Only remedy against a compromise decree Is to file a recall application

In Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi vs. Gurusiddappa Tirakappa Malagi (D) 2025 INSC 517, Supreme Court dealt with Irder XXIII Rule 3 CPC and concluded that "Once the Court passes a compromise decree after such a satisfaction, the decree cannot be challenged in an appeal as no appeal lies against a compromise decree'. Also, a compromise decree cannot be challenged by filing a fresh suit as there is a bar on filing a fresh suit challenging.... The only remedy against a compromise decree Is to file a recall application."

This appeal arose out of pure civil proceedings initiated at the hands of the appellants in the year 2003. The appellants had filed a suit for declaring a compromise decree entered into between the respondents (defendants) as null and void, and not binding on the appellants. 

The law governing a consent decree is Order 23 Rule 3 of CPC, which deals with compromise decree. It reads as follows:

“3. Compromise of suit.— Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit:

Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.

Explanation.—An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule” Thus, a reading of the above provision makes it clear that before passing a decree on the basis of a compromise, the Court has to satisfy itself that the suit has been adjusted by a 7  lawful compromise. Once the Court passes a compromise decree after such a satisfaction, the decree cannot be challenged in an appeal as no appeal lies against a compromise decree. 

A compromise decree cannot be challenged by filing a fresh suit as there is a bar on filing a fresh suit challenging the consent decree on the ground of the legality of the compromise under Order 23 Rule 3A of CPC. It reads as follows:

“3-A. Bar to suit.— No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.”

The only remedy against a compromise decree is to file a recall application. The Supreme Court in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566 summed up the position of law as follows:

“17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus:

(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC.

(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a 1 Section 96(3) of CPC: No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties.

(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A.

(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23. Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made…” (Emphasis Provided) Thus, even if we accept the contention of the appellants that their father was coerced by his brothers and father (appellants’ grandfather) to enter into a compromise, which led to the passing of the consent decree, a fresh suit is still not a valid remedy. In that situation, the appellants’ father should have 9  filed a recall application before the Court that had passed the decree. The appellants’ father has never done so! Moreover, he had admitted the consent decree and never questioned its validity.

The appellants' argument that the suit property is not a joint family property but was purchased by their grandmother in the name of the appellants’ father and that he is now trying to deprive the appellants from the suit property as their relations have turned sour, was of no help to them. This is because if the appellants’ grandmother had purchased the suit property in the name of the appellants’ father, and it is not a part of the ancestral property then in that case it would be the property of the appellants’ father as of now, since he is alive, and he is at full liberty to dispose of the same as per his wishes. Be that as it may, if the father of the appellants has no grievance against the consent decree, then we are unable to understand how the appellants can be allowed to challenge it.

The Court observed that "the appellants’ case has no merits. The appellants’ suit is also barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC as it did not include all the properties which were part of their earlier suit. The present suit is also hit by the principles of res judicata or 10 by constructive res judicata as the appellants cannot re-agitate their claim regarding the partition of the suit property, which has already been partitioned as a result of previous litigations. The Trial Court and High Court have dealt with these issues in detail. We are not required to go into the same as we have already given our reasons above for holding that the appellants’ suit is bereft of any merits."

The Court concluded:"we see no reason to interfere with the impugned order dated 23.09.2022 passed by the High Court. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed."

Supreme Court upholds descision of Bombay High Court on Urdu

Urdu and Hindi are not two languages, but it is one language. Urdu and Hindi are mentioned as two different languages in our Constitution, but that is political expediency, not a linguistic reality." Their recognition as two separate languages under the Constitution need not deter linguists from questioning the scientific validity of their separation. 

