Saturday, November 7, 2026

"an entry in the revenue record is not a document of title and that the revenue authorities cannot decide questions of title": Patna High Court cites Supreme Court's decision

In Ashim Sundar Das vs. The State of Bihar through Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department. Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhir Singh and Rajesh Kumar Verma passed a 13-page long order dated September 23, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"14. The learned Single Judge, while considering the writ petition, noticed that there was a dispute between the parties in respect of the land in question and that the revenue authorities have no jurisdiction to adjudicate complicated questions of title. For the said proposition, reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Faqruddin (Dead) through LRs. vs. Tajuddin (Dead) through LRs., reported in (2008) 8 SCC 12, wherein it has been held that an entry in the revenue record is not a document of title and that the revenue authorities cannot decide questions of title. 15. The aforesaid principle is not in dispute. However, from the order under appeal, it appears that the writ petition was taken up on 09.02.2026 itself and the appellant, who was respondent no.6 therein, had appeared and raised an objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the order dated 29.12.2025 passed by the learned Additional Collector was appealable under Section 9(6) of the Bihar Land Mutation Act, 2011. The appellant had also sought an opportunity to place its case and the relevant materials before the learned Single Judge. 16. The appellant submits that no copy of the writ petition had been served upon him and that he was neither granted an opportunity to file a counter affidavit nor to place the documents and materials relied upon by him before the learned Single Judge. The order under appeal also does not indicate that any effective opportunity was granted to the appellant before the order of the learned Additional Collector was set aside. 17. The requirement of fair and effective opportunity of hearing is an essential facet of the principles of natural justice. It is well settled that where an order is passed in breach of natural justice, the Court is required to examine the prejudice caused to the affected party. 18. In the present case, the appellant had appeared on the very first date and had specifically sought an opportunity to place its case, while also raising the issue of availability of the statutory remedy. The appellant has asserted that it had relevant materials in support of its claim which could not be brought on record for want of such opportunity." The order was authored by Justice Singh. 

The order reads: "19. There is another aspect of the matter. The order challenged before the learned Single Judge was an order passed by the learned Additional Collector and the statute itself provides an appellate remedy against such order. Section 9(6) of the Bihar Land Mutation Act, 2011 reads as follows: "9(6)(a) An Appeal against the order of the Additional Collector shall lie with the Collector of the district within thirty (30) days of the order appealed against. (b) The Collector of the district may condone the delay in filing appeals provided he is satisfied that there are sufficient reasons for the delay. (c) The Collector of the district shall not pass any order modifying, altering or setting aside the order appealed against unless the concerned parties have been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard." 20. Thus, the statutory scheme not only provides a specific appellate remedy against an order of the Additional Collector, but also expressly provides for a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties before the appellate authority." 

Supreme Court has consistently held that where an efficacious statutory remedy is available, the writ jurisdiction ordinarily ought not to be invoked in disregard of such remedy, subject to the recognised exceptions. In United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110, wherein the Court observed: “43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.” 

Justice Singh observed: "21. In the present case, the dispute between the parties concerns rival claims over the property and the parties rely upon their respective documents and revenue records. We are not inclined to examine the correctness or otherwise of such rival claims in the present intra-court appeal. In particular, the allegations made by the appellant regarding the genuineness of the documents relied upon by the writ petitioners are matters which, if raised before the competent authority, are required to be considered in accordance with law. Similarly, no opinion is being expressed by us on the correctness of the findings recorded by the learned Additional Collector. 22. In the aforesaid circumstances, the order dated 09.02.2026, passed in C.W.J.C. No.2008 of 2026 is set aside. 23. The appellant is directed to prefer an appeal before the Collector of the district under Section 9(6) of the Bihar Land Mutation Act, 2011 within a period of thirty days from today. 24. In the event such appeal is filed within the aforesaid period, the same shall be entertained and decided by the competent appellate authority in accordance with law, after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties. 25. It is made clear that the appellate authority shall consider the appeal independently on its own merits and shall not be prejudiced or influenced either by the observations made in the order dated 09.02.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge or by any observation made by us in the present order. The appellate authority shall examine the rival claims and the materials produced before it in accordance with law and pass a reasoned and speaking order. 26. Accordingly, the present appeal stands allowed."

The other eight respondents are: 2. The Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar, 3. The Collector, Bhojpur at Ara, 4. The Additional Collector, Bhojpur at Ara, 5. The Circle Officer, Ara, 6. Devki Singh, Nawada, Bhojpur, 7. Ayodhya Singh, Ara, Nawada, Bhojpur, 8. Bhagwati Singh, Nawada, Bhojpur and 9. Rajendra Singh, Nawada, Bhojpur. 

