had asked him to reach the school by 12:00 noon. The inconsistencies in the statement of the peon was pointed out, which was never investigated by the police thoroughly. The peon had stated that the deceased had informed him before reaching the school premises, however, contradicting his statement, on the other hand, he had stated that the deceased usually used to inform him about her arrival at the school, however, she did not inform him on the date of occurrence. The peon in his statement had stated that he had reached the school at 12:30 P.M. but during investigation, it had come that the CCTV camera installed at the school was suspiciously switched on at 01:45 P.M. and at 01:53 P.M. the peon was seen running towards the main gate calling people and hurling. However, there is no finding regarding the whereabouts of peon in between 12:30 P.M. and 01:53 P.M. and more importantly, the investigating officer failed to investigate the case on the point as to why the CCTV camera installed at the school remained non-functional/ switched off for almost five and half hours. Although the investigation regarding the Call Detail Records and Customer Acquisition Form of the deceased and Kaushal Kumar was made, but the investigation failed to gather details regarding call records either of the deceased or Kaushal Kumar and though the Investigating Officer analyzed the tower location of the suspected accused, but the same was only after 08:59 A.M. which was way beyond the time when the CCTV camera got switched off, and therefore, the investigation of the Call Detail Record holds no meaningful relevance.

The counsel of the petitioner submitted that from the inquest report prepared on the place of occurrence, it was evident that the body of the deceased was found in a sitting position, which further aggravates the suspicion of a staged hanging and therefore, pointed towards planned homicide, considering the fact that even the C.C.T.V. cameras installed in the school premises were switched off just after the entry of the deceased in the school.  During investigation it emeregd that these suspected two persons had taken money from the deceased and there was regular tension amongst the family of the deceased and these persons. The police failed to conduct a fair, proper and honest investigation in the present case and the petitioner seeks justice to unravel the mystery of her mother's death, dissatisfied with the investigation carried out by the investigating officer as the investigation has reached a dead end without identification of the criminals and the investigating authorities have investigated the case with a coloured perspective from the very inception. 

Justice Kumar referred to the position of law on the powers of the Constitutional Court to direct for re-investigation / de-novo investigation. He relied on Supreme Court's decision in Rubabbuddin Sheikh vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. reported as (2010) 2 SCC 200 while exercising epistolary jurisdiction on the letter written by the brother of the victim in a fake encounter has held that the Constitutional Court is not barred from directing further/de novo investigation in an appropriate case and has held as follows:-“60. Therefore, in view of our discussions made hereinabove, it is difficult to accept the contentions of Mr Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Gujarat that after the charge-sheet is submitted in the court in the criminal proceeding it was not open for this Court or even for the High Court to direct investigation of the case to be handed over to CBI or to any independent agency. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that in an appropriate case when the court feels that the investigation by the police authorities is not in the proper direction and in order to do complete justice in the case and as the high police officials are involved in the said crime, it was always open to the court to hand over the investigation to the independent agency like CBI. It cannot be said that after the charge-sheet is submitted, the court is not empowered, in an appropriate case, to hand over the investigation to an independent agency like CBI. 61. Keeping this discussion in mind, that is to say, in an appropriate case, the court is empowered to hand over the investigation to an independent agency like CBI even when the charge-sheet has been submitted, we now deal with the facts of this case whether such investigation should be transferred to the CBI Authorities or any other independent agency in spite of the fact that the charge- sheet has been submitted in court. On this ground, we have carefully examined the eight action taken reports submitted by the State police authorities before us and also the various materials produced and the submissions of the learned counsel for both the parties. (emphasis supplied).