-Supreme Court of India, April 15, 2025

In Ms. Varshatai, w/o Sanjay Bagade vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. Etc., Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran concluded:"The display of an additional language cannot, by itself, be said to be in violation of the provisions of the 2022 Act. The High Court while reaching the above findings had considered the relevant provisions of law. We completely agree with the reasoning given by the High Court that there is no prohibition on the use of Urdu under the 2022 Act or in any provision of law. The entire case of the appellant to our mind is based on a misconception of law. We see no reason therefore to interfere in the present case. These appeals are liable to be dismissed, and are hereby dismissed" in its 36-page long judgment dated April 15, 2025. The 2022 Act refers to Maharashtra Local Authorities (Official Languages) Act, 2022. It was wrongly claimed that in terms of which, the use of Urdu language on the signboard of the Municipal Council is not permitted.

Supreme Court observed:"The High Court to our mind rightly concluded that the 2022 Act, on which the appellant placed significant reliance, does not prohibit the use of an additional language, which is Urdu in the present case, on the signboard of the Municipal Council building. The argument before the High Court in the second round of litigation by the present appellant was that Section 3(1) of the 2022 Act provides for Marathi to be the official language of all local authorities in the State, except for the purposes specified in sub-section (2) and the only exception which was provided was the use of English in the specified communications under sub-section (2). All the same, this argument is incorrect. There is no prohibition on using any other language, especially one included in the VIIIth Schedule of the Constitution of India. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 is an enabling provision to use English in situations where the communications, in which the subject matter of the communication cannot be properly conveyed in Marathi or in situations where the persons to whom such communications are addressed cannot understand Marathi. This makes it more than explicit that even the enactment recognizes that language essentially is a tool of communication; which, according to us, cannot be condemned, when this language is being used by a community or group. We have to emphasize that Marathi and Urdu occupy the same position under Schedule VIII of the Constitution of India."

The Court pointed out that "a fellow citizen" has  great pains to take this matter twice to the High Court and then twice again" before the Supreme Court. It underlined that "What the appellant thinks may also be the thinking of many of our fellow citizens. These need to be addressed."

Addressing such thinking, the Court observed:"Let our concepts be clear. Language is not religion. Language does not even represent religion. Language belongs to a community, to a region, to people; and not to a religion. Language is culture. Language is the yardstick to measure the civilizational march of a community and its people. So is the case of Urdu, which is the finest specimen of ganga-jamuni tahzeeb, or the Hindustani tahzeeb, which is the composite cultural ethos of the plains of northern and central India. But before language became a tool for learning, its earliest and primary purpose will always remain communication." 

The judgment recorded that India has more than hundred major languages. Then there are other languages known as dialects or ‘Mother Tongues’ which also run into hundreds. According to the 2001 Census, India had a total of 122 major languages including the 22 scheduled languages, and a total of 234 mother tongues. Urdu was the sixth most spoken scheduled language of India. In the 2011 Census, the number of mother tongues increased to 270. However, it is to be noted that this number was also arrived at by taking into consideration only those mother tongues which had more than ten thousand speakers. Thus, it would not be wrong to say that the actual number of mother tongues in India would run into thousands. Such is the immense linguistic diversity of India!

The Constitution of India though mentions twenty-two Indian languages in its VIIIth Schedule, which includes both Marathi and Urdu, and significantly, ‘English’ is not a language mentioned in the VIIIth Schedule as it is not an Indian language. Language is also representative of a culture. It is both sensitive and delicate. Article 351 emphasizes on the spread of Hindi language and to develop the language, inter alia, by assimilating the forms and style and expressions used in “Hindustani” and other languages of the VIIIth Schedule and wherever necessary or desirable, by drawing vocabulary, primarily from Sanskrit but also secondarily from other languages. Article empowers State legislatures to adopt Hindi or any other language in use in that State as the official language of that State. 

The Court observed:"The prejudice against Urdu stems from the misconception that Urdu is alien to India. This opinion, we are afraid, is incorrect as Urdu, like Marathi and Hindi, is an Indo-Aryan language. It is a language which was born in this land. Urdu developed and flourished in India due to the need for people belonging to different cultural milieus who wanted to exchange ideas and communicate amongst themselves. Over the centuries, it attained ever greater refinement and became the language of choice for many acclaimed poets."

