Supreme Court directs Bihar Government to decide premature release/remission of Barun Yadav expeditiously

In Barun Yadav vs. The State Of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and N.V. Anjaria passed a 2-page long order dated January 29, 2026 wherein, it concluded:"....we direct the respondent-State to consider and decide the petitioner’s case for premature release/ remission expeditiously. 3. List the matter on 16.07.2026." The order recorded that "....the counter affidavit filed by the respondent-State, that petitioner’s case for pre-mature release/ remission is under consideration which shall be decided in accordance with provisions of the Bihar Prison Manual."

In Barun Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2023), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Chakradhari Sharan Singh and Rajiv Roy delivered a 11-page long judgement dated May 16, 2023, wherein it had concluded: "15. After having gone through the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses, we do not find any justifiable reason to doubt the veracity of the depositions made by the prosecution's witnesses at the trial in the facts and circumstance as noted above. In our view, based on the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses, the trial court has rightly held the appellant guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 324 of the IPC for killing his father and his nephew in the wake of a dispute arising out of partition in the family and injuring PW-8. 16. We accordingly do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed." The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Singh.  

The appeal before the High Court was preferred by the appellant under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to challenge the impugned judgment of conviction dated June 2, 2015 and order dated June 10, 2015, passed by Additional Sessions Judge-II, Supaul, in a Sessions Trial of 2010 which arose out of Jadia P.S. case f 2010, whereby the appellant was convicted and sentenced under Sections 324, 307 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code for rigorous imprisonment of 3 years, 10 years and for life respectively. He was fined Rs 10,000/ each under Sections 307 and 302. All the sentences are running concurrently.

The prosecution's case as per the fardbeyan of the informant (PW-7) was that her father-in-law Shiv Ram Yadav (the deceased) had three sons viz. Arun Yadav (PW-8), Tarun Yadav (PW-2) and Barun Yadav (the appellant). Consequent upon disputes raised by the appellant, Shiv Ram Yadav (the deceased) had partitioned the joint family property in equal shares amongst the coparceners. On August 15, 2010 at about 03:30 am, when the informant was sleeping with her daughter in her house and, her father-in-law, Shiv Ram Yadav (the deceased), brother-in-law, Arun Yadav (PW-8) with his son Raj Kumar and the daughter of Arun Yadav, Arti kumari (aged eight years, PW-3) over a machaan made of bamboos at the door, PW-3 suddenly came crying to tell the informant that his uncle (the appellant) was assaulting her grandfather (Shiv Ram Yadav) and Raj Kumar (son of Arun Yadav also a deceased) with dabia (a sharp cutting heavy weapon). The informant and her daughter Puja rushed towards the machaan and noticed the appellant, Ashok Yadav and another person inflicting dabia blows over the deceased Shiv Ram Yadav, Raj Kumar and Arun Yadav. On alarm being raised by the informant and her daughter, the villagers assembled and saw the accused persons fleeing away. The reason behind the occurrence as mentioned in the FIR was that the appellant was not satisfied with the share allotted to him and used to demand a further amount of Rs. 50,000/- as his share. 

In the previous night, accused Ashok Yadav along with an unknown person had been seen taking meal in the house of the appellant, who too was involved in the commission of the offence. The police upon completion of investigation, submitted its chargesheet for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 324 of the IPC. The court, after taking cognizance of the offences committed the case for trial. The trial court framed the charges for commission of the offences punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 324 of the IPC. As the appellant denied the charge and claimed to be tried, he was put on trial. 

The High Court recorded that the occurrence in question took place on August 16, 2010 at 03:30 am, the fardbeyan of the informant was recorded at 06:15 am and the inquest report was prepared soon thereafter at 06:30 am. Prompt recording of fardbeyan, preparation of inquest report and registration of FIR normally obviates chance of false implication of a person upon due deliberation. The inquest report clearly suggests that the injury was caused by sharp cutting heavy weapon which corroborates the prosecution's case as disclosed in the FIR and subsequently at the trial. The post-mortem examination also supports the prosecution's case of the ante-mortem injuries caused on the body of the deceased persons by sharp cutting weapon. The child witness, who is an eyewitness and was sleeping with her father at machan appears to be consistent in her deposition in whose presence the occurrence had taken place.animosity arising out of dispute over the respective shares of the joint family property upon partition cuts both ways and appears to be the apparent reason why the appellant committed the ghastly murder of his father and son of his full brother. 

 

Justice Partha Sarthy sets aside orders by District Magistrate, Nalanda, Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division and Joint Director, Revenue and Land Reforms Department in ₹ 5,000 bribery case

In Suresh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 14-page long judgement dated January 29, 2026, wherein, he set aside the unsustainable order of punishment dated January 31, 2014 passed by the District Magistrate, Nalanda, the order dated July 29, 2015 rejecting Service Appeal no. 246 of 2014 by the Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division, and the order dated October 14, 2016 by the Joint Director, Agriculture Ganana, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar in a ₹ 5,000 bribery case. 

The judgement reads:"27. The writ application is allowed along with consequential benefits. 28. The petitioner will be reinstated in service with effect from the date of dismissal i.e. 31.1.2014 and the entire arrears of salary, after deducting the suspension allowance paid to the petitioner, shall be paid to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order." The writ application was allowed. The six other Respondents were: Chief Secretary, Bihar, Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Bihar, Joint Director, Agriculture Ganana, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Bihar, Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division, District Magistrate Cum Collector, Nalanda at Bihar Sarif and Circle Officer, Hilsa, Nalanda.

The case of the petitioner was that while he was at the relevant time posted as revenue clerk in Circle Hilsa in the district of Nalanda, the petitioner was caught taking bribe in a trap case for which Vigilance P.S. Case no. 7 of 2012 was registered and he was taken into custody. The petitioner was subsequently enlarged on bail. An inquiry was started against the petitioner for which memo of charge was served on him with the charge that on January 25, 2012 the petitioner, a Rajaswa Karamchari, was caught taking bribe of Rs.5,000/- and he was taken into custody by the Vigilance Investigation Bureau. He was sent in judicial custody to the Adarsh Jail, Beur, Patna. The petitioner had filed his reply to the charges and the inquiry proceeded. The Enquiry Report dated August 29, 2012 was submitted by the Conducting Officer, a copy of which was provided to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his reply to the same.. The respondent authorities i.e. the District Magistrate, Nalanda came out with an order of punishment dated January 31, 2014 dismissing the petitioner from service. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected by the Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division on July 29, 2015 and the revision filed by the petitioner was also rejected by the Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Bihar by his order dated October 14, 2016. 7.

