Delhi High Court directs Google, Indian Kanoon, and all other search engine operators and intermediary platforms to recognize person's "right to be forgotten" in its operations

In Laksh Vir Singh Yadav vS.  Union of India & Ors. (2026), Justice Sachin Dutta of Delhi High Court delivered a 144-page long judgement dated May 29, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"Google LLC/ Google Inc./Google India Private Ltd. and all other search engine operators are directed to de-index the relevant content, orders, judgments and associated reportage from name-based search results, and shall be complied in the same manner, as a direction under Rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. 285. Indian Kanoon (iKanoon Software Development Private Limited) is directed to restrict name-based search functionality within its platform in respect of the records of the petitioners identified above. The judgments and orders shall remain accessible on Indian Kanoon by case number, citation, Court details and date. 286. All petitioners in respect of whom de-indexing has been directed shall be at liberty to seek masking from the concerned Court that rendered the original order or judgment. 287. The Union of India, through the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY), is directed to ensure compliance with these directions by the respondent intermediaries within the aforementioned time period. MEITY shall immediately communicate these directions to Google LLC/ Google Inc., Indian Kanoon and all other search engine operators and intermediary platforms operating within the jurisdiction of India, and shall file a compliance affidavit within a period four weeks from today." 

The 30-page long Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 has been framed under Section 87 (1) (z) (zg) and Section 87 (2) of section 87 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 by Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY). It was published in the Gazette of India on February 25, 2021, in the aftermath of Supreme Court's unanimous judgement dated August 24, 027 in K.S. Puttaswamy vs. Union of India, 2017 10 SCC 1. 

The judgement reads: "141. The right to be forgotten, understood as subsuming the right of an individual to seek removal or restriction of personal information from public digital accessibility, where such information is no longer relevant or serves no legitimate public purpose, flows naturally and necessarily from the constitutional recognition of informational privacy under Article 21." He pointed out: "146. India presently lacks a comprehensive statutory framework explicitly governing the right to be forgotten. However, the absence of specific  legislation does not preclude Constitutional Courts from recognizing and enforcing this right."

Justice Dutta recorded that  "Google has submitted that it performs a passive and neutral function" to state that "This is inaccurate. By actively collecting, indexing, organizing and serving personal data through name-based search results, and by deriving commercial revenue through advertising linked to those search results, Google is an active processor of personal data, which materially contributes to the invasion of informational privacy. The same has also been traced by the European Court of Human Rights, in the judgment rendered in Hurbain v. Belgium (Grand Chamber, Application No. 57292/16)...." He noted that "the functioning of Google (and similar search engines) is entirely automated and algorithmic....A purely mechanical process driven by algorithmic logic cannot constitute an exercise of freedom of speech and expression." Justice Dutta referred to the decision in Google Spain, S.L. vs. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) & Mario Costeja González (Case C-131/12) to state that "the activities of Google cannot be equated with those of the 'publishers of websites'. In Google Spain, it has been observed:“35 In this connection, it should be pointed out that the processing of personal data carried out in the context of the activity of a search engine can be distinguished from and is additional to that carried out by publishers of websites, consisting in loading those data on an internet page.” 176. It follows that Google’s indexing and serving of judicial and other records in response to name-based searches is not an exercise of any fundamental right that can be legitimately pitted against the petitioner’s fundamental right to informational privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution. Such search engines are not ‘passive channels of information’, instead they are in the nature of a ‘commercial platform’, deriving revenue by leveraging user searches and associating them with advertising opportunities."  

