Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra in a POCSO case

In Ravi Ranjan Choube @ Ravi Ranjan Choubey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and Prasanna B. Varale passed a 5-page long order dated May 11, 2026, wherein, it set aside the order by Patna High Court's Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra dated March 11, 2026. The order concluded:"6. It is pertinent to note at this juncture itself and for the limited purpose of considering the prayer for bail, that the statements of the recused girls which have been recorded under Section 183 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and particularly two victims associated with the orchestra group where petitioner was working would disclose that there were no recent evidence of sexual
assault and three co-accused Gena Sah, Rajat Sardar @Rajjat Kumar @ Rajat Kumar and Subhash Kumar have since then granted regular bail by the jurisdictional High Court. Hence, on the ground of parity, petitioner is also entitled for grant of bail. 7. The impugned order dated 11.03.2026 passed by the High Court is set aside and petitioner is ordered to be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the jurisdictional court deems fit to impose, including the condition of directing the petitioner to appear before the Trial Court on all dates of hearing."

The petitioner was arraigned as an accused No. 11 in the FIR No. 8 of 2025, registered at Police Station Women Police Station, District Betiah, for the offence punishable under Section 64, 65(1), 143(1), 145, 95, 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 6, 8 and 12 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 75 and 79 of Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, Section 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act,1956 and Section 16, 17, and 18 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, was seeking regular bail. The record disclosed that investigation had been concluded and charge-sheet was filed and two witnesses were already examined. It was the case of the prosecution that minor girls were found in various orchestra groups who had been trafficked and they were sexually exploitated. Even according to the FIR, the petitioner was neither the owner or Manager of the orchestra group and he was only a employee (Announcer) in Chhoti New Musical Orchestra Dhamaka Group.

Earlier, in Ravi Ranjan Choube @ Ravi Ranjan Choubey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra of Patna High Court had passed a 3-page long order dated March 11, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"...the prayer for bail of the petitioner is again rejected with a direction to the court below to expedite the trial and conclude the same expeditiously preferably within a period of six months from today. If the trial is not concluded within the period of six months, as stated above, the petitioner will be at liberty to renew his prayer before the court below." The name of respondent no. 2 has been kept anonymous. 

The petitioner sought bail in connection with Bettiah Mahila P.S. case of 2025 instituted for the offences under Sections 64, 65(1), 143(1), 145, 98 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Sections 6, 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act and Sections 75 and 79 of the J.J. Act and Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act and Sections 16, 17 and 18 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act. This was the second attempt of the petitioner for bail. The petitioner had renewed his prayer for grant of regular bail which was earlier rejected on merit by Justice Mishra of the High Court vide 3-page long order dated August 13, 2025 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 31511 of 2025, taking into account the nature of accusation and the gravity of the offence and involvement of the petitioner in the offence.  

The order dated August 13, 2025 recorded that the informant filed a complaint before the ADJ, Champaran, based on an tip-off from National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) constituted under Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015, which led to raids at seven locations by the police team. Sixteen girls were rescued. The victims gave statements under Section 180 BNSS alleging repeated sexual assaults, exploitation for dance, and being forced into sexual activities by various accused associated with different orchestra groups.

APP for the State and counsel for the informant had opposed the prayer for grant of bail to the petitioners. They submitted that on perusal of record it appeared that the several victims were minor girl. It was specifically submitted that petitioner, namely, Dhamu Sah used to inappropriately touch the body of victim, during dance on the stage, whereas petitioner, namely, Ravi Ranjan Choube @ Ravi Ranjan Choubey, had established illicit relation with one of the victims.

In compliance of the order dated January 17, 2026, a report dated February 12, 2026 with regard to the present stage of trial has been received. From perusal of the report, it appeared that two (2) out of nineteen (19) charge sheet witnesses had been examined in the case. It was also reported that trial was likely to be concluded within a period of nine months. The petitioner's counsel had submitted that the petitioner was languishing in judicial custody since February 23, 2025 without any rhymes or reason, having no criminal antecedent. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that there was no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future, hence, petitioner may be enlarged on bail. The APP for the State had opposed the prayer for grant of bail. The APP had further relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3539 (X. vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.), wherein, in paragraph No.14, Supreme Court had observed as under: “14. Ordinarily inserious offences like rape, murder, dacoity, etc., once the trial commences and the prosecution starts examining its witnesses, the Court be it the Trial Court or the High Court should be loath in entertaining the bail application of the accused.”  

Justice Mishra observed: "7. There is no new ground to consider the bail petition of the petitioner. From the aforesaid report, it appears that the trial is going on." Supreme Court has reversed the order by the High Court. 

Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo, Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad set aside conviction of 5 in Ara Civil Court bomb blast case, upholds escape charges for two convicts

In The State of Bihar vs. Lamboo Sharma (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad delivered a-176 page long judgement dated March 26, 2026, wherein, in the penultimate paragraph, it concluded: "....we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to establish any of the charges against the appellants Shyam Vinay Sharma, Rinku Yadav, Md. Naim Miya @ Naim Miya, Md. Chand Miya @ Chand Miyan and Anshu Kumar. The impugned judgment and order of conviction of these appellants is hereby set aside and they are acquitted of all the charges. They shall be set at liberty forthwith if their detention is not required in any other cases. The conviction of the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay of all the charges except under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code, are hereby set aside. The sentence imposed by the learned trial Court on these two appellants for the offence under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code is upheld. Since both the appellants are in jail, they are to be set at liberty if they have already undergone the sentence imposed for the offence under section 224 of I.P.C. and their detention is not required in any other cases."

