Sunday, November 15, 2026

Supreme Court concludes: High Court cannot direct surrender while rejecting anticipatory bail in complaint cases, refers to "serious problems" in Bihar and Jharkhand

In Om Prakash Chhawnika vs. State of Jharkhand, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 676, the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Ujjal Bhuyan delivered a 7-page long order dated April 23, 2026 wherein, it observed: "7. We have noticed that there is a serious problem in two States, viz. the State of Bihar and State of Jharkhand, respectively. We fail to understand that in a private complaint how does the Police involve itself or is concerned, in any manner. What was the basis for the accused to express apprehension that the police would arrest them. 8. In a private complaint when cognizance is taken and process is issued all that the Court would do is to issue summons. We have explained many times in the past the purport of Section 87 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, “the Cr.PC.”)". It concluded:"15. Registry is directed to forward one copy of this order to the Registrar General of the High Court of Bihar and also the Registrar General of the High Court of Jharkhand, respectively who in turn shall place this order before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the respective High Courts. 16. We also impressed upon the learned counsel appearing for the State to look into this issue and guide the State accordingly. 17. With the aforesaid, the Special Leave Petition stands disposed of." 

Section 87 of the Cr.PC. reads: “87. Issue of warrant in lieu of, or in addition to, summons.—A Court may, in any case in which it is empowered by this Code to issue a summons for the appearance of any person, issue, after recording its reasons in writing, a warrant for his arrest—(a) if, either before the issue of such summons, or after the issue of the same but before the time fixed for his appearance, the Court sees reason to believe that he has absconded or will not obey the summons; or (b) if at such time he fails to appear and the summons is proved to have been duly served in time to admit of his appearing in accordance therewith and no reasonable excuse is offered for such failure.” 

Section 87 empowers the Court to issue warrant in lieu of, or in addition to, summons. However, this power has to be exercised only in two contingencies as explained by the provision itself, i.e, (a) and (b), referred to above, respectively.

Supreme Court observed: "10. Once the Court takes cognizance and issues summons, all that the accused has to do is to appear before that Court and join the proceedings. Why should the accused go before the Sessions Court or the High Court, as the case may be, and pray for anticipatory bail? Police has no power to arrest the accused in a complaint case unless there is a non bailable warrant issued by that Court along with the summons. 11. We may give one another simple illustration. Take a case wherein on a private complaint, the magistrate deems fit to take cognizance under Section 200 of the Cr.PC. but postpones the issue of process till the conclusion of the magisterial inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. If a magistrate orders a Police inquiry under Section 202 and asks the police to give a report, then whether in the course of such inquiry, the police can arrest the accused. The answer is an emphatic “NO”, Police has no powers to arrest even during the course of the inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.PC. 12. The aforesaid aspects need to be kept in mind by the High Courts. Unnecessarily anticipatory bail applications are entertained and when rejected the litigants have to travel all the way upto the highest Court of this Country. We also remind the High Court that the direction issued that the petitioner should surrender and seek regular bail before the Court was also wholly without jurisdiction. 13. If the Court wants to reject the anticipatory bail, it may do so but the Court has no jurisdiction to say that the petitioner should now surrender." 

In the appeal before the Supreme Court, there was a land dispute between the petitioner and Respondent 2, the complainant. The Jharkhand High Court denied anticipatory bail to the petitioner in a complaint case for offences punishable under Sections 323, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B and 34 Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 

In Om Prakash Chhawnika @ Om Prakash Chabnika @ Om Prakash Chawnika vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. (2025), Justice Pradeep Kumar Srivastava of the Jharkhand High Court had passed a 1-page long order dated July 4, 2025, wherein, it reproduced his own 2-page long order dated March 13, 2023 which reads: “Petitioner is directed to surrender before the court below and seek regular bail which shall be disposed off on its own merits in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Satender Kumar Antil Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. reported in 2021(10) SCC 773” in the anticipatory bail application being A.B.A. No. 8063 of 2022 which was disposed of. In the July 4, 2025 order, Justice Srivastava concluded:"3. No fresh and new ground has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner for entertaining this second Anticipatory Bail Application, therefore, A.B.A No. 2319 of 2025 stands dismissed."

The March 2023 order recorded that the petitioner had submitted that he was falsely implicated in this case. As per complaint petition, the complainant was power of attorney holder of certain disputed land but his possession was always disturbed by the accused person. Several Suits have also been instituted and contested up to the Kolkata High Court since long. Petitioner has also got 110 kattas land out of plot Nos.1608 and 1609 through registered sale deed after paying valuable consideration money. It was also submitted that petitioner is bonafide purchaser having no criminal antecedent. The Additional P.P appearing for the State assisted with counsel for the complainant had opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner and submitted that after taking cognizance of offence only summons was issued against the petitioner for his appearance. Hence, petitioner had no reasonable apprehension of his arrest in this case. Hence, the anticipatory bail of the petitioner may be dismissed. 

Justice Srivastava had observed: "Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it appears that there is sheer land dispute between the parties and civil Suit and Criminal proceedings have been lodged and pending. It further appears that petitioner is bonafide purchaser of some piece of land under dispute and custodial trial is not required in this case. Hence, without expressing any view on the merits of the case, this anticipatory bail application is disposed off" but directed the petitioner to surrender before the court below and seek regular bail. Supreme Court reminded the High Court that the direction issued by it for the petitioner to surrender and seek regular bail before the Court was also wholly without jurisdiction. It adeed: "If the Court wants to reject the anticipatory bail, it may do so but the Court has no jurisdiction to say that the petitioner should now surrender."  