The senior counsel, S.N.P. Singh appearing for the petitioner submitted that on perusal of the memo of charges, it emerged that it was alleged that the petitioner being caught taking bribe of ₹ 5,000/- on January 25, 2012, however when the inquiry proceeded, from the contents of the inquiry report it emerged that the inquiry proceedings dealt with three charges against the petitioner. 

It was also submitted that on perusal of the inquiry report, the so called informant of the criminal case who was said to have been examined, however neither any intimation was given to the petitioner of his examination nor was the petitioner given any opportunity to cross-examine him. Admittedly no document was either produced, marked exhibit or proved by any of the witness in course of inquiry. He relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors.; (2009) 2 SCC 570. It was submitted that it was a case of no evidence. He submitted that even the memo of charge neither mentions about the witnesses who are proposed to be examined to prove the charges against the petitioner nor does it mention about any of the documents that is sought to be relied upon in proving the charges. It was submitted that it was categorically stated that neither the date of examination of the witnesses was fixed nor the petitioner was given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. It was also submitted that the entire order sheet of the departmental proceeding was brought on record. 

Referring to the order dated August 16, 2012 of the Conducting Officer which mentioned about the examination of the informant who was said to have come with evidence as also other witnesses namely Yogendra Kumar and Raja Babu, it was stated that there was no mention of any cross-examination nor any of the witnesses having proved any document and the proceedings was concluded on the same day. 

A Division Bench of the High Court in Devendra Prasad vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2023) drew on Supreme Court's decision in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & oOrs. (2009) 2 SCC 570 to underline that "the documents produced in a departmental inquiry has to be proved by examining witnesses. Even an F.I.R. was held to be not evidence by itself without actual proof of facts stated therein. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had also held that even an admission or confession to the police itself is not sufficient to find the delinquent employee guilty in a departmental proceeding if no evidence is brought on record to prove the offence or misconduct alleged. Departmental inquiry was held to be a quasi-judicial proceeding and the Inquiry Officer functions in the status of a quasi-judicial authority. Not only should evidence be led in a departmental inquiry, the conclusions arrived at should be based on evidence which brings forth a probability that the delinquent has committed the misconduct alleged and charged against him. No Inquiry Report based on conjectures and surmises can be sustained and even in a departmental inquiry, the standard of However high the degree of suspicion is, it cannot be a substitute for legal proof.”  

Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of Roop Singh Negi observed:“14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence.”

In such a backdrop, the case against the petitioner being one of no evidence, the orders impugned were not sustainable. 

 

Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya set aside Judgment, decree of 2012 by Subordinate Judge 1st, Sitamarhi in a Title Suit of 2011

In Aditya Pratap Sinha & Ors. vs. Raj karan Chaudhary & Ors. (2026), Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya of Patna High Court delivered a 27-pag long judgement dated January 28, 2026, whereby, he set aside the Judgment and decree dated June 4, 2012 passed by the Sub-ordinate Judge 1st Sitamarhi, in Title Suit of 2011 whereby and whereunder the petition filed on behalf of petitioner under Order VII rule 11(d) of the CPC was rejected as the same is barred under Section 4 of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988. The High Court heard the First Appeal which was filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The appeal was allowed. The application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC was dismissed and the suit was  restored. It was one of the five judgements delivered by the High Court on January 28. 

The High Court's judgement directed that the "Trial Court shall proceed with the trial of the suit. Both the parties are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court in Title Suit No. 196 of 2011. The learned Trial Court shall adjudicate the suit on its own merits in accordance with law and uninfluenced by the observation made by this Court in this judgment. 23. Let the Trial Court Record be returned to the concerned Court forthwith." 

Justice Malviya noted that the point of determination which arose before the High Court for consideration in this first appeal was whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the Trial Court was justified in rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC. 

The scope of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC explained in various decisions and the legal principles deducible. The Supreme Court in Kamla & Ors. vs .K.T. Eshwara Sa & Ors. reported in (2008) 12 SCC 661 held that for invoking clause (d) of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, only the averment in the plaint would be relevant. For this purpose, there cannot be any addition or subtraction. No amount of evidence can be looked into. The issue on merit of the matter would not be within the realm of the Court this stage. The material to be considered for rejecting the plaint has been dealt with in the case of Dahiben vs. Arvind Bhai Kalyanji Bhanusali reported in (2020) SCC OnLine SC 563 The Supreme Court has settled the principle.

Justice Malviya observed: "17. Moreover, from the facts and circumstances of the instant case it appears that there is mixed question of law and fact that requires a full trial for proper adjudication after evidence has been presented. The application of Section 4 of the Act in the present case is a complex issue that requires further examining of evidence. At this stage, adjudicating on the point of benami transaction would be a premature determination of a mixed question of law and fact, which is only suitable for a trial after examination of evidence. Therefore, it cannot be decided merely on assertions made in the application seeking rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. 18. In the present case, if the statements in the plaint are taken to be true, it cannot be said that it does not disclose a cause of action and the plaint shall be rejected. This is a matter of trial, the result of which would depend upon the evidence adduced by the appellant/plaintiff. At this stage, the Court is not concerned with the correctness of the averments, except to state that the appellant/plaintiff has to discharge the burden of proving this case. Insofar as the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is concerned, this court will proceed only that far, to examine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action or suit is barred by law and no further. The genuineness, validity and binding nature of document will have to be adjudicated at the appropriate stage in trial of the case after the parties adduce oral and documentary evidence. 19. At this outset, it is relevant to mention that the court concerned shall not reject the plaint based on a claim of benami transaction at the initial stage. The issue shall be addressed during the trial, after all parties had an opportunity to present their case as well as the evidence in support of their case.