Chief Justice Sahoo authored a 162-page long leading judgment and Justice Prasad authored a 14-page long concurring judgement. 

The High Court concluded: "In the result, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1150 of 2019 filed by appellant Shyam Vinay Sharma, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1162 of 2019 filed by appellant Rinku Yadav, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1185 of 2019 filed by appellant Md. Naim Miya @ Naim Miya, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1246 of 2019 filed by appellant Md. Chand Miya @ Chand Miyan and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1271 of 2019 filed by appellant Anshu Kumar are allowed. Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1210 of 2019 filed by appellant Lamboo Sharma @ Munna Sharma @ Sachidanand Sharma and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1290 of 2019 filed by appellant Akhilesh Upadhyay are allowed in part.  The death sentence reference is answered in negative." 

Ravindra Kumar was the Advocate for the appellant and Shashi Bala Verma and Ajay Mishra were was the Additional Public Prosecutors for State of Bihar. Pratik Mishra was the Amicus Curiae. Ravindra Kumar, was also the Amicus Curiae to represent the case of Rinku Yadav.

The judgement was delivered upon hearing the Death Reference No.01 of 2024, the reference under section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which corresponds to section 407 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 submitted to the High Court by the Additional Sessions Judge-VIII, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial Case No.35 of 2016 for confirmation of death sentence imposed on Lamboo Sharma @ Munna Sharma @ Sachidanand Sharma vide judgment and order dated April 5, 2023 so also the judgment and order dated August 17, 2019 passed by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial No.35 of 2016. 

As per the first information report lodged by Sub-Inspector Gauri Shankar Pathak before the Inspector Satyendra Kumar Shahi, S.H.O., Ara Town Police Station at Civil Court premises, Ara on January 23, 2025 at 1:35 p.m., approximately at about 11:25 a.m., a prisoner van carrying prisoners from the District Jail, Ara, arrived near the Court hazat (lock-up) for their appearance in the Court. After the van stopped, a female prisoner was first disembarked, followed by the other prisoners. A total number of 37 prisoners, including one female prisoner, were in the van. After the female prisoner was taken to the hazat, when three male prisoners were being escorted towards the Court hazat, Nagina Devi, a woman standing on the road, south to the prison van, detonated a bomb. The bomb blast caused severe injuries to Constable Amit Kumar (the deceased) of the armed forces, who was on duty to bring the prisoners from the jail to the Court so also to Havildar Shivji Prasad Singh and Constable Dwarika Prasad Pathak, both posted at Sadar Court, Ara and fifteen to sixteen persons present in Court also suffered severe injuries. The woman who detonated the bomb and was approximately 30 years old also suffered severe injuries on her face and the other parts of her body got mutilated. Smoke from the bomb spread everywhere, causing stampede and people started running hither and thither and taking advantage of such chaos, two prisoners i.e. appellant Lamboo Sharma and appellant Akhilesh Upadhyay, who were the two male prisoners amongst the three male prisoners disembarked from the prisoner van, escaped. The unknown woman who detonated the bomb died at the spot and the injured constable Amit Kumar (the deceased) who was sent to Sadar Hospital, Ara for treatment, was also declared dead by the doctor. All the other injured persons were immediately shifted to Sadar Hospital, Ara for treatment. It is further stated in the F.I.R that the name of the woman, who died in the bomb blast, was not known to the informant. The woman used to come to the Court previously when appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay were coming to the Court for their Court appearances and she used to meet those two appellants. The informant believed that the woman carried out the bomb blast to help the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay in escaping from the judicial custody, in which she herself was also killed. The bomb blast occurrence was the result of criminal conspiracy carried out by the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhya and the deceased unknown woman and other unknown accused persons helped the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay in escaping from judicial custody. Prior to this bomb blast incident, in the year 2009, appellant Lamboo Sharma with the help of other accused persons, had also detonated a bomb in the Ara Court premises in which one Advocate was killed and many others got injured. In the 2009 bomb blast occurrence committed in the Ara Court premises, appellant Lamboo Sharma was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Court and some other cases were also pending against him for trial before the Court. 

Notably, as per prosecution case, the appellant Lamboo Sharma was inside the jail and on the date of occurrence, he was produced along with others in a prisoner van from jail in the campus of Civil Court, Ara and after bomb blast, he escaped from judicial custody. 

Chief Justice Sahoo observed that the F.I.R. story that the deceased unknown woman was previously coming to the Court and meeting the two appellants cannot be accepted. in the case of Utpal Das and others vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2010) 6 Supreme Court Cases 493 that the first information report does not constitute substantive evidence. It can, however, only be used as a previous statement for the purpose of either corroborating its maker or for contradicting him and in such a case, the previous statement cannot be used unless the attention of the witness has first been drawn to those parts by which it is proposed to contradict the witness. 

