Supreme Court's Division Bench sets aside reasoned judgement of Jharkhand High Court, approves Additional Judicial Commissioner's unreasoned cognizance order

Pramila Devi & Ors. v. The State Of Jharkhand & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 560)

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/cognizance-order-by-magistrate-cant-be-faulted-only-because-its-not-well-reasoned-2025-insc-560-pramila-devi-v-state-of-jharkhand-1575222

In Pramila Devi & Ors. vs. The State Of Jharkhand & Anr 2025 INSC 560, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah "set right the error committed by the High Court, on the legal issue of requirement of recording detailed grounds/reasons for taking cognizance, the Impugned Judgment is set aside in toto.” Jharkhand High Court's Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi had set aside a cognizance order under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act) by the Additional Judicial Commissioner by his order dated March 9, 2022. The other petitioners were Satyanarain Sahu and Krishna Kumar. The other respondent was Jyoti  Beck. The judgement was authored by Justice Amanullah.

In its 16-page long judgement, the Supreme Court observed:“If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down.” It added:“Perusal of the entire gamut of the pleadings of the Appellants does not disclose any categorical statement to the effect that during investigation by the police, no evidence has emerged to warrant taking of cognizance, much less against the Appellants. The only averment which has been made is that the Trial Court had not recorded the prima facie material against the Appellants because it does not exist. This is too simplistic an argument and does not shift the burden from the Appellants of taking a categorical stand that no material whatsoever for taking cognizance is available in the police papers/case diary against the Appellants.”

Jyoti Beck, the informant and the Respondent No.2 claimed to be the second wife of one Vishnu Sahu (Deceased). Pramila Devi, Appellant No.1 is the first wife of Late Vishnu Sahu, and Satyanarain Sahu, the Appellant No.2 and and Krishna Kumar, the Appellant No. 3 are their children. It was alleged that the deceased posing himself as unmarried about 25-30 years ago befriended Jyoti, the Respondent No.2 and married her in 1990 at Jagannath Temple under Hindu customs and traditions and lived peacefully for more than 26 years. From their marriage (Vishnu Sahu and Respondent No.2), three children were born, namely Reshma Kumari, Rupa Kumari, and Vishal Kumar. It was pleaded that after 26 years, Respondent No.2 filed a written complaint against Vishnu Sahu and the Appellants which culminated into First Information Report (FIR) dated November 27, 2016  under Sections 498A, 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 3(1)(iv) of The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act). The allegations made in the FIR was that Vishnu Sahu posing himself to be unmarried, performed marriage with Respondent No.2 in 1990, and two daughters and a son were born to them. By taking a loan in her name from a bank and at her expense, a pakka house was constructed upon the land purchased by her father in her name, and she was living in the house with her family. She also alleged that Vishnu Sahu along with the first wife and the children, born from wedlock of Vishnu Sahu and Pramila Devi, his first wife, the Appellant No.1 started to harass and assault her and ultimately, in the year 2013, she and her children were ousted by them from the house. It was also alleged that she has been deprived of her land and house, that she is facing hardship, her daughters are of marriageable age and that she was humiliated and abused by Vishnu Sahu, his first wife, the Appellant No.1 and their children in the name of Adivasi Kol. Bhurung, etc.

Vishnu Sahu and the Appellants moved Anticipatory Bail Petition before the Additional Judicial Commissioner-1 at Ranchi, who on December 19, 2016 passed an order directing that no coercive steps shall be taken against them and adjourned the matter with direction to put up on January 20, 2017. On January 20, 2017, an order was passed rejecting the application for anticipatory bail as the allegation illustrated commission of offence(s) under the SC/ST Act. The Additional Judicial Commissioner took cognizance against Vishnu Sahu and Appellants on June 13, 2019 in the SC/ST Case. 

The Appellants had initially sought quashing of the FIR, in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition before the High Court, the prayer was later amended by filing an Interlocutory Application challenging the Order taking cognizance dated June 13, 2019. The High Court in its judgment, instead of going into the question of whether the FIR itself was fit to be quashed, focused only on the cognizance-taking order. Even before the Supreme Court, the Appellants had challenged the judgment to the extent the matter was remanded to pass order afresh after disclosure of the prima facie material against the Appellants. No prayer was pressed to quash FIR. 

The Supreme Court proceeded only with regard to the challenge whether the High Court by the impugned judgment ought to have remanded the matter to the Trial Court for disclosure of the prima facie material against the Appellants. The High Court had set aside the cognizance Order and remitted the matter to the Additional Judicial Commissioner to pass order afresh as in the cognizance order, prima facie material against the Appellants had not been disclosed.