It noted that the early debates in the Constituent Assembly indicated a compromise on this issue between the hardliners from both sides i.e. between supporters of Sanskritized Hindi and proponents of liberal mixture of Urdu and Hindi known as ‘Hindustani’. But then comes a strong rupture in the form of the partition of India, and amongst its several fallouts, one vital blow was given to Urdu and Hindustani both. 

In his book The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Granville Austin wrote:

“…Partition killed Hindustani and endangered the position of English and the provincial languages in the Constitution. ‘If there had been no Partition, Hindustani would without doubt have been the national language,’ K. Santhanam believed, ‘but the anger against the Muslims turned against Urdu. Assembly members ‘felt that the Muslims having caused the division of the country, the whole issue of national language must be reviewed afresh’, said an article in The Hindustan Times. Having seen the dream of unity shattered by Partition, by the ‘treachery’ of the Urdu (Hindustani) speakers, the Hindi extremists became even more firmly committed to Hindi and to achieving national unity through it. Speakers of the provincial languages must learn Hindi and the regional languages must take second place, the Hindi-wallahs believed. And as to English, it should go as Urdu had gone. Were not both un-Indian?” The judgment referred to these observations of Austin. 

While it is a fact now that Hindustani is not the official language under the Constitution. Under Article 343 of the Constitution, Hindi is the official language, while the use of English was made permissible for official purposes for a period of fifteen years. But this does not mean that Hindustani and Urdu have become extinct. This was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution. 

Urdu language has come to be adopted by many States and Union Territories in India ad the second official language in exercise of powers conferred by Article 345 of the Constitution. The States which have Urdu as one of the official languages are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal, while the Union Territories which follow this practice are Delhi and Jammu and Kashmir. 

Even from a Constitutional perspective, the use of language for official purposes is not according to any rigid formula. For example, Article 120 of the Constitution prescribes Hindi or English as the official language of Parliament, but the proviso to the said Article empowers the Presiding Officer of the House to allow a member to express themselves in their mother tongue, if they do not know Hindi or English. The same principle applies to State legislatures vide Article 210 of the Constitution.

The Court underscored that when anyone criticizes Urdu, in a way one criticizes Hindi because according to linguists and literary scholars, Urdu and Hindi are not two languages, but it is one language. Urdu is mainly written in Nastaliq and Hindi in Devnagri; but scripts do not make a language. What makes languages distinct is their syntax, their grammar and their phonology. Urdu and Hindi have broad similarities in all these counts.

Division Bench to hear case of maintainbility of writ against decision of a private trust which runs Siwan Engineering and Technical Institute (SETI)

In Tipu Sultan vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2020), the Single Judge bench of Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah concluded: "Having considered the matter, the Court finds substance in the objection of learned State counsel. Against any grievance of a decision of a private trust, the forum is the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction and not the writ Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Once the Court finds that the petitioner has to go before another forum, there is no occasion to go into the merits. For the reasons aforesaid, the application stands disposed off with liberty to the petitioner to move before the appropriate forum, in accordance with law." The judgement was delivered on November 27, 2020. The other six respondents were: Aryabhatta Knowledge University, Patna, All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE), New Delhi, AICTE-Northern Regional Office,Kanpur, Islamia Educational & Social Welfare Trust, Siwan through its Secretary, Siwan Engineering and Technical Institute (SETI), Siwan and Principal, SETI.

The petitioner was a Assistant Professor, Siwan Engineering and Technical Institute (SETI) had approached the High Court for the quashing the order of March 1, 2020 whereby and where under SETI had illegally dismissed him from his service without any valid reason. He also sought quashing the order dated March 2, 2020 whereby and where under SETI had illegally deducted one day salary dated  February 12, 2020) without any valid reason. 

The counsel for the State raised a preliminary objection that the writ is not maintainable as it is against the decision of a private trust which runs the college. The judgement recorded that Md. Aslam Ansari, "the counsel for the petitioner could not meet the objection of learned counsel for the State and only submitted that there has been violation of principles of natural justice and due procedure of law has not been followed before passing of the order of dismissal."