Justice Dutta drew on Justice S.K Kaul's concurring judgement as part of 9-Judge Constitution Bench in K.S. Puttaswamy vs. Union of India (2017). Justice Kaul observed: “629. The right of an individual to exercise control over his personal  data and to be able to control his/her own life would also encompass his right to control his existence on the internet. Needless to say that this would not be an absolute right. The existence of such a right does not  imply that a criminal can obliterate his past, but that there are variant degrees of mistakes, small and big, and it cannot be said that a person should be profiled to the nth extent for all and sundry to know....631. The impact of the digital age results in information on the internet being permanent. Humans forget, but the internet does not forget and does not let humans forget. Any endeavour to remove information from the internet does not result in its absolute obliteration. The footprints remain. It is thus, said that in the digital world preservation is the norm and forgetting a struggle....634....People change and an individual should be able to determine the path of his life and not be stuck only on a path of which he/she treaded initially. An individual should have the capacity to change his/her beliefs and evolve as a person. Individuals should not live in fear that the views they expressed will forever be associated with them and thus refrain from W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 73 of 144 expressing themselves. 635. Whereas this right to control dissemination of personal information in the physical and virtual space should not amount to a right of total eraser of history, this right, as a part of the larger right to privacy, has to be balanced against other fundamental rights like the freedom of expression, or freedom of media, fundamental to a democratic society. 636. Thus, the European Union Regulation of 2016 [ Regulation No. (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27-4 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive No. 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).] has recognised what has been termed as “the right to be forgotten”. This does not mean that all aspects of earlier existence are to be obliterated, as some may have a social ramification. If we were to recognise a similar right, it would only mean that an individual who is no longer desirous of his personal data to be processed or stored, should be able to remove it from the system where the personal data/information is no longer necessary, relevant, or is incorrect and serves no legitimate interest. Such a right cannot be exercised where the information/data is necessary, for exercising the right of freedom of expression and information, for compliance with legal obligations, for the performance of a task carried out in public interest, on the grounds of public interest in the area of public health, for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims. Such justifications would be valid in all cases of breach of privacy, including breaches of data privacy.”

Drawing on the Supreme Court's decsion, Justice Dutta wrote: "....the present proceedings are directed at enforcing the fundamental rights of the petitioners, originating from Article 21 of the Constitution, the rights that the Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, expressly recognized as operating against both State and non-State actors" The relevant observations read: “328. Informational privacy is a facet of the right to privacy. The dangers to privacy in an age of information can originate not only from the State but from non-State actors as well…… 367. Claims for protection of privacy interests can arise against the State and its instrumentalities and against non-State entities, such as, individuals acting in their private capacity and bodies corporate or unincorporated associations, etc., without any element of State participation. Apart from academic literature, different claims based on different asserted privacy interests have also found judicial support. Cases arose in various jurisdictions in the context of privacy interests based on (i) common law; (ii) statutory recognition; and (iii) constitutionally protected claims of the right to privacy.....644. The right to privacy is a fundamental right. It is a right which  protects the inner sphere of the individual from interference from  both State and non-State actors and allows the individuals to make autonomous life choices.”

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Soni Shrivastava set aside order by Conficating Authority, remit the matter back to it

In Raju Kumar Yadav @ Raju Yadav vs. The State of Bihar through Secretary of the Excise Department, Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava delivered a 5-page long judgement dated May 12, 2026, wherein, it concluded that "a notice to show cause was required to be issued in the confiscation matter and only after hearing the petitioner or his authorised representative/counsel in the confiscation matter, an appropriate order would have been passed. This has not been done. In result, the impugned orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law. The impugned orders were set aside. The judgement was authored by Justice Prasad. 

The judgement reads:"The matter is remitted to the Confiscating Authority to consider the application for release of the vehicle afresh keeping in view the judgment of this Court in the case of Manjeet Kumar Yadav Vs. The State of Bihar and Others in CWJC No. 10126 of 2025. The Confiscating Authority shall first decide on the application for release within a period of one month from the date of receipt/communication of a copy of this order. 11. So far as the confiscation proceeding is concerned, it will be open to the Confiscating Authority to proceed with the confiscation matter separately by issuing notice to the petitioner calling upon him to submit his response. A reasoned order in confiscation matter shall be passed by the Confiscating Authority after giving appropriate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner/his authorised representative/counsel. 12. This writ application is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove." 

