Completion of execution proceedings within 6 months from the date of filing is mandatory: Supreme Court

"It is said that the woes for the litigants in this country start once they are able to obtain a decree in their favour and are unable to execute and reap its fruits for years together."

-Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Supreme Court of India, March6, 2025

In Periyammal (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. vs. V. Rajamani & Anr. Etc. (2025 INSC 329), the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Pankaj Mithal set aside the judgement dated December 18, 2019 by Justice R. Pongiappan of Madras High Court and the order passed by First Additional Subordinate Judge, Salem, the Executing Court. The High Court had passed its judgement upon hearing the Civil Revision Petition filed under under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure, seeking setting aside of the fair and Decreetal order dated August 12, 2011 made in R.E.A. case of 2011 in R.E.P. case of 2004 in O.S. case of 1983 on the file of the First Additional Subordinate Judge, Salem pertaining to an agreement of sale dated June 30, 1980. Both the Courts' had rejected the application filed by the appellants seeking amendment in the execution petition.

One Ayyavoo Udayar, the father of the appellants entered into an agreement of sale dated June 30, 1980 with Ramanujan and Jagadeesan, the respondent nos. 3 and 4, the vendors respectively, whereby the respondents agreed to sell the property under dispute, the “suit property” for Rs. 67,000/-. An earnest money of Rs. 10,000/- was paid by Ayyavoo Udayar while entering the agreement of sale. It was agreed between the parties that the balance of Rs. 57,000/- would be paid on or before November 15, 1980 upon receipt of which, the vendors would execute the sale deed. On November 15, 1980, Ayyavoo Udayar issued a telegram to the vendors requesting that they should receive the balance consideration and execute the sale deed. The vendors sent a reply stating that they would execute the sale deed on November 20, 1980, but, no sale deed was executed even on the said date. Since the vendors did not come forward to execute the sale deed despite notice and talks of settlement, Ayyavoo Udayar was compelled to file the O.S. in 1983 before the Subordinate Judge, Salem praying for specific performance of agreement of sale i.e. the execution and registration of the sale deed in respect of the suit properties and delivery of actual physical possession of the same. The relief prayed for in the plaint by the original plaintiff Ayyavoo Udayar is as under:
“Therefore the plaintiff prays that this Honourable Court may be pleased to pass a decree for specific
performance.
(a) Directing the defendants 1 and 2 to execute and register the sale deed in respect of the entire suit properties for the sum of Rs. 67,000/- and deliver actual possession of the entire suit properties to the plaintiff, and if the defendants 1 and 2 fail to execute the sale deed;
(b) The Court may be pleased to execute and register the sale deed in respect of the entire suit properties for Rs. 67,000/- in favour of the plaintiff and order delivery of possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff;
(c) Directing the defendants 1 and 2 to pay the costs of the suit;
(d) Directing the defendants 1 and 2 to deduct the value of the trees cut by them after the date of the suit agreement;
(e) Granting such other relief or reliefs as the court may deem fit and necessary under the circumstances of the case and thus render justice.” 

Besides V. Rajamani, the three other respondents were:E. Ethirajulu, Ramanujam and Jagadeesan respectively.

Supreme Court's 78-page long judgement on dated March 6, 2025 reads:"The Executing Court shall now proceed to ensure that vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property is handed over to the appellants in their capacity as decree holders and if necessary, with the aid of police. This exercise shall be completed within a period of two months from today without fail."

The judgment authored by Justice Pardiwala reads: "we direct all the High Courts across the country to call for the necessary information from their respective district judiciary as regards pendency of the execution petitions. Once the data is collected by each of the High Courts, the High Courts shall thereafter proceed to issue an administrative order or circular, directing their respective district judiciary to ensure that the execution petitions pending in various courts shall be decided and disposed of within a period of six months without fail otherwise the concerned presiding officer would be answerable to the High Court on its administrative side. Once the entire data along with the figures of pendency and disposal thereafter, is collected by all the High Courts, the same shall be forwarded to the Registry of this Court with individual reports. Registry is directed to forward one copy each of this judgment to all the High Courts at the earliest. The Registry shall notify this matter once again after seven months only for the purpose of reporting compliance of the directions issued by us referred to above." The compliance with the judgement will be ascertained in the first week of October 2025.    