The order was passed upon hearing the intra court appeal against the 6-page long judgment dated February 9, 2026 passed in Devki Singh vs. The State of Bihar through Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department. Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), whereby the writ petition preferred by the writ-petitioners (respondent no.6 to 9 herein) came to be disposed of while setting aside the order dated December 29, 2025 passed by the Additional Collector, Bhojpur at Ara in Jamabandi Cancellation Case No.25 of 2025-26. The dispute related to land bearing Old Khata No. 5, Old Khesra No. 26 measuring 5 decimals, Old Khesra No. 27 measuring 45 decimals and Old Khesra No. 28 measuring 24.5 decimals, situated at Mauza Nawada, Town Ara. The writ-petitioners (respondent nos.6 to 9 herein) claimed the aforesaid land through their predecessor, Late Hargovind Ahir, who is stated to have purchased the land from the recorded raiyat, Indradev Pathak, through registered sale deed dated August 23, 1929 bearing Deed No. 5691. They also relied upon earlier Mahadanamas dated July 3, 1922, September 12, 1924 and June 21, 1927 and the subsequent revenue records in support of their claim. It was the case of the writ-petitioners that after the aforesaid purchase, Late Hargovind Ahir came in possession of the land and Jamabandi No. 75 was created in his favour. They relied upon a rent receipt of the year 1957 bearing receipt no. 653773, as also subsequent rent receipts, to contend that after the death of Late Hargovind Ahir in the year 1982, the jamabandi was mutated in the names of his four sons, namely, Ayodhya Singh, Bhagwati Singh, Rajendra Singh and Devki Singh, as Jamabandi No. 75/5 in the year 1985. According to them, rent receipts bearing the said jamabandi number were issued thereafter up to the year 2025. The writ-respondent no. 6, the appellant in the LPA, on the other hand, disputed the aforesaid claim and asserted his right over the disputed land on the basis of the chain of title traced from Late Indradev Pathak. The appellant’s case was that Late Bindeshwari Pathak, son of Late Indradev Pathak, had transferred the land in favour of Dulhin Hiraman Biwi, wife of Shyam Sundar Das, from whom the property subsequently came in possession of Rishab Sundar Das and thereafter his descendants. On the basis of the said claim, the appellant questioned the validity of Jamabandi No. 75 standing in favour of the writ-petitioners. The appellant accordingly instituted Jamabandi Cancellation Case No. 25 of 2025-26 seeking cancellation of Jamabandi No. 75. Notice was issued to the writ-petitioners. After considering the materials placed by the parties, including the respective rent receipts and the rival claims over the land, the Additional Collector, Bhojpur at Ara, by a reasoned order dated December  29, 2025, cancelled Jamabandi No.75.

Being aggrieved by the order of Additional Collector, Bhojpur at Ara, the writ-petitioners filed civil writ before the High Court seeking, inter alia, quashing of the order dated December  29, 2025 and restoration of Jamabandi No. 75 in their favour. Justice Purnendu Singh, the Single Judge disposed of the said writ
application, wherein, he observed: “7. Considering the nature of dispute and the manner in which the Circle Officers in Bihar from time to time in exercise of their jurisdiction has created frivolous cases by
putting one person in advantageous position and other to face the consequences of their illegal act. Present is the case where the petitioners claim to be in possession of the land, which has been disputed by the respondent no.6. The land has been described in above paragraphs of this writ petition. The Circle Officer in a very arbitrary and malafide manner has cancelled the Jamabandi standing in the name of the petitioners who also claim to be the owners. The record reveals that the respondent no.6 has filed application before the Circle Officer has admitted in his application that he was not in possession of the land. 8. It is well settled that the Revenue authorities have no power or jurisdiction to decide the complicated question of title and possession. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Faqruddin v. Tajuddin, reported in, (2008) 8 SCC 12, in para no. 44 and 45, held as under: 44. The jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue being limited, no title could have been conferred upon the plaintiff. Title in or over a land will depend upon the statutory provisions. A title does not remain in vacuum. It has to be determined keeping in view the law operating in the field viz. religious law or statutory law or customary law, etc. 45. Revenue authorities of the State are concerned with revenue. Mutation takes place only for certain purposes. The statutory rules must be held to be operating in a limited sense. The provisions of Rule 13 of the Matmi Rules laying down a rule of primogeniture will have no application in relation to the offices of
sajjadanashin and mutawalli, which are offices of different nature. They are stricto sensu not hereditary in nature. It is well settled that an entry in the revenue records is not a document of title. Revenue authorities cannot decide a question of title. 9. Considering the facts of the case as well as, the law laid down by the Apex Court in case of Faqruddin (Supra), I find that based on certain documents without verifying its genuity, the revenue authority has proceeded to decide the title of the parties and as such the order dated 29.12.2025 passed by the Additional Collector, Bhojpur is hereby set-aside and quashed. 10. The Collector, Bhojpur is directed to constitute a three-member committee of officials not below the rank of Additional Collector and based on the inquiry report, verify, as to whether, any other person also claim their interest with the original land holders in respect of the land in question and after providing opportunity to both the parties pass a reasoned order in accordance with law. 11. Accordingly, the present writ application stands disposed of.”

The counsel for the appellant had submitted that the impugned order dated February 9, 2026 was passed on the very first date of hearing, without affording any effective opportunity to the appellant to contest the writ petition. It was submitted that the appellant had appeared and raised an objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition, pointing out that the order of the Additional Collector was appealable under Section 9(6) of the Bihar Land Mutation Act. It was further submitted that the appellant had neither been served with a copy of the writ petition nor been granted an opportunity to file counter affidavit or advance submissions on merits. Despite the same, Justice Purnendu Singh, the Single Judge proceeded to set aside the reasoned order dated December 29, 2025, passed by the Additional Collector and directed constitution of a committee to enquire into the matter. The counsel submitted that the appellant had material documents in support of his claim and also disputed the documents relied upon by the writ petitioners, but these aspects could not be brought before the Single Judge for want of opportunity. It was, therefore, submitted that the impugned order is in violation of the principles of natural justice and deserves to be set aside on this ground alone. The counsel appearing for the private respondents submitted that the impugned order did not suffer from any illegality warranting interference in the appeal. It was submitted that the Single Judge had rightly exercised jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of the case and that the appellant had failed to demonstrate any perversity in the impugned order. It was, therefore, submitted that the LPA deserved to be dismissed.
 


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