Supreme Court says, "Merely showing certain press release and circulars permitting the holding of gold to a certain extent will not amount to accounting for the possession of the said assets", sets aside Patna High Court's order. Both orders suffer from Hetvabhasa

In The State of Bihar Through Vigilance, Bihar vs. Phulpari Kumari (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli passed a 6-page long order dated November 2, 2026, wherein, it granted leave. The order concluded: "....we find that the reasoning of the High Court is totally untenable. In a prosecution under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Act, the accused is called upon to explain allegations with regard to owning assets disproportionate to known sources of income. Merely showing certain press release and circulars permitting the holding of gold to a certain extent will not amount to accounting for the possession of the said assets. 10. In view of the above, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and restore to file the order of cognizance dated 28th January, 2021 taken by the Court of Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna in Special Case No. 20 of 2015, arising from P.S. Case No. 37 of 2015. The case shall proceed from that stage....12. The respondent is at liberty to initiate such proceedings as are available in law before the Trial Court, and needless to say that if those proceedings are resorted to, they will be decided uninfluenced by any of the observations in the order of the High Court or in the present order. 13. The Appeal is allowed in the above terms."

The appeal before the Supreme Court had called into question the correctness of the order dated May 14, 2026 passed by Justice Ansul of the Patna High Court. By the said order, the High Court had quashed the order of cognizance dated January 28, 2021 passed by the Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna. On May 11, 2015, a First Information Report was registered at the Vigilance Police Station, Patna, in P.S. Case No. 37 of 2015 against the respondent under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Act as well as her husband for owning assets disproportionate to known sources of income. After obtaining sanction, on July 29, 2020, a chargesheet was filed only against the respondent for the said offences.. On January 28, 2021, the Court of Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna took the cognizance against the respondent. The respondent had challenged the said order in the High Court. 

The appellant-State submitted that entitlement to possess gold is one thing, accounting for it when called upon in a prosecution under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Act, is a wholly different matter. Phulpari Kumari, the respondent defended the impugned order by Justice Ansul and submitted through her counsel that there were other aspects which will show that the assets were not disproportionate to the known source of income. 

Earlier, in Phulpari Kumari vs. The State of Bihar Through Vigilance, Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul of the High Court had passed a 4-page long judgement dated May 14, 2026, wherein, he had concluded:" 5. Learned counsel for the Vigilance submits that Instruction No. 1916 dated 11.05.1994 and Press Release issued by Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Central Board of Direct Taxes dated 01.12.2016 will not be applicable in the case of the petitioner. He has filed counter-affidavit where the details of mode and manner of assessment of gold jewellery has been given but it is categorical case of the Vigilance Department that the Instruction has been issued to the Income Tax Department with reference to possession of gold jewellery. In sum and substance, it is submitted by learned counsel for the Vigilance that the aforesaid Executive Instruction/Guidelines issued by the Government has no application in the present case of the petitioner. 6. In the present case, if the gold is calculated with reference to the aforesaid Circular, the petitioner does not possess more than 750 Grams which is the permissible limit of petitioner. Thus, the Vigilance Department has seized the gold erroneously and has committed error in calculating the weight of the gold jewellery of the petitioner and determining the proportionate assets of the petitioner. 7. In such view of the matter, the order of cognizance dated 28.01.2021 passed by learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna in connection with Special Case No. 20 of 2015 arising out of Vigilance P.S. Case No. 37 of 2015 registered for the offences under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is quashed so far as the petitioner is concerned. 8. Accordingly, the present application stands allowed." The petitioner had filed the case in the High Court on March 15, 2021. It was registered on September 24, 2021. 

On March 13, 2026, the counsel for the Vigilance had sought time to take instruction as to whether Instruction: 1916 dated May 11, 1994 regarding Guidelines for seizure of jewellery and ornaments in course of search vide F. No. 286/63/93-IT (Inv. II), issued by the Secretary, CBDT, Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, was  taken into consideration while calculating disproportionate assets of the petitioner or not. Justice Ansul's order dated March 13, 2026 had stayed the operation of the order dated January 28, 2021 pending before the Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna till the next date of hearing. 

The petitioner had approached the High Court praying for quashing of the order of cognizance dated January 28, 2021 passed by Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna in connection with a Special Case of 2015 which arose out of Vigilance P.S. Case of 2015 registered for the offences under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The petitioner was posted as CDPO Patna. While taking bribe, she was trapped by the Vigilance and the case was registered vide Vigilance P.S. Case No. 54 of 2013. During the search of the house, inventory of other articles was prepared along with several documents showing investment in Bank. Vigilance PS Case No. 37 of 2015 was instituted under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. During the course of enquiry, the D.A. against her husband was found minimal. Therefore, no charge-sheet was submitted against her. The difference between the total income and expenditure of the petitioner during the check period was Rs. 12,71,693/-. The total weight of gold jewellery was 646.400 grams. The case of the petitioner was that the same not only belongs to her but also to her unmarried daughter and other family members. 

The counsel for the petitioner relied upon Instruction No. 1916 dated May 11, 1994 and Press Release issued by Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Central Board of Direct Taxes dated December 1, 2016 which prescribes that a married woman was entitled to possess 500 Grams of gold jewellery, unmarried lady was entitled to possess 250 Grams of gold jewellery and male was entitled to possess 100 Grams of gold jewellery. The petitioner was/is a married woman and married woman is entitled to 500 Grams of gold and the petitioner has a daughter who was unmarried on the date of search, i.e., August 17, 2013. 

Given the fact that Supreme Court has not passed a detailed order while setting aside the High Court's order, it is difficult to appreciate as to why showing union government's own press release and its circulars "permitting the holding of gold to a certain extent will not amount to accounting for the possession of the said assets." The order should have elaborated as to why union government's own press release and its circulars permitting possession of the gold assets is not enough. The order simply reproduces the detailed submissions by the appellant-State to conclude that High Court's order was "untenable". It does not engage with the submission of the respondent which was accepted by the High Court in paragraph 6 of the impugned order which, the Supreme Court merely reproduced as verbatim: “6. In the present case, if the gold is calculated with reference to the aforesaid Circular, the petitioner does not possess more than 750 Grams which is the permissible limit of petitioner. Thus, the Vigilance Department has seized the gold erroneously and has committee error in calculating the weight of the gold jewellery of the petitioner and determining the proportionate assets of the petitioner.”  

