Saturday, October 31, 2026

Justice Purnendu Singh's judgement affirmed by Patna High Court's Division Bench in a case of termination of an employee from Begusarai

In Mithun Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary, Rural Development Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Rana Vikram Singh delivered a 20-page long judgement dated October 28, 2026, wherein, it upheld the 11-page long judgment dated October 17, 2024 by Justice Purnendu Singh. The Letters Patent Appeal was preferred by the appellant challenging the judgment by Justice Singh, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant questioning the order dated September 6, 2019 dispensing with his contractual service as Rural Housing Assistant under the Rural Development Department, Government of Bihar, came to be dismissed. The principal questions which arose for consideration were whether the Justice Singh, the Single Judge was justified in upholding the order passed by the Deputy Development Commissioner, Lakhisarai, in view of Memo dated October 3, 2013 and Memo dated October 21, 2014, and whether the procedure adopted by the respondents in dispensing with the appellant’s services suffered from any illegality warranting interference in the appellate jurisdiction. The Division Bench judgement was authored by Justice Chaudhuri.   

Justice Singh had concluded:"10. From the records of the case, I find that the petitioner was terminated from service on the allegation that he was absent from the duty, while he was favoring one candidate in Lok Sabha Election, 2019, which according to this Court, falls under the category of misconduct, as such, I find no reason to interfere with the order of termination. It is further made clear that the petitioner has nowhere pleaded in his writ petition, whether the order of termination is stigmatic, calling for any reasons for interference supported with evidence. Rather, the impugned order has been issued after following the due procedure prescribed in the Circulars issued from time to time. 11. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed."  

The appellant was selected for appointment as Rural Housing Assistant in connection with the implementation of the Indira Gandhi Awas Yojana under the Rural Development Department. He was appointed on March 19, 2014 and thereafter entered into an agreement of service on March 24, 2014. His appointment was contractual in nature and was governed by the terms and conditions prescribed by the department. The departmental instructions contained in Memo dated October 3, 2013 prescribed the service conditions governing contractual employees, including the procedure relating to termination of their services. Subsequently, the department issued further instructions by Memo dated October 21, 2014. The interpretation and applicability of these two departmental communications constitute the principal point of controversy between the parties. While the appellant was continuing in service, a show-cause notice dated April 18, 2019 was issued by the Deputy Development Commissioner, Lakhisarai, alleging financial irregularities in the distribution of funds to beneficiaries under the housing scheme. The allegations included irregularities concerning the construction of houses and the uploading of the same photograph of a toilet in respect of two different beneficiaries. Thereafter, a further communication dated
April 26, 2019 was issued in connection with information received by the Block Development Office, Chanan, concerning a video in which the appellant was allegedly seen making statements in favour of candidates contesting the 2019 Lok Sabha election from the Begusarai parliamentary constituency. The appellant was also alleged to have been unauthorisedly absent from his place of work on April 25, 2019. The appellant submitted his explanation dated May 14, 2019. A further show-cause notice dated  May 20, 2019, was issued to him, and he submitted his reply dated June 18, 2019. The respondents did not accept the explanations furnished by him and, by order dated September 6, 2019, the Deputy Development Commissioner, Lakhisarai, dispensed with his services. 

The appellant challenged the said order before the District Magistrate, Lakhisarai. The appeal was rejected by order dated December 31, 2022, on the ground that the termination order had been passed on the directions of the District Magistrate and that the appeal was misconceived. The appellant thereafter preferred a revision petition before the Secretary, Rural Development Department, which was rejected by order dated December 5, 2023, communicated to him by letter dated January 2, 2024. 

The aggrieved appellant approached the High Court by filing C.W.J.C. No. 15324 of 2024. The Single Judge, after considering the rival submissions and the departmental instructions relied upon by the parties, dismissed the writ petition by judgment and order dated October 17, 2024. The appellant had questioned the said decision in the appeal. The counsel for the appellant contended that the order dated September 6, 2019 was passed by the Deputy Development Commissioner without jurisdiction and in violation of Memo dated October 21, 2014. According to the appellant, the said instructions prescribed a procedure under which the Block Development Officer was required to make a recommendation, the Deputy Development Commissioner was required to prepare the charge memorandum, and the District Magistrate was required to consider the matter after affording the concerned employee an opportunity of personal hearing before passing the final order. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that Memo dated October 21, 2014 introduced a procedure different from that contained in Memo dated October 3, 2013 and that the respondents could not have relied upon the earlier instructions to sustain an order passed in violation of the subsequent procedure. The appellant also questioned the termination on the ground that the allegations relating to financial irregularities were not established upon subsequent review and that the termination in fact rested upon the allegation concerning his alleged expression of political support during the 2019 Lok Sabha election from the Begusarai parliamentary constituency.

The respondents submitted that the Deputy Development Commissioner was the competent authority under Clause 11 of Memo dated October 3, 2013 and that Memo dated October 21, 2014 was issued in continuation of, and by way of clarification of, the earlier instructions. According to the respondents, Memo dated October 21, 2014 did not supersede the terms and conditions governing appointments already made under Memo dated October 3, 2013. The respondentssupported the judgment of Justice Singh.

