Supreme Court grants bail to K. Kavitha, the Telangana lawmaker, quashes Single Judge Bench judgement of Delhi High Court

The judgement in the bail application case of K. Kavitha vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2024) and Enforcement Directorate was reserved by the Single Judge Bench of Justice Swarna Kanta Sharma of Delhi High Court on May 28, 2024. The 41-page long judgement was delivered on July 1, 2024. Justice Sharma's judgement concluded: "this Court is of the view that no case for grant of regular bail....is made out at this stage." 

This judgement of the High Court has been quashed and set aside by a 3-page long order of the Division Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and K.V. Viswanathan on August 27, 2024 in Enforcement Directorate vs. K. Kavitha (2024).

The High Court judgement reads:"....as far as benefit of proviso to Section 45 is concerned, when it is the case of applicant herself that she is a well-educated and accomplished woman, who has remained Member of Parliament, Member of Legislative Council, etc., this Court is bound to keep in mind the observations of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in case of Saumya Chaurasia (supra). The material collected by the Directorate of Enforcement, which has been discussed in the preceding paragraphs has pointed out that the applicant herein was one of the chief conspirators in the entire conspiracy relating to formulation and implementation of new Excise Policy of Delhi. In fact, some other accused persons were working on behalf of the applicant and as per her instructions, as noted in the preceding discussion. Thus, Smt. K. Kavitha cannot be equated to a vulnerable woman who may have been misused to commit an offence, which is the class of women for whom the proviso to Section 45 of PMLA has been incorporated, as held by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in case of Saumya Chaurasia (supra). Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that Smt. K. Kavitha is not entitled to the benefit of proviso to Section 45 of PMLA."  

The proviso to Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 confers a discretion on the Court to grant bail where the accused is a woman. 

Supreme Court's order reads: "The impugned judgment and order dated 01.07.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi in Bail Application No.1675 of 2024 and Bail Application No.1739 of 2024 are quashed and set aside." Kavitha was arrested by ED on March 15, 2024 and subsequently by CBI. The apex Court found the reasoning of the Single Judge Bench of Delhi High Court regarding "vulnerable woman" for denying the benefit of Section 45(1) of the PML Act to be totally misdirected. 

Police and judicial officers need training in law to understand distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating: Supreme Court

In Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,  Supreme Court's Division bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra pointed out the the fine distinction between the offence of cheating viz-a-viz criminal breach of trust. It observed: "Both offences are independent and distinct. The two offences cannot coexist simultaneously in the same set of facts. They are antithetical to each other. The two provisions of the IPC (now BNS, 2023) are not twins that they cannot survive without each other." The Court set aside orders of Allahabad High Court and the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khurja, Bulandshahar taking cognizance upon the complaint dated April 3, 2024 and February 28, 2023 respectively. Supreme Court's judgement was delivered on August 23, 2024. It was authored by Justice Pardiwala. 

The case in question pertained to one unpaid seller. It is the case of the complainant that he used to regularly supply consignments of grains & oats meant for horses at the Delhi Race Club. The complainant used to raise invoices in favour of the Club and the Club used to pay the requisite amount. However, according to the complainant after 2017, the Club stopped making the payment. It is the case of the complainant that an amount of Rs. 9,11,434/- is due and payable by the appellants towards the supply of the consignment of oats.

The Court observed:"The impugned order passed by the High Court is a fine specimen of total non- application of mind. Although the complaint was filed for the offence punishable under Sections 406, 420 and 120B respectively of the IPC yet the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate thought fit to take cognizance and issue process only for the offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405 of the IPC and made punishable under Section 406 of the IPC. We are of the view that even if the entire case of the complainant is accepted as true no offence worth the name is disclosed." 

The Court drew on its decision in S.W. Palanitkar & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr. reported in (2002) 1 SCC 241 expounded the difference in the ingredients required for constituting an of offence of criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) viz-a-viz the offence of cheating (Section 420).

In order to constitute a criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC): -
1) There must be entrustment with person for property or dominion over the property, and
2) The person entrusted: -
a) dishonestly misappropriated or converted property to his own use, or
b) dishonestly used or disposed of the property or willfully suffers any other person so to do in violation of:
i. any direction of law prescribing the method in which the trust is discharged; or
ii. legal contract touching the discharge of trust (see: S.W.P. Palanitkar (supra).
Similarly, in respect of an offence under Section 420 IPC, the essential ingredients are: -
1) deception of any person, either by making a false or misleading representation or by other action or by omission;
2) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property, or
3) the consent that any persons shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit (see: Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, (2009) 7 SCC 712 : (2009) Cr.L.J. 3462 (SC))

The judgement concluded:"We direct the Registry to send one copy each of this judgment to the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Law & Justice, Union of India and also to the Principal Secretary, Home Department, Union of India." It underlined the need of proper training of police and judicial officers so that they understand the distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. 

