Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh upholds the order by Justice A. Abhishek Reddy in a case from Darbhanga

In The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Rural Works Department, Bihar & Ors. vs. Lal Jha (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma delivered a 5-page long judgement dated October 31, 2025, wherein, upheld the 5-page long order dated September 23, 2024 by Justice A. Abhishek Reddy in Lal Jha vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Rural Works Department, Bihar (2024). The judgement was authored by Justice Singh. In his third judgement as Acting Chief Justice , he concluded:"....we find no reason to interfere in the order of the learned Single Judge. affirmed, and the appeal is, accordingly, dismissed." The other 4 respondents were: The Chief Engineer, Rural Works Department, Patna, Additional Chief Executive Officer, Rural Works Department, Patna, Superintending Engineer, Rural Works Department, Works Circle, Darbhanga and Executive Engineer, Rural Woks Department, Works Division, Madhubani.

The intra court appeal was filed against Justice Reddy's order whereby the he had issued direction to the authorities to calculate the amount payable to the petitioner towards the maintenance for the year 2021-22 to 2022-23 as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of the receipt of the copy of the order and pay the same. It was further clarified that, in case, the amounts are not paid by the authority within the stipulated time, the petitioner would be entitled to simple interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of the submission of the bills till the date of actual payment to the petitioner.

Pursuant to the notice inviting tender (NIT) floated under the authority of the respondent department, the petitioner was allotted the construction and five years maintenance work of the road, namely, Champa Laxmipur and Jadaha under the Scheme New Maintenance Policy MR 3054 vide Agreement No. 90MBD/2020-21 dated 19.09.2020. The respondent-petitioners were paid the maintenance cost for the year 2023-24. However, they were not paid the maintenance cost for the year 2021-22 and 2022-23. The respondent-petitioners had contented before the Writ Court that they had completed the construction work in the year 2021 itself and ought to be paid the maintenance cost for the year 2021-22 and 2022-23. 

Justice Reddy had observed: “5. Admittedly, as seen from the record, the petitioner was entrusted with the work of laying of the roads for the areas i.e. Jadaha Tole Road measuring length 1.130 Kilometres and Champa-laxmipur measuring length 19.750 Kilometres. The petitioner after completion of the work was entitled for maintenance of the roads for a period of five years under the said agreement. The respondents are disputing the date of completion of the work which according to the petitioner was completed on 15.06.2021, whereas the respondents are stating that the work was completed only in the year 2023. In the counter affidavit, it is stated that the works were completed only in the year 2023, however, it is to be noted that in the said counter affidavit the factum of entering into the contract in the year 2020 is not disputed and also the fact that the completion of the work was within a period of nine months from the date of the commencement of the work i.e. from 19.09.2020 has also not been disputed by the authorities. When they themselves are stating that the agreement was entered on 19.09.2020 and the works were commenced from 19.09.2020 to be completed within a period of nine months from the date of commencement of the work, the question of completing the works in the year 2023 does not arise." 

The counsel for the petitioner pointed out that in case, the petitioner had completed the work only in the month of July 2023 as alleged by the respondents, the petitioner could have been subjected to penalty for not completing the work within the stipulated time and also black-listing. However, the same is not the case, moreover, there is no averments in the counter affidavit to the effect that the petitioner at any point of time was given any extension of time. Further, it is to be noted that merely because the Management Information System (MIS) shows the completion of work as 15.07.2023, the same cannot be a ground for denying the payment and penalize the petitioner for the same. It was pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner that the measurement book filed by the respondents themselves shows that the works were completed in the year, 2021.

The High Court recorded:"5. From perusal of records of the case, it is apparent that the concerned Department themselves have stated in their counter-affidavit that the agreement was entered into on 19.09.2020, and the work commenced from 19.09.2020. Further, it has been stated in the counter-affidavit before the Writ Court that the date of completion of work was 9 months from the date of commencement of the work. As such, the appellants have themselves stated that the work was completed within the stipulated period of time.  

In Lal Jha vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Rural Works Department, Patna & Ors. (2024), Justice Reddy had concluded:"....the stand taken by the authorities that the petitioner has completed the work only in the month of July, 2023 and, therefore, he is not entitled for the year 2021-22 to 2022-23 is without any legal basis and contrary to the record. The authorities have directed to calculate the amount payable to the petitioner towards the maintenance for the year 2021-22 to 2022-23 as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of the receipt of the copy of this order and pay the same. It is further clarified that, in case, the amounts are not paid by the authority within the stipulated time, the petitioner would be entitled to simple interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of the submission of the bills till the date of actual payment to the petitioner." With these directions, the writ petition was allowed to the extent indicated.

Supreme Court reverses Justice Satyavrat Verma's anticipatory bail rejection order

In Sima Devi vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 4-page long order dated November 7, 2025 upon hearing Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) which arose out of impugned 3-page long order dated July 16, 2025 passed by Justice Satyavrat Verma of Patna High Court. 

