BiharWatch-Journal of Justice, Jurisprudence and Law: Justice Sudhir Singh appointed Acting Chief Justice, Patna High Court awaits appointment of 19 judges

The Appointments Division, Department of Justice, Union Ministry of Law and Justice issued a notification dated October 21, 2025 whereby it appointed Justice Sudhir Singh as the Acting Chief Justice of Patna High Court. The notification reads: ''In exercise of the power conferred by Article 223 of the Constitution of India, the President is pleased to appoint Shri Justice Sudhir Singh, Judge of the Patna High Court, to perform the duties of office of the Chief Justice of that High Court with effect from 23.10.2025 consequent upon the retirement of Shri Justice Pavankumar Bhimappa Bajanthri, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court on 22.10.2025.'' Justice Sing is the son of Justice N.P. Singh, former judge of the Supreme Court. Justice Singh will retire on December 10, 2027.

A copy of the notification has been sent to Justice Singh through the Registrar General, Patna High Court, Secretary to Governor, Bihar, Secretary to Chief Minister, Secretary to the Chief Justice, Patna High Court, Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Registrar General, Patna High Court, Accountant General, Bihar, President's Secretariat, Rashtrapati Bhawan, New Delhi, PS to the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Prime Minister's Office, New Delhi, Registrar (Conf), Supreme Court of India and others.

During July 22, 2025-October 18, 2025, Justice Singh headed bench has delivered 130 judgements. In his previous tenure, he was part of a bench which had delivered 1576 judgements during April 15, 2015-October 16, 2023.

Justice returned to the High Court and took oath as a judge of the High Court on July 22, 2025. He was administered the oath of office by the 45th Chief Justice Vipul M Pancholi. In October 2023, he was transferred from Patna High Court to the Punjab and Haryana High Court following the recommendation by the Supreme Court Collegium of Chief Justice Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice B. R. Gavai and Justice Surya Kant During the tenure of Justice Krishnan Vinod Chandran, the 44th Chief Justice of India. Justice Singh was sworn in as a Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana on November 2, 2023.

Reversing the recommendation of the previous Collegium, the current Supreme Court Collegium of Chief Justice B.R. Gavai, Justices Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, J.K. Maheshwari and B.V. Nagarathna in its meeting held on May 26, 2025 recommended repatriation of Justice Singh to the parent High Court. These recommendations were made keeping in mind the idea of 'better administration of justice'.

Justice Singh was elevated from the bar to be an additional judge of the Patna High Court on April 15, 2015 during the tenure of Justice L. Narasimha Reddy, the 38th Chief Justice. On the first day as a judge he sat with Justice Reddy as part of the High Court's Division Bench on April 15, 2015. The first case he heard as part of the Division Bench was Dhiraj Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary, Human Resources Department, Patna & Ors. (2015), wherein, the 6-page long order dated March 7, 2014 by Justice Shivaji Pandey was upheld by the Division Bench's 3-page long order dated April 15, 2015. Justice Pandey had quashed the order dated August 22, 2011 passed by the Appellate Authority in a case of 2009. He had remanded the matter back to the District Teacher Employment Appellate Authority, Begusarai who was directed to decide the case within six months. The Division Bench's order was authored by Chief Justice Narasimha Reddy.

After more than a month of his appointment as an additional judge, as part of the Division Bench which included Chief Justice Reddy, Justice Singh authored his first 9-page long judgement dated June 26, 2015 in Baban Ram @ Baban Dusadh @ Bababan Dusadh & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2025). He concluded:''In our endeavour to ensure that none of the relevant facts miss our attention, we have gone through the entire record carefully. What we find from them is that there is hardly any consistency between the version presented in the fardbeyan and the evidence adduced in the trial. Viewed from any angle, we find that the prosecution failed to prove its case against the appellant nos. 1, 3 and 4 herein. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence ordered by the trial court. Since the appellant no. 1 Baban Ram @ Baban Dusadh @ Bababan Dusadh, appellant no. 3. Suresh Kanu @ Suresh Sah and appellant no. 4 Krishna Koiri are already on bail, their bail bonds shall stand cancelled.''