The Court recalled the mandatory direction contained in para 42.12 of Supreme Court's decision in Rahul S. Shah vs. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi reported in (2021) 6 SCC 418 requiring the execution proceedings to be completed within six months from the date of filing, which has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in its order in Bhoj Raj Garg vs. Goyal Education and Welfare Society & Ors., Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 19654 of 2022.

Supreme Court observed:“A harmonious reading of Section 47 with Order XXI Rule 101 implies that questions relating to right, title or interest in a decretal property must be related to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. The import of such a reading of the provisions is that only matters arising subsequent to the passing of the decree can be determined by an executing court under Section 47 and Order XXI Rule 101.” 

The judgment underlines that there is no question of deciding the validity of the Decree on the ground of being a nullity due to lack of jurisdiction of the Civil Court to evict cultivating tenants in this case. It pointed out how “… the High Court committed an egregious error in passing the impugned order. We must now ensure that the appellants are able to reap the fruits of the decree. We are also of the view that the rejection by the High Court of the amendments to the execution petition filed by the appellants, was erroneous and deserves to be set aside”. 

Court's "Registry cannot defy the order and refuse to list the cases on the ground that there was non-compliance with procedural aspects": Supreme Court

"Something is rotten in the state of Denmark." 

-Act I, Scene 4, Hamlet  (1599-1601) by William Shakespeare

In Saddam  MK & Other vs. Union of India, on December 20, 2024, Supreme Court's bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Augustine George Masih observed that the registry cannot refuse to list those cases solely due to the litigant's failure to comply with procedural requirements when specific cases are assigned to be heard by a particular bench of the Court by way of judicial orders. 

It observed:"We do not find any Rule in the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 which provides that on the ground of the failure to comply with requirements of Rule 2 of Order XV, a case cannot be listed before the Court even if there is a direction of the Court to list it. There may be cases of extreme urgency. In such cases, the Registry cannot rely upon Rule 2 of Order XV and refuse to list the case. "

The order reads: "When there is an order of the Court directing listing of the cases specifically assigned to that Bench, the Registry cannot defy the order and refuse to list the cases on the ground that there was non-compliance with procedural aspects.  The Registry is relying upon Rule 2 of Order XV of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 which enjoins petitioner to serve notice of the caveat along with copy of the petition to the Caveator.  In this case, six petitions were not listed notwithstanding the directions of this Court to list the same on the ground that the Advocate for the petitioner had not produced on record the proof of a service of copies of the petitioners as caveators."

The Court said: "We may at this stage refer to Section 148A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.  If a caveator files a caveat, he gets right of hearing when the court considers the prayer for interim relief.In appeal or in Special Leave Petition, a caveator does not have right to be heard on the issue of grant of leave or admission of the appeal. He has a right of hearing on the prayer for interim relief. Moreover, apart from the obligation under sub-Section (5) of Section 148A of the petitioner/appellant, under sub-section 3 of Section 148A even this court is under an obligation to issue a notice of the application for interim relief to the caveator once it is noticed that there is a caveat filed."

In in its penultimate paragraph, the order reads: Therefore, when there is a direction of the Court to list SLPs/appeals notwithstanding non-compliance with Rule 2 of Chapter XV of the Rules, Registry can always list the case before the Court with an office report highlighting the failure of the petitioner/appellant to comply with requirements of Rule 2 of Order XV of the Rules.  We hope that the incident of defiance with the order of this Court is not repeated.  However, no action is called for against erring court officials."

In its order, Supreme Court directed "Registrar (Judicial) to take a note of this order" and "list all the matters on 17th January, 2025." The case arose out of ing out of final judgment and order dated June 25, 2024 in CRLA No. 1441/2023 passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam. The case was registered in the Supreme Court on  July 15, 2024.