Victim, mother turn hostile, POCSO accused gets benefit of doubt from Justice Ashutosh Kumar

In Jayant Kumar @ Jayakant Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2024), by its order dated August 1, 2024, Patna High Court's Division bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Jitendra Kumar observed that "The minimum mandatory sentence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 is twenty years" but 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, POCSO Act, Saharsa in a POCSO case sentenced Jayant Kumar to undergo rigorous imprisonment (R.I.) for 12 years along with a fine of Rs. 10,000/-for each of the offence and in default of payment of fine. He was directed to suffer R.I. for six months for each on each of the counts by order dated January 31, 2019.  The appellant was convicted for the offences under Section 376 of Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 by judgment dated January 21, 2019. The Court pointed out the error in the sentencing order but ut did not ask the 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, POCSO Act, Saharsa to rectify it. 

The appellant was convicted for the having impregnated a 14 years old girl. The victim herself lodged a written report addressed to the Officer-in-Charge of Mahila Police Station on June 14, 2016 alleging that the appellant, her neighbour, had been subjecting her to sexual intercourse for the last six months on the pretext of marrying her. At the time of lodging of the written report, she was “quick with the child”. She alleged that on June 13, 2016 when she went to the appellant to press for the marriage, she was assaulted, abused and thrown out of the house. It was then that she informed her mother, who brought her to the Mahila Police Station. The victim had delivered a child who at the time of Trial was two years old. After examining six witnesses on behalf of the prosecution and one on behalf of the defense, the Trial Court, convicted and sentenced the appellant.

The High Court has recorded that the victim turned volte-face at the Trial. As prosecution witness (PW) 1, she deposed before the Trial Court that the appellant used to call her at his home and rape her. But in her cross-examination, she narrated an absolutely different story. On the prompting of villagers, in order to pressurize the appellant to marry her, the name of the appellant was provided by the villagers and therefore she had lodged this case against him. The appellant had not committed rape on her. Arti Singh, PW3, the Investigator of this case admitted that no document or evidence was furnished by the victim or her family members regarding the accusation against the appellant. The victim was examined by Dr. Ravindra Mohan (PW4) submitted that the victim was pregnant for over eight months. It is apparent that the victim chose to file the case against the appellant at a very advanced stage of pregnancy. Navneet Singh, defense witness (DW) 1 spoke about the good moral character of the appellant. DW1 is one of the panches of the Panchayat in which the village of the victim is located.

The High Court found it "really queer" that even though the victim has delivered a baby but at the Trial, she made a somersault and stated that the appellant was not the father of her child. All the allegations against the appellant were denied by the victim and her mother as well. The Court has recorded that "no effort was made by the prosecution to prove that the victim was less than 18 years of age. Though no objection has been raised regarding the assessment of the age of the victim and consequent assuming of jurisdiction of the Special Court to try this case, but on an overall analysis, we find that even the age of the victim has not been proved. She, at the time of her medical examination was already carrying a pregnancy of eight months and was found less than 18 years of age."

The Court observed that the accusation against the appellant have become "very doubtful". It concluded: "Giving benefit of doubt to the appellant, we set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence and set the appellant at liberty....The appellant is directed to be released from jail forthwith if not required or detained in connection with any other case....Let a copy of this judgment be communicated to the Superintendent of concerned jail for record and compliance." The judgement was authored by Justice Ashutosh Kumar.

The Court noted that the Trial Court ought to have determined whether the the victim was a minor at that time or else the case would fall in some other category of offence, namely, reneging on the promise of marriage.

Supreme Court grants benefit of Section 479 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) to undertrials across the country retrospectively

Supreme Court's bench of bench of Justices Hima Kohli and Sandeep Mehta held that Section 479 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 would apply retrospectively to the undertrials across the country. It implies that the provision will apply to all undertrials in cases was registered before July 1, 2024. The observations were delivered on August 23, 2024. Aishwarya Bhati, the Additional Solicitor General (ASG) confirmed that Section 479 would apply to undertrial prisoners irrespective of the date when the case was registered.

