Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sunil Dutta Mishra set aside judgment by Additional Sessions Judge-III, Lakhisarai in a murder case

In Subhash Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sunil Dutta Mishra delivered a 23-page long judgement dated September 29, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"33. We, therefore, find that in this case, the learned trial court has grossly erred in appreciation of the evidences available on the record. The prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond all reasonable doubts. 34. In result, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 06.12.2022 and the order of sentence dated 08.12.2022 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Lakhisarai in Sessions Trial No. 60 of 2020, arising out of Lakhisarai (Ramgarh Chowk) P.S. Case No. 56 of 2019. The accused-appellant is acquitted of all the charges, giving him benefit of doubt. The appellant is said to be in
jail, he shall be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other case. 35. This appeal stands allowed." The judgement was authored by Justice Prasad. 

The appellant had preferred the appeal for setting aside the judgment of conviction dated December 6, 2022 and the order of sentence dated December 8, 2022 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-III, Lakhisarai in Sessions Trial No. 60 of 2020, which arose out of a Lakhisarai (Ramgarh Chowk) P.S. Case of 2019. By the impugned judgment, the appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 341/34, 324/34, 326/34 and 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 341/34 IPC with a fine of Rs.500/. He was also sentenced to undergo three years simple imprisonment for the offence under Section 324/34 IPC with a fine of Rs.5,000/. He was further sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for seven years for the offence under Section 326/34 IPC with a fine of Rs. 5,000/. The appellant was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment for the offence under Section 302/34 IPC with a fine of Rs.10,000/. 

The prosecution story was based on the fardbeyan of Birju Yadav (deceased) recorded by ASI Anil Kumar of P.S. Ramgarh Chowk at Emergency Ward, Sadar Hospital at 17:20 hrs on January 18, 2019 wherein he had alleged that on January 18, 2019 at about 03:00 P.M., while he was cutting grass in his field, his villagers namely (1) Vikash Yadav, (2) Subhash Yadav, (3) Mukesh Yadav and (4) Rajesh Yadav came armed with sword and other weapon and assaulted him with intention to kill. It was alleged that Vikash Yadav assaulted the informant with a Talwar on his right leg causing cut injuries at 2-3 places. Subhash Yadav (the appellant) assaulted him with katta on his left causing injuries at 2-3 places. It was further alleged that Mukesh Yadav assaulted the informant on his head resulting in 2-3 cut injuries and Rajesh Yadav assaulted him with a katta, causing injuries to his right wrist and hand. It was alleged that all four accused persons assaulted the informant with deadly weapon due to which he sustained various injuries on his body. The informant stated that this occurrence took place due to previous enmity. On the basis of his fardbeyan recorded at Sadar Hospital, Lakhisarai, Ramgarh Chowk P.S. Case No. 56 of 2019 dated January 18, 2019 was registered for the offences under Sections 341, 323, 324, 326, 307, 120B and 34 of the IPC against (1) Vikash Yadav, (2) Subhash Yadav, (3) Mukesh Yadav and (4) Rajesh Yadav. During the course of treatment, the informant succumbed to his injuries on January 19, 2019, whereafter Section 302
I.P.C. was added. 

After investigation, Police submitted a charge-sheet bearing Chargesheet No. 473 of 2019 dated October 9, 2019 against the appellant Subhash Yadav for the offences punishable under Section 302/34 IPC, keeping the investigation pending against (1) Vikash Yadav, (2) Mukesh Yadav and (3) Rajesh Yadav.

The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lakshisarai  vide order February 17, 2020 took cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC against the appellant Subhash Yadav and committed the records to the Court of Sessions on March 2, 2020. Accordingly, vide order dated November 16, 2021 charges were framed for the offences punishable under Sections 323/34, 324/34, 326/34, 341/149, 307/34, 302/34 and 120B IPC against accused-appellant Subhash Yadav. In his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused denied the allegations and pleaded false implication.  In course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as eight witnesses and got exhibited several documents. 