On September 13, 2024, Aishwarya Bhati, Additional Solicitor General had appeared on behalf of Union of India to state that she will appear in those cases where service of notice is not complete. On October 18, 2024, she pointed out that the National Investigation Agency (NIA) has filed 17 Special Leave Petitions for challenging the impugned order(s) to the extent to which the bail was granted to 17 accused. The Court's order of October 18 stated: "It will be appropriate if the present Special Leave Petitions are heard along with aforesaid 17 Special Leave Petitions. After seeking necessary directions from Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, all the cases shall be listed on 8th November, 2024."

The order of November 8, 2024 reads:Perused the order dated 18th October, 2024. The order incorporates the numbers of 17 Special Leave Petitions filed by the National Investigation Agency for challenging a part of the same impugned order by which bail was granted.  Therefore, we had issued a direction for placing all the 17 cases before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India so that all the cases can be assigned to the same Bench. We have perused the administrative order of 5th November, 2024 which says that out of 17 cases which are mentioned in our last order, cases at serial Nos.9 and 15 have not been assigned to this Bench.  The Registry to clarify. List on 18th November, 2024."

The order of November 18 reads: "These matters along with 17 Special Leave Petitions mentioned in the oned in the note presented to Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India on 5th November, 2024 shall be listed on 29th November, 2024. All matters will be considered together on 29th November, 2024."

The order of November 29 reads: "Notwithstanding the repeated directions issued by the Court" six Petitions filed by Union of India have not been listed. It states:" Registry owes an explanation to the Court for not listing the aforesaid Petitions in spite of earlier orders. We direct that the above-mentioned six Petitions shall be listed on 16th December, 2024.  The explanation of the Registry will be considered on 16th December, 2024. A copy of this order be forwarded to the Registrar (Judicial)." 

This isn't the first instance. 

In January 2024, the Supreme Court had criticised the Registry for it's failure to comply with the order directing listing of the Civil Appeal along with the connected matters on  December 7, 2023 on the regular list.

"Though we are not inclined to initiate any action, what is worrying is that some members of the staff have bye-passed the judicial order directing listing of the Civil Appeal along with the connected matters on 7th December 2023 on the regular list. We wonder how judicial order could have been violated like this", a division bench of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan had observed.

The Court noted that although the staff member had relied upon a Circular dated February 14, 2023, it ignored that the lead matter in this group is a Civil Appeal which ought to have been listed,  in terms of the Circular in question.

The Court chose not to initiate action while stating that the Registrar (Judicial Listing) has submitted that the dealing assistant and all staff members have been warned. 

In May 2024, the Supreme Court Bench comprising Justices JK Maheshwari and Sanjayh Karol had sought an explanation from its Registrar (Judicial) against the listing of the case without following the proper procedure.The Special Leave Petition (Criminal) was filed and it was listed before the court without an exemption from the surrender application.

Notably, 49th Chief Justice U.U.Lalit had also sought an explanation from the Supreme Court Registry for not listing a matter.  Two days after that Justice Ajay Rastogi told the court master, 'once this court passes a date for listing, the registry has no business changing it'. He observed after being informed by the counsel for one of the parties that the matter had not been listed despite repeated efforts and even after receiving the approval of the Bench in the form of an order. He underlined: "This time, I am telling you very clearly. Next time this is brought to my notice that despite an order of the court, a matter has not been listed, I will take strict action. I will not permit any Registrar to have this discretion. Do not call upon the court to pass such orders," justice Rastogi warned, "But you call upon me, I have no difficulty in passing necessary orders." He observed: "The Registrar is not above our order. They are behaving as if they are running the court."

Prior to this on November 1,2022, a division bench of chief justice Lalit and justice Bela M Trivedi had asked the registry to file an explanation for not listing a matter for over a year and a half, despite it being ready to be listed.  