The case arose from Dinara, Rohtas. The appeal was filed in the High Court against the judgment of conviction dated April 25, 1992 and order of sentence dated April 27, 1992, passed by Ram Nath, Ist Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtas at Sasaram, in Sessions Trial No. 273/9 of 1989/1990, by which all the five appellants, namely, Baban Ram @ Baban Dusadh @ Bababan Dusadh, Ram Nath Sah @ Ram Nath Kanu, Suresh Kanu @ Suresh Sah, Krishna Koiri and Babu Ram @ Babu Ram Dusadh were found guilty of committing the offence under Sections 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code and were sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life, whereas the appellant no. 1 Baban Ram @ Baban Dusadh @ Bababan Dusadh, appellant no. 3 Suresh Kanu @ Suresh Sah and appellant no. 5 Babu Ram @ Babu Ram Dusadh were also found guilty of committing the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act and were sentenced to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for one year. The sentences are directed to run concurrently. Out of the aforesaid five appellants, appellant no. 2 Ram Nath Sah @ Ram Nath Kanu and appellant no. 5 Babu Ram @ Babu Ram Dusadh died during pendency of the present appeal. Hence, the appeal in so far as they are concerned were treated as abated vide orders dated December 10, 2014 and January 30, 2015 respectively passed by the High Court.

Justice Singh was made a permanent judge on April 20, 2016 during the tenure of Justice Iqbal Ahmed Ansari, the 39th Chief Justice of the High Court. As a permanent judge, he delivered his first 6-page long judgement dated January 11, 2017 in Ravi Dyal Shah & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2017). He concluded:'' 11. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482, this Court should not assume the role of a trial court and embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability of evidence and sustainability of accusation on a reasonable appreciation of such evidence. 12. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I find no merit in the present case. The same is dismissed. 13. The interim stay granted to the petitioners vide order dated 24.10.2013, stands vacated.''

The judgement was delivered upon hearing the application which was filed by the petitioners for quashing the order dated September 13, 2013, passed by Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Samastipur, in connection with a complaint case of 2013 whereby after taking cognizance under Sections 364 and 120(B) of the I.P.C., the process was issued against the petitioners. The prosecution case was that on the alleged date and time of occurrence, the son of the informant, namely, Amit Kumar, went with the petitioners but he did not return. The informant started search him. Some people told the informant that on April 26, 2011 at about 9.00 A.M., his son was seen in the company of accused persons. The informant went at the house of petitioner no. 1, where he was informed that his son went to Delhi with the petitioners for doing some job. The informant insisted to talk with his son but the petitioners did not make such arrangements. On August 1, 2011, when the petitioners returned back and his son did not return back than the informant enquired from the petitioners but they told him that his son went somewhere. The informant apprehended that the petitioners might have killed his son. It was also alleged that there was some monetary dispute between the petitioners and his son, Amit Kumar. The counsel for the petitioners had submitted that it was a malafide prosecution. There was no substantive evidence to suggest their implication in the case. Prior to institution of the present complaint case, a police case was also instituted where the final form was submitted by the police. The court below had no jurisdiction to proceed with the complaint case as death of the victim had taken place at Delhi. 5. It was submitted on behalf of the complainant and the State that prima-facie the offence was made out under Sections 364 and 120(B) of the I.P.C., against the petitioners. The victim was abducted within the jurisdiction of the High Court. Hence, the question of jurisdiction did not arise in the case.

The application was filed in the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, which envisages three circumstances in which inherent powers can be exercised.
(i) to give effect to any order passed or made under the Code;
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court; and
(iii) to secure the ends of justice.
Thus, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court could be exercised to quash criminal proceedings in an appropriate case either to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily, Criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person, must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court should be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage.

Drawing on the judgement dated November 21, 1990 by Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices S.R. Pandian and K. Jayachandra Reddy in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Justice Singh observed: ''8. It is, however, not possible or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule, which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction but by way of illustrations, some categories of cases, may be indicated, where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the criminal proceedings:
(1)Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2)Where the allegations in the F.I.R and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out case against the accused.(4)Where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5)Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent man can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievances of the aggrieved party.
(7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly accompanied with malafides and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to personal and private grudge.''

