Showing posts with label Civil Procedure Code. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Civil Procedure Code. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 3, 2025

Justice Arun Kumar Jha dismisses petition with cost of Rs.25,000 on petitioner to be paid to answering respondents

On September 3, 2025, the Patna High Court delivered only two judgements. In Laliteshwar Kumar Sinha vs.The Welfare Housing Cooperative Society Ltd. & Ors. (2025), a civil miscellaneous petition, Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 15-page long judgement dated September 3, 2025. It was one of the two judgements. The civil miscellaneous was filed against the order dated April 26, 2018 passed by Subordinate Judge-III, Danapur, Patna in Title Suit No. 89 of 1986 whereby and whereunder the petition dated July 2, 2014 for acceptance of additional written statement was rejected. Justice Jha concluded: "....I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner has utterly failed to show any error of jurisdiction in passing the impugned order dated 26.04.2018 by the learned trial court and hence the said order is affirmed. 11. Further finding that the present civil miscellaneous petition is a clear case of abuse of process of law and the present petition is completely frivolous, vexatious and evidently filed for the purpose of delaying the disposal of Title Suit No. 89 of 1986, the same is dismissed with cost of Rs.25,000/- to be paid to the answering respondents before the learned trial court by the petitioner on the first date of hearing. 12. Office is directed to immediately send the record to the learned trial court and the learned trial court is requested to take steps for early disposal of the Title Suit No. 89 of 1986 considering its antiquity." The respondents included The Welfare Housing Cooperative Society Ltd., Shashi Prasad Singh, Shailendra Kumar Sinha, Shailesh Kumar Sinha, Satyanand Sinha and Kundan Sinha.

The case is that the petitioner was one of the defendants in a suit filed by respondents 1st set bearing Title Suit No. 89 of 1986. The suit was filed against Kewala Kuer and Inder Singh, the parents of the petitioner, for specific performance of contract on the basis of agreement for sale dated April 12, 1983 said to be executed by Kewala Kuer in favour of the plaintiff. Kewala Kuer, the original defendant no. 1 died on 30.04.1993 and a petition for substitution of her heirs/legal representatives was filed on July  15, 1993 which was allowed vide order dated May 31, 1994/August 1, 1994 directing the plaintiffs to file requisites for appearance of substituted defendant fixing August 25, 1994 as the next date in the suit. It appeared that a vakalatnama was filed on behalf of the petitioner, his brothers and sister who were the legal representatives of Kewala Kuer with a petition to treat the written statement filed by Kewala Kuer and Inder Singh as written statement of the substituted defendants. The matter proceeded and the evidence of the plaintiffs was closed and the matter had been coming up for the recording of the evidence of the defendants. At this stage on July 2, 2014, the petitioner who is defendant no. 1 (B) before the trial court filed an application along with an additional written statement for taking the additional written statement of the petitioner on record. It also transpired that March 4, 2016 was fixed in the suit for hearing on the petition dated July 2, 2014 filed by the petitioner and rejoinders filed by the plaintiffs and defendant no. 1(A). A time petition was filed on behalf of the petitioner seeking adjournment due to engagement of his counsel in some other Court but the petition dated July 2, 2014 was rejected instead of rejecting the adjournment petition. Thereafter, the petitioner on May 3, 2016 filed another application to hear the petitioner on his petition dated July 2, 2014 which had been rejected on March 4, 2016 as not pressed. The trial court, after hearing the petitioner had rejected the petition dated May 3, 2016 by its order dated August 17, 2016 with a liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh petition

Thereafter, the petitioner filed a fresh petition on September 29, 2016 with prayer to recall the order dated March 4, 2016 and accept the additional written stated dated July 2, 2014. This application was dismissed by the trial court vide order dated April 26, 2018 which was under challenge before the High Court.

The counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the impugned order was not sustainable and the same was passed in total disregard of the facts of the case. The mother of the petitioner, who was the original defendant no. 1, died on April 30, 1993 leaving behind her three sons and one daughter but the summons issued upon the substituted heirs was not served on the petitioner though it was stated that petitioner appeared in the case on August 25, 1994 as vakalatnama was filed on behalf of the petitioner and other substituted heirs, this presumption is not correct as petitioner had no knowledge or information about pendency of Title Suit No. 89 of 1986 prior to July 2, 2014. The petitioner did not execute any vakalatnama in favour of B. Chaudhary, Advocate and he was not instructed him to file any petition on his behalf for adopting the written statement filed by his mother. This fact becomes clear from the petition dated August 25, 1994 purported to have been filed jointly on behalf of the petitioner, his two brother and sister as the said petition does not bear the signature of any of the petitioners. The counsel also submitted that perhaps, the brother of the petitioner namely Shailesh Kumar Sinha, misused the signature of the petitioner which he had obtained on a blank vakalatnama and he was in collusion with the plaintiffs.

