Supreme Court sets aside Allahabad High Court order directing NCB to compensate NDPS accused under Section 439 of CrPC

In Union of India Through I.O. Narcotics Control Bureau v. Man Singh Verma 2025 INSC 292, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Manmohan concluded: "we accept the submission of the Union of India that grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.5,00,000/- was without the authority of law. The order of the High Court, therefore, to this extent has to be set aside. Ordered accordingly. Appeal is allowed partly. The observations made hereinabove should not be taken to preclude any remedy that may be available to the respondent as per law. Hence, our observations are limited only to the correctness of the grant of compensation in the adjudication of a bail application."

It observed: "It is a settled principle of law that the jurisdiction conferred upon a Court under Section 439 CrPC is limited to grant or refusal of bail pending trial. In the following decisions, this Court has time and again held that the sphere of consideration, when exercising power under this Section, pertains only to securing or restricting liberty of the person in question." 

The Allahabad High Court had asked the Director of Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) to pay a sum of Rs 5 lakh as compensation to the respondent for the alleged wrongful confinement. NCB had challenged the impugned order of the High Court.

The Court took note of the decision in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan (2004), wherein it was observed that at the stage of granting bail, a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of a case need not be undertaken. 

In State vs. M.Murugan (2020)15 SCC 251, Supreme Court reiterated that the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to grant or refusal to grant bail, pending trial. In this case, the High Court, while taking a decision on bail application, had retained the file and directed the State to form a committee and seek its recommendations on the reformation and rehabilitation of convict/accused persons. The Court held that while ordering such directions the High Court has committed grave illegality and held that the jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC ends when the bail application is finally decided. The Court held as under :-

“11. We find that the learned Single Judge [M. Murugesan v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 12414] has collated data from the State and made it part of the order after the decision [M. Murugesan v. State, Criminal Original Petition No. 1618 of 2019, order dated 18-2-2019 (Mad)] of the bail application, as if the Court had the inherent jurisdiction to pass any order under the guise of improving the criminal justice system in the State. The jurisdiction of the court under Section 439 of the Code is limited to grant or not to grant bail pending trial. Even though the object of the Hon'ble Judge was laudable but the jurisdiction exercised was clearly erroneous. The effort made by the Hon'ble Judge may be academically proper to be presented at an appropriate forum but such directions could not be issued under the colour of office of the court.”

Section 439 of CrPC reads: “439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail.—(1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct,— (a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of section 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub-section; 

(b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified: 

Provided that the High Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is accused of an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session or which, though not so triable, is punishable with imprisonment for life, give notice of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor unless it is, for reasons to be recorded in writing, of opinion that it is not practicable to give such notice. 

Provided further that the High Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is accused of an offence triable under sub-section (3) of section 376 or section 376AB or section 376DA or section376DB of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), give notice of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor within a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice of such application.

(1A) The presence of the informant or any person authorised by him shall be obligatory at the time of hearing of the application for bail to the person under subsection (3) of section 376 or section 376AB or section 376DA or section DB of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).] 

(2) A High Court or Court of Session may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody.”

The Division Bench added:"The undue restriction of liberty, i.e., without the backing of procedures established by law is unquestionably an affront to a person’s rights but the avenues to seek recourse of law in connection therewith are limited to remedies as per law. However, none was availed in the present facts”. 

It stated, “As such, we accept the submission of the Union of India that grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.5,00,000/- was without the authority of law. The order of the High Court, therefore, to this extent has to be set aside. Ordered accordingly. Appeal is allowed partly.” The judgement was authored by Justice Karol and delivered on February 28, 2025. 

In the case in question, the NCB had seized 1280 grams of brown powder (allegedly heroin) from the possession of one Man Singh Verma (respondent herein) and one Aman Singh. A Criminal Case was registered against the respondent under Sections 8(C), 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985. While awaiting the results of the samples from the laboratory, the respondent filed an application seeking bail but the same was rejected. Consequently, the respondent approached the High Court. The Central Revenue Control Laboratory's report showed that the sample tested negative for heroin and other narcotic substances.