The five other respondents were: 2. Excise Commissioner, Bihar, 3.District Magistrate, Kaimur Bhabua. 4. Superintendent of Police, Kaimur Bhabua,  5. The Superintendent of Excise, Kaimur Bhabua and 6. Investigating Officer of Police Station Excise P.S.,Kaimur. 

The petitioner was aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order dated July 24, 2025 passed by the Secretary (Prohibition and Excise), Bihar, Patna in Excise Revision Case of 2025 by which the Revisional Authority upheld the order passed by the Confiscating Authority and the Appellate Authority. The Revisional Authority rejected the revision application. The petitioner approached the High Court.

The petitioner submitted that the vehicle in question was a Tractor. On December 15, 2023, the vehicle was intercepted by a police party. The allegation was that the vehicle was engaged in transportation of 261 liters of country made liquor. The driver of the vehicle was arrested. On the basis of his self-statement, the S.I. of Police registered Mohania P.S. Case of 2023 dated December 15, 2023. It was the case of the petitioner that he was engaged in agricultural work. For the release of the vehicle, the petitioner filed an application before the Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Kaimur. It was submitted that such application was filed in terms of Rule 12A of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Rules, 2021. A report was called for from the S.H.O. of the concerned police station. In his report, the S.H.O. opposed the prayer for release of the vehicle.The counsel submitted that even as the Confiscating Authority had not issued any notice proposing to confiscate the vehicle in question and no opportunity to show case was given in the confiscation matter to the petitioner, the Confiscating Authority while rejecting the request of the petitioner to release the vehicle in question on the ground of the provision contained in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12A of the Rules of 2021, simultaneously passed an order of confiscation of the vehicle.  

It was submitted that in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent State and its authorities, there is no averment that any notice to show cause was issued in confiscation matter. The counsel submitted that this being the position, the order of confiscation suffers from procedural infirmity and was liable to be set aside.

Justice Prasad observed: "....we are of the opinion that the order of confiscation suffers from violation of principles of natural justice inasmuch as it appears that in the confiscation matter, no notice to show cause
was issued to the petitioner. It was the petitioner who had approached the Confiscating Authority under Rule 12A of the Rules of 2021 (as amended up to date) for release of the vehicle which was refused citing sub-rule (3) of Rule 12A of the Rules of 2021 (as amended up to date). At this stage, the Confiscating
Authority became functus officio insofar as the application was concerned but the Confiscating Authority did not stop there, he continued with the order and considered the matter of confiscation."

Supreme Court to examine validity of Section 58 of Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 read with specific Rules

In The State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Shankar Baranwal (2025), Supreme Court's bench of Chief Justice B.R.Gavai. Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice N.V. Anjaria passed an order dated August 9, 2025. It issued notice as it is all set to to examine validity of Section 58 of Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 read with Rules 12 A and 12 B of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Rules, 2021. Its order reads:"Until further orders, there shall be stay insofar as the direction issued by the High Court to make the payment by the valuer is concerned. The case arose out of impugned 7-pag long final judgment and order dated April 16, 2025 in Shankar Baranwal vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025) passed by the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices P. B. Bajanthri and S. B. Pd. Singh. 

The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Bajanthri. The petitioner had prayed for issuance of writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing the order dated January 17, 2022 passed in Excise Revision Case No. 282/2021 by Additional Chief Secretary, Bihar, Patna whereby and whereunder the order dated September 10, 2021, passed in Excise Appeal Case No. 523/2021 by the Commissioner, Excise, Patna and order dated July 17, 2021, passed in Confiscation Case NO. 118/2021 by the District Magistrate, Kaimur at Bhabua, which arose out of Durgawati P.S. Case No. 74/2020 have been confirmed and Safari car bearing Registration No. UP-60V-0160 of the petitioner was confiscated and also for giving direction to release the aforesaid vehicle of the petitioner. 

