Supreme Court's Division Bench seeks ballistic report of the pistol in a challenge against order of Justice Harish Kumar

In Vjay Prasad Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench  of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Manoj Misra passed an order which deemed it "appropriate to direct the learned counsel for the State to bring on record the ballistic report with regard to the pistol said to have been recovered from Sudama Sahani @ Sudama Sahni, as also the details with regard to the SIM Card being used at the relevant time/CDR, if the same has been recovered relating to Ramesh Mahto." The matter is to be listed on July 30, 2025. 

Patna High Court's Justice Harish Kumar had heard the case which arose Motihari, East Champaran. The petitions of Ramesh Mahto and Sudama Sahani were heard together and the order was passed on November  20, 2024. The application for grant of bail to the petitioners who are in custody in connection with Motihari Town Case registered for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 120B, 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959.

The prosecution alleged that on June 26, 2024 while the informant and his elder brother, Suresh Prasad Yadav, went on his four wheeler and reached near a railway crossing, in the mean time, two unknown miscreants who were standing there, opened fire, due to which the informant’s brother sustained gun shot injury. After causing fire arm injury, both the miscreants sat on one Apache motorcycle alongwith one pillion rider and fled away. The fire arm injuries sustained to the deceased proved fatal.The petitioners' counsel contended that the FIR was instituted against unknown miscreants, however, during the course of investigation the name of the petitioners sprung up on the confessional statement of co-accused persons; save and except the confessional statement, there is no other material suggesting the involvement of the petitioner in the crime. It was also contended that during the course of investigation various other co-accused persons have been apprehended, but they did not disclose the name of the petitioners in causing the murder of the deceased. So far the petitioner in Cr. Misc. No. 62213 of 2024 is concerned, the only material which has come during the course of investigation is that before the occurrence, the petitioner had conversation with one of the co-accused person, whose mobile was allegedly fallen at the place of occurrence in course of fleeing. So far the petitioner in Cr. Misc. No. 64450 of 2024 is concerned, during the course of investigation it has come that on the confessional statement of Harishankar Paswan, the weapon which is said to be used in the crime, has been recovered from the house of the petitioner. It is lastly contended that now the investigation of the crime is complete and the chargesheet has been submitted and, as such, there is no chance of tampering with the evidence or threatening the witnesses. The petitioners undertake that they will fully cooperate in the proceeding of the Court. 

Regard being had to the submissions made on behalf of the parties and considering the materials collected
during the course of investigation apart from the criminal antecedent of the petitioner, the Court is not acceded to the prayer of the petitioners for the present, however the Court directed that the petitioners shall be released from the custody after framing of the charge in the afore-noted case on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Motihari, East Champaran.

Supreme Court's Division Bench reverses decision of Justice Partha Sarthy which endorsed cognizance order of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Biharsharif (Nalanda)

In Parmanand Prasad vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran observed:"In any case considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of offences and the sequence therein, it appears to be a false case and we are of the opinion that in this case, the High Court ought to have invoked the power under Section 482 of the Code and should have against the petitioner. We do not think there is any justification here in this case for the petitioner to undergo trial." It allowed the prayer of the petitioner and quash the criminal proceedings. The 3-page long order was passed on April 29, 2025.  

The petitioner was an accused in a complaint case instituted at the instance of Rohit Raj, the respondent no.2-complainant pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Biharshariff, Nalanda, Bihar, or the offences punishable under 379, 504, 506, 120(B) read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) where the Court took cognizance under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC against the petitioner. His petition against this order, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was dismissed by Justice Partha Sarthy of the Patna High Court. Being aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court. The Court had stayed further proceedings in the complaint against the petitioner by its order dated November 11, 2024. 

Section 323 deals with voluntarily causing hurt. This section punishes anyone who intentionally causes harm to another person, excluding cases covered under Section 334. The punishment for this offense can be imprisonment for up to one year, a fine of up to 1,000 rupees, or both.

Section 504 deals with intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace. This section penalizes individuals who intentionally insult someone, thereby provoking them to commit a breach of the peace or other offenses. The punishment for this offense can be imprisonment for up to two years, a fine, or both.

Section 506 deals with criminal intimidation. This section addresses criminal intimidation, which includes making threats to cause death or grievous hurt, or to commit other serious offenses. The punishment for this offense can vary depending on the severity of the threat, ranging from up to two years of imprisonment and/or a fine for simple intimidation, to up to seven years of imprisonment, a fine, or both for more severe threats.

The complaint stated that the petitioner along with another person had attacked on the respondent no.2-the complainant. There are no injuries and the case inter-alia is registered under Section 307 of the IPC, which addresses the offense of attempt to murder.. The fact of the matter is that prior to one month from filing of the aforesaid complaint, the petitioner had lodged an FIR against the respondent no.2-the complainant along with another person for having attacked the petitioner who is a practicing lawyer in Patna. It is from the very same transaction, where the complainant had gone to the office of the petitioner with the another person that the complaint was raised after one month. 