In his judgement, Chief Justice Sahoo pointed out that the prosecution did not succeed by adducing cogent evidence in establishing any previous meeting between the deceased woman and appellants either in jail or in Court complex. 

He noted that vital incriminating circumstance was not put in accused statement. The circumstance as deposed to by P.W.10, P.W.15 and P.W.26 that the deceased woman was trying to handover the bag to the appellants Lamboo Sharma or Akhilesh Upadhyay was not put to any of them in their accused statements recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C.

In Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam reported in (2013) 12 SCC 406, it has been held that in a criminal trial, the purpose of examining the accused under section 313 of Cr.P.C., is to meet the requirement of principles of natural justice. The accused may be asked to furnish some explanation as regards the incriminating circumstances associated with him and the Court must take note of such explanation. It is further held that the circumstances which were not put to the accused in his examination under section 313 of Cr.P.C., cannot be used against him and it must be excluded from consideration.

In Indrakunwar vs. The State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1364, it has been held that the object of section 313 of Cr.P.C. is to enable the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. The intent is to establish a dialogue between the Court and the accused and this process benefits the accused and aids the Court in arriving at the final verdict, which is not a matter of procedural formality but based on cardinal principle of natural justice. It is also held that the circumstances that are not put to the accused while recording the statement under the section 313 of Cr.P.C. are to be excluded from consideration and the Court is obligated to put, in the form the questions, all incriminating circumstances to the accused so as to give him an opportunity to articulate his defence. Non-compliance with the section may cause prejudice to the accused and may impede the process of arriving at a fair decision.

In Ganesh Gogoi vs. State of Assam reported in (2009) 7 SCC 404, relying upon the earlier decision in Basavaraj R. Patil & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2000) 8 SCC 740, it was held that the provisions of section 313 of Cr.P.C. are not meant to nail the accused to his disadvantage but are meant for his benefit. The provisions are based on the salutary principles of natural justice and the maxim audi alteram partem’ has been enshrined in them. Therefore, an examination under section 313 of Cr.P.C. has to be of utmost fairness.

In Shaikh Maqsood Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2009) 6 SCC 583 and Ranvir Yadav vs. State of Bihar reported in (2009) 6 SCC 595, theSupreme Court has held that it is the duty of the trial court to indicate incriminating material to the accused. Section 313 of Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality. An improper examination/inadequate questioning under section 313 of Cr.P.C. amounts to a serious lapse on the part of the trial Court and is a ground for interference with the conviction. 

Justice Sahoo observed: "We are of the humble view that since the prosecution is utilizing the evidence of these three witnesses i.e. P.W.10, P.W.15 and P.W.26 regarding the attempt made by the unknown woman to hand over a bag to the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay against these two appellants, which is a vital circumstance, the learned trial Court was required to put this circumstance, in the form of questions to these two appellants seeking for their explanation. Since the same has not been done, we are of the view that it has actually and materially prejudiced them and has resulted in the failure of justice as it has deprived them in giving their explanation. Thus, in view of the settled law, we are not able to use such particular circumstance against any of them and it must be excluded from consideration."

The judgement of the High Court took note of the withholding of statement of the daughter of the deceased namely Soni Devi, whose statement was recorded both under sections 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C., who could have thrown light on the use of mobile no.8083172236 by her mother by the prosecution and non-examination in the trial court. It reads: "Law is well settled that the statement of a witness recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. is not substantive evidence. Substantive evidence is one which is given by witness in Court on oath in presence of the accused. Statement of a witness under section 164 of the Code is recorded in absence of accused and as such it is not substantive evidence. The statement of a witness under section 164 Cr.P.C. is recorded being sponsored by the investigating agency. During course of trial, if the witness does not support the prosecution case and declared hostile by the prosecution then the prosecution with the permission of the Court can confront his previous statement made before the Magistrate to him. A statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. can be used either for corroboration of the testimony of a witness under section 157 of the Evidence Act or for contradiction thereof under section 145 of the Evidence Act." 

In State of Delhi vs. Shri Ram reported in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 490, it is held that the statements recorded under section 164 of the Code are not substantive evidence in a case and cannot be made use of except to corroborate or contradict the witness. An admission by a witness that a statement of his was recorded under section 164 of the Code and that what he had stated there was true would not make the entire statement admissible, much less could any part of it be used as substantive evidence.

In Baij Nath Sah vs. State of Bihar reported in (2010) 6 SCC 736, the Supreme Court held that a statement under section 164 can be only utilized as a previous statement and nothing more.

Chief Justice Sahoo recorded that the evidence on record clearly indicated that when the bomb blast took place, there was darkness and nothing was visible in the darkness for about ten to fifteen minutes and the people were running hither and thither to save their lives. In such a scenario, merely because the Micromax mobile phone set was lying nearer to the body of the deceased intact, it is very difficult to accept that the deceased woman was the user of such mobile phone. When material witnesses who could have thrown light that the deceased had got any link with such Micromax mobile have been withheld, adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution. 

