Justice Arun Kumar Jha sets aside order by Special Judge (SC/ST), Aurangabad, grants anticipatory bail in a SC/SCT case

In Saroja Devi @ Saroj Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 4-page long judgement dated July 17, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"07. Having regard to the submissions made on behalf of the parties and considering the case and counter version and also considering the background of land dispute and further considering the possibility of false implication, let the appellant above named, in the event of her arrest or surrender before the court concerned within a period of eight weeks from today, be released on bail, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Special Judge (SC/ST) -cum- 1st Additional District & Sessions Judge, Aurangabad, Bihar in connection with Rafiganj P.S. Case No. 312 of 2024, subject to the condition as laid down under Section 482(2) BNSS and other following conditions: (i) One of the bailors will be a close relative of the appellant. (ii) The appellant will remain present on each and every date fixed by the court below, if so required by the learned trial court. 08. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed."

The judgement records that "Despite valid service of notice, there is no representation on behalf of respondent no. 2" who is Anita Devi.  

The judgement was delivered upon hearing  appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the refusal of prayer for anticipatory bail vide order dated September 23, 2024 passed by the Special Judge (SC/ST)-cum-1st Additional District & Sessions Judge, Aurangabad, Bihar in A.B.P. No. 2009 of 2024. The case arose out of Rafiganj P.S. Case No. 312 of 2024, registered for the alleged offences under Sections 3(5), 109, 115(2), 118(1), 126(2) BNS and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(w) & 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Act.  

The prosecution case is that the appellant and other co-accused persons entered into the house of the informant and assaulted her. The counsel for the appellant submitted  that the appellant was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case. No occurrence as alleged has ever taken place. The case was the result of land dispute between the parties and there was a counter case instituted by co-accused Ramkrit Yadav being Rafiganj P.S. Case No. 311 of 2024 and the genesis of the occurrence is that the co-accused was fencing his land and the informant and her family members assaulted him causing injury to him. The counsel submitted that there was no intention to humiliate the informant side by taking their caste name rather it appears to be a case of scuffle and free fight between two groups over some land dispute and this fact depicts from the counter case and the present case has been lodged by the informant only with a view to save their skin from the counter case. The counsel also submitted that the appellant was a lady and there is no specific allegation against her that she insulted the informant by taking her caste name in a public place. No independent witness has supported the version of the informant and it appears that the informant has instituted the case in order to create defence. The appellant was having antecedent of one case which was instituted under different provisions of the IPC and sections 3(1)(r),3(2)(1), 3(2) (va) of SC/ST (PoA) Act in which she is on bail. The Special PP submitted that the appellant and other co-accused persons took
caste name of the informant and also assaulted her.

High Court cannot impose civil suit-related conditions while granting anticipatory bail: Supreme Court

In Nehru Irulandi vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. V. Vishwanathan delivered judgment dated May 27, 2026, wherein, it set aside order dated February 24, 2026 by Madras High Court's condition restraining accused from interfering with disputed property, holding that criminal courts cannot effectively grant relief pending in a civil suit. The Supreme Court held that conditions imposed while granting anticipatory bail cannot amount to granting relief that is yet to be decided by a civil court.

It set aside the condition prohibiting the appellants from interfering with the disputed property until the civil suit was decided. It clarified that all other conditions imposed while granting anticipatory bail would continue to remain in force.

It observed that if the complainant, as plaintiff in the civil suit, apprehends breach of peace or interference with the suit property, he is free to seek appropriate relief before the civil court or any other appropriate forum in accordance with law.

The case arose from an FIR registered at Perunazhi Police Station, Madurai, for offences under Sections 189(2), 329(3), 324(4), 115(2) and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. While granting anticipatory bail to the appellants and other co-accused, the high court had directed them not to interfere with the disputed property until the conclusion of a civil suit filed by the complainant.

Responding to the question: can a High Court impose civil suit-related conditions while granting anticipatory bail, the Supreme Court answered in the negative. It held that such a condition effectively amounted to granting relief in the civil suit itself. The Court observed that the appellants were defendants in a civil suit filed by the complainant seeking a permanent injunction. It factored in the fact that the appellant's claim that he had purchased the suit property.

The judgement reads: "Prima facie, it appears that the case of the appellant, namely, Nehru Irulandi as one of the defendants is that he has purchased the suit property. Be that as it may, the Suit is of the year 2019. The plaintiff has not prayed for any injunction pending the Suit".

Supreme Court recorded that although an application seeking interim injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been filed, it had not yet been taken up for hearing by the civil court.

The judgement reads:"We are of the view that while granting anticipatory bail, high court should not have imposed a condition which tantamount to granting of some relief in the suit itself, which otherwise the civil court has not granted."

The Division Bench held that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction in a criminal matter, could not impose a condition that effectively granted a relief which the civil court itself had not granted.

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh in a case from Jehanabad

In Deepak Kumar @ Deepak Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George passed a 4-page long order dated May 26, 2026, wherein, it concluded:" 7. We allow the present appeal by confirming the order dated 27.04.2026, passed by this Court, with a direction to the appellant to continue to cooperate during the investigation/trial and not to take any unnecessary adjournment. Also, the appellant shall report before the Investigating Officer every alternate Monday, between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m., till such time the investigation is complete in all respects. 8. If the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer/Trial Court feels that the investigation/trial is delayed on account of the appellant’s conduct, it shall be open to the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer/Trial Court to take appropriate steps in accordance with the law, including cancellation of bail. 9. The impugned judgment and order dated 12.03.2026 is set aside." The impugned order was passed by Patna High Court's Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh.

