Why is CNLU using Google Form Link ignoring cyber security, not disclosig names of outsourcing agencies

Chanakya National Law University (CNLU), Patna published an advertisement dated May 28, 2025 seeking applications for Professor of Practice (on 3 Year Contract)–Practice Track in the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Investigation domain. The eligibility criteria for this position states "Professionals such as CISOs, ACISOs, CTOs, Director–IT with at least a Master’s Degree in Computer Science, Information Technology, Computer Applications or equivalent professional qualification from a reputed national or international institution, or a related field can be considered for the position of Professor of Practice." 

CNLU's advertisement states that it can dispense with the requirement of Ph.D. if the candidate can offset it by the demonstrated domain knowledge obtained from deep experience in the field of designing and teaching cyber security courses. This post requires a minimum 15 years of managerial or professional experience out of which at least 5 years in designing, developing and delivering Masters/Diploma Cyber Security courses to LEAs, PSUs, Govt Departments, IT Industry is mandatory. The advertisement reads:"Globally recognised Cyber Security certifications are must like CISSP/CISM/CISA." 

CNLU has asked the interested candidates to upload their filled-in scanned application form with relevant annexures through the following Google Form Link, latest by 10th June, 2025. https://forms.gle/MSyewgqQBBHRPJrn8 

It informs that the 1."selected candidate is expected to teach in different programmes as per the norms of the CNLU Patna" 

2. to promote industry-CNLU Patna linkages through consulting assignments/MDPs and 

3. to be involved in placements and academic activities.

A notice of placement dated June 7, 2025 has been published on the website of Chanakya National Law University (CNLU), Patna informing the law graduates that the Board of Revenue, Government of Bihar is looking for law experts. The Board "wants to fill-in some Law Experts position on contractual basis, through outsourcing agencies, who will be placed in the various districts of Bihar. They will be required to work full-time in the said department for the purposes of auction, preparing SOP in the field of land-related matters etc. The selected candidates will be paid Rs. 32,000/- in hand per month by the agency." In the interest of transparency CNLU must disclose the credentials of the outsourcing agencies in question. Why are these agencies afraid of sun-light? Isn't sun-light the best disinfectant? 

The notice reads:"All such students who are interested in joining the said position are requested to fill in their details through the following Google Form Link latest by Tuesday, the 10th June, 2025: 

https://forms.gle/ntBRb49CA3AGFBZU6 

The applicants will be shortlisted on the basis of their UG/PG marks and it would be sent to the outsourcing agencies for further course of action. The tentative number of vacancies may be around 40 to 50." The notice clarifies that "CNLU is just a facilitator and is NOT involved in the selection process."

The advertisement and the notice of placement raise three questions:  

Is CNLU aware that use Google Form Link which keeps a "permanent record" of the applicants, compromises the cyber security of the applicants? Does it approve of such permanent record keeping?

It can be a tool for phishing or collecting sensitive information. Office of Information Security, Washington University in St. Louis has issued an alert entitled: Phishing Alert: Credential Phishing via Google Form. Its advice reads:"You should never enter your credentials into a Google Form."

Google Form is designed to share and collect information. The Google Form's trusted status provides advantages to phishers. It enables malicious link delivery. It creates illusion of cyber security because of its trusted domain. It gets deemed as plausible form. As a consequence, forms linked from phishing emails seeking additional information get blindly trusted. Many shared document repositories are publicly available, it enables cyber criminals to insert phishing documents into legitimate corporate drives. These threats are relevant for Google Doc and Google Drive as well.  

Why is CNLU not disclosing names of outsourcing agencies hired by the Board of Revenue, Government of Bihar? 

Benefit of doubt, if any, must be given to accused: Patna High Court

The benefit of doubt, if any, be given to the accused, the principles which were laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Hanumant Govind Nargundkar vs. State of M.P. reported in (1952) 2 SCC 71. Recalling this decision, Patna High Court's Division Bench led by Justice V.M. Pancholi set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated September 4, 2014 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, III, Khagaria in Sessions Trial of 2010 arising out of a case of 2010. The appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.10,000. The accused/appellant was acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the High Court's judgement dated August 25, 2023 in Amarnath Swarnkar vs. The State of Bihar (2023) was authored by Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha. 

The High Court was took a guidance from Supreme Court's decision in Sarad Vridhi Chandra Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 1984 (4) SCC 116, wherein the principles of “Panchsheel” was laid down, which must require to be established in a case based upon circumstantial evidence, as of present, which is as under:-
152. "It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground far a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."

153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (') where the following observations were made: "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 

154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence."

Right to Privacy of Adolescents

In RE: Right to Privacy of Adolescents (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan) observed:"After having read the reports and having interacted with the Committee as well as the victim, we are of the view that if we send the accused to jail, the worst sufferer will be the victim herself. As compared to the situation in 2018, she is better placed today. Now she is comfortable with her small family. She along with the accused, is concentrating on their daughter and the want to ensure that she gets quality education. At the same time, as recorded in the final report, the victim is attending school and is desperate to complete her school education. Though the State has offered to enroll her in some vocational course, she is keen on completing her education, at least up to graduation."

The Criminal Appeal was preferred by the State of West Bengal against the judgment and order dated October 18, 2023, passed ny a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. In Suo Motu Writ Petition, Supreme Court’s attention was drawn to certain objectionable observations made in the High Court's judgement. The  former court took note of the systemic failure of the State to protect the victim, resulting in her fate and wellbeing being ultimately tied up with that of the accused. Accordingly, in this judgement, we are dealing with the issue of sentencing the accused arising out of the criminal appeal and the

In the Suo Motu Writ Petition, the Court dealt with are the issue of rehabilitation of the victim and her child. The Suo Motu writ petition was initiated based on the directions issued by the  Chief Justice of India for challenging the impugned judgment. The State Government had preferred the criminal appeal to challenge the order of acquittal.

The Court considered three issues. The first issue is of sentencing the accused. The second issue is about the rehabilitation of the victim and her child. The third issue is a wider issue about adopting measures for adolescent wellbeing and child protection which goes to the root cause of the problem in our changing society. 

The Court relied on the reports of the Court appointed  3-member Committee of Experts. In its preliminary report, it recorded "the victim’s struggles while tackling the legal system for securing the release of the accused." The final report provided details of all the interviews conducted by the Committee, including those off the victim, the accused, their respective families, teachers and management personnel at the school of the victim, investigating police officers, personnel at the welfare home—Sanlaap Sneha Home, and other relevant stakeholders. It highlighted the inadequate, inefficient implementation of the POCSO Act. It emphasized the “collective failure of the systems that are there to protect a girl child”. It stated that the loopholes were glaring, and that the elopement, the living in/marriage of the victim, the birth of a child—all were preventable. 

The final report had specifically highlighted the failure of the Child Protection Committees at the village level; the inadequate implementation of the State of West Bengal’s “Kanyashree Prakalpa Scheme”;the inaction of the designated Child Welfare Officer at the local police station;lack of provision of free legal aid; lack of sufficient and effective counsellors from both genders in schools and even welfare homes;high frequency of elopements by children in class 8 and above;stigmatisation of girls in similar situations as the adolescent victim in the present case; irregularities and delays in the investigation of such crimes;inadequate accessibility to judicial fora and corruption and financial exploitation by touts, members of the Bar etc.; and lack of awareness and sensitisation among family, and public officials in respect of the POCSO Act and the sexual, emotional, and mental well-being of children.

The final report concluded that "in this particular case, it was not the legal crime which caused trauma on the victim, rather it was the legal battle which ensued consequent to the crime that is taking a toll on the victim."

The final report also concluded that though the incident was seen as a crime in law, the victim did not accept it as one. The Committee records that it was not the legal crime that caused any trauma to the victim, but rather, it was the consequences that followed, which took a toll on her. What she had to face as a consequence was the police, the legal system and the constant battle to save the accused from punishment. At the same time, she took care of her daughter to the best of her abilities, notwithstanding the huge financial burden she carried." 

The final conclusion in the report is an eye opener. It reads:

“In conclusion, a heinous crime causes trauma in the psyche of the victim. In this case, the law saw it as a crime, the victim did not. Hence, the legal crime did not cause any trauma on this particular victim. It was the consequences thereafter – the police personnel, the legal system, the battle to save her husband and do the best for her daughter while having a financial burden, which is taking its toll on her. A young woman, who refuses to be called a “Victim”, fighting for her husband needs all the support that can be made available. It would be in the best interest of the child if the family structure can be restored.”

The judgment noted: "Though the victim did not treat the incident as a heinous crime, she suffered because of it. This was because at an earlier stage, the victim could not make an informed choice due to the shortcomings of our society, our legal system and her family. In fact, she did not get any opportunity to make informed choice. The society judged her, the legal system failed her, and her own family abandoned her. Now, she is at a stage where she is desperate to save her husband. Now, she is emotionally committed to the accused and has become very possessive of her small family."

The Special Judge appointed under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) had convicted the accused for the offences punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. For the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, the accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for twenty years and pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-. For the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC, thea accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years and five years respectively and was also ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-and Rs.5,000/- respectively. Though the Special Judge under the POCSO Act came to the conclusion that the accused was guilty of the offences punishable under clause (n) of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of Section 376 of the IPC, in view of the sentence imposed for the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, no separate punishment was imposed. The accused preferred Criminal Appeal (DB) 14 of 2023 before the Calcutta High Court against the conviction. The High Court by the Impugned Judgement dated October 18, 2023 purported to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to set aside the conviction of the accused for the aforesaid offences. 

