An order of debarment/blacklisting passed for an indefinite period is legally unsustainable, Justice Mohit Kumar Shah refers to Supreme Court's decision

In Sindhuja Engineer and Contractor having its Principal Place of Business at village Mow, P.S. Tekari, District Gaya, Bihar through its Authorized Signatory, Sushil Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Public Health and Engineering Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench  Patna of Justices Mohit Kumar Shah and Raj Kumar allowed the writ petition. The 7-page long judgement dated July 9, 206 was authored by Justice Shah. He concluded:"...we deem it fit and proper to quash the impugned Office Order dated 09.01.2026 and remand the matter back to the respondent No. 3 who shall issue fresh show cause notice to the petitioner and after inviting his objections shall pass a reasoned and a speaking order, in accordance with law and the agreement entered into between the parties." 

The judgement was delivered upon hearing a writ petition filed for quashing of an Office Order dated January 9, 2026, whereby and whereunder the Executive Engineer, Public Health Division, Banka, i.e. the respondent No.4 had debarred the petitioner firm. The petitioner had also prayed for quashing of the letter dated January 14, 2026, issued by the respondent No.4 whereby the petitioner had been directed to make payment of the electricity bills within 24 hours, failing which process shall be initiated for debarment/rescindment of the contract. 

The case was that the petitioner was a registered Class I contractor under the provisions of the Bihar Contractors Registration Rules, 2007. The petitioner was granted certificate of registration dated August 26, 2020, as a Contractor of Public Health Engineering Department by the Chief Engineer (Urban), Public Health Engineering Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, i.e. the respondent No.3 for a period of five years. The petitioner participated in a tender process relating to Mukhya Mantri Peyjal Nischay Yojana for the District of Banka relating to the work of management of safe and pure drinking water for the areas which were affected by High Floride content in the water by establishing/construction of Floride Removal / Treatment Unit along with five years operation and maintenance. The tender was awarded to the petitioner, leading to execution of an Agreement in between the petitioner and the respondent No.4 as also issuance of work order. The petitioner completed the work. It was also the case of the petitioner that subsequently the respondent No. 4, by Office Order dated December 29, 2025 had directed the petitioner to pay the up to date electricity bills by means of receipt failing which it was contemplated that the bills would be paid from the amount payable to the petitioner from the concerned work division and further action for debarment/blacklisting/ rescindment of agreement etc. shall be taken in terms of the agreement and in accordance with law. Thereafter, the respondent No.4 had issued the impugned Office Order dated January 9, 2026, debarring the petitioner indefinitely. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the debarment cannot be for an indefinite period in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Khulja Industries Limited vs. Chief General Manager, Western
Telecom Project Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Others, reported in (2014) 14 SCC 731. The paragraph No.25 of the judgement reads: “25. Suffice it to say that “debarment” is recognised and often used as an effective method for disciplining deviant suppliers/contractors who may have committed acts of omission and commission or frauds including misrepresentations, falsification of records and other breaches of the regulations under which such contracts were allotted. What is notable is that the “debarment” is never permanent and the period of debarment would invariably depend upon the nature of the offence committed by the erring contractor.”

It was submitted that the impugned order dated January 9, 2026 had been issued by an incompetent authority inasmuch as the respondent No.4 was not the authority who had registered the firm of the petitioner. It was thus submitted that only the respondent No.3 could have either issued the show cause notice to the petitioner or the order of debarment/ blacklisting qua the petitioner. In this regard, reference was made to Rule 11 (d) of the Rules, 2007. Rule 11 (d) reads: "The order of blacklisting/suspension shall be passed by the officer who is competent to register the contractor or by the officer under whom the registering officer works.” Thus, it was submitted that since the respondent No.3 i.e. the Chief Engineer (Urban)-cum-Registering Authority, Public Health and Engineering Department, Government of Bihar, Patna was the registering authority of the firm of the petitioner, he was only authorized to either issue show cause notice to the petitioner or pass any order of debarment/blacklisting.

The counsel for the respondent-State submitted that the respondent No.4 had issued show cause notices dated November 5, 2025, November 6, 2025 and November 19, 2025, apart from other notices before passing the impugned order dated January 9, 2026, hence the principles of natural justice had been complied with before passing of the impugned order dated January 9, 2026. 

In his judgement, Justice Shah recorded that the counsel for the respondent-State could not show from the records or from the Rules, 2007 that the respondent No.4 was the competent authority to either issue show cause notice to the petitioner, prior to passing of the order for debarment/ blacklisting or pass an order of debarment/ blacklisting itself.

The judgement reads: "We find from the records that the show cause notices as also the order of debarment of the petitioner firm have been issued by the respondent No.4, who is not the registering authority in the present case inasmuch as a bare perusal of the certificate of registration,....would show that the registering authority is the respondent No.3, i.e. the Chief Engineer (Urban)-cum-Registering Authority, Public Health and Engineering Department, Govt. of Bihar, Patna, hence it is only the respondent No.3 who is/was authorized to issue show cause notice for debarment/ blacklisting as also pass an order of debarment/ blacklisting. Thus, a debarment or blacklisting order passed without a valid show cause notice is not only invalid but also violates the principles of natural justice, hence is liable to be quashed on this ground alone."

Justice Shah observed: "8. We further find that it is a well settled law that an order of debarment/blacklisting passed for an indefinite period is legally unsustainable, as it violates the principles of natural justice, the doctrine of proportionality, and the fundamental right to carry on trade. In the present case, by the impugned order dated 09.01.2026, the petitioner firm has been debarred for an indefinite period. The law in this regard is no longer res integra inasmuch as the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Khulja Industries Limited (supra) has held that debarment can never be permanent. Thus, on this score as well the impugned order dated 09..01.2026 is unsustainable in the eyes of law."

Chief Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai, Soni Shrivastava hearing amendment to Section 27 of Bihar Municipal Act through Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025

In Ghnshyam Bhrosh Pandit & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's  Division Bench of Chief Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai and Soni Shrivastava heard the writ petition which was filed for quashing Act Nos. 3, 4, and 5 of the Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025 dated October 3, 2025. The ordinance was promulgated to amend the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007. 

By way of Act No. 3, an amendment has been carried out in sub-section (3) of Section 21, whereby the existing provision has been substituted with a new sub-section (3). Similarly, Act No. 4 introduces an amendment to sub-section (3) of Section 23, substituting it with a newly inserted provision. By Act No. 5, Section 27 has been amended and a new sub-section (3) has been inserted after sub-section (2). 

Upon perusal of the Ordinance, it appeared to the Court that the Governor of Bihar, being satisfied that circumstances existed warranting the exercise of powers conferred under Article 213 of the Constitution of India, promulgated the said Ordinance to amend the Bihar Municipal Act, as the Legislature was not in session at the relevant time. 

In its order dated June 18, 2026 From the records of the case, vide order dated April 7, 2026, it was inter alia ordered that upon perusal of the Ordinance. The counsel for the State Election Commission had then sought time to obtain instructions regarding the present status of the Ordinance. The counsel submitted that now the Act has been enforced and there are several other writ petitions which are challenging the amendment to the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007. He submitted that all the matters may be tagged together. The matter is listed for July 16, 2026. The Bench directed, "7. In the interregnum, steps be taken."