Justice Singh relied on the observations of Justice Pandian in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, which lay down the limitations of inherent power of this Court, saved under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. His judgement reads:“9. It is worth quoting, the observations of PANDIAN, J. in State of Haryana Vs Bhajanlal, which lay down the limitations of inherent power of this Court, saved under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 'The Power of Quashing a Criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the Complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to it’s whim or Caprice.'”

Justice Singh observed: ''10. In my view, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code, in cases where there is no express provision empowering this Court to achieve the said object. The power is discretionary and should be exercised for ex debito justitiae. Purpose behind saving of inherent power is that no legislature can foresee all possible contingencies or eventualities that may arise in future and to meet with such situations, inherent power can be invoked by this Court.''

Prior to Justice Singh's transfer to Punjab and Haryana High Court on October 18, 2023, his bench had delivered five (5) judgments during October 3-October 16, 2023 in Khusboo Kumari vs. The State of Bihar, Vikky Singh @ Ravi @ Guddu Singh @ Munna vs. The State Of Bihar, Naresh Burnwal @ Naresh Pd. Burnwal vs. The State of Bihar, Ram Pravesh Singh @ Burbha vs. The State of Bihar, Basant Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Jitu Singh @ Jitendra Singh @ Amarjeet Kumar @ Suraj Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Vinay Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Ranjay Singh @ Debu Singh @ Ganesh Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Shankar Chaudhary vs. The State of Bihar, Sukesh Sah vs. The State of Bihar, Davindra Kumar Choudhary vs. The State Of Bihar, Ram Daresh Ray @ Ramdresh Ray @ Tunna Ray vs. The State of Bihar, Rajesh Uraon vs. The State of Bihar, Maksud Khan @ Manu vs. The State of Bihar, Rashid Ansari vs. The State of Bihar, Md. Shakeel @ Md. Shakeel Ahmad & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar, Subhash Singh vs. The State of Bihar and Rishi Mandal vs. The State of Bihar.

In Shankar Chaudhary vs. The State of Bihar (2023), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhir Singh and Chandra Prakash Singh delivered a 17-page long judgement dated October 9, 2023, wherein, it concluded:''we are of the considered opinion that the conviction of the appellants in all the appeals is not sustainable in the eyes of law and the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts. 15. Therefore, all the criminal appeals stand allowed and the judgment of conviction dated 15.02.2017 and order of sentence dated 22.02.2017, passed by Shri Prabhu Nath Singh, Sessions Judge, Rohtas, Sasaram in Sessions Trial No.378 of 2014 arising out of Karakat P.S. case No.242 of 2013, are set aside. 16. Since the appellant Shankar Chaudhary of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.325 of 2017 and appellant Davindra Kumar Choudhary of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.481 of 2017, are in jail custody, they are directed to be released from custody forthwith, if not wanted in any other case. 17. The appellant Sukesh Sah of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.456 of 2017 is on bail, he is discharged from the liability of his bail bonds.''

The criminal appeals arose out of common judgment of conviction dated February 15, 2017 and order of sentence dated February 22, 2017, therefore, was heard together and was disposed of by the common judgment. All the appellants had preferred these appeals against the common judgment of conviction whereby and whereunder the appellants were convicted under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.) and have been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment with fine of Rs.50,000/- each for the offence under Sections 302/34 of the I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.

The prosecution case, as per the written report of informant Vikesh Kumar, was that on October 26, 2013 at around 7.30 P.M. his elder brother Ramesh Kumar Sah went to attend natural call towards road. In the meantime he heard cry of his brother whereupon he run towards the road and he had seen in the torch light, accused persons-appellants Davindra Kumar Choudhary, Sukesh Sah and Shankar Choudhary armed with knife and they were blowing knife repeatedly. The accused persons seeing the informant also asked to do away his life. Then he ran away from there towards village making alarm. The accused persons threw the brother of the informant in the water and fled away. The brother of the informant was taken out from the water with the help of the villagers, then the informant saw the injury on the person of his brother making by knife. His brother told him that Sukesh Sah, Davindra Kumar Choudhary and Shankar Choudhary assaulted him badly by means of knife and further asked him to take him to the Hospital for his treatment. He was rushed to the Hospital, but his brother died on the way to the Hospital. They rushed to the police station along with dead body of his brother. It was claimed by the informant that the accused persons with common intention committed death of his brother by means of knife. On the basis of fardbeyan of the informant, a case was registered as Karakat P.S. case No.242 of 2013. After completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted charge sheet under Sections 302/34 of the I.P.C. and thereafter cognizance was taken by the Jurisdictional Magistrate and thereafter the case was committed to the court of Sessions. Charges were framed against the appellants to which the appellants pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. During trial, the prosecution examined altogether nine witnesses.

