In Saif Ahmad vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhir Singh and Rajesh Kumar Verma delivered a 18-page long judgement dated October 16, 2025, upon hearing an appeal was preferred against the judgment of acquittal dated April 22, 2024 in favour of Alamgir, Safi Rijwan, Firdos Ahmad, Arsad Hussain @ Dadu, Fasi Rijwan, Abdul Manaan, Jubair Akhtar @ Jibbu, Ansar Ahmad, Sana Jamal @Sannu and Aslam Jamal who were respondent Nos. 2 to 11 in a case which arose out of a P.S. case of 1994 from Ara Nagar Thana, of Bhojpur district. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal. The judgement of the Division Bench was authored by Justice Singh.
Prior to this the judgment of acquittal was passed by the District and Sessions Judge, Bhojpur, Ara in a Sessions Trial of 2001, wherein these Respondent Nos. 2 to 11 were acquitted by the Trial Court from the charge of Sections 302/149, 148 of Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The appeal was filed on June 20, 2024 and registered on June 24, 2024 in the Patna High Court.
The prosecution case, as per the F.I.R. was that on December 21, 1994 at about 11:00 am, the informant was sitting and talking with Safdar Ahmad, Faiz Ahmad, Haider Ahmed and Farid Ahmad in his room and the deceased Safdar Ahmad was standing near the window of the same room and having breakfast. At about 11:15 am, Riyasat Hussain, Safi Rijwan, Fasi Rijwan alias Tunnu, Sannu alias Sana Jamal, Aslam, Abdul Manaan, Junaid Ahmad, Alamgir, Firdos Ahmad, Ansar Ahmad, Arshad alias Dadu, Isthiyak Ahmad and Jibbu, all armed with weapons such as pistols, and country made guns, came to the informant’s door. Upon arriving, Riyasat Hussain said to all the persons accompanying him, “This is a good opportunity, everyone is gathered together, kill them.” After saying this, Riyasat Hussain fired a shot from his which hit the informant’s brother Safdar Ahmad, the deceased, who was standing near the window eating breakfast. It was also alleged that, Fasi Rijwan, Aslam, Junaid Ahmad, and Arshad alias Dadu, who were all armed with guns, fired indiscriminately on the informant and his brother. The informant stated that the rest of the people hid in the room to save their lives. The informant’s brother, Safdar Ahmad, was badly injured by the gunfire and fell on the bench inside the room. Seeing this, Riyasat Hussain said, “Run, the job is done,” and they fled. By then, Asif Ahmad, Sajid Ahmed, Imran Alam, Sakin Daulatpur, and many other people from the neighborhood came running and witnessed the incident and the fleeing of the accused. The informant and others then brought his brother to Sadar Hospital, Ara for treatment, where informant’s brother, Safdar Ahmad, died. The informant claimed that all the mentioned accused, acting in collusion, killed the informant’s brother and fatally attacked the informant and others, who saved their lives by hiding in the room. This statement of the informant was recorded on December 21, 1994 at 1:30 pm on the veranda of the medical ward in Sadar Hospital, Ara.
On the basis of written report of the informant, a Ara Town P.S. case was instituted under Sections 302/149, 148 of Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act and investigation was taken up by the police. The police after investigation submitted charge-sheet against respondents, and accordingly, cognizance was taken. Thereafter the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. Charges were framed against the accused persons under Sections 302/149, 148 of Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
During the trial, the prosecution examined altogether twelve prosecution witnesses i.e. PW1 Haider Ahmad, PW2 Fareed Ahmad, PW3 Imran Alam, PW4 Md. Kafil, PW5 Rajesh Kumar, PW6 Ramakant Mahto, PW7 Kamaldev Kumar Yadav, and PW8 Saif Ahmad (Informant), PW9 Irshad Akhtar, PW10 Dr. Anil Kishore Prasad, PW11 Awdhesh Kumar and PW12 Ramcharitra Prasad.
After closure of prosecution evidence, the statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and after conclusion of trial, trial Court has acquitted the accused persons. The trial Court on the basis of the materials available on record, and the evidence produced before the Court, acquitted the accused persons observing that the prosecution completely failed to prove its story, place of occurrence and cause of action beyond a reasonable doubt by sufficient, effective, and material evidence. The trial Court held that there are contradictions with respect to who shot the deceased. The trial Court also held that the manner of the occurrence and the prosecution story are doubtful in the present case.
The appellant's counsel submitted that the trial Court miserably failed to appreciate the fact that the prosecution witnesses as well as the official witnesses have completely supported the prosecution case.
The counsel for the State submitted that there is no perversity in the judgment of the trial court, and the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused before the learned trial court. Therefore, the order of the trial court requires no interference in the present case.
The Division Bench observed that the sole question that requires consideration by the High Court was whether the impugned judgment requires any interference by this Court. It observed that the place of occurrence in the present case was not established by the prosecution. The evidence of PW1, 2, 3, and 8 suggested that the place of the alleged occurrence was the house of the informant. However, the evidence of the PW4, 5, 6, and 7 suggested that the place of occurrence was Satapahadi Mela. The Mela, as per the evidence of PW1 was organised approximately 300m away from the house of the informant. The informant (PW8) in his evidence stated that the alleged occurrence took place in the middle room of the ground floor of his house. However, the I.O. (PW12) in his evidence stated that alleged occurrence took place in the Uttarwari Kamra (North Side Room). As such there was a discrepancy in the place of the occurrence, if the evidence of all the prosecution witnesses are read together. Therefore, the prosecution clearly failed to establish a place of occurrence in the present case.
