5 year old mental health act case tagged with "In Court on its own motion Regarding matter relates to the Inspection Report", a Suo Motu PIL

In Court on its own motion Regarding matter relates to the Inspection Report (2026), a Suo Motu Public Interest Litigation was initiated by the Patna High Court's Division Bench pursuant to the report dated February 17, 2026 submitted by the Member Secretary, Bihar State Legal Services Authority (BSLSA). BALSA's inspection report with respect to the shortcomings of mental health facilities in the State of Bihar as well as in Bihar State Institute of Mental Health and Allied Sciences (BIMHAS), Koelwar, Bhojpur is an independent report. The case was listed for hearing on April 20, 2026 by the High Court's Division of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Harish Kumar by its 54-page long order dated March 16, 2026.

The PIL was filed and registered on February 17, 2026 and tagged with a 5-year-old case  filed by Vishal Kumar Singh, Akash Keshav, Deepak Kumar Singh and Shashwat with Advocate Akanksha Malviya as petitioner in person. 

By its order dated February 25, 2019, the High Court had issued notice to the (i) Principal Secretary, Health Department; (ii) Secretary, State Mental Health Authority, Bihar; (iii) Director, Bihar Institute of Mental Health and Allied Sciences (BIMHAS); (iv) DG of Police, Bihar; (v) I.G. of Prisons; and (vi) Union of India and asked the concerned authorities to submit their responses on the following aspects:-
“i) Whether any Mental Health Review Board has been constituted in accordance with Section 73 of the
2017 Act?
ii) If so, what are the functions being discharged by such Board under section 82 of the 2017 Act?
iii) How Bihar Institute of Mental Health and Allied Sciences (BIMHAS) is performing its duties and carrying out its responsibilities relating to the admission and treatment of persons with mental illness? What provisions have been made by the Hospital Authorities for supplying free food to the patients and attendants, medicines and to maintain the cleanliness and hygiene of the hospital and to create a positive environment?
iv) DG of Police shall submit a report regarding the duties performed by police officers of different police stations of the State in respect of persons with mental illness and their protection as envisaged under section 100 of 2017 Act, and also, I.G. of Prisons in respect of the prisoners with mental illness as per section 103 of 2017 Act;
v) The Member Secretary, Bihar State Legal Service Authority (BSLSA) shall submit a report regarding the legal aid facilities provided to the persons with mental illness and particularly to those who are coming
for treatment to BIMHAS;
vi) The Principal Secretary, Health Department shall submit a report regarding the steps taken by the government for rehabilitation of the persons with mental illness after their recovery and discharge from the Hospital;
vii) Report shall also be submitted by the State through a Responsible Officer regarding the steps taken to address the issues highlighted in the report of the Member Secretary, BSLSA.

The notice was issued pursuant to relevant sections of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, NALSA (Legal Service to persons with Mental Illness and Persons with Intellectual Disabilities) Scheme, 2024, and the decision of the Supreme Court in Sukdeb Saha vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in A.I.R. 2025 S.C. 3458 and in Gaurav Kumar Bansal vs. Mr. Dinesh Kumar & Ors. (CONMT. PET. (C) No. 1653 of 2018 in W.P.(C) No. 412 of 2016) vide order dated February 25, 2019. 

By its earlier 26-page long order dated February 18, 2026, the Division Bench had 9. The concerned authorities are to submit their responses on the following aspect: i) Whether any Mental Health Review Board has been constituted in accordance with Section 73 of the 2017 Act?
ii) If so, what are the functions being discharged by such Board under section 82 of the 2017 Act?
iii) How Bihar Institute of Mental Health and Allied Sciences (BIMHAS) is performing its duties and carrying out its responsibilities relating to the admission and treatment of persons with mental illness? What provisions have been made by the Hospital Authorities for supplying free food to the patients and attendants, medicines and to maintain the cleanliness and hygiene of the hospital and to create a positive environment?
iv) DG of Police shall submit a report regarding the duties performed by police officers of different police stations of the State in respect of persons with mental illness and their protection as envisaged under section 100 of 2017 Act, and also, I.G. of Prisons in respect of the prisoners with mental illness as per section 103 of 2017 Act;
v) The Member Secretary, Bihar State Legal Service Authority (BSLSA) shall submit a report regarding the legal aid facilities provided to the persons with mental illness and particularly to those who are coming for treatment to BIMHAS;
vi) The Principal Secretary, Health Department shall submit a report regarding the steps taken by the government for rehabilitation of the persons with mental illness after their recovery and discharge from the Hospital; 
vii) Report shall also be submitted by the State through a Responsible Officer regarding the steps taken to address the issues highlighted in the report of the Member Secretary, BSLSA. 

The High Court referred to Supreme Court's decision in Sukdeb Saha vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in A.I.R. 2025 S.C. 3458, wherein it held:- “31. Mental health is an integral component of the right to life Under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This Court has, in a consistent line of precedents, affirmed that the right to life does not mean mere animal existence, but a life of dignity, autonomy, and well-being. Mental health is central to this vision. In Shatrughan Chauhan vs. Union of India MANU/SC/0043/2014 : 2014:INSC:46: (2014) 3 SCC 1 and Navtej Singh Johar vs. Union of India MANU/SC/0947/2018 2018:INSC:790 : (2018) 10 SCC 1, this Court recognised mental integrity, psychological autonomy, and freedom from degrading treatment as essential facets of human dignity Under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Further, the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, a rights- based legislation, reinforces this constitutional mandate by recognising every person's right to access mental healthcare and protection from inhuman or degrading treatment in mental health settings. Section 18 of the MH Act guarantees mental health services to all, and Section 115 of the MH Act explicitly decriminalises attempted suicide, acknowledging the need for care and support rather than punishment. These provisions read with judicial precedents reflect a broader constitutional vision that mandates a responsive legal framework to prevent self-harm and promote well-being, particularly among vulnerable populations such as students and youth.”