Section 479 reads: Maximum period for which undertrial prisoner can be detained-(1)Where a person has, during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Sanhita of an offence under any law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death or life imprisonment has been specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court on bail:Provided that where such person is a first-time offender (who has never been convicted of any offence in the past) he shall be released on bond by the Court, if he has undergone detention for the period extending up to one-third of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for such offence under that law:Provided further that the Court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order the continued detention of such person for a period longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail bond instead of his bond:Provided also that no such person shall in any case be detained during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial for more than the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the said offence under that law.Explanation.-In computing the period of detention under this section for granting bail, the period of detention passed due to delay in proceeding caused by the accused shall be excluded.

(2)Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), and subject to the third proviso thereof, where an investigation, inquiry or trial in more than one offence or in multiple cases are pending against a person, he shall not be released on bail by the Court.

(3)The Superintendent of jail, where the accused person is detained, on completion of one-half or one-third of the period mentioned in sub-section (1), as the case may be, shall forthwith make an application in writing to the Court to proceed under sub-section (1) for the release of such person on bail. 

The Court's order reads:“On the last date of hearing, Amicus Gaurav Aggarwal had submitted that Section 479 of BNSS that allows grant of bail to first-time undertrials. The attention of this court was drawn to the first proviso of Section 479. Having regard to the fact that the substituted provision of Section 436A CrPC was more beneficial where the period undergone was mentioned as 1/2rd of the maximum sentence undergone, this new provision provided for 1/3rd of the maximum sentence. We had sought clarification from ASG Bhati regarding applicability of this new provision of Section 479 BNSS. Ms. Bhati submitted that instructions have been obtained from concerned ministry that Section 479 will be applicable on all undertrials irrespective of whether cases were registered before July 1.” Notably, this provision of BNSS is similar to Section 436A of Cr.P.C.

 

Bail with excessive and onerous conditions is no bail: Supreme Court

In Girish Gandhi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, the Supreme Court's bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and K.V. Viswanathan observed that the grant of bail with excessive conditions that the accused would find difficult to fulfill would tantamount to denial of bail. The judgement was delivered on August 22, 2024. The Court took note of the meaning of ‘surety’ according to Oxford Dictionary. It defines it as “a person who takes responsibility for another’s obligation”. Advanced Law Lexicon defines ‘surety’ to mean “the bail that undertakes for another man in a criminal case.” The Court referred to the relevant provisions-Sections 441 and 446-under Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC).

Section 441 of the Cr.PC which deals with bonds and sureties, reads: “Bond of accused and sureties.– (1)Before any person is released on bail or released on his own bond, a bond for such sum of money as the police officer or Court, as the case may be, thinks sufficient shall be executed by such person, and, when he is released on bail, by one or more sufficient sureties conditioned that such person shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond, and shall continue so to attend until otherwise directed by the police officer or Court, as the case may be.
(2) Where any condition is imposed for the release of any person on bail, the bond shall also contain that condition.
(3) If the case so requires, the bond shall also bind the person released on bail to appear when called upon at the High Court, Court of Session or other Court to answer the charge.
(4) For the purpose of determining whether the sureties are fit or sufficient, the Court may accept affidavits in proof of the facts contained therein relating to the sufficiency or fitness of the sureties, or, if it considers necessary, may either hold an inquiry itself or cause an inquiry to be made by a Magistrate subordinate to the Court, as to such sufficiency or fitness.”

Section 446 of the Cr.PC which deals with procedure when bond has been forfeited, reads: “Procedure when bond has been forfeited. – (1) Where a bond under this Code is for appearance, or for production of property, before a Court and it is proved to the satisfaction of that Court or of any Court to which the case has subsequently been transferred, that the bond has been forfeited, or where in respect of any other bond under this Code, it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court by which the bond was taken, or of any Court to which the case has subsequently been transferred, or of the Court of any Magistrate of the first class, that the bond has been forfeited, the Court shall record the grounds of such proof, and may call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof or to show cause why it should not be paid.”

The Court relied on Court's decision in Satender Kumar Antil vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. (2022) 10 SCC 51. The Court has held that “imposing a condition which is impossible of compliance would be defeating the very object of release.” 

It also relied on Court's order in Court in Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail in SMWP (Criminal) No. 4/2021 reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 483. By the order dated 31.01.2023, the Court endorsing certain directions sought by the Amicus Curiae passed an order for compliance with those directions. The two relevant directions are extracted hereunder:- “6) If the bail bonds are not furnished within one month from the date of grant bail, the concerned Court may suo moto take up the case and consider whether the conditions of bail require modification/relaxation.
7) One of the reasons which delays the release of the accused/convict is the insistence upon local surety. It is suggested that in such cases, the courts may not impose the condition of local surety.” 