Justice Chauduri considered the applicability of Memo dated October 21, 2014 to the appellant’s appointment. It was not in dispute that the appellant was appointed on March 19, 2014, whereas Memo dated October 21, 2014 was issued subsequently. He observed: "The distinction is material because the learned Single Judge proceeded on the basis that the subsequent communication clarified the service conditions without disturbing the terms and conditions of appointments already made before its issuance. 15. The effect of a subsequent administrative instruction upon an appointment already made must be determined from the language of the instruction itself. The mere fact that a subsequent communication deals with the same subject does not, by itself, establish that it supersedes the earlier instructions or retrospectively alters the conditions governing an existing contractual engagement. Equally, the description of a communication as clarificatory cannot be conclusive if its operative provisions disclose a substantive alteration of the earlier procedure." 

In this case, Justice Singh, the Single Judge had examined Memo dated October 21, 2014 and held that it had been issued in continuation of Memo dated October 3, 2013, without affecting the terms and conditions of appointments already made before its publication. The Single Judge also held that the subsequent communication did not have a superseding effect and that the Deputy Development Commissioner, being the appointing authority under the earlier instructions, was competent to take action
under Clause 11 thereof. The appellant had not merely relied upon the subsequent date of the communication but had questioned the extent to which Memo dated October 21, 2014 altered the procedure for termination. The objection, therefore, requires consideration with reference to the operative provisions of both departmental communications. In the absence of a demonstrated provision retrospectively substituting the authority competent to terminate an appointment already made, the appellant’s contention that the procedure contained in Memo dated October 21, 2014 necessarily governed his appointment cannot be accepted merely on the ground that the termination took place after October 21, 2014. The appellant’s appointment preceded the issuance of Memo dated October 21, 2014. 

Justice Chaudhuri observed: "The relevant question is whether the later instructions expressly or by necessary implication displaced the earlier terms governing such an appointment. The conclusion of the learned Single Judge that the subsequent instructions were clarificatory and did not supersede Memo No. 165209 dated 03.10.2013 is supported by the interpretation recorded in the impugned judgment. No material placed before us has been shown to establish that Memo No. 205985 dated 21.10.2014 expressly substituted the District Magistrate as the sole authority competent to terminate every contractual employee whose appointment had already been made under Memo No. 165209 dated 03.10.2013. 19. The principle that an authority must act within the limits of the power conferred upon it is well settled. In Krishna Kumar v. Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer, reported in (1979) 4 SCC 289, the Supreme Court examined the validity of an order of removal passed by an authority subordinate to the authority which had appointed the employee. The Court held that the delegation of appointment powers does not, by itself, elevate the delegate to the rank of the delegating authority or confer a power of removal contrary to the applicable constitutional guarantee. 20. The principle laid down in Krishna Kumar requires the Court to ascertain the authority by which the employee was appointed, the authority which passed the order of removal, and the legal source of the power exercised by the latter. The decision cannot, however, be applied without regard to the nature of the appointment and the provisions governing the service in question. In the present case, the appellant’s appointment was contractual, and the question of competence has to be examined primarily with reference to Memo No. 165209 dated 03.10.2013, Memo No. 205985 dated 21.10.2014, and the terms governing his engagement." 

The judgement reads: "21. Article 311 of the Constitution of India protects persons falling within its scope against dismissal or removal by an authority subordinate to that by which they were appointed. The mere fact that an individual is engaged by a government department does not, by itself, establish that every constitutional protection applicable to a holder of a civil post is available to that individual irrespective of the nature of the engagement. The applicability of Article 311 must be determined by examining the status of the post and the nature of the appointment. In the present case, the appellant’s principal challenge also arises under the departmental instructions governing contractual employees, and that objection must be examined independently of the constitutional contention."

Justice Chaudhuri noted that Justice Singh had accepted the respondents’ contention that the Deputy Development Commissioner was the appointing authority under Memo No. 165209 dated 03.10.2013 and that Memo No. 205985 dated 21.10.2014 did not confer upon the District Magistrate an exclusive power of removal in respect of an appointment already made under the earlier instructions. He recorded:"The appellant has not demonstrated, from the operative provisions governing his appointment, that the Deputy
Development Commissioner lacked authority under the applicable instructions. The finding of the learned Single Judge on this aspect, therefore, does not warrant interference on the grounds urged."

The judgement noted that the report dated November 3, 2023 referred to by the appellant was relevant to the extent that it recorded the departmental position concerning the financial irregularities. The appellant relied upon that report to contend that the financial allegations were not found to be true. Thus, the financial irregularities constituted, at most, an initial allegation or possible motive for examining the appellant’s conduct; they were not, according to the appellant, the established foundation of the termination order. "The existence of the report does not, however, dispense with the necessity of examining the actual termination order and the contemporaneous proceedings to determine the ground which formed the basis of the action taken in 2019." 