The appellant had challenges the judgment and order by Justice Singh. On April 27, 2026, the Supreme Court had passed an order, which reads: "8. In the event of arrest in connection with Crime No.5790020250137 of 2025 of Kako Police Station, Jehanabad District, Bihar, the petitioner shall be released on bail on the appropriate terms and conditions as may be fixed by the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer. However, in the attending facts, one of the conditions shall necessarily be that if the petitioner possesses a passport, the same shall be deposited before the Competent Authority/Court, till the
conclusion of the Trial or directed otherwise. 9. The petitioner shall make himself available before the Investigating Officer on 04.05.2026 at 10:00 a.m. and on all such dates as he may be required. 10. Needless to add, till the investigation is not complete in all respects, the petitioner would fully cooperate, and if the challan/charge sheet is filed, he would maintain good conduct and not attempt to influence any
of the witnesses in any manner till the completion of the trial.”

Supreme Court's May 2026 order pointed out that "5.Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty It is not in dispute that the conditions stand fully complied with; the appellant has cooperated during the investigation; he has not threatened or intimidated any of the witnesses; or has tried to influence the investigation in any manner. 6. We have noticed the nature of crime and the manner in which it was allegedly committed.

Earlier, in Deepak Kumar @ Deepak Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Prabhat Kumar Singh passed a 2-page long order dated March 12, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"3. As per F.I.R., this petitioner is alleged to have created obstruction in construction of ‘pucca nala’ work and also assaulted informant, who is a government employee while executing his government lawful duty, and due to which, the construction work could not be completed. 4. Considering the nature of accusation, the prayer for anticipatory bail of petitioner is rejected." Supreme Court has reversed Justice Singh's order. 

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in Kako P.S. Case of 2025, registered for offence punishable under Sections 191(2), 126(2), 115(2), 110 and 132 of the Bhartiya Nayay Sanhita, 2023, which pertain to rioting, wrongful restraint,  voluntarily causing hurt, and attempt to commit culpable homicide respectively. The case was filed in the High Court on September 8, 2025 and registered on September 10, 2025.

Supreme Court reverses conditional pre-arrest bail order by Justice Purnendu Singh in a rape case, vindicates bail order by Justice Satyavrat Verma

In Ghutuk Miyan @ Ismail Miyan vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 3-page order dated May 13, 2026, wherein, it reversed the conditional order dated April 28, 2026 by Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court. It issued notice and concluded: "By way of an ad interim order, in the event of arrest, the petitioner be released on bail in connection with P.S. Case No. 192 of 2025 registered SLP (Crl.) No(s). 8811/2026  at Police Station Gopalpur, District West Champaran, Bihar...." The respondent no. 2 from village, Mahesda, Gopalpur, West Champaranis is not named because it is a rape case. The Court's order vindicates the order dated March 12, 2026 by Justice Satyavrat Verma. 

Earlier, Justice Singh had passed an order wherein, he had observed:"7. Having heard the rival  submissions made on behalf of the parties, as well as, having perused the allegation made in the FIR, from the manner in which the entire story has been narrated, it appears to be shaky to the extent that learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has rightly submitted that no one can carry a female in his lap without her desire. No force was applied by the informant, however, the informant has supported the allegation made in the FIR, in her statement recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS and the same is also supported by the 11 years old child in his statement recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS before the Investigating Officer." 

The order reads: "8. In such circumstances, I direct the learned District Court to first get the statement of the 11 years old child of the informant recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS by a child friendly Court and if the learned District Court finds that the 11 years old child of the informant has not supported the allegation as alleged in the FIR, then in that case, the petitioner, above named, is directed to be released on pre-arrest bail, in the event of his/her arrest or surrender before the learned District Court within a period of four weeks from today, on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned District Court where the case is pending, in connection with Gopalpur P.S. Case No. 192 of 2025, subject to the condition as laid down under Section 482(2) of the BNSS. 9. If the child supports the allegations made in the FIR, in his statement recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS, then in that case, the petitioner is directed to be taken into custody forthwith. 10. The learned District Court is directed to verify the criminal antecedent of the petitioner as stated in paragraph no. 3 of the bail application. If any other case is pending against the petitioner as what has been stated in paragraph no. 3, this order will lose its force automatically." 

The petitioner had approached the High Court seeking pre-arrest bail in connection with Gopalpur P.S. Case No. 192 of 2025 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 64, 351(2), 352 and 3(5) of the BNS. According to the allegation made in the FIR, the petitioner had allegedly committed rape upon the informant while her husband was not present in the house. The rape was allegedly committed in presence of her 11 years old son. The counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had submitted that the manner in which the allegation was narrated, itself makes the allegation of commission of rape doubtful as it is the case of the informant that she was taken into lap and, thereafter, without having resisted to the same act of the petitioner, she was taken to another room where the rape was committed in presence of her 11 years old son, who supported the prosecution case along with the victim, who was the informant of the case. She also submitted that the victim was examined by the doctor and the doctor opined that there was no trace of any recent sexual assault having been committed. She submitted that Rs 70, 000 of the petitioner was due with the informant and in order to avoid payment of the same, the informant lodged the FIR. She had also submitted that on these grounds, co-ordinate Bench of the High Court had granted interim relief to the petitioner and, as such, in absence of any evidence, the petitioner deserve to be released on pre-arrest bail.

The counsel appearing on behalf of the informant, referred to the impugned order of the District Court, submitted that enough evidences have been collected in course of investigation and the petitioner having taken advantage of the absence of the husband of the informant, had committed rape, which was in presence of her 11 years old son and the statement of her son was also recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS before the Investigating Officer, in which, he supported the prosecution story. He also  submitted that it was not a case of tutoring of the 11 years old child, who is innocent and his version is required to be given emphasis, particularly, in case where rape is committed. He submitted that the petitioner had not taken any plea that the child was tutored and narrated a false story under Section 180 of the BNSS before the Investigating Officer. He also submitted that evidence was there, which suggested that the petitioner had committed rape upon the victim, who is the informant. He had vehemently opposed the prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail.