The report from Central Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh revealed that the second set of samples also tested negative for any narcotic substance. The NCB filed a closure report before the Special Judge, NDPS, pursuant to which the respondent was released from the District Jail. 

Unmindful of the respondent’s release, the High Court had proceeded to adjudicate the pending bail application and, by the impugned order, observed that the respondent was a young person who had been wrongfully confined for four months despite the initial laboratory finding. The High Court had directed the Director, NCB to pay Rs.5,00,000 as compensation to the respondent. 

The fact remains the principle of awarding compensatory relief for the violation of fundamental rights by public officials was recognized in Rudal Sah vs. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 141; Nilabati Behera vs. State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746; and D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416 under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. 

Acquittal of murder accused Darshan Singh, Rani Kaur, improvement of witness statement under Section 161 insignificant

In Darshan Singh vs. The State of Punjab (2024), a 3-judge bench of Supreme Court held that prosecution cannot seek to prove a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not stated to police during investigation – Evidence of that witness regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. [Para 26].

The case before the Court arose from the judgment and order dated July 23, 2009 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in CRLA No.593-DB of 2000. 

The deceased, Amrik Kaur was married to Darshan Singh, the appellant, some time in 1988. The marriage was arranged through Melo Kaur (PW-3), the cousin sister of the deceased. The prosecution alleges that their marital relationship was strained owing largely to the fact that Darshan Singh had developed an illicit partnership with Rani Kaur (A2). Several relatives had prevailed on the appellant to put an end to his relationship with Rani Kaur, but to no avail. The illicit relationship between Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur is said to have lasted for at least three years before the fateful day. It is the case of the prosecution that on the intervening night of  May 18, 1999 and May 19, 1999, Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur, with the motive of eliminating the deceased, administered poison and intentionally caused the death of Amrik Kaur.

On these allegations, Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur were prosecuted for charges under Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC. The Trial Court convicted both the accused persons for the offence under Section 302 r/w Section 34 and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life.

The Trial Court had concluded that it was a case of homicide and not suicide. It has found that the appellant had a strong motive to commit the murder of his wife. It further held that the appellant and Rani Kaur were present in the house on the intervening night of May 18, 1999 and May 19, 1999 and therefore, the burden lay on them to explain as to ‘how the body of Amrik Kaur who was alive on the night of May 18, 1999 turned into a corpse’ the next morning. The Court completely disbelieved the theory of suicide sought to be advanced on behalf of appellant. It was noted that merely because there were no injuries on the body of the deceased, that by itself would not obviate the possibility of forceful administration of the poisonous substance. On the basis of the above circumstances taken together, the Trial Court held that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant and Rani Kaur.

In appeal, the High Court had agreed with the findings of the Trial Court in so far as the appellant is concerned and had acquitted Rani Kaur by extending her the benefit of doubt. It has found that there is no other evidence except the testimony of PW3 and PW4, to prove the presence of Rani Kaur on the intervening night of May 18, 1999 and May 19, 1999 at the appellant’s house.

The High Court had upheld the order of conviction and sentence, as against Darshan Singh (the appellant) and has allowed the appeal of Rani Kaur (Accused No. 2), thereby acquitting her of all charges. The State of Punjab had not challenged the acquittal of Rani Kaur by filing any special leave petition. Darshan Singh had sought special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court and leave came to be granted by order dated January 22, 2010.

In its January 2024 judgement, the Supreme Court concluded: There cannot be a gap in the chain of circumstances. When the conviction is to be based on circumstantial evidence solely, then there should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances. If there is a snap in the chain, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. If some of the circumstances in the chain can be explained by any other reasonable hypothesis, then also the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. [See: Bhimsingh Vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2015) 4 SCC 281.] Therefore, we allow this appeal and set aside the concurrent findings of conviction." The appeal was allowed. 

Court can convert petition under Section 482 CrPC as a criminal revision under Section 397 CrPC: Supreme Court

In Akanksha Arora v. Tanay Maben (2024), Supreme Court's bench of Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Sandeep Mehta directed the High Court to convert the petition under Section 482 CrPC as a criminal revision under Section 397 CrPC and decide it in accordance with law. It observed that the nomenclature of a petition is immaterial and for doing substantive justice. 