The Trial Court, upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidences, held that the homicidal death of Birju Yadav stood established on the basis of the evidence of Dr. Shiv Ranjan Kumar (PW-4), postmortem report, inquest report and other materials on record. The Trial Court treated the fardbeyan of the deceased, recorded by Anil Kumar (PW-8) at Sadar Hospital, Lakhisarai, as a dying declaration and held that the same was admissible even in the absence of a medical certificate regarding the fitness of the deceased, particularly when the recording witness had stated that the deceased was in a fit condition to give his statement. The specific allegation against the appellant Subhash Yadav of assaulting the deceased with a Katta was found corroborated by the testimonies of P.Ws.1, 2 and 3 and the medical evidence. The Trial Court further rejected the defence objections regarding the related nature of the prosecution witnesses, non-examination of independent witnesses, alleged inconsistencies and the plea of alibi, holding that the prosecution witnesses were consistent on material particulars and their evidence inspired confidence, whereas the defence failed to establish the plea of alibi with requisite certainty. The Trial Court also held that previous enmity between the parties could not, by itself, discredit the prosecution case and concluded that the appellant, along with the co-accused, had assaulted the deceased and shared common intention in commission of the offence. Accordingly, the appellant was convicted under Sections 341/34, 324/34, 326/34 and 302/34 of the I.P.C. On the point of sentence, considering that there was no material to show that the appellant had inflicted more than one blow or that the murder was committed in a brutal manner, the Trial Court held that the case did not fall within the category of rarest of rare cases and sentenced the appellant to simple imprisonment for one month under Section 341/34, three years under Section 324/34, seven years under Section 326/34 and imprisonment for life under Section 302/34 of the I.P.C., with respective fines and directed payment of the fine to the dependent of the deceased besides recommending compensation through the District Legal Services Authority. 

The appellant's counsel submitted that the prosecution case suffered from serious infirmities from its very inception. It was submitted that the formal F.I.R. was registered fifty minutes prior to the recording of the fardbeyan of the deceased, which was projected as the basis of the F.I.R. PW-1, Mauli Yadav @ Anmol Kumar, nephew of the deceased, has stated that he had made his statement before the police at Sadar Hospital at about 4:30 P.M. on January 18, 2019, whereas the fardbeyan of the deceased was recorded at 5:20 P.M., however, the statement of PW-1, being the earliest version, was not made the basis of the F.I.R. It was submitted that the first version of the prosecution case was suppressed. He also submitted that the alleged fardbeyan cannot be safely treated as a dying declaration as there was no medical certification regarding the fitness of the deceased to make the statement, rather, PW-8, A.S.I. Anil Kumar, admitted that the doctor treating the deceased had not granted permission for recording his statement. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Surjit Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in (2024) 2 SCC 411. It was submitted that PW-4, Dr. Shiv Ranjan Kumar, had found as many as ten ante mortem injuries on the body of the deceased, yet no treatment papers or medical records from Sadar Hospital, Lakhisarai or Patna Medical College Hospital was produced to establish that the deceased was in a fit physical and mental condition to make such a detailed statement. In this regard, reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Suresh Sahu & Anr. vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2637. He submitted that the Investigating Officer stated that the further statement of the deceased was recorded through videography but the said videographic evidence was not produced before the Trial Court, though it would have been a material piece of evidence for appreciating the condition and manner of making the alleged statement. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tomaso Bruno & Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2015) 7 SCC 178. It was also submitted that the alleged dying declaration was not put to the appellant in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and therefore the said incriminating circumstance could not have been relied upon against him. In this regard, counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgment of the High Court in Munna Shukla vs. State of Bihar reported in 2020 SCC OnLine Pat 1980 and the judgment of Supreme Court in Aejaz Ahmad Sheikh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 913. The appellant's counsel submitted that material inconsistencies exist regarding the motive, inasmuch as the fardbeyan refers to prior enmity, whereas, PW-2 refers to rangdaari as the reason for the occurrence. The defence brought on record documents relating to the criminal antecedents of the deceased. It was lastly submitted that PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 were not eyewitnesses to the occurrence. PW-2 himself stated that his statement was not recorded by the police and the presence of PW-2 and PW-3 at the place of occurrence does not find mention in the fardbeyan of the deceased or the subsequent fardbeyan of PW-3. Thus, according to counsel, once the alleged dying declaration was found to be doubtful and excluded from consideration, the remaining evidence was insufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant deserves to be extended the benefit of doubt. 