The counsel for the appellants submitted that the trial suffers from several infirmities that were overlooked by the trial Court and, therefore, the impugned judgement was not sustainable in the eyes of the law. It was contended that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the place and manner of occurrence beyond reasonable doubt, as the material contradictions and discrepancies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the case of the prosecution. To buttress this contention, attention has been drawn to the deposition of the eyewitnesses, asserting that severe discrepancies exist in the ocular testimony of PW 1, PW 2, PW 3, PW 4 and PW 5. It was pointed out that their testimonies suffer from inconsistencies and deserve rejection. Moreover, PW 5 (Informant), who was alleged to be an eyewitness, doesn't mention the presence of other witnesses as eyewitnesses to the offence. The attention of the High Court was also drawn to the absence of any source of light, and thereby, the possibility of identification made by the deceased in his oral dying declaration regarding the participation of appellants in the alleged crime could be considered as a mistaken identity. Moreover, the testimony of a doctor casts doubt on the oral dying declaration, stating that the patient would have died immediately after sustaining multiple injuries. Furthermore, the Investigating Officer did not seize the light alleged to be the source of identification by PW 5. Additionally, the Investigating Officer testified that there were no cut marks on the clothes of the , despite multiple stab injuries. Therefore, it was argued that there are severe lacunae in the prosecution's case, and the chain of circumstances do not unequivocally point to the guilt of the appellants. Hence, the findings of the ltrial Court are legally flawed, incorrect in terms of facts, lacking in legal reasoning, and devoid of merit, making the judgement of conviction fit to be set aside.

After perusing the record and hearing the arguments advanced by the counsels of the parties, following issues had arisen for consideration in these appeals: -
(I) Whether the oral dying declaration can be relied upon in the absence of a source of identification and considering the testimony of the doctor?
(II) Whether the presence of the alleged eyewitnesses (PW1 to PW4) at the place of occurrence becomes doubtful in the light of the statement made by the Informant (PW5)?
(III) Whether the presence of PW5 at the alleged place of occurrence can be considered admissible in light of the fact that he heard the voice of the deceased from 800 gaj which is equivalent to 0.728Km?
(IV) Whether the absence of cut marks on the clothing of the deceased despite the presence of multiple stab injuries is fatal for the prosecution's case?
(V) Whether non-examination of the material witnesses (Rahul Paswan, Ghamri Ansari and Sanju Singh), who helped the Informant to take out the deceased from the pond and in front of whom it is alleged that the deceased made oral testimony, has caused prejudice to the appellants?

The order of Justice Singh's transfer by the President of India in consultation with the then Chief Justice of India was issued under Article 222 (1) of the Constitution of India.

In Khusboo Kumari vs. The State of Bihar (2023), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhir Singh and Chandra Prakash Singh delivered a 28-page long judgement dated October 3, 2023, wherein, it allowed the criminal appeals and set aside the judgment of conviction dated December 10, 2014 and the order of sentence dated December 11, 2014 passed by Krishna Kumar Agrawal, Ad hoc Additional District and Sessions Judge-V, Lakhisarai in Sessions a trial of 2012, in a case which arose out of Halsi P.S. case of 2012. The judgement was authored by Justice Sudhir Singh Singh. He concluded:''Since the appellant Vikky Singh @ Ravi @ Guddu Singh @ Munna of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.39 of 2015, appellant Basant Singh of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.127 of 2015, appellant Jitu Singh @ Jitendra Singh @ Amarjeet Singh @ Suraj Singh of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.154 of 2015 and appellant Vinay Singh of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.166 of 2015, are in jail custody, they are directed to be released from custody forthwith, if not wanted in any other case. 20. The appellant Khusboo Kumari of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.944 of 2014, appellant Naresh Burnwal @ Naresh Pd. Burnwal of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.74 of 2015, appellant Ram Pravesh Singh @ Burbha of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.114 of 2015 and appellant Ranjay Singh @ Debu Singh @ Ganesh Singh of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.169 of 2015, are on bail, they are discharged from the liabilities of their respective bail bonds.''