In Gaurav Kumar Bansal vs. Mr. Dinesh Kumar & Ors. (CONMT. PET. (C) No. 1653/2018 in W.P.(C) No. 412/2016), the Supreme Court, by order dated February 25, 2019, held:- “7. For ensuring availability of rehabilitation halfway homes in the districts: (i) State Governments must either expand their existing homes or construct new homes at their own cost and provide facilities as per the ‘Rehabilitation Homes’ Guidelines approved by the Supreme Court. (ii) Another way out is for the States/UTs to encourage NGOs in their States to set up rehabilitation homes or even expand the existing homes run by NGOs. The State Government may provide financial assistance to the NGOs towards this objective or seek the assistance of the Central Government for the same. The Central Government already has a scheme to fund such NGOs on the recommendation of State Government (Project Halfway Homes). The State Governments may give wide publicity to this Central scheme. 8. In certain States, some NGOs/community-based organizations have been providing remarkable services in the area of rehabilitation of mentally ill persons. The State Governments may involve them to supplement their own efforts. 9. Assistance is required to be elicited from police departments of various States, in order to register FIRs and make efforts to trace the families of de-institutionalized persons, and to include the details of such persons in national missing persons databases.

Prior to this, the Division Bench of Chief Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice S. Kumar had passed 2-page long order dated January 6, 2022 in Akanksha Malviya vs. The Union of India & Ors., a case of 2021 wherein, notice was issued considering pryer for issuance of a writ in the nature of a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ(s) or order(s) or direction(s) commanding the Respondents to establish a legitimate and functional State Mental Health Authority in adherence with Section 45 and Section 55 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017.

The same bench passed a 4-page long order dated February 10, 2022, wherein it noted that Mental Health Care Act, 2017 was notified on April 7, 2017. The object and purpose of the Act was to provide for mental healthcare and services for persons with mental illness. Also to protect, promote and fulfil the rights of such persons during delivery of mental healthcare. The Act is divided into XVI Chapters. Chapter-VIII specifically deals with the establishment and composition of the State Authority, to be termed as the “State Mental Health Authority”. The composition of such authority in terms of Section-46 has to be of certain persons specified therein. The functions of the authority, as specified under Section-55 of the Act, are, inter alia, to- (a) develop quality and service provision norms for different types of mental health establishments in the State; (b) supervise all mental health establishments in the State and receive complaints about deficiencies in provision of services; (c) register clinical psychologists, mental health nurses and psychiatric social workers in the State to work as mental health professionals, and publish the list of such registered mental health professionals in such manner as may be specified by regulations by the State Authority; (d) train all relevant persons including law enforcement officials, mental health professionals and other health professionals about the provisions and implementation of this Act; (e) discharge such other functions with respect to matters relating to mental health as the State Government may decide. 

The order reads: "Shockingly, as is now evident from the affidavit filed by the State, the said authority has yet not been constituted. Also as to whether there was one under the repealed Mental Health Act, 1987 is not clear from the response....The purpose behind the enactment, as we have already noticed, is to provide mental healthcare and services to persons in need whose mental condition stands determined in terms of Chapter-II of the Act. We notice that such step for establishing the authority commenced only in the year 2020, that too, with the publication of an advertisement in the Newspaper and since then nothing has been done to expedite the process. Even the affidavit filed does not disclose the time-limit within which such process would be completed. We refer to para 8 of affidavit dated 22.01.2022 filed by Additional Director, Health, Bihar, Patna. The averments are as vague as they can be....It is in this backdrop, we are constrained to direct the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, to forthwith take all steps ensuring establishment of the authority as stipulated under Section-45 of the Act. Let an affidavit of compliance indicating the latest status, be filed by the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, before the next date. We also expect the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar to indicate the steps taken for complying with the other provisions of the Statute; the deficiencies pointed out by the petitioner in the writ petition; and the suggestion given for proper and effective implementation on expeditious basis."
 
The same bench passed a 9-page long order dated April 1, 2022. It reiterated the importance and significancethe the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017. The Act is divided into XVI Chapters containing 126 Sections. Chapter III deals with advance directive; Chapter V deals with rights of persons with mental illness; Chapter VI deals with duties of appropriate Government; Chapter VII deals with constitution of Central Mental Health Authority; Chapter IX deals with Finance, Accounts and Audit; Chapter X deals with establishment of Mental Health; Chapter XI deals with Mental Health Review Board; Chapter XII deals with admission, treatment and discharge; Chapter XIII deals with responsibilities of other agencies. In terms of Section 5 of Chapter III, every person, who is not a minor, shall have a right to make an advance directive in writing, specifying the manner in which he wishes to be cared for and not to be cared for and treated for a mental illness. 

The order wondered as to "Whether there is any mechanism in place dealing with mandatory requirement of the statute or directives whereby and whereunder the person has a right to specify in advance the manner in which he wishes to be cared for and not to be cared for and treated for a mental illness and whether an Online Register as mandated by Section 7 has been set up and is being duly maintained? What are the steps undertaken to be made or already stand taken with respect to the right of community living for persons with mental illness under Section 19 where they have rights to not remain in Mental Health Establishments etc.? The Act under Section 20 grants a right of protection from cruel inhuman and degrading treatment and Section 21 provides for a right to equality and non-discrimination. Whether the staffs of already existing mental health institutions have been trained in accordance with these provisions to ensure the realization of these important basic rights? What are the steps taken in fulfillment of the duties imposed on the appropriate Government in this case, the Government of Bihar, vide Chapter VI, in particular Sections 29 and 31 which deal with promotion of mental health and preventive programme and human resource development and training respectively? The State to furnish detailed reasons as to why the time line provided under Section 45 of the Act for the establishment of the Mental Health Authority (nine months) has not been complied with, as noted in our order dated 10.02.2022. As also we note that the order dated 25.02.2022 directed the process to be expedited. What are the steps that have been taken in furtherance thereof. Section 66 of the Act provides the procedure for inspection and enquiry of mental health establishments. Details of inspection and enquiry as also under Section 67, carried out be furnished by the relevant authority before the next date. Section 100 of the Act details duties of Police Officers in respect of persons with mental illness. Whether any training, awareness or sensitization programme has been undertaken to ensure that police officers are able to carry out their duties towards this vulnerable group of people? Section 103 is titled as ‘prisoners with mental illness’. The authorities to furnish particulars of such prisoners as also the steps taken to ensure preparedness of prisons for accepting such
inmates? Section 123 grants power to State Authority to make regulations with respect to minimum standard of quality etc. Whether the State has framed such Rules? If in the affirmative, a copy of the said Rules be supplied to the Court." 

