Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma sets aside order of Bihar State Election Commissioner

In Kismati Devi vs. The State of Bihar through its Additional Chief Secretary cum Principal Secretary, Urban Development and Housing Department, Bihar & Ors. (2025), Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma of Patna High Court delivered a 21-page long judgement dated June 26, 2025 setting aside the order dated December 6, 2024 by Bihar State Election Commission disqualifying the the petitioner from the post of Chief Councillor. He allowed the writ application. 

The State Election Commission in its order dated December 6, 2024 disqualified Kismati Devi, the petitioner from the post of Chief Councillor for violation of Section 18(1)(k) read with Section 18(2) of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007. The disqualification of the petitioner was based on the ground that the petitioner was participated in election process for the post of Chief Councillor without paying holding tax for other two properties even though no demand for the same was ever made by the respondent authority to the petitioner. The Court found that the State Election Commission's order dated by which the petitioner was arbitrary, illegal and based on without jurisdiction. It noted that the petitioner was not served any demand notice, hence, the order is in complete violation of principles of natural justice.

The petitioner relied upon para-12 of the judgment in the case of C.M.D., City Union Bank Limited Vs. R. Chandramohan, reported in AIR 2023 SC 1762, questions can't be agitated when substantive proceeding is same statue, that substantive procedure has to be followed.

Under Section 18(1)(k) of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007, provides that a person is disqualified if "he has not paid all taxes due by him to the Municipality at the end of the financial year immediately preceding that in which the election is held." The word "due" implies a formal assessment and demand from the authority concerned. Since no such demand was ever made against the petitioner, the taxes cannot be considered to be “due”. The Petitioner has acted in bonafide and voluntarily deposited the holding tax for the remaining two holdings on 12.04.2023, well before the complaint dated 05.03.2024. Although the State Election Commission is empowered under section 18(2)(k) of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 to entertain the Complaint date 05.03.2024 as the said complaint is based upon not filing nomination paper in accordance with law. The only remedy available to respondent No.6 with the Election Petition.

The Court observed: "7. The State Election Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction by deciding a disputed question of fact without referring the matter to a competent tribunal, as required under law... "

It observed: "the Commission not only initiated proceedings based on the complaint but also conducted a full-fledged enquiry by collecting evidence from various authorities. It sought reports from the Sub-Divisional Officer and the District Officer, assessed those reports, made factual determinations, and acted upon them to the detriment of the petitioner. By doing so, the Commission went beyond its statutory mandate under the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007, and effectively assumed the role of an enquiry agent. Such conduct amounts to a colourable exercise of power and violates the basic principles of adjudication."

The counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Full Bench of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Rajani Kumari v. State of Bihar, LPA No. 566 of 2017, since reported in 2019 (4) PJLR 673 (Para 181 and 184), has held that “where a disputed question of fact arises, the Commission must refer the matter to a competent forum and not decide it itself.” 

The petitioner's counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Purohit Lal Gupta vs. Dharamsheela Devi, passed in LPA 812 of 2014 in CWJC 16861 of 2013, has held that “disqualification under Section 18(1) must be based on clear, undisputed material and cannot be determined summarily where facts are contentious”.

The counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment in the case of State Election Commission vs. Manager Prasad in LPA No. 443 of 2014 in CWJC No.17493 of 2013, it was held that "unless an assessment of property tax is done and demand raised, the Commission cannot conclude that taxes were concealed or unpaid". 

The Interpretation of "taxes due" has been Judicially clarified to mean only those taxes which are either demanded or assessed and not hypothetical dues under Rule 13 of the Bihar Municipal Property Tax Rules, 2013.

The  petitioner also relied upon para-17 of the judgment in the case of Karim Uddin Barbhuiya vs. Aminul Haque Laskar, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2193.

Disquiet over colonial provisions under Sections 147-158 and Sections 189-197 of BNS

Following amendment in the Indian Penal Code (IPC), Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) came into effect on July 1, 2024 replacing 23 chapters and 511 Sections of the IPC with 19 chapters and 358 sections of the BNS. 