Prior to this Justice Satyavrat Verma had passed an order dated March 12, 2026. The case arose from a Gopalpur P.S. Case of 2025 from the Court of Arvind Kumar Gupta, learned Exclusive Special Judge Rape and POCSO Act, Bettiah, West Champaran. The order reads: "4. There shall be no coercive action against the petitioner until the anticipatory bail application is finally adjudicated by this Court, as it has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that petitioner is a person with clean antecedent and from perusal of the allegation as alleged in the FIR, it would manifest that petitioner and the informant were in a consensual relationship and when the child of the informant woke up, the petitioner fled and thereafter the instant FIR came to be instituted after a delay of six days. It is also submitted that the informant in the FIR alleges that after making her children sleep, she also went to sleep without locking the door and petitioner taking advantage of the same entered the house and came to her room, lifted her in his arms and brought her in another room and on the point of knife threatened and raped her. It is submitted that it does not appear probable that petitioner would have been knowing that the door was unlocked on the date of occurrence, this fact also creates a suspicion that petitioner and the informant were in a consensual relationship."

Supreme Court reverses anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra

In Suraj Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Ujjal Bhuyan passed a 2-page long order dated May 6, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"5. We are informed that out of nine accused persons, all the four lady accused have been released on bail. The High Court initially had protected the petitioner from any coercive steps being taken against him. 6. In the overall view of the matter, particularly the genesis of the occurrence and the fact that they all are  neighbors, we are persuaded to exercise our discretion in favor of the petitioner. 7. We order that in the event of the arrest of the petitioner in connection with the FIR, referred to above, he shall be released on bail by the IO subject to terms and conditions that he may deem fit to impose. 8. Once the petitioner is released by the IO, he shall thereafter furnish fresh bonds to the Trial Court." Prior to that the allowed the exemption applications.

The petitioner had approached the Supreme Court through SLP after being denied anticipatory bail by Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra of the Patna High Court in connection with the First Information Report of 2025 registered with Singhaul Police Station,  Begusarai for the offence punishable under Sections 191(2), 190, 126(2), 115(2) and 109 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 respectively.

Supreme Court took "notice of the fact that in the FIR, nine persons have been named as accused. Out of nine, four are ladies." It observed: "4. It is evident on plain reading of the FIR, the other materials on record and also the impugned Order passed by the High Court that the accused persons and the prosecution witnesses are neighbors. On the date of the incident, they picked up a fight which ultimately led to an assault. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused persons attempted to commit murder. Whether it is a case of attempt to commit murder or not will be looked into by the Trial Court in the course of trial."

In his order dated February 11, 2026, Justice Mishra had rejected the prayer for anticipatory bail. As per prosecution case, on the alleged date of occurrence, the named accused persons including petitioner came to the house of informant Aarti Kumari and started beating her and her husband. The petitioner was alleged to have assaulted the informant’s husband with iron rod on back of his head due to which he fell down and thereafter all the accused persons assaulted him with bricks and stone as a result of which the husband of informant sustained injuries. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case due to dirty village politics. The informant and the petitioner were agnates. The petitioner had clean antecedent. A.P.P. for the State had opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner by contending that there was direct allegation of assault to the husband of informant on his head with iron rod against the petitioner causing head injury. He further submitted that the injury report showed that the injury caused to the injured was found to be grievous in nature. Therefore, the petitioner did not deserve anticipatory bail. In such a backdrop, Justice Mishra was not inclined to enlarge the petitioner on anticipatory bail. 

Supreme Court grants pre-arrest bail to Gyanti Devi from Jahanabad

In Janti Devi @ Buchiya Devi @Gyanti Devi vs. The State of Bihar (2026),  Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justice Rajesh Bindal and Vijay Bishnoi granted pre-arrest bail to the appellant by its 6-page long order dated March 19, 2026. The appellant was a woman aged 42-43 years, who had filed the appeal seeking pre-arrest bail in connection with FIR dated March 15, 2025 registered at Police Station Jahanabad Thana, Jahanabad, Bihar under sections 126(2), 115(2), 109 and 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. 

The counsel for the appellant submitted that there are no allegations against her. Her entire family was involved in the case. Two minor sons were already granted bail being juvenile. The husband of the appellant is still in custody.

The Court observed:"5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and considering the fact that entire family had been involved in the case, the appellant is a woman aged 42-43 and her husband is already in custody, in our opinion, she deserves to be granted pre-arrest bail."

Supreme Court takes note of allegations "against some of the police officers of trying to coerce the petitioner" in a matrimonial case from Naugachhiya, Bhagalpur

In Amit Kumar Hari @ Amit Kumar Abhimanyu vs. The State of Bihar Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan passed a 3-page long order dated February 26, 2026, wherein, it observed:".....we notice that certain allegations have been made against some of the police officers of trying to coerce the petitioner even after the order dated 25.11.2025 passed by this Court extending the interim protection granted by the High Court to the petitioner, due to which, the petitioner has filed a complaint bearing M.P. No.264 of 2026 against those police officers before the learned CJM, Purnia. We further note that the said Court has also issued notice in the said petition. The said Court has also asked for a report from the concerned police, which is awaited. 4. Be that as it may, let the concerned Superintendent of Police applied with the aforesaid order of the learned CJM, Purnia without any delay. Thereafter, the learned CJM, Purnia shall take a call in accordance with law. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1-State of Bihar shall communicate the present order to the Trial Court. 6. A copy of this order be also sent to the learned CJM, Purnia." The Respondent no. 2 is Palak Kumari @ Pallawi Kumari. 