The counsel also submitted that once the petitioner came to know about the pendency of the title suit in which he had been made a defendant, the petitioner was within his rights to file additional written statement in accordance with the provisions of Order 22 Rule 4(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The counsel further submitted that Order 22 Rule 4(2) of the Code provides that any person made a party after death of the defendant may make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant. But the trial court did not consider this legal principle and went on to pass an erroneous order. 

The counsel further submitted that petitioner was one of the co-sharers of the land in dispute and being the substituted defendant he had every right to protect his interest in his own capacity. By rejecting the application dated July 2, 2014, the trial court denied the petitioner his statutory right to file an additional written statement and to make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the original defendant no. 1. counsel referred to para no. 8 of the case of Sumtibai & others vs. Paras Finance Co. Mankanwar W/o Parasmal Chordia (D)& Ors. reported in (2007) 10 SCC 82 wherein the Supreme Court held as follows:-
“8. Every party in a case has a right to file a written statement. This is in accordance with natural justice. The Civil Procedure Code is really the rules of natural justice which are set out in great and elaborate detail. Its purpose is to enable both parties to get a hearing. The appellants in the present case have already
been made parties in the suit, but it would be strange if they are not allowed to take a defence. In our opinion, Order 22 Rule 4(2) CPC cannot be construed in the manner suggested by counsel for the respondent.” 

The counsel reiterated that the respondent in their rejoinder did not refute the claim of the petitioner about the petition dated August 25, 1994 being unsigned. The counsel further submitted that the trial court committed further mistake in considering the merits of the written statement and the additional written statement sought to be brought on record by the petitioner. The counsel next submitted that defendant no. 1(A) has also filed rejoinder stating that the said defendant has no objection in accepting the written statement filed by the petitioner. Considering all these facts and circumstances, it was evident that the petitioner has been denied an opportunity to contest the case and if the same was not allowed, it would cause miscarriage of justice. Thus, the counsel submitted that the impugned order was bad and not sustainable in the eyes of law and the same needs to be set aside. 

On behalf of the respondents' counsel 1st set vehemently contended that there was no merit in the present petition and the same was liable to be dismissed. There was no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order and the petitioner had filed a false and frivolous petition challenging the order. The counsel further submitted that after death of their parents, the petitioner and other legal heirs had duly substituted and all the four legal heirs entered appearance by filing a common vakalatnama. Therefore it was wrong on part of the petitioner to say that he was not having any knowledge of the Title Suit No. 89 of 1986. All of them adopted the written statement filed earlier by their mother, the original defendant no. 1 and their father, the original defendant no. 2. 

The plea taken by the petitioner was wholly untenable and the grounds urged were incorrect and misleading. The petitioner and other substituted defendants have been participating in the proceeding through their advocates since 1994. The record would show evidence of the plaintiffs was closed long back where after the defendants started adducing their evidence. However, despite passage of considerable time, the evidence on behalf of the defendants remains incomplete. The conduct of the substituted defendants including the petitioner clearly reflects a concerted attempt through collusion and delay tactics to protract the proceeding by adopting unwarranted and obstructive means as evident from the records of the case. 

The counsel also submitted that after lapse of nearly two decades, the petitioner sprang a surprise and filed an additional written statement on July 2, 2014 praying for its acceptance, feigning ignorance about pendency of Title Suit No. 89 of 1986 and denying the fact that he ever appointed Sri B. Chaudhary, Advocate for executing the vakalatnama in his favour. But the plea of the petitioner that his signatures were obtained on a blank vakalatnama by his own brother was completely devoid of merit and appears to be a deliberate attempt to delay the adjudication of the suit. Such unsubstantiated allegation made without any cogent material cannot be accepted or relied on at this highly belated stage of the proceeding. The petitioner has developed a false and fabricated story under the pretext of lack of knowledge, non-service of summons and other baseless allegations but all these grounds were considered by the trial court and were rightly rejected. The story of the petitioner is not believable and conduct of the petitioner dis-entitles him to any equitable relief from this court. Rather the conduct of the petitioner amounted to abuse of the process of law. By attempting to reopen settled issues after a lapse of nearly two decades shows the petitioner wants to circumvent the principles of laches and estoppel which bars such belated claims

The counsel further submitted that the ground taken by the petitioner regarding his right to file an additional written statement is wholly unsustainable. The petitioner can take a defence not contrary to the defence raised by the deceased defendants since the substituted defendants step into the shoes of the deceased defendants. Moreover in a suit for specific performance the substituted defendants cannot be permitted to take plea that are inconsistent or contrary to those taken by the original defendants. 