By a detailed judgement dated August 20, 2024, the Supreme Court had set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restored the verdict of the Special Court to the extent of the conviction of the accused for the offences punishable under clause (n) of sub-section 2 and sub-section (3) of Section 376 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. This Court confirmed the acquittal of the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC. However, the sentencing was postponed for the reasons recorded in the judgment. In paragraph 2 of the said judgment, the basic facts of the case have been mentioned and in paragraph 3, the findings recorded by the High Court have been mentioned. 

The paragraphs 2 to 5 of the High Court's judgment reads: “2. The victim girl was fourteen years old at the time of the incident. The victim’s mother lodged a First Information Report (FIR) on 29th May 2018. The victim’s mother stated in her complaint that the victim, who was her minor daughter, escaped from her home at 5:30 p.m. on 20th May 2018 without informing anyone. On inquiry, it was found that the accused enticed her to leave her house. The accused did so with the help of his two sisters. The victim’s mother repeatedly visited the house of the accused and requested him to facilitate the return of her daughter. However, the victim did not come back. A female child was born to the victim. Admittedly, the accused is the biological father of the child. There was a gross delay in the investigation, and the accused was arrested on 19th December 2021. The chargesheet was filed on 27th January 2022 against the accused for the offences for which he was convicted. In addition, the accused was charged with the offence punishable under Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. The prosecution examined seven witnesses. We may note here that as the learned Special Judge under the POCSO Act found that there was no evidence of marriage between the victim and the accused, the charge under Section 9 of the 2006 Act was held as not substantiated."

Significantly, the High Court noted that the mother of the victim had disowned her and therefore, the victim was continuously residing with the accused along with their minor child.

The Supreme Court observed: "In law, we have no option but to sentence the accused and send him to jail for undergoing the minimum punishment prescribed by the Statute. However, in this case, the society, the family of the victim and the legal system have done enough injustice to the victim. She has been subjected to enough trauma and agony. We do not want to add to the injustice done to the victim by sending her husband to jail. We as Judges, cannot shut our eyes to these harsh realities. Now, at this stage, in order to do real justice to the victim, the only option left before us is to ensure that the accused is not separated from the victim. The State and the society must ensure that the family is rehabilitated till the family settles down in all respects."

It opined:"Ultimately, this Court is bestowed with extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 for the sole a position to do substantial justice in its truest sense. In the context of this situation, sadly, true justice lies in not sentencing the accused to undergo imprisonment. This case is not going to be a precedent and should not be a precedent. This case is an illustration of the complete failure of our society and our legal system. All that the system can do for the victim now, is to help her fulfil her desire of completing her education, settling down in life, providing a better education to her daughter and ensuring overall better living conditions for her family. This year we have completed 75 years of the Constitution on 26th January. The Constitution contemplates the State to be a welfare state. The Constitution guaranteed social and economic justice to all the citizens. In this case, there is a failure to provide both social and economic justice to the victim. The facts of the case indicate failure of the concept of welfare state. To remedy the situation in this case, it is the obligation of the State Government to act as the true guardian of the victim and her child and ensure that they settle down in life and lead a happy, healthy and constructive life ahead."

The 44-page long judgement reads: "we pass the following order: a) We exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and hold that though the accused stands convicted, he will not undergo sentence for the reasons stated earlier; b)We direct the State to take following measures: i) To act as a true guardian of the victim and her child; ii) To provide a better shelter to the victim and her family within a period of few months from today; iii) To bear the entire expenditure of the education of the victim till Xth standard examination and if she desires to take up education for a degree course, till the completion of degree course. After she passes her Xth standard examination, the we pass the following order: a) We exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and hold that though the accused stands convicted, he will not undergo sentence for the reasons stated earlier;

b) We direct the State to take following measures:

i) To act as a true guardian of the victim and her child;

ii) To provide a better shelter to the victim and her family within a period of few months from today;

iii) To bear the entire expenditure of the education of the victim till Xth standard examination and if she desires to take up education for a degree course, till the completion of degree course. After she passes her Xth standard examination, the State can offer her vocational training, obviously, at the cost of the State;

iv) To bear the entire expenditure of the education of the child up to Xth standard and ensuring that she is educated in a very good school in the vicinity of the place of residence of the victim; and

v) To endeavour to take the assistance of NGOs or public-spirited citizens for the purpose of securing the debts incurred by the victim as a one-time measure." 

Justice Vipul Pancholi to take over as Patna High Court Chief Justice, dismissed State Government Appeals against acquittal of 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2024

Justice Vipul M. Pancholi is all set to take charge as Chief Justice of Patna High Court after Supreme Court Collegium recommended his appointment. He was transferred from Gujarat High Court to Patna High Court and took oath as Judge, Patna High Court on July 24, 2023. Justice Pancholi did his Bachelor of Science (Electronics) from St. Xavier's College, Ahmedabad, Gujarat University and Master of Law in Commercial Group from Sir L.A. Shah Law College, Ahmedabad, Gujarat University. He entered the Bar in September 1991 and started practice as an advocate in the High Court of Gujarat. He was appointed as Assistant Government Pleader and Additional Public Prosecutor, High Court of Gujarat and served as such for seven years till March 2006. He was Honorary Joint Editor of Law Reporter-The Gujarat Law Herald for two years. He worked as visiting faculty at Sir L.A. Shah Law College, Ahmedabad from December 1993 for twenty one years. As an Advocate, he conducted important cases in various branches of law, viz. criminal law, civil law, property law, service law, family law, banking law and other laws.  He was elevated as Additional Judge, Gujarat High Court on October 1, 2014 and confirmed as permanent Judge on June 10, 2016. He was born on May 28,1968 at Ahmedabad.

On the first day at the Patna High Court he was part of the Division Bench headed by Justice Ashutosh Kumar which pronounced their 19-page long judgement in Rupchand Kewat vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2023) wherein it set aside the judgement and order of the  2nd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hilsa at Nalanda, which had convicted the appellants under Section 304(B)/34 and 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code and had sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and rigorous imprisonment for 7 years for the offences under Sections 304(B) and 201/34 of the I.P.C. respectively along with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The judgement was authored by Justice Kumar.  

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his first judgement four days after joining the Patna High Court in Shankar Yadav & Ors. vs. The State Of Bihar (2023) and Jagdeo Yadav  vs. The State Of Bihar (2023) wherein he upheld the judgment and order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Rosera, Samastipur in a Sessions Trial in a case whose arose in 2012. The Trial Court had convicted the appellants/accused person from Muzaffarpur for the offences punishable under Sections-302 read with 149, 148 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code and the appellants/accused are sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.10,000/-for the offences punishable under Sections-302/149 of the Indian Penal Code. In his 13-page long judgement dated July 28, 2023, Justice Pancholi observed that the Trial Court did not commit any error while passing the impugned order.  

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, he authored his second 26-page long judgement dated August 2, 2023 in Kamakhya Giri vs. The State of Bihar (2023), wherein the judgment of conviction and order of sentence of March 2019 by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (NDPS) Act, Aurangabad was upheld. It arose out of a case from 2016, whereby all the appellants were convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 8-20 (b) ii (C) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 14 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,50,000/- each and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for six months each.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, he authored his third 25-page long judgement dated August 18, 2023 in Mani Kant Singh@ Tunna Singh vs The State of Bihar (2023) wherein the judgment of conviction and order of January, 2014 by Additional Sessions Judge-I, Sitamarhi in a Session Trial of 2013 in a case which arose in 2011 was set aside. The appellant, namely, Mani Kant Singh @ Tunna Singh was acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the trial court. He felt a persuaded by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bahal Singh Vs. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1976 SC 2032. The Supreme Court had noted that the Trial Cpurt hd grave doubts about the presence of two prosecution witnesses at the time and place of occurrence. It observed: "If by coincidence or chance a person happens to be at the place of occurrence at the time it is taking place, he is called a chance witness. And if such a person happens to be a relative or friend of the victim or inimically disposed towards the accused then his being a chance witness is viewed with suspicion. Such a piece of evidence is not necessarily incredible or unbelievable but does require cautious and close scrutiny." It had underlined that "There was not any compelling or sufficient reason for the High Court to differ from the evaluation of the evidence of the two chance witnesses. It may well be as remarked by the High Court that the respondent was also their collateral but they appeared to be partisan witnesses on the side of the prosecution and hence their testimony was viewed with suspicion by the trial Judge.” The appellants' counsel also relied upon the decisions the Supreme Court in the case of Virendra Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 2022 SC 3373, Raja Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 2005 (5) SCC 272, Assoo Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2011 (14) SCC 448 and Javed Masood and Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 2010 SC 979.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, he authored his fourth 35-page judgement dated August 22, 2023 in Brahmdeo Sahni vs.The State of Bihar (2023) wherein the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence March 2015 by Additional District and Sessions Judge-7, Begusarai in connection with Session Trial of 2009 arising out of a case  of 2009 was set aside. The appellants, namely, Brahmdeo Sahni in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.521 of 2015 and Parmanand Sah in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.418 of 2015 were acquitted of the charges levelled against them by the trial court for the offences punishable under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. He directed Patna High Court Legal Services Committee to pay Rs.5,000/ to Ms. Surya Nilambari, the Amicus Curiae for the assistance she rendered to the Court.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his fifth 18-page long judgement dated August 22, 2023 in Bhimal Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2023), wherein he quashed and set aside the judgment of conviction from May 2015 and order of sentence by 3rd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Barh, Patna in a Session Trial of 2006 in a case which arose in 2001 are quashed and set aside. The appellant was acquitted of the charges levelled against him for the offence punishable with rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and a fine of Rs. 10,000 only for offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act. The Court observed, "Fine, if any paid by the appellant, be returned to him immediately."

