Supreme Court reverses order by Justice Khatim Reza, restores stay on proceeding of Execution Case of 1999 in Court of Subordinate Judge V, Begusarai

In Bihar State Financial Corporation & Anr. vs. Bhushan Singh & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's division bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra has passed a 2-page long order dated July 18, 2025 saying, "In the meanwhile, there shall be stay of operation of the impugned judgment and order dated 18.03.2025 in First Appeal Nos.268/1999 (Bihar State Financial Corporation & Anr. vs. Bhushan Singh & Ors.) & 272/1999 (Bambam Kumar & Ors. vs. Bhusan Singh & Ors.) passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna." 

In Bihar State Financial Corporation & Anr. vs. Bhushan Singh & Ors. (2025), Justice Khatim Reza of Patna High Court, upon hearing the two appeals which arose out of judgment and decree dated May 19, 1999 passed in a Title Suit of 1996 by Sub-Judge-5th, Begusarai, passed an 73-page long judgement dated March 18, 2025 vacating the stay granted vide order dated September 15, 1999 with regard to further proceeding of the Execution Case of 1999 pending in the Court of Subordinate Judge V, Begusarai.

The plaintiffs had filed the Title Suit for declaration that the intervenor/defendant did not derive any right, title, interest or have possession by virtue of auction sale dated March 18, 1996 and also that the delivery of possession was void. It was also prayed to set aside auction sale and delivery of possession with a declaration that the plaintiffs had got title and interest in the suit property, and further for declaration that defendant had no right to auction sale the property under Section 29 and 30 of the Bihar State Financial Corporation Act and also sought mandatory injunction directing the defendant Corporation to put the plaintiffs back in possession of the suit premises.

As per the case of the plaintiffs, the defendant Corporation was established under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 to promote industrialisation in the State of Bihar by establishing and developing industries and by getting the project of each industry completed and also by maintaining working capital of each industry through some financial banks. The case of the plaintiffs was that on January 5, 1982, the plaintiffs applied for sanction of Rs. 15,00,000/- loan for its Motel Industry at Begusarai. The Corporation wrongly and illegally estimated the total project of the industry at Rs. 12.50 lakhs and sanctioned a loan of Rs. 8.50 lakhs only on 29.05.1982 to the plaintiffs and according to the terms of the loan, promoter’s contribution i.e., of the plaintiffs was to be Rs. 2 lakhs. It was also contended that the plaintiffs deposited original title deeds of land and buildings on September 24, 1982 for creating equitable mortgage of the same in favour of defendant Corporation. On December 2, 1982, the partner of the plaintiffs executed document in favour of defendant Corporation. The defendant Corporation realised its mistake concerning sanction of the said loan and on July 12, 1984, sanctioned another loan amounting to Rs. 3.15 lakhs and both the loans were repayable in installments, last installment was being payable on January 1, 1993. It was also pleaded that even out of total sanctioned loan of Rs. 11.65 lakhs, Rs. 8.29 lakhs only was disbursed to the plaintiffs and about three lakhs rupees was adjusted towards alleged due of the defendants, on account of interest from the very beginning of the loan, as a result of which the total project of the plaintiffs could not be completed.

The case of the plaintiffs was that after service of notice under Section 29 and 30 of the Act, the matter was finally settled on November 6, 1990 in terms of order passed in C.W.J.C. No. 6104 of 1990 by the High Court. 

High Court overrules judgment and order of Special Judge, POCSO Act, Darbhanga, appellant acquitted of charges

In Vidya Das Vs. State of Bihar, Patna High Court's bench of Justice Ashutosh Kumar overruled the judgment dated August 25, 2023 and the order of the Special Judge, POCSO Act, Darbhanga. The latter had convicted the appellant has under Sections 376 (AB) and 341 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. By order dated August 29, 2023, Vidya Das was sentenced to undergo R.I. for 20 years, to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further suffer S.I. for six months for the offence under Sections 376 (AB) of the IPC. For the offence under Section 341 of the IPC, the appellant has been sentenced to undergo S.I. for one month, to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo S.I. for one week. For the offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, the appellant has again been sentenced to undergo R.I. for 20 years, to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further suffer S.I. for six months.

The High Court "found that initially the case was lodged only with the accusation of attempt at molestation. The victim was examined medically after a long time. In the medical examination, the torn hymen was opined to have been caused a couple of days earlier. That apart, we have taken due notice of the fact that the allegation of the appellant having committed sexual misdemeanor with the victim on the rooftop in the night of a winter month. The victim herself has stated something which makes her entire deposition untrustworthy. According to her, the mother was present all through when she was subjected to sexual intercourse. This does not appear to be possible, especially when the appellant is related to the victim and the informant. If the victim is to be believed, then perhaps the mother did not make any attempt to stop the appellant or to apprehend him for his having committed such an offence with her minor daughter." 

The Court observed: "It thus appears that the accusation have been levelled for some ulterior purposes. Though it could not be deciphered during Trial but from a close look at the deposition, it appears that there was some dispute with respect to a parcel of land near the temple and graveyard in the village." It wondered as to whether "this allegation because of that". 

It has recorded that the victim is a minor but that itself would not be sufficient to invoke the mischief of Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, 2012. The prosecution will have to prove that "the offence had taken place and that appellant had committed sexual intercourse with the victim." As a consequence, the Court gave benefit of doubt to the appellant. The order of the Division Bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Jitendra Kumar reads: "The appellant is in jail. He is directed to be released from jail forthwith, if not wanted or detained in any other case." The order was authored by the former.