The order reads: "We may also note that the importance of this Act is reflected also in Section 125 where the Central Government has been bestowed with the power to remove any difficulty arising in giving effect to the provisions of the Act. Although there was a limitation to this section of two years from the date of commencement of the Act, the legislative intent is clearly that of furthering and improving the mental health institutions and their regulations. It is saddening to see that the State of Bihar even after the passing of more than four and half years has not taken adequate steps in line with the intention of the Parliament. Even more so, in the light of the fact that the National Mental Health Programme (NMHP) was launched by the Central Government as far as back in 1982 with the following objectives:-
1. To ensure the availability and accessibility of minimum mental healthcare for all in the foreseeable future, particularly to the most vulnerable and underprivileged sections of the population;
2. To encourage the application of mental health knowledge in general healthcare and in social development; and
3. To promote community participation in the mental health service development and to stimulate efforts towards self-help in the community;
And yet the entire State of Bihar since after its bifurcation has only one functioning unit and even for that sufficient particulars have not been furnished. It is only after a public spirited person approaches this Court that action is initiated albeit with continued lethargy." 

The State did not address any one of the issues in its affidavit dated March 23, 2022 filed by the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar. From the supplementary counter affidavit dated March 23, 2022, filed by the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, it was not clear as to whether the provisions of Rule 6 of the Mental Healthcare (State Mental Health Authority) Rules, 2018 has been complied with. It was not clear as to whether the provisions of Section 62 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 stands complied with. The Court noted that there is only one mental health establishment registered within the State of Bihar although almost 1/10th people of India live within the State of Bihar. 

The Court directed Respondent No. 1, namely, the Union of India through its Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to file an affidavit dealing with each one of the averments made in the petition, also specifying as to whether each one of the statutory provisions and the rules framed thereunder were complied with. 

The 2-page long order dated April 7, 2022 noted that Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar filed his supplementary counter affidavit dated April 7, 2022 vide notification dated April 6, 2022 constituting State Mental Health Authority, as envisaged under the provisions of the Mental Health Care Act, 2017. This exercise was undertaken only pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court vide order dated April 1, 2022. The counter affidavit stated that a 272 bedded new hospital at BIMHANS, Koilwar at the cost of Rs. 128.96 Crores was being set up.

Notably, the High Court had passed orders dated February 13, 2014 and January 5, 2015 In the matter of News Reports published in The Hindustan Times, Patna Dated 24/10/2013 vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. in CWJC No. 21462 of 2013. 

In its order dated June 27, 2022, the Court noted that Additional Solicitor General "placed on record a chart indicating the budgetary allocation with respect to the National Mental Health Programme (NMHP) under Flexible Pool for Non Communicable Diseases (NCDs) under NHM during the period from 2018-19 to 2020-21. Evidently, there is reduction in the budgetary allocation with each succeeding year. We are informed that only on account of non-utilization of funds, the Central Government has taken such a measure."

In its order dated September 27, 2022, it was recorded that the State Mental Health Review Board and State Mental Health Fund was constituted. In its order dated November 16, 2022, it recorded that Review
Board as envisaged under Section 73 of the Mental Health Act, 2017 was not constituted. There were more than 11.2 million persons, moreso below the age of 35 years, who are suffering from several psychiatric disorders as defined under the Act.  

In its 2-page long order dated December 8, 2023, High Court's Division Bench of Justices K. Vinod Chandran and Rajiv Roy recorded the affidavit dated October 12, 2023 by the respondent pointed out that the State Mental Health Authority and the State Mental Health Review Board have been constituted. The Mental Health Review Board have been constituted in 9 divisional headquarters of the State, i.e. Patna, Chapra, Gaya, Muzzaffarpur, Bhagalpur, Purnea, Saharsa and Munger under the Chairmanship of District and Sessions Judges, the Districts which is the divisional headquarters. The order reads: "The District Judges of the divisional headquarters afore-mentioned shall file a report on the intimation of such constitution having been received by them and the steps taken to convene the Review Board, within a period of four weeks from today. The Registry shall issue a certified copy of this order to the above said District Judges at the divisional headquarters, who shall file a report through the Registrar General."

The High Court' Division Bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Partha Sarthy, passed a 2-page long order dated November 22, 2024 recorded that out of the nine Divisional Commissionerates, in eight Commissionerates Mental Health Review Boards have been constituted, however, in Saran, no Board has been constituted for reason of the district having no medical colleges and no psychiatrist. The Court observed: "2. We do not think that this is a reason to not constitute a Board for the said Divisional Commissionerate also. 3. The learned AAG submits that steps will be taken to constitute a Board in the said district also within a period of two weeks." 

In its 3-page long order dated March 7, 2025, High Court's of Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy recorded that mere setting up of Review Boards in different Commissionerates would not be of any avail to the people suffering from mental health, unless funds were allocated for the purpose. There was no allocation of funds towards making the Mental Health Review Boards functional, thus, rendering the Boards in nine Commissionerates to be in existence only on paper. For effective implementation of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, the State must take pro-active steps with respect to prisoners who are suffering from mental health issues. There is no updated report on behalf of the State with respect to the number of half-way homes, shelter accommodation; supported accommodation and other places where persons suffering from mental health issues could be sent. The need for steps for the outreach of the Act to jail inmates remained unaddressed.

The same bench passed a 3-page long order dated May 16, 2025, wherein, it noted that for smooth functioning of the State Mental Health Tribunal, a fund of Rs. 40 lacs was allocated by the Health Department for 2025-26. The order reads: "The allocation of funds to Mental Health Review Boards shall be done after collating all information with respect to such Boards and the proposal of work which can be handed over or entrusted to them. Such allocation also shall be made without wastage of any further time. 4. With respect to the query of the Court regarding outreach of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 to jail inmates and the infrastructure in the shape of half-way homes and accommodation shelters, it appears that only information is being sought from the relevant quarters." It recorded that the allocated fund would be meaningless unless it comes to the Board along with the proposal of work programme which was mandated under Section 53(1)(c) of the Act of 2017. 6. Similarly, even with Review Boards, such allocation of fund and proposal for work programme has to be supplied by the State. The Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 and Mental Healthcare (Rights of Persons with Mental Illness) Rules, 2018 command for setting up of a mental health establishment in at-least one prison in the State. It concluded: "8. It has rightly been pointed out that there is no information in the affidavit regarding compliance of such requirement under the Act and the Rules."