Justice Bajanthri observed: "It is to be noted not even reference to value of the vehicle purchased and depreciation year wise with reference to any policy or the Government or General Insurance Company. In the absence of assessment and randomly evaluation of vehicle in wholesale is highly deprecated. Irrespective of movable and immovable property cannot be valued with the naked eye by the bureaucrats of the State of Bihar and proceed to undertake auction and causing the state exchequer under loss and for the concerned person. In almost each and every case Motor Vehicle Inspectors are evaluating valuation of the vehicle in wholesale without there being individual assessment of the vehicle or property with reference to evaluation like date of purchase and value of what would be value as on the date of seizure of the vehicle and on the date of auction. 5. Having regard to the facts that one liter of liquor has been seized from the subject matter of vehicle, petitioner shall not be penalized in seizing vehicle and auctioning the vehicle at throw away price and realised amount remitting arbitrary and illegal." 

In the light of these observations, the High Court concluded: "the confiscation order, appellate authority order and revision authority order stands modified to the above extent, while exercising extra ordinary jurisdiction under article 226 of constitution", in order to avoid further legal proceedings. 

Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad led bench sets aside hasty judgment of acquittal passed bhy Additional District & Sessions Judge-V, Bhagalpur

In Dulari Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sourendra Pandey observed: "The judicial conscience of this Court is totally disturbed on finding the kind of insensitiveness on the part of the investigating agency and the Public Prosecutor who were involved in this case. The trial court seems to have acted in haste in closing the prosecution evidence without taking care of it’s own order dated 08.11.2023 by which an explanation was called from the I.O." The judgement was delivered May 9, 2025.

It underlined that the Court "had a duty to find out the truth and for this purpose the Presiding Officer of the trial court was required to exhaust all such procedures which were available to him in law to secure the presence of the witnesses. This Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that the judgment of acquittal in this case, having been passed in haste is liable to be set aside. 43. This Court, accordingly sets aside the impugned judgment. The trial court is directed to take steps to secure presence of the prosecution witnesses in accordance with law. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Bhagalpur shall ensure presence of the police officers who are charge-sheet witnesses of this case on the dates fixed in the matter."

The seven other respondents are respectively: Shravan Yadav, Haldhar Yadav, Kanki Devi, Lalan Yadav, Sunil Yadav, Sushil Yadav and Reeta Devi.

The Court concluded:"Respondent nos. 2 to 8 shall surrender in the trial court within four weeks from today. Since the respondent nos. 3 to 8 were on bail during trial, the learned trial court shall allow them to continue on bail. Respondent No. 2 was in custody at the time of delivery of impugned judgment, therefore, he would be taken into custody. It will be open to respondent no.2 to pray for bail in the trial court." 

The Court drew on Criminal Trials Guidelines Regarding Inadequacies and Deficiencies, IN RE vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. reported in (2021) 10 SCC 598, the Supreme Court has provided the Draft Criminal Rules on Practice, 2021. The Rules are to be made part of the rules governing the criminal trials. Directions in this regard have been issued to all the High Courts and the State Governments. It also referred to Draft Criminal Rules on Practice, 2021.

The prosecution case was based on the written application of the mother of the deceased (PW-2) addressed to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Bhagalpur in which she has stated that she had got her daughter married to Shravan Yadav, resident of Bhagalpur in the year 2012 and out of the wedlock, her daughter has got two children. After marriage, her daughter’s husband Shravan Yadav, father-in-law Haldhar Yadav, mother-in-law Kanki Devi, devar Lalan Yadav and Sunil Yadav, Sushil Yadav and Reeta Devi were continuously torturing and beating her daughter for Rupees One Lakh and cow due to which her daughter used to come to her alleged that six months ago, upon compromise with the husband of her daughter and her in-laws showing good faith, the informant allowed her daughter to go to her sasural and also gave two cows worth Rs.60,000/-, but again the in-laws started assaulting her daughter and harassed her. On 22.07.2018, the informant came to know that her daughter has been murdered by her husband and in- laws, they have concealed the dead body and ran away after locking their house. The informant alleged that she gave written complaint in Goradih Police Station but no action was being taken. This written application was sent to the Officer Incharge of Goradih Police Station to ensure proper action as per law. On being receipt of this written application, a case dated August 2, 2018 was registered for the offences under Sections 304B/201/34 IPC at Jagdishpur (Goradih) Police Station. 