According to the F.I.R., the prosecution case was that on the evening of March 25, 2012, Suman Barnwal, the wife of Naresh Barnwal (informant-cum-appellant) along with her husband and family members was travelling from Rajgir to Jamui, in between 8-9 pm, she was shot dead near Lakhisarai road and thereby, formal first information report (Exhibit 6) was registered. The prosecution, in course of trial, contended that the murder was committed by the appellant Naresh Barnwal in conspiracy with the appellants Jitu Singh @ Jitendra Singh @ Amarjeet Singh @ Suraj Singh, Vikky Singh @ Ravi @ Guddu Singh @ Munna, Ram Pravesh Singh @ Burbha, Basant Singh, Vinay Singh, Ranjay Singh @ Debu Singh @ Ganesh Singh and Khusboo Kumari. Adhoc Additional District and Sessions Judge-V, Lakhisarai, after the trial, by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, all the appellants were convicted for the offences under Section 302/120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each. Appellants Vikky Singh @ Ravi @ Guddu Singh @ Munna and Jitu Singh @ Jitendra Singh @ Amarjeet Kumar @ Suraj Singh were convicted under Section 379 of the I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three-three years. Appellants Jitu Singh @ Jitendra Singh @ Amarjeet Kumar @ Suraj Singh, Basant Singh and Ranjay Singh @ Debu Singh @Ganesh Singh were convicted for the offence under Section 411 of I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three-three years. Appellants Vikky Singh @ Ravi @ Guddu Singh @ Munna and Jitu Singh @ Jitendra Singh @ Amarjeet Singh @ Suraj Singh have also been convicted for the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for five-five years and a fine of Rs. 500/- each. All the sentences so imposed on the appellants were to run concurrently.

The first information report registered on the statement of appellant Naresh Barnwal, narrated the facts. He along with his wife Suman Devi (deceased), brother-in-law Rajesh Baranwal @ Pappu, Bhabhi of his wife with her children were going from his Zen Maruti Car bearing No. JH-10A-9329 from Gaya to Jamui via Rajgir, Biharsharif and Sheikhpura and in the night of March 25, 2012 at about 8 p.m., when they reached near Tarhari village within Halsi Police Station of Lakhisarai district, subsequently 8-10 unknown persons by flashing torch directed them to stop the vehicle.

As soon as the vehicle came to a halt, two of the unknown individuals brandishing pistols, one in the front seat and the other in the rear, forcibly entered the car. The rest of the assailants warned against raising an alarm. Those who boarded the vehicle instructed Naresh to drive, and after ten steps, they ordered a left turn. Approximately a kilometre later, they forced the vehicle to stop again. They dragged Suman Devi out of the car and threw her onto the road, after which they shot her. The two assailants also looted jewellery, mobile phones, money, and clothes, etc. and fled away. With the assistance of his brother-in-law, Naresh rushed his injured wife to Sikandara Hospital and then to Sadar Hospital in Jamui. Unfortunately, Suman Devi succumbed to her injuries during treatment. The assailants, who had boarded the vehicle, verbally abused and physically assaulted the other occupants, hitting them with the butt of their guns. Naresh claimed that he couldn't identify the culprits as their faces were covered, but he believed he could recognize them by their voices. He also noted that the place where the incident occurred was marshy. This incident took place near Tarhari village, within the jurisdiction of Halsi Police Station, Lakhisarai district, approximately one kilometre away from the road, on the evening of March 25, 2012, between 8 and 9 p.m. On the basis of fardbeyan of the informant, a Halsi P.S. case was registered under Section 396 of the I.P.C. Later, on the request of the Investigating Officer, statements of some of the witnesses were taken under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and thereafter the informant of the case was made accused in the case. The police after investigation submitted a charge-sheet under Sections 302, 379, 411, 120B of the I.P.C. and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The cognizance of the offence was taken by the jurisdictional Magistrate and thereafter the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. Charges were framed under Sections 302, 379, 120B, 411 of the I.P.C. and Section 27 of the Arms Act against all the appellants herein, on which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. During the trial, in order to substantiate the charges against the accused persons, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses

Justice Sudhir Singh relied on the decision of 3-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Gurucharan Singh versus State of Punjab reported in 1962 SCC OnLine SC 42, wherein the Court held: ''“…Where the direct evidence is not satisfactory or disinterested or where the injuries are alleged to have been caused with a gun and they prima facie appear to have been inflicted by a rifle, undoubtedly the apparent inconsistency can be cured or the oral evidence can be corroborated by leading the evidence of a ballistic expert. In what cases the examination of a ballistic expert is essential for the proof of the prosecution case, must naturally depend upon the circumstances of each case.”

He also relied on Supreme Court decision in Pritinder Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in (2023) 7 SCC 727, wherein it observed that in view of the circumstances, non- examination by ballistic expert has created a significant doubt to the case of the prosecution. Thus, in light of the above discussions and in view of the serious doubt with regard to the identification of the appellants upon thorough application of the above-settled law on the facts of the present case, we hold that it is difficult for the court to ascertain whether the recovered weapon has been used by the appellant in the commission of the present offence and thereby, failure to examine the recovered weapon has caused serious infirmity to the prosecution case.

Justice Singh noted decision of the Supreme Court in Dudh Nath Pandey vs. State of U.P. reported in (1981) 2 SCC 166, wherein it observed that: “.. Evidence of recovery of the pistol at the instance of the appellant cannot by itself prove that he who pointed out the weapon wielded it in offence. The statement accompanying the discovery is woefully vague to identify the authorship of concealment, with the result that the pointing out of the weapon may at best prove the appellant's knowledge as to where the weapon was kept. The evidence of the ballistic expert carries the proof of the charge a significant step ahead, but not near enough, because at the highest, it shows that the shot which killed Pappoo was fired from the pistol which was pointed out by the appellant...”

He recollected Supreme Court's decision in A. Shankar vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2011) 6 SCC 279 wherein it has been held that the non-production of the FSL report by the prosecution is fatal, as in the absence of such report, it was difficult for the court to reach to a definite conclusion.

He referred to para no. 4 of Supreme Court's decision in Surinder vs. State of Haryana, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 365, wherein, it was held that in cases where the articles are not sealed then it will cast serious doubt on the prosecution. In light of the discussions made above, we are of the considered opinion that the seizure made for the articles, in the absence of the sealing of these materials, casts serious doubt on the prosecution.

Justice Singh took note of the decision of Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ghudan reported in (2003) 12 SCC 485 wherein it was observed that if any source of light was present at the place of occurrence, then the investigating agency would have mentioned or shown the existence of such source and the benefit of such omission should be given to the accused.

He relied on para no. 9 of the decision of the Supreme Court, in Tamilselvan versus State, reported in (2008) 7 SCC 755, wherein, the Court observed: “9. Since it was the accused who allegedly carried torches, we find it difficult to believe how the prosecution witnesses could have identified the assailants. The position would have been different if the forest guards had been carrying torches and had been pointing them at the assailants, but here the position is just the reverse. In fact due to the torches of the assailants the prosecution witnesses would have been partially blinded by the light of the torchlight, and would not have been able to identify anybody.”