In his 7-page long order dated July 11, 2024, Justice Partha Sarthy had concluded: "in the opinion of the Court, there is no illegality in the order impugned dated 5.7.2023 passed in Complaint Case no.135C of 2023 by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Biharsharif (Nalanda) taking cognizance under sections 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code".

He observed: "Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material on record, this Court finds that in the complaint (Annexure-1) filed by the complainant, there is no direct allegation against the petitioner along with one another of having abused and assaulted the complainant and others. Though the petitioner has made substantial points of an earlier FIR having been lodged by him being Bihar P.S. Case no.28 of 2023 on 8.1.2023 with respect to the occurrence of the same date as in the present complaint, the Investigating Officer having found the contents of the said FIR to be true and having submitted chargesheet no.194 of 2023 on 28.2.2023 together with the delay in filing of the instant complaint, in the opinion of the Court, these points being the defence of the petitioner could not have been looked into by the learned trial Court at the time of taking cognizance. The Court was required only to see the contents of the complaint petition together with the statement of the complainant and the witnesses examined in support of the complaint during enquiry. The Court did not have the jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the allegations made in the complaint." He made reference to the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha Rani vs. Suraj Kumar & Anr.; (1985) 2 SCC 370 and M/s. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma P. Ltd. vs. M/s. Biological E. Ltd. & Ors.; (2000) 3 SCC 269.

Supreme Court's Division Bench grants bail, Justice Sandeep Kumar had declined bail to the accused with "no criminal antecedent"

In Md. Saheb vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and K.V. Viswanathan passed a 3-page long order on May 1, 2025 saying, "taking into account the nature of the offence and the period of incarceration, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to be released on bail pending trial" after hearing the appeal against the order of Justice Sandeep Kumar of the Patna High Court rejecting the bail prayer of the appellant. The appellant's counsel submitted that  Md. Saheb, a resident of Basgaon, Abadpur, Katihar. has suffered incarceration of over seven months. The prosecution case against the appellant was based on recovery of Rs. 5,300/- cash and a mobile. 

But as far as the cash is concerned, it has not been identified as a looted article and the mobile which has been recovered is not connected with the crime. It was submitted that First Information Report was lodged against unknown persons and co-accused has already been granted bail. The order recorded that the State's counsel "could not point out any previous criminal antecedents of the appellant rather, in paragraph 17 of the counter affidavit, it is admitted that appellant has no criminal antecedent."  

In Md. Saheb vs. The State of Bihar (2025), in his 2-page order dated February 21, 2025 Justice Sandeep Kumar  concluded: "this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner." The petitioner had sought bail in connection with police case registered for the offence under Section 309(4) of the BNS which provides punishment for robbery which is rigorous imprisonment for a term that may extend to ten years, and a fine. The prosecution case was that four unknown criminals are alleged to have looted Rs. 55,805/-, one Tab etc. from the informant. Rs. 5300/- and one mobile phone was recovered from the petitioner and the petitioner had given a self-inculpatory statement. The petitioner is in jail since August 5, 2024. The petitioner's application was dismissed.

Justice Arun Kumar Jha sets aside rejection order of Sub Judge-VI, Patna in a Title Suit from Phulwari Sharif

In Farkunda Shahin & Ors. vs. Md. Mokhtar Alam & Ors. (2025), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court in his 17-page long judgement dated April 30, 2025 concluded: "I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 20.09.2016 could not be sustained and same is set aside and the application dated 08.04.2016 is allowed. Accordingly, the present petition stands allowed." In this case from Phulwari Sharif, the order dated 20.09.2016 passed by Sub Judge-VI, Patna in Title Suit No. 482 of 2006 whereby and whereunder the trial court had rejected the petition dated 08.04.2016 filed under Order 1 Rule 10(2) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the petitioners to be added as defendants in the suit.