Justice Prasad observed: "A perusal of the enclosure to the formal F.I.R. would show that it has been drawn on the basis of the fardbeyan of Birju Yadav (since deceased) recorded by A.S.I. Anil Kumar (PW-8) in the Emergency Ward of Sadar Hospital, Lakhisarai at 17:20 hrs on 18.01.2019. It is evident that the time of recording of formal F.I.R. is fifty minutes prior to the recording of the fardbeyan (Exhibit ‘P- 1/2’). In this regard, we have also noticed from the deposition of Mauli Yadav @ Anmol Kumar (PW-1), who is the nephew of the deceased, that he claims to have made statement before police in the Sadar Hospital on 18.01.2019 at 4:30 P.M. Therefore, there is no iota of doubt that prior to recording of the fardbeyan of the victim, the statement of PW-1 had already been recorded at 4:30 P.M., but this statement has not been made basis of lodging of the F.I.R. It is for this reason, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the first version of the prosecution case which came through PW-1 has been suppressed. We are of the opinion that the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant as regard suppression of the first version cannot be thrown away." 

The High Court noticed that the fardbeyan of Birju Yadav (deceased) was recorded by A.S.I. Anil Kumar (P.W.-8) in the Sadar Hospital, Lakhisarai. It was witnessed by Alakh Yadav (son of the deceased), who has deposed as PW-3 but as regards the mental state and fitness of the victim to make statement, no certification was done by any Doctor of the hospital. PW-8 stated in paragraph '3' of his deposition that the doctor who was treating Birju Yadav had not granted permission to record his statement. It referred to the judgment of Supreme Court rendered in the case of Surjit Singh, wherein, the Court had considered a case where dying declaration was recorded by the I.O. in which the doctor has certified at 4:30 P.M. that the patient was fit for making the statement. The dying declaration was recorded at 5:30 P.M. The Court found that Surjit Singh (PW-10), who had recorded the dying declaration had not stated that Dr. Sudhir Sharma had examined the deceased before giving the fitness certificate. It relied on paragraphs ‘12’, ‘13’ and ‘14’ of the judgment of the Court. It reads: “12. Now, we come to the dying declaration relied upon by the prosecution which is recorded by Surjit Singh (PW 10). He recorded the alleged dying declaration at 5.30 p.m. on 8-7-1999. A request was made by him to the doctor attached to GGS Medical College to certify whether the deceased was fit to make a statement. An endorsement, according to him, was made by Dr Sudhir Sharma at 4.30 p.m. recording that the patient was fit for making the statement. 13. In the examination-in-chief, Surjit Singh (PW 10) has not stated that Dr Sudhir Sharma examined the deceased before giving the fitness certificate. He has stated that Dr Sudhir Sharma remained present by his side when he recorded the statement of the deceased. What is most relevant is the admission given by Surjit Singh (PW 10) in Para 2 of his cross-examination, which reads thus: “2. It is correct that doctor remained beside Reeta Rani throughout when I recorded her statement. It is correct that I sought the opinion of the doctor regarding the fitness of Reeta Rani throughout her statement but he refused to give this certificate i.e. fitness certificate. …” (emphasis supplied) 14. Thus, even according to Surjit Singh (PW 10), the doctor, who gave certificate at 4.30 p.m., declined to give a certificate that when the statement of the deceased was being recorded, she was fit to give a statement. There is nothing brought on record to show that Dr Sudhir Sharma examined the deceased before giving certificate of fitness at 4.30 p.m. What is most crucial is that Dr Sudhir Sharma has not been examined as a prosecution witness. In view of what is admitted by Surjit Singh (PW 10) in Para 2 in his cross-examination, which we have quoted above, an adverse inference will have to be drawn against the prosecution for not examining the said doctor. Therefore, for the aforesaid reasons, the dying declaration allegedly recorded by Surjit Singh (PW 10) will have to be discarded. Then the other dying declaration recorded by an independent doctor, namely, Dr Manvir Gupta (PW 13), holds the field.”