Justice Malviya also observed: "20. So far as the ground of limitation is concerned, it is needless to emphasis that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law. The fact regarding the date on which the appellant/plaintiff was acquainted with the knowledge of the essential facts from which cause of action arose, is crucial for deciding the question whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. It becomes a triable issue and hence, the suit cannot be thrown out at the threshold. Law is well settled that a plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC if the issue of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law, such as, the date of knowledge of a cause of action, as it requires a full trial and evidence. In view thereof, such issues cannot be decided summarily without allowing the parties to lead evidence on arising of the cause of action.

The case of the plaintiff was that Krishna Devi, the defendant no. 2 is the mameri sister of plaintiff and defendant no.1 is the husband of defendant no. 2. There is very close and cordial relations among the plaintiff and both the defendants no 1, Raj karan Chaudhary and 2 and on account of such close relationship and mutual confidence, the plaintiff purchased in the year 1980 lands measuring 17.5 decimals of Plot No. 262, 9.5 decimals of Plot No. 265 and 14.5 decimals of Plot No. 264 situated at Mauza, Sitamarhi Bazar, the detail of the land was mentioned under schedule 1 of the plaint, through two registered sale deeds dated 02.01.1980. However the sale deeds were registered in the names of defendant nos. 1 and 2. The plaintiff was retired government employee under Road Construction Department of Government of Bihar. It is specific case of the plaintiff that at the relevant time the plaintiff was in Government service and due to certain technical and service-related constraints he could not purchase the lands in his own name as well as in the names of his family members, and therefore, with the consent of the defendant nos. 1 and 2, the sale deeds were obtained in their names, they being merely name-lenders, while the entire consideration was paid by the plaintiff. It was further alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff is the real purchaser of the land, paid the entire consideration money and came in exclusive and peaceful possession over the disputed land since the date of purchase. The defendants were simply name lenders of the plaintiff. The original sale deed was in the custody of the plaintiff and the defendants had no right, title and interest in the disputed land nor have they ever come in the possession of the land in question. 

The case of the plaintiff as stated in the plaint was that the plaintiff constructed a residential house over the disputed land and from roadside he constructed commercial shops and let out to different persons for carrying business for which they are paying rent to the plaintiff and in the residential house the plaintiff is residing along with his family members. It was also alleged that the defendant nos. 1 and 2 never came in possession of the suit land and have no right, title or interest therein, but taking advantage of the sale deeds dated 02.01.1980 standing in their names, they started creating obstruction and attempted to alienate a portion of the suit land, which gave rise to the cause of action in April 2011, culminating in the filing of the suit seeking declaration that the defendant nos. 1 and 2 are merely name-lenders, declaration of the plaintiff’s title and confirmation of possession, along with consequential injunction. The defendant nos. 1 and 2 in their joint written statement denied the claim of the appellant/plaintiff and stated that the suit was not maintainable in the eyes of law and the suit was barred by estoppel, waiver, acquiescence and also by limitation. It is stated that the plaintiff has no cause of action or locus standi to file the suit. 

The defendant nos. 1 and 2 had specifically asserted that the suit is hit by the provisions of the Act and was also barred under the provisions of the Bihar Consolidation of Holding and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 as consolidation operations are applicable in that area. It was also stated that the suit property was grossly undervalued and proper court fee had not been paid, the market value of the land being much higher than what was shown by the plaintiff. Moreover, the defendant nos. 1 and 2 had categorically denied that the plaintiff purchased the suit land or paid the consideration amount, or that the defendant nos. 1 and 2 were name-lenders or benamidars. It was asserted that defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 2 independently purchased the respective portions of the suit land by registered sale deeds dated 02.01.1980 out of their own funds, came in possession thereof from the date of purchase, got their names mutated, paid rent and municipal dues, and constructed residential houses and shops at their own expense. The defendant nos. 1 and 2 had also denied the alleged cordial relationship or fiduciary confidence pleaded by the plaintiff and have stated that the plaintiff was never in possession of the suit land, and has never constructed any house or shops, and never collected rent from any tenant. It was also stated that the plaintiff was not in custody of the original sale deeds, as only certified copies were filed, which itself falsifies the entire claim. It was, therefore, stated that the plaintiff had no right, title or interest in the suit land and was not entitled to any relief, declaratory or injunctive. 

On April 23, 2012, an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC was filed on behalf of the intervenor, namely Pintu Kumar, praying for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by law, particularly under Section 4 of the Act, and the plaint did not disclose any cause of action. It was also evident from the record that the said intervenor claimed interest in a portion of the suit land on the basis of subsequent registered sale deed executed in his favour by the defendant no. 1. The Trial Court allowed his prayer for impleadment as a defendant and while considering his application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, proceeded to examine the maintainability of the suit at the threshold. 

After hearing both the parties, upon due consideration of the pleadings, materials available on record, and the settled position of law, the Trial Court found that the core controversy in the present case is crystallized into two determinative issues for adjudication, namely, first, whether the present suit was instituted after the coming into force of the Act; and second, if so, whether the provisions of the Act operate as a statutory bar to the maintainability of the suit.  

Based on facts and circumstances of the case and upon consideration of the materials available on record, Trial Court held that although earlier benami transactions were not invalidated retrospectively, the suit was instituted after the coming into force of the Act, was squarely governed by the provisions of the Act. The Trial Court concluded that the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff were barred by Section 4 of the Act, as the plaintiff sought to enforce rights in respect of property standing in the names of others on the plea of benami. It was further held that, in view of such statutory bar, the suit was not maintainable and fell within the scope of rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC. On the aforesaid reasoning, the Trial Court accepted the application filed on behalf of defendant no.3 (intervenor Pintu Kumar) dated April 23, 2012 and dismissed the suit as not maintainable.

Aggrieved  by the judgment and decree dated June 4, 2012 passed by the Trial Court, whereby the plaint was rejected by allowing the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and the suit was dismissed as not maintainable on the ground of statutory bar under the Act. It was in this backdrop that the first appeal was filed in the High Court. 