After investigation, police submitted a charge-sheet dated November 28, 2018 against Sushil Yadav (respondent no. 7) keeping investigation pending against other accused persons. After receiving this chargesheet, Magistrate took cognizance for the offence under Sections 304(B)/201/120(B)/34 IPC vide order dated December 13, 2018. After commitment, Session Trial was registered on March 26, 2019 in which Yadav to which he denied and claimed to be tried. Accordingly charges under Sections 304B/34, 302/34, 201/34 and 120B IPC was framed vide order dated April 30, 2019. Thereafter, police submitted supplementary chargesheet dated May 15, 2019 against Reeta Devi (Respondent no. 8) keeping investigation pending against other accused persons. After receiving this chargesheet, Magistrate finding prima-facie material against her for the offences under Sections 304(B)/201/120(B)/34 IPC vide order dated 21.05.2019 kept the case for supply of police paper. After commitment, Session Trial was registered on June 19, 2019 in which charges were explained to accused Reeta Devi to which she denied and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, charges under Sections 304B/120B/201/34 IPC was framed by order dated February 20, 2020. 

Thereafter, police submitted another supplementary chargesheet dated December 5, 2019 against Shravan Yadav (Respondent No. 2), Lalan Yadav (Respondent No. 5), Sunil Yadav (Respondent No. 6), Haldhar Yadav (Respondent No. 3), Kanki Devi (Respondent No. 4). After receiving this chargesheet, Magistrate finding prima-facie material against these accused persons for the offences under Sections 304(B)/201/120(B)/34 IPC vide order dated December 23, 2019 kept the case for supply of police paper. After commitment, Session Trial was registered on March 15, 2021 in which charges were explained to accused persons to which they denied and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, charges have been framed against Shravan Yadav, Haldhar Yadav, Lalan Yadav, Kanki Devi and Sunil Yadav vide order dated December 1, 2021 under Sections 304(B)/34, 201 and 120(B) IPC. Prio to September 21, 2022, PW-1 and PW-2 of Sessions Trial No. 223 of 2021 were already examined and discharged. In Session Trial No. 1191 of 2019, Ena Devi (PW-1) had been examined prior to passing of the order of amalgamation. Further, we find from the ordersheet of Sessions Trial No. 339 of 2019 that in the said trial Ena Devi has been examined on May 7, 2022, she has been described as PW-3 but there is no PW-1 and PW-2.

By order dated September 21, 2022, Sessions Trial No. 339 of 2019 and Sessions Trial No. 223 of 2021 were amalgamated with Session Trial No. 119 of 2019. Prior to September 21, 2022, PW-1 and PW-2 of Sessions Trial No. 223 of 2021 were already examined and discharged. In Sessions Trail No. 119 of 2019, Ena Devi (PW-1) had been examined prior to passing of the order of amalgamation. Further, we find from the ordersheet of Sessions Trial No. 339 of 2019 that in the said trial Ena Devi has been examined on May 7, 2022, she has been described as PW-3 but there is no PW-1 and PW-2.