Justice Singh relied on para 11 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Syed Ibrahim vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 601. The Court held: “11…..But there is another significant factor which completely destroys the prosecution version and the credibility of PW 1 as a witness. He has indicated four different places to be the place of occurrence. In his examination-in-chief he stated that the occurrence took place in his house. In the cross-examination he stated that the incident took place at the house of his wife, the deceased's mother. This is a very important factor considering the undisputed position and in fact the admission of PW 1 that he and his wife were separated nearly two decades ago, and that he was not on visiting terms with his wife. Then the question would automatically arise as to how in spite of strained relationship he could have seen the occurrence as alleged in the house of his wife. That is not the end of the matter. In his cross-examination he further stated that the incident happened in the small lane in front of the house of his wife. This is at clear variance with the statement that the occurrence took place inside the house where allegedly he, the deceased, his son, PW 2 and daughters, PWs 3 and 6 were present. That is not the final say of the witness. He accepted that in the FIR (Ext. P-1) he had stated the place of occurrence to be the house of the deceased. Though the FIR is not a substantive evidence yet, the same can be used to test the veracity of the witness. PW 1 accepted that what was stated in the FIR was correct. When the place of occurrence itself has not been established it would not be proper to accept the prosecution version.”
Justice Singh recorded: ''15. Four people were said to be present in the room with the informant at the time of the occurrence, and it is alleged that indiscriminate firing took place in the room upon them. However, except the deceased, no one else who was present in the room sustained any injuries. Further, the prosecution witnesses who were present in the room, i.e., PW1, 2 and 8 during the trial have stated that the deceased while standing at the window had sustained firearm injury and thereafter he fell down. It is surprising that once a person had fallen down after sustaining a firearm injury which he had received through the window, the subsequent injuries sustained by the deceased goes unexplained which makes the manner of occurrence doubtful as well as the place of occurrence also becomes doubtful." He relied on trial court's judgment with respect to manner of occurrence.
Justice Singh observed: ''16. There are also material contradictions in the evidence of PW1 and PW2 with respect to who open fired. PW1 states in his evidence that only four persons open fired, whereas PW2 in his evidence states that all the accused persons open fired. Upon perusal of records of the case, we find that the learned trial Court had correctly found discrepancy in the manner of occurrence. Therefore, on the basis of the discussions made above, the manner of the alleged occurrence has also been not proved by the prosecution in the present case.'' He added:'' 17. Upon examination of the medical evidence in the present case, we find that the medical evidence is also inconsistent with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses during the trial. PW1, 2 and 8 who claim to present at the place of occurrence have stated that the shots were fired from a distance of about 20-25 feet. However, the learned trial Court has rightly held that such nature of injuries could only be inflicted if the shots are fired from a close range of 2-3 feet, relying on Modi’s –A Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology.'' Based on trial court's judgement, he referred to inconsistencies found in the medical evidence in the present case.
Justice Singh noted that it was alleged that ''indiscriminate firing was done by the accused persons at the place of occurrence, and the all the accused persons were armed with pistols/guns/country-made guns. However, upon perusal of records in the present case it is evident that no empty cartridge at the place of the alleged occurrence has been recovered by the police. Also, no weapon has been recovered by police, even though in the FIR specific allegations with respect to ownership and license details of the gun were made. 20. Therefore, we are of the view that the prosecution has been unable to prove the guilt of the accused beyond the shadow of reasonable doubts in the present case. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court do not suffer from any illegality and perversity. In a criminal case, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond the shadow of a reasonable doubt. Wherever, any doubt is cast upon the case of the prosecution, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.''
The judgment of the Division Bench reads: ''21. In criminal appeal against acquittal what the Appellate Court has to examine is whether the finding of the learned Court below is perverse and prima facie illegal. Once the Appellate Court comes to the finding that the grounds on which the judgment is based is not perverse, the scope of appeal against acquittal is limited considering the fact that the legal presumption about the innocence of the accused is further strengthened by the finding of the Court.''
Justice Singh considered the decision of the Supreme Court in Surajpal Singh & Ors. vs. State, as reported in 1951 SCC 1207. It reads: “13. It is well established that in an appeal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.”
The High Court also drew on Supreme Court's decision in Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, as reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415. The Court reiterated and laid down the general principles to followed while
dealing with appeal against an order of acquittal. The relevant paragraph of the judgment reads: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such
power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”,
“very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail
extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the
nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with
acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in
favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental
principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption
of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
Justice Singh referred to para 75 in Supreme Court's judgement of Ghurey Lal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh as reported in (2008) 10 SCC 450. It reads: “75. ......The trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence, therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the trial court. An acquittal by the trial court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.”
The Division bench concluded: ''24. Thus, an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only for compelling and substantial reasons. In case if the order is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference. But where there is no perversity in the finding of the impugned judgment of acquittal, the Appellate Court must not take a different view only because another view is possible. It is because the trial Court has the privilege of seeing the demeanour of witnesses and, therefore, its decision must not be upset in absence of strong and compelling grounds. 25. In view of the above, we do not find any illegality and perversity in the findings recorded by the trial Court."
The decision in Saif Ahmad vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025) was one of the 14 judgements delivered during October 7, 2025-October 16, 2025 by Justice Singh in The State of Bihar vs. Dr. Manindra Kumar Manish, Abhishek Kumar Tanti vs. The State of Bihar, Sunita Devi vs. The State of Bihar, Umesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Rajesh Prasad Rai vs. The State of Bihar, Ranjeet Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Vinod Kumar Singh @ Vinod Prasad vs. The State of Bihar, In-Re, Suo Motu cognizance taken by the Honble Court for initiation of contempt proceeding vs. Mr. Jitendra Prasad, The Union of India vs. Manish Kumar, Punam Devi @ Reena @ Reeta Devi vs. The State of Bihar, Laxmeshwar Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar, The Union of India vs. Vishwa Mohan Kumar (In person) and Jhabu Kumar Ram Vs. The Union of India.
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