Prior to this order, the Supreme Court had passed an order dated November 25, 2025, when the parties were sent to mediation initially, there was lack of cooperation on the side of the petitioner. However, later on, he did participate, but the mediation ultimately failed. The Court went into the merits of the matter. The Court found that no case for anticipatory bail was made out. Accordingly, the Special Leave Petition stands dismissed. The order of the Court dated November 25, 2025 for continuation of the interim protection granted to the petitioner by the High Court vide the impugned order dated September 24, 2025 stands vacated. 

The case arose out of impugned final 4-page long order dated September 24, 2025 passed by Justice Purnendu Singh of the Patna High Court. The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in connection with Naugachhiya P.S. Case No. 33 of 2025 registered under Sections 85,115(2),126(2),352,3(5) of the BNS and Sections 3,4 of the DP Act. As per the allegation made in the FIR, the petitioner along with other family members had assaulted the informant due to non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. 

Justice Singh had recorded and observed that "the parties have failed to settle the matrimonial dispute, the Court till last minute must strive to give opportunity to the parties to settle the dispute between the husband and wife amicably. The matrimonial dispute is not an offense against the society rather a matrimonial dispute is a private conflict between spouses and does not inherently constitute an offence against society. However, a false case can have a disastrous consequence in absence of any criminal content. The personal dispute cannot call for a criminal offence. Continuation of the proceeding would amount to abuse of process of law leading to vexatious proceeding against the petitioner."

Justice Singh drew on Supreme Court's decision in B.S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana, reported in, (2003) 4 SCC 675, in paragraph nos. 12 and 13 wherein it held as under:-
“ 12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes. 13. The observations made by this Court, though in a slightly different context, in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [(2000) 3 SCC 693 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 733] are very apt for determining the approach required to be kept in view in a matrimonial dispute by the courts. It was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts.

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma because of committing "an egregious error" in exercising his discretion in favour of murder accused persons by granting anticipatory bail

In Ramakant Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan passed an order dated February 11,  2026, wherein, it set aside the impugned order by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma of the Patna High Court. The accused persons i.e. Respondent Nos.2 and 3, Omprakash Singh and Rajneesh Kumar Singh @Aman Kumar @Aman Singh respectively were ordered to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of one week from February 11, 2026.

Supreme Court' s Division Bench observed: "17. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the High Court committed an egregious error exercising its discretion in favour of the accused persons by granting them anticipatory bail. 18. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. 19. The impugned Order passed by the High Court is set aside....21. Once they surrender before the Trial Court, they shall be remanded to judicial custody. It will be open for both the accused persons to thereafter pray for regular bail. 22. We are informed that the investigation is over and charge- sheet has been filed. 23. The regular bail application that may be filed by the accused persons shall be considered on its own merits in accordance with law, having regard to the materials in the charge-sheet. 24. It is needless to clarify that the regular bail application shall be decided without being influenced by any of the observation made by us in the present order. We have said in so many words that the principles governing grant of anticipatory bail differ to a considerable extent from the principles governing grant of regular bail. This shall be kept in mind by the concerned Court while considering the regular bail application of the accused persons."

This appeal arose  from the Order passed by the High Court dated July 30, 2025 by which the anticipatory bail application was preferred by the Respondent Nos.2 and 3 in connection with Bishanpur Police Station Case No.14 of 2025 registered on 27-1-2025 for the offence punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 109, 352, 351(2), 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita respectively. Later, in point of time as the injured succumbed to the injuries, Section 103(1) of the BNS, 2023 (erstwhile Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code came to be added.

The appellant before the Supreme Court was the son of the deceased. He also happened to be the original informant. The First Information Report lodged by the appellant with the Police Station in Darbhanga on January 27, 2025. 

In all six persons were named as accused in the FIR inclusive of the Respondent Nos.2 and 3 respectively before us. The Respondent Nos.2 and 3 apprehending arrest prayed for anticipatory bail before the Sessions Court. The Sessions Court declined to grant them anticipatory bail.

In such circumstances, they went before the High Court. The High Court accepted their plea and granted them anticipatory bail. The High Court while granting anticipatory bail observed in para 6 as under:-

“6. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, there is no specific allegation of assault against these petitioners and specific allegation of assault is against co-accused person, namely, Ratneshwar Singh and there is case and counter case between the parties and there is also land dispute between the parties for which one Title Suit is pending between the parties, let the petitioners, above named, in the event of arrest or surrender before the court below within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of the order, be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 25,000/- (Twenty Five Thousand) each with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Darbhanga in connection with Bishanpur P.S. Case No. 14 of 2025, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure / Section 482(2) of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita and with other following conditions:-

i. Petitioners shall co-operate in the trial and shall be properly represented on each and every date fixed by the court and shall remain physically present as directed by the court and on their absence on two consecutive dates without sufficient reason, their bail bond shall be cancelled by the Court below.

ii. If the petitioners tampers with the evidence or the witnesses, in that case, the prosecution will be at liberty to move for cancellation of bail.

iii. And further condition that the court below shall verify the criminal antecedent of the petitioners and in case at any stage it is found that the petitioners have concealed their criminal antecedent, the court below shall take step for cancellation of bail bond of the petitioners. However, the acceptance of bail bonds in terms of the above-mentioned order shall not be delayed for purpose of or in the name of verification.”

The appellant, being the son of the deceased, was before the Supreme Court with the present appeal being aggrieved by the grant of anticipatory bail to the two accused persons i.e. the Respondent Nos.2 and 3 respectively before us. 