The counsel on the behalf of the appellant/plaintiff submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the pleadings and evidence on record in their correct legal perspective and committed a grave error in rejecting the plaint. He submits that the appellant/plaintiff had specifically pleaded and proved that the entire consideration amount for purchase of the suit land was paid by him in the year 1980 and that the sale deeds were obtained in the names of defendant nos. 1 and 2 only on account of close familial relationship and due to technical constraints arising out of the appellant/plaintiff being in government service at the relevant time. He also submitted that the appellant/plaintiff had been in exclusive, peaceful and continuous possession of the suit land since the date of purchase and he had constructed a residential house and commercial shops thereon. Moreover, he was residing with his family members and had inducted tenants, and had been paying municipal taxes and electricity charges, all of which clearly establish his possession and enjoyment of the suit property as the real owner. He submitted that the defendant nos. 1 and 2 never came in possession of the suit land and had not produced any evidence to show exercise of ownership rights. The Trial Court failed to draw the correct inference from long, uninterrupted possession coupled with payment of consideration and custody of original sale deeds by the appellant/plaintiff. He also submitted that the cause of action clearly arose when the defendant nos. 1 and 2, taking advantage of the sale deeds standing in their names, attempted to create third-party interest, necessitating the filing of the suit. He also submitted that the two sale deeds in question were registered on January 2, 1980 and the Act came into force on September 5, 1988. 

There was reference made to Supreme Court's decision in R. Rajagopal & Ors. vs. Padmini Chandrasekharan reported in AIR 1996 SC 238 and held that the provision of Section 4 of the Act would not have retrospective effect and hence the suit in question would not be barred by Section 4 of the Act. The heading of Section 4 of the Act i.e., “Prohibition of the right to recover property held Benami” suggests that it prohibits right to recover property held Benami, but in the instant case there was no case for “recovery of property” from benamidar, in as much as, the property in suit was not in possession of benamidar. The specific case of the appellant/plaintiff was that he had been coming in possession of the suit land since its purchase on January 2, 1980 and he had constructed his residential house over the land where he was residing along with his family and he had constructed some shops over the suit land, which had been let out to different persons and a holding was created in the name of the appellant/plaintiff and electric connection in the house was taken in the name of his father and the entire premise was in one compact block within boundary wall and hence in the facts of the case the appellant/plaintiff was entitled for confirmation of his possession over the suit land, but the Trial Court had failed to take into consideration these aspect of the case and was illegally rejected the plaint on the basis of provision of Section 4 of the Act. He submitted that even assuming for the sake of argument, though not accepting, that the suit was barred by Section 4 of the Act, the benamidar's right to property under suit was  extinguished by operation of Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the question as to whether ownership and possession can be pleaded alternatively was required to be considered at trial and it would not make the plaint barred by the provision of Section 4 of the Act. Moreover rejection of plaint must be on the basis of averments in plaint, for this he placed reliance on the judgement passed by the Supreme Court in Bhau Ram vs. Janak Singh and Ors. reported in (2012) 8 SCC 701 and Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 706.

He also submitted that from bare perusal of the plaint it would appear that complicated pleas and factual aspects were involved in the case and the same could be denied only at the time of trial and these aspects of the suit/case remained untouched by the Trial Court while deciding application for rejection of plaint as held by the  Supreme Court in Saleem Bhai and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in AIR 2003 SC 759 and hence, rejection of plaint at the threshold of the proceeding was wholly illegal and unjustified. He further contended that the law is well-settled on the point that the power of rejection of plaint should be exercised sparingly and cautiously, as the provision related to rejection of the plaint, as envisaged under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC are aimed at preventing vexatious and frivolous litigation, but the learned Trial Court had passed the impugned judgment and decree without taking into consideration these important aspects of the case. He submitted that for the aforesaid grounds, the impugned judgment and decree are unsustainable in law and on facts and are liable to be set aside and the suit of the appellant/plaintiff deserves to be decreed as prayed for.

The High Court delivered five judgements in Birendra Kumar Sinha vs. Raj Karan Chaudhary & Ors., Ram Shankar Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Sitbiya Devi vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, the Department of Home, Government of Bihar, Anar Devi vs. The State of Bihar, through the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department, Government of Bihar and Mukesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Anr. on January 28. 

Justice Sandeep Kumar set aside notice of Managing Director, Bihar State Mining Corporation Limited for violating doctrine of audi alteram partem in Bhojpur case

In Shivshankar Kaushik Infrastructure Pvt. Limited vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Mines and Geology Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 16-page long judgement dated January 27, 2026, wherein. he concluded:"....the impugned letter dated 03.03.2023 imposing penalty upon the petitioner is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted to the respondents to consider the matter afresh and pass a speaking order after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 20. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition stands allowed." It was one of the seven judgements delivered by the High Court on January 27.  

In the penultimate paragraph of the judgement, Justice Kumar observed:"18. In the present case, it appears from the records that the inspection was conducted behind the back of the petitioner and after inspection the petitioner was neither provided the inspection report nor show-cause was issued to him, and the impugned order imposing penalty has also been passed without hearing the petitioner, which is in complete violation of principles of natural justice and therefore non est. Moreover, the respondent authorities had provided merely 24 hours’ time to deposit the penalty amount and the petitioner under the threat of non-generation of his e-challans had deposited the aforesaid penalty amount. The action of the respondent authorities in grating only 24 hours time to deposit the huge penalty amount imposed upon the petitioner is totally arbitrary and therefore, unsustainable."

He pointed out that "17. It is a cardinal principle of law that no one should be condemned before being heard, which is also an integral part of the principles of natural justice. Considering the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishnadatt Awasthy (supra), it is clear that the principles of nature justice must be adhered to strictly. The doctrine of audi alteram partem has three basic essentials. Firstly, a person against whom an order is required to be passed or whose rights are likely to be affected adversely, must be granted a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Secondly, the authority concerned should provide a fair and transparent procedure and lastly, the authority concerned must apply its mind and dispose of the matter by a reasoned and speaking order.

