Patna High Court's delivered five judgements on January 16, 2026 in Nitesh Kumar vs. The Union of India through Assistant Director, Patna Zonal Office, Enforcement Directorate (E.D.), Minta Devi vs. The State of Bihar, Ran Vijay Kumar @ Ranvijay Kumar Gupta vs. Sanjay Kumar, Kumar Sidharth vs. The State of Bihar and In view of Honble courts order dt. 19-07-2024 passed in CWJC No.6995 of 2019 vs. The State of Bihar.
In Nitesh Kumar vs. The Union of India through Assistant Director, Patna Zonal Office, Enforcement Directorate (E.D.) (2026), Justice Sandeep Kumar delivered a 29-page long judgment concluded:"26. In the considered opinion of this Court, the petitioner, who is in custody since 20.12.2023 having clean antecedent and similarly situated co-accused persons have been granted bail by a coordinate Bench of this Court, deserves to be enlarged on bail on the grounds of his prolonged incarceration and that there being no possibility of conclusion of trial in near future. Further, keeping the petitioner in custody without actually being held guilty would be against Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of V. Senthil Balaji (supra) and Manish Sisodia (supra). 27. Accordingly, let the petitioner be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (PMLA), Patna / concerned Court below, in connection with Special Trial (P.M.L.A.) Case No.12 of 2023, arising out of E.C.I.R. No. PTZO/27/2023, subject to the following conditions:-
i. The petitioner shall not leave the country without the permission of the Trial Court;
ii. The petitioner shall appear before the Special Court/concerned Court as and when the matter shall be taken up i.e. on each and every date.
iii. The petitioner shall provide his mobile number to the Enforcement Directorate at the time of his release, which shall be kept in working condition and active at all times and he shall not switch off or change the same without prior intimation to the Enforcement Directorate during the period of bail.
iv. In case, the petitioner changes his address, he will inform the Enforcement Directorate as well as to the concerned Court.
v. The petitioner shall not indulge in any criminal activity during the bail period.
vi. The petitioner shall not influence the prosecution witnesses directly or remotely.
vii. The prosecuting agency will be at liberty to file an application for modification/recalling of the order passed by this Court if the petitioner violates any of the conditions imposed by this Court.
28. Accordingly, the present bail application is allowed with the aforesaid conditions.
29. Needless to state that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case."
Justice Kumar drew on Supreme Court's decision in V. Senthil Balaji vs. The Deputy Director, Directorate
of Enforcement reported as 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626, wherein the Court has held that the Constitutional Courts can enlarge the accused on bail in cases of continued and prolonged incarceration and where there is no possibility of conclusion of trial in near future. The petitioner's counsel relied on Supreme Court's judgement in Sagar vs. State of U.P. & Anr. reported as 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2584.
He also relied on Supreme Court's decision in Manish Sisodiya vs. Directorate of Enforcement reported as (2024) 12 SCC 660, wherein it has clarified and crystallized the law on the aspect of harmonization between the stringent twin conditions under section 45 of the P.M.L.A. and the valuable and treasured right to personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The relevant portion of the aforesaid decision read as under:-
“47. We find that, on account of a long period of incarceration running for around 17 months and the trial even not having been commenced, the appellant has been deprived of his right to speedy trial.
48. As observed by this Court, the right to speedy trial and the right to liberty are sacrosanct rights. On denial of these rights, the trial court as well as the High Court ought to have given due weightage to this factor.
49. Recently, this Court had an occasion to consider an application for bail in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v.
State of Maharashtra [(2024) 9 SCC 813] wherein the accused was prosecuted under the provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. This Court surveyed the entire law right from the judgment of this Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P. [(1978) 1 SCC 240], Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab [(1980) 2 SCC 565], Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81], Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] and Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI [(2022) 10 SCC 51].
50. The Court observed thus: (Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh case
“17. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21of the Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime.”
51. The Court also reproduced the observations made in Gudikanti Narasimhulu [(1978) 1 SCC 240], which read thus:
“8. In the aforesaid context, we may remind the trial courts and the High Courts of what came to be observed by this Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P. (1978) 1 SCC 240. We quote (SCC p. 243, para 5):
‘5. … What is often forgotten, and therefore warrants reminder, is the object to keep a person in judicial custody pending trial or disposal of an appeal. Lord Russel, C.J., said [R. v. Rose (1898) 18 Cox CC 717]:
“I observe that in this case bail was refused for the prisoner. It cannot be too strongly impressed on the magistracy of the country that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment, but that the requirements as to bail are merely to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial.”