In Takhaji Hiraji vs. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing & Ors. reported in (2001) 6 SCC 145,  it has been held that it is true that if a material witness, who would unfold the genesis of the incident or an essential part of the prosecution case, not convincingly brought to fore otherwise, or where there is a gap or infirmity in the prosecution case which could have been supplied or made good by examining a witness who though available is not examined, the prosecution case can be termed as suffering from a deficiency and withholding of such a material witness would oblige the Court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution by holding that if the witness would have been examined, it would not have supported the prosecution case. The Court of facts must ask itself as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was necessary to examine such other witness, and examined and yet was being withheld from the Court. If the answer be positive, then only a question of drawing an adverse inference may arise. 

There is no evidence on record that Savitri Devi in whose name the mobile number was registered which was lying near the deceased woman or the three mobile subscribers namely Sanjay Kumar, Musa Nut and Vijay Prasad were not available to be examined. Had they been examined, Savitri Devi could have thrown light as to how her mobile phone set was lying nearer to the deceased woman at the spot and whether she had handed over the same for the use of the deceased. Similarly, the three mobile subscribers would have thrown light as to in whose possession mobile SIM cards were there for its use. 

Chief Justice Sahoo observed: "We are of the view that an essential part of the prosecution case, which could have been proved by adducing the evidence of the aforesaid four witnesses has not been done. The examination of such witnesses was very crucial to establish the link between the deceased woman and the appellants in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, we are constrained to draw adverse inference against the prosecution for withholding such important witnesses."

With regard to the electronic evidence in the form of call detail records (CDR) and tower location data of the mobile numbers which were produced by the prosecution, Amicus Curiae submitted these were not admissible in evidence in absence of requisite certificate under section 65(4) of Evidence Act. The certificate under section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act which is a pre-requisite for admissibility of electronic evidence has not been brought on record and therefore, the electronic documents brought on record by the prosecution by way of exhibits are completely inadmissible.

The  judgement noted that the I.O. has stated in the cross-examination that the CDR does not bear the signature of any official and that no statement was recorded from the person from whom the CDR was obtained. Neither any Nodal Officer of the telecom (service provider) nor any person occupying responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device has been examined in this case. 

Notably, Section 59 of the Evidence Act states that all facts, except the contents of documents or electronic records, may be proved by oral evidence. As per section 3 of the Evidence Act, the expression ‘electronic records’ shall have the meaning as assigned in the Information Technology Act, 2000. Section 2(ta) of 2000 Act defines ‘electronic record’ which means data, record or data generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form or micro form or computer generated micro fiche. Section 61
of the Evidence Act states that the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. Section 62 of the Evidence Act defines ‘primary evidence’ as meaning the documents itself produced for the inspection of the Court. Section 63 of the Evidence Act speaks of the kind or types of ‘secondary evidence’ by which documents may be proved. Section 65 of the important and it states that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in certain cases which have been enumerated under clauses (a) to (g) of such section. Whereas ‘existence’ goes to ‘admissibility’ of a document, ‘contents’ of a document are to be proved after a document becomes admissible in evidence. 

Section 65A of the Evidence Act speaks of ‘contents’ of electronic records being proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. Section 65B of the Evidence Act speaks of ‘admissibility’ of electronic records which deals with ‘existence’ and ‘contents’ of electronic records being proved once admissible into evidence. Section 65B(1) opens with a non-obstante clause, and makes it clear that any information that is contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document, if the conditions mentioned in the section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof of production of the original as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible. The deeming fiction is for the reason that ‘document’ as defined by section 3 of the Evidence Act does not include ‘electronic records’. 

Section 65B(2) of the Evidence Act refers must be satisfied in respect of a computer output, and states that the test for being included in conditions 65B(2) (a) to 65(2)(d) is that the computer be regularly used to store or process information for purposes of activities regularly carried on in the period in question. The conditions mentioned in sub-sections 2(a) to 2(d) must be satisfied cumulatively.

The judgement reads:"....we are of the view that mere absconding of the two appellants from judicial custody may not be alone sufficient to hold that they in connivance with others caused the bomb blast in the Ara Civil Court complex on the date of occurrence...." 

Notably, Lamboo Sharma, the appellant was lawfully detained for commission of various offences and he escaped from judicial custody and section 224 of I.P.C, inter alia, provides for punishment if a person escapes or attempts to escape from any custody in which he is lawfully detained, therefore, Chief Justice Sahoo observed: "we are of the humble view that the learned trial Court has rightly found him guilty under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code." 

In his concurring judgement, Justice Prasad made observations with regard to appointment of Amicus Curiae wherein he drew on Supreme Court's judgement in Bhola Mahto vs. The State of Jharkhand reported in 2026 INSC 257 which had referred to the decision of the Court in Anokhi Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2019) 20 SCC 196. He concluded:"11. I believe that the procedure followed in the present case in the matter of appointment of Amicus Curiae and securing the presence of the convicts particularly condemned prisoner and giving them an opportunity to interact will set a precedent."