Justice Prasad has recorded that in the present case, since the I.O. himself admitted that "the doctor had not granted him permission to record the statement of the victim, this Court cannot attach much evidentiary value to the fardbeyan of the victim as dying declaration. 22. This Court finds that there is a huge doubt over the condition of the victim at the time of recording of the fardbeyan in Sadar Hospital, Lakhisarai." 

He also recorded: "23. The Doctor had noticed as many as ten injuries on the various parts of the body of the victim. No chit of paper regarding the treatment of the victim in the Sadar Hospital, Lakhisarai or in the Patna Medical College Hospital has been produced by the prosecution. Had those papers been produced, the Court would have been in a position to appreciate from the medical papers whether deceased was in a position to speak. 24. Going through the kind of injuries suffered by the victim, we cannot believe that the victim would have been in a position to speak. We can see from the kind of recording of the fardbeyan that it is giving every detail of himself and that of the accused persons as also the narration of occurrence which could not have been possible. In this regard, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Suresh Sahu (supra)." 

Supreme Court's judgement in paragraphs ‘41’ to ‘44’ reads:“41. The prosecution relies heavily on the disclosure of the names of the accused-appellants in the oral dying declaration of the deceased. However, having gone through the evidence of the medical jurist, Dr. Ajit Kumar Chaudhary (PW-5), we are unable to subscribe to the theory that the deceased would have been in a position to speak after receiving the injuries described .....42. It is impossible to believe that, having received such grave head/cranial injuries, the deceased would have been in a position to speak what to talk of making an oral dying declaration. 43. That apart, admittedly, the deceased was taken to the hospital at Mandar, at the first instance, from where he was referred to R.M.C.H., Ranchi. The treatment documents of the deceased from the Mandar Hospital could have provided vital information regarding his condition at the time of arrival at the hospital. However, the prosecution did not bring any such document on record, which further weakens the case of prosecution on the theory of oral dying declaration. 44. The evidence of Tapeshwari Kumari (PW-1) and Saroj Kumari (PW-2), being the sisters of the deceased, on the aspect of oral dying declaration is unworthy of credence for the reasons which we have assigned above.”

Justice Prasad observed:"25. In view of the above discussions, we are of the opinion that the learned Trial Court has grossly erred in appreciating the fardbeyan of the victim by taking the same as dying declaration. 26. We have further noticed that the I.O. (PW-5) has tated in paragraph ‘1’ that he had recorded the further statement of the informant (victim) and had recorded it by way of videography but the said videographic statement has not been produced before the learned Trial Court. The electronic evidence
of videography would have been a vital piece of evidence in this case and it would have demonstrated how the deceased had made statement during his hospitalization in the Sadar Hospital. Non- production of the video by the I.O. (PW-5) would prove fatal to the prosecution.' 

The High Court referred to paragraph 28 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Tomaso Bruno (supra). The judgment reads:“28. The High Court held that even though the appellants alleged that the footage of CCTV is being concealed by the prosecution for the reasons best known to the prosecution, the accused did not invoke Section 233 CrPC and they did not make any application for production of CCTV camera footage. The High Court further observed that the accused were not able to discredit the testimony of PW 1, PW 12 and PW 13 qua there being no relevant material in the CCTV camera footage. Notwithstanding the fact that the burden lies upon the accused to establish the defence plea of alibi in the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view, the prosecution in possession of the best evidence, CCTV footage ought to have produced the same. In our considered view, it is a fit case to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution under Section 114 Illustration (g) of the Evidence Act that the prosecution withheld the same as it would be unfavourable to them had it been produced.”  