The Supreme Court relied on the decision in Bhushan Kumar vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012), wherein the Supreme Court has held that “an order of the Magistrate taking cognizance cannot be faulted only because it was not a reasoned order.” It also held that  “Time and again it has been stated by this Court that the summoning order under Section 204 of the Code requires no explicit reasons to be stated because it is imperative that the Magistrate must have taken notice of the accusations and applied his mind to the allegations made in the police report and the materials filed therewith.”

The Court referred to the decision in Sonu Gupta vs. Deepak Gupta (2015), wherein the Supreme Court held that “At the stage of cognizance and summoning the Magistrate is required to apply his judicial mind only with a view to take cognizance of the offence … to find out whether a prima facie case has been made out for summoning the accused persons. At this stage, the learned Magistrate is not required to consider the defence version or materials or arguments nor is he required to evaluate the merits of the materials or evidence of the complainant, because the Magistrate must not undertake the exercise to find out at this stage whether the materials would lead to conviction or not.”

It is apparent that the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dhulia and Amanullah has relied on Court's  decisions of 2012 and 2015 but it has not been apprised of judgement of 2024 by the  Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Justices Hima Kohli and Sandeep Mehta. The 27-page long decision of April 15, 2010 by the Court's Division Bench of Justices Swatanter Kumar and S.H. Kapadia in Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department, Works Contract and Leasing, Kota vs. Shukla and Brothers (2010) 4 SCC 785 has been cited in State Project Director, UP Education for All Project Board & Ors. v. Saroj Maurya & Ors (2024) with approval in Supreme Court's judgement dated August 21, 2024 wherein it observed: "We are of the opinion that in the absence of any reasoning in the impugned judgment, the same cannot be sustained. In this regard, we are benefited by the following observations made by this Court in CCT v. Shukla & Bros."

It reads: "23....A litigant has a legitimate expectation of knowing reasons for rejection of his claim/prayer. It is then alone, that a party would be in a position to challenge the order on appropriate grounds. Besides, this would be for the benefit of the higher or the appellate court. As arguments bring things hidden and obscure to the light of reasons, reasoned judgment where the law and factual matrix of the case is discussed, provides lucidity and foundation for conclusions or exercise of judicial discretion by the courts.

24. Reason is the very life of law. When the reason of a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases (Wharton's Law Lexicon). Such is the significance of reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice as well as avoids uncertainty. As a matter of fact it helps in the observance of law of precedent. Absence of reasons on the contrary essentially introduces an element of uncertainty, dissatisfaction and give entirely different dimensions to the questions of law raised before the higher/appellate courts. In our view, the court should provide its own grounds and reasons for rejecting claim/prayer of a party whether at the very threshold i.e. at admission stage or after regular hearing, howsoever concise they may be.

25. We would reiterate the principle that when reasons are announced and can be weighed, the public can have assurance that process of correction is in place and working. It is the requirement of law that correction process of judgments should not only appear to be implemented but also seem to have been properly implemented. Reasons for an order would ensure and enhance public confidence and would provide due satisfaction to the consumer of justice under our justice dispensation system. It may not be very correct in law to say, that there is a qualified duty imposed upon the courts to record reasons.

26. Our procedural law and the established practice, in fact, imposes unqualified obligation upon the courts to record reasons. There is hardly any statutory provision under the Income Tax Act or under the Constitution itself requiring recording of reasons in the judgments but it is no more res integra and stands unequivocally settled by different judgments of this Court holding that the courts and tribunals are required to pass reasoned judgments/orders. In fact, Order 14 Rule 2 read with Order 20 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that, the court should record findings on each issue and such findings which obviously should be reasoned would form part of the judgment, which in turn would be the basis for writing a decree of the court.

27. By practice adopted in all courts and by virtue of judge-made law, the concept of reasoned judgment has become an indispensable part of basic rule of law and, in fact, is a mandatory requirement of the procedural law. Clarity of thoughts leads to clarity of vision and proper reasoning is the foundation of a just and fair decision. In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. [1974 ICR 120 (NIRC)] there are apt observations in this regard to say “failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice”. Reasons are the real live links to the administration of justice. With respect we will contribute to this view. There is a rationale, logic and purpose behind a reasoned judgment. A reasoned judgment is primarily written to clarify own thoughts; communicate the reasons for the decision to the concerned and to provide and ensure that such reasons can be appropriately considered by the appellate/higher court. Absence of reasons thus would lead to frustrate the very object stated hereinabove.”