A joint reading of the provisions of BNS and IPC reveals that both the laws are still in operation. The former is operational with regard to offences committed prior to July 1, 2024 and the latter with regard to offences committed after July 1, 2024

Sections 147 to 158 of BNS deal with the offences against the state, such as waging war or attempting and abetting to wage war against the government of India, committing acts endangering the country’s sovereignty, unity, and integrity, etc. Sections 189 to 197 deal with the offences against public tranquillity. They include offences of unlawful assembly, rioting, etc.

These provisions grant the governments the right to suppress the voices of citizens. They ate violative of the fundamental rights to equality, life, and personal liberty. It is becoming a “key tool for opposition-free governance.” They undermine the basic structure of the Constitution and create an arbitrary attitude among government officials. These colonial provisions were challenged before the Allahabad High Court without success. 

Chapter 7 of BNS has Sections 147-158 which deal with Offences Against the State.

Chapter 11 of BNS has Sections 189-197 which deal with Offences Against the Public Tranquility. 

Notably, Chapter 6 of IPC too has Sections 121-130 which deal with Offences against the State and Chapter 8 of IPC has Sections 141-160 which deal with Offences against the Public Tranquillity.

The nine Sections 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 150, 151, 157 and 158 of IPC for "Unlawful Assembly" under IPC have been clubbed under Section 189 of BNS. 

Also read: Implications of amendments in the criminal laws 

Acting Chief Justice led bench upholds judgement by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan, but "uncharitable remarks" expunged

In Balendra Shukla vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy passed a 25-page long judgement dated July 8, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"....we find the uncharitable remarks in paragraphs 52, 53 and 57 to 61 to be unworthy of being retained in the judgment and we expunge the same. 47. We make it doubly clear that we have not commented on the rationale and the correctness of the judgment in the case of the writ petitioner, which has not been challenged by any one of the parties here, but only on the observations against the Hon’ble Chancellor’s Office; the Officer in the Hon’ble Chancellor’s Office and the Judicial Officer on deputation, as being wholly unnecessary for the disposal of this case." The Division Bench expunged "the uncharitable remarks in paragraphs 52, 53 and 57 to 61" in the 42-page long judgement dated March 5, 2025 by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan in Kumari Anjana vs. State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025). 

The relevant paragraphs are as under:

52. Having perused the record produced by the officials of Raj Bhawan, the court comes to the conclusive finding that the order in the appeal was passed by antedating it just in order to defeat the mandatory directions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. From the record, it appears that the matter was heard on various dates and thereafter on 26.09.2023 the order was reserved. On 03.10.2023, the Written arguments were submitted by the petitioner in the office of the Hon’ble Chancellor but in first week of January, 2024, i.e., 06.01.2024, the petitioner got a copy of the judgment. On this aspect, the queries made by the court but could not be answered by the Officers on Special Duty (Judicial) and Officers on Special Duty (University) of the Governore’s Secretariate. They simply tried to evade giving direct replies by tendering oral apologies. The query of the court was intended to examine the delay caused in passing of the order and communication thereof, however, not even a single satisfactory answer was provided by the Officers on Special Duty (Judicial) and Officers on Special Duty (University) of the Governore’s Secretariate except for tendering oral apologies, thus showing the clear case of ante-dating.

53. The ratio of judgment of Anil Rai (Supra) applies with full force throughout the country on all the institutions discharging judicial and quasi- judicial functions. It appears that just with a view to avoid the mandatory direction assed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court prescribing and limiting the period within which the reserved order has to be delivered, the Officers on Special Duty (Judicial) and Officers on Special Duty (University) keeping the Hon’ble Chancellor in dark got the order of appeal signed by antedating it.... 

57. Before parting, I find it apposite to highlight the grave issues which have been found during the course of hearing of instant matter which raises serious concern on the quality of work, the manner in which it is executed; as well as discharging of official responsibilities by officials in the Secretariat of Hon'ble Chancellor.