Significantly, it was after 38 order have been passed by the High Court that in the case filed on November 20, 2021 and registered on November 25, 2021, that a PIL entitled "In Court on its own motion Regarding matter relates to the Inspection Report" was filed in mid-February 2026.
  

Supreme Court reverses Justice Dr. Anshuman's bail rejection order in a NDPS case

In Satyam Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and Joymalya Bagchi passed a 2-page long order dated August 28, 2025. The order reads: "Considering that the petitioners are in jail since 03.03.2021 i.e. for nearly four and a half year, we are of the view that the petitioners deserve to be released on bail. Accordingly, the petitioners shall be enlarged on bail subject to such conditions and restrictions as imposed by the jurisdictional Trial Court."

Earlier, Dr. Anshuman of Patna High Court had passed a 4-page long order dated February 2, 2025 in Satyam Kumar Singh & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2025). The petitioners had approached the High Court seeking regular bail in connection with a P.S. case  of 2021 lodged under Sections 8, 21, 22(B)(C) N.D.P.S. Act. The counsel for the petitioners of first two cases i.e.,. Cr. Misc. No.72426 of 2024 and Cr. Misc. No.71160 of 2024 had submitted that the bail application of the petitioners has earlier been rejected twice vide order dated 27.09.2022 passed in Cr. Misc. No.49865 of 2021 and vide order dated March 20, 2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No.79114 of 2023. He also further submitted that the petitioners were innocent and other named co-accused persons were granted bail on the basis of same allegation. The petitioners were apprehended from the place of occurrence. He further submitted that petitioners were in custody since March 3, 2021 had clean antecedent. The counsel for the petitioner for third case i.e.,Cr. Misc. No.79563 of 2024 submitted that the petitioner was named in the F.I.R., but he was not apprehended from the place of occurrence nor any material was recovered from his possession. The Senior Counsel submitted that the name of petitioner had come by virtue of confessional statement of co-accused who were apprehended from the place of occurrence. It stated that the Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court had granted bail to other co-accused persons, who were not apprehended nor any recovery has been made from their possession. He also submitted that petitioner was in custody since August 28, 2024 had clean antecedent.

Justice Anshuman observed:"11. In the present facts and circumstances of this case and the submissions made above, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioners, namely, Satyam Kumar Singh and Amit Kumar@ Jaikar of first two cases. Therefore, the bail applications of the petitioners are hereby rejected." This order has been reversed by the Supreme Court. 

Justice Dr. Anshuman had heard the case of Satyam Kumar Singh & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2025) along with the case Amit Kumar @ Jaikar vs. The State of Bihar (2025) and Anant Sah @ Anant Kumar @ Anant Kumar Sah vs. The State of Bihar (2025). In his order, Justice Anshuman added: "the bail application of the petitioner, namely, Anant Sah of third case is concerned, let the petitioner be granted bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.30,000/- (Rupees Thirty thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each....". It was required to be furnished to Additional Sessions Judge-IV-cum-Special Judge, N.D.P.S. Act., Purnea in connection with Supplementary N.D.P.S. Case of 2021(CIS No.121 of 2024) which arose out of P.S. case  of 2021, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 437(3) of Cr.P.C. 

Supreme Court sets aside order on narco-analysis test of accused persons by Justice Sandeep Kumar, rejects Bihar State's submission

In Amlesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Prasanna B. Varale set aside the 2-page long interim order dated November 9, 2023 by Justice Sandeep Kumar by its 17-page long judgement dated June 9, 2025. Justice Kumar had accepted the submission of the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Mahua, Vaishali that she would conduct narco-analysis test of all the accused persons (including the Appellant herein) and other witnesses, during the investigation in direct contravention of the exposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Selvi and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka (2010) 7 SCC 263, wherein it was held that forceful subjection of an individual to techniques, such as the narco-analysis test, violates personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. 

Justice Sanjay Karol observed: "we cannot find a reason in the High Court accepting a submission by the Investigating Officer, stating that they will conduct a narco-analysis test of all the accused persons. Such a submission and its acceptance, is in direct contravention to the judgment of this Court in Selvi (supra), being hit by the protections under Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution. Moreover, we fail to understand how such an endeavour was accepted by the High Court when adjudicating an application for regular bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is settled law that while entertaining an application for grant of bail, the Court has to take into consideration the allegations against the accused; period of custody undergone; nature of evidence and the crime in question; likelihood of influencing witnesses and other such relevant grounds. It does not involve entering into a roving enquiry or accepting the use of involuntary investigative techniques." 

Notably, the order dated November 9, 2023 has recorded that the S.D.P.O. Mahua, Vaisahali had assured the bench of Justice Kumar that "she will take further steps in the investigation to find out details about the missing woman and for that she has further submitted that she will get narco test of all the accused persons and other witnesses, if required in the investigation." The petitioner had filed the case for regular bail  in the High Court on October 6, 2023 in Police Station case of August 2022. It was registered on October 16, 2023.  

Justice Sourendra Pandey who joined as the judge of the High Court from the bar on March 8, 2025 was not inclined to enlarge the petitioner in question on bail. His application for bail was rejected by Justice Pandey's order dated May 1, 2025. 

With regard to the bail application of the appellant, pending if any, Supreme Court's Division Bench observed that it has "to be decided in accordance with law" in its judgement dated June 9, 2025.  

Prior to this on March 26, 2025, Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey passed an order after hearing the counsel for the parties. His order reads: "Call for a report from the Court of learned C.J.M., Vaishali at Hajipur with respect to present stage of trial, the number of witnesses to be examined and the expected duration that will take to conclude the trial in connection with Mahua P.S. Case No. 545 of 2022. 3. Put up this case on 23.04.2025."