Citing the above observations of the Supreme Court, the Court's Division Bench of Justices Kohli and Mehta set aside the judgment and order dated April 18, 2022 passed by the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court comprising Justices Pritinker Diwakar and A. Srivastava on August 21, 2024.  

Court's Division Bench of Justices Swatanter Kumar and S.H. Kapadia observed: "It would have been desirable if the High Court would have recorded some reasons for rejecting the Revision Petition preferred by the Department." 

The judgement reads: 9. The increasing institution of cases in all Courts in India and its resultant burden upon the Courts has invited attention of all concerned in the justice administration system. Despite heavy quantum of cases in Courts, in our view, it would neither be permissible nor possible to state as a principle of law, that while exercising power of judicial review on administrative action and more particularly judgment of courts in appeal before the higher Court, providing of reasons can never be dispensed with. The doctrine of audi alteram partem has three basic essentials. Firstly, a person against whom an order is required to be passed or whose rights are likely to be affected adversely must be granted an opportunity of being heard. Secondly, the concerned authority should provide a fair and transparent procedure and lastly, the authority concerned must apply its mind and dispose of the matter by a reasoned or speaking order. This has been uniformly applied by courts in India and abroad. 

10. The Supreme Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India [(1990) 4 SCC 594], while referring to the practice adopted and insistence placed by the Courts in United States, emphasized the importance of recording of reasons for decisions by the administrative authorities and tribunals. It said "administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity in its exercise". To enable the Courts to exercise the power of review in consonance with settled principles, the authorities are advised of the considerations underlining the action under review. This Court with approval stated:-"the orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained."

11. In exercise of the power of judicial review, the concept of reasoned orders/actions has been enforced equally by the foreign courts as by the courts in India. The administrative authority and tribunals are obliged to give reasons, absence whereof could render the order liable to judicial chastise. Thus, it will not be far from absolute principle of law that the Courts should record reasons for its conclusions to enable the appellate or higher Courts to exercise their jurisdiction appropriately and in accordance with law. It is the reasoning alone, that can enable a higher or an appellate court to appreciate the controversy in issue in its correct perspective and to hold whether the reasoning recorded by the Court whose order is impugned, is sustainable in law and whether it has adopted the correct legal approach. To sub-serve the purpose of justice delivery system, therefore, it is essential that the Courts should record reasons for its conclusions, whether disposing of the case at admission stage or after regular hearing.

12. At the cost of repetition, we may notice, that this Court has consistently taken the view that recording of reasons is an essential feature of dispensation of justice. A litigant who approaches the Court with any grievance in accordance with law is entitled to know the reasons for grant or rejection of his prayer. Reasons are the soul of orders. Non-recording of reasons could lead to dual infirmities; firstly, it may cause prejudice to the affected party and secondly, more particularly, hamper the proper administration of justice. These principles are not only applicable to administrative or executive actions, but they apply with equal force and, in fact, with a greater degree of precision to judicial pronouncements. A judgment without reasons causes prejudice to the person against whom it is pronounced, as that litigant is unable to know the ground which weighed with the Court in rejecting his claim and also causes impediments in his taking adequate and appropriate grounds before the higher Court in the event of challenge to that judgment. Now, we may refer to certain judgments of this Court as well as of the High Courts which have taken this view.

13. The principle of natural justice has twin ingredients; firstly, the person who is likely to be adversely affected by the action of the authorities should be given notice to show cause thereof and granted an opportunity of hearing and secondly, the orders so passed by the authorities should give reason for arriving at any conclusion showing proper application of mind. Violation of either of them could in the given facts and circumstances of the case, vitiate the order itself. Such rule being applicable to the administrative authorities certainly requires that the judgment of the Court should meet with this requirement with higher degree of satisfaction. The order of an administrative authority may not provide reasons like a judgment but the order must be supported by the reasons of rationality. The distinction between passing of an order by an administrative or quasi-judicial authority has practically extinguished and both are required to pass reasoned orders. In the case of Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr. [AIR 1976 SC 1785], the Supreme Court held as under:-

"6. ......If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative Law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry  credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. ..."

14. In the case of Mc Dermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and Ors. (2006) SLT 345, the Supreme Court clarified the rationality behind providing of reasons and stated the principle as follows:-

". . . Reason is a ground or motive for a belief or a course of action, a statement in justification or explanation of belief or action. It is in this sense that the award must state reasons for the amount awarded.