Justice Chaudhuri observed: "25. The distinction between misconduct which merely furnishes the motive for termination and misconduct which forms the foundation of a punitive order has been explained by the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd., reported in (1999) 2 SCC 21. The Court held that the true nature of a termination must be determined from the substance of the proceedings and the circumstances in which the order was passed, rather than merely from the terminology employed in the formal order. Where the finding of misconduct forms the foundation of termination, the consequences are materially different from a case in which an employer, without determining the truth of an allegation, decides not to continue an employee in service. 26. Applying the above principle, the financial irregularities alleged in the show-cause notice dated 18.04.2019 must be distinguished from the political-expression allegation contained in the communication dated 26.04.2019. The subsequent departmental review relied upon by the appellant reportedly did not establish the financial
allegations. The appellant’s specific case is that the actual basis of the order dated 06.09.2019 was the allegation that he had made political statements in favour of candidates contesting the 2019 Lok Sabha election from the Begusarai parliamentary constituency. If the authority treated that allegation as proved and terminated the appellant as a consequence of such finding, the allegation would constitute the foundation of the order and the termination would assume a punitive character, attracting the procedural safeguards applicable to such action. If, on the other hand, the allegation merely led the competent authority to decide not to continue a contractual engagement without recording a finding of misconduct, it would operate only as the motive for the decision. 27. The record, as reflected in the writ petition and the judgment under appeal, shows that the appellant was issued notices concerning both the financial irregularities and the alleged political statements and that explanations were submitted by him. The appellant’s case is that the financial allegations were not established and that the termination ultimately rested upon the allegation concerning the 2019 Lok Sabha election. The respondents, on the other hand, have maintained that the appellant’s conduct was unsatisfactory and that his services were terminated in accordance with the applicable conditions of appointment. 28. The relevant inquiry is not whether the allegation concerning the political statements is serious in the abstract, but whether the order dated 06.09.2019 was passed in exercise of a contractual power of termination or as a punitive consequence of a concluded finding of misconduct." 

Justice Chaudhuri noted that the judgment of the Justice Singh recorded that the appellant was terminated after the authority found that he had committed misconduct. The appellant’s contention that the order was founded upon a specific allegation therefore requires consideration of the contemporaneous termination order and the record of the proceedings. The mere existence of an allegation cannot, without more, determine the legal character of the order; the Court must ascertain whether the political-expression charge was merely the motive for discontinuance or the actual foundation of the termination. The allegation in question related exclusively to the 2019 Lok Sabha election from the Begusarai parliamentary constituency. Any reference to a 2021 Lok Sabha election would be inconsistent with the record and cannot form the basis of the decision. The legality of the termination must be examined with reference to the allegation actually made in the communication dated April 26, 2019 and the material relied upon by the competent authority at the time of passing the order dated September 6, 2019.

Justice Chaudhuri observed: "33. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of an appellate court under the Letters Patent is not exercised merely because another view of the facts or the departmental instructions may be possible. Interference is warranted where the judgment under appeal discloses an error of law, a material misappreciation of the record, or a conclusion which cannot be sustained on the applicable provisions. The question before this Court is whether the learned Single Judge committed such an error in dismissing the writ petition." 

The Division Bench judgment noted that Justice Singh, the Single Judge considered the competing interpretations and concluded that the subsequent communication was clarificatory and did not supersede the earlier instructions. The appellant did not demonstrate a sufficient basis for reversing that conclusion. The legal principles governing punitive termination and the requirement to examine the true foundation of an order remain applicable. 

Justice Chaudhuri concluded that "....the appellant has not demonstrated that the learned Single Judge committed an error warranting interference in concluding that the termination was sustainable under the applicable contractual and departmental framework....36. We make it clear that the conclusion reached in the present appeal rests upon the grounds raised and the material placed before the Court. Memo No. 165209 dated 03.10.2013 and Memo No. 205985 dated 21.10.2014 must be applied according to their actual terms. Likewise, the financial irregularities and the political-expression charge must not be conflated: the former were reportedly not established upon review, whereas the latter was the allegation relied upon as the actual basis of the termination. Neither the contractual nature of the appointment nor the mere issuance of a show-cause notice can, by itself, determine the legality of a termination. In the present case, however, the appellant has not established the jurisdictional or procedural error necessary to warrant
reversal of the judgment under appeal. 37. For the reasons recorded above, we find no sufficient ground to interfere with the judgment and order dated 17.10.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 15324 of 2024. 38. The Letters Patent Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. The judgment and order dated 17.10.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge are affirmed. 39. There shall be no order as to costs."

Justice Chaudhuri wrote: "40. Before parting with the judgement, this Court places on record its deep appreciation for the research and assistance rendered by Mr. Aditya Shekhar and Mr. Ribhav Raj, Legal Researchers, attached with this Court." He wrote these words of appreciation in two judgements authored and delivered on the last working day as a judge on October 28, 2026. 
 


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