Supreme Court's Division Bench reversed the order of Justice Verma saying, "3....we deem it appropriate to confirm the order of interim protection and deem it appropriate to release the petitioner on anticipatory bail. 4 In view of the above, we direct that in the event of arrest, the petitioner shall be released on bail on furnishing suitable bail bonds and sureties...." The Court had granted interim relief by its order dated September 24, 2025 by issuing direction for not taking coercive steps.

The petitioner had approached the Supreme Court apprehending her arrest in connection with a FIR dated December 1, 2024 registered at Police Station Banjariya, District East Champaran, Bihar for the offences
punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 109, 118(2), 352 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. 

Earlier, in Sima Devi vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Verma had concluded:"5. Considering the submissions made by the learned APP, the court is not inclined to extend the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioner. 6. The anticipatory bail application of the petitioner is rejected. 7. However, if the petitioner surrenders on or before 30.07.2025, in that event, the learned trial Court shall dispose of the case, on the same day, keeping in mind that husband of the petitioner has been granted the privilege of regular bail by this Court." 

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending her arrest in connection with Banjariya P.S. Case No.394/2024, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 118(2), 109, 352, 3(5) of the B.N.S. Act.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that woman petitioner was a person with clean antecedent. The husband of the petitioner had approached the High Court seeking regular bail by filing Cr. Misc.No.32639/2025 and the same was allowed by an order dated 22.05.2025. It was submitted that informant alleged that husband of the petitioner was indulged in trade of liquor, further on 26.11.2024, the Banjariya police caught the liquor of her husband, on account of which, the husband of the petitioner abused the informant alleging that it was at his instance that the liquor was caught, thereafter husband of the petitioner assaulted the informant by knife causing injury. It was next alleged that the petitioner along with co-accused Vivek Kumar also assaulted the brother of the informant Vinod Sah by knife causing injury. It was submitted that the injury suffered by Vinod Sah was simple in nature. A.P.P. for the State opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner and submitted that the petitioner along with Vivek were alleged to have assaulted Vinod by knife causing injury. It was also submitted that Vinod suffered two injuries and the husband of the petitioner was granted the privilege of regular bail, as such, the APP submitted that it was not a fit case, where the privilege of anticipatory bail be granted to the petitioner, in the nature of allegation as alleged in the FIR.

Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh led Bench upholds Justice Bibek Chaudhuri's order on petitioners' right for regularization, dismisses appeal by Principal Secretary, Health Department

In The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Health Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. vs. Anil Kumr Sharma & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma delivered a 3-page long judgement dated October 30, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"4. Upon perusal of records of the case, we find that there is no sufficient material available on record to substantiate the grounds of the present appeal. Therefore, in our view, the appellant has been unable to dislodge the findings of the learned Single Judge. 5. Thus, considering the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and the observations and findings of the learned Single Judge, we find no infirmity in the order. 6. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed."  

The other seven appellants were: Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of Bihar, Deputy Secretary, Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of Bihar, Director-in-Chief, Disease Control Public Health Paramedical, Health Service, Government of Bihar, Chief Malaria Officer, Bihar, District Magistrate-cum-Collector, Patna, Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer, Patna and District Malariaa Officer, Sultanganj, Patna. 

The other eight respondents were: Surendra Prasad, Ramekwal Prasad, Vidya Sagar Prasad, Ram Bhawan Paswan, Rajnandan Saw @ Rajnandan Sao, Madan Prasad, Prem Paswan and Chuni Lal Thakur @Chunilal. 

The appeal was directed against the order and judgment dated September 25, 2024 passed in Anil Kumar Sharma & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Health Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2024) by Justice Chaudhuri, the Single Judge whereby and whereunder he had held that the petitioners/respondents were entitled to be absorbed/regularised as Superior Field Workers/Field Workers in the establishment of the Department of Health and Family Welfare, subject to the condition of their seniority in the existing vacancy of the department, within 90 days from the date of communication of this order.

Justice Chaudhuri had observed: “13. Since, the petitioners worked for 240 days during the period of 5 years starting from 1985-1986, their right of absorption/regularization has been crystallized by virtue of the resolution of the State Government dated 16.03.2006. When the right of the petitioners for regularization has been settled by a 2006 Resolution, the same cannot be denied by a subsequent decision of the General Administrative Department taken in the year 2022. Moreover, I have already come to the conclusion that the reasoned order passed on 30.08.2022 on the basis of the decision in C.W.J.C. No.5538 of 2020 completely misinterpreted and misconstrued the resolution dated 16.03.2006. Thus, the said resolution cannot stand. 14. In view of what has been stated above, this Court finds that the petitioners are entitled to be absorbed/regularized as Superior Field Workers/Field Workers in the establishment of the Department of Health and Family Welfare, subject to the condition of their seniority in the existing vacancy of the department, within 90 days from the date of communication of this order”. 