Justice Prasad observed: "27. We, therefore, find that in this case so far as the fardbeyan of the victim/deceased, which has been attached with the formal FIR is concerned, the same is not free from blemish and doubt for the reasons discussed hereinabove. 28. We have further noticed that in this case the said dying declaration has to be discarded in view of the provisions contained in Section 313 Cr.P.C. The dying declaration was not put before the accused-appellant during his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C." 

Reliance was placed on the judgment of the High Court in the case of Munna Shukla and the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Aejaz Ahmad Sheikh. The High Court in paragraph ‘24’ of its decision in the case of Munna Shukla held:- “24. In the case of Jaswant Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) reported in (1978) 4 SCC 85 : AIR 1979 SC 190, it has been held by the Apex Court that the dying declaration, which is not recorded by a Magistrate has to be scrutinized closely but it is well settled that if the Court is satisfied on a close scrutiny of the dying declaration that it is truthful, it is open to the court to convict the accused on its basis without any independent corroboration.”

The Supreme Court in in paragraph ‘16’ of its decision in the case of Aejaz Ahmad Sheikh has held:-“16. The most unfortunate part is that the evidence of PW-11 about the dying declarations made by these two victims has not been put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 of CrPC. Not only that what is stated in the evidence by PW-11 is not put to the accused in his statement under Section 313 of CrPC., but even the fact that the dying declarations were made by Fatima and Amina to PW-11 was not put to the
accused.” 

Justice Prasad observed: "31. We have also noticed that in this case the fardbeyan of the informant talks of prior enmity whereas the statement of Sheetal Yadav (PW-2) talks of rangdaari as the reason for the occurrence. Defence has exhibited several documents and marked exhibits to show that the deceased was a veteran criminal. He was convicted in Sheikhpura P.S. Case No. 716 of 2018. 32. We have further noticed that in this case the prosecution witness numbers PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 are not eyewitnesses to the occurrence. PW-2 has stated that his statement was not recorded by police. Presence of PW-2 and PW-3 is not stated in the fardbeyan of the deceased or in the fardbeyan of PW-3 which was recorded on 19.01.2019 at 13:00 Hrs. The occurrence took place outside the village and in this regard, the statement of PW-3 says that it happened in south-west Bahiyar to the village."

Patna High Court's new chief justice has delivered thirteen judgments so far

After joining as the new chief justice of Patna High Court, Chief Justice V. Kameswar Rao has authored thirteen judgments in Virendra Ram, vs. The State of Bihar on September 15, 2026, Mithilesh Kumar Upadhyay vs. The State of Bihar, Mani Bhushan Giri vs. The State of Bihar, M/s. SEPL LLC Sphere vs. Union of India on September 16, 2026, Kamla Devi vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, JKM Infra Projects Ltd. vs. The State of Bihar, Daya Shankar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar on September 17, 2026, Union of India through Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs, vs. Pramod Kumar Sinha on September 18, 2026, Rajeev Kumar vs. The State of Bihar on September 22, 2026, The State of Bihar vs. Shrawan Kumar, MS Singh Enterprises vs. The Central Warehousing Corporation on September 23, 2026, Bijendra Kumar vs. The North Bihar Power Distribution Company Limited on September 24, 2026 and Sushil Kumar Ray @ Sushil Kumar vs. The State of Bihar on September 28, 2026. The judgements were delivered as part of a Division Bench. 

In M/s. SEPL LLC Sphere vs. Union of India, as part of the Division Bench, in his judgement dated  on September 16, 2026, Justice Rao concluded:"The law on the subject is very clear, inasmuch as the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not sit as an Appellate Authority over the decision of the Tender Committee and come to a different conclusion, more so when there are sufficient reasons to hold that the bid of the petitioner was not in accordance with the
RFP. 16. We find no merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed. No cost." 