The rationale of the requirement of reasons is that reasons assure that the arbitrator has not acted capriciously. Reasons reveal the grounds on which the Arbitrator reached the conclusion which adversely affects the interests of a party. The contractual stipulation of reasons means, as held in Poyser and Mills' Arbitration in Re, `proper adequate reasons'. Such reasons shall not only be intelligible but shall be a reason connected with the case which the Court can see is proper. Contradictory reasons are equal to lack of reasons. . . ."

15. In Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab [(1979) 2 SCC 368], while dealing with the matter of selection of candidates who could be under review, if not found suitable otherwise, the Court explained the reasons being a link between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions and held, that where providing reasons for proposed supersession were essential, then it could not be held to be a valid reason that the concerned officer's record was not such as to justify his selection was not contemplated and thus was not legal. In this context, the Court held -

"... "Reasons" are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. The Court accordingly held that the mandatory provisions of Regulation 5(5) were not complied with by the Selection Committee. That an officer was "not found suitable" is the conclusion and not a reason in support of the decision to supersede him. True, that it is not expected that the Selection Committee should give anything approaching the judgment of a Court, but it must at least state, as briefly as it may, why it came to the conclusion that the officer concerned was found to be not suitable for inclusion in the Select List."

16. This principle has been extended to administrative actions on the premise that it applies with greater rigor to the judgments of the Courts. In State of Maharashtra v. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan [(1981) 4 SCC 129], while remanding the matter to the High Court for examination of certain issues raised, this Court observed:

". . . It would be for the benefit of this Court that a speaking judgment is given".

17. In the cases where the Courts have not recorded reasons in the judgment, legality, propriety and correctness of the orders by the Court of competent jurisdiction are challenged in absence of proper discussion. The requirement of recording reasons is applicable with greater rigor to the judicial proceedings. The orders of the Court must reflect what weighed with the Court in granting or declining the relief claimed by the applicant. In this regard we may refer to certain judgments of this Court....

In the case of Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh and Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 222, accepting the plea that absence of examination of reasons by the High Court on the basis of which the trial Court discarded prosecution evidence and recorded the finding of an acquittal in favour of all the accused was not appropriate, the Supreme Court held that the order should record reasons. Recording of proper reasons would be essential, so that the Appellate Court would have advantage of considering the considered opinion of the High Court on the reasons which had weighed with the trial Court.

In the case of State of Punjab and Ors. v. Surinder Kumar and Ors. [(1992) 1 SCC 489], while noticing the jurisdictional distinction between Article 142 and Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court stated that powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 are much wider and the Supreme Court would pass orders to do complete justice. The Supreme Court further reiterated the principle with approval that the High Court has the jurisdiction to dismiss petitions or criminal revisions in limini or grant leave asked for by the petitioner but for adequate reasons which should be recorded in the order. The High Court may not pass cryptic order in relation to regularisation of service of the respondents in view of certain directions passed by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Absence of reasoning did not find favour with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also stated the principle that powers of the High Court were circumscribed by limitations discussed and declared by judicial decision and it cannot transgress the limits on the basis of whims or subjective opinion varying from Judge to Judge.

In the case of State of U.P. v. Battan and Ors. [(2001) 10 SCC 607], the Supreme Court held as under:

 "The High Court has not given any reasons for refusing to grant leave to file appeal against acquittal. The manner in which appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the High Court leaves much to be desired. Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have set forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order. The absence of reasons has rendered the High Court order not sustainable."

Similar view was also taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar and Ors. JT 2003 (Supp.2) SC 354

The Court also observed: Providing of reasons in orders is of essence in judicial proceedings. Every litigant who approaches the Court with a prayer is entitled to know the reasons for acceptance or rejection of such request. Either of the parties to the lis has a right of appeal and, therefore, it is essential for them to know the considered opinion of the Court to make the remedy of appeal meaningful. It is the reasoning which ultimately culminates into final decision which may be subject to examination of the appellate or other higher Courts. It is not only desirable but, in view of the consistent position of law, mandatory for the Court to pass orders while recording reasons in support thereof, however, brief they may be. Brevity in reasoning cannot be understood in legal parlance as absence of reasons. While no reasoning in support of judicial orders is impermissible, the brief reasoning would suffice to meet the ends of justice at least at the interlocutory stages and would render the remedy of appeal purposeful and meaningful. It is a settled canon of legal jurisprudence that the Courts are vested with discretionary powers but such powers are to be exercised judiciously, equitably and in consonance with the settled principles of law. Whether or not, such judicial discretion has been exercised in accordance with the accepted norms, can only be reflected by the reasons recorded in the order impugned before the higher Court. Often it is said that absence of reasoning may ipso facto indicate whimsical exercise of judicial discretion. Patricia Wald, Chief Justice of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in the Article, Blackrobed Bureaucracy Or Collegiality Under Challenge, (42 MD.L. REV. 766, 782 (1983), observed as under:-