The petitioner is in judicial custody since June 5, 2023. He was made accused in Mahua P.S. Case No. 545 of 2022 dated 24.08.2022 registered under Sections 341, 342, 323, 363, 364, 498(A), 504, 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act but he was chargesheeted under Sections 341, 342, 323, 498(A), 364, 120(B), 302, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution case is that the petitioner was married to the sister of the informant on December 11, 2020. There was demand of dowry being made by the in laws and the informant’s sister was being tortured. It was alleged that on August 22, 2022 informant’s brother-in-law stated that petitioner had called and informed that his sister had escaped. Subsequently, on the application of the informant the FIR was registered against five named accused persons. The APP for the State stated that the wife of the petitioner was admittedly with the petitioner when she went missing and despite admitting that the wife of the petitioner went missing on August 21, 2022, a Sanha was registered on August 28, 2022 to cover up the misdeeds although the FIR was already lodged against the petitioner and another on August 24, 2022 by the brother of the victim. The APP also pointed that in his confessional statement the petitioner described  how he killed his wife and thrown her body in the Saryu River. 

Notably, the mother, father and brothers of Amlesh Kumar, the appellant, a resident of Fatehpur Pakari, Mahua, Vaishali have been granted bail by the High Court. The appellant's prayer for regular bail was rejected vide Order dated August 1, 2023 passed by the Sessions Judge, Vaishali at Hajipur in B.P.No.1141 of 2023. The Court was not inclined to grant bail on the basis of the allegations made in the FIR, as well as the confessional statements of the co-accused, who stated that they had thrown the missing person in the river Saryu on the intervening night of the 21st and 22nd August 22, 2022. Dissatisfied with the order of the Sessions Judge, the appellant approached the High Court for grant of a regular bail vide Crl. Misc. No.71293 of 2023. By the impugned interim Order, the High Court accepted the submission of the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Mahua, that she will conduct a narco-analysis test of all the accused persons.  

The order dated August 30, 2024 by Justice Partha Sarthy bench of the High Court recorded that the counsel for the petitioner submitted that an application for bail arising out of this very F.I.R., has been decided by this Court by order dated June 5, 2023 in Kailash Singh & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr., (Cr. Misc. no. 17656 of 2023). The order referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court dated January 19, 2024 passed in Kusha Duruka vs. The State of Odisha (Cr. Appeal no. 303 of 2024), and directed that the case should be put up before appropriate Bench.

In a subsequent order dated October 25, 2024, Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad recorded: "It is pointed out that earlier the predecessor Court had passed an order on 09.11.2023 and being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has filed a special leave petition being Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Diary No(s). 9701 of 2024 in the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has stayed the impugned order dated 09.11.2023. It is his submission that the order dated 09.11.2023 is altogether on a different issue and the pendency of the SLP in the Hon’ble Supreme Court as against the said order would not have any impact on the hearing of the bail petition on its own merit, therefore, he would request this Court to hear the bail petition of the petitioner on its own merit...In the meantime, learned counsel for the petitioner is expected to apprise his submissions to the Hon’ble Supreme Court where the matter is pending against the order dated 09.11.2023." 

In its judgement dated June 9, 2025 authored by Justice Karol, the Supreme Court examined the order dated November 9, 2023 by Justice Kumar, set it aside and allowed the appeal. The Court held that an accused person does not have an indefeasible right to seek a narco-analysis test to lead the evidence. This decision assumes significance because it has brought clarity to the law following several conflicting High Court judgements on the issue. He observed that the High Court had exceeded the scope of a bail hearing by approving a narco-analysis test. In Selvi vs. State of Karnataka (2010), the Court has held that a narco-analysis test cannot form the sole basis of conviction.

According to B R Sharma, Forensic Science in Criminal Investigation & Trials, a narco-analysis test is an interrogation method whereby a suspect of a crime is injected with a psychoactive drug under controlled conditions to suppress their reasoning power or the ability to determine what is good/bad for themselves. The drug used for this test is sodium pentothal, which is also used in higher dosages for inducing general anesthesia in surgeries. However, conducting such tests on persons accused of committing a crime raises serious questions, vis-à-vis, the constitutional protection granted from compulsion to become a witness against oneself under Article 20(3). The constitutional validity of this test, along with similar tests like the polygraph test, came to be challenged before this Court in Selvi (supra). After an elaborate discussion, this Court (three-Judge Bench) held involuntary administration of this test to be hit by Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution. The following principles came to be expounded: 
8.1. Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution are non-derogable and sacrosanct rights to which the judiciary cannot carve out exceptions;
8.2. Involuntary administration of narco-analysis and similar tests is in contravention of the protection given by Article 20(3) of the Constitution, i.e. the right against self-incrimination;
8.3. The results of such involuntary tests cannot be considered as ‘material evidence’ in the eyes of the law;
8.4. Conducting such tests in the absence of consent violates ‘substantive due process’ – which is an essential element required for restraining one’s personal liberty. Permitting such tests may lead to a disproportionate exercise of police powers;
8.5. The boundaries of privacy of a person are also breached when these tests are conducted without consent; and
8.6. For voluntary tests, it must be ensured that appropriate safeguards are in place. Moreover, the results of the same cannot be admitted directly as evidence. Pertinently, any fact or information that is discovered subsequent thereto, with the help of the information supplied in the result, can be admitted into evidence with the aid of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872.

Justice Karol observed:"...it is clear that under no circumstances, is an involuntary or forced narco-analysis test permissible under law. Consequently, a report of such involuntary  test or information that is discovered subsequently is also not per se admissible as evidence in criminal or other proceedings."

The Patna High Court had allowed narco-analysis tests for all the accused persons in a dowry harassment and kidnapping case after hearing a plea for the grant of regular bail by the accused persons. 

