In Surjeet Singh Sahni vs. State of U.P. and Others, reported in (2022) 15 SCC 536, Supreme Court's Division Bench Justices M.R Shah and B.V. Nagarathna has held that mere filing representation does not extend the period of limitation and if it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court should dismiss it at the threshold and ought not to dispose of the writ petition by relegating the writ petitioner to file representation and /or directing the authority to decide the representation. Patna High Court relied on this decision to dismiss a civil writ on April 1, 2026.
In its 6-page long judgement dated February 28, 2022, Supreme Court's Division Bench concluded:"The High Court has rightly refused to grant any relief which as such was in the form of specific performance of the contract. No writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India shall be maintainable and/or entertainable for specific performance of the contract and that too after a period of 10 years by which time even the suit for specific performance would have been barred by limitation. 7. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, there is no substance in the present special leave petition and the same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed."
The petition had approached the Supreme Court through a special leave petition because he was aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated September 9, 2021 passed by the Allahabad High Court in Writ C No.40336 of 2017 by which the High Court had dismissed the said writ petition. The petitioner entered into a Sale Deed with the respondent –NOIDA vide Sale Deed dated 19.09.2001 whereby the petitioner sold a Plot No. 163 of Khata No. 254 to the NOIDA under the provisions of Section 6 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 and in terms of the Resolution in 102nd meeting of NOIDA. According to the petitioner, Clause No. 12 of the Sale Deed clearly provided that a plot of 10% area (to be calculated of the total land sold) shall be allotted to the petitioner on payment of 10% of the amount as being paid under the Sale Deed. In addition, it clearly recorded that "Original Farmer" shall also be entitled to "Rehabilitation Bonus". After a period of 10 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed, the petitioner made a representation to NOIDA vide representation dated March 10, 2010 requesting to allot a plot as agreed in terms of the Sale Deed. That thereafter the petitioner preferred Writ Petition No.5599 of 2011 before the High Court inter alia praying that directions to the NOIDA to allot 10% of the land of the acquired area of the land of the petitioner for Abadi purposes in terms of Clause 12 of the Sale Deed dated September 19, 2001 and as per Resolution in 102nd meeting of NOIDA Board held on January 7, 1998. Though the writ petition was filed after a period of 11 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed and though the writ petition was barred by delay and laches, the High Court entertained the writ petition, however, disposed of the writ petition vide order dated April 7, 2017 directing the NOIDA to decide the representation of the petitioner expeditiously and preferably within a period of six weeks. NOIDA rejected the representation.
Aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the NOIDA dated May 23, 2017 rejecting the representation, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.40336 of 2017 by which the petitioner again prayed to allot 10% plot to him as provided under Clause 12 of the Sale Deed dated September 19, 2001 and as per the Resolution passed in 102nd meeting of NOIDA Board on January 7, 1998. The High Court by the impugned judgment and order dismissed the writ petition inter alia holding firstly, that Writ Petition arising out of contract between parties is not maintainable and petitioner should have filed a Suit for specific performance; secondly, Writ Petition has been filed after a delay of 16 years and delay is fatal for challenge to acquisition or for any claim arising out of it; thirdly, Clause 12 of Sale Deed provided for allotment of land to original Khatedar and as the petitioner had purchased land in 1970 therefore it's clear that petitioner was not original agriculturist; and the establishment of NOIDA in 1976 shall have no bearing on the matter.
Justice Shah who authored the judgement observed: "The High Court by passing the order dated 07.04.2017 as such did not realise and/or appreciated that the writ petition itself was required to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches as the same was filed after a period of 11 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed under which the right was claimed. We have come across number of such orders passed by the High Courts directing the authorities to decide the representation though the representations are made belatedly and thereafter when a decision is taken on such representation, thereafter it can be said on behalf of the petitioner that the fresh cause of action has arisen on rejection of the representation. Therefore, when such orders are passed by the High Courts either relegating the petitioner to make a representation and/or directing the appropriate authority to decide the representation, the High Courts have to consider whether the writ petition is filed belatedly and/or the same is barred by laches and/or not, so that in future the person who has approached belatedly may not contend that the fresh cause of action has arisen on rejection of the representation. Even in a case where earlier representation is rejected, the High Court shall decide the matter on merits."
The judgement reads: "5. As observed by this Court in catena of decisions, mere representation does not extend the period of limitation and the aggrieved person has to approach the Court expeditiously and within reasonable time. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court should dismiss it at the threshold and ought not to dispose of the writ petition by relegating the writ petitioner to file a representation and/or directing the authority to decide the representation, once it is found that the original writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. Such order shall not give an opportunity to the petitioner to thereafter contend that rejection of the representation subsequently has given a fresh cause of action."
Relying on this judgement of the Supreme Court, Justice Anil Kumar Sinha dismissed the writ petition in Ram Sewak Thakur vs. Chancellor of the Universities of Bihar Raj Bhawan, Patna & Ors (2026) by its 9-page long order dated April 1, 2026. The other six respondents were:The State of Bihar through the Additional Chief Secretary, Education Department, Government of Bihar, Director, Higher Education Department, Government of Bihar, 4. Lalit Narayan Mithila University, through its Registrar, Darbhanga, Vice Chancellor, Lalit Narayan Mithila University, Darbhanga, Pro Vice Chancellor-cum-Chairman of the Grievance Redressal Cell, Lalit Narayan Mithila University, Darbhanga and Registrar, Lalit Narayan Mithila University, Darbhanga.
Justice Sinha observed: "10. Delay and laches is a recognized doctrine. “Laches” is derived from french language and means remissness and slackness. The Supreme Court, in the case of Union of India and Others v. N. Murugesan and Others, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 25, has held that laches involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right and therefore must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy." He added: "In paragraph 21 and 22 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:-
“21. The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning "remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy."
Justice Sinha referred to the judgment of Chairman, State Bank of India and Another v. M.J. James, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 301, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:-“36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four years and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the ground that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case."
The petitioner had challenged the notification dated June 6, 2004 and December 26, 2009 seeking its modification after inordinate delay. Though the case of the petitioner is that he kept on filing representations on several occasion, but the petitioner has approached this Court after a long gap of nearly about 18 years raising claim of regularization on the post of Assistant. The petitioner retired on February 28, 2023 and woke up from deep slumber and filed this writ application after nearly two decades on a dead cause of action which can be termed as stale claim.
Justice Sinha concluded:" Following the law laid down by the Supreme Court that the writ court should be conscious and alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure and pleasure, the court is under a legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. 14. This court is of the view that this is a textbook case of delay and laches where the petitioner has chosen to wake up from the slumber after nearly two decades. Applying the law case, this Court finds no merit in the writ petition. The writ petition is clearly barred by delay and laches. 15. Accordingly, the present writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs."