The nine petitioners before the High Court's Single Judge Bench used to work on Daily Wage basis as a Seasonal Field Workers as DDT sprayers in Malaria Eradication Department under the Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of Bihar. The case of the petitioners was that they were engaged as Seasonal Workers in the year 1985 and 1986, till 1990, they worked more than 240 days, therefore, they were entitled to be regularized/absorbed in Group-D posts in the Department of Health and Family Welfare as per State Government Resolution dated March 16, 2006, which came into force retrospectively w.e.f. December 11, 1990. The petitioners had prayed for issuance of appropriate writ in the nature of Certiorari for setting aside the memo dated August 30, 2022 issued under signature of the Director-in-Chief, (Disease Control, Public Health, Paramedical), Health Service, Government of Bihar, Patna whereby and whereunder, grievance of the petitioners for regularization/absorption in the regular cadre Class- IV was rejected. They had also prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondent authorities to issue orders for regularization/absorption of the petitioners in the regular cadre Class-IV as Superior Field Worker/Field Worker respectively in accordance with law keeping in view of the Seniority List in the District-Patna. They prayed for directing the respondent authorities to follow the Seniority List strictly for regularization/ absorption of the petitioners in the regular cadre against the vacancy available.  

In the second judgement as Acting Chief Justice, Justice Singh upheld the 12-page long order dated September 25, 2024 passed by Justice Bibek Chaudhuri. 

Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh upholds Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh's verdict, dismisses "unsustainable order", LPA by Principal Secretary, Rural Department, Bihar

"I express my anguish and displeasure over the manner in which the disciplinary proceeding has been held in the present case and the appellate order has been passed. 67. In numerous cases, this Court has experienced that more often than not, the authorities/functionaries, under the Rules, fail to adhere to the statutory provisions. Breach of statutory prescriptions in disciplinary proceedings, involving matters of serious misconduct by Government Servants, renders the disciplinary action unsustainable, which is not in public interest. I have dealt with various provisions under the Rules, in the present judgment, with an expectation, that top officials, under the State Government, shall take all possible corrective measures including by way of imparting training to the officials who play their respective roles under the Rules. For the said purpose, let a copy of this order be sent to the Chief Secretary, Bihar, for him to chalk out ways and means to ensure strict compliance of various provisions under the Rules, in the light of the observations made in the present judgment."

-Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh in Abhay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2020), February 24, 2020 

In The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Rural Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. vs. Abhay Kumar (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma delivered a 4-page long judgement dated October 30, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"4. From the perusal of records of the case it is apparent that the order of the learned Single Judge does not take away any right of the concerned parties, and the matter has already been remanded to the competent authority for taking a fresh decision in accordance with the law. 5. In addition to this, the department has already made compliance of the order awaiting the outcome of this appeal. We also could not find any impropriety in the said direction of learned Single Judge. Further, we find that there is no sufficient material available on record to substantiate the grounds of the present appeal. Therefore, the appeal is devoid of merit and not fit for interference. 6. The present Letters Patent Appeal is accordingly dismissed." 

The other four respondents were: Commissioner, Munger Division, Munger, Collector, Lakhisarai, Senior Deputy Collector, Lakhisarai and Circle Officer, Suryagarha Block, Lakhisarai.  

The Letters Patent Appeal was directed against 53-page long judgment dated February 24, 2020 passed in Abhay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2020), by Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh whereby and where under the Single Judge had been pleased to allow the writ application and set aside the impugned order dated April 20, 2015 passed by the disciplinary authority and order dated November 16, 2016 passed by the appellate authority being unsustainable in the law. The Court directed the disciplinary authority to consider afresh, the report of inquiry officer and the materials available on record of the departmental enquiry and take a fresh decision in accordance with law, observing that it will open for him to exercise his power under Sub Rule 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules by remitting the case back to Inquiring Authority for further enquiry consequent upon quashing of the impugned order of dismissal and the appellate order and further the petitioner shall be required to be reinstated forthwith because of the manner in which the departmental enquiry has been concluded and the punishment has been imposed. The Court also directed that the petitioner shall be entitled to full back wages for the period during which he remained out of service because of illegal order of punishment.

Justice Singh, the Single Judge had observed: “64. I direct the disciplinary authority, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to consider afresh, the report of the inquiry officer and the materials available on record of the departmental enquiry, and take afresh decision in accordance with law. It will be open for him to exercise his power under sub Rule (1) of Rule 18 of the Rules by remitting the case back to the Inquiring Authority for further enquiry. Consequent upon quashing of the impugned order of dismissal and the appellate order, the petitioner shall be required to be reinstated forthwith. Because of the manner in which the departmental enquiry has been conducted and the punishment has been imposed, I direct that the petitioner shall be entitled to full back wages for the period during which he remained out of service because of illegal order of punishment. 65. This writ application is allowed accordingly in terms of the directions and observations as made hereinabove.” 

Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh had relied on the decision in Union of India vs. Prakash Kumar Tandon (AIR 2009 SC 1375), wherein, the Supreme Court, dealing with the role of the Inquiry Officer held as under:-
“15. The principles of natural justice demand that an application for summoning a witness by the delinquent officer should be enquiry officer. It was obligatory on the part of the enquiry officer to pass an order in the said application. He could not refuse to consider the same. It is not for the Railway Administration to contend that it is for them to consider as to whether any witness should be examined by it or not. It was for the enquiry officer to take a decision thereupon. A disciplinary proceeding must be fairly conducted. An enquiry officer is a quasi-judicial authority. He, therefore, must perform his functions fairly and reasonably which is even otherwise the requirement of the principles of natural justice.”

He underlined the significance of recording of reasons which has been noted in a series of decisions; illustratively in G. Vallikumari vs. Andhra Education Society, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 497, Oryx Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2010) 13 SCC 427 and Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. & Anr. vs. Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors. reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496. 

In his first order as Acting Chief Justice Justice Sudhir Singh upheld the judgement by Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal filed by Principal Secretary, Rural Department, Government of Bihar.   

Supreme Court's Division Bench sets aside judgment by Patna High Court's Justice Vinod Chandran led Division Bench, quashes 2019 Amendment Notification

In Samiullah vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Registration Excise and Prohibition Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and Joymalya Baghci delivered a 34-page long judgement dated November 7, 2025, wherein it set aside the 21-page long judgement dated February 9, 2024 in Amod Bihari Sinha vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Registration Excise and Prohibition Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2024) by Patna High Court's Division of Justices K. Vinod Chandran and Rajiv Roy and quashed the Notification of 2019. The Court's judgement was authored by Justice Vinod Chandran. 

The High Court had heard the case of Amod Bihari Sinha along with the cases of Samiullah, Umesh Kumar, Rakesh Kumar, Deepak Kumar Singh and Avinash. The petitioners in the High Court filed the writ petitions to challenge the addition of sub-rule (xvii) and (xviii) to Rule 19 of the Bihar Registration Rules, 2008. It was argued that the same was ultra vires the Registration Act, 1908, and beyond the scope of clauses (a) and (aa) of sub-section (1) of Section 69. Justice Vinod Chandran had concluded: "25. We find absolutely no reason to interfere with the amendment incorporated. We reject the writ petitions."

Reversing High Court's judgement, the Supreme Court has concluded:"....we have no hesitation in concluding that the impugned sub-rules are ultra vires the rule-making power under Section 69 or any other provisions of the Act", the Registration Act, 1908. It observed: "...Section 69(1)(a) and (aa), as referred to and relied on by the Government to frame the impugned sub-rules. These provisions only relate to the power of Inspector General of Registration to frame rules for “safe custody of books, papers and documents” and also for “providing the manner in which and safeguards subject to which books may be kept in …. electronic form.” Equally, Section 69(1)(j) also does not legitimize making of the impugned sub-rules, as it only enables making of rules for “generally regulating the proceedings of registrars and sub-registrars”. 

The judgement reads:"23. A detailed examination of the relevant provisions of the Act, coupled with Sections 21 and 22 and also Section 69(1)(h) read with Sections 55(3), do not indicate anything as assumed by the High Court. At the same time a detailed examination of Sections 21, 22 and 55(3) only evidences the requirement of sufficient description to property. All these requirements are intended only to identify the property and for this purpose the provisions enable reference to maps, plans or surveys, if practicable. The reality is that, none of these provisions require reference to or production of proof of mutation in the name of the owner. That is to say, the provision does not relate to the right of disposition of the executant in respect of a property which is otherwise physically identifiable. The power to make the impugned sub-rules 19 (xvii) and (xviii) cannot be traced to these provisions."

Supreme Court observed:"17. Interestingly, while the notification introducing impugned sub-rules 19 (xvii) and (xviii) sources the power of making it to Section 69(1)(a) and (aa), the High Court came to the conclusion that the power to introduce sub-rules (xvii) and (xviii) of Rule 19 is not relatable to 69(1)(a) and (aa). High Court, however, traced the power to make the impugned sub-rules to Section 69(1)(h) and Section 55 (3), read with Sections 21 and 22 of the Act, or in the alternative to the Inspector General’s general rule-making power under Section 69(1)(j). We will now refer to these provisions and at the same time consider other provisions of the Act to examine the legality and authority of sub-rules 19(xvii) and (xviii)."  