Justice Kumar referred to Supreme Court's decision in State of West Bengal & Ors. vs. Committee For Protection Of Democratic Rights, West Bengal & Ors. reported as (2010) 3 SCC 571, wherein it has been held: “Conclusions 68. Thus, having examined the rival contentions in the context of the constitutional scheme, we conclude as follows: (i) The fundamental rights, enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, are inherent and cannot be extinguished by any constitutional or statutory provision. Any law that abrogates or abridges such rights would be violative of the basic structure doctrine. The actual effect and impact of the law on the rights guaranteed under Part III has to be taken into account in determining whether or not it destroys the basic structure. (ii) Article 21 of the Constitution in its broad perspective seeks to protect the persons of their lives and personal liberties except according to the procedure established by law. The said article in its broad application not only takes within its fold enforcement of the rights of an accused but also the rights of the victim. The State has a duty to enforce the human rights of a citizen providing for fair and impartial investigation against any person accused of commission of a cognizable offence, which may include its own officers. In certain situations even a witness to the crime may seek for and shall be granted protection by the State.
xxx
(vii) When the Special Police Act itself provides that subject to the consent by the State, CBI can take up investigation in relation to the crime which was otherwise within the jurisdiction of the State police, the Court can also exercise its constitutional power of judicial review and direct CBI to take up the investigation within the jurisdiction of the State. The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be taken away, curtailed or diluted by Section 6 of the Special Police Act. Irrespective of there being any statutory provision acting as a restriction on the powers of the Courts, the restriction imposed by Section 6 of the Special Police Act on the powers of the Union, cannot be read as restriction on the powers of the constitutional courts. Therefore, exercise of power of judicial review by the High Court, in our opinion, would not amount to infringement of either the doctrine of separation of power or the federal structure. 
69. In the final analysis, our answer to the question referred is that a direction by the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to CBI to investigate a cognizable offence alleged to have been committed within the territory of a State without the consent of that State will neither impinge upon the federal structure of the Constitution nor violate the doctrine of separation of power and shall be valid in law. Being the protectors of civil liberties of the citizens, this Court and the High Courts have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to protect the fundamental rights, guaranteed by Part III in general and under Article 21 of the Constitution in particular, zealously and vigilantly.” (emphasis supplied)

Justice Kumar drew on Supreme Court's judgements in Subrata Chattoraj vs. Union of India & Ors. reported as (2014) 8 SCC 768, Mithilesh Kumar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported as (2015) 9 SCC 795, Pooja Pal vs. Union of India & Ors. reported as (2016) 3 SCC 135, Karnel Singh v. State of M.P. (1995) 5 SCC 518, Ram Bihari Yadav vs. State of Bihar (1998) 4 SCC 517, Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158, Gudalure M.J. Cherian [Gudalure M.J. Cherian v. Union of India, (1992) 1 SCC 397], Punjab and Haryana High Court Bar Assn. [Punjab and Haryana High Court Bar Assn. vs. State of Punjab, (1994) 1 SCC 616, Neetu Kumar Nagaich vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported as (2020) 16 SCC 777, Kashmeri Devi vs. Delhi Admn. 1988 Supp SCC 482, Babubhai vs. State of Gujarat (2010) 12 SCC 254, Ganeshbhai Jakshibhai Bharwad vs. State of Gujarat, 2009 SCC OnLine Guj 12130], Dharam Pal vs. State of Haryana [Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2016) 4 SCC 160,

Justice Kumar observed that "...from the perusal of the case records, it is clear that the suspected accused persons were not named in the F.I.R. on the alleged insistence of the S.H.O. of Birpur Police Station. More
importantly, from the perusal of the case diary, it appears that the statement of one of the aforesaid suspected accused was not recorded by the investigating officer. 32. In a case of unnatural death, which appears to be suicide, it is imperative for the investigating officer to conclusively establish suicide. In the present case, there is no suicide note or verifiable psychological suicidal history supported by the independent witnesses to bring home the factum of suicide. The sole statement of the alleged suspected accused Rohit Kumar could not be the sole ground to point towards a pre-existing suicidal tendency of the deceased mother of the petitioner since the aforesaid Rohit Kumar is not only one of the suspected accused but his brother is also a suspected accused, who is alleged to have had taken Rs.15,00,000/- from
the deceased mother of the petitioner as per the version of the petitioner. Therefore, a bald statement before the police that one fine day the aforesaid Rohit Kumar had seen the deceased mother trying to pour kerosene on herself does not establish conclusively the suicidal tendency. 33. Further, from the perusal of the records of the case, it appears that the investigation since its inception has been on the presumption that the deceased, that is, the mother of the petitioner, had committed suicide. The primary purpose of the investigation is fact finding and finding the truth, therefore, it is incumbent upon the investigating officer to conduct a holistic investigation to uncover the actual truth. Proceeding with a myopic view would not only fail to bring the truth to the forefront but also be a gross miscarriage of justice."