Justice Karol recalled that in similar circumstances, where the High Court had ordered lie detector, brain mapping and narco tests, the Supreme Court in Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datana vs. State of Gujarat (2019) 14 SCC 522. observed: “6. Having heard the counsel for the parties, it is surprising to note the present approach adopted by the High Court while considering the bail application. The High Court ordering the above mentioned tests is not only in contravention to the first principles of criminal law jurisprudence but also violates statutory requirements. While adjudicating a bail application, Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is the guiding principle wherein the court takes into consideration, inter alia, the gravity of the crime, the character of the evidence, position and status of the accused with reference to the victim and witnesses, the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and repeating the offence, the possibility of his tampering with the witnesses and obstructing the course of justice and such other grounds. Each criminal case presents its own peculiar factual matrix, and therefore, certain grounds peculiar to a particular case may have to be taken into account by the court. However, the court has to only opine as to whether there is a prima facie case against the accused. The court must not undertake meticulous examination of the evidence collected by the police, or rather order specific tests as done in the present case.
7. In the instant case, by ordering the above mentioned tests and venturing into the reports of the same with meticulous details, the High Court has converted the adjudication of a bail matter to that of a mini trial indeed. This assumption of function of a trial court by the High Court is deprecated.”

Justice Karol considered following three issues:
i. Firstly, whether in the attending facts and circumstances, Justice Kumar could have accepted such a submission. 
ii. Secondly, whether a report of a voluntary narco-analysis test can form the sole basis of conviction in the absence of other evidence on record.
iii. Lastly, whether an accused can voluntarily seek a narco-analysis test, as a matter of an indefeasible right. 

With regard the first issue, he observed: "We are not inclined to accept the submission of the Respondent- State that since modern investigative techniques are the need of the hour, the High Court was correct in accepting the submission that narco-analysis test of all accused persons will be conducted. While the need for modern investigative techniques may be true, such investigative techniques cannot be conducted at the cost of constitutional guarantees under Articles 20(3) and 21. Therefore, the first question framed is answered in the negative. The High Court has erred in accepting a submission to carry out a narco-analysis test of all accused persons by the Investigating Officer." Supreme Court rejected the submission of the State of Bihar which endorsed Justice's Kumar's interim order.  

With respect to the second issue, the judgement reads:"...a report of a voluntary narco-analysis test with adequate safeguards as well in place, or information found as a result thereof, cannot form the sole basis of conviction of an accused person. The second question is, therefore, answered in the negative." 

The Court in had considered voluntary narco-analysis tests in Selvi case and opined that the reports thereof cannot be admitted directly into evidence. Information that is discovered, as a consequence thereof, can be admitted with the aid of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 

Justice Karol added:"The evidentiary value of information received through the aid of Section 27 is no longer res integra." The term res integra is something which has not yet been determined or resolved by the authority of a decided case, so that a judge may decide it upon principle alone. 

Justice Karol recalled Court's decision in Vinobhai vs. State of Kerela2025 SCC Online SC 178, which while placing reliance on Manoj Kumar Soni vs. State of M.P. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 984 held that in the absence of supporting evidence, a conviction cannot be based solely on such information. It was observed: “8. …..The law relating to the evidentiary value of recovery made under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is settled by this Court in the case of Manoj Kumar Soni v. State of M.P.. Paragraph 22 of the said decision reads: “22. A doubt looms: can disclosure statements per se, unaccompanied by any supporting evidence, be deemed adequate to secure a conviction? We find it implausible. Although disclosure statements hold significance as a contributing factor in unriddling a case, in our opinion, they are not so strong a piece of evidence sufficient on its own and without anything more to bring home the charges beyond reasonable doubt.”  Therefore, in our view, the appellant's guilt was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Justice Karole led bench was informed that there has been a divergence of views taken by High Courts on the issue as to whether a narco-analysis test can be claimed by an accused as a matter of right. Allahabad High Court in Rajesh Talwar vs. CBI; Bombay High Court in Dominic Luis vs. State and Mohd. Samir vs. State; Delhi High Court in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs. Union of India; Kerala High Court in Louis vs. State of Kerala; Guajrat High Court in State of Gujarat vs. Sanjay Kumar Kanchanlal Desai and Punjab & Haryana High Court in Navjeet Kaur vs. State of Punjab, have held that an involuntary narco-analysis test cannot be relied on and have taken an overall view of the circumstances when an accused has sought a narco-analysis test himself.

Rajasthan High Court in Sunil Bhatt vs. State has held that the accused can seek a narco-analysis test at a relevant stage in view of the statutory right to lead evidence in defence under Section 233 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

 

Given the suspect nature of a report of narco-analysis, therefore, this position required clarification. Supreme Court's Division Bench observed: "In our view, as rightly submitted by the learned Amicus, the above view of the Rajasthan High Court cannot be sustained. It cannot be said that undergoing a narco-analysis test is part of the indefeasible right to lead evidence, given its suspect nature, and moreover, we find the same to be in the teeth of the judgment of this Court in Selvi (supra). It had been categorically observed: “240. We must also contemplate situations where a threat given by the investigators to conduct any of the impugned tests could prompt a person to make incriminatory statements or to undergo some mental trauma. Especially in cases of individuals from weaker sections of society who are unaware of their fundamental rights and unable to afford legal advice, the mere apprehension of undergoing scientific tests that supposedly reveal the truth could push them to make confessional statements. Hence, the act of threatening to administer the impugned tests could also elicit testimony. It is also quite conceivable that an individual may give his/her consent to undergo the said tests on account of threats, false promises or deception by the investigators. For example, a person may be convinced to give his/her consent after being promised that this would lead to an early release from custody or dropping of charges. However, after the administration of the tests, the investigators may renege on such promises. In such a case the relevant inquiry is not confined to the apparent voluntariness of the act of undergoing the tests, but also includes an examination of the totality of circumstances."
 

It also drew on para 253-264 of the judgement which reads: "We are of the view that an untrammelled right of resorting to the techniques in question will lead to an unnecessary rise in the volume of frivolous litigation before our courts. In light of these conclusions, we hold that no individual should be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question, whether in the context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise. Doing so would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty. However, we do leave room for the voluntary administration of the impugned techniques in the context of criminal justice, provided that certain safeguards are in place. Even when the subject has given consent to undergo any of these tests, the test results by themselves cannot be admitted as evidence because the subject does not exercise conscious control over the responses during the administration of the test. However, any information or material that is subsequently discovered with the help of voluntary administered test results can be admitted in accordance with Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872.”