Notably, in Ashish Kumar Sinha vs. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine Pat 3472, as Chief Justice of Patna High Court, Justice Sanjay Karol led Division Bench held that Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Act, 2021 as unconstitutional to the effect of amendments carried out in Sections 36, 37, 38 and 41 of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007. Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Act, 2021 ran contrary to Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 and 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 are unconstitutional.

Supreme Court requests Chief Justice of Patna High Court to list Usha Kaushik case before an appropriate Bench for final hearing on June 29, assigned bench requested to take up the same on an out-of-turn basis and decide the same at the earliest

In Usha Kaushik vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Suryakant and V. Mohana passed a 2-page long order dated June, 19, 2026, wherein, the order reads:".....we dispose of this application with a request to Hon’ble Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to list CWJC No.15629/2025 before an appropriate Bench for final hearing on 29.06.2026. The learned Bench, to whom the matter is assigned, is requested to take up the same on an out-of-turn basis and decide the same at the earliest. 2. The parties are directed to extend full cooperation to the High Court for expeditious disposal of the above-stated writ petition. 3. The applicant shall also be at liberty to approach the High Court at any time for the grant of interim relief, if so required, in light of any subsequent events/developments." 

Sri Saryug Mochi @ Saraug Mochi vs. The State Election Commission Through State Election Commissioner(Municipality) CWJC No. 15629/2025 was filed September 15, 2025. It was registered on September 19, 2025. Initially, the case was before Justice Anil Kumar Sinha of the High Court. Subsequently, it was listed before Justice A. Abhishek Reddy. At present, the Court's website shows it be pending before Justice Sinha.    

Earlier, in Saryug Mochi vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2022), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Chakradhari Sharan Singh and Madhuresh Prasad had delivered a 28-page long judgement dated May 9, 2022, wherein, it had concluded:" 35....in our opinion, is unsustainable being beyond jurisdiction in view of the law laid down by the Full Bench in case of Rajani Kumari (supra). In the Court's opinion, the authority exercising power under Section 18(2) of the Act by invoking Clause (m) of Section 18 (1) of the Act must always keep in mind the disasterous consequences of a declaration made in respect of date of birth of a child to a person before or after cut off date, i.e., 05.04.2008. Once, there is a finding recorded by the Commissioner that a person is disqualified by operation of Clause (m) of Section 18(1) of the Act, such disqualification shall permanently debar him to contest a Panchayat/Municipal Election. Further, such finding would also have serious bearing on the date of birth of such child/children for their own purpose on various counts. A conclusive finding recorded by Statutory Authority touching the date of birth of such persons is capable of creating multifaceted complications. In such view of the matter, extra care and caution is required by the authorities in determining such disputes exercising power under Section 18 (2) of the Act by applying Clause (m) of Section 18 (1) of the Act. More serious the consequence the stricter must be the degree of proof. In the present case, not only that the State Election Commissioner overlooked the Full Bench decision rendered in case of Rajani Kumari (supra) for the purpose of resolution of dispute in the light of the complaint made by respondent No. 5 and resistance made by the petitioner to such complaint, he undertook a casual procedure of causing an ex parte fact finding enquiry through the District Magistrate-cum-District Election Officer (Municipality). 36. From careful reading of the impugned order, we have noticed that the same does not disclose issuance of any notice to these petitioners for their participation in the enquiry conducted at the district administration level. 37. In view of the aforesaid discussion, in our opinion, the impugned order is unsustainable being illegal, arbitrary and in violation of principles of natural justice as well as contrary to the law laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Rajani Kumari (supra). Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.03.2022 passed by the State Election Commissioner, Bihar in case No. 12/20 is hereby set aside. The consequences of quashing of the said order dated 02.03.2022 shall follow. 38. These applications are accordingly allowed with a cost of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand Only) each payable to the petitioners by the State Election Commission. The cost must be paid within one month from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 39. We have considered imposing cost as we are of the view that the Commission has completely ignored the enunciation of law by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Rajani Kumari (supra) in which the Commission was the first respondent." The judgement was authored by Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh. 

The other four respondents were: 2. The District Magistrate-Cum-District Election Officer (Municipality), Patna, 3. The State Election Commission, Bihar through its Secretary, Sone Bhawan, Patna. 4. The District Panchayati Raj Officer, Patna and 5. Usha Kaushik. It was heard along with teh cases of Punam Devi and Vijay Paswan. 

Sub-section (1) of Section 18 of Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 lays down the disqualifications of a person for election, or after election for holding the post, as a member of municipality. One of such disqualifications is laid down as:“(m) If he is more than two living children:- Provided that a person having more than two children on or up to the expiry of one year of the commencement of the Act, shall not be deemed to be disqualified.”. The Act came into force with effect from the date of its publication in Bihar Gazette (Extraordinary) dated April 5, 2007. Clearly thus, a person having more than two children up to April 5, 2008 does not suffer disqualification by operation of Clause (m) of sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act. Sub-section 2 of the Act empowers the State Election Commission to decide the matters of disqualification on a complaint, application or information by any authority or upon taking suo motu cognizance of such matters, after allowing sufficient opportunity to the affected parties of being heard. The scope of the jurisdiction of the State Election Commission under sub-section 2 of Section 18 of the Act has been conclusively decided by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Rajani Kumari vs. The State Election Commission and Ors. reported in 2019 (4) PLJR 673. 

While answering the question of whether the State Election Commission will have the power to consider disqualification of a candidate after election as such Election Commission is constituted for conduct of elections, the Full Bench in case of Rajani Kumari (supra) has held in no uncertain terms as follows:-“184. We are in agreement that the State Election Commission has got power under sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 and sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 to consider an issue of pre or post-election disqualification of a candidate subject to a caution which we have pointed out in our judgments in respect of a case which is in the nature of a purely election dispute and then a matter which cannot be decided without adducement of evidence by a competent court and authority in accordance with law. The State Election Commission shall entertain and consider the 'disqualification' issues on the basis of the unimpeachable materials placed before him. Whether a complaint brought before the Commission either suo-moto or by any other person, the Commission shall at the first instance enquire whether it is a purely election dispute and only when it is found that the dispute brought before it is not a purely election dispute, the Commission shall proceed to consider the same on the basis of unimpeachable materials. Whenever a disputed question of facts and a contentious issue is brought before the Commission as a ground and basis to render a candidate disqualified, the Commission would be required to relegate the parties to a competent court/tribunal or a fact finding body competent to decide such contentious issues after taking evidences and till such time the Commission shall not take a decision on such complaint either suo-moto or otherwise.” 