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 6th 25-page long judgement dated August 24, 2023 in Bhantu Rai @ Mantu Rai vs. The State of Bihar (2023) through the Informant Nitesh Kumar. He acquitted Bhantu Rai @ Mantu Rai of the charges levelled against him in the judgment of March 2015 by Additional District and Sessions Judge-1st, Sitamarhi in a Sessions Trial of 2013 whereby the appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 148 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 27 of Arms Act, arising out of a case of 2012. 

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 7th 23-page long judgement dated August 28, 2023 in Sudistha Singh @ Sudishtha Singh vs.The State of Bihar (2023), wherein he set aside the judgment of conviction dated March 30, 2016 by 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Sitamarhi in Session Trial of 2013 arising out of a case of 2011. The appellant, namely, Sudistha Singh @ Sudishtha Singh acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the learned trial court. He was directed to be released forthwith.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 8th 16-page long judgement dated August 29, 2023 in Sanjay Kumar Singh vs.The State of Bihar (2023), wherein the judgement reads: "we are of the view that the prosecution has proved the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant has committed the offence punishable under Section 302 of the I.P.C. and the case of the appellant does not fall under Exception 4 of Section 300 of the I.P.C. and, therefore, he cannot be convicted under Section 304 Part-II of the I.P.C. as alternatively contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. Thus, no error is committed by Learned Trial Court while passing impugned order." The Additional Sessions Judge - IV, Saran, Chapra convicted appellant by judgement dated May 22, 2015 and had passed order of sentence dated May 28 May, 2015 in Sessions Trial of 2014 which arose out of a case of 2013. The Trial Court had convicted the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 302 of I.P.C. and under Section 27(3) of the Indian Arms Act, 1959. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of life and a fine of Rs. 15,000/- under Section 302 of the I.P.C. and 5 years R.I. under Section 27(1) of the Arms Act and a fine of Rs. 5,000/. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 9th 23-page long judgement dated August 29, 2023 in Bajrang Shankar vs.The National Investigation Agency, Patna (2023), wherein in the penultimate paragraph, he concluded:"A fortiori, we deem it proper to reverse the order passed by the High Court granting bail to the respondent. Instead, we agree with the conclusion recorded by the Designated Court that in the facts of the present case, the respondent is not entitled to grant of bail in connection with the stated offences, particularly those falling under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act....the impugned judgment and order [Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali v. NIA, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11185] is set aside and, instead, the order passed by the Designated Court rejecting the application for grant of bail made by the respondent herein, is affirmed....we are of the view that the appellant is not entitled to be released on bail". 

Notably, Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Pancholi and Chandra Shekhar Jha set aside the judgement dated September 13, 2018 passed by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court comprising Justices Dr. S. Muralidhar and Vinod Goel which had concluded: "this Court holds, for the limited purposes of the present appeal, that there are no reasonable grounds to form an opinion at this stage that the accusations against the Appellant under the UAPA are prima facie true. The Court is also not satisfied at this stage that there is prima facie material to show the involvement of the Appellant in any criminal conspiracy with the other accused justifying the accusations for the offences under Section 120-B IPC or Section 121, 121-A, 124-A IPC. The duty of the Court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities....The impugned order dated 8th June, 2018 of the trial Court is accordingly set aside. The Appellant is directed to be released on bail..."

Significantly, the Delhi High Court judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court. The Patna High Court's Division quoted para 56 of the Supreme Court judgment which reversed the Delhi High Court's verdict. 

Patna High Court's Division Bench had passed the judgement after hearing the appellant who had filed a bail application in the pending trial in a Special Case of 2019 before the Special Judge, NIA Act, Patna which was dismissed vide order dated September 28, 2021 in the matter of F.I.R. of 2018 at Muffasil Police Station in the District of Munger, under Sections-121, 379, 414 and 120B/34 of Indian Penal Code, Sections-25(1A), 25(1AA), 25(1-B)(a) and Sections- 26 and 35 of the Arms Act read with Section-39 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (U.A.P.A.) relating to recovery of 3 A.K.-47 weapons and arrest of two persons who were involved in supply of A.K.-47 weapons to Maoists and other criminals in various States from Army Armory, Jabalpur, Bhopal. All together 26 persons were named in the category of accused in the F.I.R. The appellant was not named in the F.I.R but during course of investigation, he was implicated and arrested and he has been in custody since January 6, 2019. His counsel had relied on decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. K. Najeeb, reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713, particularly para-17 and 18 of the judgment and para 14 of the decision in Mohd Muslim @ Hussain Vs. State (NCT OF DELHI) in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No(s). 915 of 2023. 

In Bajrang Shankar vs.The National Investigation Agency, Patna, Additional Solicitor General had relied upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of National Investigation Agency Vs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, reported in (2019) 5 SCC 1 and sought dismissal of the appeal.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 10th 16-page long judgement dated August 30, 2023 in Latyain Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2023) concluded:'we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the Trial Court has committed an error while passing the order of conviction against the appellants." He set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated June 22, 2016 and order of sentence dated June 23, 2016 passed by 2nd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Jamui in connection with Sessions Trial which arose out of case of 2012. The appellants, namely, Latyain Yadav in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.720 of 2016 and Jagdeo Yadav in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1024 of 2016 were acquitted by the High Court of the charges levelled against them by the trial court. Both were convicted and sentenced to undergo R.I. for life and fine of Rs.10,000/- each for the offences punishable under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 11th 19-page long judgement dated August 31, 2023 in Kisto Paswan  vs. The State of Bihar (2023) concluded:"we are of the view that the Trial Court has committed an error while recording the order of conviction against the present appellant and, therefore, the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside." The impugned judgment of conviction dated March 6, 2017 and order of sentence dated March 8, 2017 for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code by Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court-I, Nalanda at Bihar Sharif in Session Trial Case of 2006/649 of 2007/434 of 2008 which arose out of 2005 case was quashed and set aside. 

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 12th 30-page long judgement dated September 4, 2023 in Ashok Kumar Singh @ Ashok Chaudhary vs. The State of Bihar (2023) drawing on Supreme Court's decision in Shailendra Rajdev Pasvan & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors, reported in (2020) 14 SCC 750.  In para 17, the Supreme Court observed:“It is well settled by now that in a case based on circumstantial evidence the courts ought to have a conscientious approach and conviction ought to be recorded only in case all the links of the chain are complete pointing to the guilt of the accused. Each link unless connected together to form a chain may suggest suspicion but the same in itself cannot take place of proof and will not be sufficient to convict the accused.”

Justice Pancholi observed in the penultimate paragraph:"Thus, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that each link, unless connected together to form a chain, may suggest suspicion but the same in itself cannot take place of proof and will not be sufficient to convict the accused. It is further revealed from the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
aforesaid decisions that the circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who had committed the crime. It is a primary principle that the accused “must be” and not merely “may be” guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. The prosecution must stand or fall on its own legs and it cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence. Keeping in view the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, if the evidence of the prosecution as discussed hereinabove is examined, it is revealed that the prosecution has failed to prove the chain from which it can be established that the present appellant/accused only committed the alleged offense and none else."  

The Division Bench of the High Court quashed and set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated April 9, 2015 and order of sentence dated April 16, 2015 by Ad0hoc Additional Sessions Judge-II, Begusarai in a Sessions Trial of 1993 which arose out of a case of 1993. The appellant was acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the trial court. He was directed to be released from jail forthwith. The trial court had convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 364, 302 and 34 of the IPC.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 13th 33-page long judgement dated September 5, 2023 in Chandan Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2023), wherein he quashed and set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated August 21, 2019 and order of sentence dated August 26, 2019 by 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge POCSO Act & SC/ST Act, Bhojpur, Ara in a POCSO case of 2018 which arose out of Bihia Police Station case of 2018. The appellants, namely, Chandan Singh in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1142 of 2019, Ramjee Singh in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1168 of 2019 and Yuvraj Singh in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1169 of 2019 were acquitted of the charges levelled against them by the learned Trial Court. They were directed to be released from jail forthwith." The trial court had convicted the appellants for the offences punishable under Section 376-D of the IPC, under Section 6 of the  Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act and under Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.  

The counsel of the appellants had relied upon the decisions rendered by thee Supreme Court in the cases of (i) Jarnail Singh vs. State of Haryana, reported in 2013 Cr.L.J. 3976, (ii) Rajak Mohammad vs. State of H.P. reported in (2018) 9 SCC 248, (iii) Sunil vs. State of Haryana reported in AIR 2010 SC 392 (iv) State of M.P. vs. Munna @ Shambhoo Nath reported in (2016) 1 SCC 696 and the decision rendered by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Anil Kumar and Anr. vs. State of Bihar reported in 2023 (4) BLJ 562 Criminal Appeal (DB) No.417 of 2020.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 14th 27-page long judgement dated September 14, 2023 in Manoj Bhuiyan vs. The State of Bihar (2023), wherein  he concluded that "there is no eye-witness to the incident in question and the case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence." He heard the appeal against the judgment of conviction dated June 1, 2013 and order of sentence dated June 7, 2013, by Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge-V, Aurangabad (Bihar) in Sessions Trial of 2011 which arose out of a P.S. case of 2011, whereby the concerned Trial Court had convicted the sole appellant for the offences punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and had sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. Amicus Curiae for the appellant relied the decisions by the Supreme Court in the cases of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1622, Anjan Kumar Sarma Vs. State of Assam SCC 359, Ravi vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2018) 16 SCC 102 and Reena Hazarika vs. State of Assam, reported in (2019) 3 SCC 289.