Also read:  Chief Justice V. Kameswar Rao of Patna High Court authored his first judgment, heard 41 cases on the first day as Chief Justice 

Justice Valluri Kameswar Rao all set to be 49th Chief Justice of Patna High Court

 

 

Supreme Court declines pre-arrest bail to main accused, the husband of the deceased, grants bail on parity to brother-in-law, sister-in-law because father-in-law, mother-in-law were granted relief

In Devlal Sahani & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices  Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed a 8-page long order dated October 1, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....we are of the opinion that the case of Devlal Sahani (petitioner No.1–brother-in-law of the deceased) and Anandi Devi (petitioner No.3–sister-in-law of the deceased) is, in no manner, distinguishable from that of Jaga Sahani and Shri Devi (father-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased), who have been extended the benefit of pre-arrest bail by this Court. Hence, Devlal Sahani and Anandi Devi (petitioner Nos.1 and 3) deserve the indulgence of pre-arrest bail on parity. However, Prince Sahani (petitioner No.2), being the husband of the deceased Rupkali Devi, was alleged to be the main offender in the FIR. Otherwise also, the responsibility of the husband to ensure the safety and security of his wife is more onerous. Hence, we are inclined to extend the indulgence of pre-arrest bail to Devlal Sahani and Anandi Devi (petitioner Nos.1 and 3), whereas the prayer for pre-arrest bail made by Prince Sahani (petitioner No.2) stands rejected. Prince Sahani (petitioner No.2) shall surrender before the trial Court within a period of two weeks from today. Before parting, we would like to observe that the investigation seems to have been misdirected in this case by the post-mortem findings referred to supra. Therefore, we hereby direct that the Superintendent of AIIMS, Patna, shall constitute a Medical Board which shall examine the post-mortem report and the antecedent circumstances and give its opinion regarding the cause of death of Rupkali Devi. The opinion of the Medical Board shall be forwarded to the trial Court, and a copy thereof shall also be forwarded to the High Court of Judicature at Patna for necessary follow up action. In case the Medical Board is of the opinion that the cause of death of Rupkali Devi was homicidal, necessary amendment in the charges would follow. We make it clear that the trial of the case shall not be prejudiced by the observations made hereinabove. The special leave petition is disposed of in these terms." 

The petitioners had approached the Supreme Court seeking anticipatory bail in connection with FIR No.343 of 2023 lodged at Chiraiya P.S., District East Champaran, Bihar, for the offences punishable under Section 304B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860. The facts of the case is that the deceased Rupkali Devi was married to Lakshmi Sahani, s/o Jaga Sahani in the year 2018. From their wedlock, a son was born. In the year 2019, Lakshmi Sahani passed away because of illness. Following the death of Lakshmi Sahani, the families, after mutual discussion, agreed that Rupkali Devi should be married to Prince Sahani (petitioner No.2), the younger brother of Lakshmi Sahani. Accordingly, both were married in the year 2020 and a son named ‘Master V’ was born from their wedlock. It is alleged that Rupkali Devi was continuously harassed and humiliated on account of demand of dowry and, as a culmination to the said cruel conduct, she was done to death in the matrimonial home on 16th July, 2023. Shri Harendra Sahani, father of the deceased Rupkali Devi, lodged an FIR at P.S. Chiraiya, District East Champaran, on 16th July, 2023 itself, arraigning her father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law (petitioner No.1), brother-in-law’s wife (petitioner No.3) and the husband Prince Sahani (petitioner No.2) as accused in the case. The dead body of Rupkali Devi was subjected to post-mortem, and a pertinent finding was recorded by the Medical Jurist in the post-mortem report, which requires special emphasis and is noted hereinbelow:-
“On External Examination – Ligature mark found in the upper part of the neck which is wider in left side extending from left angle of mandible to right up to posterior part of the right pinna having size-7" × 1" which is prominent in left side progressively diffusing in right side. Abrasion on the both side of the shoulder of size-2" × 2". 
On Internal Examination –Head-Meninges and brain tissue congested and intact.
Neck – Subcutaneous Haemorrhage found underlying the ligature mark mentioned above. Trachea congested. Thyroid xxx(illegible) cricoid cartilage intact. …. In my opinion, the cause of death is Asphyxia due to hanging.
Caused by – Ligature material. Time elapsed since death within 18 hrs to 36 hrs from the time of P.M. Examination.”
Apparently, thus, the position of the muscles underneath the ligature mark was found with subcutaneous haemorrhage and the trachea was congested.
As per medical jurisprudence by Modi, in cases of death by asphyxia, where subcutaneous haemorrhage is found in the muscles underlying the ligature mark, the same would be suggestive of manual strangulation rather than hanging. In sheer ignorance of the symptoms underneath the ligature mark, the medical jurists expressed an opinion that the cause of death was asphyxia due to hanging.