58. The office of the Hon'ble Chancellor is a statutory position, and the Hon'ble Governor, by virtue of holding the post of Governor, assumes the role of Chancellor of the Universities of Bihar as per the provisions of the Bihar State University Act, 1976 and, to assist the Hon'ble Chancellor in discharging his official, legislative, executive, statutory, and quasi-judicial functions, officers from the administrative and judicial services are deputed to the Governor's Secretariat for a specific term, in accordance with the prevailing rules and notifications of the Government of Bihar. These officers, once posted in the Governor's Secretariat, are duty-bound to present accurate facts, relevant statutory provisions, and existing judicial precedents on various issues. This ensures that the Hon'ble Chancellor can make well-informed decisions and issue orders in compliance with statutory provisions and established judicial pronouncements.

59. However, in the present case, I found allegations of ante-dating in the order passed by the Hon'ble Chancellor. Therefore, it was deemed appropriate to summon Officer on Special Duty (Judicial), Shri Balendra Shukla, and Officer on Special Duty (University), Shri Mahavir Prasad Sharma, along with the original record of the petitioner's appeal in a sealed cover, as per the order dated 21.03.2024. Upon perusal of the records and upon inquiry from the aforesaid officials, I found that the allegations of antedating had merit. Consequently, the officials failed to provide satisfactory answers to the questions posed by the Court and instead tendered their oral apologies.

60. In my considered opinion, the designations of Officer on Special Duty (Judicial) and Officer on Special Duty (University) are positions of high responsibility and integrity, as it is their bounden duty to assist the Hon'ble Chancellor in passing just, fair, and legal orders or directions. However, in the present case, I find that these responsibilities have not only been overlooked by the concerned officials but that they have also deliberately concealed crucial facts, thereby misleading the Hon'ble Chancellor into passing an erroneous order. Consequently, I find it appropriate to hold that the concerned officials “Officer on Special Duty (Judicial) and Officer on Special Duty (University)” are unfit for their respective positions and should be sent for appropriate training.

61. Accordingly, I direct that this order be placed before the Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice for appropriate action concerning Shri Balendra Shukla, Officer on Special Duty (Judicial), who holds the rank of Additional District and Sessions Judge and falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Patna High Court.

Furthermore, with respect to Shri Mahavir Prasad Sharma, Officer on Special Duty (University), the Court directs the Principal Secretary to the Hon'ble Governor to place the matter before the Hon'ble Chancellor for necessary action."

The petitioner had prayed for expunging adverse remarks against him because he was not heard before such remarks were made. Also because those remarks were not in the nature of any correctional approach of the Court as also on the ground that such remarks do not make up for the reasons why the writ petition was allowed.

Justice Sharan, as Single Judge Bench had concluded:"In my considered opinion, the designations of Officer on Special Duty (Judicial) and Officer on Special Duty (University) are positions of high responsibility and integrity, as it is their bounden duty to assist the Hon'ble Chancellor in passing just, fair, and legal orders or directions. However, in the present case, I find that these responsibilities have not only been overlooked by the concerned officials but that they have also deliberately concealed crucial facts, thereby misleading the Hon'ble Chancellor into passing an erroneous order. Consequently, I find it appropriate to hold that the concerned officials 'Officer on Special Duty (Judicial) and Officer on Special Duty (University)' are unfit for their respective positions and should be sent for appropriate training." 

The fact remains Justice Shatan had directed that "this order be placed before the Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice for appropriate action concerning Shri Balendra Shukla, Officer on Special Duty (Judicial), who holds the rank of Additional District and Sessions Judge and falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Patna High Court. Furthermore, with respect to Shri Mahavir Prasad Sharma, Officer on Special Duty (University), the Court directs the Principal Secretary to the Hon'ble Governor to place the matter before the Hon'ble Chancellor for necessary action." 