The petitioner had prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorarı for quashing the notice dated March 3, 2023 issued by the Respondent Managing Director, Bihar State Mining Corporation Limited whereby and whereunder a penalty of Rs.96,97,705/- was  levied upon the petitioner for allegedly excavating 90060 cubic feet sand from beyond the permissible environment clearance area. It had also prayed for issuance of appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the Respondents to refund the penalty amount of Rs.96,97,705/- deposited by the
petitioner on March 3, 2023. It prayed for holding that Respondent Managing Director was not the competent authority to levy penalty upon a settlee under Rule 30(1) of the 2019 Rules.It prayed the High Court to hold that penalty cannot be levied upon a valid settee under Rule 56(2) of the 2019 Rules. It prayed for holding that letter dated March 3, 2023 was issued by the Respondent Managing Director is bad in the eyes of law since the same has been issued in glaring violation of the principles of natural justice as the petitioner has not been afforded any show cause notice whatsoever to controvert the allegations upon which the penalty has been levied. It also prayed the Court to hold that the levy of penalty was in gross violation of the maxim audi alteram partem as the petitioner was condemned unheard without an opportunity to defend the charges against it. It prayed the Court to hold that the imposition of penalty upon the petitioner was in violation of the 2019 Rules.

It was the case of the petitioner that the respondent-Bihar State Mining Corporation Limited had published a notice inviting e-auction for selection of sub-contractors for operation of sand ghats in the district of Bhojpur. The petitioner had participated in the said tender process and being the highest bidder, he was awarded Khangaon (Bahiyara) sand ghat after quoting an amount of Rs.5,53,41,610/-. Thereafter, the petitioner had deposited the requisite amount and accordingly, work order was issued in his favour. It was the case of the petitioner that an agreement was also executed between the petitioner and the respondent- Bihar State Mining Corporation Limited which was registered on June 27, 2022. Thereafter, the petitioner started carrying out the mining activities, but all of a sudden the Managing Director of the Bihar State Mining Corporation Limited issued the impugned letter dated March 3, 2023, whereby a penalty of Rs.96,97,705/- was levied upon the petitioner for excavating the sand beyond the permissible mining area and the petitioner was directed to deposit the penalty amount within 24 hours. The petitioner, had deposited the penalty amount under compulsion and threat of restriction on generation of e-transit challans.  

It was submitted by counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order of penalty dated March 3, 2023 indicates that on February 24, 2023 and February 25, 2023 inspection was conducted and it was found that the signboard and boundary wall were not erected and the sand was found to have been excavated outside the permissible area, however, neither the petitioner was intimated about any inspection nor the alleged inspection was conducted in his presence. It was further submitted that neither show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner nor any inspection report was provided to him before imposing the penalty. The petitioner had not excavated the sand beyond the permissible area and the imposition of penalty of such a huge amount is completely illegal and in violation of the principles of natural justice as the same has been
passed without issuance of any show-cause notice to the petitioner and without affording an opportunity to rebut the allegation.

In support of this submission, counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on decisions dated May 9, 2023 passed by a coordinate Bench of the High Court passed in in M/s. Uma Associates vs. State of Bihar & Ors.; the judgment dated August 1, 2025 passed in M/s. Shri Vijay Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. and the judgment dated August 1, 2024 passed in Maa Bhawani Traders vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.

Referring to Rule 20 and 56 of the Bihar Minerals (Concession, Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation & Storage) Rules, 2019, counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no provision in the Rules, regarding recovery of price of mineral for illegal excavation as a compensation. Also Rule-30 specifically provides that for the first time violation, a penalty of Rs.1,00,000/-can be imposed upon the setttlee, however, even assuming that the allegation against the petitioner was true then also the aforesaid imposition of penalty is totally illegal and not sustainable.

Justice Kumar noted that the central argument of the counsel for the petitioner was that the impugned penalty order was passed in complete contravention of the principles of natural justice as no show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner before imposing the penalty and even no opportunity of hearing was afforded to him. He observed:"15. I find substance in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that before passing the impugned order of penalty neither show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner nor he has been heard and further the enquiry report has also not been supplied to the petitioner. Even the learned counsel for the answering respondents is not in a position to show anything from the records indicating that before passing the impugned order either the show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner or that he has been heard. Further, the respondents had provided only 24 hours time to deposit the penalty amount. 

Justice Kumar underlined: "In my opinion, the penalty could have been imposed upon the petitioner only after a proper inquiry conducted in his presence, which is absent in the present case." 

In Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors., reported as (2025) 7 SCC 545, Supreme Court has emphasized the imperativeness of principles of natural justice, particularly, before an administrative authority acting in a quasi judicial function and has held as under:-
“43. The opportunity of hearing is considered so fundamental to any civilised legal system that the courts have read the principles of natural justice into an enactment to save it from being declared unconstitutional on procedural grounds [Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn., (1985) 3 SCC 545].
44. It has been argued before us that if the failure to provide hearing does not cause prejudice, observing the principle of natural justice may not be necessary. In this context, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379] speaking through Chinappa Reddy, J. considered such arguments to be “pernicious” and held that “[t]he non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary”. The Supreme Court, however, has drawn out an exception where “on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible, and under the law only one penalty is permissible, then the Court may not compel the observance of natural justice” [Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664 : (1981) 51 Comp Cas 210; Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 965]. 
45. Professor I.P. Massey [I.P. Massey, Administrative Law (8th Edn., 2012).] has commented on this shift as under: “Before the decision of the highest Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379], the rule was that the principles of natural justice shall apply only when an
administrative action has caused some prejudice to the person, meaning thereby that he must have suffered some “civil consequences”. Therefore, the person had to show something extra in order to prove “prejudice” or civil consequences. This approach had stultified the growth of administrative law within an area of highly practical significance. It is gratifying that in Jagmohan [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379] , the Court took a bold step in holding that a separate showing of prejudice is not necessary. The non-observance of natural justice is in itself prejudice caused. However, merely because facts are admitted or are undisputable it does not follow that the principles of natural justice need not be observed.”
46. In State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717], the Supreme Court observed that where an enquiry is not convened by any statutory provision and the only obligation of the administrative authority is to observe the principles of natural justice, the court/tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of the rule of fair hearing and violation of the facet of that rule. In other words, a distinction must be made between “no opportunity” or “no adequate opportunity”. In the case of the former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid and the authority may be asked to conduct proceedings afresh according to the rule of fair hearing. But in the latter case, the effect of violation of a facet of the rule of fair hearing has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice.
47. In Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. CCE [Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. CCE, (2015) 8 SCC 519 : (2015) 33 GSTR 1], this Court dealt with the prejudice question as under: (SCC p. 540, para 42) “42. So far so good. However, an important question posed by Mr Sorabjee is as to whether it is open to the authority, which has to take a decision, to dispense with the requirement of the principles of natural justice on the ground that affording such an opportunity will not make any difference? To put it otherwise, can the administrative authority dispense with the requirement of issuing notice by itself deciding that no prejudice will be caused to the person against whom the action is contemplated? Answer has to be in the negative. It is not permissible for the authority to jump over the compliance of the principles of natural justice on the ground that even if hearing had been provided it would have served no useful purpose. The opportunity of hearing will serve the purpose or not has to be considered at a later stage and such things cannot be presumed by the authority. This was so held by the English Court way back in the year 1943 in General Medical Council v. Spackman [1943 AC 627 (HL)]. This Court also spoke in the same language in Board of High School & Intermediate Education, U.P. v. Chitra Srivastava [Board of High School & Intermediate Education, U.P. v. Chitra Srivastava, (1970) 1 SCC 121] ….”
48. In a more recent decision in State of U.P. v Sudhir Kumar Singh [State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 706] , the position of law was summarised as under: (SCC pp. 748-49, para 42)
“42. …42.1. Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused.
42.2. Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their
infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also in public interest.
42.3. No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice.
42.4. In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person.
42.5. The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice.”