After analysing the evidences available on the record, trial court found that in the written application, the informant alleged that her daughter was harassed by her in-laws for dowry due to which her daughter many times came to naiher but there is no evidence of any witness to corroborate this allegation. The trial court found that there is no application regarding beating for dowry on record reported to any authority. The trial court further found from the evidence of the defence witnesses that accused Reeta Devi was married and was living in her sasural with her husband and all the brothers of the husband of the deceased were also living separately. The trial court observed that it seems that the informant has tried to drag the entire family of in-laws of her daughter in the dowry case due to said unfortunate incident. The trial court found that the body of the deceased was recovered from river after seven days.The trial court found that PW-2 deposed that there was black mark on neck of her daughter but this fact has not been supported by her husband (PW-3). Learned trial court further found that Post mortem report shows that there was no external injury and it indicates the presence of Celphos in the visceral fluid of the deceased but it does not show that the said Celphos was forcefully administered to the deceased. 

The trial court observed that even if for the argument sake, it is presumed that Celphos was forcefully administered to the deceased and the body was thrown in the river then also there is not a single eye witness to depose from the prosecution side that they have seen the accused persons throwing the dead body in the river. The trial court after considering all the materials found that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond all reasonable doubts that the deceased was harassed soon before her death for demand of dowry and due to non-fullfilment of said demand, the deceased was killed by the accused. The trial court found that the prosecution is unable to prove the charges under Sections 304B/34, 302/34, 201/34 and 120B IPC, hence, acquitted the accused persons-respondent nos. 2 to 8. 

The appellant's counsel submitted that the trial court has erroneously closed the evidence without examining the four charge-sheet witnesses including the Investigating Officer of this case and the Officer-in-Charge of Sanhaula Police Station. He submitted that there were ample materials before the trial court to held the respondent nos. 2 to 8 guilty but has erroneously acquitted them from the charges levelled against them without examining all the chargesheet witnesses.

The State defended the impugned judgment but agreed that the trial court closed the evidence without examining the four chargesheet witnesses. 

The Court referred to the discussion on Section 311 CrPC in the case of V.N. Patil vs. K. Niranjan Kumar reported in (2021) 3 SCC 661.The judgment reads: “14. The object underlying Section 311 CrPC is that there may not be failure of justice on account of mistake of either party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses examined from either side. The determinative factor is whether it is essential to the just decision of the case. The significant expression that occurs is “at any stage of any inquiry or trial or other proceeding under this Code”. It is, however, to be borne in mind that the discretionary power conferred under Section 311 CrPC has to be exercised judiciously, as it is always said “wider the power, greater is the necessity of caution while exercise of judicious discretion”. 15. The principles related to the exercise of the power under Section 311 CrPC have been well settled by this Court in Vijay Kumar v. State of U.P.2: (SCC p. 141, para 17). “17. Though Section 311 confers vast discretion upon the court and is expressed in the widest possible terms, the discretionary power under the said section can be invoked only for the ends of justice. Discretionary power should be exercised consistently with the provisions of the Code and the principles of criminal law. The discretionary power conferred under Section 311 has to be exercised judicially for reasons stated by the court and not arbitrarily or capriciously. Before directing the learned Special Judge to examine Smt Ruchi Saxena as a court witness, the High Court did not examine the reasons assigned by the learned Special Judge as to why it was not necessary to examine her as a court witness and has given the impugned direction without assigning any reason.”

The case of V.N. Patil was under Sections 304B and 302 IPC read with Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. In the said case Public Prosecutor had filed an application under Section 173(5) read with Section 311 CrPC which was allowed by the learned trial court. The High Court upset the order of the trial court summoning the witnesses but the Supreme Court upheld the order of the trial court.

In its judgement, the High Court observed that in the Dulari Devi case, "the Public Prosecutor who conducted the case at Bhagalpur was not acting with due diligence and care. The records speak for themselves. No summon was issued to the other prosecution witnesses, no explanation came from the two police personnel who were charge-sheet witnesses, even Senior Superintendent of Police did not act on receipt of the letter from the court. In fact the FIR itself was registered after the informant made a complaint to the Dy.SP." The judgement was authored by Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad.