The judgement clarified that "the Court has not expressed any opinion with regard to the merits of the matter and it shall be gone into by the competent forum before which the matter is brought for adjudication, in accordance with law, which shall decide the same expeditiously."

It all began because Tipu Sultan, the appellant had participated in a protest along with other faculty menthers. The six protesting faculty members had submitted their reply to the show cause letter in March 2020. The appellant/petitioner was given a back dated dated March 5, 2010 of the Secretary, SETI alongwith regarding decision of the Governing Body to dismiss the appellant/petitioner from his service with immediate effect. The appellant has pointed out that there is specific direction by the AICTE vide its lettcr dated April 15, 2020 regarding withdrawal of terminations made during lockdown dated May 1, 2020: The appellant/petitioner had approached to the Registrar and Vice Chancellr of the affiliating Aryabhatta Knowledge University, for withdrawal of his illegal termination vide emails dated May 1, 2020 and reminder emails dated May 29, 2020 but no action was taken.

 

The LPA has been filed on the ground that the Single Judge passed the order impugned without going into merit of the case only on the ground of preliminary objection raised by the counsel for the State about maintainability of the writ petition against the decision of the private trust, which rums SETI. 

 

The LPA was filed against the Single Judge judgement on January 6, 2021 which was registered on February 3, 2021 which is listed for hearing before the Division Bench of Justices P. B. Bajanthri, and Sunil Dutta Mishra. In its order dated February 18, 2025, the Division Bench had asked the appellant "to verify whether grievance of employees of 5th and 6th respondents would fall under any other statute of the State, like Education Act so as to find out he has other alternative remedy." The case listed is listed for order on Office Notes before the Court No. 15 of the Division Bench on April 22.  

Patna High Court refuses to interfere with blacklisting of M/S R.S Construction partnership firm

In M/S R.S Construction vs The Bihar Police Building Construction Corporation & Ors. (2025), the Division Bench comprising Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy observed: “Submitting of forged certificate leading to the registration of an FIR, even though the investigation with respect to the same is pending, is a serious matter which affects and jeopardizes the trust of the Corporation and it is the duty of every Corporation to warn the other counterparts regarding such persons.” The respondents were: Chairman -cum- Managing Director cum Appellate Authority, Bihar Police Building Construction Corporation, Patna, Chief Engineer cum Registering Authority, Bihar Police Building Construction Corporation, Patna and Superintending Engineer, Bihar Police Building Construction, Patna. The judgement concluded: "we do not wish to interfere with the decision of the respondents in blacklisting the petitioner/firm for three years."

The petitioner had approached the High Court against the order dated June 22, 2023 passed by the Chief Engineer-cum Registering Authority, Bihar Police Building Construction Corporation, Patna, blacklisting the registration of the petitioner/firm for an indefinite period, which vide corrigenda dated July 3, 2023 was altered to blacklisting for five years, to be effected from July 21, 2022, as also the order dated January 19, 2024 passed in appeal by the Chariman-cum-Managing Director of Bihar Police Building Construction Corporation, by which, the order passed by the Chief Engineer, respondent No. 3 was modified and the petitioner/firm was blacklisted for three years, but made it operative for other Departments of the Government also.

The review petition of the petitioner/firm filed on February 12, 2024 was also rejected. 

The Chief Engineer, Bihar Police Building Construction Corporation had invited tender for construction and electrification of Police Stations and Out-houses in the District of Gaya, apart from other works. The last date for uploading of the bids was extended from time to time.

One of clauses of the Notice for Inviting Tender (NIT), namely, Clause 35 was that the bid of only such firms would be considered who would upload their experience certificate of carrying out work of the Central Government/State Government/Public Sector Undertakings of similar nature along with proof thereof. 