Supreme Court takes note of allegations "against some of the police officers of trying to coerce the petitioner" in a matrimonial case from Naugachhiya, Bhagalpur

In Amit Kumar Hari @ Amit Kumar Abhimanyu vs. The State of Bihar Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan passed a 3-page long order dated February 26, 2026, wherein, it observed:".....we notice that certain allegations have been made against some of the police officers of trying to coerce the petitioner even after the order dated 25.11.2025 passed by this Court extending the interim protection granted by the High Court to the petitioner, due to which, the petitioner has filed a complaint bearing M.P. No.264 of 2026 against those police officers before the learned CJM, Purnia. We further note that the said Court has also issued notice in the said petition. The said Court has also asked for a report from the concerned police, which is awaited. 4. Be that as it may, let the concerned Superintendent of Police applied with the aforesaid order of the learned CJM, Purnia without any delay. Thereafter, the learned CJM, Purnia shall take a call in accordance with law. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1-State of Bihar shall communicate the present order to the Trial Court. 6. A copy of this order be also sent to the learned CJM, Purnia." The Respondent no. 2 is Palak Kumari @ Pallawi Kumari. 

Prior to this order, the Supreme Court had passed an order dated November 25, 2025, when the parties were sent to mediation initially, there was lack of cooperation on the side of the petitioner. However, later on, he did participate, but the mediation ultimately failed. The Court went into the merits of the matter. The Court found that no case for anticipatory bail was made out. Accordingly, the Special Leave Petition stands dismissed. The order of the Court dated November 25, 2025 for continuation of the interim protection granted to the petitioner by the High Court vide the impugned order dated September 24, 2025 stands vacated. 

The case arose out of impugned final 4-page long order dated September 24, 2025 passed by Justice Purnendu Singh of the Patna High Court. The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in connection with Naugachhiya P.S. Case No. 33 of 2025 registered under Sections 85,115(2),126(2),352,3(5) of the BNS and Sections 3,4 of the DP Act. As per the allegation made in the FIR, the petitioner along with other family members had assaulted the informant due to non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. 

Justice Singh had recorded and observed that "the parties have failed to settle the matrimonial dispute, the Court till last minute must strive to give opportunity to the parties to settle the dispute between the husband and wife amicably. The matrimonial dispute is not an offense against the society rather a matrimonial dispute is a private conflict between spouses and does not inherently constitute an offence against society. However, a false case can have a disastrous consequence in absence of any criminal content. The personal dispute cannot call for a criminal offence. Continuation of the proceeding would amount to abuse of process of law leading to vexatious proceeding against the petitioner."

Justice Singh drew on Supreme Court's decision in B.S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana, reported in, (2003) 4 SCC 675, in paragraph nos. 12 and 13 wherein it held as under:-
“ 12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes. 13. The observations made by this Court, though in a slightly different context, in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [(2000) 3 SCC 693 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 733] are very apt for determining the approach required to be kept in view in a matrimonial dispute by the courts. It was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts.

Patna High Court delivered two judgements on November 11, Justice Jha remands sets aside order by Special Judge, PMLA, Patna, remands for fresh hearing

Patna High Court delivered two judgements on November 11, 2025 in Ajay Kumar Rai vs. The State of Bihar by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma (as part of Division Bench led by Acting Chief Justice) and Pushpraj Bajaj vs. The Union of India through the Assistant Director, ED, Patna Zonal Office, Patna by Justice Arun Kumar Jha. 

In his 33-page long judgement in the case of Pushpraj Bajaj, a Kolkata based resident, Justice Jha relied on Supreme Court's decision in Kushal Kumar Agrawal vs. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221, wherein the Court observed that the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 223 of BNSS puts an embargo on the power of the Court to take cognizance in the absence of opportunity of hearing being afforded to the accused and, thus, set aside the order taking cognizance by the learned Special Court on a complaint filed under Section 44 (1) (b) of PMLA. 

Justice Jha observed: "52. Now, having regard to the position of law as discussed herein above and specifically taking note of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kushal Kumar Agrawal (supra), I have no hesitation in holding that as the complaint has been filed after 01.07.2024 and cognizance has been taken on 08.01.2025, Section 223 of BNSS will apply to the present complaint. Thereafter, proviso to Section 223 of BNSS mandatorily provides for an opportunity of hearing to an accused before cognizance could be taken against him, which means no cognizance of an offence shall be taken by the Magistrate without giving the accused of an opportunity of being heard and admittedly, no opportunity has been given by the learned Special Court to the petitioner before taking cognizance of an offence."

He concluded:"....I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 08.01.2025 passed by the learned Special Court in Special Trial No. (PMLA) 10/2024 suffers from infirmity and, hence, the same is set aside. The matter is remanded to the learned Special Judge, PMLA, Patna for taking decision afresh in accordance with law after hearing the petitioner in terms of Section 223(1) of BNSS within a reasonable time. 54. Accordingly, the present revision petition stands allowed. 55. However, it is made clear that this Court has interfered with the impugned order merely on infirmity and illegality committed by the learned Special Court. This order shall not be treated to be an order expressing any opinion on the merits of the case."

The criminal revision was filed under Sections 438 read with Section 442 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 seeking setting aside of the order dated January 8, 2025 passed by the Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (PMLA), Patna in Special Trial No. (PMLA) 10/2024 along with proceedings emanating therefrom, whereby and whereunder the Special Court took cognizance for the offence punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 against the petitioner and others. 