Justice Pancholi observed: "It may be interesting to note that as regards the mode of proof in a criminal case depending on circumstantial evidence, in the absence of a corpus delicti, the statement of law as to proof of the same was laid down by Gresson, J. (and concurred by 3 more Judges) in The King v. Horry, (1952) NZLR 111, thus: “Before he can be convicted, the fact of death should be proved by such circumstances as render the commission of the crime morally certain and leave no ground for reasonable doubt: the circumstantial evidence should be so cogent and compelling as to convince a jury that upon no rational hypothesis other than murder can the facts be accounted for.” 155. Lord Goddard slightly modified the expression ‘morally certain’ by ‘such circumstances as render the commission of the crime certain’. This indicates the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that a case can be said to be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence and no person can be convicted on pure moral conviction."

Manoj Bhuiyan, the appellant was arrested on September 28, 2011 and he was in jail since almost approximately 12 years. He quashsd and set aside the impugned judgment of conviction by Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge-V, Aurangabad (Bihar). The appellant, namely, Manoj Bhuiyan was  acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the trial court. He was directed to be released forthwith. He directed Patna High Court Legal Services Committee to pay Rs.5,000 to Smiti Bharti, Amicus Curiae for the assistance to the Court.   

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 15th 41-page long judgement dated September 18, 2023 in Ranjeet Thakur @ Ranjeet Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2023), wherein he observed:"we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the complete chain and even the prosecution has also failed to prove by leading cogent evidence that the appellant-accused was lastly seen in the company of the deceased. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, we are of the view that the appellant-accused is required to be acquitted." He quahed and set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated July 16, 2015 by 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur in a Sessions Trial of 2013, which arose out of a P.S. Case of 2013, The Trial Court had convicted the sole appellant Ranjeet Thakur @ Ranjeet Kumar for the offences punishable under Sections- 376, 302, 120B of the IPC and had sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years under Section-376 of the I.P.C. and fine of Rs.10,000/-and in default of payment of fine, further to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. He had been further convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life till his death and fine of Rs.10,000.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 16th 24-page long judgement dated September 19, 2023 in Param Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2023), wherein drew on Patna High Court's decision in Shikha Kumari vs. State of Bihar reported in 2020 SCC OnLine Pat 362 to observe: "it is clear that writ of habeas corpus would not be maintainable if the detention in custody is as per the judicial orders passed by Judicial Magistrate or a Court of competent jurisdiction. Consequently, an order of remand passed by Judicial Magistrate having competent jurisdiction cannot be assailed or set aside in a writ of habeas corpus."

He also observed:"It is further held by the Full Bench (of the High Court) that an illegal or irregular exercise of jurisdiction by Magistrate passing an order of remand can be cured by way of challenging the legality, validity and correctness of the order by filing appropriate proceeding before the competent revisional or appellate Court under the statutory provision of law and such
type of order cannot be reviewed in a petition seeking the writ of habeas corpus. Further, it has been held that illegal order of judicial remand cannot be termed/viewed as an illegal detention." 

The petitioner had challenged the order dated July 9, 2022 by the  Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM)-IV, Patna City whereby the petitioner was been sent to judicial custody.The petitioner was arrested in connection with Didarganj Police Station case of 2022, registered under Sections 307, 324 and 34 of the IPC and under Section 27 of Arms Act. The judgement records that petitioner was produced before the Magistrate Court who had sent the petitioner to Model Central Jail, Beur, Patna till July 22,  2022 and thereafter the concerned learned Magistrate had directed to produce the petitioner on the next date. 

Relying on Supreme Court's decision in the case of Gautam Navlakha vs. National Investigation Agency reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 382, the petitioner's counsel pointed out that the Court has held that a writ of Habeas Corpus would lie where the order prima-facie shows that it was without jurisdiction or was passed in an absolutely mechanical manner before the single judge bench of Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad who had referred the case to the Division Bench on November 29, 2022. During January 12, 2023-August 7, 2023, the matter was before the Division Bench led by Justice A. M. Badar.

It was submitted by the petitioner's counsel that the petitioner was not produced before the concerned Magistrate Court within stipulated time and the Magistrate has passed the order mechanically and, therefore, custody of the petitioner is illegal and, therefore, the High Court was prayed to issue writ of habeas corpus directing the respondent authorities to produce the petitioner before the High Court. He relied upon the decisions in Mahesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 2008 (2) BLJ PHC-135, Arbind Kumar vs. State of Bihar reported in 2004 SCC OnLine Pat 638 and Gautam Navlakha vs. National Investigation Agency reported in 2021 (3) CCSC 1378 (SC). The Court pointed out that the two decisions of the Patna High Court upon which reliance is placed by Advocate for the petitioner is misconceived. Justice Pancholi recalled the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kanu Sanyal in para 4 which in turn had relied on Court's decision in A.K. Gopalan vs. State of Madras (1950) wherein it was observed: “It is well settled that in dealing with the petition for habeas corpus the Court is to see whether the detention on the date on which the application is made to the Court is legal, if nothing more has intervened between the date of the application and the date of the hearing.” Justice Pancholi cited with approval "xxi. The principal laid down in Kanu Sanyal (supra), thus, is that any infirmity in the detention of the petitioner at the initial stage cannot invalidate the subsequent detention and the same has to be judged on its own merits" in Serious Fraud Investigation Office and others vs. Rahul Modi and others, (2019) 5 SCC 266. 

The reference to decisions of the Court which rely on the Court's 4:1 decision in A.K. Gopalan vs. State of Madras (1950) appear bizarre because they do not refer to the 108-page long judgement (10:1) by 11-judge Constitution Bench in R. C. Cooper vs. Union of India [1973] 3 S.C.R. 530 which overruled the decision in A.K. Gopalan case. It reads:“55. …. In our judgment, the assumption in A.K. Gopalan case that certain articles in the Constitution exclusively deal with specific matters and in determining whether there is infringement of the individual's guaranteed rights, the object and the form of the State action alone need be considered, and effect of the laws on fundamental rights of the individuals in general will be ignored cannot be accepted as correct.”  Prior to this, the Court held: “45. Early in the history of this Court the question of inter-relation between the diverse provisions affording the guarantee of fundamental rights in Part III fell to be determined. In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [(1950) SCR 88] a person detained pursuant to an order made in exercise of the power conferred by the Preventive Detention Act, 4 of 1950 applied to this Court for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the Act contravened the guarantee under Articles 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution. The majority of the Court (Kania, C.J., and Patanjali Sastri, Mahajan, Mukherjea and Das, JJ.), held that Article 22 being a complete code relating to preventive detention, the validity of an order of detention must be determined strictly according to the terms and “within the four corners of that Article”. They held that a person detained may not claim that the freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) was infringed by his detention, and that validity of the law providing for making orders of detention will not be tested in the light of the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed thereby on the freedom of movement, nor on the ground that his right to personal liberty is infringed otherwise than acceding to the procedure established by law. Fazl Ali, J., expressed a contrary view. This case has formed the nucleus of the theory that the protection of the guarantee of a fundamental freedom must be adjudged in the light of the object of State action in relation to the individual's right and not upon its influence upon the guarantee of the fundamental freedom, and as a corollary thereto, that the freedoms under Articles 19, 21, 22 and 31 are exclusive — each article enacting a code relating to protection of distinct rights.” 

It ignored the landmark 154 page judgement (6:1) 7-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), which recalled that "The decision in A. K. Gopalan’s (supra) case gave rise to the theory that the freedoms under Articles 19, 21, 22 and 31 are exclusive-each article enacting a code relating to the protection of distinct rights, but this theory was over-turned in R. C. Cooper’s case (supra) where Shah, J., speaking on behalf of the majority pointed out that 'Part III of the Constitution weaves a pattern of guarantees on the texture of basic human: rights. The guarantees delimit the protection of those rights in their allotted fields : they do not attempt to enunciate distinct rights'."   

In A.K. Gopalan case, the Court held that Article 19(1)(d) was distinct of personal liberty under Article 21 and the freedom to move freely in Article 19(1)(d) was not a facet of Article 21 and since a detention was duly authorized under the impugned law, the requirement of reasonableness for examining such action under Article 19(1)(d) did not arise. Further, the contention to correlate Articles 19 and 21 was rejected. The interpretation was vitiated by formalism.

On August 16, 2023, Justice Pancholi had directed Assistant Counsel for Advocate General appearing for the respondent "to file a supplementary affidavit explaining the reason for not producing the petitioner on 22.07.2022 before the concerned Magistrate Court. Such affidavit shall be filed on or before 23.08.2023." 

The petitioner's counsel had submitted that after petitioner's arrest on July 8, .2022, he was produced before the Magistrate after 24 hours on 09.07.2022. The Magistrate had sent the petitioner to judicial remand and it was directed to produce the petitioner on 22.07.2022. However, petitioner was not produced by the concerned respondent authority before the Magistrate and therefore, his subsequent custody was illegal. 