The petitioner/firm along with eight others had submitted their bids for the work in question. The petitioner had submitted his performance/experience certificate along with the tender documents. The certificate was purportedly issued by the Managing Director of the Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Vegetable Marketing Federation, Ranchi. On verification of the documents, it was found that no such performance/experience certificate as was uploaded by the petitioner was ever issued from the office of VEGFED. This was communicated by the Managing Director of VEGFED vide his communication dated April 24, 2023. 

When the Corporation found that the certificate of experience enclosed by the petitioner/firm was a forged one, filed a criminal case, registered as Airport P.S. Case No. 106 of 2023, against all the partners of the petitioner/firm along with the power of attorney holder, viz., Deepak Kumar for offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420, 120(B) and 511 of the Indian Penal Code.

The High Court's 13-page long judgment was authored by Justice Kumar on February 27, 2025 in a Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case which challenged the order passed by the Chief Engineer-cum-Registering Authority, Bihar Police Building Construction Corporation, Patna initially blacklisting the the registration of the petitioner/firm for an indefinite period, which was modified through a corrigendum to blacklist the firm for five years. 

The firm had also submitted an affidavit along with its bid, stating that all enclosed certificates were true, and that in case of detection of any false information, the competent authority could take legal action, including blacklisting and lodging of an FIR. 

Invoking the provisions of the Bihar Contractor Registration Rules, 2007, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 01.06.2023, asking the firm to explain within one week of the receipt of the notice as to why the registration be not suspended and the petitioner/firm be not blacklisted on the charge of forgery, cheating and uploading a forged experience certificate along with the bid documents. 

The High Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs.Tulsi Ram Patel : (1985) 3 SCC 398, which encompasses the complete amplitude of the principle of audi alteram partem, which reads as follows :-

“96. The rule of natural justice with which we are concerned in these appeals and writ petitions, namely, the audi alteram partem rule, in its fullest amplitude means that a person against whom an order to his prejudice may be passed should be informed of the allegations and charges against him, be given an opportunity of submitting his explanation thereto, have the right to know the evidence, both oral or documentary, by which the matter is proposed to be decided against him, and to inspect the documents which are relied upon for the purpose of being used against him examined in his presence and have the right to cross-examine them, and to lead his own evidence, both oral and documentary, in his defence.

The process of a fair hearing need not, however, conform to the judicial process in a court of law, because judicial adjudication of causes involves a number of technical rules of procedure and evidence which are unnecessary and not required for the purpose of a fair hearing within the meaning of audi alteram partem rule in a quasi-judicial or administrative inquiry.”

Notably, the petitioner/firm got an opportunity to explain the evidence against it and represent why it should not be blacklisted, in the appeal.

The judgment reads: "We, even at the cost of repetition, state that there is no statement on behalf of the petitioner/firm that the certificate uploaded by it is not forged."

The High Court also referred to Supreme Court's decisions in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. Vs. State of W.B : (1975) 1 SCC 70; B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd.Vs. Nair Coal Services Ltd. : (2006) 11 SCC 548; Kulja Industries Ltd. Vs. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Ors. :(2014) 14 SCC 731; Patel Engineering Ltd. Vs. Union of India : (2012) 11 SCC 257 and Blue Dreamz Advertising Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Ors. : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1896. 

In a different case, the High Court had delivered its 57-page judgement wherein it quashed the BUIDCo order of blacklisting M/s EMS Infracon Private Limited on March 4, 2021 for one year as per the provisions of Bihar Contractor Registration Rules, 2007 for mentioning false facts in its tender documents. The rules were actually formed by the state road construction department with it’s commissioner-cum-secretary as an appellate authority. The court observed that blacklisting a contractor can have more serious consequences than dismissal of an employee for reason that his status may be restored with other consequential benefits if found illegal. Loss incurred by a firm because of the ineligibility after being blacklisted cannot be compensated. It is high time the state considered framing statutory rules in view of laws laid down by the Supreme court on the serious and grave consequences of blacklisting a firm.