During the course of investigation, the father-in-law of the deceased, Jaga Sahani, and the mother-in-law of the deceased, Shri Devi, were granted pre-arrest bail by the Supreme Court vide order dated October 14, 2024 passed in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9716 of 2024. The police, after investigation, filed a partial chargesheet only against the father-in-law of the deceased, Jaga Sahani, and the mother-in-law of the deceased, Shri Devi, for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 306 read with Section 34 IPC. The jurisdictional Magistrate, vide order dated November 18, 2025 proceeded to take cognizance and directed summoning of Devlal Sahani, Anandi Devi and Prince Sahani, i.e., the petitioners herein. The petitioners herein, approached Patna High Court apprehending their arrest in connection with the FIR. Such application preferred by the petitioners was rejected by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh, the Single Judge vide order dated August 6, 2026 whereupon the petitioners approached the Supreme court by way of the special leave petition. 

Earlier, in Devlal Sahani & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Singh had passed a 2-page long order dated August 6, 2026, wherein, he concluded:" 4. Considering the nature of accusation, the prayer for anticipatory bail of petitioners is rejected." The petitioners had approached the High Court apprehend their arrest in Chiraiya P.S. Case No. 343/2023, registered for offence punishable under Sections 304-B, 34 of the Indian Penal Code. As per F.I.R., the daughter of informant was married with co-accused Laxmi Sahani in the year 2018 and from the wedlock, one male child was born and thereafter, due to illness, Laxmi Sahani died in the year 2019. It is alleged that after death of Laxmi Sahani, daughter of informant was married with younger brother of Laxmi Sahani namely Princi Sahani (petitioner no. 2) and from the wedlock, one male child was also born, but thereafter, due to some family feud, it is alleged that all the named accused persons including these petitioners committed torture & cruelty with daughter of informant and ultimately, committed her murder by pressing her neck. Petitioner no.1 is elder brother-in-law (tsB) and petitioner no. 3 is sister-in-law (tsBkuh), whereas petitioner no. 2 is husband of the deceased.

Supreme Court requests Justice Purnendu Singh to expedite hearing of bail cancellation application of Harsh Narayan Jha, a resident of Benipati, Madhubani in a murder case

In Harsh Narayan Jha vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Prasanna B. Varale passed a 2-page long order dated October 1, 2026, wherein, it refused to interfere with the impugned orders passed by Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court and the dismissed the Special Leave Petition with the observation "However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we request the High Court to expedite the hearing of the application being Criminal Miscellaneous No.19997/2026."