 

With regard to the third issue, Justice Karole observed: answered in the following terms:"In view of the above exposition in Selvi (Supra), the third question is answered in the following terms: The accused has a right to voluntarily undergo a narco-analysis test at an appropriate stage. We deem it appropriate to add, that the appropriate stage for such a test to be conducted is when the accused is exercising his right to lead evidence in a trial. However, there is no indefeasible right with the accused to undergo a narco- analysis test, for upon receipt of such an application the concerned Court, must consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the matter, such as free consent, appropriate safeguards etc., authorizing a person to undergo a voluntary narco-analysis test. We deem it appropriate to reproduce and reiterate the guidelines issued in Selvi (Supra) in this regard as follows :
“265. The National Human Rights Commission had published Guidelines for the Administration of Polygraph Test (Lie Detector Test) on an Accused in 2000. These Guidelines should be strictly adhered to and similar safeguards should be adopted for conducting the “narcoanalysis technique” and the “Brain Electrical Activation Profile” test. The text of these Guidelines has been reproduced below:
(i) No lie detector tests should be administered except on the basis of consent of the accused. An option should be given to the accused whether he wishes to avail such test.
(ii) If the accused volunteers for a lie detector test, he should be given access to a lawyer and the physical,
emotional and legal implication of such a test should be explained to him by the police and his lawyer.
(iii) The consent should be recorded before a Judicial Magistrate.

(iv) During the hearing before the Magistrate, the person alleged to have agreed should be duly represented by a lawyer.
(v) At the hearing, the person in question should also be told in clear terms that the statement that is made shall not be a “confessional” statement to the Magistrate but will have the status of a statement made to the police.
(vi) The Magistrate shall consider all factors relating to the detention including the length of detention and the nature of the interrogation.
(vii) The actual recording of the lie detector test shall be done by an independent agency (such as a hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer.
(viii) A full medical and factual narration of the manner of the information received must be taken on record.” 

 

Justice Karol concluded:"....we have no doubt that the impugned Order cannot be sustained" referring to the interim order dated November 9, 2023. 

Supreme Court sets aside Allahabad High Court order directing NCB to compensate NDPS accused under Section 439 of CrPC

In Union of India Through I.O. Narcotics Control Bureau v. Man Singh Verma 2025 INSC 292, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Manmohan concluded: "we accept the submission of the Union of India that grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.5,00,000/- was without the authority of law. The order of the High Court, therefore, to this extent has to be set aside. Ordered accordingly. Appeal is allowed partly. The observations made hereinabove should not be taken to preclude any remedy that may be available to the respondent as per law. Hence, our observations are limited only to the correctness of the grant of compensation in the adjudication of a bail application."

It observed: "It is a settled principle of law that the jurisdiction conferred upon a Court under Section 439 CrPC is limited to grant or refusal of bail pending trial. In the following decisions, this Court has time and again held that the sphere of consideration, when exercising power under this Section, pertains only to securing or restricting liberty of the person in question." 

The Allahabad High Court had asked the Director of Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) to pay a sum of Rs 5 lakh as compensation to the respondent for the alleged wrongful confinement. NCB had challenged the impugned order of the High Court.

The Court took note of the decision in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan (2004), wherein it was observed that at the stage of granting bail, a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of a case need not be undertaken. 

In State vs. M.Murugan (2020)15 SCC 251, Supreme Court reiterated that the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to grant or refusal to grant bail, pending trial. In this case, the High Court, while taking a decision on bail application, had retained the file and directed the State to form a committee and seek its recommendations on the reformation and rehabilitation of convict/accused persons. The Court held that while ordering such directions the High Court has committed grave illegality and held that the jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC ends when the bail application is finally decided. The Court held as under :-

“11. We find that the learned Single Judge [M. Murugesan v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 12414] has collated data from the State and made it part of the order after the decision [M. Murugesan v. State, Criminal Original Petition No. 1618 of 2019, order dated 18-2-2019 (Mad)] of the bail application, as if the Court had the inherent jurisdiction to pass any order under the guise of improving the criminal justice system in the State. The jurisdiction of the court under Section 439 of the Code is limited to grant or not to grant bail pending trial. Even though the object of the Hon'ble Judge was laudable but the jurisdiction exercised was clearly erroneous. The effort made by the Hon'ble Judge may be academically proper to be presented at an appropriate forum but such directions could not be issued under the colour of office of the court.”

Section 439 of CrPC reads: “439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail.—(1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct,— (a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of section 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub-section; 

(b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified: 

Provided that the High Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is accused of an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session or which, though not so triable, is punishable with imprisonment for life, give notice of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor unless it is, for reasons to be recorded in writing, of opinion that it is not practicable to give such notice. 

Provided further that the High Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is accused of an offence triable under sub-section (3) of section 376 or section 376AB or section 376DA or section376DB of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), give notice of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor within a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice of such application.

(1A) The presence of the informant or any person authorised by him shall be obligatory at the time of hearing of the application for bail to the person under subsection (3) of section 376 or section 376AB or section 376DA or section DB of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).] 

(2) A High Court or Court of Session may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody.”

The Division Bench added:"The undue restriction of liberty, i.e., without the backing of procedures established by law is unquestionably an affront to a person’s rights but the avenues to seek recourse of law in connection therewith are limited to remedies as per law. However, none was availed in the present facts”. 

It stated, “As such, we accept the submission of the Union of India that grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.5,00,000/- was without the authority of law. The order of the High Court, therefore, to this extent has to be set aside. Ordered accordingly. Appeal is allowed partly.” The judgement was authored by Justice Karol and delivered on February 28, 2025. 

In the case in question, the NCB had seized 1280 grams of brown powder (allegedly heroin) from the possession of one Man Singh Verma (respondent herein) and one Aman Singh. A Criminal Case was registered against the respondent under Sections 8(C), 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985. While awaiting the results of the samples from the laboratory, the respondent filed an application seeking bail but the same was rejected. Consequently, the respondent approached the High Court. The Central Revenue Control Laboratory's report showed that the sample tested negative for heroin and other narcotic substances.

The report from Central Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh revealed that the second set of samples also tested negative for any narcotic substance. The NCB filed a closure report before the Special Judge, NDPS, pursuant to which the respondent was released from the District Jail. 

