Supreme Court quashes judgments, orders of High Court and Special Judge, Kurukshetra against Haryana IPS officer, Bharti Arora in NDPS case

Supreme Court's bench of Justices B.R Gavai, P.K Mishra and K.V. Viswanathan delivered a judgement on December 13, 2024 quashing the judgments and orders of High Court and Special Judge, Kurukshetra against Haryana IPS officer Bharti Arora in a proceedings initiated against the her for the offence punishable under Section 58 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985. The Special Judge had recorded the findings against the appellant as well as the other police officers without even issuing notice to them. Notably, on October 26, 2010, the Court had stayed the High Court's judgment and order which had refused to interfere with the Special Judge, Kurukshetra and upheld the order dated May 30, 2008. The High Court's order dated May 19 2008 had refused to entertain the revision with the observation that the order passed by the learned Special Judge should not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the matter.

Justice Gavai who has authored the 39-page long judgement observed that the Special Judge had acted in a predetermined manner. The "Special Judge had given a complete go-bye to all the principles of natural justice. It is a well-settled principle of law that justice should not only be done but should be seen to be done." He underlined that the "Special Judge could not have conducted the proceedings against the present appellant for the offence punishable under Section 58 of the NDPS Act inasmuch as such proceedings could have been conducted only by a Magistrate. Undisputedly, the procedure as required under Chapter XX i.e. Sections 251 to 256 of the Cr.P.C. has also not been followed." 

He recalled the Court's decision in State of West Bengal and Others v. Babu Chakraborthy (2004) 12 SCC 201 : 2004 INSC 492. In this case, the accused persons were convicted for an offence punishable under the NDPS Act. In the appeal preferred by them, while allowing the appeal, the High Court made several strictures and observations against two officers of the West Bengal Police in an IPS Cadre. In the said case also, the allegations against the said officers were with regard to violation of provisions of Section 42 of the NDPS Act. The Court observed:"In our view, the High Court was not justified and correct in passing observations/strictures against Appellants 2 and 3 without affording an opportunity of being heard, and it is in violation of a catena of pronouncements of this Court that harsh or disparaging remarks are not to be made against the persons and authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law unless it is really necessary for the decision of the case. Likewise, the directions issued by the High Court to the trial court to lodge a complaint to the Magistrate having jurisdiction for prosecuting Appellants 2 and 3 for having committed an offence under Section 58 of the Act read with Sections 166 and 167 of the Penal Code, 1860 is not warranted. The observations made by the High Court are liable to be expunged and accordingly."

It cited the following passage from Jackson’s Natural Justice (1980 Edn.). It reads: “The distinction between justice being done and being seen to be done has been emphasised in many cases. . . .The requirement that justice should be seen to be done may be regarded as a general principle which in some cases can be satisfied only by the observance of the rules of natural justice or as itself forming one of those rules. Both explanations of the significance of the maxim are found in Lord Widgery, C.J.'s judgment in R. v. Home Secretary [(1977) 1 WLR 766, 772] , ex. p. Hosenball, where after saying that “the principles of natural justice are those fundamental rules, the breach of which will prevent justice from being seen to be done” he went on to describe the maxim as “one of the rules generally accepted in the bundle of the rules making up natural justice”. It is the recognition of the importance of the requirement that justice is seen to be done that justifies the giving of a remedy to a litigant even when it may be claimed that a decision alleged to be vitiated by a breach of natural justice would still have been reached had a fair hearing been given by an impartial tribunal. The maxim is applicable precisely when the court is concerned not with a case of actual injustice but with the appearance of injustice or possible injustice. In Altco Ltd. v. Sutherland [(1971) 2 Lloyd's Rep 515] Donaldson, J., said that the court, in deciding whether to interfere where an arbitrator had not given a party a full hearing was not concerned with whether a further hearing would produce a different or the same result. It was important that the parties should not only be given justice, but, as reasonable men, know that they had had justice or “to use the time hallowed phrase” that justice should not only be done but be seen to be done. In R. v. Thames Magistrates' Court, ex. p. Polemis [(1974) 1 WLR 1371] , the applicant obtained an order of certiorari to quash his conviction by a stipendiary magistrate on the ground that he had not had sufficient time to prepare his defence. The Divisional Court rejected the argument that, in its discretion, it ought to refuse relief because the applicant had no defence to the charge. It is again absolutely basic to our system that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done. If justice was so clearly not seen to be done, as on the afternoon in question here, it seems to me that it is no answer to the applicant to say: ‘Well, even if the case had been properly conducted, the result would have been the same. That is mixing up doing justice with seeing that justice is done (per Lord Widgery, C.J. at p. 1375).”

The Court observed that the Special Judge acted, without even giving notice to her, only on the basis of the arguments advanced at the stage of final hearing of the matter, made adverse observations against her by almost finding her guilty of the offence punishable under Section 58 of the NDPS Act. While doing so, neither any notice nor was any opportunity of being heard given to her.