Justice Anil Kumar Sinha quashes punishment order by District Programme Officer (Establishment), Arwal, appellate order by Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Gaya

In Satyendra Kumar Pathak vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Justice Anil Kumar Sinha delivered a 11-page long judgement dated November 7, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"The order of punishment dated 01.10.2016 passed by the District Programme Officer (Establishment), Arwal, as well as the appellate order dated 16.01.2018 passed by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh  Division, Gaya, is hereby quashed. 23. The petitioner is entitled to be paid his full salary for the suspension period and the consequential benefits. The entire payments shall be made to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order." 

Justice Sinha observed: "This Court finds that the appellate order dated 16.01.2018 passed by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Gaya, is cryptic and non-speaking. The appellate authority has merely reiterated the conclusion of the disciplinary authority without assigning any independent reason, and without examining the correctness of the procedure adopted in the inquiry. The appellate order is, thus, nothing but a mere mechanical affirmation and suffers from clear non-application of mind. 21. Considering the facts as discussed above, this Court is  satisfied that the punishment order, dated 01.10.2016 as well as the appellate order, dated 16.01.2018, stand vitiated which violates the principles of natural justice causing serious prejudice to the petitioner. 22. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed." 

The other seven respondents were:Principal Secretary, Department of Education, Government of Bihar, Director, Primary Education Bihar, Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Bihar, District Education Officer, Arwal, District Programme Officer, Establishment, Arwal, Block Education Officer, Block-Karpi, Arwal and Head Master-Cum Drawing and Disbursing Officer, Middle School, Karpi, Arwal.

The writ petition was filed for quashing the order of punishment, dated October 1, 2016 passed by the District Programme Officer, Arwal. It also prayed for a direction to the respondent/authorities for payment of salary and subsistence allowance for the entire period of suspension along with all consequential and monetary benefits. The petitioner sought amendment in the prayer portion of the writ petition, stating that during the pendency of the present petition, the respondent no. 4, namely the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Gaya, Bihar, who is the appellate authority, had passed an order dated January 16, 2018, whereby the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority was upheld. The petitioner had also prayed for quashing of the appellate order.

The petitioner was initially appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the Matric Trained Scale on November 1, 1977, at Primary School, Kendua, Imamganj, District Gaya. In the year 1987, he was granted the first time-bound promotion and subsequently received ‘Pravar Koti’ promotion in the year 1989. Thereafter, he was posted as the In-charge Headmaster of the Middle School, Kochahasa, Karpi Block, District -Arwal, and was due to retire on June 30, 2017. While the petitioner was serving as In-charge Headmaster, the District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad, issued a letter dated February 17, 2010, placing the petitioner under suspension on the basis of a report submitted by the Area Education Officer cum Incharge, Mid-Day Meal Scheme, Arwal on the allegation that he was absent without notice and irregularities were committed in the mid-day meal scheme. Pursuant to the order of suspension, petitioner submitted his joining at headquarters on February 19, 2010. The District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad, by order dated May 6, 2010, framed memo of charge in Prapatra “Ka” and appointed Block Education Officer, Arwal, as Enquiry Officer and Block Education Officer, Karpi, as Presenting Officer to conduct the departmental inquiry.

By order dated March 10, 2011, District Superintendent of Education, Arwal, revoked the suspension of the petitioner and the petitioner was directed to be posted at Middle School, Kochahasa, Karpi, Arwal. In the said order, it was clarified that the Departmental Proceeding would continue. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner submitted his joining at Middle School, Kochahasa on March 15, 2011. Thereafter, a memo of charge was again served upon the petitioner vide order dated June 4, 2011 in Prapatra “Ka” by District Superintendent of Education, Arwal, and Block Education Officer, Kurtha, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer and Block Education Officer, Karpi was appointed as Presenting officer. At this stage, the Enquiry officer, submitted the inquiry report on April 4, 2016. 

In view of the inquiry report dated April 4, 2016, the District Programme Officer (Establishment), Arwal, passed the order of punishment dated October 1, 2016 imposing punishment of withholding of three increments with cumulative effect alongwith warning regarding not to remain absent in the school in future without prior intimation and departmental permission. In the punishment order, it was also directed that apart from subsistence allowance during suspension period, nothing will be paid to the petitioner. The petitioner had filed an appeal before the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Gaya, against the impugned order of punishment, dated October 1, 2016. The appellate authority disposed the appeal vide order, dated January 16, 2018, whereby the punishment order passed by the disciplinary authority has been upheld. 

The counsel for the petitioner argued that the Enquiry Officer without issuing a show-cause notice or affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing, proceeded to submit an inquiry report on April 4, 2016 before the District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad. The enquiry report was submitted behind his back and in complete disregard of the mandatory procedural safeguards, a copy of which was not furnished to the petitioner.