It can be easily culled out from what has been laid down in case of Rajani Kumari (supra) that; (i) The Election Commission has the power under sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act to consider the issue of pre or post election disqualification of a candidate subject to a caution that a case which is in the nature of purely election dispute, it cannot be decided without adducement of evidence by a competent court and authority in accordance with law.
(ii) The State Election Commission, shall, at the first instance, inquire whether it is a purely election dispute only and only when it is found that the dispute brought before it is not a purely election dispute, the Commission shall proceed to consider the same on the basis of unimpeachable material.
(iii) Whenever a disputed question of facts and contentious issue is brought before the Commission as a ground and basis to render a candidate disqualified, the Commission would be required to relegate the parties to a competent court/tribunal or a fact finding body competent to decide such contentious issues after taking evidences and till such time the Commission shall not take a decision on such complaint either
suo motu or otherwise.

In the batch of three writ applications filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, an order dated March 2, 2022 passed by the State Election Commissioner, Bihar, whereby it was declared the petitioners disqualified to hold the post of ward councilor by operation of Clause (m) of sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act is under challenge. After having declared so, the petitioners have been ordered to be removed from the posts of ward councillors of respective councils of the Nagar Panchayat, Naubatpur in the District of Patna. The petitioners have put to challenge the said order dated 02.03.2022 passed by the Commission. 

The primordial issue that required determination by the High Court in this batch of cases was as to whether the impugned action of the Commission is based on unimpeachable materials before reaching a conclusion that the petitioners incurred disqualification because of child/children born to them after the cut off date of April 5, 2008, in the given facts and circumstances of the case. It is worthwhile mentioning that the Full Bench decision in the case of Rajani Kumari (supra) has made it mandatory for the Commission to enquire, at the first instance, whether it was a purely election dispute and only when it is the Commission is satisfied that the dispute brought before it is not a purely election dispute, the it shall proceed to consider the same. Whether the Commission has adhered to the statutory mandate as enunciated by the Full Bench in the case of Rajani Kumari (supra) is a question which needs consideration in these cases.

The petitioners Saryug Mochi, Punam Devi, and Vijay Paswan were elected as the Ward Councillors of the Nagar Panchayat, Naubatpur for Ward Nos. 14, 6, and 2 respectively in the election held on February 23, 2020. Certificates were issued to them on February 25, 2020. One Usha Kaushik (the Respondent No. 5 in all the cases) filed an application before the State Election Commissioner asserting therein that the petitioners were disqualified to contest the election by operation of Clause (m) of Section 18 (1) of the Act since they had more than two surviving children and the last child/children born to them was after the cut-off date, i.e., April 5, 2008. 7. 

In respect of Saryug Mochi, she asserted that his 5th female child was studying in the Upgraded Middle School, Akopur under Naubatpur Anchal of Patna district, and according to the Usha Kaushik, the respondent No. 5, as per the date of birth recorded in the Admission Register she was born on March 5, 2010. She was admitted to the said school in standard one in the year 2014. 

Usha Kaushik, the respondent No. 5, had made an enquiry about the dates of birth of the children of said Saryug Mochi during the course of which she learnt that in connivance with the Headmaster of the School, the said Saryug Mochi had made certain interpolation in the original Admission Register to suit his interest and protect his post. There were interpolations and cuttings made in the Admission Register which were visible with the naked eye. She also relied on an entry made in account of the daughter of the petitioner Saryug Mochi, maintained for direct benefit transfer of payment against dress allowance under the Poshak Yojna of the Government, wherein her date of birth was mentioned as March 5, 2010. On these two entries, respondent No. 5 asserted in her complaint that the 5th child of Saryug Mochi was born much after the cut-off date. 

In respect of Punam Devi,  the respondent No. 5 relied on Ration Card which disclosed age of said Punam Devi and her children in years. She asserted that Ration Card in question was delivered to the consumers including Punam Devi in the year 2019 for which applications were received in 2017. Based on the age (not the date of birth) mentioned in the Ration Card, respondent No. 5 asserted that the eldest daughter was born ‘sometime in 2009’ and, therefore, other two children were apparently born after the cut off dated, i.e., April 5, 2008. 

In respect of Vijay Paswan, the respondent No. 5 asserted in her complaint that he was the father of 5 children and his last child was born on July 7, 2013. In support of this claim, respondent No. 5 relied on an entry made in the records maintained by Anganwari Center No. 141 under Naubatput Nagar Panchayat.  

Based on the pleadings on record including the averments made in the counter affidavit filed by respondent No. 5 in these cases, the Court could not discern as to when the complaint was filed. It is not clear from the complaint of respondent No. 5 that how was she aggrieved with the election of these petitioners, inasmuch as, there is no disclosure in her complaint that she had either contested for the posts in question or was an elector of either of the wards. 

Notably, the complaint of respondent No. 5 led to the registration of the case No. 12/2020 before the Commission. 

The Court observed:"33. In the Court’s opinion, the State Election Commission proceeded casually in considering the serious allegation of statutory disqualification under Clause (m) of Section 18 (1) of the Act by referring the matter to the District Election Officer (Municipality)-cum-District Magistrate, Patna for a fact finding enquiry. The State Election Commissioner, apparently, ignored the authoritative pronouncement of law laid down by Full Bench of this Court in the case of Rajani Kumari (supra) which has held in no uncertain terms that the Commission can proceed to consider the issue of disqualification on the basis of unimpeachable materials only. In no ambiguous terms, the Full Bench in the case of Rajani Kumari (supra) has held that whenever a disputed question of fact and contentious issue is brought before the Commission as a ground and basis to render a candidate disqualified, the Commission would be required to relegate parties to a Competent Court/Tribunal or a fact-finding body competent to decide such contentious issues after taking evidence. The Full Bench is in clear terms held that till such time such contentious issues are decided after taking evidences, the Commission shall not take a decision on such complaint either suo motu or otherwise. The Commission, it seems, was totally unmindful of the significance of these observations made in the case of Rajani Kumari (supra) in which the Commission was the first respondent." 

The Court relied on the decision in Purohit Lal Gupta Vs. Dharamsheela Devi and Ors. reported in 2015(4) PLJR 933, a Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court wherein, it deprecated the conduct of the Election Commission in undertaking fishy enquiry based on which the first respondent was held to be disqualified to contest the Municipal Election in which he was declared elected.

Ecocide in Patna: Story of cutting, uprooting, transplanting of over 1000 trees, clearing of forest land in Gardani Bagh for Patna Smart City Project

Upon hearing of a suo motu case In Re: Definition of Aravalli Hills and Ranges and Ancillary Issues (2025) by Supreme Court's 3-judge bench of bench of Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice A.G. Masih passed a 9-page long order December 29, 2025, stayed Supreme Court's judgement dated November 20 2025 which accepted a new definition of the Aravalli hill ranges that the Union Environment Ministry proposed: that only hills above 100 meters above the local terrain be considered as the ‘Aravalli Hills and Ranges’. 

The order dated December 29 concludes: "12. In the interim, to subserve the ends of complete justice and in the broader public interest, we deem it necessary to direct that the recommendations submitted by the Committee, together with the findings and directions stipulated by this Court in its judgment dated 20.11.2025, be kept in abeyance. This stay shall remain in effect until the present proceedings reach a state of logical finality, ensuring that no irreversible administrative or ecological actions are taken based on the current framework. 13. We further find it necessary, as a matter of abundant caution, to direct unequivocally, as set out in the order dated 09.05.2024, that until further orders, no permission shall be granted for mining, whether it is for new mining leases or renewal of old mining leases, in the ‘Aravalli Hills and Ranges’ as defined in the FSI Report dated 25.08.2010 without prior permission from this Court." 

