"Fearless judge is the bedrock of an independent judiciary": Supreme Court

In Nirbhay Singh Suliya vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices V. Viswanathan (author of the main judgment) and Justice J.B. Pardiwala (concurring judgment) delivered their 38-page long  judgment on January 5, 2026, whereby, it reinstated a judicial officer removed from service after 27 years for allegedly granting bail in four cases without citing a specific law. 

Justice Viswanathan concluded:"The order of removal dated 02.09.2015, the order of Appellate Authority dated 17.03.2016 and the impugned order of the High Court are all set aside. The appellant shall be deemed to have continued in service till he attained the normal age of superannuation. Since the appellant has been kept out of service for no fault of his, we are of the opinion that full back wages with all consequential benefits should be given to the appellant. Let the monetary benefits be released within a period of eight weeks from today with interest @ 6 per cent. No order as to costs." He added:"Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to all the Registrar Generals of the respective High Courts in the country, so as to enable them to draw the attention of the Chief Justices of the High Courts to the same."

Justice Pardiwala observed:"The maxim "Nemo Firut Repente Turpissimus" (no one becomes dishonest all of a sudden) is not unexceptional but still is a salutary guideline to judge human conduct, particularly in the field of Administrative Law. The authorities should not keep the eyes totally closed towards the overall estimation in which the delinquent officer was held in the recent past by those who were supervising him earlier. To dunk an officer into the puddle of "doubtful integrity" it is not enough that the doubt fringes on a mere hunch. That doubt should be of such a nature as would reasonably and consciously be entertainable by a reasonable man on the given material. Mere possibility is hardly sufficient to assume that it would have happened. There must be preponderance of probability for the reasonable man to entertain doubt regarding that possibility. Only then there is justification ram an officer with the label ‘doubtful integrity. "

The Court reaffirmed the principle that a wrong judicial order does not equate to misconduct. Disciplinary action requires proof of extraneous influence or corrupt motive, not mere legal error. It held that the inquiry findings perverse. The Court emphasized the High Court's duty under Article 235 to protect honest judicial officers from motivated complaints to preserve judicial independence and fearlessness. The High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva and Vinay Saraf. Justice Sachdeva had authored the High Court's judgement dated 25 July, 2024, wherein, he concluded:"Considering the material available in the present case, it is apparent that the petitioner was holding the post of Additional Sessions Judge with which comes a great responsibility and he was under obligation to conduct himself in a manner befitting the post held by him. He was under duty to conduct the proceedings of bail applications in conformity with the provisions of law. He extended the benefit of bail to some applicants relying on the pronouncement of High Court and refused to grant bail to others without considering those pronouncements. No violation of principles of natural justice or error is found in the procedure followed in the enquiry in the present case. In the absence of any procedural illegality, irregularity in the conduct of departmental enquiry, in the considered opinion of this Court, no interference is warranted and after considering the over all material available in the record and in view of the settled position of law, we do not find any reason to interfere in the order of punishment/removal dated 02.09.2014 and the order of rejection of appeal on 17.03.2016 and accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs." This judgement has been set aside. 

Supreme Court's judgment relied on decisions in MS Bindra v Union of India, K.K. Dhawan vs. Union of India, R.R. Parekh vs. High Court of Gujarat, Sadhna Chaudhary vs. State of U.P., and P.C. Joshi vs. State of U.P.

The appellant, Nirbhay Singh Suliya, served as a Judicial Officer in the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service for 27 years with an unblemished record. At the relevant time, he was posted as First Additional District & Sessions Judge, Khargone. An anonymous, general complaint was lodged by one Jaipal Mehta alleging that the appellant, through his stenographer, was taking bribes to grant bail in cases under the M.P. Excise Act involving seized liquor of 50 bulk litres or more. A preliminary inquiry was conducted, leading to departmental proceedings. 

It was alleged that with "corrupt or oblique motive," the appellant allowed four specific bail applications contrary to Section 59-A of the Excise Act, while rejecting fourteen other similar applications, thereby applying "double standards."

During the inquiry, the complainant was not examined. The prosecution witness (Gendalal Chauhan) did not support the charge. The defence witness, the Public Prosecutor who appeared in all 18 bail applications, testified that the bail grants were "absolutely proper and on proper grounds" and that he perceived no bias.

The Inquiry Officer held Charge-I proved. The Disciplinary Authority (State Government on the High Court's recommendation) removed the appellant from service in 2014. The High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, upheld the removal in 2024, leading to this appeal.

Supreme Court framed the issues as to whether the order removing the appellant from service based on the inquiry report was justified in law, and whether grounds for interference were made out?

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the removal order, and ordered reinstatement with full back wages. It observed that judicial orders alone cannot constitute misconduct without proof of corrupt motive. The settled law that a wrong judicial order, an error of judgment, or a mistake of law does not by itself amount to misconduct warranting disciplinary action. The charge of misconduct must be distinguished from the mere correctness of a judicial verdict. The basis for action must be the officer's conduct, not the legal soundness of the order. (Paras 32-35, 38-39). It added:"There must be circumstances leading to a reasonable inference of extraneous considerations, corrupt motive, or mala fides. A mere hypothesis of error or omission (like not citing a specific statute) is insufficient." (Paras 32, 35, 40) The judgment  highlights the need to protect honest judicial officers from motivated and frivolous complaints. It observed that a "fearless judge is the bedrock of an independent judiciary." The High Court, under Article 235, has a duty to protect honest officers from such "unmerited onslaught." (Paras 27-29, 36-37). 

The Court concluded that for wrong orders where no mala fide is alleged, the proper course is to correct them in appeal/revision and, administratively, to note them in the officer's service record for consideration during promotion or confidential reports. In cases of persistent wrong orders, the remedy is compulsory retirement, not disciplinary proceedings for misconduct. (Para 38).