Division Between underlined that "11. The High Court should have been mindful of the fact that the accused persons are alleged to have been involved in a serious crime like murder. We do not say for a moment that in connection with an offence of murder, Court should not grant anticipatory bail”. But, it observed: "....the principles governing grant of anticipatory bail are quite different compared to the principles governing grant of regular bail. 13. Anticipatory bail may be granted by the Court even in a case of murder provided the Court is convinced that the accused persons praying for anticipatory bail have been falsely implicated due to some personal vendetta, political rivalry etc. The accused praying for anticipatory bail has to make out more than a prima facie case of false implication. 14. Grant of anticipatory bail is not a matter of course. Here is a case where the accused persons have been named in the FIR. The first informant is none other but an eye-witness to the incident. He may be the son of the deceased but that by itself is not sufficient to disbelieve what he has alleged in the FIR more particularly when the investigation is going on. We also take into consideration the fact that the deceased died of multiple head injuries. Postmortem Report reveals there were multiple fractures. Prima facie, the ocular version as narrated is in tune with the medical evidence on record. 15. Just because a title suit is pending between the parties by itself could not have been a ground to believe that the accused persons have been falsely implicated."

Supreme Court noted that from the submissions made by the Additional Public Prosecutor before the High Court it is apparent that the Respondent No.2 has five criminal antecedents and the Respondent No.3 had also few criminal antecedents.

Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra quashes cognizance order by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Begusarai

Patna High Court delivered three judgements on January 19, 2026 in Manju Devi vs. The State of Bihar, Arun Kumar Choudhary @ Arun Choudhary vs. The State of Bihar and Ravi Singh vs. The State of Bihar. 

In Manju Devi & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra delivered a 10-page long judgement, wherein, he concluded:"21. This Court is conscious of the settled principle that criminal proceedings ought not to be quashed at the threshold in a routine manner. However, where the allegations do not disclose the commission of any offence, the prosecution is founded on legally untenable grounds, and continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of law, interference by this Court becomes not only permissible but imperative. 22. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order of cognizance suffers from non-application of mind and that continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioners would result in grave miscarriage of justice. 23. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. "

The application was filed for quashing the order dated January 3, 2025 passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Begusarai in a Complaint Case of 2024 whereby and whereunder th Judicial Magistrate First Class, Begusarai took cognizance and issued process for facing trial against the petitioners and others for the offences under sections 85, 115(2), 118(1), 191(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

The prosecution case was that the complainant solemnized marriage with the co-accused, Sumit Kumar, in accordance with Hindu rites and rituals at the Kali Temple, Begusarai. It was alleged that despite being fully aware that the complainant was a divorced woman belonging to a different caste and having a minor son from her previous marriage, the co-accused Sumit Kumar voluntarily entered into the matrimonial alliance. After the marriage, the complainant was kept in a rented accommodation. Subsequently, it was alleged that the co-accused Sumit Kumar, along with the other accused persons, subjected the complainant to cruelty, including caste-based abuse and physical assault. It was also alleged that Shivam Kumar, the petitioner no. 2 made an attempt to press the complainant’s neck with an intention to cause her harm.

The  counsel for the petitioners submitted that the criminal proceeding was a gross abuse of the process of law and were liable to be quashed at the threshold because the complaint was founded on vague, omnibus and generalized allegations without attributing any specific overt act of cruelty to the petitioners. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Preeti Gupta & Anr. vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr. reported at (2010 7 SCC 667, wherein the Court had cautioned against the tendency to implicate all family members of the husband in matrimonial disputes on the basis of sweeping and exaggerated allegations.

The counsel for the petitioners also relief upon decision in Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana & Anr.,reported at (2025) 3 SCC, wherein the Supreme Court reiterated that criminal prosecution in matrimonial disputes cannot be sustained in the absence of specific allegations and material particulars showing active involvement of the accused persons. It was held that continuation of such proceedings amounts to misuse of criminal law.

The counsel for the petitioners relied upon Rajesh Sharma & Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. , reported at (2018) 10 SCC 472, wherein the  Supreme Court recognized the rampant misuse of Section 498A IPC and emphasized the need for judicial scrutiny before subjecting the relatives of the husband to criminal prosecution, particularly when allegations were bald and unsubstantiated.

The counsel also submitted that the very foundation of the prosecution was unsustainable, as the complainant was already married to another person and no decree of divorce was placed on record. Consequently, the alleged marriage with co-accused Sumit Kumar was void-ab initio. 

The counsel relied upon Dolly Rani vs. Manish Kumar Chanchal, reported at (2025) 2 SCC 587, wherein, the Supreme Court laid down the essential ingredients of a valid marriage and held that in the absence of a legally valid subsisting marriage, prosecution for matrimonial offences is not maintainable.

Therefore, it was submitted that in the absence of a valid marriage, specific allegations of cruelty, or any material indicating harassment by the petitioners, the essential ingredients of Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 were not made out. Continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioners would therefore result in grave miscarriage of justice and deserves to be quashed in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.

The counsel for the state supported the impugned order taking cognizance that the Court below after considering all the materials against the petitioners took cognizance. 

The High Court noted that the "jurisdiction invoked under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, is undoubtedly extraordinary in nature; however, it is equally well settled that such jurisdiction must be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice. On a plain reading of the complaint and the statements recorded during enquiry, this Court finds that the allegations levelled against the petitioners, who are relatives of the husband, are largely vague, omnibus, and generalized in nature. Except for a broad narrative alleging harassment, the complaint does not attribute any specific role, overt act, or distinct instance of cruelty to any of the petitioners. The absence of material particulars assumes significance, particularly in matrimonial disputes where the tendency to implicate the entire family has been judicially noticed and deprecated."

In Preeti Gupta and Another v. State of Jharkhand and Another, (2010) 7 SCC 667, the Supreme Court, while dealing with a similar fact situation, expressed serious concern over the growing misuse of matrimonial provisions by roping in distant and uninvolved relatives on the basis of exaggerated and sweeping allegations.

The Court held that criminal law should not be permitted to be used as a weapon of harassment and that courts must be cautious and circumspect while dealing with such complaints.

Applying the ratio of the Supreme Court's judgment, the High Court found that "the allegations in the present case lack the requisite specificity to justify continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioners."