The bench issued the notice after it came to know about a matter listed, which was ready for listing one and a half years ago. The bench asked the registry to submit its explanations along with reasons for such a long delay in listing the matter. 

Judges from the court have been warning the registry on the listing of matters, despite passing instructions. In August 2024 year, a bench of Justice Dr  D.Y.Chandrachud and Justice A.S.Bopanna had expressed displeasure after being appraised that the registry deleted a matter that was listed from the board. 

The court had said, "Why does the registry delete matters? We read cases and come and they are deleted. Are we the judges or the registry? Tell them if they delete it, they can at least inform us."

Justice M.R.Shah too made similar remarks in August 2024 saying, "Registry cannot delete matters... there are excessive matters, especially considering that judges bunch the cases and list them."

In June 2022, in an abnormal development, the Supreme Court registry had defied a Court's order directing listing of a petition for hearing of a matter.

The non-listing of the petition, despite written orders, left the bench of Justices Surya Kant and J B Pardiwala surprised. The judges were heard sharing their disappointment: "How can the Registrar (Judicial) say the matter won't be listed, after we've directed?" 

It is the norm that after a bench orders, even orally, for listing of a petition on a specific day, the Registry complies with it.

The reason behind the Court's surprise was the non-listing of a Union government's petition which was mentioned by Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General (SG) for urgent listing. Mehta had questioned the Tripura High Court's jurisdiction to entertain a PIL challenging the Z+ security cover given to Mukesh Ambani. 

The SG had submitted that the High Court had without territorial or subject jurisdiction  directed the Union home ministry to provide documents substantiating the grant of highest security cover to Ambani and his family.

The bench of Justices Kant and Pardiwala in its order on had said, "Upon being orally mentioned by Tushar Mehta, law officer of India appearing for the petitioner Union of India, seeking urgent listing of the matter, the Registry is directed to list these matters tomorrow, i.e., June, 28, 2022." But, the matter wasn't listed. Later, registry  listed the Union government's special leave petition against the High Court's order on for hearing.

Isn't the conduct of Supreme Court's Registry, an ideal public institution worthy of emulation by other public institutions? 

State cannot be permitted to take plea of adverse possession: Supreme Court

An appeal was filed in the Supreme Court against the judgment and order dated January 31, 2019 passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in a case of 1987. The High Court set aside the judgment of the First Appellate Court And restoring the decree passed by the Trial Court in favour of the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the High Court's decision, the appellants (original defendants), namely the State of Haryana and the Public Works Department (PWD) chose to appeal.

The dispute related to a piece of land measuring 18 Biswas Pukhta situated within the revenue estate of Bahadurgarh, Haryana. The land is located on both sides of National Highway No. 10, which connects Delhi and Bahadurgarh. On March, 28, 1981,  Amin Lal and Ashok Kumar, the original plaintiffs filed a suit for possession of the suit property before the Court of Sub-Judge 1st Class, Bahadurgarh. They claimed ownership of the land based on revenue records and alleged that the defendants had unauthorizedly occupied the land approximately three and a half years prior to the filing of the suit. The plaintiffs contended that despite repeated requests and a legal notice served under Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the defendants failed to vacate the land.

The defendants, the State of Haryana and PWD, contested the suit by filing a written statement dated September 17, 1985. They raised preliminary objections, asserting that they had been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the suit land since 1879-80. They claimed that their possession was open, hostile, and adverse to the plaintiffs, and as such, they had become owners by way of adverse possession. The defendants also contended that the land had been used as a store by the PWD and its predecessor entities, including the District Board and Zila Parishad, for over a century.

Based on the pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following main issues:“A.Whether the State of Haryana has become owner of the suit land by way of adverse possession? B. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the present suit?”

 On May 2, 1986, the Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. It held that "the defendants had failed to prove that they had become owners by adverse possession. Mere placement of bitumen drums and construction of a boundary wall in 1980 did not constitute adverse possession. The plaintiffs had locus standi to file the suit, as they were recorded as owners in the jamabandis. The defendants' possession, if any, was permissive and not hostile."