The counsel also submitted that all the three brothers, including the petitioner, appear to be acting in collusion with each other and are deliberately making baseless and inconsistent allegations solely with the intention to obstruct the fair trial of the present suit. 

One of the brothers, namely Shailesh Kumar Sinha, who appeared as D.W. 1, during his cross examination admitted the execution of agreement to sale by his mother in favour of the plaintiffs and confirmed that a substantial amount of consideration money had been received. In order to counter this admission, the substituted defendants, under mutual understanding and under legal advice, began making false and contrary claims attempting to deviate from the original written statement filed by the deceased defendants wherein the original defendants had already admitted the material facts and receipt of consideration. Thus, the counsel submitted that the civil miscellaneous petition was completely frivolous, vexatious and has been filed by the petitioner with the sole objective of obstructing and delaying the final adjudication of the suit for specific performance which has been pending since the year 1986. Therefore, the trial court rightly rejected the application of the petitioner dated July 2, 2014 after giving due opportunity of hearing to all the concerned parties including the petitioner. Thus, the impugned order dated April 26, 2018 had been passed after due appreciation of the facts, pleadings on record and applicable legal provisions. Therefore, there is no illegality or infirmity in the order warranting interference of the High Court and hence the petition deserves to be dismissed with heavy cost.

Perusal of the lower court record which were called for in this case showed that the petitioner Laliteshwar Kumar Sinha appeared in this case, along with defendants Shailendra Kumar Sinha, Shailesh Kumar Sinha and Malti Devi, on August 25, 1994. Perusal of vakalatnama showed that the substituted defendants Shailesh Kumar Sinha, Shailendra Kumar Sinha, Malti Devi and Laliteshwar Kumar Sinha had executed the vakalatnama in favour of one B. Chaudhary, Advocate on August 25, 1994. It took note of the fact that the petitioner did not deny his signature on the vakalatnama but was merely stating that he did not execute the vakalatnama in favour of Advocate B. Chaudhary and had not instructed him for adoption of written statement. Once the petitioner admitted his signature on vakalatnama and the same has been duly accepted by the advocate, the executant cannot resile and say that he did not engage the counsel and had not passed any instructions. Any claim of the petitioner about not executing the vakalatnama was on very shaky grounds. The matter does not end there

The perusal of the lower court records showed that the same advocate namely, B Chaudhary and one more advocate namely D. P. Arya were again given a vakalatnama by the three brothers on December 3, 2010. This revealed that the petitioner did not come up before the Court with clean hands, more so, when he said that he came to know about the pending Title Suit No. 89 of 1986 for the first time on June 29, 2014 and vakalatnama was filed on behalf of the petitioner on June 30, 2014 by Suraj Kumar, advocate. The petitioner and his brothers had also engaged Bachan Prasad Srivastava and Raushan Rakesh Tiwary and Lala Hirendra Prasad Sinha as their advocates by executing vakalatnama dated December 16, 2013. The petitioner and his brothers also executed vakalatnama in favour of learned counsel Shambhu Bhushan Sharma on March 6, 2014. These facts conclusively demolished the claim of the petitioner that he did not knowledge of the suit prior to June 29, 2014. But these facts were of academic interest alone and are relevant only for the purpose of showing that the petitioner that he has made palpably false claim before the High Court with impunity since vakalatnama dated August 25, 1994 executed by the petitioner was already on record and as the signature on it had been admitted by the petitioner, the High Court did not need to look further about service of summons on the petitioner and his consequent appearance before the trial court on August 25, 1994.

Once the petitioner as substituted defendant made his appearance before the trial court, he was within his rights to take a defence commensurate with his status as legal representative of the deceased defendant as provided under Order 22 Rule 4(1) and Order 22 Rule 4(2) of the Code which reads as under:-
“4. Procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant. (1)Where one of two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, or a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.
(2)Any person so made a party may make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant.”
But this provision was required to be read along with Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code which provides that the defendant shall, within 30 days from the date of service of summons on him present a written statement on his defence. It further provided that where the defendant fails to file written statement within such period of 30 days, he shall be allowed to file it on such other day as may be specified by the Court for reasons to be recorded in writing but shall not be greater than 90 days. Therefore, the petitioner was supposed to make his defence within 90 days from the date of his appearance i.e., August 25, 1994. But the petitioner chose not to take any such defence within the stipulated period provided under Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code. 