The judgement records:"It is also pointed out by learned counsel for respondents that on 20.07.2022 due to non-availability of space, the petitioner could not be sent to the learned Court below. Thereafter, on various occasions, petitioner has been produced before the learned Magistrate Court from time to time..." The judgement records that the Court was satisfied with this explanation for not producing the petitioner on July 22, 2022 before the Magistrate Court. Its observation reads:"The respondent has given an explanation that on 22.07.2022, because of shortage of vehicle petitioner and certain other prisoners could not be produced before the learned Magistrate." 

The Assistant Counsel for Advocate General submitted somewhat ambiguously that "from time to time, the petitioner has been produced before the concerned Magistrate Court and after investigation the Investigating Officer has filed the charge-sheet on 28.09.2022." The judgement records that Assistant Counsel for Advocate General "also pointed out the relevant date when the petitioner was produced before the concerned Magistrate. Thereafter, the case was committed for trial to the Court of Sessions under the order dated 14.12.2022 passed by the concerned Magistrate and after receiving the record, the case was registered as Sessions Trial No. 177 of 2023 before the concerned Sessions Court. It is further submitted by learned counsel that on 31.03.2023, petitioner was produced before the Court and on 15.04.2023, the  regular bail application filed by the petitioner was rejected by the 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge. When the bail application filed by the petitioner was already rejected by the concerned Court and further when the case was committed to the concerned Sessions Court, wherein the case has been pending for trial, the present petition was misconceived and there is no illegality committed by the respondent authorities or the concerned Magistrate as alleged by the petitioner. He relied on the decisions in Talib Hussain vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir reported in (1971) 3 SCC 118, Kanu Sanyal vs. Distt. Magistrate reported in (1974) 4 SCC 141, Serious Fraud Investigation Office vs. Rahul Modi reported in (2019) 5 SCC 266 and Shikha Kumari vs. State of Bihar reported in 2020 SCC OnLine Pat 362. 

In Param Kumar case, the seven other respondents were: Home Secretary, Government of Bihar, Director General of Police, Bihar, Inspector General of Police, Patna Zone, Patna, Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna, Superintendent of Police Patna, Rural East, Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Patna City and S.H.O., Didarganj Police Station, Patna. Initially there were nine respondents. On September 5, 2023, the arguments were concluded before Justice Pancholi led bench and the matter was reserved for order.  

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 17th 34-page long judgement dated September 20, 2023 in Vicky Anand vs.The State of Bihar (2023), wherein  he was not satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary even if the victim was conscious and had given the statement before the S.H.O. and the witnesses, it can be said that the same was as a result of tutoring, prompting of her parents, who were kept present. 

Notably, in the FIR it was alleged that both hands of the informant were burnt, so, she was not in a position to write. Because of that, she put her impression of left leg’s toe upon fardbeyan in presence of Executive Magistrate.” The victim died after fourteen days of recording of the fardbeyan and, therefore, Section 302 of the I.P.C was added. The counsel for the appellant relied upon the decisions by the Supreme Court in the cases of Muthu Kutty and Another vs. State By Inspector of Police, T.N. reported in (2005) 9 SCC 113; Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2002) 6 SCC 710; Paparambaka Rosamma & Ors. vs.State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in (1999) 7 SCC 695. He also placed reliance upon the decision by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Sallo Singh, Bhutha Singh, Munna Singh vs. State of Bihar reported in 2007 (1) PLJR 705. He relied upon the decision by Jharkhand High Court as well in the matter of Sowam Kisku and Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) reported in 2006 CriL.J. 2526.

Justice Pancholi concluded: "36.Looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that the conviction of the appellant recorded by the trial court simply relying upon the version given by the victim in the form of dying declaration and, therefore, the conviction recorded by the trial court is required to be interfered with. It is also relevant to note that when the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused-appellant is required to be acquitted." He quashed and set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated June 21, 2016 and order of sentence dated June 22, 2016 by 6th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Nalanda at Bihar Sharif in a Sessions Trial of 2013 which arose out of a P.S. case of 2012. The Trial Court had convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 342 of the IPC. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000. The other accused were acquitted by the Trial Court due to lack of sufficient evidence.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 18th 29-page long judgement dated September 21, 2023 in Suraj Ram & Ors. vs.The State of Bihar (2023), wherein he quashed and set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated July 14, 2016 and order of sentence dated July 19, 2016 by Special Judge SC/ST Act, Samastipur in a Sessions Trial of 2013 which arose out of Sarairanjan P.S. case of 2013. The appellants, namely, Suraj Ram, Ram Bharosh Sada and Basant Sahani were also acquitted of the charges levelled against them. They were directed to be released forthwith. It was not in dispute that there is no eye-witness to the occurrence in question and, therefore, the case of the prosecution is based upon circumstantial evidence. The F.I.R. was lodged only after the dead body was recovered and during this period of about more than 22 hours, the relatives of the deceased did not inform anybody about the story of the deceased having gone along with the accused during night hours. Dr. Bibhan Ranjan, PW-9 who had conducted the post mortem of the dead body of the deceased, haD specifically stated that the time elapsed since death is less than 36 hours. If the post mortem report is carefully examined, it is revealed that the post mortem was conducted at about 11:05 a.m. on July 22, .2013, whereas the deceased Manoj Ram went along with the accused at about 09:30 p.m. on July 20, 2013, as per the prosecution witnesses. Thus, the prosecution failed to explain the time gap of two hours.

The counsel of the appellants relied upon the decisions by the Supreme Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116, Anjan Kumar Sarma & Ors. Vs. State of Assam, reported in (2017) 14 SCC 359, Ravi & Anr. Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2018) 16 SCC 102, Reena Hazarika Vs. State of Assam, reported in (2019) 3 SCC 289 and Jabir & Ors. Vs. The State of Uttarakhand, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 32 (Criminal Appeal No. 972 of 2013). 

Justice Pancjoli referred to the five golden principles, which constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence enunciated in Supreme  Court's decision in in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra (1984). The Court has observed
as under:-
"153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793:1973 SCC (Cri) 1033:1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."

Justice Pancholi also referred to Supreme Court's decision in Jabir & Ors. vs. The State of Uttarakhand (2023), which had relied on Court's decision in Arjun Marik vs. State of Bihar (1994) Supp (2) SCC 372) saying,"The conviction cannot be based only on circumstance of last seen together with the deceased." He underlined that "From the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it can be said that in the case of circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The
circumstances concerned ‘must’ or ‘should’ and not ‘maybe’ established. Further, the fact so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused that is to say they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, and there must be a chain/link of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. The inferences drawn by the Court have to be on the basis of the established facts and not on conjectures."

He added:"It is further revealed from the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that in a case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution is required to establish the continuity in the links of the chain of circumstances, so as to lead to the only an inescapable conclusion of the accused being the other hypothesis compatible with the innocence of the accused. Mere invocation of the last seen theory, sans the facts and evidence in a case will not shift the onus upon the accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, unless the prosecution first establishes a prima facie case. If the links in the chain of the circumstances itself are not complete, and the prosecution is unable to establish a prima facie case, leaving open the possibility that the occurrence may have taken place in somewhat other manner, the onus will not shift to the accused and the benefit of doubt will have to be given."

He concluded:"Keeping in view the aforesaid observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, if the facts of the present case as discussed hereinabove are carefully examined, we are of the view that merely because the deceased was lastly seen in company with the appellants/accused at about 09:30 p.m. on 20.07.2013 and thereafter, the dead body of the deceased was found at about 07:30 p.m. on 21.07.2013 i.e. after almost 22 hours, it cannot be said that the present appellants and the appellants only have killed the deceased in absence of any other material. The chain/link is missing. The prosecution has tried to prove the motive on the part of one of the appellants/accused by contending that one of the accused was having land dispute with the family of the deceased and, therefore, he has been killed. However, we are of the view that when the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellants/accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Trial Court has committed grave error while recording the order of conviction against the appellants/accused and, therefore, the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside."

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 19th 20-page long judgement dated September 25, 2023 in Santosh Chaudhary vs.The State of Bihar & Anr. (2023), wherein he concluded:"we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the complete chain and even the prosecution has also failed to prove by leading cogent evidence that the appellant-accused was lastly seen in the company of the deceased. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, we are of the view that the appellant-accused is required to be acquitted. Looking to the over all facts and circumstances of the present case, we are inclined to allow this appeal and, accordingly, the appeal stands allowed." He quashed and set aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated July 18, 2018 and order of sentence dated July 23, 2018 by 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act), Sitamarhi in connection with a Sessions Trial of 2015 which arose out of P.S. case of 2014. The appellant, namely, Santosh Chaudhary was acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the trial court. 

The counsel for the appellant relied upon Supreme Court's decisions in the cases of Anjan Kumar Sarma vs. State of Assam, reported in (2017) 14 SCC 359, Ravi vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2018) 16 SCC 102 and Reena Hazarika vs. State of Assam, reported in (2019) 3 SCC 289.

Justice Pancholi led Division Bench observed:" it can be said that if the prosecution is unable to establish a prima facie case leaving open the possibility that the occurrence may have taken place in some other manner, the onus will not shift to the accused and the benefit of doubt will have to be given to the accused. Further, mere invocation of the last seen theory, sans the facts and the evidence in a case, will not suffice to shift the onus upon the accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, unless the prosecution first establishes a prima facie case." Drawing on the  decisions rendered by theSupreme Court, the bench also observed: "it can be said that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. Further the fact so established should be consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. The inferences drawn by the Court have to be on the basis of the established facts and not on conjectures."   