The High had passed seven judgements in Bhola Prasad Choudhary @ Bhola Choudhary vs. The State of Bihar, Rakesh Kumar Roy vs. The State of Bihar, Lal Jha vs. The State of Bihar, Avinash Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Shivshankar Kaushik Infrastructure Pvt. Limited vs. The State of Bihar, Narendra Kumar vs. National Textile Corporation Ltd. & Ors. and Ganga Vishnu Shah vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. on January 27, 2026.

Supreme Court restores order by Justice Ajay Kumar Tripathi after 12 years, 5 years after his death, Justice I.A. Ansari's order sets aside

In Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority & Ors. vs. M/s Scope Sales Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court’s Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih delivered a 18-page long judgement dated January 23, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"...the impugned order of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the Single Judge restored with the result that the present appeals succeed." It was heard along with State of Bihar vs. M/s Scope Sales Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.(2026). The judgement was authored by Justice Datta. 

Justice Ajay Kumar Tripathi had passed the 18-page long order dated January 24, 2014 as a Single Judge.  

Justice Datta observed:"We must also bear in mind the nature and extent of jurisdiction that an intra-court appellate Bench of a high court exercise. Such appellate jurisdiction is conferred either under the Letters Patent or by the relevant statutory provisions. It is pertinent to note that both - Single Bench and Division Bench - exercise the same jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our view, the exercise of intra-court appellate jurisdiction is warranted only where the judgment or order under challenge is demonstrably erroneous or suffers from perversity. Such jurisdiction ought not to be invoked merely because another view is possible on the same set of facts, particularly where the view adopted by the Single Judge is a plausible and reasonable one. In other words, an intra-court appellate Bench ought not to substitute its own view, merely because such Bench considers its view to be better than the one taken by the Single Bench; so long as the view taken by the Single Bench is a plausible one, interference should stay at a distance." 

Justice Datta observed:"11. It is trite law that the remedy of a writ is discretionary in nature. Even
where a writ petition raises a substantial point of law, the High Court may decline to entertain it for a variety of reasons. Inter alia, relief may be denied to the suitor notwithstanding the existence of a strong legal case should grant of such relief not serve or advance public interest. If interfering with an impugned order/decision etc. would result in more harm to society, the writ courts may decline to exercise its jurisdiction. The high courts, being the custodian of the Constitution, carry the responsibility to maintain social balance by its interference when justice
of the case so demands and in not interfering when such an interference would affect public interest. 12. The above principle has been reiterated in a catena of precedents...."  

He added:"15. Bearing in mind the larger public interest that was involved coupled with the fact that the plot of land in question was sought to be reserved for establishment of an educational institution, we are of the firm opinion that dismissal of the writ petition was an available option for the Single Judge. The view taken by the Division Bench that BIADA lacked the authority to cancel the allotment though prima facie may appear to be appealing, yet, the same is debatable.
15.1 Applying the principles governing the exercise of intra-court appellate jurisdiction, as laid down in the aforesaid precedents, to the facts of the present case, we observe that judicial discipline demanded due deference to the exercise of discretion by the court of first instance, particularly when such discretion was exercised on relevant considerations. The Single Judge having refused exercise of discretion on a ground which, in our opinion, is valid, the Division Bench ought to have been loath to allow the writ petition, and that too in exercise of its intra-court appellate jurisdiction. The judgment and order of the Single Judge was far from being wholly incorrect or perverse. 
15.2 Further, it is a matter of record that cancellation of allotment of the plot in question was necessitated by the requirement of the land for setting up and future expansion of an institute like IIT, a circumstance which was neither contemplated nor known at the time of the original allotment. The decision of BIADA to cancel the allotment was taken bona fide and in furtherance of a larger public purpose. BIADA, to demonstrate its bona fide, also offered to M/s. Scope an alternate piece of land, which it declined. There is no material on record which suggests that BIADA’s action is infected by any malice in fact. We also note that M/s Scope, in its writ petition, sought compensation in the alternative, in the event the primary relief could not be granted. While balancing the equities in favour of the parties, this aspect assumes considerable importance.
15.3 Taking these factors cumulatively – namely, the absence of any perversity in the order of the learned Single Judge, the larger public interest involved owing to involvement of an educational institution, and the availability of an alternate prayer for compensation–interference in the exercise of writ jurisdiction in the present case would hinder a project of undeniable national importance and, in our opinion, thwart public interest.
16. Beyond doubt, institutes such as the IITs not only cater to a large number of students but also play a critical role in the development of individuals, society, and the nation at large. Suffice it to observe, their importance cannot be measured merely in quantitative terms. For their effective functioning and sustained growth, the availability of adequate resources, including land, is indispensable. 
17. It is not that we are unmindful of the rights of the individual allottee, i.e., M/s. Scope. While such rights merit due respect and consideration, it cannot be placed on a pedestal higher than the collective public interest. Where the two come into conflict, individual interest must necessarily yield to the larger public good." 

Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority and the State of Bihar approached the Supreme Court in appeal, by special leave, challenging the 110-page long order dated October 21, 2014 of a Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices I. A. Ansari and Anjana Mishra in Letters Patent Appeal No. 335 of 2014 on an intra-court appeal presented by the first respondent. The Division Bench reversed the Single Judge’s judgment and orderdated January 24, 2014 of dismissal of M/s. Scope’s writ petition and consequently, allowed the writ petition of M/s. Scope.

Pursuant to an advertisement dated June 6, 2007 issued by BIADA inviting offers for auction of plots, M/s. Scope applied for allotment of a plot. Upon its emergence as the highest bidder, M/s. Scope was allotted Plot No. C-347, Patna Industrial Area, Patliputra, Patna, on June 9, 2007 for a sum of Rs. 2,32,20,000/- (subsequently for a sum of Rs. 3,38,98,000/- due to increase in area). M/s. Scope wanted to construct a multiplex cum shopping mall on the plot, possession whereof was delivered on October 9, 2007. In the meanwhile, a decision was taken to set up the Indian Institute of Technology at Patna. The campus of a Government Polytechnic was chosen to house the IIT until the IIT developed its own campus. The plot in question is adjacent to the campus of the polytechnic. Five months after delivery of possession of the plot in question in favour of M/s. Scope, BIADA, vide letter dated March 29, 2008 directed M/s. Scope to stop construction on the plot in question till further notice. The records show that the State decided to reserve the plot in question for future development of the IIT campus and, thus, had directed BIADA to initiate action for cancellation of allotment in favour of M/s. Scope. 

Consequently, BIADA, on November 10, 2008, issued a show cause notice to M/s. Scope proposing cancellation of the allotment (with refund and interest) followed by a second notice on 4th March, 2009. Vide its response dated  March 12, 2009, M/s. Scope pointed out that the notice did not cite any legal provision of the Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority Act, 1974 or the Rules framed thereunder which allowed BIADA to cancel the allotment or to take back possession of the plot in question on the ground of public interest; therefore, the proposed cancellation was without any legal authority. M/s. Scope also gave an estimate of the expenses incurred by it in course of construction activity. BIADA cancelled the allotment vide cancellation order dated April 4, 2009 and refunded the “cost of land originally deposited by the Unit amounting to Rs.3,38,98,000/-” along with 5% interest which was equivalent to the “rate of interest charged upon dues of BIADA from the allottees”. 

Aggrieved by it, M/s. Scope invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court seeking a writ of Certiorari for quashing of the cancellation order. The alternative prayer made by M/s. Scope in the writ petition, for award of “actual compensation and not fanciful compensation”. 

Notably, during pendency of the writ petition, and almost two years after its institution, BIADA vide letter dated November 25, 2011 proposed allotment of alternate plots in a nearby area which M/s. Scope refused finding the same inappropriate.  The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition on January 24, 2017. 

The Single Judge took note of the sudden development for establishment of IIT Patna which “compelled the respondent State authorities to do some out of the hat thinking to provide immediate infrastructure by way of a temporary campus, before the main campus could be developed for which identification of land and acquisition was a cumbersome and time taking process.

In view of the above and after finding that the cancellation of allotment was not diseased by mala fide, the Single Judge found that there were convincing reasons arising out of larger public good to effect cancellation of the order of allotment and to take possession of the land as a natural corollary thereof. It was further noted that fact of an IIT being set up, was not “even in the horizon when the decision to auction the land with the petitioner was taken”. The Single Judge held that cancellation was permissible and well within the ambit of Section 9(3) of the BIADA Act, which provides for the power of the State Government to seek, at any time, the restoration of land which is placed at the disposal of the Authority. 

M/s. Scope contested the order of dismissal of its writ petition in an intra-court appeal where it succeeded. Its appeal was allowed vide the impugned order.

Justice Datta recollected Supreme Court's judgement in State of Maharashtra vs. Prabhu (1994) 2 SCC 481. A 3-Judge Bench had held that the High Court should refuse to interfere in its equity jurisdiction when the same would be detrimental to public interest.  

Justice Tripathi did not get the satisfaction of witnessing the endorsement of his order by the Supreme Court. He died on May 2, 2020, from a cardiac arrest at the AIIMS Trauma Centre, New Delhi during pandemic. He was placed on a ventilator in critical condition in April 2020. He was elevated as an Additional Judge of the Patna High Court on October 9, 2006 and was made a permanent judge of that High Court on 21 November 2007. Justice Tripathi was appointed as the Chief Justice of Chhattisgarh High Court from July 7, 2018. On March 23, 2019, Justice Tripathi resigned as Chief Justice of Chhattisgarh High Court after being appointed as Judicial Member in the anti-corruption ombudsman, Lokpal of India.On March 27, 2019, he took oath as a Judicial Member of the Lokpal of India. He had served as the President of Patna Golf Club.

 

 

Voting for UP Bar Council elections postponed, Bihar State Bar Council election results sub judice before Election Tribunal No. III of Bar Council of India

Amidst bitter protest in Lucknow during the Uttar Pradesh Bar Council elections, the Bar Council elections have been postponed indefinitely. Returning Officer and former High Court Justice A.R. Mausmai decided to postpone the voting until orders. The protesting Advocates tore up pamphlets and threw them and also smashed chairs and tables. They claimed that there was already a tick next to a candidate's name on the ballot paper.  Voting for the much-awaited four-phase election of the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh had commenced on January 16. A total of 25 members will be elected from among 333 candidates who are in the fray.The first phase of the election was held in districts beginning with the letters A, B and C, where advocates cast their votes on January 16 and 17.  The second phase of voting took place on January 20 and 21 in districts starting with the letters D to J. The third phase was scheduled for January 27 and 28 in districts beginning with the letters K to M, while the final and fourth phase was  to be held on January 30 and 31 in districts starting with the letters P to V. After the completion of polling, all ballot boxes was planned to be sent to Prayagraj by February 3, 2026. The date for counting of votes has not been announced as yet. In Lucknow, polling was underway amidst uproar during the third phase on January 27 and 28 at the high court campus.

Each advocate is entitled to vote for 25 candidates. On a single ballot paper, voters can cast votes for up to 25 candidates of their choice. On earlier occasions, voting was conducted only at the district level within district court complexes. But the current elections are being held at three levels within each district. The main polling centre has been established at the district court complex, where most advocates from the city will vote. Besides this ocal booths have been set up at sub-divisional courts for the convenience of advocates. A total of 2,49,808 advocates holding Certificates of Practice (CoP) are authorised to vote in the election. 