Justice Shatan had given relief to Kumari Anjana, a doctorate from Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi who had prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ/order or direction, in the nature of a Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ/order or direction for quashing the order dated September 26, 2023 passed by the Chancellor of Universities, Bihar, as well as the consequential orde issued cancelling the appointment of the petitioner as Deputy  Registrar, Aryabhatta Knowledge University, Patna; The other respondents were: Principal Secretary, Department of Social Welfare, Principal Secretary, Department of Education, Chancellor of Universities, Bihar, Vice Chancellor, Aryabhatta Knowledge University, Patna and Registrar, Aryabhatta Knowledge University, Patna. Notably, the main findings of Justice Shatan's judgement has not been disturbed by the Division Bench. 

The Division Beach's judgement was authored by Justice Kumar relied on Supreme Court's decision in Dr. Raghubir Sharan vs. The State of Bihar, AIR (1964) SC 1, wherein the issue arose as to whether the inherent power of an Appellate Court to expunge remarks made therein could be invoked ordinarily as such expunction might derogate from the finality of the judgment.

He also referred to decisions in the State Of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohammad Naim, AIR 1964 SC 703; Niranjan Patnaik vs. Sashibhusan Kar & Anr. 1986 (2) SCC 569; in the matter of 'K' A Judicial Officer vs. in the matter of 'K' A Judicial Officer, 2001 (3) SCC 54 and Om Prakash Chautala vs. Kanwar Bhan & Ors; 2014 (5) SCC 417. 

The the judgment of Om Prakash Chautala case which serves as a vademecum for the Judges while discharging their judicial functions. It reads: "19. It needs no special emphasis to state that a Judge is not to be guided by any kind of notion. The decision making process expects a Judge or an adjudicator to apply restraint, ostracise perceptual subjectivity, make one’s emotion subservient to one’s reasoning and think dispassionately. He is expected to be guided by the established norms of judicial process and decorum. A judgment may have rhetorics but the said rhetoric has to be dressed with reason and must be in accord with the legal principles. Otherwise a mere rhetoric, especially in a judgment, may likely to cause prejudice to a person and courts are not expected to give any kind of prejudicial remarks against a person, especially so, when he is not a party before it. In that context, the rhetoric becomes sans reason, and without root. It is likely to blinden the thinking process. A Judge is required to remember that humility and respect for temperance and chastity of thought are at the bedrock of apposite expression. In this regard, we may profitably refer to a passage from Frankfurter, Felix, in Clark, Tom C.,[16]:

“For the highest exercise of judicial duty is to subordinate one’s personal pulls and one’s private views to the law of which we are all guardians – those impersonal convictions that make a society a civilized community, and not the victims of personal rule,”

20. The said learned Judge had said: -“What becomes decisive to a Justice’s functioning on the Court in the large area within which his individuality moves is his general attitude towards law, the habits of mind that he has formed or is capable of unforming, his capacity for detachment, his temperament or training for putting his passion behind his judgment instead of in front of it.[17]”

21. Thus, a Judge should abandon his passion. He must constantly remind himself that he has a singular master “duty to truth” and such truth is to be arrived at within the legal parameters. No heroism, no rehtorics."

It emerged that right to reputation is one of the facets of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 

Living in adultery is not the same as committing adultery: Justice Jitendra Kumar

In Bulbul Khatoon & Anr. vs. The State Of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Justice Jitendra Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 37-page long judgement dated July 7, 2025, wherein, he directed the Registrar General of the High Court "to circulate a copy of this judgment/order amongst all the Family Courts of Bihar, besides sending a copy of it to Bihar Judicial Academy for discussion in the training programmes for the Presiding Officers of the Family Courts." 

Relying on judicial precedents in  Hitesh Deka vs. Jinu Deka 2025 SCC OnLine Gau 259; Sukhdev Pakharwal vs. Rekha Okhale 2018 SCC OnLine MP 1687; Ashok vs. Anita 2011 SCC OnLine MP 2249; Sandha bs. Narayanan 1999 SCC OnLine Ker 64; Pandurang Barku Nathe vs. Leela Pandurang Nathe & Anr. 1997 SCC OnLine Bom 264, Justice Kumar observed:"Adultery is an offence against one’s spouse. If a married person establishes sexual relationship with someone other than his/her spouse, he/she commits adultery. Under Section 125 Cr.PC wife/petitioner is disqualified for getting maintenance from her husband if she is living in adultery. Moreover, 'living in adultery' is distinct from 'committing adultery'. 'Living in adultery' denotes a continuous course of conduct and not isolated acts of immorality. One or two lapses from virtues would be acts of adultery but would be quite insufficient to show that the woman was 'living in adultery'. A mere lapse, whether it is one or two, and a return back to a normal life can not be said to be living in adultery. If the lapse is continued and followed up by a further adulterous life, the woman can be said to be 'living in adultery'."