Notably, in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad vs. Union of India & Ors. ( I.A. No. 130612 of 2024 and I.A. No. 134904 of 2024 in W.P.(C) 202 of 1995. Order dated July 23, 2024) had directed the Government of Rajasthan to consider the proposals for renewal of mining leases granted for operations in the Aravalli hills/ranges, as identified in the Forest Survey of India (FSI) Report dated August 25, 2010.

The Court's order dated November 20 stated that “Those hills and ranges comprising rocks of the Aravalli Supergroup and Delhi Supergroup, which originated during the Palacoproerozoid to Mesoproterozoic, having a relief higher than 100 meters (+5 Meters) above the surrounding terrain, may be defined as ‘Aravalli Hills and Ranges’”. The new definition treats a landform as part of the Aravalli landscape only if it has at least 100 metres of elevation above the local relief (including the landform’s slopes and adjacent areas). The elevations of physical and geographical features are usually expressed in metres above mean sea level – and are not dependent on the terrain around them. The report of the committee that looked into this that  justified this by noting that the use of elevation alone as a “sole criterion cannot suffice the purpose as taking the average elevation for defining Aravalli Hills and Ranges will lead to inclusion and exclusion error for selection of Aravalli Hills and Ranges in the four States”. This definition implies that at least 90% of the Aravallis will no longer be protected legally. 

These goings on around Aravilli Hills reminiscent of the Patna High Court's anti-tree decision. In Tarumitra Through Shashi Darshan, Coordinator at Tarumitra & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar ,Through its Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2022), Ptana High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice S. Kumar delivered a 5-page long judgement dated September 19, 2022, wherein it concluded:"We are of the considered view that with the passage of time, the present petition can be closed for in pursuance to the direction issued by the Court, the respondent and more particularly the Forest Department (Municipal Limits, Patna) has taken effective steps for translocating the trees which were necessarily required to be felled for planned development of the city as is evident from the last affidavit dated 5th of September, 2022 filed by the Bihar State Pollution Control Board, a large number of trees stand translocated, the surviving rate is approximately 68%." The writ was filed on July 2, 2019 and registered on July 15, 2019. The second petitioner was Aruni Charitable Trust. Notably, its name appears only in the final judgement. 

Although the High Court granted liberty to the petitioners to highlight the surviving grievances and the consequential issues which may arise for consideration of the authorities, there is nothing in public domain to show that the issue of continued killing and death of trees were brought to the attention of the authorities and the Court. In Bihar's capital district and region wanton destruction of the environment—manifests primarily through systemic ecological degradation, illegal resource extraction, and severe pollution. 

The eight other respondents in Tarumitra case were: Building Construction Department Government of Bihar, Through its Principal Secretary, Department Environment Forest and Climate Change, Government of Bihar, Through its Principal Secretary, Patna Municipal Corporation Through its Commissioner, Bihar Urban Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. Through its Managing Director, Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Bihar, Through its Principal Secretary, Bihar State Pollution Control Board Through its Chairman, Patna Smart City Limited Through its Managing Director, Patna Municipal Corporation, and Ministry of Environment Forest and Climate Change, Government of India, Through its Secretary.

The affidavit reads:- “7. That the committee again met on 30.12.2020 when on basis of filed report it was
suggested that survival rate of trees is 88%. The committee decided that some of the plantation activities can be done before next monsoon without waiting for all the constructions to be completed. 8. That on 25.08.2021 when the committee met next, the concerned Executive Engineer, Building Construction Department, Govt. of Bihar, informed that as on 25.08.2021 total of 344 trees had been translocated out of which 277 trees were surviving and as such survival rate was 80%. Further, it was informed that 260 new saplings were also been planted. 9. That the committee next met on 30.01.2022, when it was informed that total of 395 trees had been translocated, out of which 303 trees were surviving and as such survival rate was 76.71%. 10. That the DFO, Patna has also by his report dated 29.07.2020; 13.04.2021; 03.08.2021; & 22.08.2022 had informed the committee about the survival rate of the translocated trees. In the latest report dated 22.08.2022 it is informed that total 412 trees had been translocated out of which 281 are surviving and 131 had died, as such survival rate as on now is around 68%. 11. That a total of 451 trees were to be translocated, out of which 412 trees had been translocated. Further, in Ministers quarter area in addition to landscaping a total of 818 trees is proposed to be planted, out of which 324 trees had already been planted.”

Justice Karol who authored the judgement observed:"we close the present proceeding reserving liberty to the petitioner to highlight the surviving grievances, if any, as also the consequential issues which may arise for consideration of the authorities. We are hopeful that the authorities, being mindful of the ecological balance required to be maintained in the city, accounting for the environmental loss, shall take all steps on expeditious basis. As such the present petition stands disposed of reserving aforesaid liberty to the petitioner. Interlocutory Application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of."

In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.14184 of 2019, its first order dated August 21, 2019 the High Court's Division Bench of Justices Shivaji Pandey and Partha Sarthy reads: "In the present case, Tarumitra, which is a registered Society, has filed this application making serious complaint that in the name of creation of multi-storied residential complex, the authorities are uprooting large number of green trees in Gardanibagh area, which would create great environmental problem in future. It has further been stated that the manner in which they are trans-locating the old trees, their survival is difficult and without sustaining forestry, it will be very difficult for human race to survive. Human population can not remain in proper shape in concrete jungle, but we also require forestry for the purpose of proper environment and ambiance. The allegation made in the present application is the manner green trees are being destroyed would bring catastrophe. It is required inclusive sustainable development, which also includes provision for urban forestry. Falling trees, ultimately, will affect the level of underground water and every year, it has been witnesses that the level of underground water is going down. In some areas, it has gone down much below causing serious problem in drinking water." Justice Pandey who authored the order directed the Union of India, State Government, Patna Municipal Corporation, Bihar Urban Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited and Bihar State Pollution Control Board to file their respective detailed counter affidavits. The Court concluded: "In the meantime, the standing tree will not be disturbed by uprooting or passively allow it to die."

In its second order dated January 28, 2020, the High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Karol and Justice Mohit Kumar Shah wrote:"Our order dated 21.08.2019 stands clarified that it shall be open for the State to proceed with the Project up to the stage of obtaining clearance from the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority, but however without the permission of the Court, no tree would be up-rooted or felled. As to whether up-rooting or fallen of tree is necessary or not, is the only issue which is left to be considered in the present petition, which we shall examine on the next date of hearing. List on 02.03.2020." The order was authored by Chief Justice Karol. He modified the interim order passed by Justice Pandey.  