52. The Court in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh case further observed that, over a period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have forgotten a very well-settled principle of law that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. From our experience, we can say that it appears that the trial courts and the High Courts attempt to play safe in matters of grant of bail. The principle that bail is a rule and refusal is an exception is, at times, followed in breach. On account of non-grant of bail even in straightforward open-and-shut cases, this Court is flooded with huge number of bail petitions thereby adding to the huge pendency. It is high time that the trial courts and the High Courts should recognise the principle that “bail is rule and jail is exception”.
53. In the present case, in ED matter as well as CBI matter, 493 witnesses have been named. The case involves thousands of pages of documents and over a lakh pages of digitised documents. It is thus clear that there is not even the remotest possibility of the trial being concluded in the near future. In our view, keeping the appellant behind bars for an unlimited period of time in the hope of speedy
completion of trial would deprive his fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. As observed time and again, the prolonged incarceration before being pronounced guilty of an offence should not be permitted to become punishment without trial.
54. As observed by this Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240, the objective to keep a person in judicial custody pending trial or disposal of an appeal is to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial.
55. In the present case, the appellant is having deep roots in the society. There is no possibility of him fleeing available for facing the trial. In any case, conditions can be imposed to address the concern of the State.
56. Insofar as the apprehension given by the learned ASG regarding the possibility of tampering the evidence is concerned, it is to be noted that the case largely depends on documentary evidence which is already seized by the prosecution. As such, there is no possibility of tampering with the evidence. Insofar as the concern with regard to influencing the witnesses is concerned, the said concern can be addressed by imposing stringent conditions upon the appellant.” (emphasis supplied).
Justice Kumar observed: "In light of the aforesaid judgments, it is evident that the stringent requirement under section 45 of the P.M.L.A. for grant of bail i.e. the twin conditions do not create an absolute restraint or barrier in granting bail on the grounds of delay in conclusion of trial and long period of incarceration.
Justice Kumar did not agree with the counsel for the Enforcement Directorate who relied upon the following decisions in order to contend that in the facts of the present case the threshold of section 45 of the P.M.L.A. is not met and therefore, the petitioner may not be enlarged on bail:-
i. Tarun Kumar vs. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement reported as 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486;
ii. Enforcement Directorate vs. Aditya Tripathi reported as 2023 SCC OnLine SC619;
iii. State of Bihar & Anr. vs. Amit Kumar @Bachcha Rai reported as (2017) 4 SCR 503
iv. Nitesh Purohit vs. Enforcement Directorate reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Chh 3828
v. Union of India vs. Kanhaiya Prasad reported as 2025 SCC OnLine SC 306;
vi. Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma vs. Union of India reported as 2025 INSC 349.
Justice Kumar recalled the Supreme Court's decision in the Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs. Union of India reported as (2023) 12 SCC 1, the Supreme Court while upholding the Constitutionality of section 45 of the P.M.L.A. has held that though the aforesaid provision imposes stringent twin conditions for grant of bail, but the aforesaid statutory straint on the grant of bail and the discretion vests in the Court, which is to be exercised fairly, judiciously and not in an arbitrary manner. The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid decision read as under:-
“302. It is important to note that the twin conditions provided under Section 45 of the 2002 Act, though restrict the right of the accused to grant of bail, but it cannot be said that the conditions provided under Section 45 impose absolute restraint on the grant of bail. The discretion vests in the court which is not arbitrary or irrational but judicial, guided by the principles of law as provided under Section 45 of the 2002 Act. While dealing with a similar provision prescribing twin conditions in Mcoca, this Court in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma [(2005) 5 SCC 294] held as under :-
“44. The wording of Section 21(4), in our opinion, does not lead to the conclusion that the court must arrive at a positive finding that the applicant for bail has not committed an offence under the Act. If such a construction is placed, the court intending to grant bail must arrive at a finding that the applicant has not committed such an offence. In such an event, it will be impossible for the prosecution to obtain a judgment of conviction of the applicant. Such cannot be the intention of the legislature. Section 21(4) of Mcoca, therefore, must be construed reasonably. It must be so construed that the court is able to maintain a delicate balance between a judgment of acquittal and conviction and an order granting bail much before commencement of trial. Similarly, the court will be required to record a finding as to the possibility of his committing a crime after grant of bail. However, such an offence in futuro must be an offence under the Act and not any other offence. Since it is difficult to predict the future conduct of an accused, the court must necessarily consider this aspect of the matter having regard to the antecedents of the accused, his propensities and the nature and manner in which he is alleged to have committed the offence.