Justice Arun Kumar Jha sets aside Appellate Court's order in a juvenile's case

In XXX S/o Jeebachh Yadav @ Jivach Yadav Being Minor represented through under guardian ship of her mother namely Ramkumari Devi vs, The State of Bihar (2925),  Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 8-pagr long judgement dated November 4, 2025, wherein he concluded:''12. Therefore, having regard to all the facts and circumstances and considering the provisions of law applicable to grant of bail to a child in conflict with law, I am unable to agree with the finding recorded by the learned Appellate Court and therefore, the order of the learned Appellate Court dated 07.05.2025 is set aside and the present revision petitioner is allowed. Hence, the petitioner/juvenile in conflict with law is directed to be released on bail, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) each with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Additional Sessions Judge-I-cum- Special Judge, Children Court, Madhubani/concerned court, in connection with Juvenile Appeal No. 07 of 2025 arising out of Khutauna P.S. Case No. 19 of 2024, subject to the following conditions: (i) One of the bailors will be the mother of the petitioner and other bailor will also be relative of the petitioner having no criminal antecedent. (ii) The petitioner shall remain present before the Board on each and every date of trial of the case fixed by the Board.'' The judgement was upon hearing the criminal revision petition.  

The petitioner was a juvenile in conflict with law and the revision petition has been filed for setting aside the order dated 07.05.2025 passed in Juvenile Appeal No. 07 of 2025 arising out of Khutauna P.S. Case No. 19 of 2024 registered under Section 399, 402, 120B of the Indian Penal Code and 25(1-b)a, 26, 35 of the Arms Act by the Additional Sessions Judge-I-cum-Special Judge, Children Court, Madhubani whereby and whereunder the Appellate Court rejected the appeal of the petitioner and the prayer of the petitioner for grant of bail.

According to the prosecution case, police apprehended the petitioner and three other co-accused persons while they assembled for making preparation to commit crime and 2-3 persons managed to escape from the spot taking advantage of darkness. Recovery of arms, ammunition and mobile phones were made from other co-accused persons. From the possession of the petitioner a mobile phone was recovered.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order is not sustainable and the Appellate Court has passed the order without considering the facts and law. The Appellate Court rejected the prayer for bail on the ground of the Social Investigation Report of the petitioner but the said report has been prepared with false averments by submitting that petitioner was not in control of his mother and there was absence of moral and ethical values in the house and for this reason, there was possibility of involvement of the petitioner in anti-social activities after his release. But the petitioner never indulged in any illegal activities and his mother undertakes to take control of her son in future and not to allow him to indulge in any criminal activities. The counsel also submitted that petitioner was a minor and seriousness and gravity of offence could not be considered while granting bail to the petitioner who is a child in conflict with law. The Social Background Report and the Social Investigation Report have been prepared on the basis of wrong facts. It is the requirement of law that unless reasonable grounds are available to believe that in the event of grant of bail, the petitioner would go into association of any known criminals and he would be exposed to moral, physical and psychological danger or that the release of the petitioner would defeat the ends of justice, the prayer for bail ought not to be rejected. But the Appellate Court in general and vague terms and without considering the express provisions of law went on to reject the prayer for bail of the petitioner and at the same time also mentioned that the allegation against the petitioner was serious in nature. The same could not be a consideration for rejection of bail of the petitioner. The counsel for the petitioner further submitted  that the petitioner and other co-accused persons were apprehended by the police party with allegation that they had been making plan for committing dacoity and some of the co-accused persons were apprehended with firearms and ammunition but from the possession of the petitioner recovery of only a mobile phone was made and no firearm or ammunition were recovered from his possession. The petitioner had been made accused in two more cases on the basis of confessional statement of co-accused Pankaj Kumar and prior to that there was no criminal antecedent of the petitioner. Both the cases were lodged on 19.01.2024 and subsequently the petitioner was apprehended in this case on 23.01.2024 showing as one of the accused persons and since then the petitioner is in custody. Other co-accused persons were n granted bail by Co-ordinate Bench of the High  Court vide order dated 30.07.2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 47886 of 2024, order dated 05.09.2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 60492 of 2024 and order dated 04.12.2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 82496 of 2024. The counsel submitted that since no grounds are forthcoming for believing that release of petitioner was likely to bring him into association of any known criminal or expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger or that his release would defeat the ends of justice, the order of the learned Appellate Court is not sustainable. 08. Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 reads: “Section 12 Bail to a person who is apparently a child alleged to be in conflict with law.

1) When any person, who is apparently a child and is alleged to have committed a a bailable or non-bailable offence, is apprehended or detained by the police or appears or brought before a Board, such person shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in any other law for the time being in force, be released on bail with or without surety or placed under the supervision of a probation officer or under the care of any fit person: Provided that such person shall not be so released if there appears reasonable grounds for believing that the release is likely to bring that person into association with any known criminal or expose the said person to moral, physical or psychological danger or the persons release would defeat the ends of justice, and the Board shall record the reasons for denying the bail and circumstances that led to such a decision. 
(2) When such person having been apprehended is not released on bail under sub-section (1) by the officer-in-charge of the police station, such officer shall cause the person to be kept only in an observation
home 1[or a place of safety, as the case may be] in such manner as may be prescribed until the person can be brought before a Board. (3) When such person is not released on bail under sub-section (1) by the Board, it shall make an order sending him to an observation home or a place of safety, as the case may be, for such period during the pendency of the inquiry regarding the person, as may be specified in the order.(4) When a child in conflict with law is unable to fulfil the conditions of bail order within seven days of the bail order, such child shall be produced before the Board for modification of the conditions of bail.” Therefore, there exists a non-obstante clause that child in conflict with law shall be released on bail notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 