Justice Mishra observed:"A further crucial and undisputed aspect of the case is the categorical admission of the complainant that she had been residing separately from the petitioners for nearly three years and had never shared a household with them. This admission strikes at the very root of the allegation of cruelty. Cruelty, in the context of matrimonial offences, presupposes a degree of proximity, interaction, or cohabitation that enables harassment or ill-treatment. In the absence of any shared residence or meaningful interaction, the allegation of cruelty by the in-laws becomes inherently improbable. The admitted factual position, therefore, does not disclose any circumstance giving rise to cruelty attributable to the petitioners."

The only allegation with some degree of specificity was against petitioner no. 2, namely, Shivam Kumar, alleging an attempt to press the neck of the complainant. However, this allegation was conspicuously unsupported by any medical evidence or contemporaneous record. No injury report, hospital document, or independent corroboration was produced. More importantly, this allegation did not find mention in the initial complaint and surfaced for the first time during the enquiry through a witness statement. Such an improvement, in the absence of supporting material, renders the allegation doubtful and insufficient to sustain criminal prosecution.

Justice Mishra observed:"15. This Court also finds substantial merit in the submission that the very foundation of the prosecution is legally unsustainable. It is an admitted position that the complainant was previously married and has a minor child from the said marriage. No decree of divorce dissolving the earlier marriage has been placed on record. In the absence of dissolution of the subsisting marriage, the alleged subsequent marriage with accused Sumit Kumar is void-ab-initio in the eyes of law." He referred to Supreme Court's decision in Dolly Rani vs.Manish Kumar Chanchal, (2025) 2 SCC 587, had categorically held that the existence of a legally valid and subsisting marriage was a sine qua non for invoking matrimonial offences. The Court clarified that where the marriage itself is void or legally nonexistent, the very basis for prosecution under matrimonial provisions collapses. 

In this case, the absence of a valid marriage strikes at the root of the prosecution.

Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,2023 requires the coexistence of two essential ingredients: first, a legally valid marital relationship; and second, cruelty arising out of such relationship. 

Justice Mishra wrote:"This Court finds that neither of these ingredients is satisfied in the present case."

In Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana & Anr, (2025) 3 SCC, the Supreme Court reiterated that criminal prosecution in matrimonial disputes cannot be permitted to continue where allegations are general, unsupported by material evidence, and disclose no active involvement of the accused. The Court emphasized that criminal law should not be used as a tool of pressure or harassment.

Justice Mishra recollected that in Rajesh Sharma & Ors vs.State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2018) 10 SCC 472, the Supreme Court acknowledged the rampant misuse of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and underscored the duty of courts to prevent unnecessary prosecution of relatives of the husband, particularly when allegations are bald and unsubstantiated.

He noted that the case squarely falls within the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1)SCC 335. The matter clearly attracts the illustrative categories carved out therein, particularly where the allegations, even if taken at face value, do not disclose the essential ingredients of the alleged offence and are manifestly attended with mala fide and abuse of the process of law. Continuation of the prosecution, in such circumstances, would serve no legitimate purpose.

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Ritesh Kumar bench directs release of minor, directs payment of Rs 5 lakh by erring officials as compensation for illegal arrest

In Md. Jahid (Minor) under the guardianship of cousin brother Mohammad Navi Hussain/Parokar vs. The State of Bihar, through Director General of Police, Government of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench-II of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Ritesh Kumar delivered a 14-page long judgement dated January 9, 2026, wherein, it concluded:".....we direct that the petitioner shall be released forthwith by the Juvenile Justice Board from the observation home/children’s home and in this regard appropriate release order shall be issued by the Juvenile Justice Board, Madhepura forthwith. 24. For his unlawful arrest and detention, we direct the State to pay a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) as compensation. This amount, we are assessing, keeping in view that a young boy who is a juvenile at this stage has undergone physical and mental agony for two and half months by now. The State Government shall pay this amount to the petitioner within a period of one month from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order."

Justice Prsad who authored the judgement drew on judgment of the Supreme Court in Nilabati Behera (Smt) Alias Lalita Behera vs. State of Orissa & Ors. reported in AIR 1993 SC 1960 while dealing with the case of contravention of fundamental rights of a citizen. He referred to the decision in Arvind Kumar Gupta vs. State of Bihar and Others reported in 2025 (6) BLJ 5 by the Patna High Court which observed in paragraphs ‘27’, ‘28’ and ‘29’: “27. In the case of Rudal Sah Vs. State of Bihar and Another while dealing with a case of unlawful detention in jail, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-“...In these circumstances, the refusal of this court to pass an order of compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing mere lipservice to his fundamental right to liberty which the State Government has so grossly violated.” 28. In the case of Pankaj Kumar Sharma Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6215, a learned Single Judge of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has reviewed the case laws on the subject and upon finding that the petitioner was made to suffer in the lockup for only half an hour, the learned Single Judge directed for payment of compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the petitioner recoverable from the salaries of Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 who were the erring officials."

The judgement reads: "25. We find that the petitioner has been compelled to approach this Court by filing a writ application of Habeas Corpus. He/his family has incurred expenses in contesting the litigation which were imposed upon them due to misuse of power by the police official. 26. We, therefore, award a cost of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand) to the petitioner which shall also be paid by the State within the same period. 27. It is well settled in law that when the State is saddled with cost and compensation because of misuse of power by an executive, such cost and compensation must be realized from the erring officials. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of this Court in the case of K.K. Pathak @ Keshav Kumar Pathak Vs. Ravi Shankar Prasad and Others reported in 2019 (1) PLJR 1051 which was subject matter of challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Crl) No. 003566/2019, however, the same has not been interfered with and the view is based on the earlier views of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which have been duly discussed."

