In Shailendra Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar through The Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Mines and Geology, Govt. of Bihar, Patna & Ors. (2026), Justice Sandeep Kumar passed a 20-page long judgement dated April 3, 2026, wherein, he concluded: "....this Court deems it appropriate that the violation of principle of natural justice in the present case, warrants remand of the present matter to the District Magistrate-cum-District Mining Officer, Aurangabad for passing a reasoned and speaking order after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner in consonance with the principles of natural justice. 27. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 08.10.2025 issued by the District Magistrate-cum-District Mining Officer, Aurangabad is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted to the District Magistrate-cum-District Mining Officer, Aurangabad for passing a reasoned and speaking order after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 28. The writ petition is allowed to the above extent." The other three respondents were:Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Mines and Geology, Government of Bihar, District Magistrate-cum-Collector, Aurangabad-cum-District Mining Officer, Department of Mines and Geology, Government of Bihar, Aurangabad and Mines Development Officer, District Mining Office, Aurangabad.
The petitioner had prayed for quashing the order bearing Memo No.1396 dated October 8, 2025 issued under the signature of Respondent No.3 whereby the Earnest Money Deposited by the Petitioner in the auction for settlement of Sandghat Aurangabad Son-14A was arbitrarily forfeited. The writ petition sought direction upon District Magistrate-cum-Collector, Aurangabad-cum-District Mining Officer, Department of Mines and Geology, Government of Bihar, Aurangabad, the Respondent No. 3 to refund the amount of Rs. 2,34,22,500/- which was deposited by the petitioner as EMD in connection with Tender Notice for settlement of Sandghat Aurangabad Block 14-A (Aurangabad Son 14-A) or in alternative consider the said EMD submitted vide NEFT bearing UTR No. SBINR52025090597754809 as EMD for the fresh Tender Notice floated on October 20, 2025, including Aurangabad Son 14-A Sandghat at Serial 2. It had prayed for issuance of writ or order or a direction restraining the respondent from the proceeding with the fresh tender process pursuant to NIT dated October 20, 2025 in exclusion of the petitioner till adjudication and disposal of the writ petition. The petitioner had prayed for directing the Respondent No.3 to settle the Sandghat Aurangabad Son 14-A re-advertised vide short notice inviting Tender Notice dated October 20, 2025 in favour of the petitioner and for holding that the Respondent No. 3 admitting the existence of Technical glitch due to which the Petitioner could not participate in bidding process, could not have passed the impugned order forfeiting the EMD due to non-participation of the Petitioner in the bidding process on the date of bidding. He wanted the Court to hold that in the facts of the present case the Respondent No.3 could not have forfeited the EMD of the petitioner as due to admitted technical glitch, the petitioner could not have been alleged to have violated Clause 19(v) of the Tender Notice”.
The respondent-Department of Mines & Geology, Government of Bihar, published a tender notice for settlement of ghats situated in the district of Aurangabad including Aurangabad Sone 14-A. Being eligible, the petitioner participated in the bid and paid EMD of Rs. 2,34,22,500/- along with bid security amount of Rs.5000/- and Rs.5900 along with other necessary documents. According to the tender notice, the date and time for financial bidding/auction was slated for 16.09.2025 between 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM. It was the case of the petitioner that on the day of financial bid, he attempted to participate, however, according to him, he was prevented from participating in the financial bidding process on account of some technical error/glitch on the portal. The technical glitch preventing him from participating in the financial bid process on the specified date and within stipulated time was beyond the control of the petitioner. It was
the case of the petitioner that the petitioner immediately contacted the office of BELTRON which was entrusted for operating the e-portal at proc2.bihar.gov.in and therefore boda fide attempted to participate in the financial bidding process. It was also the case of the petitioner that he had submitted a representation dated September 16, 2025 requesting the respondent authorities to conduct the process afresh but vide impugned order dated October 8, 2025, the earnest money deposit of an amount of Rs.2,34,22,500/- was forfeited in terms of Clause-19(v) of the tender notice on the ground that the petitioner deliberately did not participate in the bidding process.
The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the forfeiture of the Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) of the petitioner was wholly illegal since he had attempted to log-in into the portal for participating in the e-auction process, however, for the reasons beyond the control of the petitioner he was prevented from participating in the aforesaid process. Consequent upon the representation dated September 16, 2025, filed by the petitioner, the respondent authorities had called for a report from BELTRON regarding the technical glitch on the date and time when the process of e-auction was going on, to which, BELTRON had replied vide its e-mail dated September 24, 2025 wherein, according to the counsel for the petitioner, BELTRON had admitted that there was indeed certain technical error on the portal of e-auction which had
subsisted till 1:01 P.M. on September 16, 2025. According to the tender notice, the auction process was only till 1:00 P.M. and therefore, the petitioner could not participate in the e-auction process. Adverting to Clauses- 14 and 19(v) of the tender notice, the counsel for the petitioner argued that though the participant to the e-auction process was vigilant regarding I.T. resources and its functioning, however, the technical glitch or issue on the portal itself was beyond the control of the petitioner and therefore, cannot result into punishing the petitioner himself, more-so, when admittedly, the respondents admitted to the existence of technical glitch on the portal. The counsel for the petitioner submitted no show-cause notice seeking explanation from the petitioner was issued before forfeiture of the EMD of the petitioner, which is in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and is bad in the eyes of law.