The defendants filed an appeal against the Trial Court's decision, before the District Judge, Rohtak. The First Appellate Court, after reappreciating the evidence, allowed the appeal on October 8, 1987 and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit.

The Appellate Court held that: "The plaintiffs failed to prove their ownership, as they did not produce the sale deeds or mutation records establishing their title. The jamabandi entries in favor of the plaintiffs were doubtful and appeared to be manipulated. The defendants and their predecessors had been in continuous possession of the suit land since 1879-80. The defendants' possession was open, continuous, and adverse, thereby perfecting their title by adverse possession. The plaintiffs were attempting to grab the land by manipulating revenue records."

The plaintiffs challenged the judgment of the First Appellate Court before the High Court. The High Court framed the following substantial questions of law:“I. Whether the State can set up the plea of adverse possession, and does it imply admitting the title of the plaintiffs? II. Whether the judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court suffer from illegality and perversity?”

The High Court allowed the appeal, holding that: "By taking the plea of adverse possession, the defendants impliedly admitted the title of the plaintiffs. The State cannot claim title through adverse possession against its own citizens. The defendants failed to specifically deny the plaintiffs' title as required under Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The possession of the defendants was permissive, as evidenced by the Misal Hakiyat of 1879-80. The First Appellate Court erred in shifting the burden of proof onto the plaintiffs and in not appreciating the evidence correctly."

The defendants (now appellants) have approached the Supreme Court against the High Court's judgment. The core issue before the Court was whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the judgment of the First Appellate Court and restoring the decree passed by the Trial Court in favour of the respondents (plaintiffs). 

The Court observed:"The appellants contention that plaintiff failed to prove their title and ownership is completely misplaced." The Court found this argument unconvincing. It noted that "In their written statement before the Trial Court, the appellants did not specifically deny the plaintiffs' ownership of the suit property. Instead, they primarily relied on the plea of adverse possession. Under Order VIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, allegations of fact not denied specifically are deemed to be admitted. By asserting adverse possession, the appellants have impliedly admitted the plaintiffs' title."

The Court has recorded that "The plaintiffs relied on jamabandi entries to establish their ownership. The jamabandi for the year 1969-70 (Exhibit P1) records the name of Shri Amin Lal as owner to the extent of half share. Revenue records are public documents maintained by government officials in the regular course of duties and carry a presumption of correctness under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. While it is true that revenue entries do not by themselves confer title, they are admissible as evidence of possession and can support a claim of ownership when corroborated by other evidence." It underlined that copies of registered sale deeds and mutation records produced before the Court "establish a chain of title and cannot be ignored."

The Court observed:"The appellants did not dispute the plaintiffs' title in their pleadings or during the trial. The First Appellate Court's finding that the plaintiffs are not the true owners is based on conjecture and lacks evidentiary support. The appellants cannot now, at this appellate stage, challenge the plaintiffs' ownership without having raised a specific denial earlier."

The judgement reads: "It is a well-settled principle that in a suit for possession based on title, the plaintiffs must establish their ownership. In the present case, the plaintiffs have done so by producing revenue records and, subsequently, the registered sale deeds and mutation entries." It pointed out that "the appellants failed to deny the plaintiffs' title specifically". As a consequence, "the burden has shifted to the appellants to prove their adverse possession."

The Court dismissed the appellants claim that "due to their long and continuous possession of the suit property since 1879-80, they have perfected their title", as being unsustainable in law. The judgment unequivocally states that "it is a fundamental principle that the State cannot claim adverse possession over the property of its own citizens." It relied on Court's decision in Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020), to emphatically drive home the point that "the State cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession."

The Court observed:"Allowing the State to appropriate private property through adverse possession would undermine the constitutional rights of citizens and erode public trust in the government. Therefore, the appellants' plea of adverse possession is untenable in law."

The judgement reads: "The High Court found that the First Appellate Court had ignored material evidence and legal principles, leading to a perverse judgment. Therefore, the High Court was justified in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure."