In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.8939 of 2019 filed by Gaurav Kumar Singh, in High Court's third 6-page long order dated March 4, 2020 in Gaurav Kumar Singh vs. The Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar with Tarumitra vs. The State of Bihar, the Division Bench of Chief Justice Karol and Justice S. Kumar wrote:"Our attention is invited to the second supplementary counter affidavit dated 02.03.2020 sworn by Pawan Kumar, Executive Engineer, Construction Division-1, Building Construction Department, Patna, wherein it stands averred that the State Environmental Assessment Committee, in its meeting, held on 28.02.2020, has decided to issue environmental clearance in respect of construction site Gardanibagh Housing Area Development Work, Patna. From the counter affidavit filed on behalf of Bihar State Pollution Control Board, Patna, it appears that the Board has no objection to the development of the area as also the project. From the affidavit dated 11.09.2019 filed by Shri Pawan Kumar, it is apparent that the area, in question, is sought to be developed in terms of the order dated 26.07.2019 issued by the Department of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of Bihar, as also its subsequent modification. The project is for construction of residential complexes of various agencies under the Government of Bihar. The residential quarters and bungalows are to be constructed by demolishing the existing construction as per the master-plan approved by the State Government without involving any change in the land use." 

Justice Karol who authored the order added:"From the affidavit, it is also clear that the environmental clearance are either underway or have been proceeded by the authorities. The ‘Guideline for developing greenbelts 2000’ issued by the Central Pollution Control Board, also stands complied with. Under the proposed construction, approximately 365 numbers of trees are to be relocated and in lieu thereof 1119 new trees are to be planted. However, 384 trees are to be retained. At this juncture, we may also observe that way back in the year 1912, the land, in question, was acquired/earmarked for the purpose of Government quarters and offices. As such, the purpose is not to be changed/altered and is within the stipulations prescribed under the master-plan of Patna, 2031, as approved by the Government of Bihar in October, 2016. What the Government wants to do is to demolish the century old structures, thus far used for housing Government employees and instead of refurbishing the same, re-construction the area by building multi-storied apartments. Thus, the growth stipulated and postulated is vertical instead of horizontal. The project has complete provision for water conservation, recharge of ground water, disposal of garbage, maintenance of greenery, etc. Approximately, 20 per cent of the area of the land under the new
project is to be left as a green area with adequate parking space. Orally, we are informed by Shri Lalit Kishore, learned Advocate General that for redeveloping of 700 single storied Government houses as new modern residential complexes, process for issuance of tenders already stands completed and all environmental clearance will be obtained. The work is likely to be allotted to the successful bidder in the near future. As such, in our considered view, we see no hindrance in allowing the Government to proceed with the same."

Justice Karol further wrote:" there is one issue of public concern which needs attention/monitoring by the Court and that being as to how best and who would monitor the relocation/re-transplantation of the old trees as also afforestation of new trees. This, in our considered view, it can best be done with the monitoring of a committee of experts, including the learned counsels assisting the Court in these petitions.
As such, we constitute a Committee comprising of: (a) Conservator of Forest, Government of Bihar; (b) Chief Engineer, Building and Construction Department; (c) Member Secretary, Bihar State Pollution Control Board; (d) Secretary of State Environmental Impact Assessment Committee; (e) Shri Sarvesh Kumar Singh, AAG-13; (f) Shri Shashwat, Advocate; (g) Shri Deepak Kumar Singh, Advocate and (h) Ms. Binita Singh, Advocate. Needless to add, the State shall provide all facilities to the committee. The Conservator of Forest, Government of Bihar shall be the Chairman and the Member Secretary of the Bihar State Pollution Control Board shall be the Secretary of the Committee. We also notice that the State Government has its novel programme whereby has already planted 22.2 crores saplings in the State of Bihar. The Committee shall submit its report within a period of six months. List on 21.09.2020. It shall be open for the Government to proceed with the project and commence construction in accordance with law. Equally, it shall be open for the successful bidder to commence construction as per sanctioned plans."

In its fourth 2-page long order dated December 8, 2020, the same bench wrote:"We find the order dated 4th of March, 2020 has yet not been complied with. We are informed that the Committee has yet to prepare its report. Let needful be positively done within a period of four weeks from today, failing which the Members of the Committee shall remain present in Court through virtual mode. List on 19th of January, 2021."

In its penultimate order dated August 2, 2022, same bench wrote:"Let all the reports, including fresh evaluation report of the committee constituted by this Court in terms of order dated 04.03.2020 be filed within a period of four weeks from today. List this case on 6th of September, 2022."

The story of the felling and uprooting of 1000 trees and clearing of the forest land by the government in Gardani Bagh, Patna for the Patna Smart City Project is a story of institutional complicity in environmental destruction. There were approximately 1000 different variants of biomass in the plantation. It seemed impossible to transplant these rare species of biomass. 

Notably, Tarumitra;s case was filed after Gaurav Kumar Singh's case which was filed on April 3, 2019 and registered on April 22, 2019. It was heard along with Tarumita's case on few occasions but its name does not appear in the final judgement dated September 19, 2019. But it was also disposed of on the same day (September 19, 2019) but by a separate but almost similar 5-page long judgement. Justice Karol who authored the judgement in Gaurav Kumar Singh's case as well observed:"we close the present proceeding reserving liberty to the petitioner to highlight the surviving grievances, if any, as also the consequential issues which may arise for consideration of the authorities. We are hopeful that the authorities, being mindful of the ecological balance required to be maintained in the city, accounting for the environmental loss, shall take all steps on expeditious basis. As such the present petition stands disposed of reserving aforesaid liberty to the petitioner. Interlocutory Application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of." 

By now it is crystal clear that platitudes are inadequate to reverse ongoing environmental loss and ecocide.  

Ecocide is a crime in 11 countries. Vietnam has codified ecocide in its domestic law. It became the first country to do so. Article 278 of the Criminal Code of Vietnam, 1990 states that “Those who, in peacetime or wartime, commit acts of annihilating en-mass population in an area, destroying the source of their livelihood, undermining the cultural and spiritual life of a country, upsetting the foundation of a society to undermine such society, as well as other acts of genocide or acts of ecocide or destroying the natural environment, shall be sentenced to between ten years and twenty years of imprisonment, life imprisonment or capital punishment.”Some 30 countries are contemplating similar legislation." It is apparent that it drew environmental lessons from its war with USA which had used Agent Orange, a chemical weapon based on Dioxins, a persistent organic pollutant. 

Under Article 358 of the Criminal Code Russian Federation, 1996, ecocide is defined as “massive destruction of the fauna and flora, contamination of the atmosphere or water resources, as well as other acts capable of causing an ecological catastrophe, constitutes a crime against the peace and security of mankind".

Under Article 161 of the Penal Code Kazakhstan, 1997, ecocide is defined as “mass destruction of the fauna or flora, pollution of the atmosphere, agricultural or water resources, as well as other acts which have caused or are capable of causing an ecological catastrophe, constitutes a crime against the peace and
security of mankind".

Under Article 374 of the Criminal Code Kyrgyzstan, 1997, ecocide is defined as “mass destruction of the flora and fauna, poisoning of the atmosphere or water resources, as well as other acts capable of causing an ecological catastrophe, is punishable by deprivation of liberty".

Under Article 400 of the Criminal Code Tajikistan, 1998, ecocide defined as “mass extermination of flora or fauna, poisoning the atmosphere or water resources, as well as other acts capable of causing an ecological catastrophe, constitutes a crime against the peace and security of mankind".