It was the specific case of the petitioner that, before passing the order of punishment, a second show-cause notice was not served upon him, nor was any opportunity of personal hearing afforded. The entire proceeding, according to him, was conducted in violation of principles of natural justice. Non-supply of inquiry report and second show cause has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. During the entire period of suspension, the petitioner was neither paid his salary nor even the subsistence allowance to which he was entitled under the law.

Assailing the appellate order, the counsel for the petitioner submits that the appellate order also vitiated on the ground of non-application of mind and has been passed in a cryptic manner. The said order is nothing but a mere reiteration of the original punishment order passed by the disciplinary authority, without any independent reasoning, analysis of the grounds urged in appeal, or consideration of the procedural lapses pointed out by the petitioner.

To sum up, his argument was that the entire departmental proceeding is vitiated on multiple counts. Firstly, the petitioner was subjected to double jeopardy as charges were framed twice for the same misconduct. Secondly, the inquiry was conducted ex-parte without issuance of any show-cause notice or providing him any opportunity to defend himself. Thirdly, the order of punishment was passed after an unexplained delay of six years, thereby, causing grave prejudice to him. Fourthly, the denial of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension is not only violative of statutory provisions but also violates the petitioner’s fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The counsel for the State submitted that during posting of the petitioner as In-charge Headmaster of Middle School, Kochahasa, Karpi Block, serious complaints were received regarding petitioner’s conduct,
including the allegation that he remained absent from the school at Kinjar without any intimation to the competent authorities and that irregularities were found in the implementation of the Mid-Day Meal Scheme under his supervision. The entire departmental proceeding starting from suspension order, submission of the inquiry report, passing of the punishment order till the passing of appellate order are strictly in accordance with law after following the due process and that there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice.

Justice Sinha noted that the record disclosed that the petitioner was served with two separate charge-memos on two different occasions. The first was issued by the then District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad, on May 6, 2010, and the second by the District Superintendent of Education, Arwal, on June 4, 2011.  Though issued on separate dates, both charge-memos substantially contain the same set of allegations. However, it appeared that the inquiry was conducted only with reference to the second charge memo issued by the District Superintendent of Education, Arwal. The Block Education Officer, Kurtha, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer and Block Education Officer, Karpi as Presenting officer. The allegations put forth against the petitioner as evident from memo of charge dated June 4, 2011 were as follows:-
(I) While functioning as the In-charge Headmaster of Middle School, Kinjhar, the petitioner remained absent from the school on 09.02.2010 without giving any prior information or obtaining permission from the competent authority.
(ii) During the period of his suspension vide Memo No. 494 dated 17.02.2010 issued by the District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad, the petitioner did not report at the Headquarters as required under the suspension order.
(iii)That the petitioner disobeyed the directions issued by the Superior officers, appointing officers as well as controlling officers.
(iv) That the petitioner did not comply with Memo No. 493 dated 14.05.2010 thereby violating the order of the superior authority.
(v) During his functioning as the Headmaster, irregularities were committed by the petitioner in the 

He observed: "From perusal of the memo of charge, it would be evident that neither the charge-memos contains the statutory particulars required under Rule 17(3) of the Bihar CCA Rules. The charge-memos does not have any list of documents or list of witnesses as required by Rule 17(3) by whom the charges were proposed to be proved. The absence of these essential ingredients goes to the very root of the proceeding, for without being apprised of the documentary and oral evidence proposed to be relied upon. In order to sustain the charges, the delinquent cannot be expected to defend himself effectively. This Court
therefore finds that the very initiation of the departmental proceeding suffers from a foundational illegality." 

Justice Sinha observed: "19. It further appears that neither the petitioner nor the respondents have placed the inquiry report on record. In the absence of the report, this Court is unable to satisfy itself as to whether the inquiry was conducted in accordance with law, whether evidence was led in support of the charges, or whether the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceeding. The stand of the petitioner is that no notice of hearing was ever served upon him by the Enquiry Officer and that he was never given an opportunity to offer his defence. It is also his specific case that the disciplinary authority did not issue any second show-cause notice along with a copy of the inquiry report prior to imposition of the punishment, which is mandatory requirement under CCA Rules. These assertions have not been specifically denied on behalf of the State, and in the absence of such, the submissions of the petitioner is to be accepted."

Justice Jitendra Kumar directs National Insurance Company to pay enhanced compensation

In Shila Devi & Anr.vs. Raja Ram Dokania & Ors. (2025), Justice Jitendra Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 25-page long judgement dated November 7, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"....the respondent No.3/Insurance Company is directed to pay the said amount of Rs.6,92,648/- to the appellants within two months, failing which the respondent No.3/Insurance Company would be liable to pay penal interest @ 12% per annum. This amount must be paid by way of account payee cheque or Bank Draft in the name of the appellant No.1, Shila Devi." The Respondent No. 3 is Divisional Manager, National Insurance Company, Bhagalpur.