Justice Kumar added:"....the inquest report prepared by the police at the place of occurrence, the postmortem of the deceased conducted at Sadar Hospital, Begusarai, as well as the special opinion sought by this Court from the Head of the Department, Forensic Medicine and Toxicology, P.M.C.H., Patna would, though point towards the conclusion that the mother of the petitioner had committed suicide inside the school premises where she was working as warden but, the postmortem report or the medico-legal opinion cannot be sole ground to establish suicide conclusively. A postmortem report or a medico-legal opinion is an important corroborative evidence but, it could not qualify as a substantive evidence to conclusively establish suicide. Where the investigation seeks to proceeds on a theory of suicide, such theory, must be supported by reliable material and must, therefore, be properly investigated. A premature or unsupported labeling of an unnatural death as suicide is inconsistent with the constitutional requirement of a fair and proper investigation. 35. It is trite law that medico-legal opinions have a corroborative evidentiary value but cannot be the sole ground based on which an inescapable conclusion is drawn, particularly, when there are admitted suspicious elements surrounding the death of the mother of the petitioner. The fact that the CCTV cameras installed inside the school premises were functioning perfectly well up until 7:18 hours when it was switched off, and the aforesaid cameras were switched on at 13:24 hours. 36. The contention of the petitioner is that the allegedly suspected accused Kaushal Kumar had taken Rs.15,00,000/- from the mother of the petitioner in lieu of transferring a piece of land. However, from the perusal of the case records, it appears that though the investigating officer had analyzed the CDR and CAF, yet they failed to record the statement of aforesaid Kaushal Kumar. Therefore, it appears that the investigation did not holistically investigate the incident and proceeded with a preconceived presumption of suicide. No meaningful attempts also appears to have been made to investigate the abetment of suicide or whether the scene of crime was staged."
 

 

Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha sets aside order by Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga

In Md. Reyaz & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 11-page long judgement dated February 25, 2026, wherein, he concluded:".... by taking note of guidelines as mentioned in para nos. 1, 5 and 7 of Bhajan Lal (supra), impugned order of discharge along with cognizance order dated 28.04.2022 with all its consequential proceedings, qua, all above named appellants arising thereof as passed in in SC/ST/GR Case No. 33 of 2017 arising out of Sadar P.S. Case No. 137 of 2017, pending before learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga is hereby quashed and set aside. 13. Hence, this application stands allowed. 14. TCR (Trial Court Records), if any, be returned to the learned Trial Court alongwith the copy of this judgment." 

The quashing petition was preferred to quash the order dated April 28, 2022 passed in SC/ST/GR Case of 2017 arising out of Sadar P.S. Case of 2017 passed by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga, where learned Exclusive Special Judge for SC/ST (POA) Act rejected the application of the appellants filed under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. for not framing the charge against them for the offence under Sections 409, 420, 419, 504, 506 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 3(i)(r)(s) of the SC/ST (POA) Act.

The counsel for the appellants submitted that at the stage of framing of charge the appellants filed an application for discharge under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. praying therein that no offence under the SC/ST Act or under the IPC made out against them in the present case, as the core issue is land dispute arising out of oral agreement, where petitioner no. 2 was implicated only for the reason as he was witness of the agreement of sale, petitioner no. 3 was implicated being the wife of Md. Rakib Alam. It was submitted that there is no occasion to implicate petitioner no. 2 namely Md. Mehtab Alam @ Md. Mehtab. It was further submitted that even the abuse in the caste name as per FIR was just to aggravate the allegation as to implicate the appellants for the offences punishable under the Sections 3(i)(s), 3(i)(r) and 3(i)(w) of the
SC/ST Act. He also submitted that as per FIR, only “caste related abuse” was alleged to made during the
occurrence without specifying any caste. It was submitted that the occurrence alleged to be taken place at about 10:00 PM inside the house, therefore, allegation qua abusing in public view was not appears convincing. Neither sale deed was executed nor money was paid hence, no offence under the Indian Penal Code is made out. 

The counsel relied upon Supreme Court's decision in Murarilal Gupta vs. Gopi Singh, [(2005) 13 SCC 699. He also submitted that, in-fact informant himself was the land broker and he lodged this criminal case for putting pressure, against appellants. It was submitted that no money has been transferred in the accounts of any of the three appellants and as such they are not beneficiary out of alleged land deal. 