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 20th 18-page long judgement dated October 3, 2023 in Haji Saleem @ Saleem Ahmad vs. The State of Bihar & Anr (2013), wherein the bench was not inclined to entertain the appeal. It dismissed the appeal saying, "....merely because the appellant is in jail since last 2 years, he is not to be enlarged on bail only on this ground and that too when serious allegations are levelled against the appellant in the papers of the charge-sheet and further when there is a provision contained in Section 43(D)(5) of U.A.P.A. Act. 21." Although the appellant, a resident of Kairana, Shamli, Uttar Pradesh was about 72 years old was not impressed by the submissions canvassed by the appellant's counsel. The bench disregarded the fact that out of 95 witnesses, the prosecution had examined only 6 witnesses. He refused to  release the appellant on bail. The Court noted that the maximum punishment prescribed for the alleged offences is life imprisonment. The second respondent was National Investigating Agency, Bihar. The appellant's counsel relied upon the decision dated August 25, 2022 by the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1066 of 2010 in the case of Ram Sharan Chaturvedi vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1080. The counsel referred to Paragraphs 22, 24, 25 and 27 of the decision.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 21st 21-page long judgement dated October 5, 2023 in Pintu Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2013), wherein, the bench quashed and set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated October 7, 2015 and order of sentence dated October 10, 2015 by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur in a Sessions Trial of 2013 which arose out of Pirpainti P.S. case of 2012. The appellant, namely, Pintu Yadav was acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the learned Trial Court. The trial court had convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Section 302 of the I.P.C. and Section 27 of the Arms Act. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 25,000/. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The appellant was in custody since September 1, 2012 i.e. more than eleven years, he was ordered to be set at liberty forthwith. He observed:"Merely because there are certain antecedents against the appellant, he cannot be convicted, if there is no evidence against him in the present case." The appellant's counsel had relied upon the decision rendered by Supreme Court in the case of Virendra Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 2022 SC 3373. Drawing on the observations of the Supreme Court, Justce Pancholi observed: "it can be said that the statement of the prosecution witness who was not treated as hostile and no attempt was made by the prosecution either to treat him as hostile or to re-examine him, the statement made by such prosecution witness in favour of the accused would certainly inure to the benefit of the accused." After citing Section 25 of the Evidence Act, he underlined that the "confessional statement cannot be read as an evidence against the appellant". Section 25 reads: “No confession made to a police officer investigating a case shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence”. 

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 22nd 17-page long judgement dated October 6, 2023 in Gurucharan Rishi  vs. The State of Bihar (2013), wherein, the bench quashed and set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated February 13, 2019 and order of sentence dated February 18, 2019 by 5th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Purnea in connection with Sessions Trials 2016 and 2017 which arose out of K. Nagar (Sree Nagar) P.S. case of 2016. The appellant, namely, Gurucharan Rishi in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1348 of 2019 and appellants, namely, Kaleshar Rishi @ Kaleshwar Rishi and Kharchan Rishi @ Kharchandra Rishi in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.508 of 2022 were acquitted of the charges levelled against them by the trial court for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 323 and 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Since appellant, namely, Gurucharan Rishi is on bail, he was discharged from the liabilities of his bail bond and appellants, namely, Kaleshar Rishi @ Kaleshwar Rishi and Kharchan Rishi @ Kharchandra Rishi were in jail, they were directed to be released forthwith. The trial court had sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life under Sections 302/34 of the IPC and to pay a fine of Rs.2000/- each. Theywere also sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month under Section 341 of the IPC. They were further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year under Section 323 of the IPC. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

Justice Pancholi observed:"we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the present appellants-convicts beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the concerned Trial Court has committed an error while recording the order of conviction and sentence against the present appellants hence, the said order is required to be interfered with." 

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 23rd 25-page long judgement dated October 11, 2023 in Parwati Devi @ Paro Devi   vs. The State of Bihar (2013), wherein, the bench concluded:"we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to complete the chain of circumstances from which it can be said that the appellant/convicts only have committed the alleged offences and none else. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellants/convicts beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the Trial Court has committed grave error while passing the order of conviction against the present appellants. The impugned order is, therefore, required to be quashed and set aside." The Trial court had convicted the appellants for the offences punishable under Sections 302/34, 120B of the I.P.C., under Section 27 of the Arms Act and under Section 3(2)(v) of S.C./S.T. Prevention of Atrocities Act.

The impugned judgment of conviction dated April 6, 2018 and order of sentence dated April 9, 2018 by Special Judge S.C./S.T. (POA) Act, Begusarai in connection with Naokothi P.S. case of 2016 was quashed and set aside. The appellants, namely, Parwati Devi @ Paro Devi, Prince Kumar Mahto @ Prince Kumar and Rameshwar Mahto were acquitted of the charges levelled against them by the trial court. Justice Pancholi observed:"It is also relevant to note that pistol/revolver from which firing took place has also not been recovered/discovered and, therefore, merely by attributing some motive to the accused, it cannot be presumed that the appellants/convicts only have committed the alleged offences." 

The judgement records thatthe counsel appearing for the informant as well as the A.P.P. heavily relied upon the deposition of the Investigating Officer, PW-5. It was submitted that the said witness had collected documentary evidence in the form of CDR of the mobile phones of the deceased and the appellants and the said witness has also seized mobile phones of accused Parwati Devi and Rameshwar Mahto as well as of the deceased Swati Kumari. It was contended that the accused Prince Mahto had made phone calls to his father and mother on the date of the occurrence on various occasions. It was also submitted that the accused Prince Mahto also made phone call to the deceased at 07:13 a.m.in the morning and gave threats. However, it was relevant to note that merely because phone call was made to the deceased, it cannot be presumed that the threat was given to her on her mobile phone. The deceased had not informed any authority with regard to the so called threats given by accused Prince Mahto from jail. It was also contended that the tower location of the mobile phone of accused Parwati Devi and Rameshwar Mahto is Pirnager, i.e. the place of occurrence. However, it was also not in dispute that the said two appellants/convicts are residing in the same area, i.e. in Pirnager. The said aspect was admitted by Investigating Officer during his cross-examination. Thus, when the said appellants/convicts were residents of Pirnager, then naturally their tower location would be of the same area and only on that basis it cannot be presumed that the said appellants have killed the deceased by hatching conspiracy with accused Prince Mahto." 

The judgement pointed out that "Even the CDR and CAF of the relevant mobile numbers was collected by PW-6 who was working as System Officer at the Information Branch in the concerned District. The said Officer had not produced the order of Superintendent of Police by which he was directed to take out the said CDR from the computer. The said Officer has issued the certificate under Section 65(B) of the Evidence Act by stating that he is authorized to issue such certificate. However, such authority letter was not produced by him. It is also not in dispute that service providers of the concerned mobile company have not been examined by the prosecution."

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 24th 21-page long judgement dated October 13, 2023 in Sunni Kumar @ Sunni Dewal  vs. The State of Bihar (2013), wherein, the bench concluded:"we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt despite which the Trial Court has recorded the order of conviction against the appellants and thereby committed grave error which requires interference in the present appeals." The bench quashed and set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated March 31, 2018 and order of sentence dated April 6, 2018 by 7th Additional District & Sessions Judge, Begusarai in connection with Sessions Trial of 2016, which arose out of Begusarai Town P.S. case of 2015. The appellant, namely, Sunni Kumar @ Sunni Dewal in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.636 of 2018 and appellant, namely, Sonu Kumar in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.541 of 2018 were acquitted of the charges levelled against them by the trial court. Since both the appellants, were in jail, they were directed to be released forthwith. The trial court had convicted for them of offences punishable under Sections 302/34 of I.P.C. and 27 of the Arms Act and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.20,000, for Section 27 of the Arms Act it had directed them to undergo 4 years imprisonment and to pay Rs. 4000. 

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 25th 14-page long judgement dated October 18, 2023 in Nagendra Pd. @ Nagendra Pd. Yadav @ Munna Yada vs. The State of Bihar (2013), wherein, the bench concluded:"we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, despite which the Trial Court has passed the impugned order of conviction against the appellant. Hence, the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside." The impugned judgment of conviction dated March 25, 2014 and order of sentence dated March 28, 2014 by Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial of 2013 which arose out of Sandesh P.S. case of 2012 is quashed and set aside. The appellant, namely, Nagendra Pd. @ Nagendra Pd. Yadav @ Munna Yadav was acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the Trial Court. He was directed to be released forthwith." The trial court had convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Section 302 of the I.P.C and had sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs. 50,000.

Justice Pancholi recalled the Supreme Court's decision in Reena Hazarika vs. State of Assam, reported in (2019) 3 SCC 289, wherein the Court observed: 
“9. The essentials of circumstantial evidence stand well established by precedents and we do not consider it necessary to reiterate the same and burden the order unnecessarily. Suffice it to observe that in a case of circumstantial evidence the prosecution is required to establish the continuity in the links of the chain of circumstances, so as to lead to the only and inescapable conclusion of the accused being the assailant, inconsistent or incompatible with the possibility of any other hypothesis compatible with the innocence of the accused. Mere invocation of the last-seen theory, sans the facts and evidence in a case, will not suffice to shift the onus upon the accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 unless the prosecution first establishes a prima facie case. If the links in the chain of circumstances itself are not complete, and the prosecution is unable to establish a prima facie case, leaving open the possibility that the occurrence may have taken place in some other manner, the onus will not shift to the accused, and the benefit of doubt will have to be given.” 

