"preventive detention cannot be sustained on the basis of stale, vague, or indefinite allegations": Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court

In Huzaif Ahmad Dar vs. Union Territory of J&K & Ors. (2026), Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Arun Palli and Justice Rajnesh Oswal delivered a 6-page long judgement dated January 29, 2026, wherein it concluded:"....we are of the considered view that the judgment impugned in this appeal is not sustainable in the eyes of law and accordingly, the same is set aside. Resultantly, order of detention bearing Order No. 09/DMA/PSA/DET/2024 dated 20.04.2024, issued by the District Magistrate, Anantnag (respondent No. 2) under Section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, being unsustainable in law is, accordingly, quashed. The appellant shall be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case."  The judgement was authored by Justice Oswal. 

The High Court observed: "It is a well-settled principle of law that preventive detention cannot be sustained on the basis of stale, vague, or indefinite allegations. The detaining authority is under a mandated constitutional obligation to furnish clear, precise, and proximate grounds. This requirement is a prerequisite to enabling the detenu to exercise his/her right to make an 'effective representation,' a fundamental safeguard guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India." 

Justice Oswal relied upon the judgment of the Supreme court in Jahangirkhan Fazalkhan Pathan vs. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad & Anr, (1989) 3 SCC 590, wherein it has been held that the order of detention passed on vague grounds deprives the petitioner of his right to make an effective representation against the order of detention." He also referred to Supreme Court's decision in Saeed Zakir Hussain Malik vs. State of Maharashtra’ (2012) 8 SCC 233, wherein the Court held: “27. As regards the second contention, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant, the delay in passing the detention order, namely, after 15 months vitiates the detention itself. The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Though there is no hard and fast rule and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf, however, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, it is incumbent on the part of the court to scrutinize whether the Detaining Authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a reasonable and acceptable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned. 28. It is also the duty of the court to investigate whether casual connection has been broken in the circumstance of each case. We are satisfied that in the absence of proper explanation for a period of 15 months in issuing the order of detention, the same has to be set aside. Since, we are in agreement with the contentions relating to delay in passing the Detention Order and serving the same on detenue, there is no need to go into the factual details.”

Drawing on these decisions, Justice Oswal observed: ".....the impugned detention order, founded on vague, stale, and unsupported material, cannot be sustained. 14.We have carefully examined the judgment rendered by the learned Writ Court and are of the considered view that the issues noticed and discussed hereinabove have not been adequately addressed and, in fact, have escaped the attention of the learned Writ Court.

Justice Dr. Anshuman sets aside disciplinary order by Superintendent of Police, Nalanda and the appellate order

In Bishwajeet Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary cum Home Commissioner, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Dr. Anshuman of Patna High Court allowed the writ petition. He delivered a 5-page long judgement dated January 30, 2026, wherein, he sets aside the disciplinary order dated May 31, 2020 by the Superintendent of Police, Nalanda and the appellate order dated July 7, 2020. The matter was remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority, who is required to pass a fresh order in accordance with law, considering points mentioned in reply to 2nd show-cause notice, within a period of 90 days from the date of production of a copy of this order. The four other Respondents were: Director General cum Inspector General of Police, Patna, Inspector General of Police, Patna Zone, Patna, Superintendent of Police, Nalanda and Sri Prakash Kumar Sharan, Inspector of Police, the then Bihar Police Station (Campt), Nalanda Bihar Police Station.

The petitioner had prayed for directing the concerned respondents to forbear from giving any effect to the order dated dated May 31, 2020 issued in a Departmental Proceeding of 2020 which was  affirmed by the
order dated June 30, 2020 by the Inspector General of Police, Patna, against the order of awarding punishment in the Appeal filed by the Petitioner, communicated by the S.P. Nalanda. The petitioner had filed memorial application before the Director General of Police which was also rejected and affirmed by the order passed by the above both authority on August 10, 2021. It was submitted that the orders were illegal, void and arbitrary manner. The orders were also contrary to Rule 824 read with Appendix 49 of the Bihar Police Manual, 1978.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the said order was essentially one wherein the second show-cause reply was not considered at all, except for a cryptic one-line observation stating that the reply was “not found satisfactory.” He submitted that in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, the submissions of both sides are required to be duly considered, and a mere one-line statement that the reply was unsatisfactory amounts to a gross violation of the settled principles of law. He also submitted that in the order-sheet, particularly in the first and fifteenth lines, interpolations were apparently made by using whitener and inserting other words, without any initials or authentication. He submitted that the enquiry report itself was not prepared in accordance with law. It was also submitted that the petitioner had filed a detailed second show-cause reply in defence, which was not considered at all. Therefore, he submitted that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority was in complete violation of the settled principles of service jurisprudence. He pointed out that the Appellate Authority had failed to consider these aspects of the matter and dismissed the petitioner’s appeal vide order dated July 7, 2020.
 