Under Article 409 of the Criminal Code Georgia, 1999, ecocide is defined as "Contamination of atmosphere, land and water resources, mass destruction of flora and fauna or any other action that could have caused ecological disaster - shall be punishable by imprisonment extending from eight to twenty years in
length".

Under Article 131 of Criminal Code Belarus, 1999, ecocide is defined as “mass destruction of the fauna and flora, pollution of the atmosphere and water resources as well as any other act liable to cause an ecological disaster”.

Under Article 441 of Criminal Code Ukraine, 2001, ecocide is defined as "Mass destruction of flora and fauna, poisoning of air or water resources, and also any other actions that may cause an environmental disaster, - shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of eight to fifteen years".

Under Article 136 of the  Penal Code Republic of Moldova, 2002, ecocide is defined as “the deliberate and massive destruction of the fauna and flora, the pollution of the atmosphere or poisoning of water resources, as well as other acts capable of causing an ecological catastrophe, is punishable by deprivation of liberty".

Under Article 394 of the Criminal Code the Republic of Armenia, 2003 defines ecocide as "Mass destruction of flora or fauna, poisoning the environment, the soils or water resources, as well as implementation of other actions causing an ecological catastrophe, is punished with imprisonment for the term of 10 to 15 years". 

The Courts in India seem oblivious of these developments in environmental law and jurisprudence. 

Dr. Gopal Krishna

 

Orders of Building Construction Department, Bihar Government set aside: Chief Justice P. B. Bajanthri

In M/s Harendra Construction through its Proprietor Harendra Prasad Yadav vs. The State of Bihar through its Principal Secretary, Building Construction Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice P. B. Bajanthri and Justice Alok Kumar Sinha delivered a 4-page long judgement dated October 10, 2025. Justice Bajanthri concluded:''the petitioner has made out a case so as to interfere with the impugned action/order of the respondents dated 06.06.2025. Accordingly, it is set aside. Writ petition stands allowed. 4. The concerned authority is hereby directed to undertake fresh steps insofar as action to be taken. The petitioner shall co-operate in submitting a detailed reply to the show cause notice in the event of issuing fresh show cause notice. The above exercise shall be completed within a period of three months....6. Petitioner is at liberty to assail the work order stated to have been issued to the 5th respondent – Rajesh Kumar, in accordance with law.''

The judgement was authored by Justice Bajanthri. The other four respondents were: Principal Secretary, Building Construction Department, Government of Bihar, Chief Engineer, Patna, Building Construction Department, Patna, Superintending Engineer, Building Construction Department, Patna and Rajesh Kumar.

The petitioner had prayed for the following reliefs:(A) A writ in the nature of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ/s, order/s, direction/s quashing the following : (i) Order dated June 6, 2025 by way of which the Petitioner has been declared as unsuccessful candidate in the Technical BID after finding the Petitioner non-responsive in connection with Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) issued for Construction of New Panchayat Sarkar Bhawan (Civil + Electrical Work) at Bindaul Panchayat in Bihita Block Patna for the year 2024–25 and further it has been ordered to take appropriate legal action against the Petitioner under Bihar Registration of Contractor Rules (Rural Work Department), 2007. 
(B) A writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ/s, order/s direction/s for the following reliefs:
(i) To restrain the Respondent Authorities from giving effect to the impugned Order dated June 6, 2025 containing under the Memo No. 1448 till the pendency of the Writ Petition.
(ii) To restrain the Respondent Authorities from opening of Financial Bid in connection with NIT issued for Construction of New Panchayat Sarkar Bhawan (Civil + Electrical Work) at Bindaul Panchayat in Bihita Block Patna for the year 2024–25 till the pendency of the Writ Petition.
(iii) To restrain the Respondents from taking any further steps in connection with NIT issued for Construction of New Panchayat Sarkar Bhawan (Civil + Electrical Work) at Bindaul Panchayat in Bihita Block Patna for the year 2024-25 till pendency of the instant case.
(C) To any other relief/s to which the petitioner is found entitled to.

Notably, the High Court had passed an order dated September 4, 2025. It reads: ''2. For the reasons stated in the application read with the affidavit, petitioner has assailed the work order issued to the proposed respondent No. 5–Rajesh Kumar. He is necessary and proper party insofar as challenge to the work order, therefore, I.A. No. 1 of 2025 is allowed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner is hereby directed to carry out necessary amendment in the cause title while adding additional respondent No. 5 – Rajesh Kumar. 4. Issue notice to respondent No. 5–Rajesh Kumar. Petitioner to remit necessary requisites under both processes, i.e. ordinary as well as registered post with A/D, for which requisites must be filed within a period of one week....6. In the meanwhile, State has to apprise this Court whether the impugned action of the respondents is speaking order after due consideration of show cause notice read with reply or not?”

Justice Bajanthri observed: ''3. Today, learned counsel for the State is not in a position to apprise whether Annexure - P/8 is after due consideration of show cause notice dated 01.04.2025 read with reply dated 02.04.2025. It is learnt that fresh show cause notice is stated to have been issued.'' In this backdrop, the Court Order set aside the order dated June 6, 2025 by way of which the Petitioner was declared as unsuccessful candidate in the Technical BID after finding the Petitioner non-responsive in connection with Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) issued for Construction of New Panchayat Sarkar Bhawan (Civil + Electrical Work) at Bindaul Panchayat in Bihita Block Patna for the year 2024–25 and the order to take appropriate legal action against the Petitioner under Bihar Registration of Contractor Rules (Rural Work Department), 2007. 

Patna High Court's Division Bench upholds judgement by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a case against Maintenance Tribunal order

In Shailesh Kumar @ Azad & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary Co-operative Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice P. B. Bajanthri and Justice Alok Kumar Sinha delivered a 17-page long judgement dated October 9, 2025, wherein, it upheld the 23-page long judgment by Justice Sandeep Kumar, the Single Judge of the High Court. It found that there there is no infirmity in the concurrent findings of the Maintenance Tribunal order dated March 14, 2020, the Collector-cum-District Magistrate in Senior Citizen Appeal order dated June 10, 2022, and the judgment dated January 29, 2024 by Single Judge. It dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal against the judgement of the Single Judge. 

The Division Bench affirmed the judgment by the Single Judge in Shailesh Kumar @ Azad & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Co-operative, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2022). The judgement of the Division Bench was authored by Justice Alok Kumar Sinha.  

The writ petition was filed for quashing of the order dated June 10, 2022 passed in a Senior Citizen (Misc.) Appeal by the Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Patna whereby the Collector had set aside the order of Chairman cum Sub Divisional Officer, Patna Sadar, Patna. The petitioner had prayed for issuance of direction in the nature of mandamus upon the respondents authority to not disturb the family of the petitioners as the petitioners are living along with their family members. The counsel for the appellants, submitted that the very initiation of proceedings under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was without jurisdiction, inasmuch as the appellants are not “children” within the meaning of Section 4 of the Act, but nephews of the complainant senior citizen. 