Notably, Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad is one of the five members of the High Court's Committee to consider Draft Criminal Court Rules. The other members are: Justices Bibek Chaudhuri, Rajiv Roy, Sunil Dutta Mishra and Shashi Bhushan Prasad Singh. It is one ofthe 43 committees of the High Court. 
 

 

Can Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2021 prevail over Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972?

In Union of India through the Secretary, Home vs. Alok Arya (2025), Patna High Court's division bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Partha Sarthy concluded:"The respondent is not entitled for any pension because of his resignation in view of Section 26 (1) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2021." 

The division bench set aside the judgement of Justice Purnendu Singh of single judge bench in Alok Arya vs. Union of India through the Secretary, Home (2023) C.W.J.C. No. 1379 of 2023, which had ordered on May 3, 2023 that "the respondent be given the benefit of gratuity in view of Section 7 (3-A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and also interest on it, after calculating the same within a period of six weeks."  This judgment was challenged by the Union of India on the sole ground that if a person resigns from service, his past service is forfeited.

In his order, Justice Singh had recorded the submission of petitioner in light of order dated January 13, 2021 passed in CWJC No. 11188 of 2018 and in light of ‘Annexures- 7 and 8’, communication made by the petitioner for providing him benefits of gratuity and HPL encashment and subsequently, he had sent a reminder to the Director General, B.S.F., Ministry of Home Affairs, Union of India. 

He considered the law as on date in terms of Section 7(3-A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and the decision of Supreme Court in case of D.D. Tiwari (dead) through Legal Representatives vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. &Ors. Reported in (2014) 8 SCC 894 to direct the respondent no. 2- the Director General, B.S.F. CGO Complex, New Delhi "to give equal treatment to the petitioner to abide by the law laid down by the Apex Court and the provision of Section 7(3-A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 by calculating interest on delayed payment of gratuity within a period of six weeks." 

Section 26 (1) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2021 clearly provides that resignation from a service or a post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the appointing authority, entails forfeiture of past service. Sub-Clause (2) of Section 26 the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2021 further clarifies, by way of an exception, that a resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service, if it has been submitted to take up, with proper permission, another appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government where the service qualifies.

The respondent resigned without indicating to his employer that such resignation was for the purposes of taking up another appointment with the Government where he qualified. Thus, his entire past service was forfeited making him ineligible for being paid pension. Pension also includes gratuity. 

The provisions contained in the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 would not apply to an employee of the Central Government, if he is governed by other Rules.

The division bench observed:"the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is unsustainable in the eyes of law for not having considered the import of Section 26 (1) and (2) of the Central Civil Services Pension) Rules, 2021, which applies to the case of the respondent. "

The division bench drew on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. vs. Braj Nandan Singh : (2005) 8 SCC 325,wherein it has been explained that Section 26 (2) has to be read in conjunction with Section 26(1) and 26(2) only carves an exception under certain circumstances.: 

“Rule 26, as the heading itself shows, relates to forfeiture of service on resignation. In clear terms, it provides that resignation from a service or a post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the appointing authority, entails forfeiture of past service. The language is couched in mandatory terms. However, sub-rule (2) is in the nature of an exception. It provides that resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service if it has been submitted to take up, with proper permission, another appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government where service qualifies. Admittedly this is not the case of the Respondent. Rule 5 on which great emphasis was laid down by the learned counsel for the respondent deals with regulation of claims to pension or family pension. Qualifying service is dealt with in Chapter III. The conditions subject to which service qualifies are provided in Rule 14. Chapter V deals with classes of pensions and conditions governing their grant. The effect of Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) cannot be lost sight of while deciding the question of entitlement to pension. The High Court was not justified in its conclusion that the rule was being torn out of context. After the past service is forfeited the same has to be excluded from the period of qualifying service. The language of Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) is very clear and unambiguous. It is trite law that all the provisions of a statute have to be read together and no particular provision should be treated as superfluous. That being the position after the acceptance of resignation, in terms of Rule 26 sub-rule (1) the past service stands forfeited. That being so, it has to be held that for the purpose of deciding question of entitlement to pension the respondent did not have the qualifying period of service. There is no substance in the plea of the learned counsel for the respondent that Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) has limited operation and does not wipe out entitlement to pension as quantified in Rule 49. The said rule deals with amount of pension and not with entitlement.”