The Miscellaneous Appeal was preferred against the impugned judgment/award dated August 5,  2019 passed by learned District Judge-cum-Motor Accident Claim Tribunal (M.A.C.T.), Bhagalpur in Claim Case of 2017, whereby M.A.C.T., Bhagalpur had directed the insurance company, who was the Respondent No.3 , to pay an amount of Rs. 6,33,000/- to the claimants, who were Appellants, as compensation on account of death of one Ashu Raj Kumar @ Ashu Raj @ Shrawan Kumar in a motor accident along with interest @ 8 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the petition. The payment of Rs. 50,000/-already made towards interim compensation was directed to be adjusted against the total compensation amount and the compensation was directed to be paid within sixty days from the date of the order.

The counsel for the Appellants submitted that the total compensation amount as directed by Tribunal was already received by the Appellants from the insurance company. However, being dissatisfied by the quantum of the compensation, the Appellants preferred the appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act for getting enhanced compensation. 

In the course of pendency of this appeal, the Appellant No.2, Pappu Thakur died. Hence, he was substituted by his legal heir, Champa Devi, who is his married daughter. The other legal heir Shila Devi (wife of Pappu Thakur) was already Appellant No.1. 

The factual background of this case is that on March 29, 2017, an accident took place involving a tanker resulting into death of one Ashu Raj Kumar @ Ashu Raj @ Shrawan Kumar, son of the claimants Shila Devi and Pappu Thakur. Subsequently, Rajoun P.S. Case No. 104 of 2017 was registered on 29.03.2017 for the offences punishable under Section 279, 337, 338, 304A IPC against the driver and the owner of the aforesaid tanker. As per further averment in the claim petition, the deceased Ashu Raj Kumar @ Ashu Raj @ Shrawan Kumar was traveling in an auto-rickshaw which was dashed by the said tanker on account of rash and negligent driving. The deceased is alleged to be 19 years of age at the time of death and he was unmarried and working as a private tutor earning Rs. 10,000/- per month. It was further claimed that the offending tanker was insured with National Insurance Company Limited at the relevant time of accident vide the policy no.171000/31/16/6300002116 effective from 10.07.2016 to 09.07.2017 covering the date of accident on 29.03.2017. 

The Appellants, Shila Devi and Pappu Thakur filed the claim case no. 98 of 2017 on 11.05.2017 for compensation of Rs. 16,16,000/- impleading the driver, owner of the offending vehicle and the insurance company. On notice, all the three Opposite Parties appeared, but the Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2, who were owner and driver of the offending vehicle respectively, did not file any written statement. However, the insurance company, who was the Opposite Party No.3 before the Tribunal, filed its written statement. However, no application under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act was filed by the insurance company seeking permission to contest the claim petition.

On the basis of the pleadings of the Claimants and the Insurance Company, the following six issues were
framed:
“(i) Whether the claim case is maintainable? 
(ii) Whether the claimants have valid cause of action for the present claim case?
(iii) Whether the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving by the driver of the offending vehicle?
(iv)Whether the claimants are entitled to get compensation as prayed for?
(v). Whether the offending vehicle was insured at the time of alleged incident?
(vi) Whether the driver has valid license at the time of accident?”

The Judgement recorded that nobody was present on behalf of the Respondent No.3, insurance company, despite valid service of notice.

The counsel for the Appellants submitted that he had no dispute with the finding by the Tribunal regarding the income of the deceased @ Rs. 200/- per day. However, no addition to income has been made towards future prospect. He also submitted that Tribunal has applied multiplier of only 16, whereas it should have been 18 and hence, the loss of dependency has been determined on the lower side. Even the quantum of compensation under the conventional heads has been granted on the lower side. Hence, the Appellants could not get just compensation.

The counsel for the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 contested the submission of counsel for the appellants submitting that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment/award and the appellants are not entitled to get any higher quantum of compensation. He also submitted that the Respondent Nos. 1 and
2, being owner and driver of the vehicle and the vehicle being insured with Respondent No. 3/Insurance Company, were not liable to pay any compensation to the appellants. 

Justice Kumar opined that the Tribunal had rightly directed the Respondent No. 3/Insurance Company to pay the awarded amount of compensation to the appellants and which was already paid to the appellants. 
But nobody was present on behalf of the Respondent No. 3/Insurance Company, despite valid service of
notice.

The High Court inferred that the following points arose for determination:-
(i) Whether there should be any addition to the income of the deceased towards future prospect while calculating the loss of dependency?
(ii) What should be the appropriate multiplier in the case on hand ?
(iii) Whether the appellants are entitled to get higher quantum of compensation under conventional heads?
(iv) What should be the quantum of just compensation ?