The counsel urged that the property in dispute constitutes a joint family property, and issues of ownership, partition, and entitlement are already sub judice before the competent Civil Court. Despite this, the Maintenance Tribunal, in a summary proceeding under Section 23, assumed to decide complex questions of title and possession, which lie outside its limited statutory domain. The appellants defence and supporting documents, including the written reply, the registered family settlement deed, and the revenue receipts establishing possession, were disregarded, and the appellants were erroneously treated as mere licensees or permissive occupiers. It was also submitted that the interlocutory applications filed during pendency demonstrated the continuing prejudice suffered by the appellants due to the impugned orders. It was further contended that eviction or dispossession under Section 23 cannot be ordered mechanically, and the Tribunal is bound to act fairly and in consonance with statutory limitations. On these premises, it was urged that the orders of the Tribunal, affirmed by the Single Judge, were vitiated by jurisdictional error, disregard of material evidence, and misapplication of the Act, and therefore warrant interference in this LPA appeal. 

The counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the proceedings before the Maintenance Tribunal were fully within jurisdiction and in strict consonance with the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. It was argued that the appellants are in permissive occupation of the property, without any vestige of independent title, and cannot resist the lawful claim of the senior citizen. The Tribunal, by its order dated July 20, 2022, after due notice and hearing, recorded categorical findings that the senior citizen was entitled to recover possession and rent. It was also submitted that the so-called family settlement deed and revenue receipts carry no legal sanctity and were rightly disregarded. The subsequent affidavit and revenue entries, even if considered, did not confer any title, as eligibility and rights must be determined on the basis of settled ownership, not unilateral claims.

The Division Bench framed the following issues for consideration:

1. Whether the learned Single Judge, in affirming the order of the Maintenance Tribunal dated March 14, 2020 and the Collector-cum-District Magistrate dated 10.06.2022, erred in law on the ground of alleged  violation of the principles of natural justice?
2. Whether the Maintenance Tribunal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, acted within the statutory limits in directing eviction of the appellants from the property in question?
3. Whether the appellants’ asserted independent rights based on family arrangement, partition claims and revenue records can be adjudicated within the summary jurisdiction under “the 2007 Act” ?
4. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the beneficial object and mandate of “the 2007 Act” require sustaining the Tribunal’s order as affirmed by the learned Single Judge?

As to issue no. 1, the Division Bench found that the appellants had urged that the proceedings before the Maintenance Tribunal were conducted in breach of the principles of natural justice. It was contended that the Tribunal did not grant them sufficient opportunity to place their defence, that their written submissions and supporting documents such as revenue receipts and family arrangement were brushed aside, and that the Tribunal’s order dated March 14, 2020 proceeded in undue haste. It was further argued that the Single Judge, while dismissing CWJC No. 10426 of 2022 on January 29, 2024, failed to appreciate such infirmities. On the other hand, the record reveals that notices were duly served upon the appellants; they entered appearance, participated in the proceedings, and filed written replies together with annexures in support of their stand. The Maintenance Tribunal considered those submissions before passing a reasoned order of eviction on March 14, 2020. The Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Patna, upon hearing both sides, affirmed the same by order dated June 10, 2022 in Senior Citizen Appeal No. 01/2020–21. Thereafter, the Single Judge, by judgment dated January 29, 2024, independently examined the matter and dismissed the writ petition. 

Justice Sinha observed: "It is well settled that the essence of natural justice is fairness in action, not a ritualistic adherence to technicalities." He recollected that the Supreme Court in Union of India v. W.N. Chadha, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 260, observed that “the principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straitjacket formula; their applicability depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and once a fair opportunity is afforded, the complaint of violation cannot be entertained.”

Justice Sinha also drew on Supreme Court's decision in Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. vs. Dy. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2015) 8 SCC 519, the Court reiterated that natural justice is not an “unruly horse” but a
principle to ensure that no one is condemned unheard, and that what is required is “substantial fairness of procedure.” Where participation has been afforded and considered, the plea of denial fails.

The High Court's Division Bench applied the above principles to the present case. Its judgement reads:''it is evident that the appellants were heard at every stage. Their plea of denial of opportunity is belied by their own participation and submission of documents before both the Tribunal and the Appellate Authority. The learned Single Judge rightly recorded that the appellants sought to expand the limited scope of jurisdiction under “the 2007 Act" into a forum for deciding title and partition disputes, which is impermissible. Accordingly, we hold that no violation of principles of natural justice is made out.''

With regard to issue no. 2, the Division Bench observed that the order of the Maintenance Tribunal dated May 5, 2023, directing eviction of the appellants from the scheduled premises, was affirmed by the Appellate Authority on 10.06.2022 and by the learned Single Judge by judgment dated November 21, 2023. The appellants contend that the Tribunal travelled beyond the statutory limits of Section 23 of “the 2007 Act" by venturing into questions of ownership, partition, and title, which are matters pending adjudication before the competent Civil Court. It was urged that Section 23 only permits the Tribunal to annul transfers made subject to a condition of maintenance, and does not extend to ordering eviction or dispossession.

The counsel appearing for the respondent senior citizen submitted that “the 2007 Act" is a beneficial legislation and the Tribunal, being a statutory forum, is empowered to pass all consequential directions necessary to secure the residence, dignity, and peaceful possession of senior citizens. It was contended that the appellants, being nephews and not “children” within the meaning of Section 4, lack locus to resist the
proceedings. Their claim of joint ownership, if any, is a matter for the civil court, but cannot dilute the protective jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Reliance was placed on the Collector-cum-District Magistrate’s order dated 10.06.2022 affirming the Tribunal, and the Single Judge’s judgment dated November 21, 2023, upholding the same.

Justice Sinha observed: "we are unable to accept the appellants plea of jurisdictional excess. Section 23(1) of “the 2007 Act" provides that where a senior citizen transfers property subject to the condition of maintenance, such transfer shall be deemed void if the transferee fails to provide the same. The Supreme Court in Samtola Devi vs State of Uttar Pradesh SLP No. 26651 of 2023, para 31and para 32 states that “31. The provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, nowhere specifically provides for drawing proceedings for eviction of persons from any premises owned or belonging to such a senior person. It is only on account of the observations made by this Court in S. Vanitha vs.Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District & Ors that the Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act may also order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizens. The Tribunal thus had acquired jurisdiction to pass orders of eviction while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Senior Citizen Act which otherwise provide for treating the sale of the property to be void if it is against the interest of the senior citizen. 
32.The aforesaid decision was followed by this Court in Urmila Dixit (supra). However, even in the aforesaid case the court has only held that in a given case, the Tribunal ‘‘may order’’ eviction but it is not necessary and mandatory to pass an order of eviction in every case. The Appellate Tribunal has not recorded any reason necessitating the eviction of Krishna Kumar or that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is expedient to order eviction so as to ensure the protection of the senior citizen.”

The Division Bench of the High Court relied on judgements of the Supreme Court. In its Judgment dated January 2, 2025 passed in Urmila Dixit Case-Civil Appeal No.10927 of 2024, the Supreme Court held that Tribunals under “the 2007 Act" are competent to direct eviction as an incident of enforcing statutory protection. In the recent case of Kamalakant Mishra vs. Additional Collector & Ors., the Supreme Court has reiterated that the Tribunal may direct for eviction where such relief is essential to give under “the 2007 Act".