The only difference between the order of the Supreme Court and the judgement of the High Court is that the former accepts the submission of the Department of Vigilance, Bihar and the latter accepts the submission of the Child Development Project Officer (CDPO), Patna who manages block-level implementation of the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) program under the Social Welfare Department, Government of Bihar. 

There is a similarity in the order of the Supreme Court and the judgement of the High Court. Both suffer from one of the five kinds of hetvabhasa (insufficient reason used in an inference) systematically identified by the Nyaya school of Indian philosophy as a class of defective reasons. Hetvabhasa is listed as the 13th of the 16 philosophical categories (padarthas) in the opening sūtra (1.1.1) and later in Sutras 1.2.5 through 1.2.9 of the Nyaya Sutras, the ancient Sanskrit text composed by Akṣapada Gautama. When a reason appears valid on the surface but is fundamentally defective, it is called a hetvabhasa ('fallacy of the reason' or 'pseudo-reason'). In Indian logic, hetu means the reason used to prove something and abhasa means appearance. Hetvabhasa is, therefore, a reason that appears valid. 


Friday, November 13, 2026

Justice Khatim Reza sets aside order by Bihar Land Tribunal comprising of Justice (Retd.) Mridula Mishra, Ram Pravesh Sharma, K. P. Ramaiah, remits the matter back to it, directs it to decide it preferably, within 9 months on merit in accordance with law after hearing all the parties

In Vishal Kumar Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar through Chief Secretary, Govt. of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Khatim Reza delivered a 15-page long judgement dated November 6, 2026, wherein, he set aside order dated October 3, 2016 by Justice (Retd.) Mridula Mishra led  Bihar Land Tribunal, remitted the matter back to it, directed it to decide it preferably, within nine months on merit in accordance with law after hearing all the parties. Justice Mishra was the Chairperson of the tribunal during January 16, 2012-January 17, 2017. Ram Pravesh Sharma was the judicial member during her tenure. 

Notably, K. P. Ramaiah was the administrative member during the tenure of Justice Mishra and even after that till his resignation in May 2019 after vigilance investigation bureau lodged an FIR against him Bihar Mahadalit Vikas Mission scam related to embezzlement of at least Rs 5.01 crore of central government funds for imparting computer training and of spoken English and other courses to Mahadalit youths under Dashrath Manjhi Skill Development Scheme, which was run by Bihar Mahadalit Vikas Mission. 

The tribunal is constituted under Chapter XIII of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 and Article 323B of the Constitution of India. The function of the tribunal extends to twelve laws including Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961, Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885, Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act,1956, Bihar Tenants' Holdings (Maintenance of Records) Act, 1973, Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1954, Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947, Bihar Government Estates Manual, 1953, Bihar Settlement Manual, Bihar Land Disputes Resolution Act, 2009, Bihar Special Survey and Settlement Act ,2001and Bihar Land Mutation Act, 2011.  

Justice Reza concluded: "16. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions of the parties, it is apparent that the present proceeding is not related to reopening of the case. It is the case of continuation of original ceiling proceedings (Ceiling Case No. 43/1973-74 / 158/1975-76). The statutory remedy for an appeal against the final order passed under Section 11(1) of the Ceiling Act is prescribed under Section 30 of the Ceiling Act and the provision for revision against the order of appellate court is prescribed under Section 32 of the Ceiling Act. Both the sections give statutory right to the parties. These sections have not been repealed by Gazette notification. The pending proceedings under Section 30 & 32 as well as proceedings pending before the Bihar Land Tribunal against the order passed under Section 32 of the Ceiling Act shall not be abated under Section 45D of the Ceiling Act. The final adjudicatory authority is Bihar Land Tribunal which has the power to entertain any application against the final order under the Ceiling Act under Section 9 of the Bihar Land Tribunal Act, and, thus, the appeal, revision and B.L.T. Case are continuation of original ceiling proceedings. The question of abatement of the proceedings under Section 45D of the Ceiling Act does not arise. 17. Since the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is not on merit and it is only on technical issue, the impugned order dated 03.10.2016 passed in B.L.T. Case No. 7 of 2014 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Bihar Land Tribunal to dispose of the case afresh on merit in accordance with law after hearing all the parties. 18. Further, the Bihar Land Tribunal Patna is directed to dispose of the Bihar Land Tribunal Case No. 7 of 2014 as early as possible, preferably, within a period of nine (9) months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 19. In the result, this writ application is allowed." 

The five respondents were:2. The Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Government of Bihar, 3. The Collector, Kaimur at Bhabua, 4. The Additional Collector, Kaimur at Bhabua, 5. Circle Officer, Kudra, Kaimur at Bhabua and 6. Ramayan Paswan, Chilbili, Kudra, Kaimur (Bhabua).

The writ application was heard on remand by the Supreme Court vide order dated 17.02.2025 passed in Civil Appeal No. 4419 of 2025 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 12649 of 2022 whereby the order of  Single Judge dated 10.05.2019 passed in CWJC No. 20355 of 2016 and judgment of Division Bench of the Patna High Court had passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 615 of 2019 on 04.07.2022 had been set aside by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that in this case, the issue to declare the land belonging to the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant as surplus is in question. In the cases where the land has been declared surplus and prior to dismissing the pending proceedings before the Tribunal the question of possession is relevant. In the case at hand, the land was declared as surplus and proceedings were pending before Tribunal at the time of declaring such proceedings as abated. Therefore, in such a situation dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches would not be justified. In such view of the matter, the orders of the High Court were set aside and the matter was remitted to be decided on merit. The writ application was filed for quashing the resolution dated October 15, 1993 passed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Government of Bihar in Case No. 226 of 1989 whereby the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Government of Bihar, affirmed the order passed by the Collector, Rohtas in Ceiling Case No. 05 of 1989 affirming the order of the Additional Collector (Ceiling) Kaimur in Ceiling Case No. 43 of 1973-74/158 of 1975 / 76. 