Justice Prasad who authored the judgement wrote: "28. We direct the competent authority/the Director General of Police, Bihar to institute an inquiry into the matter in administrative side, take a suitable view based on the materials which would come in course of the inquiry proceeding and realize the cost and the compensation amount from the erring officials. The cost and compensation amount which will be paid to the petitioner shall be realized from the erring officials after completion of inquiry, within a period of six months from the date of receipt/communication of a copy of this order. 29. This writ application stands allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. 30. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the learned Principal District Judge, Madhepura, the Juvenile Justice Board, Madhepura and the Director General of Police, Bihar for compliance."

The writ application was filed in the nature of a Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking release of the petitioner from the illegal detention of the respondents. It was the case of the petitioner that the I.O. in this case arrested the petitioner in complete disregard to the powers of arrest and without following the established procedure of law. The petitioner alleged gross violation of his fundamental right as embodied under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

One Khushboo Praveen wife of Md. Amzad, resident of village Sapardah Ward No. 8, P.S.- Puraini, District- Madhepura lodged a first information report giving rise to Puraini P.S. Case of 2025 dated July 11, 2025 registered under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 76, 308(2), 109, 303(2), 3(5) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. She alleged that in connection with a land dispute, a Panchayati was held with the intervention of the co-villagers, the accused persons called the prosecution side to participate in the said Panchayati but while the Panchayati was going on, the 14 named accused including this petitioner who are all the co-villagers of the informant assaulted the prosecution side. It was also alleged that the accused persons had taken away the silver chain and other ornaments. In connection with the said occurrence, the petitioner’s mother also lodged a counter case giving rise to Puraini P.S. Case of 2025 dated July 16, 2025. The  case was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 191(2), 191(3), 190, 115(2), 76, 126(2), 109, 303(2), 352, 351(2), 351(3) of the BNS, 2023. 

During investigation of the Puraini P.S. Case, the I.O. found that there was no sufficient material to proceed against ten named accused persons including thE petitioner. One accused, namely, Md. Naushad was arrested. The investigation was supervised by the Inspector and upon instructions, the I.O. filed a chargesheet bearing Chargesheet No. 235 of 2025 dated September 1, 2025 in which ten accused including this petitioner were shown in Column No. 12 as not chargesheeted accused. In another words, they were not sent up for trial. A reading of the chargesheet which is on the record  would show that the same was filed on the direction of the Senior Police officer, while the arrested accused Md. Naushad was chargesheeted, the investigation was kept open against three absconding accused, namely, (1) Md. Muktar, (2) Md. Zakir and (3) Md. Akhtar. It was apparent that after about 25 days, the I.O. received a review note/supervision note from the office of the Deputy Inspector General of Police (in short ‘DIG’), Koshi Range, Saharsa. It was evident that the supervision note was recorded by the DIG on his own on the request of the informant who had visited the office of the DIG with an application complaining that the Inspector of Police had wrongly exonerated ten named accused persons. The DIG simply recorded in his note the allegations. Taking note of the statements of the witnesses, he issued a direction to the I.O. to proceed with the investigation of the case assuming that the allegations are true against the accused persons. He directed the Superintendent of Police, Madhepura to ensure further action and arrest all the remaining accused persons expeditiously. A perusal of the case diary would showed that the supervision note of the DIG was incorporated in the case diary on September 25, 2025 whereafter the I.O. straightway proceeded to conduct raid on the house of the accused persons. The case diary did not show that after the supervision note of the DIG, any instruction was obtained from the Superintendent of Police, Madhepura. It did not show that the I.O., being fully aware of the fact that the ten accused persons had already been shown not sent up for trial, made any application in the court of Magistrate for permitting a further investigation. The I.O. could not lay his hand to any other material against the petitioner but on October 23, 2025, he arrested the petitioner, described his age as 19 years and produced him before the court from where he was sent to jail. It appeared that even at the time of his production before the Magistrate, the attention of the Magistrate was not drawn towards the fact that the petitioner was shown in the column of not chargesheeted accused in the chargesheet, therefore, once the chargesheet had been filed in the court, it was incumbent upon the I.O. to file an application seeking further investigation of the case if at all any material had come against the petitioner. Even the Magistrate did not look into these aspects of the matter and straightway in a mechanical manner sent the petitioner behind the bars. 

The petitioner approached the High Court by filing the writ application and informed this Court on November 24, 2025 in course of hearing that the petitioner was a juvenile as per his date of birth certificate i.e. the registration card of the Bihar School Examination Board showing his date of birth as January 1, 2010. The petitioner complained that despite the fact that he was a juvenile, the Magistrate did not assess his age at the time of sending him behind the bars and in complete breach of the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the petitioner was languishing in jail. On 24.11.2025, the High Court noticed the submissions and asked the State to file a counter affidavit duly sworn by the I.O. who had effected the arrest of the petitioner. In the meantime, the High Court observed that “it will be open to the Jurisdictional Magistrate to take corrective measures after considering the date of birth certificate of the petitioner. If it is found that the petitioner is aged below 18 years, it will be incumbent upon the Jurisdictional Magistrate to send him to the concerned Juvenile Justice Board for assessment of age and considering his date of birth certificate as per the Bihar School Examination Board, he would be kept in an observation home and not in jail with adults.”

The High Court was been informed at this stage that, in fact, after coming to know the claim of the petitioner that he was a juvenile, the Jurisdictional Magistrate had vide his order dated November 21, 2025 referred him for assessment of age to the Juvenile Justice Board, Madhepura. A Letter No. 13 dated January 7, 2026 from the office of the Superintendent of Police, Madhepura showed that the petitioner was declared juvenile aged about 15 years 06 months and 08 days on the date of occurrence.