"My own guiding principle is that virtually every appellate decision requires some statement of reasons. The discipline of writing even a few sentences or paragraphs explaining the basis for the judgment insures a level of thought and scrutiny by the Court that a bare signal of affirmance, dismissal, or reversal does not."

The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that a losing litigant has a cause to plead and a right to challenge the order if it is adverse to him. Opinion of the Court alone can explain the cause which led to passing of the final order. Whether an argument was rejected validly or otherwise, reasoning of the order alone can show. To evaluate the submissions is obligation of the Court and to know the reasons for rejection of its contention is a legitimate expectation on the part of the litigant. Another facet of providing reasoning is to give it a value of precedent which can help in reduction of frivolous litigation. Paul D. Carrington, Daniel J Meador and Maurice Rosenburg, Justice on Appeal 10 (West 1976), observed as under:-

"When reasons are announced and can be weighed, the public can have assurance that the correcting process is working. Announcing reasons can also provide public understanding of how the numerous decisions of the system are integrated. In a busy Court, the reasons are an essential demonstration that the Court did in fact fix its mind on the case at hand. An unreasoned decision has very little claim to acceptance by the defeated party, and is difficult or impossible to accept as an act reflecting systematic application of legal principles. Moreover, the necessity of stating reasons not infrequently changes the results by forcing the judges to come to grips with nettlesome facts or issues which their normal instincts would otherwise cause them to avoid."

The reasoning in the opinion of the Court, thus, can effectively be analysed or scrutinized by the Appellate Court. The reasons indicated by the Court could be accepted by the Appellate Court without presuming what weighed with the Court while coming to the impugned decision. The cause of expeditious and effective disposal would be furthered by such an approach. A right of appeal could be created by a special statute or under the provisions of the Code governing the procedure. In either of them, absence of reasoning may have the effect of negating the purpose or right of appeal and, thus, may not achieve the ends of justice.

It will be useful to refer words of Justice Roslyn Atkinson, Supreme Court of Queensland, at AIJA Conference at Brisbane on September 13, 2002 in relation to Judgment Writing. Describing that some judgment could be complex, in distinction to routine judgments, where one requires deeper thoughts, and the other could be disposed of easily but in either cases, reasons they must have. While speaking about purpose of the judgment, he said, "The first matter to consider is the purpose of the judgment. To my mind there are four purposes for any judgment that is written: -

(1) to clarify your own thoughts; (2) to explain your decision to the parties; (3) to communicate the reasons for the decision to the public; and (4) to provide reasons for an appeal Court to consider."

Clarity of thought leads to proper reasoning and proper reasoning is the foundation of a just and fair decision. In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree 1974 ICR 120, the Court went to the extent of observing that "Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice". Reasons are really linchpin to administration of justice. They are link between the mind of the decision taker and the controversy in question. To justify our conclusion, reasons are essential. Absence of reasoning would render the judicial order liable to interference by the higher Court. Reasons are the soul of the decision and its absence would render the order open to judicial chastism. The consistent judicial opinion is that every order determining rights of the parties in a Court of law ought not to be recorded without supportive reasons. Issuing reasoned order is not only beneficial to the higher Courts but is even of great utility for providing public understanding of law and imposing self-discipline in the Judge as their discretion is controlled by well established norms.

In Jairamdas Kukreja vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024:MPHC-JBP:51262, Justice G. S. Ahluwalia's judgement dated October 14, 2024 reads: “Reasons are the backbone of the order and only from the reasons it can be deciphered as to what persuaded the authority to draw a particular conclusion."

Is it the case that providing reasoned cognizance order is optional? Is reasons not the soul of the cognizance orders? 

The four purposes for any judgment that is written:(1) to clarify your own thoughts; (2) to explain your decision to the parties; (3) to communicate the reasons for the decision to the public; and (4) to provide reasons for an appeal Court to consider. Is it the case that cognizance order of Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranch is not required to fulfill these four purposes. Are unreasoned cognizance orders logically defensible?