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 26th 46-page long judgement dated October 19, 2023 in  Ranjeet Kumar Jha @ Ranjeet Jha vs. The State of Bihar (2013), wherein, the bench observed that merely because the "witnesses are family members or related witnesses, their deposition cannot be discarded as their presence at the place of occurrence was quite natural. If the deposition of the interested and related witnesses is trustworthy, such deposition is required to be accepted."

Justice Pancoli concluded:"we are of the considered view that the prosecution has proved the case against the appellants/convicts beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the learned Trial Court has not committed any error while passing the impugned order and, hence, we are of theview that no interference is required in the present appeals. Accordingly, Cr. Appeal (D.B.) Nos. 643 of 2013, 528 of 2013, 591 of 2013 and 730 of 2013 are dismissed." It recorded that it is apparent that appellant/accused Ranjeet Kumar Jha @ Ranjeet Jha in Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 643 of 2013, was already in custody. The appellant Gauri Shankar Singh @ Bhola in Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 528 of 2013, appellant Sidhnath Parasar in Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No.591 of 2013 and appellant Mintu Singh @ Dhruv Nath Mishra @ Dhruv Nath Kumar @ Dhruv Nath Parasar in Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 730 of 2013 were on bail. The judgement reads: "On convictions as recorded above, their bail-bonds stand cancelled and they are directed to surrender before the jail authority/concerned Court on or before 1st of December, 2023. If any of the above named appellants/accused fails to surrender before 1st of December, 2023 for any reasons, learned Trial Court to take appropriate legal steps to secure their arrest. Since the sole appellant of Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 608 of 2013 namely Vinay Kumar Sharma has died during the pendency of the appeal, Cr. Appal (D.B.) No. 608 of 2013 stands abated." 

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 27th 24-page long judgement dated November 1, 2023 in Munna Sah vs. The State of Bihar (2013), wherein, the bench set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated November 6, 2015 and order of sentence dated November 9, 2015 by 10th Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur in a Sessions Trial of 2013 which arose out of Kazi Mohammadpur P.S. case of 2012. The appellant, namely, Munna Sah was acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the trial court. He was directed to be released forthwith. The trial court had convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 376 read with 511 of the IPC, whereby the appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment. for life for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. and a fine of Rs. 5,000 was also imposed. He was awarded three months simple imprisonment. Further the appellant was directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years for offence under Section 376/511 of I.P.C. and a fine of Rs. 5,000/- was imposed. He was also awarded three months simple imprisonment. Both the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. Justice Pancholi observed:"we are of the view that the Trial Court has committed grave error by recording conviction of the appellant. Accordingly, the same is required to be quashed and set aside."

The prosecution case was that on September 14, 2012, the informant Nikki Kumari went to domestic work in the house of Dilip Kumar leaving her mother Kiran Devi and younger sister Aarti Kumari, aged about 7 years, in the house. Her mother was suffering from Diabetes. Since last one month, she was bed-ridden. When she came to her home at 9 O’clock, her sister Aarti Kumari told her that at 8:00 A.M. accused Munna Sah came to her home and lifted the saree worn by her mother and laid down on her body. Her sister saw this incident and she went to narrate the story and came back. In the meanwhile, fearing getting caught by the people of the muhalla, the accused pressed the neck of her mother and at 3 O’clock, as a result of which, she died at her home.” 

The case of the prosecution rested only upon the deposition of PW-8 Aarti Kumari who claimed that she was an eye-witness to the occurrence in question. It was submitted that PW-4 Nikki Kumari, who is the informant, is not an eye-witness to the occurrence and she had lodged the F.I.R. on the basis of the information given by PW-8 Aarti Kumari. It was submitted that at the time of occurrence the age of PW-8 was 7.5 years and at the time of giving her deposition before the Court she was aged about 10 years. However, the concerned Trial Court did not put question to her with a view to ascertain whether the said child witness was in a position to understand the question put to her. It was submitted that the Trial Court convicted the appellant/accused only relying upon the deposition given by PW-8 who is a child witness. Amicus Curiae relied upon the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 777 and would refer to para-7 to 10 of the said decision. She also relied upon the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in P. Ramesh vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, reported in (2019) 20 SCC 593. She mainly placed reliance upon para-13 to 16 of the decision. She  contended that the deposition of child witness who was aged about 10 years at the time of giving her deposition must be discarded. She also pointed out the contradictions in the deposition given by the prosecution witnesses.  

The case was filed in the High Court on December 17, 2015 by Advocate Satyendra Narayan Singh and was registered in the High Court on December 21, 2015.. Notably, High Court's order dated December 22, 2015 records: "The prayer for suspension of sentences as well as the prayer for bail are not pressed, at this stage, on the ground that the said prayers may be taken into consideration on receipt of the Lower Court Record. In view of above, list this appeal, on receipt of the Lower Court Record, under the heading ‘For Orders’."  The High Court's order dated February 2, 2016 reads: "This appeal has been placed under the heading 'For Orders' for consideration of bail of the Appellant on receipt of the lower court records. In view of the nature of evidence against the Appellant, we are not inclined to release him on bail. Prayer for bail is rejected."

in such a backdrop, the Court has recorded in its judgemnt that because the counsel for the appellant was not present and the appeal has been pending since 2015 and the appellant/convict was in custody since September 27, 2012, the Court had no option but to proceed with the matter. Justice Pancholi asked Advocate Ms. Surya Nilambari to assist the Court. Justice Pancholi recorded appreciation for the able assistance rendered by Ms. Nilambari, Amicus Curiae and directed the Patna High Court, Legal Services Committee to pay 5,000 in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1039 of 2015 as consolidated fee for the services rendered by her. 

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 28th 33-page long judgement dated November 6, 2023 in Pantulal Roy & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2013), wherein, the bench concluded:"From the evidence led by the prosecution, it cannot be said that the present appellants have kidnapped/abducted Rudal Roy. Further, the prosecution has also failed to prove that Rudal Roy has been killed by the appellants and, therefore, the provisions contained in Section- 364 of I.P.C. i.e. kidnapping or abducting in order to murder is also not proved beyond reasonable doubt. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the Trial Court has committed grave error by recording the order of conviction and, therefore, the impugned judgment and order is required to be quashed and set aside." Justice Pancholi quashed and set aside he impugned judgment of conviction dated December 15, .2018 and order of sentence dated December 18, 2018 by Additional Sessions Judge-II-cum-Special Judge, Hajipur, Vaishali in Sessions Trial of 2011 which arose out of Bidupur P.S. case of 2002. The appellants, namely, Pantulal Roy, Rasgulla Roy, Akhilesh Roy and Kanak Roy were acquitted of the charges levelled against them by the trial court. They were directed to be released forthwith.   

Justice Pancholi observed:"It is to be noted that the prosecution has failed to prove that Rudal Roy has been killed. Dead body of Rudal Roy has not been found and, therefore, in absence of the same, it cannot be presumed that Rudal Roy has expired or has died. The Trial Court has observed that for 7 years from the date of occurrence nothing is heard about Rudal Roy and, therefore, it can be reasonably presumed that Rudal Roy has expired and, therefore, it is for the appellants to prove by leading cogent evidence that Rudal Roy is still alive and when the appellants have failed to prove the same, the Trial Court has presumed that the appellants must have killed him. We are of the view that the aforesaid reasoning recorded by the Trial Court is totally misconceived." 

At this stage, the judgement referred to the provisions contained in Sections-362 and 364 of I.P.C. which reads:Section-362: Abduction.- Whoever by force compels, or by any deceitful means induces, any person to go from any place, is said to abduct that person. Section-364: Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder.- Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that such person may be murdered or may be so disposed of as to be put in danger of being murdered, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.   

Justice Pancholi observed:"From the evidence led by the prosecution, it cannot be said that the present appellants have kidnapped/abducted Rudal Roy. Further, the prosecution has also failed to prove that Rudal Roy has been killed by the appellants and, therefore, the provisions contained in Section-364 of I.P.C. i.e. kidnapping or abducting in order to murder is also not proved beyond reasonable doubt." 