The High Court's Division Bench observed: "In the present case, the Tribunal did not purport to adjudicate title, partition, or ownership, which remain pending before the civil court. Its direction of eviction was a necessary measure to restore possession and ensure the senior citizen’s right to live with dignity and security. The learned Single Judge, in affirming the Tribunal’s order, therefore, committed no error in appreciating the limited but effective jurisdiction conferred by Section 23. Accordingly, this Court holds that the Tribunal acted within its statutory mandate, and its order of eviction, having been affirmed by both the Appellate Authority and the learned Single Judge, does not suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference."

With regard to issue no. 3, the High Court's Division Bench examined whether the appellants’ asserted  independent rights based on family arrangement and revenue records can be adjudicated within the Tribunal’s limited, summary jurisdiction under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007?  The appellants contended that their rights in the scheduled property flow from the family settlement deed and supporting revenue receipts, dated 19.12.2022. It was urged that these materials demonstrate an independent claim of ownership and that the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge erred in treating the appellants as mere permissive occupants. According to the appellants, their claim required adjudication in the proceedings under Section 23 of “the 2007 Act".

The respondents' counsel argued that proceedings under “the 2007 Act" are summary in nature and do not extend to adjudicating intricate questions of title, partition, or ownership. The appellants, being nephews and not “children” within the meaning of Section 4 of the Act, had no locus to resist proceedings before the Tribunal on the basis of alleged independent title. It was submitted that the proper forum for asserting such rights is the competent Civil Court, not the Maintenance Tribunal, whose jurisdiction is confined to ensuring protection of senior citizens’ property and residence.

Justice Sinha observed:"we find merit in the respondents’ submission. Section 23 of “the 2007 Act" is designed to safeguard senior citizens against neglect and to protect their possession and property where transfers are made subject to a condition of maintenance. The jurisdiction is protective, summary, and limited, and does not extend to resolving competing civil claims of title or partition. In the present case, the Tribunal correctly declined to adjudicate the appellants’ claim of rights under the alleged family arrangement and revenue entries, holding such matters to be beyond its scope. The learned Single Judge, by judgment dated January 29, 2024, also observed that the appellants were attempting to expand the summary proceedings under “the 2007 Act" into a substitute for civil litigation, which is impermissible. We accordingly hold that the appellants’ asserted independent rights, even if supported by documents such as family settlement or revenue receipts, are matters for adjudication by the civil court, and cannot be determined in proceedings under “the 2007 Act". The Tribunal and the learned Single Judge were correct in confining themselves to the statutory jurisdiction and in refusing to entertain these collateral claims."

As to issue no. 4, the High Court's Division Bench examined whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the beneficial object and mandate of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 require sustaining the Tribunal’s order as affirmed by the Single Judge.  The appellants urged that the Tribunal, by order dated March 14, 2020, travelled beyond the scope of Section 23 of the 2007 Act by directing their eviction from the scheduled property. It was argued that the Act is primarily intended to secure monetary maintenance and not to divest possession of property, and that the Single Judge, by judgment dated January 29, 2024, erred in treating the Act as a basis for dispossession. 

The counsel for the respondents submitted that “the 2007 Act" is a welfare legislation enacted with the avowed object of protecting senior citizens from neglect, harassment, and deprivation of their property. It was contended that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction must be construed purposively, so as to secure the right of senior citizens to reside peacefully and with dignity, and that eviction of unauthorized occupants is a necessary incident of that protection. Reliance was placed upon S. Vanitha vs. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District, (2021) 15 SCC 730, Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi, (2022) 1 SCC 705, as well as recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court dated January 2, 2025 in Urmila Dixit Case (Supra) and dated September 12, 2025 in Kamalakant Mishra Case.

Justice Sinha observed:''we find that the object of “the 2007 Act" is to ensure not only provision of monetary maintenance but also protection of life, dignity, and residence of senior citizens. Section 23 confers jurisdiction upon the Tribunal to declare void transfers of property where maintenance is not provided, and by necessary implication, to pass orders restoring possession and evicting unauthorized occupants where the continued occupation impedes the rights of senior citizens. In S. Vanitha case (supra), the Supreme Court emphasized that though the Tribunal cannot adjudicate intricate civil disputes, it is empowered to pass eviction orders where occupation of relatives or others frustrates the statutory mandate. Similarly, in Sudesh Chhikara case (supra), the Court held that proceedings under the Act are protective and must be interpreted purposively to secure effective relief for senior citizens.'' He recollected that the Supreme Court, in Kamalakant Mishra vs. Additional Collector & ors. SLP(CIVIL)D no. 42786 of 2025 delivered a judgment dated September 12, 2025, wherein, he reiterated that “Tribunals constituted under “the 2007 Act" may direct eviction where such relief is essential to give effect to the protection envisaged for senior citizens,” stressing that the statute would otherwise be rendered otiose. All these decisions underscore that the legislative intent is to provide real and effective protection to senior citizens against neglect or exploitation.

Relying on these principles, Justice Sinha concluded:''we are of the view that the Tribunal, in directing eviction of the appellants, acted squarely within the protective ambit of “the 2007 Act". The appellants, being nephews and not “children” under Section 4, have no statutory right to resist proceedings, and their alleged claims of co-ownership were rightly left to the civil court. The Tribunal’s order was necessary to secure the complainant’s right to peaceful possession of his residential property, and the learned Single Judge correctly affirmed that view by judgment dated 29.01.2024. Accordingly, we hold that the beneficial object and mandate of “the 2007 Act" require sustaining the orders of the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge. The appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed.''

In the penultimate paragraph of the his judgment, Justice Sandeep Kumar had concluded:''6. From the prayer made in the Partition Suit, it appears that the petitioners have claimed only 18 paise share in the suit properties including the house in question" which was in the name of Rajendra Prasad, the respondent no.5. He added: ''The partition suit is yet to be decided. The petitioners by filing a suit cannot change the character of the property. The lease deed is in favour of respondent no.5 and unless and until the share of the petitioners is decided by a competent court, the house in question cannot be treated as a joint family property. Further, in the partition suit the petitioners have prayed for recovery of possession and therefore, it appears that the petitioners are not in possession of the property in question. The respondent no.5 being a senior citizen is being harassed by the petitioners by simply filing a Partition Suit and the claim of the petitioners is yet to be decided by the District Court. Therefore, I am of the view that merely by filing a Partition Suit, the house/property acquired and owned by the respondent no.5 cannot be interfered with by the petitioners."

Justice Kumar concluded:''27. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the considered view that the impugned order dated 10.06.2022 passed by the Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Patna in Senior Citizen (Misc.) Appeal No.01 of 2020-21 cannot be interfered with as there is no infirmity in the same. This writ petition is devoid of any merit and accordingly, it is dismissed. The interim order dated 10.08.2022 is hereby vacated." The High Court's Division Bench has upheld the judgement.