The petitioner slept over the matter for 20 years and all of a sudden approached the trial court with a completely false and concocted plea of having no knowledge/information about pending Title Suit No. 89 of 1986 instituted against his parents and duly contested by his brothers and sister. 

One of the grounds to deny his appearance on August 25, 1994 was that the petition adopting the written statement was not signed by the petitioner or his brothers but when vakalatnama had been executed by the petitioner and his siblings, the substituted defendants, they cannot disown the petition seeking adoption of the written statement of their parents. 

Justice Jha observed: "The petitioner was also economical with truth as none of the siblings denied the adoption and had been prosecuting the case on the basis of the written statement. Therefore, the submission of the counsel for the petitioner on this point was without merit."

Thursday, May 1, 2025

Justice Arun Kumar Jha sets aside rejection order of Sub Judge-VI, Patna in a Title Suit from Phulwari Sharif

In Farkunda Shahin & Ors. vs. Md. Mokhtar Alam & Ors. (2025), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court in his 17-page long judgement dated April 30, 2025 concluded: "I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 20.09.2016 could not be sustained and same is set aside and the application dated 08.04.2016 is allowed. Accordingly, the present petition stands allowed." In this case from Phulwari Sharif, the order dated 20.09.2016 passed by Sub Judge-VI, Patna in Title Suit No. 482 of 2006 whereby and whereunder the trial court had rejected the petition dated 08.04.2016 filed under Order 1 Rule 10(2) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the petitioners to be added as defendants in the suit.

The trial court had heard the parties and rejected the prayer for impleadment vide order dated 20.09.2016. This order was challenged before the High Court. The petitioners' counsel submitted that the impugned order is not sustainable and the trial court has passed the orders against the settled provision of law. The senior counsel further submitted that due to the mistake of the scribe, a wrong plot no. has been mentioned in the sale deed of the vendors and also in the sale deed of the petitioners but other description like Tauzi No., Khata No., area and boundary are the same. Further, a property could be identified by its boundary and misdescription or wrong mentioning of plot number would not come in the way of identifying the property. But this fact was not considered by the trial court. The counsel referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sheodhyan Singh And Others vs Musammat Santchara Kuer And Others reported in AIR 1963 SC 1879 wherein the Court referred to the decision of the Privy Council wherein it was observed that a case of misdescription could be treated as a mere irregularity where there is no doubas to the identity of the property and if identity of the property is well established, misdescription does not affect the identity of the property sold and thus, Supreme Court held that the mistake in plot number must be treated as mere misdescription which does not affect the identity of the property sold. The senior counsel also submitted that moreover plot number 797 is part of Khata no. 46 and this is the admitted position in the plaint of the plaintiffs. This fact is also clear from making the vendors of the petitioners, namely Muneshwar Rai and Nazir Rai, as parties/defendants. They were made parties only on the ground that they were admittedly the title holder of Plot No. 796 but they have nothing to do with the Plot No. 797. Thus, the petitioners are bona fide purchasers from Muneshwar Rai and Nazir Rai of Plot No. 796 and are in exclusive possession of the same. The trial court failed to exercise its jurisdiction and did not consider the real dispute in issue and rejected the petition of the petitioner on misconceived grounds. Prior to the sale of the disputed property to the petitoners, Muneshwar Rai and Nazir Rai partitioned their property in half and got their names recorded in Government Sarista of the State of Bihar and jamabandi was created in their names and mutation was also done in the names of the petitioners. The senior counsel reiterated that Plot No. 797 comes under Khata No. 46 having area 11 decimal with different boundary and neither the plaintiffs not the intervenors/petitioners have any concern with the said plot of land. The senior counsel further submitted that the vendors of the petitioners have already sold the suit land and they have no interest in the suit property and might not properly contest the suit. This makes the petitioners necessary parties for proper disposal of the suit. The senior counsel also submitted that the petitioners are necessary parties having right, title and possession over one of the plots of the Schedule II property and their interest would be jeopardized if they are not made parties and it would also result in multiplicity of litigation. Thus, it has been submitted by the senior counsel that the impugned order is not sustainable and the same be set aside and the application of the petitioners for impleadment be allowed. 

Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code reads: “(2) Court may strike out or add parties The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name, of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.”

Supreme Court in the case of Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 733, has held that ‘necessary parties’ are those persons in whose absence no decree can be passed by the Court or that there must be a right to some relief against some party in respect of the controversy involved in the proceedings. On the other hand ‘proper parties’ are those whose presence before the Court would be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit although no relief in the suit was claimed against such person.

The Supreme Court in the case of Sumtibai vs. Paras Finance Co. Regd. Partnership Firm Beawer (Raj.), reported in (2007) 10 SCC 82, has held that a party having a semblance of interest in the suit property could be impleaded as a party in the suit.

In the case of Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. vs. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., reported in (2010) 7 SCC 417 has discussed the law relating to impleadment of the parties. The relevant paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 22, 25 & 27 of the judgment reads:
“13. The general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person
against whom he does not seek any relief. Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff. But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the Code”, impleadment of proper or necessary parties...
14. The said provision makes it clear that a court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party: (a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, but not added; or (b) any person whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in the suit. In short, the court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party.
15. A “necessary party” is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. If a “necessary party” is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A “proper party” is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance.
22. Let us consider the scope and ambit of Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC regarding striking out or adding parties. The said sub-rule is not about the right of a non-party to be impleaded as a party, but about the judicial discretion of the court to strike out or add parties at any stage of a proceeding. The discretion under the sub-rule can be exercised either suo motu or on the application of the plaintiff or the defendant, or on an application of a person who is not a party to the suit. The court can strike out any party who is improperly joined. The court can add anyone as a plaintiff or as a defendant if it finds that he is a necessary party or proper party. Such deletion or addition can be without any conditions or subject to such terms as the court deems fit to impose. In exercising its judicial discretion under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the
Code, the court will of course act according to reason and fair play and not according to whims and caprice.
25. In other words, the court has the discretion to either to allow or reject an application of a person claiming to be a proper party, depending upon the facts and circumstances and no person has a right to insist that he should be impleaded as a party, merely because he is a proper party.
27. On a careful examination of the facts of this case, we find that the appellant is neither a necessary party nor a proper party. As noticed above, the appellant is neither a purchaser nor the lessee of the suit property and has no right, title or interest therein. The first respondent-plaintiff in the suit has not sought any relief against the appellant. The presence of the appellant is not necessary for passing an effective decree in the suit for specific performance. Nor is its presence necessary for complete and effective adjudication of the matters in issue in the suit for specific performance filed by the first respondent-plaintiff against AAI. A person who expects to get a lease from the defendant in a suit for specific performance in the event of the suit being dismissed, cannot be said to be a person having some semblance of title in the property in dispute”.

Drawing on these judgements of the Supreme Court, Justice Jha observed: "...merely on this ground that disputed plot number does not match with the plot number of the petitioners, the rejection of the claim of the petitioners for impleadment is not proper. It is the settled provision of law that a land would be identified by its boundary and if its identity is established and the same is certain, mere misdescription would not come in the way of asserting rights by its title holder."






Tuesday, February 4, 2025

Law Secretary, Madhya Pradesh directed to remain present in Supreme Court on February 14

Hearing a Special Leave Petition (Civil)-The State of Madhya Pradesh, Sub Divisional Officer  and Ceiling Officer and the Tehsildar vs. Gokulchand and Ajit Kumar which arose out of final judgment and order dated  April 5, 2024 in SA No. 156/2021 passed by Justice Hridesh of High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore, Supreme Court's bench of Justices J. B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan passed an order on January 31, 2025. The order reads:"We direct the Law Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to remain present before us on 14-2-2025 along with the original files containing the decision taken to challenge the impugned order passed by the High Court declining to condone the delay of 656 days. We would like to know who is that authority who took the decision that the order passed by the High Court is worth challenging before this Court. 7. List on 14-2-2025."

It observed: "We admire the courage with which the State of Madhya Pradesh has been filing Special Leave Petitions in this Court over a period of time with delay of 300/400 days....The matter of concern is as to who is taking the decision to challenge a particular order passed by the High Court before the Supreme Court.  In the present case, the State preferred a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 before the High Court with delay of 656 days. The State was not able to assign any sufficient cause for this gross delay and, accordingly, the High Court rejected the plea to condone the delay. It is this order which has now been made a subject matter of challenge before this Court by filing the present Special Leave Petition and that too with delay of 177 days. We could have dismissed this petition solely on the ground of delay but we do not intend to do this as we have something else in our mind."