The case of the petitioners was that the Land Ceiling Case No. 43 of 1973-74 was initiated against the land holder, namely, Late Baijnath Singh and Late Shiv Shankar Singh, both sons of Late Kalki Singh under the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. According to the verification report of the Circle Officer, the descendants of Late Kalki Singh possessed 63.02 acres of land on September 9, 1970 out of which of the land except 4 acres of land has no facility for irrigation. As per the genealogical table mentioned in the verification report of the Circle Officer, Late Baijnath Singh had two sons, namely Rajendra Prasad Singh and Chandra Bhan Singh and one daughter, namely Godawari Devi. Late Shiv Shankar Singh had also two sons, namely, Mritunjay Singh and Karunesh Singh and one daughter, namely, Kumari Madhu Singh. Accordingly, a draft statement under Section 10(2) of the Ceiling Act was published in the official gazette of the district. The land holder filed their objections under Section 10(3) of the Ceiling Act. As per the verification report of the Circle Officer, Shiv Shankar Singh wrongly shown as dead. The age of Rajendra Singh and Chandra Bhan Singh, both sons of Baijnath Singh, are shown to be 28 years and 23 years on the appointed day i.e. on September 9, 1970. 

It was further case of the petitioners that in the said report, Mritunjay Singh, father of the petitioners and Karunesh Singh, son of Late Shiv Shankar Singh are shown to be aged about 24 years and 20 years respectively on the appointed day. The Additional Collector (Ceiling) again called for a verification report from Circle Officer, Kudra, which was submitted vide Letter No. 738 dated 14.05.1977. In the said report, the facts stated in the earlier reports were reiterated. It was also pleaded that the land holders filed a matriculation certificate of Rajendra Singh and a certificate issued by the Head Master of Madhya Vidhyalay, Jehanabad and also appointment letter of Chandra Bhan Singh, but even then, the Additional Collector (Ceiling) neither accepted the verification report nor the certificate submitted by the land holders and held that Rajendra Singh, Chandra Bhan Singh, Mritunjay Singh and Karunesh Singh were minors on the appointed day and only two units of land; one for Baijnath Singh and another for Most. Ram Pyari Kunwar were allowed and all the lands were classified as Class-II land and thus 27.02 acres land was found to be surplus by the Additional Collector (Ceiling), Kaimur on 11.08.1988 in the said Ceiling Case No. 43 of 1973-74 / 158 of 1975-76. An appeal was preferred before the District Collector, Rohtas which gave rise to the Ceiling Appeal No. 5 of 1989. The Collector modified the order of the Additional Collector (Ceiling) dated 11.08.1988 and disposed of the appeal by its order dated May 9, 1989 allowing one unit with three additional units to the members of the family of land holders. The order dated May 9, 1989 came to be challenged by way of revision under Section 32 of Ceiling Act giving rise to Ceiling Revision Case No. 226 of 1989 which came to be dismissed by order dated 15.10.1993.

Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue dated 15.10.1993, a writ application was filed by the land holders before the High Court which gave rise to C.W.J.C. No. 7407 of 2006. The said writ petition was disposed of by order of this Court dated 05.12.2013 by transferring the same to the Bihar Land Tribunal, Patna after noticing the fact that the dispute was amenable to the jurisdiction of Bihar Land Tribunal constituted under Section 4 of the Bihar Land Tribunal Act, 2009. Applying the provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 2009 read with Rule 5(6) of the Bihar Land Tribunal Rules, 2010, the records of the writ proceedings were transferred to the Tribunal for adjudication which was numbered as B.L.T. Case No. 07 of 2014 which was disposed of as abated by the order dated October 3, 2016 passed by the Chairman of the Bihar Land Tribunal in view of repealing Section 45B by inserting Section 45D of the Ceiling Act which is under challenged in the present writ application.

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that original petitioners filed C.W.J.C. No. 7407 of 2006 before the High Court against the order passed in Ceiling Revision Case No. 226 of 1989 by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue against the allotment of the units to the land holders. The impugned orders arise out of Land Ceiling Case No. 43/1973-74 / 158/1975- 76 passed by the Additional Collector (Ceiling), Kaimur as well as order dated 09.05.1989 passed by the Collector, Rohtas in Ceiling Appeal Case No. 5 of 1989 and order passed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue in Revision Case No. 226 of 1989 which was ultimately transferred by a Bench of the High Court to Bihar Land Tribunal for adjudication. It is further submitted that all the aforesaid orders have been passed in continuation of original proceedings. However, the order passed by the Additional ollector and the Collector were not passed under Section 45B of the Ceiling Act and no any proceedings has ever been initiated against the land holders under Section 45B of the Ceiling Act. The Tribunal wrongly assumed that the present proceedings is initiated under Section 45B of the Ceiling Act. Against the order of Additional Collector passed on 11.08.1988 in Ceiling Case No. 43/1973-74 / 158/1975-76, the land holders filed Ceiling Appeal No. 5 of 1989 before the Collector. The Collector modified the order of Additional Collector to the detrimental of the petitioners to the extent of allowing only one unit of land to the family of the land holders and declared 39.62 acres of Class-II land as surplus. Against the aforesaid order of the Collector, the land holders filed Revision Case No. 226 of 1989, which, too, was dismissed vide Resolution dated 15.10.1993 by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue. Against the aforesaid revisional order, the original petitioner filed C.W.J.C. No. 740of 2006. It is apparent from the proceedings which was challenged in C.W.J.C. No. 7407 of 2006 arising out of Ceiling Case No. 43/1973-74 / 158/1975-76 that a direction was given for transferring the records of the case to the Bihar Land Tribunal.

Thec ounsel for the petitioners submitted that the Tribunal has not passed order on merit. The order passed
by the Tribunal is purely on technical issue. The Tribunal misdirected itself that Section 45-B of the Ceiling Act has been repealed and a new Section 45-D has been added after Section 45-C in the Ceiling Act. As per Section 45-D after repeal of Section 45-B of the Ceiling Act, proceedings pending before the State or the Bihar Land Tribunal shall be deemed to be abated and the proceedings reopened earlier under the repealed Section 45-B of the Ceiling Act and are pending before the Collector shall also stand abated. Since the matter is still pending, as such, it shall also stand abated.

The counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the appeal was in continuation of original proceedings bearing Land Ceiling Case No. 43/1973-74 / 158/1975-76 against the order of the Additional Collector, whereby 27.02 acres of Class-II land held by the landlord was found to be surplus. The Collector in Ceiling Appeal No. 5 of 1989 found that wrongly one major units and three additional units were to be given to the land holders and thus, the order of the Additional Collector referred to above was modified by giving one major unit and three additional units (1/10th of an unit) to the land holders. The said order was challenged by the land holders before the Additional Member,  Board of Revenue vide Ceiling Revision Case No. 226 of 1989 which was not interfered with and Board of Revenue dismissed the aforesaid revision petition on 15.10.1993. The aforesaid proceedings were in continuation of original aforesaid land ceiling case proceedings and B.L.T. Case is also in continuation of original Ceiling Proceedings. The order passed by the Additional Collector, the Collector and the Additional Member, Board ofRevenue, Govt. of Bihar are not arising out of reopening of Ceiling Case under Section 45-B of the Ceiling Act. 

The counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the Appellate Court's order is bad in law became in absence of any appeal by the State Government, the units were reduced to one from two as given in the original proceedings merely on the ground of death of Baijnath Singh, who died during the pendency of the proceedings and was very much alive on September 9, 1970 i.e. the cut of death as fixed in the Act itself and the same was even affirmed by the revisional court.

So far denial of unit to one Chandra Bhan Singh is concerned, it was submitted that since he was not matriculate, therefore, only School Leaving Certificate was provided which shows his date of birth as 17.01.1946, meaning thereby that on the appointed day, he was major and not only this, his appointment letter and confirmation letter of Hindalco Industries Limited, Renukut, was also given, but it was not considered and he, too, was not allotted any unit. By now, he has retired on 18.01.2004 from the aforesaid employment and a certificate to this effect was given to him stating therein that he was in continuous service from October 3, 1965 and on his PAN Card also, the date of birth is given as 17.01.1946. The genealogical table shows that at least three more units should have been given to the land holders and the land in question should have been declared as Class-IV land and any improvement of irrigation facility after 09.09.1970 could not be taken into consideration for the purpose of declaration of nature of land under the Act. The report of the Circle Officer clearly stated the aforesaid persons as major and apart from 4 acres of land over 59 acres of land was declared to be Class-IV land but that, too, was not considered by any of the authorities.

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that it is admitted fact that till date the land, in question, is in possession of the petitioners and the land holders, which would be evident from the supplementary counter affidavit filed by the respondents before the Bihar Land Tribunal in which they themselves have admitted this fact that the land is in possession of the land holders.

On the other hand, counsel for the State submitted that the Ceiling Case No. 43 of 1973 / 158 of 1975-76 was initiated against Baijnath Singh and Shiv Shankar Singh, both the sons of Late Kalika Singh before the Additional Collector, Rohtas, in which show-cause was called for from the land holders. They filed their show-cause mentioning therein that their lands under Ceiling Act are unirrigated save and except 4 acres of irrigated land. As such, their land comes under category of Class-IV and also claimed 6 units on the basis of genealogical table. After hearing the parties, the Additional Collector passed an order on 11.08.1988 by which one unit each to Ram Dulari Kunwar, wife of Baijnath Singh and Ram Pyari Kunwar, wife of Shiv Shankar Singh was allowed and the land was declared as Class-2 land and accordingly, 36 acres land was allowed to be retained by land holders and rest 27.02 acres of land was declared as Surplus.

Against the order dated August 11, 1988, the land holders preferred a Ceiling Appeal No. 5 of 1989 before the Collector, Rohtas at Sasaram. After hearing the parties, the appellate court passed order on May 9, 1989 whereby the order of Additional Collector was modified to the extent that only one unit was granted to the appellant nos. 1 & 3 (minor) in family which were given as 1/10th of a unit and the petitioners were allowed to be entitled to retain only 23.04 acres of land of Class-II land and remaining 39.62 acres of land was declared as surplus.

Against the aforesaid order, the petitioners moved before the Board of Revenue in Ceiling Revision Case No. 226 of 1989. The said revision application was dismissed on October 15, 1993 and the order of District Collector, Rohtas at Sasaram was affirmed. The petitioners preferred C.W.J.C. No. 7407 of 2006
which was ultimately transferred to the Bihar Land Tribunal. After receiving the above writ application, B.L.T Case No. 7 of 2014 was registered in the registry of Bihar Land Tribunal, Patna.

During the pendency of B.L.T Case, Section 45B of the Ceiling Act was repealed and a new Section 45D of the Ceiling Act was added by the State Government through amendment. Since the matter was kept in suspended animation, the record of the Ceiling Appeal No. 5 of 1989 was sent to the S.D.M., Mohania for
compliance of the order. The S.D.M., Mohania after hearing the parties, passed an order on 27.04.2019 / 22.06.2019 declaring 39.62 acres of Class-II land as surplus in the light of order dated 12.04.1989 / 09.05.1989 was passed by the Collector, Rohtas and a Gazette notification was published under Section 11(1) of the Ceiling Act on 20.08.2019. Against the order dated 27.04.2019 /22.06.2019 passed in Ceiling Case No. 5 of 1989, the land holders (petitioners) filed Ceiling Appeal No. 1 of 2019 before the Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Kaimur, Bhabhua. After hearing the parties, the said appeal was dismissed vide order dated 07.11.2019 and S.D.M., Mohania was directed to implement his own order dated 27.04.2019 / 22.06.2019 as soon as possible. Accordingly, District Gazette Notification under 11(1) of the Ceiling Act was published on August 20, 2019, whereby 23.40 acres of land were allowed to retain the land holders and 39.62 acres of class-II lands were declared as surplus.

Wednesday, November 11, 2026

Can electoral convenience be presented as social service to justify nomination of Deepak Prakash, son of Union Minister Upendra Kushwaha as MLC under Article 171 of Constitution of India?