The judgement was pronounced upon hearing the Criminal Revision Petition which was preferred by the petitioners, praying for setting aside the impugned judgment/order dated April 4, 2020 and direct Md. Shamshad, the Opposite Party No. 2 to pay Rs. 20,000/- per month to the petitioners towards maintenance. The impugned order was passed by Principal Judge, Family Court, Purnia in a Maintenance case of 2017, whereby O.P. No. 2/Md.Shamshad was directed to pay maintenance to the petitioner No. 2/Danish Raza @ Rahul at the rate of Rs. 4,000/-per month from the date of order i.e. April 4, 2020. Bulbul Khatoon, the petitioner No. 1 was denied any maintenance holding that she is not entitled to get any maintenance from O.P. No. 2. 

The petitioners had filed Maintenance case on October 30, 2017 before the Family Court, Purniau under Section 125 Cr.PC against O.P. No. 2 herein/Md.Shamshad, the husband of the petitioner No. 1/Bulbul Khatoon and father of petitioner No. 2/Danish Raza @ Rahul, stating that the marriage between Bulbul Khatoon and Md.Shamshad was solemnized on February 18, 2013 as per Muslim Rites and Customs and after the marriage, Bulbul Khatoon joined the matrimonial home of her husband/Md. Shamshad and subsequently, Danish Raza @ Rahul was born out of the wedlock in March, 2014. It was further stated that during the pregnancy, Bulbul Khatoon came back to her parental home on account of ill behavior of relatives of her husband and after the birth of the child, her husband and his family members started demanding Rs. 5 lac towards additional dowry and they threatened that in case, she failed to pay the additional dowry, Md. Shamshad would solemnize second marriage with other girl. On account of failure of Bulbul Khatoon to pay the additional dowry, she was ousted from the matrimonial home on July 17, 2017 along with newly born child and even her ornaments were snatched from her. 

It was also stated that after ousting his wife Bulbul Khatoon, Md.Shamshad solemnized second marriage with one Kajal Khatoon, daughter of Md. Naseem. It is also stated that Bulbul Khatoon was unable to maintain herself and her minor son, whereas Md.Shamshad had sufficient means to maintain his wife and child having ten acres of agricultural land, tractor and corn factory machine and having Rs.5 lac annual income. Bulbul Khatoon and her son Danish Raza @ Rahul had claimed for monthly maintenance @ Rs.20,000/. 

Justice Kumar observed:"However, I find that learned Family Court by the impugned judgment/order has denied maintenance to Bulbul Khatoon on account of his finding that she has been living in adultery with Md. Tarikat, whereas there is no such cogent evidence on record. As such, the findings of learned Family Court is based on no evidence or perverse appreciation of evidence. Accordingly, the impugned order is not sustainable in the eye of law and hence, it is set aside to this extent and it is held that the petitioner No. 1/Bulbul Khatoon is also entitled to get maintenance from her husband/Respondent No. 2 herein. "

Justice Purnendu Singh as part of DB upholds verdict by Justice Anil Kumar Sinha in a CCA case from 1991

Supreme Court's decision in Ram Kishan vs. Union of India & Ors. (AIR 1996 SC 255) irrelevant in this CCA case? 

Justice Purnendu Singh as part of Division Bench led by Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar authored a 9-page long judgment dated July 1, 2025 wherein, he upheld the verdict by Justice Anil Kumar Sinha in Awadh Tiwari vs. The State of Bihar (2025). Justice Singh who authored the judgement observed:"...the appellant has not been able to show any illegality in the order of the learned Single Judge. The Court finds no merit in the instant appeal. The appeal is dismissed."