It found the "findings of the First Appellate Court's judgment are flawed" and observed: "The court erroneously placed the burden of proving ownership on the plaintiffs, despite the defendants' admission of their title by pleading adverse possession. The court disregarded the jamabandi entries and other revenue records without valid justification. The court's conclusion that the plaintiffs are "land grabbers" is not supported by evidence and appears to be based on conjecture. Therefore, the High Court rightly set aside the First Appellate Court's judgment, which suffered from legal infirmities and misappreciation of evidence." 

Supreme Court's bench of Justice Vikarm Nath and Prasanna B, Varale concluded:The High Court's judgment is based on sound legal principles and correct appreciation of evidence." The judgement authored by Justice Vikarm Nath was delivered on November 19, 2024.

Patna HIgh Court's Justice Arun Kumar Jha sets aside Bhagalpur Court's judgement in a civil suit

In Smt. Baby Devi v,  State of Bihar and others, Patna High Court's Justice Arun Kumar Jha set aside the order dated March 26, 2018 passed by the Munsif-II, Sadar, Bhagalpur in Title Suit No. 109 of 1993 because it could be sustained. As a consequence, the Court allowed the petition filed by the petitioner under Order 1 Rule 10 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It directed the trial court to implead the intervenor-petitioner as defendant in Title Suit No. 109 of 1993.

Section 151 of the Code deals with the inherent powers of Court. It states that "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court." 

Order I of the First Schedule of the Code deals with the Parties to the Suits. 

The Rule 10 under Order I of the Code deals with "Suit in name of wrong plaintiff", "Court may strike out or add parties" and "Where defendant added, plaint to be amended" subject to the provisions of the Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It states that "Where a defendant is added, the plaint shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as may be necessary, and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and, if the Court thinks fit, on the original defendant". 

The petition was filed in the High Court because the petition filed under Order 1 Rule 10 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for impleadment of the petitioner as defendant in the  title suit was rejected by the Munsif-II, Sadar, Bhagalpur. 

The Title Suit No. 109 of 1993 was filed by the private respondents who are Trustees of one Pachrukhi Goshala at District-Bhagalpur against the defendants, the State of Bihar and other authorities as well as private parties, seeking following relief(s):- (i). For declaration that Pachrukhi Goshala is the rightful owner and is in possession of the suit land through its trustees and survey entry in the name of defendants is illegal. (ii). For declaration of revisional survey entry to be wrong, inoperative and void. (iii). Permanent injunction against defendants-1st party from distributing the suit land treating as Government land through purcha. (iv). The cost of the suit and other relief(s) which the court may think fit and proper be awarded to the plaintiff. The petitioner claimed her right, title and possession over one acre and 60 ½ decimal of land of khesra no. 80, khata no. 307 out of total area of 03-acre 76 decimal. 

The petitioner had purchased the part of land of khesra no. 80 under khata no. 307 having area one acre 60 ½ decimal through registered sale-deed dated May 14, 2015 along with other land from one Vijay Chandra Das and got mutated her name in serista of State of Bihar vide mutation appeal no. 44/2015-16 dated December 9, 2016. After the mutation, the petitioner has been regularly paying the rent and obtaining rent receipts. The Circle Officer, Shahkund, Bhagalpur issued land possession certificate in the name of the present petitioner. The demarcation was also done by the Circle Officer, Shahkund. The vendor of the petitioner purchased the land through registered sale deed dated November 19, 1958 from one Rama Kant Mishra, who purchased the land on September 19, 1940 through registered sale-deed from one Brij Mohan Lal Das. The execution of sale-deeds shows continuous and peaceful possession on the suit property of khesra no. 80, khata no. 307 since 1940 either of the vendors or the petitioner herself. Therefore, it was claimed that the petitioner is the absolute owner of the suit land.