In Prince Kumar Ojha vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Joint Registrar (List) Patna High Court granted permission to file PIL vide order dated October 15, 2026. The other respondents are:2. The Principal Secretary to the Governor of Bihar, 3. The Principal Secretary, Election Department, Government of Bihar, 4. The Chief Electoral Officer-cum-Secretary, Election Department, Government of Bihar and 5. Deepak Prakash, Nominated Member of the Bihar Legislative Council (MLC). The case is listed for order before the Chief Justice on November 18, 2026.  The petitioner has argued that his nomination violates Articles 171(3)(e) and 171(5) of the Constitution, which restrict Legislative Council nominations to specific fields such as social service, literature, science, art, and the cooperative movement, rather than serving as political rehabilitation.

Deepak Prakash was appointed as a member of Legislative Council on August 5, 2026 by Bihar Governor Syed Ata Hasnain to fill the vacancy following the resignation of Devesh Kumar. Devesh was made to resign as member of Legislative Council on July 31, 2026. 

Earlier, in Rakesh Kumar Singh alias Rakesh Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors.(2026), Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Bagchi and Justice V Mohana on July 30, 2026 while hearing a petition, had asked the Bihar government as to how Deepak Prakash, an unelected minister, can hold the position even after six months after assuming office. He was first sworn in as Bihar’s Panchayati Raj Minister on November 20, 2025, in the Council of Ministers headed by then Chief Minister Nitish Kumar. At the time, he was not a member of either the Bihar Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council. After the resignation and dissolution of the Nitish Kumar-led Cabinet, NDA leader Samrat Choudhary assumed office as Bihar Chief Minister on April 15. Prakash consequently ceased to be a Minister and remained out of the Council of Ministers. After a gap of around 22 days, Prakash was re-inducted into the Cabinet and sworn in again as Panchayati Raj Minister on May 7, despite still not being an elected legislator. The petitioner had contended that Deepak Prakash had already utilised approximately four months and 26 days of the six-month period permitted under Article 164(4) of the Constitution for a person who is not a member of the State Legislature to continue as a Minister. The six-month period had  expired on May 19. The petitioner had argued that Deepak Prakash’s resignation and subsequent reappointment could not be used to reset or extend the constitutional time limit.

The PIL in the High Court was filed on September 24, 2026 and registered on October 27, 2026. It challenges the nomination of Deepak Prakash as a MLC. The PIL has alleged that the nomination of Prakash violates Article 171(3)(e) and Article 171(5) of the Constitution of India. The PIL seeks issuance of a writ of quo warranto, calling Deepak Prakash to show under what circumstances he occupies the public office of a nominated MLC. It has also sought a writ of certiorari quashing the notification through which he was nominated as MLC. 

The petitioner has pointed out that Article 171(5) restricts nominations to the Legislative Council to persons possessing special knowledge or practical experience in literature, science, art, the cooperative movement and social service. The petitioner has submitted that Prakash does not fulfill the constitutional requirement for nomination under Article 171(3)(e), which a person must posses the prescribed special knowledge or practical experience in the five exhaustive fields. The PIL has submitted that the constitutional intent behind Article 171 is not to create a ‘backdoor’ entry for active political personalities into the Legislative Council. 


No writ can be entertained under Article 227: Supreme Court

In Radhey Shyam & Anr. vs. Chhabi Nath & Ors., reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423, the Supreme Court has held that jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is distinct from writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court also observed in the same case that in some High Courts there is tendency of entertaining petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by terming them as writ petition. The Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, reported in (2010)8 SCC 329 has also made it clear that under Article 227 of the Constitution of India no writ could be entertained. 
 
In Neeta Singh & Ors. vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 5761, the Supreme Court has held: “15. In view of the decision in Prakash Chand (supra), we hold that nomenclature of a petition read with the substance thereof does matter. Much depends on what the subject matter of the petition is and who is entrusted to hear and decide it. A Judge of a high court having been assigned petitions under Article 226 for hearing and decision by its Chief Justice cannot, if he (the Judge) finds that the petition filed under Article 226 should have ideally been filed under Article 227, treat the petition as one under Article 227 and proceed to hear and decide it, unless the Chief Justice has also assigned to such Judge petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution for hearing and decision. If not so assigned, the learned Judge may, in his discretion, direct the petition to be treated as one under Article 227 for being placed before the learned Judge having assignment. This is mandatory and, therefore, one finds the caution sounded by this Court in the opening sentence of paragraph 26 of Pepsi Foods (supra) to be of extreme significance.”
 
In conformity with judicial pronouncements, the Patna High Court Rules was amended on March 14, 2016 and Part A, Chapter XII, Sub Rule (v) of Rule 3 of Patna High Court Rules was incorporated which provides: “(v) Petitioner under Article-227 of the Constitution of India in respect of any order or any proceeding before any Criminal Court would be filed in Criminal Miscellaneous Jurisdiction.”  Under Patna High Court Rules a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India needs to be filed under Criminal Miscellaneous jurisdiction.  Under the Subject Code Classification of the High Court, Group 54, pertaining to Criminal Writ  Jurisdiction Cases, is divided into sixteen distinct subject categories, including Subject No. 10, which specifically relates to Criminal Writ Petitions arising out of judicial orders. But the subject classification has not been amended to bring it in conformity with the amendment dated March 14, 2016, whereby Part A, Chapter XII, Rule 3, Sub-rule (v) of the Patna High Court Rules came into force, though subject of 'Criminal Miscellaneous under Article 227' has been put under Group 50 in the Constitution of Benches. The aforesaid rule specifically stipulates that a petition invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in criminal matters, is required to be instituted as a Criminal Miscellaneous Jurisdiction. The High Court would be failing in its duty if it were to disregard the nomenclature of ‘Criminal Miscellaneous Jurisdiction’ prescribed under the aforesaid Rules.
 