In the year 1989 while posted as Junior Engineer in the Minor Distributory Division-IX, Ghatshila Camp, Galudih, as a result of an agreement entered into, M/s Barauni Tiles was required supply PCC tiles which the appellant was to receive. Awadh Tiwari, the appellant received the same, however without waiting for the quality test report of the tiles, payment was made to the contractor, causing financial loss to the government.

By an order contained in Resolution no.1691 dated July 17, 1991, a decision was taken to initiate a departmental proceeding against the appellant under Rule 55 of Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 which was subsequently converted into a proceeding under Rule 55A of the Rules. The appellant was served with a memo of charge according to which he during his tenure had received substandard tiles for the purpose of lining of canal. The tiles supplied at the ratio 1:2.97 of cement and sand against the specified ratio of 1:2. A sum of Rs.11,73,000/ had been paid to the contractor causing loss to the State exchequer. 

The charge was to the effect that the appellant was negligent and casual in his duty causing financial loss to the State. He had prepared the bill for payment to the contractor without getting the quality of the supplied tiles tested. The appellant submitted his reply to the show cause notice and on consideration of the contents thereof, the respondents came out with an order of punishment dated December 11, 1999 according to which there was stoppage of promotion for a period of ten years and further order of recovery of a sum to the tune of Rs.1,46,625.

The appellant had moved to the High Court in CWJC no.1015 of 2000 against the order of punishment which was allowed vide order dated February 17, 2006, the order of punishment quashed and the respondents were directed to refund the recovered amount on the basis of the said order to the appellant forthwith. 

The respondents preferred an appeal (LPA no.790 of 2007) against the order allowing the writ application (CWJC no.1015 of 2000). Though the judgment passed in the writ application was not interfered with and the appeal dismissed, however it was observed that if the law permits, the State of Bihar can proceed against the concerned employee in accordance with law.

The respondents included Secretary, Water Resources Department, Joint Secretary, Water Resources Department, Deputy Secretary, Water Resources Department and Engineer-In-Chief Middle, Water Resources Department, Government of Bihar. 

The respondents came out with an order dated January 18, 2011 stating therein that a decision was taken to proceed against the appellant and two others under Rule 17 of the Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005. The chargesheet containing the charges was enclosed with the order, to which the appellant filed his reply.

When the appellant retired from service on May 31, 2011, the departmental proceeding against the petitioner was converted into a proceeding under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules.

The enquiry officer submitted his report dated January 12, 2012 not finding the charges to have been proved against the appellant. Disagreeing with the contents of the enquiry report, a detailed second show cause contained in Memo no.683 dated June 26, 2012 was issued under the signature of the Engineer-in-Chief (Central), Water Resources Department, which was brought on record with the counter affidavit of the respondents in the writ application.

The letter showed that the point of difference of the disciplinary authority with the report of the enquiry officer was two fold. Firstly, that inspite of the ratio of cement and sand in the tiles supplied by the contractor being 1:2.97 in place of the specified 1:2, steps had been taken by the appellant in the measurement book for payment to the contractor, though he should have obtained the directions of the higher authorities with respect to the quality test report and only thereafter should have proceeded to take steps for payment. The second point of difference was to the effect that a direction had been given to the Barauni Tiles i.e. the contractor to replace the tiles but the contractor had not carried out the directions. Inspite of having knowledge of this fact, the appellant proceeded to make entries in the measurement book and recommend for payment of amount to the contractor.

The appellant filed his response to the show cause notice dated June 26, 2012 of the disciplinary authority differing with the contents of the enquiry report. After considering the reply of the appellant, the respondents passed an order contained in Memo no.374 dated March 20, 2013 under Rule 43(b) of Bihar Pension Rules imposing punishment of 5% pension. Following dismissal of the writ application preferred by the appellant against the order of punishment, the appeal was preferred.