The counsel drew on the decision of Supreme Court in Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto vs. State of Bihar & Another, [SLP (Crl.) No. 12144 of 2025] and also State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others reported in 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335. He also relied upon the legal report of Hon’ble Supreme Court as available through Gulam Mustafa vs. State of Karnataka and Anr. [2023 SCC OnLine SC 603]. 

The paragraph no(s). 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the Keshaw Mahto Case (supra) for better understanding of the case, which is as under:-
11. This Court in Shajan Skaria vs. The State of Kerala & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249, laid down the ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act. It reads thus:-
“55. The basic ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are:
a. Accused person must not be a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; b. Accused must intentionally insult or intimidate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;
c. Accused must do so with the intent to humiliate such a person; and
d. Accused must do so at any place within public view.”
12. Section 3(1)(r) is attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation by the accused is
that the person who is subjected to is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In other words, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) cannot stand merely on the fact that the informant/complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless the insult or intimidation is with the intention to humiliate such a member of the community.
13. To put it briefly - first, the fact that the complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. Secondly, any insult or intimidation towards the complainant must be on the account of such person being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.
14. With a view to dispel any doubt and lend clarity, we deem it appropriate to mention that even mere knowledge of the fact that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r).
15. Further, for an offence to be made out under Section 3(1)(s), merely abusing a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. At the same time, saying caste name would also not constitute an offence.
16. In other words, to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(s) it would be necessary that the accused abuses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe “by the caste name” in any place within public view. Thus, the allegations must reveal that abuses were laced with caste name, or the caste name had been hurled as an abuse.
9. It would be apposite at this stage to reproduce paragraph no. 34 of the better understanding of the case, which is as under:-
34. Insofar and inasmuch as interference in cases involving the SC/ST Act is concerned, we may only point out that a 3-Judge Bench of this Court, in Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 966, has held that the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not inhibit this Court or the High Court from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Code, in the terms below: “15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The SC/ST Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands of upper-castes. The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the SC/ST Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin-fold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste-based atrocities. 
16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily civil or private where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the SC/ST Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr. P.C.”

Justice Jha referred to the paragraph no. 102 of the Supreme Court's decision in Bhajan Lal Case (supra) which reads as under:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first informant report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of nay offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent persons can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

Justice Jha observed: "11. Coming to the case in hand, it appears that dispute between the parties are civil in nature arising out of agreement related with land deal, where appellants are not the beneficiary and moreover, in view of aforesaid discussions qua making out a case for the offence under SC/ST Act, particularly in view of Keshaw Mahto Case (supra), no case for the aforesaid offence is made out."

Supreme Court asserts "court's permission needed to arrest accused for offence added post grant of bail"

In Sumit vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B.Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan concluded:“In a case where an accused has already been granted bail, the investigating authority on addition of an offence or offences may not proceed to arrest the accused, but for arresting the accused on such addition of offence or offences it needs to obtain an order to arrest the accused from the Court which had granted the bail.” It held that an accused who is already on bail cannot be automatically re-arrested by the investigating agency merely because a new cognizable and non-bailable offence has been added in the charge sheet.

The Court observed that the investigating agency cannot automatically arrest the accused only because new offences have been added. The  agency must first obtain an appropriate order from the court that granted bail before proceeding with the arrest in respect of the newly added offence.

It examined what the legal position would be in such circumstances and whether the  agency could directly arrest the accused based on the newly added offences alone.

Drawing on its decision in Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand and Prahlad Singh Bhati vs. NCT of Delhi, the recollected the following principles:

(i) The accused can surrender and apply for bail for newly added cognizable and non-bailable offences. In the event of refusal of bail, the accused can certainly be arrested.

(ii) The investigating agency can seek order from the court under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C. respectively for arrest of the accused and his custody.

(iii) The Court, in exercise of its power under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C. respectively, can direct for taking into custody the accused who has already been granted bail after cancellation of his bail. The Court in exercise of its power under Section 437(5) as well as Section 439(2) respectively can direct the person who has already been granted bail to be arrested and commit him to custody on addition of graver and non-cognizable offences which may not be necessary always with order of cancelling of earlier bail.