The Subject Code Classification of Patna High Court, Group 54 pertains to Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Cases and is further classified into sixteen distinct subject categories, all of which are assigned to a Single Judge. The Subject No. 4 relates to matters concerning quashing of FIR/charge-sheet, whereas Subject No. 10 specifically pertains to matters arising out of judicial orders. As per the constitution of Benches of the High Court, all matters falling under the various subject categories of Group 54 are assigned to the same Bench. 
 
There is a need for necessary steps for amendment in the Subject Code Classification of the Court to bring it in conformity with the Patna High Court Rules. 

Tuesday, November 10, 2026

Patna High Court imposes cost of Rs 5, 000 upon the petitioner in a case from Chitragupta Nagar, Khagaria

In Shashi Bhushan Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar Through Its Pr. Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Rana Vikram Singh delivered a 24-page long judgement dated October 30, 2026, wherein, it considered the question: can High Court interfere with the order granting remand of the accused on the ground of non-service of the written grounds of arrest upon the petitioner’s son at the time of his arrest on June 5, 2026. The Court concluded: "27. Having considered the facts of the present case in the light of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are of the considered opinion that once the prejudice-oriented test is applied in the present case, this writ application is liable to fail. As has been noticed hereinabove, the petitioner's son was fully aware of the ground of his arrest and it is not one of those cases in which he was taken by surprise and that he was not in possession of any information/materials to oppose the remand. The fact is that his lawyer had appeared through video conferencing and opposed the remand order. 28. In our order dated 15.10.2026 and 28.10.2026, we have noted how this case has progressed and time of this Court has been wasted. We have also taken note of the conduct and manner in which the case has been conducted. At one stage, we were of the considered opinion that this aspect of the matter was required to be discussed and appropriate order is required to be passed but considering that sometimes in legal profession, the lawyers engaged by a party go on making submissions under some excitements without understanding the effect of the same and as we have been informed by learned counsel for the petitioner himself that he was mostly dealing in service matters and perhaps for that reason he could not take an appropriate view at the time of  filing of the present writ application, we have decided to drop this aspect of the matter and not to pass any order as regards the conduct etc. 29. Vide order dated 28.10.2026, this Court had imposed a cost of Rs.5,000/- upon the petitioner which was required to be deposited within two weeks from the said order. If the receipt showing deposit of cost is not filed in the Registry within two weeks from the said date, steps shall be taken for recovery of the same in accordance with law. 30. This writ application, therefore, fails. It is dismissed accordingly."  

The counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Mihir Rajesh Shah vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2026) 1 SCC 500, Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India reported in (2024) 7 SCC 576 and Dr. Rajinder Rajan vs. Union of India & Anr. reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 802. One of the contentions of the counsel was, that even if a non-bailable warrant was issued against the detenue that alone would not serve the purpose unless it was shown that the warrant of arrest was duly read out to the accused at the time of his arrest. In this connection, he relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Kasireddy Upender Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2026) 8 SCC 275 (Paragraph ‘38’). The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the writ application as framed was well maintainable and in the light of the judgments of the Supreme Court, the petitioner’s son would deserve his release on bail on the ground of non-furnishing of the written grounds of his arrest. 

The Advocate General submitted that the facts of the case would clearly show that the petitioner was well aware of the accusations against him, he was in possession of a copy of the First Information Report in which he was named accused, he was also aware of the issuance of non-bailable warrant and in fact he had filed an application for recall of the warrant of arrest. It was also pointed out that the petitioner’s son had filed an application seeking pre-arrest bail before this Court in Criminal Miscellaneous No.38639 of 2026 which was pending consideration, therefore on the face of these materials, the petitioner cannot be allowed to argue that the grounds of arrest were not known to the petitioner’s son. Placing reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka vs. Sri Darshan reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702: (2026) 8 SCC 223 and State of Rajasthan vs. Jhabra Ram reported in 2026 INSC 1169, the  Advocate General submitted that the ratio of judgments of the Supreme Court in cases of Sri Darshan (supra) and Jhabra Ram (supra) would be applicable in the facts of this case. It was also submitted that the High Court has taken into consideration the various judgments of the Supreme Court on the issue of compliance with the requirement of Article 22 of the Constitution of India, in case of Sarfaraz @ Muzaffar
Ahmad Wani vs. Union of India through NIA, New Delhi (Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1478 of 2025). In it's judgment dated October 6, 2026, the High Court took note of the judgment in case of Sri Darshan (supra) and only after recording that the case of Sarfaraz @ Muzaffar Ahmad Wani (supra) was clearly distinguishable from that of Sri Darshan’s case, the High Court allowed the said writ petition. The  Advocate General informed that after the charge-sheet was filed and cognizance was taken, the records have been committed to the court of session. It was pointed out the petitioner admits filing of chargesheet dated July 11, 2026, order taking cognizance passed on July 18, 2026 by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khagaria and registration of Sessions Trial No. 508/2026 in the court of District and Sessions Judge, Khagaria.

Justice Prsad observed: "....the legal position which emerges is that the constitutional mandate provided in Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India is not a mere procedural formality but a constitutional safeguard in the form of fundamental rights. The intent and purpose of the constitutional mandate is to prepare the arrested person to defend himself. If the provisions of Article 22(1) are read in a restrictive manner, its
intended purpose of securing personal liberty would not be achieved rather curtailed and put to disuse.” 

In the case of Dr. Rajinder Rajan, the Supreme Court held:-“20. It is no longer res integra that supplying the grounds of arrest to the accused in writing before the arrest or, in a given case, under exceptional circumstances, immediately thereafter, is the mandate of the Constitutional guarantees provided under Article 22(1) read with Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The ratio of the judgment in Mihir Rajesh Shah conclusively holds that any deviation from the above principle would lead to the arrest of the accused being declared illegal entitling such accused to be released forthwith.”

In the case of Sri Darshan, the Supreme Court rejected the contention of counsel for the respondents-accused that the arrest was illegal as the grounds of arrest were not furnished immediately in writing, thereby violating Article 22 (1) of the Constitution and Section 50 CrPC (now Section 47 of the Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). The Court held that in absence of demonstrable prejudice such an irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot by itself warrant bail.