A question arose for consideration in the present case as to how the petitioner could have been arrested on October 23, 2025 when he was not chargesheeted in the case and, in fact, in the Chargesheet No. 235, he was shown one amongst the ten accused persons who were not chargesheeted/sent up for trial.

Justice Prasad observed:"We have already taken note of the fact that during investigation, sufficient materials were not found against the petitioner to send him to trial and after the supervision note of the DIG, the I.O. had not collected any other and further material against the petitioner. All that he did after receipt of the supervision note of the DIG was that he conducted a raid and ultimately arrested the petitioner from his house on 23.10.2025." 

Supreme Court reverses Justice Satyavrat Verma's anticipatory bail rejection order

In Sima Devi vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 4-page long order dated November 7, 2025 upon hearing Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) which arose out of impugned 3-page long order dated July 16, 2025 passed by Justice Satyavrat Verma of Patna High Court. 

Supreme Court's Division Bench reversed the order of Justice Verma saying, "3....we deem it appropriate to confirm the order of interim protection and deem it appropriate to release the petitioner on anticipatory bail. 4 In view of the above, we direct that in the event of arrest, the petitioner shall be released on bail on furnishing suitable bail bonds and sureties...." The Court had granted interim relief by its order dated September 24, 2025 by issuing direction for not taking coercive steps.

The petitioner had approached the Supreme Court apprehending her arrest in connection with a FIR dated December 1, 2024 registered at Police Station Banjariya, District East Champaran, Bihar for the offences
punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 109, 118(2), 352 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. 

Earlier, in Sima Devi vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Verma had concluded:"5. Considering the submissions made by the learned APP, the court is not inclined to extend the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioner. 6. The anticipatory bail application of the petitioner is rejected. 7. However, if the petitioner surrenders on or before 30.07.2025, in that event, the learned trial Court shall dispose of the case, on the same day, keeping in mind that husband of the petitioner has been granted the privilege of regular bail by this Court." 

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending her arrest in connection with Banjariya P.S. Case No.394/2024, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 118(2), 109, 352, 3(5) of the B.N.S. Act.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that woman petitioner was a person with clean antecedent. The husband of the petitioner had approached the High Court seeking regular bail by filing Cr. Misc.No.32639/2025 and the same was allowed by an order dated 22.05.2025. It was submitted that informant alleged that husband of the petitioner was indulged in trade of liquor, further on 26.11.2024, the Banjariya police caught the liquor of her husband, on account of which, the husband of the petitioner abused the informant alleging that it was at his instance that the liquor was caught, thereafter husband of the petitioner assaulted the informant by knife causing injury. It was next alleged that the petitioner along with co-accused Vivek Kumar also assaulted the brother of the informant Vinod Sah by knife causing injury. It was submitted that the injury suffered by Vinod Sah was simple in nature. A.P.P. for the State opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner and submitted that the petitioner along with Vivek were alleged to have assaulted Vinod by knife causing injury. It was also submitted that Vinod suffered two injuries and the husband of the petitioner was granted the privilege of regular bail, as such, the APP submitted that it was not a fit case, where the privilege of anticipatory bail be granted to the petitioner, in the nature of allegation as alleged in the FIR.

Supreme Court seeks medico-legal reports in an attempt to murder case from Muzaffarpur

In Rahul Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justuces Vikram Nath and K.V. Viswanathan heard a Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) arising out of 3-page long order dated January 8, 2025 passed by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma of Patna High Court on April 30, 2025. The 2-page long order of the Supreme Court's Division bench reads: "The counter affidavit filed by the State duly sworn by the Senior Superintendent of Police, District Muzaffarpur (Bihar) does not enclose the injury report or the medico-legal report of the Community Health Centre, where the injured was first examined and thereafter referred to Prashant Hospital, which is a private set-up." The counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar, produced a photocopy of the examination report of the injured by the Prashant Hospital. It observed:"The Trial Court order rejecting the bail clearly records that the injury report was not placed on record. Let the Senior Superintendent of Police file further affidavit placing on record the medico-legal reports of the Community Health Centre, where the injured was first examined and also the relevant medical report from the Prashant Hospital within two weeks. List the matter again on 15th May, 2025. In the meantime, petitioner may also file rejoinder affidavit."

In this case of attempt to murder from Mansurpur, Chamarua, Karja, Muzaffarpur, Justice Verma had concluded: "There is direct and specific allegation of assault against the petitioner and it appears from the impugned order itself that the learned court below itself perused the spot injury on the person of the husband of the informant when he has appeared before the learned court below, I am not inclined to grant the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioner...." The petitioner had approached the High apprehending his arrest in connection with FIR dated August 7, 2024 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 126(2),115(2),118(1), 109, 352, 351(3) and   3(5) Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). Section 126 of the BNS deals with "Wrongful Restraint". Section 115 deals with "voluntarily causing hurt." Section 118 of the BNS deals with the offense of "voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means". Section 109 of the BNS deals with the crime of "attempt to murder". Section 352 of the BNS penalizes intentional insults intended to provoke a breach of peace. Section 351 of the BNS deals with criminal intimidation, which is the act of threatening another person with harm to their body, reputation, property, or someone they care about, with the intent to cause fear or compel them to act against their will. Section 3(5) of the BNS outlines a principle of joint criminal liability.

The FIR was registered on the basis of the written report of the informant Babita Devi alleging that on August 6, 2024 Rahul Kumar, his wife Chandani Kumari and Mina Kumari came to her door and started hurling abused on which when her husband Ravindra Paswan objected, Chandani Kumari and Mina Devi give instigation to kin on which Rahul Kumar assaulted the husband of the informant by a knife in his ribs due to which he fell down and became unconscious. On alarm raised by her the villagers came and took her husband to SKMCH, for treatment but later on he was taken to Prashant Hospital at Juran Chhapra, Muzaffarpur where his treatment was going on so there was delay in filing of FIR.