Unmindful of the respondent’s release, the High Court had proceeded to adjudicate the pending bail application and, by the impugned order, observed that the respondent was a young person who had been wrongfully confined for four months despite the initial laboratory finding. The High Court had directed the Director, NCB to pay Rs.5,00,000 as compensation to the respondent. 

The fact remains the principle of awarding compensatory relief for the violation of fundamental rights by public officials was recognized in Rudal Sah vs. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 141; Nilabati Behera vs. State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746; and D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416 under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. 

Anticipatory bail application of accused in judicial custody in different offence is maintainable under Cr.P.C.

Supreme Court's bench of Chief Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra has "decided the issue of maintainability of an anticipatory bail application filed at the instance of an accused who is already in judicial custody in a different offence and have reached the conclusion that such an application is maintainable under the scheme of the CrPC" on  September 9, 2024 in Dhanraj Aswani Vs. Amar S. Mulchandani. It has directed the Court's Registry to "forward one copy each of this judgment to all the High Courts across the country" after examining the views of different High Courts on the issue in question. The judgement was authored by Justice Pardiwala. 

The Court observed: "Under Section 438 of the CrPC, the pre-condition for a person to apply for pre-arrest bail is a “reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence”. Therefore, the only pre-condition for exercising the said right is the apprehension of the accused that he is likely to be arrested. In view of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, custody in one case does not have the effect of taking away the apprehension of arrest in a different case."

The Court analyzed the question as to "whether a person, while in custody for a particular offence, can have a 'reason to believe' that he may be arrested in relation to some other non-bailable offence?" 

The Court recalled Court's decision in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, [1980] 3 SCR 383, (1980) 2 SCC 565 by a Constitution Bench. It has been held that "An accused is entitled to seek anticipatory bail in connection with an offence so long as he is not arrested in relation to that offence. Once he is arrested, the only remedy available to him is to apply for regular bail either under Section 437 or Section 439 of the CrPC, as the case may be." It observed that "There is no express or implied restriction in the CrPC or in any other statute that prohibits the Court of Session or the High Court from entertaining and deciding an anticipatory bail application in relation to an offence, while the applicant is in custody in relation to a different offence. No restriction can be read into Section 438 of the CrPC to preclude an accused from applying for anticipatory bail in relation to an offence while he is in custody in a different offence, as that would be against the purport of the provision and the intent of the legislature. The only restriction on the power of the court to grant anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the CrPC is the one prescribed under sub-section (4) of Section 438 of the CrPC, and in other statutes like the Act, 1989, etc."

The Court also observed that "While a person already in custody in connection with a particular offence apprehends arrest in a different offence, then, the subsequent offence is a separate offence for all practical purposes. This would necessarily imply that all rights conferred by the statute on the accused as well as the investigating agency in relation to the subsequent offence are independently protected."

It has held that "The investigating agency, if it deems necessary for the purpose of interrogation/investigation in an offence, can seek remand of the accused whilst he is in custody in connection with a previous offence so long as no order granting anticipatory bail has been passed in relation to the subsequent offence. However, if an order granting anticipatory bail in relation to the subsequent offence is obtained by the accused, it shall no longer be open to the investigating agency to seek remand of the accused in relation to the subsequent offence. Similarly, if an order of police remand is passed before the accused is able to obtain anticipatory bail, it would thereafter not be open to the accused to seek anticipatory bail and the only option available to him would be to seek regular bail."

The Court underlined the importance of the rights conferred under the procedural laws as noted by a Constitution Bench of this Court in A.R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak reported in (1988) 2 SCC 602. It was observed therein that no man can be denied of his rights under the Constitution and the laws. He has a right to be dealt with in accordance with the law, and not in derogation of it. The Court held that a denial of equal protection of laws, by being singled out for a special procedure not provided under the law, caused denial of rights under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. A few relevant observations are: “41. In the aforesaid view of the matter and the principle reiterated, it is manifest that the appellant has not been ordered to be tried by a procedure mandated by law, but by a procedure which was violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. That is violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution also, as is evident from the observations of the Seven Judges Bench judgment in Anwar Ali Sarkar case [(1952) 1 SCC 1: AIR 1952 SC 75 : 1952 SCR 284 : 1952 Cri LJ 510 where the Court found that even for a criminal who was alleged to have committed an offence, a special trial would be per se illegal because it will deprive the accused of his substantial and valuable privileges of defence which, others similarly charged, were able to claim. 

The Court had stated : "We proclaim and pronounce that no man is above the law, but at the same time reiterate and declare that no man can be denied his rights under the Constitution and the laws. He has a right to be dealt with in accordance with the law and not in derogation of it. This Court, in its anxiety to facilitate the parties to have a speedy trial gave directions on 16-2-1984 as mentioned hereinbefore without conscious awareness of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Courts under the 1952 Act and that being the only procedure established by law, there can be no deviation from the terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. That is the only procedure under which it should have been guided. By reason of giving the directions on 16-2-1984 this Court had also unintentionally caused the appellant the denial of rights under Article 14 of the Constitution by denying him the equal protection of law by being singled out for a special procedure not provided for by law. […]”

It  drew on the decision of  a Constitution Bench of the Court in the State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar reported in (1952) 1 SCC 1, wherein it was held that procedural law confers very valuable rights on a person, and their protection must be as much the object of a Court’s solicitude as those conferred under the substantive law. Few pertinent observations are: “27. The argument that changes in procedural law are not material and cannot be said to deny equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws so long as the substantive law remains unchanged or that only the fundamental rights referred to in Articles 20 to 22 should be safeguarded is, on the face of it, unsound. The right to equality postulated by Article 14 is as much a fundamental right as any other fundamental right dealt with in Part III of the Constitution. Procedural law may and does confer very valuable rights on a person, and their protection must be as much the object of a court's solicitude as those conferred under substantive law.” 

The Court endorsed the view that the right of an accused to protect his personal liberty within the contours of Article 21 of the Constitution of India with the aid of the provision of anticipatory bail as enshrined under Section 438 of the CrPC cannot be defeated or thwarted without a valid procedure established by law. Such procedure should also pass the test of fairness, reasonableness and manifest non-arbitrariness on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.