The High Court had occasion to take note of the various judgments of the Supreme Court on this issue in the case of Sarfaraz @ Muzaffar Ahmad Wani (supra). The entire discussions have been summed up in paragraph '36' of the judgment in the case of Sarfaraz @ Muzaffar Ahmad Wani (supra) which we reproduce hereunder for a ready reference:-
"36. The upshots of the aforementioned discussions would lead to conclude this Court as under:-
(i) The constitutional mandate and the statutory mandate as contained under Article 22 of the Constitution of India and Section 50 of the CrPC leave no room for doubt that it would be necessary for the investigating agency/arresting authority, that a copy of the written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. This has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal versus Union of India reported in (2024) 7 SCC 576:
(ii) If the arrest memo is simply a proforma indicating that the grounds of arrest has been conveyed, it would not be a compliance with the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ahmed Mansoor (supra) and Dr. Rajindra Rajan (supra): and
(iii) Templates of the arrest memo containing the statement to the effect that the arresting officer explained the grounds of arrest to the accused before the arrest, is no compliance with the mandate of Article 22 of the constitution of India read with section 50 and 50A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Now Sections 47 and 48 of the BNSS); and
(iv) The judgment in Sri Darshan’s case (supra) was rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with a clear finding that the arrest memos and remand orders reflected that the respondents were aware of the reasons for their arrest. They were legally represented from the outset and applied for bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed understanding of the accusations. In such circumstance, the Hon’ble Supreme Court took a view that nomaterial has been placed on record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the present case, the facts are entirely different, therefore, the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sri Darshan’s case (supra) is to be read as explained in the case of Ahmed Mansoor (supra) in paragraph ‘8’ of the judgment."
24. We have further noticed that, in it’s recent judgment in the case of Jhabra Ram (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken note of the prejudice-oriented test as has been laid down in Sri Darshan's (supra) case. We reproduce paragraph '19' of the judgment in Jhabra Ram as under:-
"19. In evaluating the effect of alleged procedural defects in communicating grounds of arrest, this Court in State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan (supra) definitively established that the governing principle is the prejudice-oriented test. The Court categorically observed as follows:
“32.5. While Section 50 CrPC is mandatory, the consistent judicial approach has been to adopt a prejudice-oriented test when examining alleged procedural lapses. The mere absence of written grounds does not ipso facto render the arrest illegal, unless it results in demonstrable prejudice or denial of a fair opportunity to defend.
32.6. The High Court, however, relied heavily on the alleged procedural lapse as a determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the offence under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. It noted, inter alia, that there was no mention in the remand orders about service of memo of grounds of arrest (SCC OnLine Kar para 45), the arrest memos were allegedly template-based and not personalised (SCC OnLine Kar para 50), and eyewitnesses had not stated that they were present at the time of arrest or had signed the memos (SCC OnLine Kar para 48). Relying on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 450] and Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 573], it concluded (SCC OnLine Kar paras 43, 49-50) that from 3-10-2023 onwards, failure to serve detailed, written, and individualised grounds of arrest immediately after arrest was a violation entitling the accused to bail.
32.7. In the present case, the arrest memos and remand records clearly reflect that the respondents were aware of the reasons for their arrest. They were legally represented from the outset and applied for bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed understanding of the accusations. No material has been placed on record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice, such as irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself, warrant release on bail. As reiterated above, the High Court treated it as a determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the charge under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. Its reliance on Pankaj Bansal [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 450] and Prabir Purkayastha [Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 573] is misplaced, as those decisions turned on materially different facts and statutory contexts. The approach adopted here is inconsistent with the settled principle that procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest, absent prejudice, do not ipso facto render custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail.”
25. This Court further finds that in the case of Jhabra Ram (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed its judgment in the case of Kasireddy Upender Reddy (supra). In this connection, the discussions made in paragraphs '20', '21' and '22' of the judgment would be significant to take note of :-"20. In examining the constitutional object underlying Article 22(1)37 of the Constitution and Section 4738 of the BNSS, this Court in Kasireddy Upender Reddy (Supra) reiterated that the requirement of communicating grounds of arrest is designed to serve a substantive purpose rather than a mere formalistic routine. The Court observed as follows: “32. The object underlying the provision that the grounds of arrest should be communicated to the person arrested has been very succinctly explained in Vihaan Kumar [Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799]. On learning about the grounds for arrest, the person concerned will be in a position to make an application before the appropriate court for bail, or move the High Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Further, the information will enable the arrested person to prepare his defence in time for the purposes of his trial. For these reasons, it has been provided by the Constitution that, the ground for the arrest must be communicated to the person arrested as soon as possible. 33. For the purposes of clause (1) of Article 22, it is not necessary for the authorities to furnish full details of the offence. However, the information should be sufficient to enable the arrested person to understand why he has been arrested. The grounds to be communicated to the arrested person should be somewhat similar to the charge framed by the Court for the trial of a case.”
21. Applying these principles to the present facts, the record clearly reflects that the respondent was fully cognizant of the grounds for his apprehension and was effectively represented by counsel at the stage of remand. The substantive mandate of Article 22(1) thus stands meaningfully fulfilled, with no demonstrable prejudice having been suffered.
22. As affirmed in Kasireddy Upender Reddy (supra) and State of Karnataka (supra), the constitutional framework requires that the arrestee be informed of the grounds of arrest but does not insist upon written communication as an indispensable formality irrespective of the attendant circumstances. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice or denial of an opportunity to defend, an alleged procedural defect in the mode of service cannot ipso facto invalidate detention or entitle an accused to regular bail, more so in cases involving grave allegations of espionage affecting national security and sovereign integrity." 

The judgement by Division Bench reads: "26. At this stage, we are reminded of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. and Another Vs. N.R. Vairamani and Another reported in (2004) 8 SCC 579 (para 9) in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-“9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton2 (AC at p. 761) Lord MacDermott observed : (All ER p. 14 C-D) “The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge,…””