The trial court had heard the parties and rejected the prayer for impleadment vide order dated 20.09.2016. This order was challenged before the High Court. The petitioners' counsel submitted that the impugned order is not sustainable and the trial court has passed the orders against the settled provision of law. The senior counsel further submitted that due to the mistake of the scribe, a wrong plot no. has been mentioned in the sale deed of the vendors and also in the sale deed of the petitioners but other description like Tauzi No., Khata No., area and boundary are the same. Further, a property could be identified by its boundary and misdescription or wrong mentioning of plot number would not come in the way of identifying the property. But this fact was not considered by the trial court. The counsel referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sheodhyan Singh And Others vs Musammat Santchara Kuer And Others reported in AIR 1963 SC 1879 wherein the Court referred to the decision of the Privy Council wherein it was observed that a case of misdescription could be treated as a mere irregularity where there is no doubas to the identity of the property and if identity of the property is well established, misdescription does not affect the identity of the property sold and thus, Supreme Court held that the mistake in plot number must be treated as mere misdescription which does not affect the identity of the property sold. The senior counsel also submitted that moreover plot number 797 is part of Khata no. 46 and this is the admitted position in the plaint of the plaintiffs. This fact is also clear from making the vendors of the petitioners, namely Muneshwar Rai and Nazir Rai, as parties/defendants. They were made parties only on the ground that they were admittedly the title holder of Plot No. 796 but they have nothing to do with the Plot No. 797. Thus, the petitioners are bona fide purchasers from Muneshwar Rai and Nazir Rai of Plot No. 796 and are in exclusive possession of the same. The trial court failed to exercise its jurisdiction and did not consider the real dispute in issue and rejected the petition of the petitioner on misconceived grounds. Prior to the sale of the disputed property to the petitoners, Muneshwar Rai and Nazir Rai partitioned their property in half and got their names recorded in Government Sarista of the State of Bihar and jamabandi was created in their names and mutation was also done in the names of the petitioners. The senior counsel reiterated that Plot No. 797 comes under Khata No. 46 having area 11 decimal with different boundary and neither the plaintiffs not the intervenors/petitioners have any concern with the said plot of land. The senior counsel further submitted that the vendors of the petitioners have already sold the suit land and they have no interest in the suit property and might not properly contest the suit. This makes the petitioners necessary parties for proper disposal of the suit. The senior counsel also submitted that the petitioners are necessary parties having right, title and possession over one of the plots of the Schedule II property and their interest would be jeopardized if they are not made parties and it would also result in multiplicity of litigation. Thus, it has been submitted by the senior counsel that the impugned order is not sustainable and the same be set aside and the application of the petitioners for impleadment be allowed. 

Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code reads: “(2) Court may strike out or add parties The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name, of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.”

Supreme Court in the case of Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 733, has held that ‘necessary parties’ are those persons in whose absence no decree can be passed by the Court or that there must be a right to some relief against some party in respect of the controversy involved in the proceedings. On the other hand ‘proper parties’ are those whose presence before the Court would be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit although no relief in the suit was claimed against such person.

The Supreme Court in the case of Sumtibai vs. Paras Finance Co. Regd. Partnership Firm Beawer (Raj.), reported in (2007) 10 SCC 82, has held that a party having a semblance of interest in the suit property could be impleaded as a party in the suit.

In the case of Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. vs. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., reported in (2010) 7 SCC 417 has discussed the law relating to impleadment of the parties. The relevant paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 22, 25 & 27 of the judgment reads:
“13. The general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person
against whom he does not seek any relief. Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff. But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the Code”, impleadment of proper or necessary parties...
14. The said provision makes it clear that a court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party: (a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, but not added; or (b) any person whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in the suit. In short, the court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party.
15. A “necessary party” is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. If a “necessary party” is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A “proper party” is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance.
22. Let us consider the scope and ambit of Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC regarding striking out or adding parties. The said sub-rule is not about the right of a non-party to be impleaded as a party, but about the judicial discretion of the court to strike out or add parties at any stage of a proceeding. The discretion under the sub-rule can be exercised either suo motu or on the application of the plaintiff or the defendant, or on an application of a person who is not a party to the suit. The court can strike out any party who is improperly joined. The court can add anyone as a plaintiff or as a defendant if it finds that he is a necessary party or proper party. Such deletion or addition can be without any conditions or subject to such terms as the court deems fit to impose. In exercising its judicial discretion under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the
Code, the court will of course act according to reason and fair play and not according to whims and caprice.
25. In other words, the court has the discretion to either to allow or reject an application of a person claiming to be a proper party, depending upon the facts and circumstances and no person has a right to insist that he should be impleaded as a party, merely because he is a proper party.
27. On a careful examination of the facts of this case, we find that the appellant is neither a necessary party nor a proper party. As noticed above, the appellant is neither a purchaser nor the lessee of the suit property and has no right, title or interest therein. The first respondent-plaintiff in the suit has not sought any relief against the appellant. The presence of the appellant is not necessary for passing an effective decree in the suit for specific performance. Nor is its presence necessary for complete and effective adjudication of the matters in issue in the suit for specific performance filed by the first respondent-plaintiff against AAI. A person who expects to get a lease from the defendant in a suit for specific performance in the event of the suit being dismissed, cannot be said to be a person having some semblance of title in the property in dispute”.

Drawing on these judgements of the Supreme Court, Justice Jha observed: "...merely on this ground that disputed plot number does not match with the plot number of the petitioners, the rejection of the claim of the petitioners for impleadment is not proper. It is the settled provision of law that a land would be identified by its boundary and if its identity is established and the same is certain, mere misdescription would not come in the way of asserting rights by its title holder."