In the case in question, the Principal Judge, Family Court had fixed interim maintenance in favour of the appellant in exercise of powers under Section 125 of CrPC. The appellant was dissatisfied with the quantum of interim maintenance. The appellant wife filed a petition under Section 482 CrPC in the High Court seeking enhancement of the quantum of the maintenance.  The High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it was not maintainable as the appellant wife had a remedy of a revision under Section 397 CrPC.

Supreme Court observed: “This Court has, in a catena of decisions, provided that nomenclature of a petition is immaterial and for doing substantive justice, the High Court can always convert a petition under Section 482 CrPC to a revision under Section 397 CrPC and vice versa.”

The Court relied on decision in Prabhu Chawla vs. State of Rajasthan and Another(1977) wherein it has been held that availability of alternative remedy of criminal revision under Section 397 CrPC, by itself, cannot be a good ground to dismiss an application under Section 482 CrPC. It also drew on Court's decision in Madhu Limaye vs. The State of Maharashtra (1977) . 

The Court noted: “Viewed in light of the above precedents, we feel that even if the High Court was of the view that the appellant should have invoked the jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC for seeking enhancement of interim maintenance, it ought not to have non­suited the appellant only on the ground of alternative remedy”.

The Court concluded:“The approach of the High Court in dismissing the petition filed by the appellant under Section 482 CrPC on the hyper technical ground that she had to avail the remedy of revision cannot be appreciated because the same has unnecessarily compelled the appellant to approach this Court by way of this appeal filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.” The judgement was delivered on December 4, 2024.

The Court decided the appeal assailing the judgment of the Jabalpur Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court whereby a wife’s petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking enhancement of interim maintenance was dismissed.

Supreme Court sets aside Patna High Court's order in anticipatory bail case from Darbhanga

In Dulare Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar (2024), the Supreme Court's bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Augustine  George Masih set aside the final judgment and order of Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of the Patna High Court on February 23, 2024 after hearing the appeal challenging the High Court's order. 

The counsel for the appellant submitted that the First Information Report in the instant case is nothing but a second Report lodged on the same facts as was lodged on earlier occasion wherein the appellant stood enlarged on anticipatory bail vide order dated 31.08.2021 annexed to the petition as Annexure-P/7. He also referred to the order granting anticipatory bail passed by the High Court in the case of co-accused in Crl. Misc. No.1400/2023 dated 08.02.2023, annexed to the petition as Annexure-P/12. This order was also passed in Ram Dinesh Rai Vs. State of Bihar (2023) by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of Patna High Court.

The Supreme Court observed: "Considering the circumstances on record, in our view, the appellant is entitled to the relief claimed under Section 438 of the Code. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set-aside the order passed by the High Court and make the order dated 28.08.2023 absolute. We direct that in the event of arrest of the appellant, the Arresting Officer shall release the appellant on bail subject to furnishing cash security in the sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Thousand Only) with two like sureties."  

Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the High Court and the Sessions Court to grant anticipatory bail to a person apprehending arrest in a non-bailable offense. Initially, by its order dated 28.08.2023, the Supreme Court had granted interim protection in favour of Dulare Choudhary, the appellant.

Prior to the Supreme Court's order, Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of Patna High Court had dismissed the application for anticipatory bail by concluding that "it is clear that there is ample evidence against the petitioner to support the prosecution case, therefore, I am not inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail" in Dulare Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar (2023). 

His order reads: "The prayer for grant of bail on his behalf is hereby rejected" on July 20, 2023. The petitioner had approached to Court apprehending his arrest in connection with Darbhanga Sadar P.S. Case No.50 of 2022, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 409, 34 of the Indian Penal Code, pending before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Darbhanga. The prosecution case arose out of a typed report of Block Development Officer, Sadar, Darbhanga in pursuance of a memo issued by the District Magistrate. Several irregularities were found to have been committed by the accused persons in the appointment of panchayat teachers in the year 2016 and 2021 within gram panchayat Raj Kabirchak. It was alleged that the petitioner in collusion with other co-accused persons, appointed 9 panchayat teachers in the year 2016 and 2021, concealing the fact that panchayat teachers had already been appointed earlier but the vacancy was not in existence. Moreover, the panchayat teachers were appointed when code of conduct was in vogue owing to panchayat elections. An inquiry was conducted under the chairmanship of Deputy Development Commissioner. The inquiry report submitted by the committee indicated involvement of petitioner in the irregularities in the appointment of panchayat teachers. 