42 year old land compensation claim will have to be considered under Section 24 (1) (a), Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act

In Dharnidhar Mishra (dead) vs. of State Bihar & Ors. (2024), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Partha Sarthy heard the matter which came up before it on the remand made by the Supreme Court by its order dated May 13, 2024. The High Court directed the State to give the details of the acquisition and the award if any passed. Dharnidhar Mishra was survived by Panchwarti Devi, Saroj Devi, Indira Kumari, Ranjana Devi, Kanchan Devi and Sushil Kumar Mishra, the residents of Hanuman Nagar, Bharbari, Rosera, Samastipur as petitioners. Besides the State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Road construction Department, Government of Bihar, the other three respondents were: District Magistrate-Cum-Collector Samastipur, District Land Acquisition Officer Samastipur and Circle Officer Hasanpur, Samastipur. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's order, a new division bench heard the matter. 

In compliance with the Supreme Court's order, the High Court's judgement dated August 29, 2024 recorded that the Advocate General conceded that no details are available with the Government. He submitted that the land in question was acquired for the purpose of State Highway. The possession has been taken and a Highway has also been constructed. The High Court observed: "In the above circumstances and also the fact that the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short ‘the Act of 2013’) has come into force, we rely on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and others; (2020) 8 SCC 129."

The writ petition was filed challenging an order dated January 8, 2019 passed in Misc. Case No. 02 of 2019 rejecting the claim for compensation against acquisition of the land of the writ-petitioners. The writ-petitioners contended that their land was acquired in L.A. Case No. 07 of 1976. Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh, the Single Judge of the High Court had held that the claim was filed after 42 years of acquisition and there was no document or notification filed, in connection with the acquisition of the subject land. The writ petition was dismissed. In the appeal filed, the Division Bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Satyavrat Verma had passed a judgement on February 7, 2023 which found on the basis of the categorical stand of the State that the subject land had been consumed and that the value of the land, as assessed by the State at Rs. 4,68,099/-, was to be paid. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, which set aside the order of the Division Bench and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. The Chief Justice led Division Bench which included Justice Partha Sarthy which considered the matter afresh observed: "It was found that the ground of delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of continuing cause of action or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court." Both the decisions by Justice Singh and Kumar of the High Court were set aside by the Supreme Court by its order dated May 13, 2024. 

The new division bench of the High Court observed: "It was also found that when the land of the appellant came to be acquired, the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 31 in Part-III of the Constitution; which could not be deprived without due process of law and only upon just and fair compensation. Even when the right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. It was held so in Paragraph 18, which is extracted hereinbelow:- “18. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1].”

The Court specifically referred to Paragraph 366.1 of Supreme Court's decision in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and others; (2020) 8 SCC 129, which reads: “366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1) (a) in case the award is not made as on 1-1- 2014, the date of commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.”

Drawing the Supreme Court's decision in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and others; (2020) 8 SCC 129, the High Court observed: "In the present case, admittedly there is no award made or rather; there is nothing produced on record to indicate an award having been made on the acquisition. In the above circumstances, the matter will have to be considered under Section 24(1)(a) and compensation will have to be determined under the provisions of the Act of 2013. 8. Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 reads as under:“24(1)(a) where no award under Section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or” 

The High Court concluded:"In the above circumstances, the compensation claim of the appellants will have to be considered under the Act of 2013 subject only to their establishing the title to the said land before the appropriate authority. The District Collector, Samastipur shall initiate proceedings under the Act of 2013 within a period of one month from today, determine the amount of compensation and if the appellants are satisfied, it will be disbursed. Further proceedings, if the appellants are not satisfied with the award, can also be taken under the Act of 2013. We make it clear that we have not observed anything about the title of the appellants which the appellants/legal heirs of the original owner will have to establish before the competent authority." With the above directions, the Letters Patent Appeal stands disposed of. Interlocutory Application(s), if any, shall stand closed."

The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Vinod Chandran. It was uploaded on the High Court's website on September 3, 2024. District Collector, Samastipur was supposed to initiate proceedings under the Act of 2013 within a period of one month from August 29, 2024. It not clear as to whether the Collector has complied with the High Court's judgement delivered in compliance with Supreme Court's order.

Also read: Patna High Court failed to inquire into 42 years of delay in determining basis of compensation for land acquisition by Bihar Govt: Supreme Court