 

Statement of Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) at the demise of Anil Chaudhury

STATEMENT BY CNDP ON THE PASSING AWAY OF ANIL CHAUDHURY

We at the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) are deeply shocked and saddened at the demise of Anil Chaudhury, one of the oldest and most active members of our group, in Delhi this morning.

Anil, in the most unobtrusive way, since shortly after the inaugural conference in Delhi in 2000 ensured continued and uninterrupted functioning of the organisation by providing the central office in Delhi and also securing working hands to run the office. Similarly, he constantly provided the logistical support necessary for making the organisation work and also enabling it to bring out its organ: Peace Now. Then in the quarter century. that we have been in existence against all odds and with the nuclear cloud still hanging over us, Anil remained steadfast in his active involvement and commitment to the cause of a Nuclear free India, South Asia and indeed a nuclear free world.

For Anil, this commitment to denuclearization and democratization, was an integral part of his lifelong engagement with movements for social justice, and building peace from the grass roots to the national, regional and global levels. His deep involvement with both INSAF (Indian Social Action Forum) and to PEACE (Popular Education and Action Centre) were a testimony to this integrated vision of a world where Justice was a necessary precondition for Peace.

Anil was also someone who worked without fanfare and in relative anonymity. His was often the unseen but steady hand, mind and heart that enabled resolution of differences and conflict [and there were many!]; quietly brought together widely differing ideological and workaday positions; and without whose calm, benign presence – many of our groups might have gone our separate ways much earlier.

That we are still together and still sharing our vision of a just, peaceful and nuclear free tomorrow is largely because we had silent warriors like Anil holding us together like a secure and sound anchor. And we can never forget that quiet sense of humour – the smile and hug that would bring us together when it was so easy to divide – which were his endearing qualities and taught all of us the need to work together as a team.

We in CNDP, join all the other anti-nuclear platforms and progressive peoples’ movements in paying tribute to a remarkable human being and celebrating the life and contribution that he has made to the ongoing efforts to bring about a different more humane world.

Our deepest condolences to Ranjana, Abhinav, Arpita and other family members. Anil’s passing leaves a void which will be difficult to fill – both personally and for the organisations with which he was associated.

A Luta Continua –“The Struggle Continues”. And we look to the legacies left by Anil and many of our comrades who have passed on, to light the way forward as we continue our work for a Nuclear Free, Peaceful and Democratic world. 

Patna High Court's Division Bench sets aside judgement by its Single Judge in teacher recruitment case

In the State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Dhirendra Kumar & Ors, Letters Patent Appeal No.1030 of 2024, Patna High Court's Division bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy set aside the Single Judge’s Judgment by Justice Nani Tagia by his 20-page long judgement dated April 8, 2025.

The Division Bench judgement recorded that the Commission categorically stated that amongst the writ-petitioners, nobody was in the category of candidates who qualify to be appointed on the basis of cut-off marks and cut-off date of birth.

Drawing on Supreme Court's decisions in Shankarsan Dash vs. Union of India: (1991) 3 SCC 47; R.S. Mittal vs. Union of India : 1995 Supp.(2) SCC 230 and Food Corporation of India & Ors. vs. Bhanu Lodh & Ors.: (2005) 3 SCC 618, the Division Bench observed: "There is no legal right to appointment but only of being considered, which is subject to bona fide action on the part of the State. An aspirant has no legal right and the superior Court, in exercise of its judicial power of review, would not ordinarily direct issuance of any writ in the absence of any pleading and proof of mala fide or arbitrariness on the part of the employer."

Drawing on Supreme Court's decision in Kashyap & Ors. vs. South East Central Railway & Ors.:(2019) 12 SCC 798, the Division Bench observed: "It is not incumbent upon the employer to fill all posts but discretion not to appoint, must be exercised judiciously. Courts normally would not interfere with the discretion not to fill up posts but exercise of such discretion should not be arbitrary, capricious or whimsical." It concluded: "For the afore-noted reasons, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where the impugned judgment could be sustained." 