Notably, the nomination fee for the Uttar Pradesh Bar Council elections is ₹1.50 lakh, along with an additional ₹25,000 for the voter list covering 80 districts, collected by the Bar Council. The fee is higher than that for parliamentary, legislative assembly, and presidential elections. Each candidate was required to pay the nomination fee.

The UP Bar elections are being monitored by a high-powered committee constituted by the Supreme Court. The committee is chaired by former chief justice of the Jharkhand high court, justice Ravi Ranjan. Its members include former Allahabad high court judge S.R. Masuri and former Delhi high court judge Rekha Palli. The state’s election officer is former Allahabad high court judge Arvind Kumar Tripathi, while former judge Surendra Singh has been appointed as the observer.

The districts which went for voting on January 16–17 2026 were: Agra, Aligarh, Allahabad, Ambedkarnagar, Amethi, Amroha, Auraiya, Azamgarh, Baghpat, Bahraich, Ballia, Balrampur, Banda, Barabanki, Bareilly, Basti, Bhadohi, Bijnor, Budaun, Bulandshahr, Chandauli, and Chitrakoot.

It is noteworthy that in M. Varadhan vs. Union of India & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Justices Surya Kant, Ujjal Bhuyan and N.K. Singh had passed a 50-page long order dated November 18, 2025. The 26 Respondents are: 1. Union of India, 2 Bar Council of India, 3. Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh, Through Chairman, 4. Bar Council of Assam, Through Chairman, 5. Bihar State Bar Council Through Chairman, 6. Bar Council of Chhattisgarh, Through Chairman, 7. Bar Council of Delhi, Through Chairman, 8. Bar Council of Gujarat, Through Chairman, 9. Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh, Through Chairman, 10. Bar Council of Jammu and Kashmir, Through Its Chairman, 11. Jharkhand State Bar Council, Through Chairman, 12. Bar Council of Karnataka, Through Chairman, 13. Bar Council of Kerala, Through Chairman, 14. Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh, Through Its Chairman, 15. Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa, Through Chairman, 16. Bar Council of Manipur, Through Chairman, 17. Bar Council of Meghalaya, Through Chairman, 18. Odisha State Bar Council, Through Chairman, 19. Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana, Through Chairman, 20. Bar Council of Rajasthan, Through Chairman, 21. Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry, Through Chairman, 22. Bar Council of Telangana, Through Chairman, 23. Bar Council of Tripura, Through Chairman, 24. Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh, Through Its Chairman, 25. Bar Council of Uttarakhand, Through Chairman and 26. Bar Council of West Bengal, Through Chairman. The case was filed on October 31, 2023, registered on November 23, 2023 and verified on December 1, 2023. It was listed for hearing on January 13, 2026. It is listed for hearing on February 24, 2026.

The order reads:"The controversy in this batch of cases, including various applications filed from time to time, revolves around fair, transparent, and timely conduction of elections for the State Bar Councils. 2. It is not necessary for us to go into the allegations or counter-allegations made by various stakeholders. All that we take notice of is that there are twenty-three State Bar Councils in India, out of which elections to the State Bar Councils of Bihar and Chhattisgarh have already been conducted. 3. In the case of Bihar, the results have been declared, and some aggrieved members have already approached the Election Tribunal No. III of the Bar Council of India. We do not wish to express any opinion in relation to the fairness of the aforesaid election since the matter is sub-judice before the Tribunal."

It added: "The entire election process, including counting of votes, shall be controlled and monitored through their direct supervision by the High-Powered Election Committees, constituted hereinafter. 12. With a view to facilitate the effective conduction of these elections, we deem it appropriate that elections to different State Bar Councils ought to take place in a phased manner. To that end, we issue the following directions: I. The State Bar Councils of Telangana and Uttar Pradesh, where the elections have already been notified, shall conclude their elections by 31.01.2026. The counting of votes and subsequent declaration of results shall, in any case, be concluded on or before 28.02.2026. The elections will be conducted under the direct supervision of the High-Powered Election Committee – Phase I, comprising the following three members: (i) Justice Ravi Ranjan, former Chief Justice, Jharkhand High Court (Chairperson); (ii) Justice A.R. Masoodi, former Judge, Allahabad High Court; and (iii) Justice Rekha Palli, former Judge, Delhi High Court.

The order also reads: "14. In addition to the High-Powered Election Committees constituted above, we also deem it appropriate to constitute a three-member High-Powered Election Supervisory Committee, on a pan- India basis, which shall be headed by a former Judge of this Court and shall also comprise one former Chief Justice of a High Court and one renowned Senior Advocate, who does not contest election(s) of the Bar Councils or the Bar Associations. For the same, in this regard, we appoint the following as members of such Supervisory Committee: (i) Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia, former Judge, Supreme Court of India (Chairperson); (ii) Justice Ravi Shankar Jha, former Chief Justice, Punjab & Haryana High Court; and (iii) Shri V. Giri, Senior Advocate." It observed: "19. During the course of hearing, it is seen that several lawyers have individual and varied grievances. We are afraid such individual grievances cannot be addressed in these proceedings. Liberty is, hence, granted to them to apply before the High-Powered Election Committee(s) for redressal of their individual issue(s). 20. Any person who is aggrieved by the decision of the High-Powered Election Committee shall be at liberty to approach the High-Powered Supervisory Committee. The decision taken by the Supervisory Committee shall be final. No civil court or High Court shall entertain any petition(s) against such decision. 21. To enable the Committees constituted herein to perform their functions, we direct the Bar Council of India to make available adequate secretarial assistance to the respective Committees, as required. 22. In addition, the respective Chairpersons and Members of the High-Powered Election Committees, as well as the Chairperson and Members of the High-Powered Election Supervisory Committee, shall be entitled to a reasonable honorarium along with other perks, the amount and modalities of which may be finally decided by the Chairperson of the High-Powered Election Supervisory Committee in consultation with the Bar Council of India."

Also read: Bihar Bar Council Journal removes names of members of Bihar State Bar Council due to pending dispute before Central Election Tribunal