In Harsh Narayan Jha vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court passed a 4-page long order dated May 8, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"4. Upon perusal of the materials available on record, it appears that the specific allegation of committing assault resulting in death is primarily attributed against co-accused Sonu Jha. It further appears that while passing order in Cr. Misc. No. 2918 of 2025, this Court had taken into consideration the period of custody of Opposite Party No. 2, as well as, the nature of allegations while enlarging him on bail. However, serious allegations have now been raised regarding suppression of criminal antecedents and threat perception to the petitioner, who is the father of the deceased. In such circumstances, this Court deems it proper to direct the Superintendent of Police, Madhubani to furnish a detailed report, as to whether, after release on bail, Opposite Party No. 2 has committed any other offence and also to provide details of all criminal cases in which Opposite Party No. 2 has been made accused along with the final outcome/status of such cases. The Superintendent of Police, Madhubani shall also verify the allegation made on behalf of the petitioner regarding threat perception and, if found true, shall ensure adequate protection to the petitioner and his family members. 5. The Superintendent of Police, Madhubani is directed to file an affidavit/report before the learned District Court in respect of the aforesaid information. The learned District Court shall also submit a report explaining as to why the trial is still at a very initial stage. 6. Re-notify on 19.06.2026 among the top ten cases."The Opposite Party No. 2 is Mohd. Javed @ Barababoo. 

The petitioner's counsel had submitted that the application was filed under section 483(3) of the BNSS for cancellation of bail granted to Opposite Party No. 2 in connection with Benipatti P.S. Case No. 119 of 2024 registered under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, relating to the brutal murder of the petitioner’s son, namely Munna Jha. He submitted that the petitioner’s son was taken away by the accused persons and thereafter brutally assaulted and murdered in furtherance of their common intention, thereafter his body was thrown beneath the Bachhraha river bridge with an intention to conceal the offence. It was submitted that Opposite Party No. 2 is specifically named in the F.I.R. with attributed overt acts and the postmortem report corroborates the prosecution case by disclosing multiple ante-mortem injuries caused by hard and blunt substance resulting in haemorrhage and shock. He also submitted that while granting bail, the Sessions Judge erroneously recorded that Opposite Party No. 2 was not named in the F.I.R., though a bare perusal thereof would demonstrate otherwise, and such factual misstatement materially affected the exercise of judicial discretion while granting bail. The counsel further submitted that despite the specific direction issued by the High Court in Cr. Misc. No. 2918 of 2025 for  verification of criminal antecedents, the trial court failed to properly consider the antecedents of Opposite Party No. 2. Opposite Party No. 2 is a habitual offender having involvement in several serious criminal cases including robbery, illegal possession of arms and excise offences, and at least four criminal cases pending against him were deliberately concealed while seeking bail. On these grounds, counsel submitted that the impugned order granting bail is fit to be set aside and the bail granted to Opposite Party No. 2 be cancelled. 

On June 19, 2026, Justice Singh passed a 2-page long order, wherein, he directed the petitioner to file a supplementary affidavit within a period of two weeks, annexing all relevant materials and documents evidencing the steps taken by the informant (petitioner) in support of his prayer for cancellation of bail granted to Mohd. Javed @ Barababoo, the Opposite Party No. 2. The petitioner was also directed to submit a fresh representation before the Superintendent of Police and the concerned SHO, with a copy duly forwarded to the Director General of Police, Bihar, so that appropriate action may be taken after verification of the allegations made in such representation. The order was passed upon hearing the informant/petitioner's counsel informed the High Court that the petitioner was being subjected to threats and that such conduct constitutes sufficient ground for seeking cancellation of the bail granted to the Opposite Party No. 2. It was also submitted that immediately after receiving such threats, the petitioner had informed the Superintendent of Police, as well as, the concerned SHO that, after being enlarged on bail by the High Court, the miscreants are bent upon to kill the petitioner.

Justice Singh's 1-page long order dated July 31, 2026 recorded that the petitioner's counsel informed the High Court that a Special Leave Petition (Criminal) has been filed before the Supreme Court and it was registered under Diary No. 42030 of 2026 dated July 16, 2026 and it was expected that the same will be notified soon. The order reads:"2. Considering the aforesaid information brought on record on behalf of the petitioner, let this matter be listed after final adjudication of the SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court."