45. It is, furthermore, trite that for the purpose of considering an application for grant of bail, although detailed reasons are not necessary to be assigned, the order granting bail must demonstrate application of mind at least in serious cases as to why the applicant has been granted or denied the privilege of bail.
46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. However, while dealing with a special statute like Mcoca having regard to the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Act, the court may have to probe into the matter deeper so as to enable it to arrive at a finding that the materials collected against the accused during the investigation may not justify a judgment of conviction. The findings recorded by the court while granting or refusing bail undoubtedly would be tentative in nature, which may not have any bearing on the merit of the case and the trial court would, thus, be free to decide the case on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial, without in any manner being prejudiced thereby.”
(emphasis supplied
303. We are in agreement with the observation made by the Court in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma. The Court while dealing with the application for grant of bail need not delve deep into the merits of the case and only a view of the court based on available material on record is required. The court will not weigh the evidence to find the guilt of the accused which is, of course, the work of the trial court. The court is only required to place its view based on probability on the basis of reasonable material collected during investigation and the said view will not be taken into consideration by the trial court in recording its finding of the guilt or acquittal during trial which is based on the evidence adduced during the trial. As explained by this Court in Nimmagadda Prasad v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 466, the words used in Section 45 of the 2002 Act are “reasonable grounds for believing” which means the court has to see only if there is a genuine case against the accused and the prosecution is not required to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt.”
Justice Kumar referred to Supreme Court's decision in Prem Prakash vs. Union of India through Directorate of Enforcement reported as (2024) 9 SCC 787 which relied upon Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) to hold as under:-
“12. All that Section 45 PMLA mentions is that certain conditions are to be satisfied. The principle that, “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” is only a paraphrasing of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Liberty of the individual is always a Rule and deprivation is the exception. Deprivation can only be by the procedure established by law, which has to be a valid and reasonable procedure. Section 45 PMLA by imposing twin conditions does not re-write this principle to mean that deprivation is the norm and liberty is the exception. As set out earlier, all that is required is that in cases where bail is subject to the satisfaction of twin conditions, those conditions must be satisfied.
13. Independently and as has been emphatically reiterated in Manish Sisodia v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 12 SCC 660, relying on Ramkripal Meena v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 12 SCC 684 and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 9 SCC 813, where the accused has already been in custody for a considerable number of months and there being no likelihood of conclusion of trial within a short span, the rigours of Section 45 PMLA can be suitably relaxed to afford conditional liberty. Further, Manish Sisodia v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 12 SCC 660 reiterated the holding in Javed Gulam Nabi Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 9 SCC 813], that keeping persons behind the bars for unlimited periods of time in the hope of speedy completion of trial would deprive the fundamental right of persons under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and that prolonged incarceration before being pronounced guilty ought not to be permitted to become the punishment without trial.
14. In fact, Manish Sisodia v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 12 SCC 660 reiterated the holding in Manish Sisodia v. CBI (2024) 12 SCC 691: wherein it was held as under : (Manish Sisodia case [Manish
Sisodia v. CBI, (2024) 12 SCC 691 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1393], SCC paras 34-35)
“34. Detention or jail before being pronounced guilty of an offence should not become punishment without trial. If the trial gets protracted despite assurances of the prosecution, and it is clear that case will not be decided within a foreseeable time, the prayer for bail may be meritorious. While the prosecution may pertain to an economic offence, yet it may not be proper to equate these cases with those punishable with death, imprisonment for life, ten years or more like offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, murder, cases of rape, dacoity, kidnapping for ransom, mass violence, etc. Neither is this a case where 100/1000s of depositors have been defrauded. The allegations have to be established and proven.
35. The right to bail in cases of delay, coupled with incarceration for a long period, depending on the nature of the allegations, should be read into Section 439 of the Code and Section 45 of the PML Act. The reason is that the constitutional mandate is the higher law, and it is the basic right of the person charged of an offence and not convicted, that he be ensured and given a speedy trial. When the trial is not proceeding for reasons not attributable to the accused, the court, unless there are good reasons, may well be guided to
exercise the power to grant bail. This would be truer where the trial would take years.”
Justice Kumar drew on this background to observe that Section 45 PMLA needs to be understood and applied. Article 21 being a higher constitutional right, statutory provisions should align themselves to the said higher constitutional edict.The Constitutional Court cannot allow provisions like Section 45(1)(ii) to become instruments in the hands of the ED to continue incarceration for a long time when there is no possibility of a trial of the scheduled offence and the PMLA offence concluding within a reasonable time. If the Constitutional Courts do not exercise their jurisdiction in such cases, the constitutional rights of the undertrials will be defeated.
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