The Court dealt with the law regarding just compensation. It recollected Supreme Court's landmark judgment in Sarla Verma vs. DTC, (2009) 2 SCC 770 with regard to assessment of compensation in cases of death. In this judgment, the Court has laid down principles to provide uniformity and consistency in awarding compensation. The principles as laid down in Sarla Verma Case (supra) were subsequently modified and improved by the Court in subsequent judgments which are as follows:
(i) Reshma Kumari vs. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65
(ii) Royal Sundram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Mandala Yadagari Goud, (2019) 5 SCC 554
(iii) National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680
(iv) Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nanu Ram, (2018) 18 SCC 130 

These landmark judgments have been referred the Court's decision in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Satinder Kaur, (2021) 11 SCC 780 providing complete prevailing law regarding assessment of compensation in cases of death arising out of Motor Vehicle Accident. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment read as follows:
“Relevant principles for assessment of compensation in cases of death as evolved by judicial dicta.
11. The criteria which are to be taken into consideration for assessing compensation in the case of death are : (i) the age of the deceased at the time of his death; (ii) the number of dependants left behind by the
deceased; and (iii) the income of the deceased at the time of his death.

In Sarla Verma vs. DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121 this Court held that to arrive at the loss of dependency, the Tribunal ought to take into consideration three factors: (SCC p. 132, para 18)
(i) additions/deductions to be made for arriving at the income;
(ii) the deduction to be made towards the personal living expenses of the deceased; and
(iii) the multiplier to be applied with reference to the age of the deceased.

13. In order to provide uniformity and consistency in awarding compensation, the following steps are required to be followed : Sarla Verma case (2009) 6 SCC 121
“Step 1 (Ascertaining the multiplicand) 
The income of the deceased per annum should be determined. Out of the said income a deduction should be made in regard to the amount which the deceased would have spent on himself by way of personal and living expenses. The balance, which is considered to be the contribution to the dependant family, constitutes the multiplicand.
Step 2 (Ascertaining the multiplier)
Having regard to the age of the deceased and period of active career, the appropriate multiplier should be
selected. This does not mean ascertaining the number of years he would have lived or worked but for the accident. Having regard to several imponderables in life and economic factors, a Table of multipliers with reference to the age has been identified by this Court. The multiplier should be chosen from the said Table with reference to the age of the deceased.
Step 3 (Actual calculation)
The annual contribution to the family (multiplicand) when multiplied by such multiplier gives the “loss of
dependency” to the family. Thereafter, a conventional amount in the range of Rs 5000 to Rs 10,000 may be added as loss of estate. Where the deceased is survived by his widow, another conventional amount in the range of 5000 to 10,000 should be added under the head of loss of consortium. But no amount is to be awarded under the head of pain, suffering or hardship caused to the legal heirs of the deceased. The funeral expenses, cost of transportation of the body (if incurred) and cost of any medical treatment of the
deceased before death (if incurred) should also added.”
(a) Deduction for personal and living expenses
14. The personal and living expenses of the deceased should be deducted from the income, to arrive at the
contribution to the family. In Sarla Verma (2009) 6 SCC 121, this Court took the view that it was necessary to standardise the deductions to be made under the head personal and living expenses of the deceased. Accordingly, it was held that:
14.1. Where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses should be 1/3rd if the number of dependant family members is two to three.
14.2. 1/4th if the number of dependant family members is four to six.
14.3. 1/5th if the number of dependant family members exceeds six.
14.4. If the deceased was a bachelor, and the claim was filed by the parents, the deduction would normally be 50% as personal and living expenses of the bachelor. Subject to evidence to the contrary, the father was likely to have his own income, and would not be considered to be a dependant. Hence, the mother alone will be considered to be a dependant. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters of the deceased bachelor would not be considered to be dependants, because they would usually either be independent and earning, or married, or dependant on the father. Thus, even if the deceased was survived by parents and siblings, only the mother would be considered to be a dependant. The deduction towards personal expenses of a bachelor would be 50%, and 50% would be the contribution to the family.
14.5. However, in a case where the family of the bachelor was large and dependant on the income of the deceased, as in a case where he had a widowed mother, and a large number of younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and living expenses could be restricted to 1/3rd, and contribution to the family be taken as 2/3rd.

Justice Kumar concluded: "29. Hence, total compensation payable to the Claimants/Appellants would work out to be Rs.13,25,648/-(12,15,648+15,000+80,000+15,000). As per the pleading of the parties, the claimants/appellants have already received Rs.6,33,000/-. Hence, the appellants are entitled to get balance
amount of Rs.6,92,648/- (13,25,648-6,33,000). 30. Hence, the respondent No.3/Insurance Company is directed to pay the said amount of Rs.6,92,648/- to the appellants within two months, failing which the respondent No.3/Insurance Company would be liable to pay penal interest @ 12% per annum. This amount must be paid by way of account payee cheque or Bank Draft in the name of the appellant No.1, Shila Devi."