The suit land of Title Suit No. 109 of 1993 pertains to Mouza-Fatehpur, Anchal-Shahkund, District-Bhagalpur bearing khata No. 307 Khesra Nos. 96, 191, 192, 725, 245, 568, 567, 704 and 80 having area in acres and decimals as follows: 3.48, 2.83, 2.79, 7.45, 28.19, 1.59, 2.69, 2.30, 3.76 – total area 55.08 acres. The claim of the petitioner is on 01 acre 60 ½ decimals of khesra no. 80 of khata no. 307. 

The counsel of the petition submitted that the Bhagalpur court committed error in not considering the fact as well as law on the point that intervenor-petitioner is a necessary party because she is a bonafide purchaser for part of suit land and has also got her name mutated in the Register-II. Land possession certificate has been issued to her with order of demarcation and she has been paying the rent to the State of Bihar. The petitioner, being rightful owner having title and possession of the part of suit land, is not only a proper party rather she is a necessary party. But, by rejecting the prayer for impleadment of the petitioner, the learned trial court has unnecessarily created complication in the matter and if any final judgment is passed in future in absence of the petitioner, it will affect the right, title and possession of the petitioner which would cause irreparable loss to her and at the same time compel her to file another suit for enforcing her right. 

The petitioner's counsel relied on the decision of the High Court in the case of Gauri Shankar Pathak v. Shankaranand Upadhyay (2011) wherein the Single Judge allowed the petition of a lispendens transferee for his impleadment as party respondent in the appeal in view of the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon (2005). He also relied on the decision of the High Court in the case of Md. Kamaluddin v. Laxmi Devi (2014), wherein the Single Judge held that position of a person on whom any interest has devolved on account of a transfer during pendency of a suit or a proceeding is similar to the position of an heir or legatee of a party who died during the pendency of the suit or proceeding and transferee could not be turned away when he applies for being added as a party in the suit. The view of the Single Judge was based upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders and Investors Private Limited (2013). 

The High Court observed: "the discretion of the court under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code is limited and such discretion could be exercised even against the wishes of the plaintiff only in case a party is found to be a necessary or proper party. Thus, the courts can order for impleadment even against the wishes of the plaintiff if a party has a direct and legal interest in the subject matter of the property."

Supreme Court has held that ‘necessary parties’ are those persons in whose absence no decree can be passed by the Court or that there must be a right to some relief against some party in respect of the controversy involved in the proceedings. On the other hand ‘proper parties’ are those whose presence before the Court would be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit although no relief in the suit was claimed against such person. This was held in the case of Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal (2005). 

The Court has observed that "a necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively and a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding" in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Addl. Member Board of Revenue (1963).  

In the case of Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum (1958), the Supreme Court has held that in a suit relating to property in order that a third party may be impleaded, he/she should have a direct or legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation as distinguished from a commercial interest. Legal interest so interpreted means that the result of the suit would affect the third party illegally.

In Smt. Baby Devi v,  State of Bihar, the petitioner claims her right, title and possession over a part of suit property which has been filed challenging the entry in revisional survey entry khatiyan. It is true that neither the vendor of the petitioner nor the petitioner herself have been mentioned in the khatiyan entry nor vendor was made party by the plaintiff but there could be no denial of the fact that the claim of the intervenor-petitioner on a portion of suit property is based upon registered sale deeds dated September 19, 1940 and November 19, 1958 and the same cannot be simply brushed aside. It is trite to say that khatiyan entry doe not create or extinguish any right. So, the petitioner has been able to show substantial interest in the suit property and she could also claim certain relief(s) against the plaintiff and defendants. Further, any order or decree passed by the court would not be an effective decree in absence of the petitioner herein. 

The High Court drew on Supreme Court's judgement in the case of Sumtibai v. Paras Finance Co. Partnership Firm (2007) besides several other decisions wherein it was held that a party having a semblance of interest in the suit property could be impleaded as intervenor in the suit. Therefore, Justice Jha concluded that the petitioner is a necessary party who needs to be impleaded as one of the defendants in Title Suit No. 109 of 1993.