(iv) In a case where an accused has already been granted bail, the investigating authority on addition of an offence or offences may not proceed to arrest the accused, but for arresting the accused on such addition of offence or offences it needs to obtain an order to arrest the accused from the Court which had granted the bail.

The Court was hearing a criminal appeal in a dowry death case against the Allahabad High Court's order granting a limited benefit of an anticipatory bail to the Appellant, the brother-in-law of the deceased victim. The High Court had ordered that the anticipatory bail order would be in operation till the filing of the charge sheet. 

Following High Court's denial of the extension of the anticipatory bail pursuant to the filing of the charge sheet, the Appellant moved to the Supreme Court.

Referring to 5-Judge Constitution Bench decision in Sushila Aggarwal & Ors. vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., (2020) 5 SCC 1, the Court set aside the High Court's order. It observed: “once anticipatory bail is granted, it ordinarily continues without fixed expiry.”, and “the filing of a charge-sheet, taking of cognizance, or issuance of summons does not terminate protection unless special reasons are recorded.”

Consequently, the Court granted the benefit of the anticipatory bail to the Appellant. 

Benefit given by police under Section 41(1)(a) of Cr.P.C. does not amount to grant of bail by police: Patna High Court

In Awadhesh Rai vs. The State of Bihar, Patna High Court's Justice Sanjay Priya held that "the benefit given by the police under Section 41(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C. does not amount to grant of bail by the police."

Awadhesh Rai, the petitioner apprehended arrest in a Mushahari, Muzaffarpur case instituted for the offence under Sections 376/511 of the Indian Penal Code.

There wa general allegation against the petitioner that he attempted to commit illegal act with the informant. It was noted in the bail petition that both parties were on inimical terms. The Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur had rejected the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner on the ground that anticipatory bail is not maintainable because petitioner was given benefit of Section 41(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C.

Justice Sanjay Priya observed that "this Court is of the view that the benefit given by the police under Section 41(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C. does not amount to grant of bail by the police. Therefore, such view of the Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur was not correct."

The High Court's order concluded that since the petitioner was already granted benefit of Section 41(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C. and charge-sheet was already submitted, the petitioner was directed to surrender before the court below and make prayer for regular bail which was to be disposed of by court below on the same day, keeping in view that there is general and omnibus allegation against the petitioner and he was given benefit of provision of Section 41(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C. and he has never misused the aforesaid privilege. The order was passed on  January 23, 2018.

Justice Rajesh Bindal reiterated judgement of Justice Indu Malhotra on procedure to be followed for grant of maintenance

With regard to the manner in which maintenance is payable under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or Section 125 of Cr.P.C. and the manner in which maintenance payable is to be assessed, Supreme Court has provided detailed guidelines in Rajnesh v. Neha and Another, (2021) 2 SCC 324. The Court had noticed that the terms of maintenance are decided on the basis of pleadings of parties and on the basis of some amount of guess work. It recognised that both the parties submit scanty material and do not disclose correct details. The tendency of the wife is to exaggerate her needs, whereas the husband tends to conceal his actual income. Therefore, the Court laid down the procedure to streamline grant of maintenance.

Pursuant to the directions of the Court, on June 25, 2024, Pradeep Kumar Malik, Registrar General, Patna High Court wrote to all the District and Sessions Judges and Principal Judges of Family Courts of Bihar to ensure compliance of order dated November 4, 2020, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 730 of 2020 and Judgment dated November 6, 2023 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 3446 of 2023 by Justice Rajesh Bindal of the Supreme Court. The High Court had drawn their attention towards Court's letters nos. 47051 47087 dated November 11, 2020 and 77130-77166 dated December 1, 2023 through which copies of aforementioned Order and Judgment were forwarded for uploading on the website of the judgeship and for circulation among all Judicial Officers. 

The Registrar General was directed to instruct that in all the District and Sessions Judges and Principal Judges of Family Courts that "maintenance proceedings, including pending proceeding before the Family Court/ District Court/ Magistrate's Court, the Affidavit of disclosure of Assets and Liabilities in accordance with the Enclosure I, II and III as given in Criminal Appeal No. 730 of 2020 titled Rajnesh Vs. Neha &Anr case" by Supreme Court's judgement of Justice Indu Malhotra. The letter reads: "directions in its para no. 72 [(2021) 2SCC 324] shall be strictly followed and any breach and non-compliance of the direction contained in the aforementioned two judgments shall be seriously viewed."