Granting relief to 101 petitioners, in his 56-page long judgment dated July 18, 2024, Justice Tagia had directed the State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary Additional chief Secretary, Education Department, Secretary, Education Department, and Director, Secondary Education, Education Department, to identify the number of vacancies that had arisen due to non-appointment of the candidates recommended by the B.P.S.C. as primary teacher for class I-V pursuant to the Advertisement No. 26/2023 for want of requisite qualifications and convey it to the respondents, namely, Bihar Public Service Commission, Chairman, Bihar Public Service Commission and Joint Secretary -cum- Examination Controller, Bihar Public Service Commission On receipt of this information, the respondents were required to publish a supplementary result in order of merit from the selection held pursuant to Advertisement No. 26 of 2023, subject to the candidate(s) having secured the cut off marks and meets the cut off date of birth prescribed by the B.P.S.C.

The petitioners had filed the writ petition praying for issuance of an appropriate writ, order, direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent Bihar Public Service Commission to publish thesupplementary / revised merit list for teachers in primary school for Class I-V in advertisement no. 26 of 2023 dated 30.05.2023, against the vacancies that could not be filled due to ineligibility/disqualification of provisionally successful candidates for non-passing of the CTET and D.El.Ed. Examination.

 

The petition sought a  direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to publish the result of the petitioners in the fresh supplementary list and call the petitioners for document verification and accordingly, allot respective schools after the publication of the supplementary/revised merit list for teachers inprimary school for Class I-V against advertisement no. 26 of 2023 dated 30.05.2023.

 

It prayed for direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to consequently, lower down the cut-off date of birth in all the categories in the supplementary/revised merit list for teachers in primary school for Class I-V against advertisement no. 26 of 2023 dated 30.05.2023, and publish the revised merit list accordingly.

 

It also sought a direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to not merge/include the leftover vacancy of advertisement no. 26/2023 dated 30.05.2023 with the future vacancy of teacher recruitment examination.

 

It prayed for direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to furnish the details of the vacancies accrued in primary teacher for class I to V due to the candidature rejection of successful candidates in want of CTET & D.El.Ed. certificates and for any other reason. The petition wanted the Court to declare that the respondent Bihar Public Service Commission is legally bound to publish the supplementary/revised merit list for teachers in primary school for Class I - V in advertisement no. 26 of 2023dated 30.05.2023 and thereafter, on the basis of the supplementary/revised merit list for teachers, the appointments are made.

 

The Bihar Public Service Commission (BPSC) had published advertisement No.26/2023, dated 30.05.2022 under the signature of the Joint Secretary cum Examination Controller, BPSC inviting on-line

applications for 1,70,461 posts. These advertised posts included 79,943 posts of primary school teachers for class-1 to 5 for the subjects Urdu, Bangla and general subject. For general subject, the number of posts advertised was 67,066. The petitioners are concerned with 67,066/- posts advertised for primary school teachers for general subject. The advertisement, apart from providing eligibility criteria also provided that in case of the candidates obtaining same marks, age will be given precedence and in case, age will be the same, alphabetical order will be given priority. While advertisement provided 12.07.2023 as the last date of submission of on-line applications, B.P.S.C. published a corrigendum dated 22.06.2023, in which, it has been mentioned that the candidates, who had participated in CTET paper-I examination till 31.08.2023, will be allowed to participate in the examination. The petitioners, who possess all the requisite qualification, applied and had appeared in the written examination held on 24.08.2023 and 25.08.2023. The B.P.S.C. published result on 18.10.2023, wherein 62,653 candidates were declared successful for appointment as primary school teacher. At the time of publishing the result, the cut off marks and cut off date of birth for primary teacher for different categories, on the basis of written examination held on 24.05.2023 and 25.05.2023.