The Supreme Court has concluded that it is a well-settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision, which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature and the language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent.

The division bench found that "the resignation was simpliciter and not for the purposes of taking up appointment, for which no permission also was taken, the services of the respondent stood forfeited and less than ten years in service would not have otherwise also qualified the appellant for being paid pension."

Notably, Justice Singh of single judge bench has referred to High Court's decision of 2021 and Supreme Court's decision of 2014. Justice Kumar of division bench has referred to Supreme Court's decision of 2005.

Has the case concerning murder of Judge Uttam Anand been solved?

On March 14, 2024, CBI informed the Jharkhand High Court that no significant information has been derived from the WhatsApp chats of two people convicted in the murder of Judge Uttam Anand in Dhanbad. 

Uttam Anand, an Additional District Judge, was knocked off by the auto-rickshaw near Randhir Verma Chowk, Dhanbad. The incident was captured on CCTV. He was killed while he was out for a morning walk on July 28, 2021. The incident happened at 5 am. Jharkhand High Court's division bench of Acting Chief Justice Shree Chandrashekhar and Justice Ananda Sen was heard a public interest litigation initiated suo moto after the murder. 

Justice N V Ramana, the then Chief Justice of India had spoken to the then Chief Justice of Jharkhand High Court. The Court had started monitoring the investigation which was initially started by the Dhanbad police. When the the investigation did not yield quick results, the case was handed over to the CBI. The CBI picked up two persons -- Lakhan Verma and Rahul Verma, the driver and conductor of the auto-rickshaw that hit Judge Anand. The CBI had re-registered the case and filed the charge sheet in October 2021. CBI had registered a case on August 4, 2021 in the matter of the murder of Uttam Anand, Additional District Judge, Dhanbad on the request of Jharkhand Government and on further Notification from Government of India. 

Jharkhand High Court had directed the CBI to take over the probe into the death case of Dhanbad district judget. A Division Bench of Chief Justice Dr Ravi Ranjan and Justice Sujit Narayan Prasad gave this direction after accepting the recommendation made by the Jharkhand Government in August 2021.

Prior to that a case was registered by State police on a complaint from wife of deceased vide FIR No.300/2021 dated July 28, 2021 at Police Station Dhanbad under Sections 302 and 34 of IPC against an unknown auto driver. Two persons were arrested by local police. Supreme Court of India had taken suo-motu cognizance in the matter. It had passed directions for regular monitoring of the case by the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi. After taking over the investigation of the said case, CBI constituted a Special Investigation Team. After thorough investigation, covering all the possible aspects, CBI filed a chargesheet on October 20, 2021 against these two accused before the Court at Dhanbad.  As many as 58 prosecution witnesses were examined.  The trial was completed in a record time of almost six months. The entire investigation and trial was completed within one year from the incident. The Trial Court had found both the accused guilty and convicted them on July 28, 2022.

The sessions court of Dhanbad had framed charges on February 2, 2022. Dhanbad's Additional District and Sessions Judge-8 convicted both of offences under sections 302 (murder), 201 (causing disappearance of evidence) and under 34 (common intention) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Court pronounced the quantum of the sentence on August 6, 2022. A fine of Rs 30,000 was also imposed on both convicts.

The CBI had issued a statement when the Special Judge, CBI Cases, Dhanbad (Jharkhand) sentenced Lakhan Kumar Verma and Rahul Kumar Verma on August 6, 2022. Both have to undergo Life Imprisonment for remainder of Natural Life without any remission  in a case related to murder of Uttam Anand, then Additional District & Sessions Judge, Dhanbad.