The relevant portion of Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 provides for the general principles of care and protection of children and are extracted herein below:- 
“Section 3 : General principles to be followed in administration of Act. (i) Principle of presumption of innocence: Any child shall be presumed to be an innocent of any mala fide or criminal intent up to the age of eighteen years.  (iv) Principle of best interest: All decisions regarding the child shall be based on the primary consideration that they are in the best interest of the child and to help the child to develop full potential. (v) Principle of family responsibility: The primary responsibility of care, nurture and protection of the child shall be that of the biological family or adoptive or foster parents, as the case may be. (xiv) Principle of fresh start: All past records of any child under the Juvenile Justice system should be erased except in special circumstances.” 

The judgement reads: ''Underlying principle is the best interest of the child and gravity and nature of offences are immaterial for consideration of grant of bail to a child/juvenile in conflict with law. It is the duty of the Court to ensure that any decision taken in respect of the child must be based on the primary consideration of the best interest of the child. Proviso to Section 12 makes certain exceptions for refusal of bail to a child in conflict with law. Apparently, bail to a child in conflict of law could be denied only on certain conditions specially on the ground that the child in conflict with law would come into association of any known criminal or there would be moral, physical or psychological danger if the child is released on bail or that the ends of justice would be defeated by such release.''

Justice Jha observed: ''The Appellate Court has not discussed the issues except making bland assertion that the petitioner was an active member of a gang of robbers and was a criminal minded and was not under control of his parents. Though the petitioner is having antecedent of two cases, the circumstances around lodging of these two cases does not rule out the possibility of false implication. It has not been mentioned how the learned Appellate Court arrived at the finding that the child was not in control of his mother and there is absence of moral and ethical values in the house or that there was possibility of involvement of petitioner in anti-social activities after his release. Further, considering the serious nature of allegation against the petitioner for denying the bail was simply uncalled for and unwarranted.

Supreme Court refuses to interfere with Justice Bibek Chaudhuri's order

In Devendra Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajesh Bindal ad Manmohan passed a q-page long order dated August 14, 2025, wherein it observed:'we do not find any case is made out for interference with the impugned order. The Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed.' In Sadhana Bharti vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Justice Bibek Chaudhuri pf Patna High Court had passed a 4-page long order dated June 26, 2025. The petitioner was the wife of Tushar Bharti, the Opposite Party. No. 2. 3. Devendra Prasad Singh, Chandana Devi, Kumari Shruti Bharti and Rinki Devi the O.P. Nos. 3 to 6 were matrimonial relations of the petitioner and closely associated and connected with O.P. No. 2. The marriage of the petitioner was solemnized with the O.P. No. 2 on May 1,  2023. At the time of her marriage, her father spent a huge amount of money towards the dowry of  the opposite parties. However, the opposite parties were not satisfied, and the petitioner was treated with cruelty by the opposite parties. This prompted the petitioner to file a complaint at Purnea Mahila P.S., on the basis of which FIR Case No. 40 of 2023 under Section 341/323/342/498A/504/506/34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act were instituted. 

The case is pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate at Purnea. The case of the petitioner was that the petitioner got employment at the National Inland Navigation Institute as an assistant librarian and was posted at Patna. Since, the petitioner was residing in Patna for her job. It was difficult for her to attend Purnea court on each and every date when the case is fixed for hearing. It was also contended by the petitioner that the sister-in-law of the petitioner was a practicing advocate at Purnea court; therefore, she was not getting proper help and advice from any advocate at Purnea. Further, the case of the petitioner was that when she was staying at Patna, her husband came to her house and abused and molested her and snatched away her mangalsutra and earrings. Over the said incident, she lodged a complaint at Alamganj P.S., which gave rise to a FIR case of 2023. In the said case, a charge sheet was filed, and the case is pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate at Patna. She had filed an application under Section 125 of the CrPC before the Principal Judge, Family Court at Patna. The said proceeding is also pending against her husband. The petitioner contended that one case is pending at Purnea and the other two cases are pending at Patna. Under such circumstances, the case pending at Purnea may be transferred to the court of competent jurisdiction at Patna under the provision of Section 407 of the CrPC.

Justice Chaudhuri observed: "It is needless to say that while deciding a transfer petition, the convenience of the woman litigant is given preference. The petitioner has been working in Patna; the said job is her only source of sustenance. If, at this stage, when two other cases are pending at Patna, the petitioner is directed to go to Purnea to represent another case, she will suffer financially and materially. Therefore, I am inclined to allow the instant petition under Section 407 of the CrPC. The Purnea P.S. Case No. 10/2023, therefore, the G.R. Case No. 2540 of 2024 arising out of Punrea Mahila P.S. Case No. 40 of 2023 pending before the Court of learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Purnea, Bihar, is transferred to the
Court of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Patna City. 8. Let a copy of this order be sent to the courts of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Purnea, as well as the court of the learned ACJM, Patna City, for information and compliance. 9. The instant criminal miscellaneous case is thus disposed of." The order recorded that the O.P.s entered appearance in the instant proceeding by filing vakalatnama on May 29, 2025, but on the date if hearing the opposite parties were not represented by their advocate. 