 

The Division Bench judgement has recorded that three kinds of vacancies were identified, viz., (i) the seats remaining vacant because of the Commission recommending lesser number of candidates which was carried forward in the next advertisement; (ii) the seats remaining vacant because of recommendation of same candidate on multiple posts for which a supplementary result of 467 candidates was published and (iii) the seats remaining vacant because of recommendation of ineligible candidates, which also was carried forward in the next advertisement. The vacancy in the third category could be calculated only after the conclusion of examination against next Advertisement No. 27/2023. Because of this, the supplementary result was published against seats which remained vacant due to recommendation of same candidate on multiple posts only.

The judgement reads: "we have taken into account the categorical statement of the Commission that no respondents/writ petitioners met the cut-off threshold of date of birth, though they had obtained marks equal to the selected candidates. We have also considered that the vacancies were carried forward and two consecutive selection process got activated."
 

Unreasoned order is a nullity: Supreme Court

"23....A litigant has a legitimate expectation of knowing reasons for rejection of his claim/prayer. It is then alone, that a party would be in a position to challenge the order on appropriate grounds. Besides, this would be for the benefit of the higher or the appellate court. As arguments bring things hidden and obscure to the light of reasons, reasoned judgment where the law and factual matrix of the case is discussed, provides lucidity and foundation for conclusions or exercise of judicial discretion by the courts.

24. Reason is the very life of law. When the reason of a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases (Wharton's Law Lexicon). Such is the significance of reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice as well as avoids uncertainty. As a matter of fact it helps in the observance of law of precedent. Absence of reasons on the contrary essentially introduces an element of uncertainty, dissatisfaction and give entirely different dimensions to the questions of law raised before the higher/appellate courts. In our view, the court should provide its own grounds and reasons for rejecting claim/prayer of a party whether at the very threshold i.e. at admission stage or after regular hearing, howsoever concise they may be.

25. We would reiterate the principle that when reasons are announced and can be weighed, the public can have assurance that process of correction is in place and working. It is the requirement of law that correction process of judgments should not only appear to be implemented but also seem to have been properly implemented. Reasons for an order would ensure and enhance public confidence and would provide due satisfaction to the consumer of justice under our justice dispensation system. It may not be very correct in law to say, that there is a qualified duty imposed upon the courts to record reasons.

26. Our procedural law and the established practice, in fact, imposes unqualified obligation upon the courts to record reasons. There is hardly any statutory provision under the Income Tax Act or under the Constitution itself requiring recording of reasons in the judgments but it is no more res integra and stands unequivocally settled by different judgments of this Court holding that the courts and tribunals are required to pass reasoned judgments/orders. In fact, Order 14 Rule 2 read with Order 20 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that, the court should record findings on each issue and such findings which obviously should be reasoned would form part of the judgment, which in turn would be the basis for writing a decree of the court.

27. By practice adopted in all courts and by virtue of judge-made law, the concept of reasoned judgment has become an indispensable part of basic rule of law and, in fact, is a mandatory requirement of the procedural law. Clarity of thoughts leads to clarity of vision and proper reasoning is the foundation of a just and fair decision. In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. [1974 ICR 120 (NIRC)] there are apt observations in this regard to say “failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice”. Reasons are the real live links to the administration of justice. With respect we will contribute to this view. There is a rationale, logic and purpose behind a reasoned judgment. A reasoned judgment is primarily written to clarify own thoughts; communicate the reasons for the decision to the concerned and to provide and ensure that such reasons can be appropriately considered by the appellate/higher court. Absence of reasons thus would lead to frustrate the very object stated hereinabove.”

-Decision in Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department, Works Contract and Leasing, Kota vs. Shukla and Brothers (2010) 4 SCC 785 April 15, 2010 cited in State Project Director, UP Education for All Project Board & Ors. v. Saroj Maurya & Ors (2024) with approval in Supreme Court's judgement dated August 21, 2024

“Reasons are the backbone of the order and only from the reasons it can be deciphered as to what persuaded the authority to draw a particular conclusion."

- Justice G. S. Ahluwalia in Jairamdas Kukreja vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024:MPHC-JBP:51262, October 14, 2024