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 29th 4-page long judgement dated November 8, 2023 in Chandan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2013), wherein, the bench dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner, who is husband of Rani Kumari, the corpus-respondent No. 8, for issuance of writ of habeas corpus, and custody of the corpus-respondent No. 8 be handed over to the petitioner. She was produced before the Judicial Magistrate, Rosera. Judicial Magistrate, Rosera recorded the statement of the corpus-respondent No. 8 under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The corpus-respondent No. 8 has stated before the Judicial Magistrate, Rosera that she wants to go with the present petitioner, and therefore, she was allowed/permitted to go with the petitioner.
5. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner has 
submitted that the parents of the corpus-respondent No. 8 has
forcibly taken the custody of the corpus-respondent No. 8, and
thereafter, filed a private complaint before the concerned Court,
alleging that the petitioner and his relatives are demanding
dowry from the corpus-respondent No. 8. It is submitted that the
corpus has been illegally detained by her parents against her
wish. She is not permitted to meet the petitioner. Petitioner has,
therefore, filed the present petition.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for
the respondent-Authorities has opposed this petition and
referred to counter affidavit and documents annexed with the
same. It is submitted that corpus-respondent No. 8 is not in
illegal custody of her parents, as alleged by the petitioner.
7. It is pointed out that on the last occasion, this Court
orally directed that the corpus-respondent No. 8 be produced
before the Court, and therefore, today the corpus-respondent
No. 8 is present.
8. This Court has interacted with the corpus-
respondent No.8, namely, Rani Kumari. She has stated that her
age is twenty-two years. She has come with her father, who is a
teacher in the concerned school. During course of interaction
with the corpus-respondent No. 8, in presence of learned
counsels appearing for the respondent - State, who are present in
the Court, she has stated before us that she is not illegally
detained by her parents as alleged by the petitioner, and in fact,
she wants to go with her father and not with the petitioner.
9. In view of the statement made by the corpus-
respondent No. 8, who is major, she is permitted to go with her
father.
10. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances,
we are not inclined to entertain the present petition.
11. Accordingly, 

Justice Pancholi led Division Bench dismisses State Government's appeal against 1999 judgement of acquittal by A.D.J.-XII, Patna in a Sessions Trial involving death of Raj Mahal Devi in 1995

In his last 31-page long judgement dated May 13, 2025 prior to the recommendation by Collegium, in The State of Bihar vs. Nawal Kishore Gope & Anr. (2025), Justice Pancholi led Division Bench which included Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra dismissed State Government's appeal of 1999 filed by the State against the judgment of acquittal is dismissed along with the revision application filed by the informant challenging the very same judgment of acquittal rendered by the Trial Court. The judgement was delivered after hearing the Government Appeal of 1999 and Criminal Revision case of 1999 Deepak Kumar vs.The State of Bihar & Ors (2025).  In the appeal, the second respondent was Kanhai Gope. In the revision case, the second and third respondents Nawal Kishore Gope and Kanhai Gope 

The State had preferred Govt. Appeal (DB) No.22 of 1999 under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment dated July 27, 1999 passed by the court of A.D.J.-XII, Patna in Sessions Trial No. 319/96, arising out of Sultanganj P.S. Case No.258/95 whereby the Trial Court had acquitted both the accused persons, i.e. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, of all the charges levelled against them.

The prosecution case, as per the fardbeyan dated December 3, 1995 recorded at 20:00 hours given by Deepak Kumar in P.M.C.H. Emergency Ward is that on December 3, 1995 at 19:00 hours informant's mother Raj Mahal Devi was murdered. After filing of the F.I.R., the investigating agency carried out the investigation and, during the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer recorded the statement of the witnesses and collected the relevant documents and thereafter filed the charge-sheet against the accused. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions where it was registered for Sessions Trial. Before the Trial Court, prosecution examined seven witnesses.

A.P.P. appearing for the appellant/State submitted that there are eye-witnesses to the incident in question who have supported the case of the prosecution, despite which the Trial Court has discarded their deposition. It is contended that though the informant, Deepak Kumar had lodged the FIR against unknown persons and did not disclose the names of the assailants while giving fardbeyan, he had given the explanation for not giving the names of the assailants to the police while giving his fardbeyan. It was submitted that Gauri Shankar Yadav, the brother of the accused, while carrying the injured to the hospital in tempo had given threat to the informant and, therefore, he had not disclosed the names of the assailants at the relevant point of time. APP submitted that the medical evidence also supported the case of the prosecution and, in fact, informant, PW-4, who was an injured eye-witness who has supported the case of the prosecution. But the Trial Court did not believe the version given by him. APP also submitted that the Trial Court has committed grave error while acquitting the respondents/accused and, therefore, the impugned judgment be quashed and set aside and the present appeal be allowed.

The counsel for the respondents/accused submitted that for the alleged incident which took place at 07:00 p.m., the informant Deepak Kumar gave his fardbeyan at 08:00 p.m., i.e., within one hour in the hospital itself. But in his fardbeyan, he did not give the names of the assailants. It was submitted that the present respondents/accused have falsely been implicated because of family dispute between the parties and, in fact, the present respondent Nawal Yadav and his brother Gauri Shankar Yadav took the injured to the hospital. The respondents/accused referred the inquest report of the dead body of the deceased. It was submitted that, in fact, the respondent/accused, Nawal Kishore had signed the said inquest. Thus, he was very much present on the next day morning at 10:45 a.m. on December 4, 1995.

The respondents/accused further submitted that even the statement of the informant and the other two witnesses under Section 164 of the Code was recorded on January 5, 1996, after more than one month. The prosecution failed to prove the case against the respondents/accused beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the Trial Court has rightly passed the order of acquittal in favour of the respondents/accused. 

Justice Pancholi led Division Bench observed: "We are of the view that there are major contradictions, inconsistencies and improvements in the version given by the prosecution witnesses and, in fact, the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the respondents/accused beyond reasonable doubt. We have also gone through the reasoning recorded by the Trial Court and we are of the view that the Trial Court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment of acquittal."

The Division Bench referred to the decision rendered by the High Court in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.621 of 2023 (Purushottam Singh vs. State of Bihar & Anr.), wherein the Court has held in paragraph nos.18, 19 and 20 as under:
“18. It is pertinent to note that we are dealing with the acquittal appeal filed by the informant, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 has observed in paragraph no. 42 as under:-
“42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge;
(1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded;
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law;
(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

Justice Pancholi recalled the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nikhil Chandra Mondal vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (2023) 6 SCC 605 has observed in paragraph no. 22:- “22. Recently, a three-Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar has considered various earlier judgments on the scope of interference in a case of acquittal. It held that there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence that is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the court. It has been further held that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

Drawing on these decisions by Supreme Court, the High Court observed: "it can be said that there is double presumption in favour of the accused, when the order of acquittal has been accorded by the Trial Court, Firstly, the presumption of innocence that is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the court. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

Relying on the decision rendered by the Supreme Court, Justice Pancholi concluded: "if the present Government Appeal filed by the State against the order of acquittal is examined, we are of the view that the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record....no interference is required in the impugned judgment rendered by the Trial Court." The High Court also dismissed the revision application filed by the informant challenging the same judgment of acquittal rendered by the Trial Court. 

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Justice Pancholi led Division Bench had delivered almost similar 28-page long judgement dated May 12, 2025 in the State of Bihar vs. Bidhesh Paswan & Ors. (2025) and dismissed the State appeal of 1999 against the judgment of acquittal of 1999 by the Court of 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad in Sessions Trial of 1993, wherein the Trial Court had acquitted all the 15 respondents/accused of all the charges levelled against them. The judgement was authored by Justice Pancholi

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Justice Pancholi led Division Bench had delivered almost similar 28-page long judgement dated May 8, 2025 in the State of Bihar vs. Hardeo Manda & Ors. (2025) and dismissed the State appeal of 1998 against the judgment of acquittal of 1998 by the Court of 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Banka in Sessions Trial of 1997, wherein the Trial Court had acquitted all the three respondents/accused of all the charges levelled against them. The judgement was authored by Justice Pancholi

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Justice Pancholi led Division Bench had delivered almost similar 25-page long judgement dated May 7, 2025 in the State of Bihar vs. Harinandan Singh & Ors. (2025) and dismissed the State appeal of 1999 against the judgment of acquittal of 1997 by the Court of 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Nawada in Sessions Trial of 1994, wherein the Trial Court had acquitted all the 13 respondents/accused of all the charges levelled against them. The judgement was authored by Justice Pancholi.

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Justice Pancholi led Division Bench had delivered almost similar 13-page long judgement dated May 6, 2025 in the State of Bihar vs. Shashi Bhushan Pal & Ors. (2025) and dismissed the State appeal of 2024 against the judgment of acquittal of 2024 by the Court of 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhojpur at Ara in Sessions Trial of 2023 for the offence under for the offences registered under Sections 302, Section 307 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act, wherein the Trial Court had acquitted all the four respondents/accused of all the charges levelled against them. The judgement was authored by Justice Pancholi. 

The prosecution story was based on the fardbeyan of the informant, namely, Meera Kumari who has been examined as PW-4 in course of trial. In her fardbeyan recorded on October 1, 2022 at 13:45 hours (afternoon) by one Pramod Kumar Tiwari, Sub-Inspector of Police, Shastri Nagar Police Station, she alleged that on September 30, 2022 at about 10:00 P.M. in the night, the informant heard the sound of firing coming from the dalan and when she went there, she saw (1) Amarjeet Pal @ Chotu (2) Ramjeet Pal, (3) Indrajeet Pal, all three sons of Shiv Person Pal and (4) Shashi Bhushan Pal, son of Heera Lal Pal were fleeing away from the dalan. She also alleged that when the informant went inside the dalan, she saw her father’s elder brother was restless and was in a pool of blood. When she shouted, the people assembled there and they took him to Sadar Hospital, Ara for treatment where after treatment he was referred to Paras Hospital, Patna for better treatment. It was further alleged that the reason of this occurrence is that eight days ago, when the work of boundary wall of her dalan three sons came there armed with lathi-danda and started abusing and stopped the work. They had also threatened them of dire consequences if they start the work of boundary wall. The informant alleged that with an intention to usurp the land, the said accused persons had shot at her elder father in his abdomen. 

The High Court recorded that A.P.P. submitted that the "appellant/informant/victim has not challenged the order dated September 24, 2024 passed by the High Court in the aforesaid Criminal Appeal till today. Thus, when the same judgment and order rendered by the learned Trial Court has not been interfered by this Court and when the said order has attained finality, we are of the view that the present appeal is also required to be dismissed. We have also independently examined the evidence led by the prosecution and we are of the view that the learned Trial Court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment and order." Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.