 

Supreme Court dismisses appeal of ED, sets aside orders of Special Court taking cognizance against accused

In Directorate of Enforcement vs. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, ED had filed complaints against the respondents and others under Section 44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). The complaint is for an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA, which is punishable under Section 4 of the Act. Both private respondents, namely, Bibhu Prasad Acharya and Adityanath Das. The Special Court took cognizance of the complaints and issued summons to the respondents and other accused persons. Both of them had filed writ petitions before the High Court challenging the cognizance taken by the Trial Court and prayed for quashing the complaints on the ground that both of them were public servants and, therefore, it was necessary to obtain prior sanction under sub-section (1) of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). By the impugned judgment, the High Court upheld the respondents' contentions and quashed the orders of taking cognizance passed by the Special Court on the complaints only as against the said respondents. The ED approached the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court's bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Augustine George Masih observed: "17. Section 65 makes the provisions of the CrPC applicable to all proceedings under the PMLA, provided the same are not inconsistent with the provisions contained in the PMLA. The words ‘All other proceedings’ include a complaint under Section 44 (1)(b) of the PMLA. We have carefully perused the provisions of the PMLA. We do not find that there is any provision therein which is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 197(1) of CrPC. Considering the object of Section 197(1) of the CrPC, its applicability cannot be excluded unless there is any provision in the PMLA which is inconsistent with Section 197(1). No such provision has been pointed out to us. Therefore, we hold that the provisions of Section 197(1) of CrPC are applicable to a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA."

The judgement was authored by Justice Oka. It reads: "18. Section 71 gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the PMLA notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. Section 65 is a prior section which specifically makes the provisions of the CrPC applicable to PMLA, subject to the condition that only those provisions of the CrPC will apply which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the PMLA. Therefore, when a particular provision of CrPC applies to proceedings under the PMLA by virtue of Section 65 of the PMLA, Section 71 (1) cannot override the provision of CrPC which applies to the PMLA. Once we hold that in view of Section 65 of the PMLA, Section 197(1) will apply to the provisions of the PMLA, Section 71 cannot be invoked to say that the provision of Section 197(1) of CrPC will not apply to the PMLA."

It also notes "A provision of Cr. P.C made applicable to the PMLA by Section 65, will not be overridden by Section 71. Those provisions of CrPC which apply to the PMLA by virtue of Section 65 will continue to apply to the PMLA, notwithstanding Section 71. If Section 71 is held applicable to such provisions of the CrPC, which apply to the PMLA by virtue of Section 65, such interpretation will render Section 65 otiose. No law can been interpreted in a manner which will render any of its provisions redundant."

It concluded: "In this case, the cognizance of the offence under Section 3, punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA, has been taken against the respondents accused without obtaining previous sanction under Section 197(1) of CrPC.Therefore, the view taken by the High Court is correct. We must clarify that the effect of the impugned judgment is that the orders of the Special Court taking cognizance only as against the accused B.P.Acharya and Adityanath Das stand set aside. The order of cognizance against the other accused will remain unaffected." The Court endorsed the verdict of Justice B. Siva Sankara Rao of Telangana High Court. 

It is not clear from the judgement as to why the order of cognizance against the other accused will remain unaffected. The judgement was delivered on November 6, 2024.

Supreme Court sets aside judgment of Jharkhand High Court that denied regular bail

In Prem Prakash vs. Union of India through Enforcement Directorate (2024), the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and K.V. Viswanathan set aside judgment of Jharkhand High Court which had dismissed the regular bail application of the appellant. The regular bail was sought in connection with a case registered for the offence under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 pending before the Court of Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi.  The bail application was under Section 45 of PMLA. 

The Court relied on  the decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs. Union of India (2022) wherein the Court categorically held that while Section 45 of PMLA restricts the right of the accused to grant of bail, it could not be said that the conditions provided under Section 45 impose absolute restraint on the grant of bail. It also relied on Court's decision in Manish Sisodia (II) vs. Directorate of Enforcement, wherein it was made amply clear that even under PMLA the governing principle is that “Bail is the Rule and Jail is the Exception”. 

The Court observed: "All that Section 45 of PMLA mentions is that certain conditions are to be satisfied. The principle that, “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” is only a paraphrasing of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Liberty of the individual is always a Rule and deprivation is the exception. Deprivation can only be by the procedure established by law, which has to be a valid and reasonable procedure. Section 45 of PMLA by imposing twin conditions does not re-write this principle to mean that deprivation is the norm and liberty is the exception. As set out earlier, all that is required is that in cases where bail is subject to the satisfaction of twin conditions, those conditions must be satisfied."

The judgement reads: we hold that the appellant has satisfied the twin conditions under Section 45. Inasmuch as from the material on record, this Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the appellant is not guilty of the offence of Money Laundering as alleged under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA and the Court is further satisfied that the appellant is not likely to commit any offence, if enlarged on bail.

It has recorded that the Court does not think that "the appellant can be denied bail based on the pendency of the other matter. We say so in the facts and circumstances of the present case as we do not find any justification for his continued detention. The appellant has already been in custody for over one year. The Trial is yet to commence."