The counsel for the appellant submitted that in the enquiry conducted in the departmental proceeding against the appellant, the enquiry officer in his report dated January 12, 2012 did not find any of the three charges to have been proved. Though the disciplinary authority issued a second show cause notice dated June 26, 2012, however no reason was given therein for differing with the contents of the enquiry report. It merely repeated the charges as contained in the chargesheet issued in the departmental proceeding. It was submitted that the second show cause notice as also the order of punishment are both unsustainable. The counsel for the appellant relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Kishan vs. Union of India & Ors. (AIR 1996 SC 255). 

But Justice Singh observed:"So far as the judgment in the case of Ram Kishan (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned, the same is of no assistance to the appellant herein, the facts of the two cases being distinct and distinguishable.While the instant case relates to steps of payment having been taken by the delinquent/appellant inspite of sub-quality tiles having been supplied by the contractor, the case cited relates to misconduct of the Constable/appellant therein of having facilitate supply of alcohol to an under-trial prisoner and of having abused his superior officer." 

Siya Ram Sahi and Shally Kumari were the counsels for the appellant. 

The appellant was proceeded against departmentally under the CCA Rules while still in service, on his retirement on May 31, 2011, the proceedings were converted into one under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules. The enquiry officer submitted his report on January 12, 2012 not finding any of the charges levelled against the appellant to have been proved. The disciplinary authority disagreeing with the contents of the enquiry report issued a second show cause notice to the appellant on June 26, 2012 to which the appellant submitted his reply. Not finding the reply to be satisfactory, another show cause notice was issued to the appellant on December 3, 2012 stating therein that it was proposed to impose a punishment on the appellant under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules. The appellant was given time of 15 days to submit his reply which was filed by the appellant on December 22, 2012. The reply of the appellant was not found satisfactory and the order of punishment was passed which was challenged unsuccessfully in the writ application before Justice Sinha, the single judge bench. 

The writ application was preferred against the order dated March 20, 2013 bearing Memo No.374 passed by Engineer-In-Chief (Central), Water Resources Department, Government of Bihar, Patna whereby punishment of stoppage of 5% pension was imposed upon the petitioner in a departmental proceeding concluded under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules. 

Before dismissing the writ application, in his 10-page long judgement dated March 14, 2023, Justice Sinha had observed:"...the Court while testing the validity of the order of the punishment is required to see the flaw into decision making process and cannot sit upon the decision itself as an appellate authority. Even assuming the aforesaid instruction of Cabinet (Vigilance) Department dated 06.07.1992 vide Memo No. 1045 is applicable in the case of the petitioner in relation to the permissible limit of difference in ratio up to 25% but the difference of ratio found by the Laboratory in the present case to the extent of 1:2.97 is more than the permissible limit of 25%. The petitioner has not pointed out any procedural infirmity and or violation of principle of natural justice in the departmental proceeding. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I come to the conclusion that the impugned order of punishment does not require any interference by this Court..."

The judgement by the Division Bench which upheld Justice Sinha's judgement appears to be a fit case for appeal in the Supreme Court.  

“Don’t act selectively on collegium recommendations" on appointments and transfers of judges:Chief Justice of India

Justice Bhushan R. Gavai, 52nd Chief Justice of India told Union government “Don’t act selectively on collegium recommendations" on appointments and transfer  of judges after presiding over his first collegium meeting on May 26, 2025. The collegium includes Justices Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, J.K. Maheshwari, and B.V. Nagarathna besides Justice Gavai.  

A Supreme Court's bench led by Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul had said, “selective appointments undermined the element of workable trust essential for the relationship between the judiciary and the executive.” It “sends a wrong signal.” Justice Kaul had made these observations prior to his retirement in December 2023. 

In the aftermath of the judgement declaring the National Democratic Alliance government enacted the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, 2014 to be unconstitutional in 2015, the Memorandum of Procedure (MoP) guides the appointment and transfer of judges in constitution. But Union Government has not been complying with it although independence of judiciary is part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India. 