The petitioner's counsel had submitted that Dulare Choudhary, the petitioner was quite innocent and had committed no offence. The Block Development Officer without knowing the fact of his order of appointment has wrongly and illegally lodged the FIR against the petitioner and others and made false and incorrect statement in the F.I.R. The petitioner was posted as Panchayat Secretary in Kabrpur Gram Panchayat Raj in the district of Darbhanga and he appointed nine Niyojeet Teachers in compliance of order dated 10.08.2019 passed by the District Teacher Appointment Appellate Authority, Darbhanga in case no.07 of 2018. He further submitted that the petitioner had no option but to comply the order of the Presiding Officer District Teacher Appointment Appellate Authority, Darbhanga and as accordingly, the petitioner appointed the nine Niyojeet Teachers, hence the petitioner did not commit any offence. It was further submitted that with the similar allegation of offence in respect of appointment of 16 Niyojeet Teachers including the nine teachers appointed by the petitioner and F.I.R was lodged by the B.D.O., Darbhanga, against the petitioner and other co-accused persons and the petitioner was granted anticipatory bail by the Sessions Judge, Darbhanga in aforesaid Darbhanga Sadar P.S.Case No.281 of 2021.

It was submitted that the Block Development Officer, Darbhanga Sadar before lodging the present case against the petitioner and others did not issue any notice to the petitioner regarding appointment of 9 Niyojeet Teachers, which shows the malafide intention and malafide action of the B.D.O. It was submitted that one of the Panchayat Secretary, who was posted in Kabirchak Gram Panchayat Raj prior to the petitioner was also made accused in the FIR lodged by the Block Development Officer, Sadar Darbhanga regarding appointment of Niyojit Teachers illegally was also granted anticipatory bail by the High Court vide order dated 08.02.2023 in Cr. Misc No.1400 of 2023. The petitioner joined Kabirchak Gram Panchayat Raj as a Panchayat Secretary on 01.07.2016 and submitted his joining report in the Sadar Prakhand on 01.07.2016 and the Secretary, Ram Dinesh Rai who handed over part charge on 15.07.2016 and no document was handed over to the petitioner in the charge report handed over by Panchayat Secretary, the then Panchayat Secretary and as such the petitioner had no knowledge about appointment of the teachers and the vacancies available before taking his charge if any teacher was appointed, it was appointed by the then Secretary of the said Gram Panchayat. 

The counsel for the State opposed the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail and submitted that during the investigation done by three men committee, it found that in Panchayat Kabirchak, the process of appointment of Niyojeet Shikshak was started in the year 2008 but the appointment letters were issued in the year 2016 which is apparently illegal. After perusal of counselling register and rectified merit list it is evident that in counselling register at Sl. No.31 name of Farhan Tabsum is mentioned but in rectified merit list at Sl. No.31, name of Vandana Kumari is mentioned. The names of candidates mentioned in serial number are not available in that serial number in counselling register or names are not found in the said register. Thereafter the appointments were made in the year 2019 and 2021 on that 09 vacant post which was filled up in year 2008. It was further submitted that Panchayat Secretary, Panchayat Raj Kabirchak was issued a letter bearing memo no.26 dated 09.11.2019 in which reference of letter BRC/434 dated 28.10.2019 of Block Education Officer, Darbhanga Sadar was mentioned which was not issued from the office of B.E.O. Sadar Darbhanga which shows that the petitioner was involved in doing illegal appointment of Niyojeet Shikshak in 2009 and 2021. It was stated that the petitioner was posted as Panchayat Sachiv in Kabirchak and Balha Panchayat (Darbhanga) and allegations that after concealment of facts (only nine posts were vacant) the appointments were made to the post of Niyojeet Shikshak was/is 18 in number without any sanction post in the year 2019 and 2021 which was apparently illegal.