The Court recalled the decision of Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in Moti Ram and Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1978) 4 SCC 47. Justice Iyer observed “33. To add insult to injury, the magistrate has demanded sureties from his own district! (we assume the allegation in the petition). What is a Malayalee, Kannadiga, Tamil or Telugu to do if arrested for alleged misappropriation or theft or criminal trespass in Bastar, Port Blair Pahalgam or Chandni Chowk? He cannot have sureties owning properties in these distant places. He may not know any one there and might have come in a batch or to seek a job or in a morcha. Judicial disruption of Indian unity is surest achieved by such provincial allergies. What law prescribes sureties from outside or non-regional language applications? What law prescribes the geographical discrimination implicit in asking for sureties from the court district? This tendency takes many forms, sometimes, geographic, sometimes linguistic, sometimes legalistic. Article 14 protects all Indians qua Indians, within the territory of India. Article 350 sanctions representation to any authority, including a court, for redress of grievances in any language used in the Union of India. Equality before the law implies that even a vakalat or affirmation made in any State language according to the law in that State must be accepted everywhere in the territory of India save where a valid legislation to the contrary exists. Otherwise, an adivasi will be unfree in Free India, and likewise many other minorities. This divagation has become necessary to still the judicial beginnings, and to inhibit the process of making Indians aliens in their own homeland Swaraj is made of united stuff.”

The Court observed: "From time immemorial, the principle has been that the excessive bail is no bail. To grant bail and thereafter to impose excessive and onerous conditions, is to take away with the left hand, what is given with the right. As to what is excessive will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case, the petitioner is experiencing a genuine difficulty in finding multiple sureties. Sureties are essential to ensure the presence of the accused, released on bail. At the same time, where the court is faced with the situation where the accused enlarged on bail is unable to find sureties, as ordered, in multiple cases, there is also a need to balance the 14 requirement of furnishing the sureties with his or her fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. An order which would protect the person’s fundamental right under Article 21 and at the same time guarantee the presence, would be reasonable and proportionate. As to what such an order should be, will again depend on the facts and circumstances of each case."

Drawing on these decisions, the Court's judgement reads: "In view of the above, we propose to relieve the petitioner from the direction to produce a local surety....This condition will supersede the condition imposed in the respective bail orders." The judgement was authored by Viswanathan.

 

 

High Court reiterates constitutional validity of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019

The constitutional validity of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019, besides other amendments, repealing section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 was challenged in the case of Sudhakar Jha & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. [2024 (3) PLJR 403 (DB)]. A Division Bench of Patna Court comprising Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Partha Sarthy had dismissed the challenge to its constitutional validity. The judgement was delivered October 13, 2023. it was authored by Justice Sarthy. Notably, in this 174 page long judgement 127 pages are names of parties and advocates.  The petitioners has also challenged the orders passed by different authorities including the Additional Collector, the Commissioner of the Division and the Bihar Land Tribunal, all of which arise out of applications for pre-emption filed under section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. The petitioners had claimed that the amendments are against the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice. It is . It is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. 

The petitioners had claimed that Section 16(3) of the Act has been repealed in an arbitrary manner without assigning any cogent reasons and the amendment is arbitrary, unconstitutional, unreasonable and ultra vires the parent Act. It should not be made applicable with retrospective affect. The amendment effected has not only been done in excess of the power granted under the Constitution; assent of the President; without which it is otiose, has not been taken before its promulgation. The amendment affected was beyond the  competence of the State legislature and on account of repeal of section 45B of the Act, the statutory remedy of appeal/revision as was earlier available has been taken away without providing for any forum for adjudication of the disputes. They prayed that the amendments be declared ultra vires the Constitution and the same be set aside.

The High Court relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Punyadeo Sharma & Ors. vs. Kamla Devi & Ors. [2022 (1) BLJ 434 (SC)] to hold that all cases or proceedings which may be pending before any authority or Court including the High Court stood abated and the amount deposited shall be refunded in the manner as provided under section 16(4) of the Act. 

The Supreme Court in the case of Punyadeo Sharma has held as follows :-
“4. The question examined by the Division Bench of the High Court was whether an application for pre-emption was filed within three months of the registration as required by Section 16(3) of the Act or was it required to be filed within three months of the day of execution of the sale deed i.e. 9.2.1990. However, the said question does not survive for consideration in view of the subsequent development whereby the right of pre-emption itself has been taken away by the Bihar Act No. 6 of 2019 when the Act was amended. The Amending Act reads thus:
………………………………
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and find that the right of pre-emption, after the Amending Act, abates as Sub-section 4(i) is specifically dealing with all pending proceedings before whatsoever forum. Therefore, the right of pre-emption will stand abated on and after 25.2.2019 including the proceedings which were pending before any forum.
………………………………
12. …Any other Court is wide enough to include the Constitutional Courts i.e. the High Court and the Supreme Court. ……………….Thus, keeping in view the object of the Statute, purpose to be achieved and the express language of the Amending Act, all proceedings of pre-emption under the Act pending before any authority under the Act or before any Court shall stand abated.