In January 2025, a bench of the Supreme Court permitted the High Courts to appoint retired judges as ad hoc judges under Article 224A of the Constitution to alleviate the mounting backlog. As ofb July 1, 2025, the High Courts have 371 vacancies out of a sanctioned strength of 1,122. The present working strength stands at 751 judges. Over 63 lakh pending cases in the High Courts, according to the National Judicial Data Grid.

The Supreme Court Collegium, headed by Chief Justice Gavai, has recommended the appointment of 39 individuals as judges across nine High Courts. The recommendations were made on July 1 and 2 after an in-person interactions with candidates from judicial officers and practising advocates. 

Notably, the collegium has recommended names of two advocates Ajit Kumar, and Praveen Kumar as judges of the Patna High Court. The High Court has a sanctioned strength of total 53 judges, which includes 40 permanent, and 13 additional judges. At present, the High Court is functioning with 36 permanent judges only. 

The Supreme Court Collegium had initially recommended five names for appointment as judges in February 2025. However, the Union government cleared only three names. The appointment of the other two recommended advocates, Ritesh Kumar and Anshul Raj, is still pending.

The question is: who should be held accountable for delay in appointment of 17 judges in the Patna High Court including these two names. In this regard, the silence of advocates' association, lawyers association and bar association is deafening. 

Why is the the Collegium issuing only statements listing the names of recommended candidates and their High Courts, sans details about timeline and process? Why has it discontinued the practice of regularly publishing detailed minutes of Collegium meetings and basic information regarding the dates on which High Courts send their recommendations and the timeline of the Collegium’s deliberations on Supreme Court's website. 

Justice Purnendu Singh quashes termination order for violating principle of natural justice

In Smt. Archana Kumari vs. The State of Bihar through its Secretary Education Department, Govt. of Bihar, New Secretariat, Patna & Ors. (2025), Justice Purnendu Singh delivered a 6-page long judgement dated June 16, 2025 wherein, he concluded:"I also find that there has been gross violation of principle of natural justice. It is admitted that before termination order dated 15.11.2022 has been passed, no opportunity has been given to the petitioner. On this ground also, the order contained in Memo No.669 dated 15.11.2022 is fit to be set aside and quashed...." There were six other respondents including The Director Primary Education, Education Department, Govt. of Bihar, Patna, District Magistrate, Vaishali, District Education Officer, Vaishali, District Programme Officer, (Establishment), Vaishali, Block Development Officer, Bhagwanpur, Vaishali and Block Education Officer, Bhagwanpur, Vaishali.

The petitioner had prayed quashing "the memo no.669 dated 15.11.2022 issued by the Executive Officer cum Block Panchayati Raj Officer, Panchayat Samiti, Bhagwanpur (Vaishali) whereby and whereunder the petitioner was terminated from service with immediate effect on the ground she was working on the basis of Madhyama Visharad certificate issued from the Hindi Sahitya Sammelo Allahabad. She also sought direction from the Court to the respondent authority to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits. 

According to the State that the main issue involved in the present writ petition was the validity of the Madhmya Visharad degree obtained by the petitioner from Hindi Sahitaya Sammelan, Allahabad.  

Justice Singh recorded that there was violation of Section 14 of Bihar State School Teachers and Employees Disputes Redressal Rules, 2015 by District Education Officer, Vaishali who acted in a mechanical manner.

Justice P.N. Bhagwati has defined it as "fair play in action". The right to hearing encompasses the following concepts within its ambit:

1. Right to notice
2. Right to present case and evidence
3. Right to rebut adverse evidence
1. Right to cross-examination
2. Right to legal representation
4. Disclosure of evidence to the party
5. Showing the report of enquiry to the other party
6. Reasoned decisions or speaking orders

Therefore, pre-decisional hearing is one of the standard and essential rules of Audi Alteram Partem. But, it would be wrong to disregard the status of the post-decisional hearing. Post-decisional hearing is also a justiciable rule as it affords the hearing opportunity to the aggrieved person and is a better option than no hearing (I.P. MASSEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Eastern Book Company 2022).. However, it is pertinent to note that a post-decisional hearing must be considered an exception rather than a rule.