The petitioner's counsel submitted that for the settlement of sand ghat at Aurangabad Sone 14-A, altogether three participants including the petitioner had filed tender notice document and in the technical bid the petitioner and one M/s. Laxmi H.P. Gas Agency were found technically qualified for the bid. The counsel emphasized that M/S. Laxmi H.P. Gas Agency was automatically restrained from participating in the present bid process since one Sand Ghat i.e. Sand Ghat No.16-A had already been allotted to the aforesaid other participant and therefore, the said bidder being restrained from participating in the auction, therefore, the petitioner remained the sole bidder. Out of a total of three participants one was disqualified in the technical bid itself and out of remaining two bidders, one was restrained from participating in the bid process since he had already been allotted another sand ghat in the same district, and therefore, as a consequence, the petitioner remained the sole bidder and in such case, the provisions under Clause-19(vi) of the Tender Documents ought to have been applied whereunder the respondents were bound to issue a fresh auction and in case of no participation even in response to such fresh notice, the respondent no.3 would be required to make necessary recommendation to the respondent department for decision on the point of acceptance of the proposal of the single bidder. Therefore, once the co-bidder M/S. Laxmi H.P. Gas Agency was prevented from participating and the petitioner was left as the single bidder, the provisions of Clause-19(vi) ought to have been implemented and the respondent no.3 had to issue a notice instead of passing the impugned order forfeiting the E.M.D. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order forfeiting the E.M.D. of the petitioner was punitive, arbitrary and wholly illegal and deserves to be quashed and set aside.
Notably, during the pendency of the case, the respondents had come out with fresh tender notice for the settlement of the subject sand ghat and in these circumstance the High Court vide order dated November 4, 2025, had permitted the petitioner to participate in the fresh tender process without depositing fresh E.M.D. subject to the final outcome of this writ petition. Thereafter, a supplementary affidavit was filed by the petitioner stating therein that pursuant to the order of the High Court he was allowed to participate in the fresh bidding process but the petitioner failed to succeed in the said fresh bidding process.
Justice Kumar observed: "It appears that the petitioner was neither issued notice nor was heard before forfeiting his E.M.D., which clearly violates the principles of nature justice." He relied on Supreme Court's decision in Krishnadatt Awasthy vs. State of M.P. & Ors., reported as (2025) 7 SCC 545 wherein it emphasized on the imperativeness of principles of natural justice, particularly, before an administrative authority acting as a quasi judicial function. It observed:“43. The opportunity of hearing is considered so fundamental to any civilised legal system that the courts have read the principles of natural justice into an enactment to save it from being declared unconstitutional on procedural grounds [Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn., (1985) 3 SCC 545]. 44. It has been argued before us that if the failure to provide hearing does not cause prejudice, observing the principle of natural justice may not be necessary. In this context, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379] speaking through Chinappa Reddy, J. considered such arguments to be “pernicious” and held that “[t]he non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary”. The Supreme Court, however, has drawn out an exception where “on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible, and under the law only one penalty is permissible, then the Court may not compel the observance of natural justice” [Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664 : (1981) 51 Comp Cas 210; Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 965]. 45. Professor I.P. Massey [I.P. Massey, Administrative Law (8th Edn., 2012).] has commented on this shift as under: “Before the decision of the highest Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379], the rule was that the principles of natural justice shall apply only when an administrative action has caused some prejudice to the person, meaning thereby that he must have suffered some “civil consequences”. Therefore, the person had to show something extra in order to prove “prejudice” or civil consequences. This approach had stultified the growth of administrative law within an area of highly practical significance. It is gratifying that in Jagmohan [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379] , the
Court took a bold step in holding that a separate showing of prejudice is not necessary. The non-observance of natural justice is in itself prejudice caused. However, merely because facts are admitted or are undisputable it does not follow that the principles of natural justice need not be observed.” 46. In State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717], the Supreme Court observed that where an enquiry is not convened by any statutory provision and the only obligation of the administrative authority is to observe the principles of natural justice, the court/tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of the rule of fair hearing and violation of the facet of that rule. In other words, a distinction must be made between “no opportunity” or “no adequate opportunity”. In the case of the former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid and the authority may be asked to conduct proceedings afresh according to the rule of fair hearing. But in the latter case, the effect of violation of a facet of the rule of fair hearing has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice."
Drawing on Supreme Court's decision in the case of Krishnadatt Awasthy (supra), Justice Kumar pointed out that "it is clear that the principles of nature justice must be adhered to strictly. However, in the present case, the same has not been adhered to since the earnest money deposited by the petitioner has been forfeited without having been given an opportunity of hearing. In my opinion, the petitioner should have been issued a proper notice and should have been given an opportunity of hearing before forfeiture of the earnest money deposited by the petitioner."
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