13. Consequently, the present appeals are allowed. The entire pre-emption proceedings stand abated. It shall be open to the respondents to withdraw 10% of the amount deposited by them in terms of Section 16 of the Act in accordance with law.” 

In Narendra Kumar @ Sanjeev Kr. Sinha vs. The State of Bihar (2024), the High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Partha Sarthy has held that the case arising out of an application under section 16(3) of the Act stands abated. It shall be open to the petitioner to withdraw the amount deposited by him in terms of section 16 of the Act in accordance with law. The judgement was delivered August 21, 2024. Justice Sarthy authored the judgement. Y.C. Verma, Senior Advocate represented the petitioner. There were seven respondents besides the State of Bihar. They are: Member Board of Revenue, Patna, the Collector, Nalanda, Biharsharif, the Additional Collector, Nalanda, Biharsharif, the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Nalanda, Biharsharif, the Sub Divisional Officer, Nalanda, Biharsharif, Ramashraya Prasad, Sherpur, Mahamadpur, Asthawan, Nalanda and Krishnaballabh Singh.

Supreme Court issues directions to all States to comply with POCSO Act and JJ Act in Re: Right To Privacy of Adolescents

In a case of offence under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Rules, 2012, Supreme Court's judgement in Writ Petition (C) no.3 of 2023 etc and a criminal appeal has directed the Court's Registry "to forward copies of this judgment to the Secretaries of Law and/or Justice Departments of all the States and Union Territories. The Secretaries shall convene meetings of the Secretaries of the concerned departments and other senior officials. The object of holding such meetings is to ensure that appropriate directions are issued to all concerned to strictly implement the provisions of Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act and the relevant provisions of the JJ Act, which we have elaborated above. The State/Union Territories must create machinery to do so. The State/Union Territories shall also assist the victims in getting the benefits under the scheme of the Government of India and the scheme of NALSA, which we have referred to above. In the meetings, the issue of framing Rules by the States to give effect to the provisions of Section 46 of the JJ Act, shall also be considered. The Secretaries shall forward the compliance reports to the Secretary of the Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India, within a period of two months from today. The Secretary of the Ministry of Women and Child Development shall compile the reports and submit an exhaustive report before this Court within three months from today. A copy of this judgment shall also be forwarded to the Secretary to the Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India." It has underlined that providing "information of the commission of offence under the POCSO Act, as required by Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act, is not an empty formality."

Section 19 deals with reporting of offences. Section 19(6) reads: "The Special Juvenile Police Unit or local police shall, without unnecessary delay but within a period of twenty-four hours, report the matter to the Child Welfare Committee and the Special Court or where no Special Court has been designated, to the Court of Session, including need of the child for care and protection and steps taken in this regard."

Section 46 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) [JJ]Act, 2015 a salutary provision that provides that any child leaving child care on completion of eighteen years of age may be provided with financial support to facilitate re-integration into the mainstream of society in the manner as may be prescribed by law. It reads: “After care of children leaving child care institution.— Any child leaving a child care institution on completion of eighteen years of age may be provided with financial support in order to facilitate child’s re-integration into the mainstream of the society in the manner as may be prescribed.” 

“After care” has been defined in Section 2(5) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act. It is a provision for financial or otherwise support to persons in the age group of 18 to 21 years. Section 46 and Rules under it are the most critical provisions that needs to be effectively implemented. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act Act has adequate provisions to ensure the care, protection, treatment, and rehabilitation of the victim of an offence under the POCSO Act. The ultimate object is to integrate the child in need of care and protection into society to lead a dignified and meaningful life.

The Court examined the failure of the State which is under an obligation to take care of the victim of an offence under the POCSO Act. The State also has constitutional obligations to take care of such victims. The existing law of the land takes adequate care of the victim. If a child is residing with a person who has injured, exploited or abused the child or has violated any other law for the time being in force meant for the protection of the child, the said child becomes a child in need of care and protection. Thus, if a child who is a victim of an offence under the POCSO Act is residing with the accused, the child becomes a child in need of care and protection.

The judgement was delivered on August 20, 2024 by the Division Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan. The Court set aside the judgement of the Calcutta High Court and restored the judgement of the Trial Court.  It was authored by Justice Oka.