The decision of Justices Indu Malhotra and R. Subhash Reddy of the Supreme Court dated November 4, 2020 in Rajnesh vs. Neha & Anr., reported in (2021) 2 SCC 324 reads:"we deem it appropriate to pass the following directions in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India:
(a) Issue of overlapping jurisdiction
To overcome the issue of overlapping jurisdiction, and avoid conflicting orders being passed in different proceedings, it has become necessary to issue directions in this regard, so that there is uniformity in the practice followed by the Family Courts/District Courts/Magistrate Courts throughout the country. We direct that:
(i) where successive claims for maintenance are made by a party under different statutes, the Court would consider an adjustment or set-off, of the amount awarded in the previous proceeding/s, while determining whether any further amount is to be awarded in the subsequent proceeding;
(ii) it is made mandatory for the applicant to disclose the previous proceeding and the orders passed therein, in the subsequent proceeding;
(iii) if the order passed in the previous proceeding/s requires any modification or variation, it would be required to be done in the same proceeding.
(b) Payment of Interim Maintenance
The Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities annexed as Enclosures I, II and III of this judgment, as may be applicable, shall be filed by both parties in all maintenance proceedings, including pending
proceedings before the concerned Family Court / District Court / Magistrates Court, as the case may be, throughout the country.
(c) Criteria for determining the quantum of maintenance
For determining the quantum of maintenance payable to an applicant, the Court shall take into account the criteria enumerated in Part B – III of the judgment.
The aforesaid factors are however not exhaustive, and the concerned Court may exercise its discretion to consider any other factor/s which may be necessary or of relevance in the facts and circumstances of a case.
(d) Date from which maintenance is to be awarded
We make it clear that maintenance in all cases will be awarded from the date of filing the application for maintenance, as held in Part B – IV above.
(e) Enforcement / Execution of orders of maintenance
For enforcement/execution of orders of maintenance, it is directed that an order or decree of maintenance may be enforced under Section 28A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956; Section 20(6) of the D.V. Act; and Section 128 of Cr.P.C., as may be applicable. The order of maintenance may be enforced as a money decree of a civil court as per the provisions of the CPC, more particularly Sections 51, 55, 58, 60 r.w. Order XXI."

The final paragraph of the judgement reads: "A copy of this judgment be communicated by the Secretary General of this Court, to the Registrars of all High Courts, who would in turn circulate it to all the District Courts in the States. It shall be displayed on the website of all District Courts / Family Courts / Courts of Judicial Magistrates for awareness and implementation." The judgement in Criminal Appeal No. 730 of 2020 was authored by Justice Indu Malhotra.

In Aditi alias Mithi vs Jitendra Sharma (Criminal Appeal No. 3446 of 2023), on November 6, 2023, the Supreme Court's bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Rajesh Bindal observed: "Nothing is evident from the record or even pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant at the time of hearing that affidavits were filed by both the parties in terms of judgment of this Court in Rajnesh’s case (supra), which was directed to be communicated to all the High Courts for further circulation to all the Judicial Officers for awareness and implementation. The case in hand is not in isolation. Even after pronouncement of the aforesaid judgment, this Court is still coming across number of cases decided by the courts below fixing maintenance, either interim or final, without their being any affidavit on record filed by the parties. Apparently, the officers concerned have failed to take notice of the guidelines issued by this Court for expeditious disposal of cases involving grant of maintenance. Comprehensive guidelines were issued pertaining to overlapping jurisdiction among courts when concurrent remedies for grant of maintenance are available under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, Section 125 Cr.P.C., the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and Criteria for determining quantum of maintenance, date from which maintenance is to be awarded, enforcement of orders of maintenance including fixing payment of interim maintenance. As a result, the litigation which should close at the trial level is taken up to this Court and the parties are forced to litigate." 

The Court's directions reads: "Considering the facts of the case in hand and the other similar cases coming across before this Court not adhering to the guidelines given in Rajnesh’s case (supra), we deem it appropriate to direct the Secretary General of this Court to re-circulate the aforesaid judgment not only to all the Judicial Officers through the High Courts concerned but also to the National Judicial Academy and the State Judicial Academies, to be taken note of during the training programmes as well." The judgement was authored by Justice Rajesh Bindal.