Justice Singh referred to judgement in Ravinder Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in (2022) 7 SCC 581, wherein the Court observed: “21. Lastly, this appeal also raised an important substantive question of law that whether the call records produced by the prosecution would be admissible under Sections 65-A and 65-B of the Evidence Act, given the fact that the requirement of certification of electronic evidence has not been complied with as contemplated under the Act. The uncertainty of whether Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473] occupies the field in this area of law or whether Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P. [Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 2 SCC 801] lays down the correct law in this regard has now been conclusively settled by this Court by a judgment dated 14-7-2020 in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal [Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1 : (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 1 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 1: (2020) 2 SCC (L&S) 587] wherein the Court has held that : (Arjun Panditrao Khotkar [Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1 : (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 1 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 1: (2020) 2 SCC (L&S) 587] , SCC pp. 56 & 62, paras 61 & 73) “61. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473: (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108] , and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi Mohammad [Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 2 SCC 801 : (2018) 2 SCC 807 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 346 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 351 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 860: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 865] . Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65-B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed principle in Taylor v. Taylor [Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) LR 1 Ch D 426] , which has been followed in a number of the judgments of this Court, can also be applied. Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if lead in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section 65-B(4) otiose.
73.1. Anvar P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27: (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108] , as clarified by us hereinabove, is the law declared by this Court on Section 65-B of the Evidence Act. The judgment in Tomaso Bruno [Tomaso Bruno v. State of U.P., (2015) 7 SCC 178 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] , being per incuriam, does not lay down the law correctly. Also, the judgment in Shafhi Mohammad [Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 2 SCC 801 : (2018) 2 SCC 807 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 346 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 351 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 860 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 865] and the judgment dated 3-4-2018 reported as Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P. [Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 5 SCC 311 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 704] , do not lay down the law correctly and are therefore overruled.
73.2. The clarification referred to above is that the required certificate under Section 65-B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the device concerned, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. In cases where the “computer” happens to be a part of a “computer system” or “computer network” and it becomes impossible to physically bring such system or network to the Court, then the only means of providing information contained in such electronic record can be in accordance with Section 65-B(1), together with the requisite certificate under Section 65-B(4).
22. In light of the above, the electronic evidence produced before the High Court should have been in accordance with the statute and should have complied with the certification requirement, for it to be admissible in the court of law. As rightly stated above, oral evidence in the place of such a certificate, as is the case in the present matter, cannot possibly suffice as Section 65-B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law.”

Justice Sudhir Singh observed: ''the intent behind the provisions contained in Section 65B is to sanctify secondary evidence in electronic form as these are more susceptible to tampering. So, in order to ensure the source and authenticity of the electronic record produced before a court, Section 65B (4) mandates a certificate from the person responsible for the operation of the relevant device because failure to do so could result in a miscarriage of justice.''

He recollected Supreme Court's decision in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal reported in (2020) 7 SCC 1, wherein three judge bench of the Court observed: “84. But Section 65-B(1) starts with a non obstante clause excluding the application of the other provisions and it makes the certification, a precondition for admissibility. While doing so, it does not talk about relevancy. In a way, Sections 65-A and 65-B, if read together, mix up both proof and admissibility, but not talk about relevancy. Section 65-A refers to the procedure prescribed in Section 65-B, for the purpose of proving the contents of electronic records, but Section 65-B speaks entirely about the preconditions for admissibility. As a result, Section 65-B places admissibility as the first or the outermost checkpost, capable of turning away even at the border, any electronic evidence, without any enquiry, if the conditions stest identification paradeulated therein are not fulfilled.”

Justice Sudhir Singh referred the Supreme Court's decision in Anvar P.V. vs. P.K. Basheer reported in (2014) 10 SCC 473, wherein three judge bench of the Court observed: “22. The evidence relating to electronic record, as noted hereinbefore, being a special provision, the general law on secondary evidence under Section 63 read with Section 65 of the Evidence Act shall yield to the same. Generalia specialibus non derogant, special law will always prevail over the general law. It appears, the court omitted to take note of Sections 59 and 65-A dealing with the admissibility of electronic record. Sections 63 and 65 have no application in the case of secondary evidence by way of electronic record; the same is wholly governed by Sections 65-A and 65-B. To that extent, the statement of law on admissibility of secondary evidence pertaining to electronic record, as stated by this Court in Navjot Sandhu case [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1715], does not lay down the correct legal position. It requires to be overruled and we do so. An electronic record by way of secondary evidence shall not be admitted in evidence unless the requirements under Section 65- B are satisfied. Thus, in the case of CD, VCD, chip, etc., certificate in terms of Section 65-B obtained at the time of taking the document, without which, the secondary evidence pertaining to that electronic record, is inadmissible.”

Justice Singh has taken charge as the Acting Chief Justice of the High Court at a time when it is currently functioning only with 34 judges although High Court's approved judge strength is 53. As of October 2025, the High Court is functioning without its 19 judges.